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To: Mr. Justice Powell

From:

In Re:

Mary

No. 81-2101, Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman

-----
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----.-r
,
-~
-~
~
....___----:--_

You asked for a brief memo before Conference explaining why
the state-law basis for the lower courts' decision in Pennhurst does
not cause problems with No. 80-1429, Youngberg v. Romeo.

When

Justice Brennan raised the state law point earlier in Romeo, the

tha~e

point he found persuasive was
only claim in Romeo is a
t(
,,
damage claim. According to Romeo's counsel at oral argument, the

--------

damage claim could not have been breought originally as a pendent
stat~~aw

claim because of the then-existing Pa. soverign immunity

law ~he

damage claim now would be barred by the state statute of

limitations.

Tr. of Oral Arg. in Romeo, at 36.

In contrast,

Pennhurst, state-law did provide a basis for relief.
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CA 3 (en bane) (Gibb ~
Aldi er , ~eis, ~g~ 1nbotham
Slovi ter; Seitz, Hunter, .,....Garth .
dissenting i~c: art)
~.

4

HOSPITAL, ~

~C)lC-

v.

HALDERMAN,

SUMMARY:

(1)

Timely

Federal/Civil

~

.

Whether the Eleventh

or comity
-injunctive relief

Am ~dment

,......

concerns prevents a federal court from ordering

,,

~

against state officials solely on the basis of a pendent state
law claim.

(2~

Whether it was proper to appoint a special

master to, at least, "monitor" compliance with court orders.
FACTS & PROCEEDINGS:

This case was commenced by a class of

retarded citizens alleging that conditions at the Pennhurst State
School and Hospital were unsanitary, inhumane, and dangerous, and
that these conditions (1) violated federal constitutional rights,

Grot..J.

\{e '1 I m,4Dr~ ....t

~,.,.( ··..r...-, '}<.¢rh'ons. 1<. r;:.

.)
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-/
violated two federal statutes, and (3) violated state law.
The DC held that all three of the above basis gave residents a
IJ

\\

right to minimally adequate habilitation and were violated by
existing conditions.

The DC ordered sweeping injunctive relief.

On appeal, CA 3 (en bane) affirmed that mentally retarded
persons were entitled to appropriate treatment in the least
restrictive setting under the Developmentally
and Bill of Rights Act, 42

u.s.c.

Disabl~ Assistance

§6010(12) and (2). The court
II

also held that

~tate

l aw gave retarded persons a right to

\\

habilitation.

The Court did not reach the question of what

.

rights were guaranteed by the Constitution and Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of of 1973.

The DC's injunctive relief was

modified. 1
This Court reversed the CA's holding that the
Developmentally Disabled Act afforded retarded persons a right to
habilitation in the least restrictive setting.
School & Hospital v. Haldermanm, 451

u.s.

Pennhurst State

1 (1981).

Because of

uncertainty over whether the state law grounds independently
supported the relief granted, the state law issue, along with the
·"

undecided federal and constitutional issues, were remanded for
reconsideration.
DECISION BELOW:

.,e
On remand from this Court, the en bane

1The DC ordered, inter alia, that Pennurst eventually be
closed, that suitable community living arrangements be made for
all Pennhurast residents, and that individual treatment plans be
developed. The CA deleted the requirement that Pennhurst be
closed.

-3-

third circuit unanimously_ held that state law, as recently
interpreted by
(1981), accords

t~e

Su~; , -:;:=- re ~c..hmi dt,

Pa.

ret ~~e ~t;;._:

least restrictive setting.
......

~

_!.ight

t~

429 A. 2d 631

I

hab.!,litation_ in the

State law, therefore, supported the

CA's earlier judgment and relief.
TheCA also was unanimous in rejecting petr's argument that

-...

I I

''

the Eleventh Amendment barred the court of appeals from granting
injunctive relief on a pendent state law claim. The court relied
on Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 213

u.s.

175 (1909),

.

which held that lower federal courts ......could entertain pendent
state law claims not otherwise within their jurisdiction in order
to implement the longstanding rule that a federal court should
rely upon a state law interpretation rather than decide a federal
constitutional question.

Sice Siler involved an action against

state officials, there cannot be an Eleventh Amendment exception
to the rule regarding pendent claims. 2
Finally, the Court of Appeals did not reconsider objections
to the use of a special master as part of the relief ordered.
Three judges (Garth, Seitz, Hunter) dissented on this point,
noting JUSTICE WHITE's dissent in Pennhurst labelled the special
master as a "far-reaching remedy," "inconsistent with [the

2The court also held that dismissal under the Younger
doctrine was not required because there was no pending state
proceeding. Neither was Pullman abstention warranted in light of
the Pa. Sup. Ct's definitive construction of state law in In re
Schmidt. "We reject [the] suggestion [that] we should completely
unglue this several year-old case and start all over so that the
Penn. Sup. Ct. can tell us again."

,..

-4federal statutory] approach." 451
CONTENTIONS:

(1)

u.s. , at

54-55.

Eleventh Amendment:

Petr argues the

-

Eleventh Amendment bars a federal court from ordering stgte

----

officials to undertake costly and intrusive relief under state

-

law.

The central premise of Ex Parte Young, 209

u.s.

123 (1908)

i s that state officials cannot evade responsibility when their

conduct "comes into conflict with the supreme authority of the
Constitution." 209

u.s.

at 159.

It does not suggest that federal

courts may also force state officials to conform their conduct to
the authority of state law.

The CA does not avoid deciding

constitutional issues in this manner; it simply substitutes an
Eleventh Amendment issue for a Fourteenth Amendment one.

Siler

v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., supra, provides merely that
the rule of avoiding constitutional decisions "is not departed
from without important reasons." 213

u.s.

at 193.

Although Siler

was a suit against state officials under state law, the case
involved no "liability which must be paid from public funds in
the state treasury" and the Eleventh Amendment was neither raised
nor discussed.

Where the relief sought puts the federal court in
'

the business of overhauling state programs, and insisting upon

"

appropriations to fund the effort, a different result is
required.

Edelman v. Jordan, 415

______

u.s.

651 (1974), allows

prospective relief
not because there is no disruptive efect on
__,
state finances, but because, despite its disrputive effect, it is
a necessary price for the supremacy of federal law.

There is no

reason to exact that price so federal courts can enforce state
law.

.
'
'•

-5Resps (including the United States, which is a plaintiffintervenor), main answer is that Siler, supra, implicitly
rejected any Eleventh Amendment argument in establishing that
federal courts have power to decide state law claims against
state officials.
reaffirmed.

u.s.

The reasoning of Siler has been frequently

E.g., Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Greene, 244

499, 508 (1917); Hagans v. Lavine, 415

(1974).

u.s.

528, 546-547

Moreover, Edelman makes clear that prospective relief

which has fiscal consequences on the state is not barred.
Resolving state law issues avoids unnecessary constitutonal
decisions, while leaving state legislaturtes free to reconsider
the underlying law.
Resps also advance a number of secondary arguments:

the

United States is a plaintiff against which the Eleventh Amendment
cannot be plead; county defendants in the case are not immunized.
In reply, petrs note that resps rely almost entirely on old
cases making no mention of the Eleventh Amendment and pre-date
this Court's limitations on the role of federal courts in
overseeing state activities.
:

(2) Comity:

,

Petr contends that the doctrine of comity

prevents a federal court from interfering in the management of
state programs solely on the basis of state law.

Federal courts

must be mindful of the delicacy between federal equitable power
and state administration of its own law. Rizzo v. Goode, 423
362, 378 (1976).

u.s.

Even when federal rights are at stake, federal

courts must avoid undue interference with legitimate state
activity.

Younger v. Harris, 401

u.s.

37 (1971); Alabama Public

-6Service comm'n v. Southern Ry Co., 341 . u.s. 341 (1951); Buford v.
Sun Oil Co., 319

u.s.

315 (1943) ••

no federal interests are at stake.

That is even truer here where
Here CA 3 revealed

"eagerness, not reluctance, to bring federal power to bear on
local rights."

The reluctance to address constitutional

questions should be less than the reluctance to use state law to
interfere with state fiscal operations.

The effect of the

decision will be to give federal courts more power over state
programs and displace the authority of state courts. 3
Resp Halderman argues that the comity question was not
argued before the Court of Appeals and should not now be
considered.

The SG in response stresses that the doctrine of

pendent jurisdiction itself incorporates principles of comity by
establishing appropriate limitations on the exercise of that

u.s.

715.

further limitation in the name of comity is required.

The

jurisdiction.

United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383

No

federal claims in this case are non-frivolous, and the applicable
state law is clear and settled.

As long as the federal claims

are not makeweights designed to invoke jurisdiction, it is
entirely appropriate to decide the case on state law grounds.
Resps also argue that comity is better served by deciding state
law issues open to state revision than by forcing an irrevocable
federal law judgment upon the state.

Finally, the one case

3 Petr suggests that faced with the instant case, the Pa.
courts might decide the issue differently than In re Schmidt,
which involved services for a single person.

..

-7-

..

suggested to be in conflict, Smith v. Sullivan, 611 F.2d 1039 (CA
5 1980), is entirely consistent.
(3) Special Master:

The use of two special masters, one to

hold hearings for members of the Resp class, and the other to
approve and disapprove plans for the residents, is a massive
displacement of sta te authority over it s own institutions.

As

the dissenters in Pennhurst stated, and the majority agreed, 451

u.s.

at 30, n.23, the appointment of special masters was a "far-

reaching remedy" and "the court should not have assumed the task
of managing Pennhurst."

451

u.s.

at 54.

Other courts have

recognized that the appointment of a special master is an
extraordinary remedy and inappropriate in that it was not the
least restrictive means of achieving the government's interest.
United States v. City of Parma, 661 F.2d 562 (CA 6 1981).
Resps emphasize that the DC has subsequently modified the
order of relief, specifying that the special master is only to
"monitor" compliance with the court orders.

The special master

no longer is charged with any planning, organizing or supervising
obligations.

The hearing master only conducts a hearing if

requested, and such hearings have been relatively rare.

It

..

lS

"

also suggested that the propriety of a hearing master is not
properly before the Court because the order establishing the
hearing master was not appealed and the issue is not addressed by
the CA.
Petr replies that the DC's recent order is merely a
linguistic clarification:

"Whether it be called 'monitoring' or

'supervising' or 'directing,' the fact remains that the Special

Master is [placed] at the core of the administration of the state
/

program."
DISCUSSION:

This petn raises fundamental questions

concerning the proper role of federal courts in ordering
significant injunctive relief on pendent state law claims.

All

~

three issues reflect this general concern.
First, the Siler decision did not involve the Eleventh
Amendment.

Moreover, subsequent decisions relying on Siler did

not confront Eleventh Amendment considerations.
Lavine, supra.

E.g., Hagans v.

Although Siler stands for the principle that

state law claims should be resolved prior to constitutional
issues, that rule normally does not come into conflict with other
important interests.
enough presented:

Here it does.

The

~sue

appears cleanly

the presence of the United States as a

plaintiff is important for federal claims, but should not be
relevant on state causes of action; the presence of some county
defendants does not legitimize the adjudication and relief
ordered against state officials.
Second, the

S£mitz_ ar ~ment

is also substantial.

The

Younger, Pullman, and Buford abstention doctrines reflect
interests.

,

.
these

These interests are not identical to those accounted

for in the standards that govern when a federal court should
decide a pendent state law claim.
supra.

Gibbs v. United mine Workers,

Although the Court of Appeals did not discuss comity, it

did consider whether Younger or Pullman abstention was in order.
Given that consideration, I believe the comity issue is suitably
presented for this Court to review.

Petr's make too much of the

~

-9-

passing statement in the fifth circuit's Smith decision that a
"violation of state law, without more, will not justify federal
judicial intervention:" this does not reflect a considered
position on the fundamental issue presented in this petn. "
Third, even if there authority is limited to "monitoring"
compliance with federal court orders, special masters arguably·
represent an unwarranted interference with state institutions
when the sole basis for intervention is state law.
masters, of course, have broader powers.

The hearing

Although the failure to

appeal the order establishing hearing masters might bar review
onf their approrpiateness as a remedy to a federal violation,
that is not the issue here.

The hearing masters were initially

ordered as relief for a federal violation: because the opinion
below carried over that relief as appropriate for the state law
violation, it is open for review whether such relief is
appropriate when only a state law violation has been found.
Because of the importance of these issues, I recommend a
GRANT.
There are 3 responses, two amicus briefs recommending a
grant, 4 and a reply.

June 11, 1982

Singer

Opn in petn

4The amicus brief filed by the State of New York only
argues the speical master issue. A separate amicus brief on
behalf of 17 states supports petrs in entirety.

.
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June 17, 1982

Alexander L. Stevas, Clerk
United States Supreme Court
1 First Street N.E.
Washington, D.C. 20543
Re:

Pennhurst State School and
Hospital v. Halderman~ No. 81-2101
(Petition for Certiorari Pending)

Dear Mr. Stevas:
Pending before the Court is a certiorari petition in this case.
I represent the Halderman respondents.
The third question presented relates to petitioners' objections
to appointment of a master to monitor implementation. Appellees
have explained that the issue is moot due to an intervening district
court order.
I received yesterday documents which bear on this issue. The
master has proposed to the Court a continued budget reduction (44%
in staff costs over last year), with total monthly requests decreasing
more than 60% from July to December, 1982 (from $40,217 to $15,191).
Although the issue is moot and, we feel~ inappropriate for certiorari,
it seems proper to bring this new information to the Court's attention ' ~
because of petitioners' allegations of expense and intrusiveness. The
fact is that the already limited monitoring role of the master continues
to diminish.
Because our in forma pauperis motion is pending~ we have not
printed this new material. If it should be presented in some way other
than the nine enclosed copies, please let me know.

DF/esj
- Enclosure
cc:

All Counsel

OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL MASTER
FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT

649 5 . HENDERSON ROAD

(21 Sl 26S-540 1

2ND FLOOR

(8001 362 - 0352

KING OF PRUSSIA . PA 19406

June 11, 1982

Honorable Raymond J. Broderick
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
10613 United States Courthouse
601 Market Street
Philade1phi~, Pennsylvania
19106

••

Dear Judge Broderick:
Enclosed is the proposed budget for operation of the Special Master's
Office for the period July 1 through December 31, 1982. Please note that the
budget reflects a 35% reduction in staff costs from the current six-month
period, and a 44% reduction in staff costs budgeted for the six-month period
a year ago. I would project further reductions in costs for the second half
of the fiscal year, assuming the Commonwealth continues provision of CourtMandated protections relating to IHP review/approval and on-site monitoring
of community programs.
If you have any questions about this budget submission, please let me

know.
Sincerely,

Carla S. Morgan
Special Master
CSM:mfp
Enclosure
cc:

All Counsel
Jeff Stemple

OFFICE OF TilE SPEClAL MASTER
PROPOSED BUDGET
JULY 1 - DECEMBER 31, 1982
Personnel:
Case Manag~nertt Monitoring
Community Monitoring
Pennhurst Monitoring
Compliance Monitoring
Administrative, other
Secretary/Bookkeeper

$ 17,830
21,712
28,331
19,287
18,416
11,593
Sub-total

Social Security
Unemployment Insurance
Workmen's Compensation

$117,169
$

7, 792

3,500
2,000
Total Personnel

Other Costs:
Office Rental
Furniture Rental
Equipment Rental
Account a nt Fees
Staff Travel
Telephone
Office Supplies
Haintenance
Postage
Printing and Reproduction
Hiscellaneous

$

4, L,4o
4,200
3,6,00
4,500
6,100
9,000
3,000
1,800
1,400
1,500
150

Total Other

$ 39,690

Tot<1l Budget

$170,151

"

MONTHLY REQUESTS
JULY - DECEMBER, 1982
l.

')

July

$ 40,217

J\ugust

$ 37 '116

September

$ 31,895

October

$ 26,403

November

$ 19,329

December

$ 15,191
Total

$1.70' 151

-~

.,,

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on

---~rl=~-=--1_'1~,-'~q_g._~---------'

I served true and

correct copies of the foregoing on all parties by mailing them through
firs t c lass, postage pre-paid mail, to counsel at the following
addresses:
Thomas K. Gilhool, Esq.
Frank Laski, Esq.
1315 Walnut Street
16th Floor
Philadelphia, Pa. 19107

Steve Barrett, Esquire
Assistant Solicitor
Montgomery County Courthouse
Norristown, Pa. 19401

Thomas M. Kittredge, Esquire
2107 The Fidelity Building
Philadelphia, Pa. 19109

Adjoa Burrow, Esquire
U.S. Department of Justice
lOth and Pennsylvania NW
Washington, D.C. 20530

Pauline Cohen, Esquire
City Solicitor's Office
1500 Municipal Services Building
15th Street and JFK Blvd.
Philadelphia, Pa. 19107

Michael Lottman, Esquire
2100 Lewis Tower Building
225 South 15th St.
Philadelphia, Pa. 19102

Carla S. Morgan, Special Master
649 S. Henderson Road
King of Prussia, Pa. 19406
Herbert Newberg, Esquire
Widener Building, Suite 809
1339 Chestnut St.
Philadelphia, Pa. 19107
Robert Hoffman, Esquire
Deputy Attorney General
Department of Justice
16th Floor
Strawberry Square
Harrisburg, Pa. 17120
Pamela Cohen, Esquire
Suite 716
1701 Arch St.
Philadelphi~, Pa.
19103
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, / PENNJIURST STATE SCL;j HOSP

v~~

~ALDERMAN,

~A~~~ ~t.i.on

of Ij.espondents Halderman,

-r:--:-;-..?t~. to"Dismiss v~rit of Certiorari

0U-_u-c-4~·

, _ ~IlJ'royidently IOta~_

, et al. ( retarde

citizens)

CA 3

SUMMARY:

Resps (retarded citizens, plaintiffs) argue that because the DC

(ED Pa., Broderick) recently ordered the phasing out of the Special Master's
duties in this protracted litigation, this case is no longer appropriate for
cert review and $ould be dismissed as improvidently granted.
FACTS:

In 1977, resps were granted broad injunctive relief by the DC (ED

Pa.) which also ap[X)inted a Special Master to supervise the relief.
theCA 3 (en bane) affirmed the DC's order in
(3rd Cir. 1979).

substantial~rt.

On

appeal

jl2 F.2d 84

etJHK'f ~

cert review this Court concluded that theCA 3 had erred
I{
in concluding that the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights
Act (42

u.s.c.

On

§6010) provided substantive rights to resps.

It reversed and

remanded to the CA 3 for consideration of resp's state-law claim as well as
the undecided federal and constitutional issues.

451 U.S. 1 (1981).

~~-.~ -\k~~ ~ ~ ~.\o
~ ·~
~ ~~~~~ .,rc\ ~ ~ ~.J)
(4.

~'~

~~ ~.clk
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-------------..--

--

On remand the CA 3 (en bane) concluded that state law granted resps a

----right to habilitation in the least restrictive setting.

The court also

rejected petrs• claim that the Eleventh Amendment prevented federal injunctive
relief on a pendent state claim.

The court did not reconsider petrs•

objections to the DC's use of a special master.l

673 F.2d 647 (3rd Cir. 1982).

On June
the Court granted cert on the following questions:
___....... 21, ......,1982,
.........
(1)

Does the Eleventh Amendn~nt prohibit a federal
court from ordering state officials to undertake
costly and intrusive relief solely under state law?

(2)

Does the doctrine of comity prevent a federal court
from interfering in the management of state programs
solely on the basis of state law?

(3)

Is it a proper exercise of judicial power for federal
courts to maintain a special master and hearing master
to supervise decisions of state officials regarding
proper placement of retarded residents under state law?

----- -

-------

On August 12, 1982, the DC (ED Pa., Broderick), on its own motion, issued a

lengthy memorandllin opinion and order modifying its previous orders to the
extent that the special master's role is to be phased out by December 31,
1982.

Noting that it had always intended that the Special Master's role would

be temporary, the court observed that in many respects the Special Master was
duplicating petrs• (defendants) monitoring of conditions at Pennhurst.

The

court also stated that:
Although the monitoring reports compiled by the Office
of the Special Master indicate that the conditions at Pennhurst
have improved, unfortunately there continue to be reports of
incidents of unnecessary injury to and abuse of residents. See
Wbestendiek, Pennhurst Probe Finds Patient Abuse, Philadelphia
Inquirer, August 11, 1982 at 1-A, col. 1. In amending its
orders to eliminate the Office of the Special Master, it will
therefore be necessary for this court to establish additional
safeguards for those retarded persons remaining at Pennhurst.
This court's Order directing the phasing out of the
Office of the Special Master should not be interpreted as an
{M~ication that this court will be less vigilant in insisting
~ at the defendants comply with its Orders.
As the defendants

/r

..

lin dissent, several judges objected to the use of a special master.

II

lA

- 3 -

are now aware, the Court will not hesitate to take appropriate
remedial action whenever it finds that such action is necessary
to protect the members of the Pennhurst class. See, ~'
Memorandum of March 2, 1981; Memorandum of August 25, 1981 (533
F. supp. at 631); Memorandum of September 11, 1981 (526 F. supp.
414). (Slip op at 26-27).
CONTENTIONS:
review because:

Resps urge that this case is no longer worthy of cert
(1)

The DC's order constitutes "new law" because the Office

of Special Master will soon no longer exist.

(2)

Although the DC's actions

also constitutes new facts, the opinion itself contains heretofore unrevealed
facts, to wit:

The state petrs have made a conscientious effort to review

"individual habilitation plans" and have further reduced Pennhurst's
population.

(3)

The DC's order demonstrates severe retraction of its

intrusion into petrs' state affairs and petrs' position is now factual in
nature; the DC's 1978 order, which is the basis of this case, has been
substantially modified.

Thus, petrs' arguments center on the factual

questions of what power the DC is actually exercising.

(4)

Although the

questions presented have "great intellectual, constitutional and political
interest," this case has substantially changed and there is no basis for cert
review.
DISCUSSION:

Resps' arguments are not persuasive.

In eliminating the

role of the special master,2 the DC explicitly stated that it intended to
m:mitor petrs' efforts to- comply with the court's earlier orders and if
necessary take remedial action.

With removal (at least for the time being) of

the Special Master, question 3 is less attractive for cert review.

However,

it seems clear that the questions of applicability of the Eleventh Amendment
and the scope of the DC' s authority over state-law claims remain certworthy.
The motion to dismiss should therefore be denied.
No

9/30/82

response has been filed.
Schlueter

PJC
2The DC's op1n1on indicates that the •Hearing Master•s• role was
terminated in February 1982 (Slip op at 14).
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CHAMSERS OF"

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

February 4, 1983

Re:

No. 81-2101 - Pennhurst State School and Hospital
v. Halderman

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
One of the issues in this case -- namely whether the
district court properly appointed a Special Master to monitor
compliance with the district court's orders -- may possibly
be moot.
Under the terms of an order entered by the District
Court on August 12, 1982, the Special Master was to be
discharged as of December 31, 1982. Frank Lorson, who has
been in contact with the Solicitor General's office,
informs me that in fact, the Special Master's office was
disbanded at that time and no longer exists. Accordingly,
I suggest we request the parties to submit supplemental
briefs on the question of mootness.
Regards,
'

.

'

!fo8

''!

,·

-~-

., .

'"
-~

~

February 9, 1983

.~w-

'~-'

Jl'

81-2101 Pennhurst State School v.

.

~alderman

'·~.

,

Dear Chief:
I have no objection to requesting supple'ltental
briefs on the question of mootness.
.,·

l

Sincerely,
.,

.,

~.
~ '\\'

The Chief

•,

lfp/ss
....'

-~-

cc:

The Conference

,.,

.,,,.

.,

-~I

·,.::

'

,.
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BENCH MEMORANDUM
No. 81-2101:
Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman
From:

Mark

February 19, 1983

Questions Presented
1. Whether the Eleventh Amendment prohibits a federal court
from granting relief against state officials solely on the basis
of state law.
2. Whether the doctrine of comity prohibits a federal court
from granting equitable relief under state law .

...

3. Whether

it is proper for a federal court to use special

masters to supervise the decisions of state officials in carrying
out state law.

2.
I. Background
This case has a long and complex history, some of which may
be familiar to you.

In 1974 a Pennhurst resident sued Pennhurst,

the State Department of Public Welfare,

and numerous officials

based on the Fourteenth Amendment and on a Pennsylvania statute.
The Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Citizens (PARC)
vened and claimed violations of two federal statutes:
the Rehabilitation Act,

inter~

§504 of

and the Developmentally Disabled Ass is-

tance and Bill of Rights Act

("DD Act").

The United States in-

tervened in support of the constitutional claims.

b")t ~

In 1978 the

E£.

(Broderick, J., ED Pa.)

~·Pennhurst's ~v_e_r_y___e_x_i_s_t_e_n~ce

was unlawful.

in effect ruled that
Relying on a right of

"habilitation" and a right to treatment in the "least restrictive
environment" -- rights that were found

in the Fourteenth Amend-

ment, §504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and state law -- the court
ordered that Pennhurst be phased out and that its residents be
placed in "community living arrangments"

}jl
•

Special

Master

under

FRCP Rule 53

to

supervise, and monitor" the transition.
In 1979

the en bane CA3 affirmed

(CLAs).

"plan,

He appointed a

organize,

direct,

~~~
in part.

It

found

that

'7

both the DD Act and state law had been violated, and further held
that the DD Act required treatment in the least restrictive setting.

(It did not decide if this "least restrictive" requirement

also was provided by state law, nor did it decide the Fourteenth
Amendment or §504 issues.)

The court vacated, however, the order

that

finding

Pennhurst

be

closed,

that none of

relied on by plaintiffs required such a result.

the provisions
In response, the

' ,,

,.·

3.

,.

1

DC ordered that an l ndividual habilitation plan ("IHP"), including a designation of the appropriate living arrangement, be drawn
up for each resident
by a team made up of the resident, his par__._.,.....
ents or guardian, and Pennhurst officials.
ing Master was created for

The position of Hear-

the purpose of review of individual

IHPs when requested by the resident or his parents. 1
the DD Act

This Court reversed in
did not require

e "'appropriate treatment' in

the 'least restrictive setting.'"

451

u.s.

1, 24-25 (1981).

joined Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court.
dissented

but

criticized

DC's "impos[ition of]

a far-reaching remedy,

...

the appointment

of

to decide which of

Special

the

statutory

Justice White

interpretation,

a

on

You

Master

the Pennhurst

the

inmates

should remain and which should be moved to community-based facilities . . • .

[T]he court should not have assumed the task of man-

aging Pennhurst or to decide in the first instance which patients
should remain and which should be removed."
On remand CA3

found

Id. at 54.

that the DC' s prior

ported completely by Pennsylvania law.

judgment was sup-

t f1- 3

~
~

Section 4201 of the Penn-

sylvania Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966 pro-

~~~

vides:
"The department of [Public Welfare] shall have
power, and its duty shall be:

-

shd:i~
~

1 rn No. 81-2363, which is being held for this case, state
officials challenge a contempt judgment rendered by the DC after
the Pennsylvania legislature refused to fund the Hearing Master.
The DC fined the officials $10,000 per day, an amount used to
fund tn e Hearing Master.
~
/

~·

4.

th~
'
7 ~
- ~,A-.,_. C.J,,1 ·-- . r[A..

(1) To assure within the State
ability and equitable provision of
equate
mental health and mental retardation
. s
for all persons who ne ~ ~ ·~

in 1979 CA3

l

ha~in~hether

this provision

~

created~

substantive right to treatment in the "least restrictive environ-

ment.

f

S~ rf'

,.tV

But prior to CA3 Is

II

s..:_~

dec ~ on,

the Pennsylvania Su-,

~~

GA~~
s~

preme Court construed this section to mean "that the least re-

str_:; tion consistent with adequate treatment and required care
~ 1 ~ e employed."

~'A~

~Y~~

_.

29 A.2d 631, 636 (Pa. 1981).

efore, CA3 conclude
'f eet -- the DC could

~f.). could

order that

~~vironment."

~~
id
~'

~t

e original decision remained cororder that Pennhurst be closed, but it

e~

be placed in the "least restrictive

(Since it decided the case on state-law grounds,

not reach the remaining federal statutory and

constitu~~,,
1~
~

tiona! issues.)
CA3 rejected the defendants'

argument that either the Elev-

enth Amendment or the doctrine of abstention prevented the federal DC from deciding the state-law question.
ity held

that

the propriety of the

Master was not before the court.
dissented

Finally, the major-

appointment of the Special

Judges Seitz, Hunter, and

Garth ~

They argued that the use of a master to

supervise compliance with state law was an abuse of discretion.
Judge Aldisert agreed in principle, but concurred in the judgment
because
egg."

there

"is

simply no way of unscrambling

this

judicial

(Pet. App. 33a.)
This Court granted cert on all three issues presented.

~--------------~----------------------~------_.-

In-

eluded among the petitioners is the Pennhurst Parent-Staff Association, which intervened in CA3.

••~1

An amicus brief in support of

~

5.

--

petrs has been filed by 24 States.
briefs:

PARC;

Halderman;

and

There are three respondents'
{154 pp.

the United States.

of

resps 1 briefs!)

II. Discussion
The issues

They also are ex-

in this case are difficult.

ceedingly important.

--"'"

Their resolution will have a large impact

~

on whether

suits

against state officials are

court or federal court.

---

brought

in state

At this point my judgment remains some-

--

what tentative, but I recommend that CA3 be affirmed.

A. Pendant Jurisdiction
I

.

"'
,e;_,-~~ ~

?~~~N~ L~ ''.JA~-i~~:l-~

-= ·;;z_~ £::i4

begin by observing

that this was a proper case for

the

exercise of pendant jurisdiction {apart from any specific Eleventh Amendment or

u.s.

comity concerns) •

In Hagans v.

Levine,

415

528 {1974), you wrote in dissent that "as a matter of common

sense and in light of deeply rooted notions of federalism,
the federal claim must have more than a glimmer of merit and must
continue to do so at least until substantial judicial resources
have been committed to the lawsuit."
case.
right

The

federal

to treatment

statutory and

Id. at 552.

This is such a

constitutional grounds

for

a

in the "least restrictive environment" were

substantial, at least until this Court's decisions in Pennhurst I
and Youngberg v.

Romeo,

102 S. Ct.

2452

{1981).

By that time,

there had been a commitment of "substantial judicial resources"
to the case.
In addition, this is a case where it makes particular sense

l

~

6.
to decide the state issue before the constitutional issue. 2

--

If

the residents of Pennhurst have specific rights under state law,
(_

it is better to resolve the case on that ground rather than to

~----------------~-----------------------------

try to define a person's minimum substantive due process rights,

-------------~~-------------------------------------

including the question of a right to a particular type of treatment setting.

As you well know, that type of federal constitu~

tional decision is not an easy one to reach.

Cf. Romeo.

B. The Eleventh Amendment Question
(1) There is a threshold question that unfortunately is not
free

from doubt.

officials,

not

Most of

state

Eleventh Amendment

the petitioners are county and city

officials.

does

not

The

apply

Court

to many

has
state

held

that

the

subdivisions,

depending on an analysis of the particular status of the entity
under state law.
429

u.s.

274,

280

See Mt. Healthy City Board of Educ. v. Doyle,
(1977).

If

the Eleventh Amendment does not

protect these local officials from suit,
order might be valid even

if

then much of the DC's

the Eleventh Amendment barred an

injunction against the state officials.
Petrs

assert

that

local

officials

are . protected

by

the

2 It is a more difficult question whether a federal court
should resolve a case on a pendant state-law basis rather than a
federal statutory basis. One might argue that a federal court
normally should construe a federal statute prior to deciding a
question of state law. Here CA3 could have reached the remaining
issue under the DD Act, as well as the §504 issue, before turning
to state law. On the other hand, it was apparent to CA3 that the
state-law ground provided the most comprehensive relief, so that
it would have been necessary in any event to reach the state-law
question.

,.f.,

•

7.
Eleventh Amendment if the result of the .lawsuit is to force the
state to pay out money.
234

(CA7 1978}.

See, e.g., Carey v. Quinn, 588 F.2d 230,

I have not had time to research this question

fully, nor to analyze the status of the county defendants in this
case.

Apparently Pennsylvania does provide the funding

for

the

CLAs, so that the effect of the injunction falls primarily on the
state

treasury.

these officials.

Thus,

the

/

Eleventh

Amendment

might

apply

to

The applicability of the Amendment to officials

of state subdivisions may be an important issue in its own right,
however, so further consideration may be necessary.

(2}

Petrs'

Eleventh Amendment argument

is straightforward.

The reason this Court has permitted state officials to be sued in
federal court, see Ex Parte Young, 209

u.s.

123

(1908},

is that

-

the Eleventh Amendment may not be used as a shield when officials'
of

conduct "comes into conflict with the superior authority

the Constitution."

however,
on

Id.

at

159-160.

This

rationale

fails,

to justify permitting a federal court to decide a case

state-law

grounds.

Therefore,

the

"fiction"

that

a

suit

against state officials is not a suit against the state should be
limited to the situation where a

federal ground of decision is

rendered.
Resps
tion.

rely primarily on the doctrine of pendant jur isdic-

The doctrine derives from Siler v. Louisville & Nashville

R.R., 213 U.S. 175 (1909} --a suit against state officials.

In

neither that case nor subsequent cases has the Court suggested
that

the Eleventh Amendment

is a

bar

to pendant

jurisdiction.

8.
See,

e.g., Hagans v.

Levine,

supra

(a s .u it against state offi-

cials in federal court on federal and state grounds, without the
Eleventh Amendment being raised).

Moreover, the Court has empha-

sized the importance of pendant jurisdiction as a means of avoiding

unnecessary

resolution

of

Just last Term,

in Schmidt v.

102 S. Ct.

(1982),

2612

federal

constitutional

issues.

Oakland Unified School District,

the Court held that it was an abuse of

discretion for CA9 to resolve a

lawsuit on a

federal consti tu-

tional ground prior to reaching a state-law ground.
firmative action plan is

"If the af-

invalid under state law, the Court of

Appeals need not have reached -the federal constitutional issue."
Id.
In resolving
that

resps

are

this conflict of doctrines,

wrong

in

suggesting

that

I

note initially

pendant

jurisdiction

Under

resps'

broad

theory of pendant jurisdiction, once a litigant raises a single
claim that is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment, the federal
court could acquire pendant
even one

for

jurisdiction over any other claim,

damages against the state

held otherwise.

itself.

The Court has

u.s.

651 (1974), the

In Edelman v. Jordan, 415

Court held that it was proper for a DC to have exercised pendant
jurisdiction over a statutory claim, id. at 653 n.l, but that the
Eleventh

~J
~

Amendment

barred

relief on the claim,

id.

the

court

at 677.

from

granting

retroactive

Edelman thus stands for

the

proposition that the Eleventh Amendment imposes a bar on federal

~ judicial
This

--

power

e~n :h:re-;::;:n,tj~ s~ iction

-,

means

that

the

only

real
........

~

question
w

.............

exists.
in

this

case

is

~---------------

9.
whether

the

Eleventh

Amendment

---

does

bar

a

federal

court

from

granting injunctive relief against state officials on the basis

----

of state law.

this question has force.

Ex

with Edelman, creates the "fiction" that a
relief against state officials is not a suit
This distinction was created as a means of
of federal law, a rationale that is ab-

suit decided under state law.

Therefore,

there is a

reasonable argument that the Court should limit the "fiction" to

~~)b.the cont~~ch it was created.
{/W ~~~ 1 :1: :ote that none of the
tj~

cases approving of pendant

jurisdiction in suits against state officials prevents the Court
from accepting petrs' argument, for none considered the Eleventh
Amendment.

"[W]hen questions of jurisdiction have been passed on

in prior decisions sub silentio, this Court has never considered
itself bound when a subsequent case finally brings the jurisdictional issue before us."
Thus,

Hagans v. Levine, 415

the Court would not need directly

u.s.

at 535 n.5.

to overrule any prior

decision to accept petr's view. 3

3Petrs argue that prior cases such as Siler can be
distinguished as resting on the fact that the state official
acted entirely without state-law authority.
In some prior cases
the ultra vires issue has been critical in determining whether
the Eleventh Amendment applied. E.g., Florida Dep't of State v.
Treasure Salvors, Inc., 102 S. Ct. 304 (1982). I do not think,
however, that resort to the ultra vires doctrine is necessary.
As I stated in text, petrs' Eleventh Amendment argument is not
foreclosed by precedent, and thus there is no reason to invent
means of distinguishing prior cases. If cases such as Siler need
to be repudiated in part, the Court should simply do so
forthrightly.

': ~I~~

~s- I/""L4tr- J.4,_f- .ru-

~~,~bf~~,~~~
~~~- ~ L4--,?,1~._,(,_.
•

~-~
1 thiM petrs' arguments

Nonetheless,

should

be

rejected.

1\

Although based significantly on a supremacy rationale, the

-

Youn ~ -

Edelman "fiction" also represents a view that it is the nature of
the

relief

~----...__.....-

that

is

crucial:

retroactive

relief

is

more

instrusive on state sovereignty than "merely" telling the state
(through its officials) what to do in the future.
cated

that

Edelman.

you

See

see

~ry

this

as

the

You have indi-

central meaning

of

v. White, 102 S. Ct. 2325, 2332

ELL, J., dissenting).

Young

(1982)

and
(POW-

If this is the critical concern underlying

the Eleventh Amendment, as interpreted by this Court, then there
is no reason to hold that the Eleventh Amendment bars a federal

--

court

......... ,.......

~---~-__...

under state law.

In other words,

if the relief granted is con-

sistent with the type of relief the Eleventh Amendment permits,
the only question is whether the federal court should be deciding
a

state-law

issue.

And

this

is

a

question

whose

resolution

should depend on the concerns underlying the pendant jurisdiction
doctrine.
This analysis, of course, is somewhat of a "fiction" itself;

1 ~J~ indeed,

~
IY'4

I do not think there is any resolution of this case that

•could rest on other than prudential considerations.
key

consideration

is

the

doctrine

questions should be avoided.

that

federal

For me,

~e

constitutional

This is an important principle of

judicial restraint, one that is particularly important as applied
to suits against state officials.
dural

and

The application of both proce-

substantive due process rights to state

and state programs continues to be difficult.

institutions

As I argued earli-

11.

er, it is far better to rely on

-----

~

~pecific

\'

state law rather than to

decide how Pennhurst, and the state mental treatment program in
general,

-

Clause.

might

This

be

operated

consistently

with

the

Due

Process

is precisely the reasoning that led the Court to

GVR in Schmidt v. Oakland Unified School District, supra:

rather

than decide the constitutionality of an affirmative action program -- a difficult task, as Bakke and Fullilove make clear -- ~~.A..
CA9 should have tried to resolve the case on state-law grounds.
Yet

under

petrs'

view,

if

the

Schmidt

case

had

been

brought

against state officials rather than school board officials,

the

Eleventh Amendment would have required the federal court to do
what

the Court

oth~erwi'se

said was an abuse of discretion:

go

immediately to the federal constitutional issue.
It can be argued that the proper response is for the plaintiff to bring his combined federal and state claims in a state
court, which as a court of general jurisdiction can decide all of
them.

I have two objections.

First, plaintiffs who prefer the

federal courts may simply decline to bring the state-law claims,
thus forcing the federal constitutional issue.

Second, I do not

think that plaintiffs should be required to make such a choice.
The point of Young was to permit plaintiffs to have a

federal

forum for bringing constitutional claims against state officials.
Prohibiting pendant jurisdiction over state claims against those
officials has the practical effect of partially undercutting that
purpose.

12.
I

C. Comity

~~ ~VfA..-~W~~
~ /1 ~

l

The argument here is that the principle of "comity"
a

federal court

law.

d.-.c.t.a.J.

prevents~

from compelling state expenditures under state

Petrs note that in Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n v.

McNary, 102
federal

s.

court

Ct. 177 (1981}, the Court held that comity bars a
from

deciding an action under

validity of a state tax system.

§1983 against

the

They also note that in Younger

v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971}, the Court held that, absent unusual circumstances, a federal court may not enjoin a state criminal
proceeding.

Petrs

want

an

analogous

holding

here:

federal

courts are barred in every case from granting equitable relief
against state officials on the basis of state law.
I

think

this

argument

-- which

was

not

raised

below 4

should be rejected.

In practical effect this view of "comity" is

identical to petrs'

Eleventh Amendment arguments:

of pendant jurisdiction would be inapplicab e
state officials

are

involved.

result is undesirable.
the

speci fie

bar

of

I

the doctrine

in cases in which

have already argued why

More important,

this

if the Court finds that

the Eleventh Amendment

is

inapplicable

in

these circumstances, I do not see how the Court nonetheless would
find that the general doctrine of comity prohibits the suit.

And

4 In CA3 petrs argued only that the federal court should
have abstained under Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 u.s. 496
(1941}, because the state-law 1ssue was novel and significant.
CA3's opinion discusses only this point, which is not raised in
this Court; there is no discussion of petrs' view that comity
entirely prohibits a federal court from granting equitable relief
against state officials under state law. Cert should not have
been granted on this issue.

13.
if the Court does find that the Eleventq Amendment applies, the
comity argument becomes unnecessary.
argument

as

restraint,

merely

a

of petrs'

restatement,

In sum, I view this comity
under

a general doctrine of
I

Eleventh Amendment argument.

prefer

to

resolve the case, either way, on that Amendment.

D. Use of Special Masters
There is a question of mootness here.
off ice has
Pending

The Special Master's

'----------------,

been eliminated,

supplemental

though the Hearing Master

briefing

on

this

question,

I

remains.

assume

the

issue is not moot.
Even if not technically moot, the

i~ e

masters is not well-suited for decision.

with respect to the

Petrs claim that both

the Special Master and Hearing Master have been exercising enormous control over the day-to-day operations of Pennhurst and over
the transfer of residents to CLAs.
made,

But these decisions have been

and would be impossible to undo.

whether the masters,

Moreover,

the question

and the DC itself, exercised too much con-

trol is a fact-bound question on which there is little this Court
could say.
The only issue that arguably is presented is whether it was
an abuse of discretion for the DC to have appointed
to exercise

~

~

masters

supervisory authority over the defendants'

pliance with the order.

On this question,

com-

I would say simply

that if the federal court properly resolved the state-law issue
./

and granted relief, I do not see why the court also could not use
a

master

to

oversee

compliance.

The

additional

intrusion

on

14.
state sovereignty is not that great.
typical practice for a

Appointing a master

is a

federal court in a complex institutional

litigation, and also is a permissible remedy under state law.
Accordingly,
issue.

I

would

recommend

that

the

Court

duck

this

The Court might suggest, as did CA3, that any prominent

-.._____/

role for masters in this type of situation should be disfavored.'
But the Court should conclude that there is no basis for deciding
now whether the particular actions taken by the DC constituted an
abuse of discretion.

I I I. Conclusion
I have recommended affirming CA3 completely.

That is both-

ersome, for the outcome in this case -- a federal court telling a
state
surely
#P'

institution how

it must act

~ ~ t_ s qguld
~

to comply with state law --

be avoided.

Yet I think this unfortu-

..........

nate outcome is an inevitable result of the institutional litigation that has become commonplace.
~

of two evils. ·

Moreover, it may be the lesser

If the state-law basis had to be ignored, the fed-

eral court likely still would have intervened in the management
~

,

of Pennhurst, perhaps on the exceedingly murky basis of the Due'
Process Clause.

/3u,f-

'f

pd-

~~~~-"~

~~~}~~~

~~~~~~

~N,o~~~.k~

•'

lfp/ss 02/21/83
81-2101 Pennhurst State School v. Halderman
This is an incomplete memo dictated primarily to
hel ~

me sort out more clearly the issues in this case.

I

have now read Mark's helpful bench memo, and draw upon it
as well as the briefs.
Following

I,

CA3

reaffirmed its prior decision on state law grounds.

The

Pennsylvania

our

statute,

remand

in

requiring

in

Pennhurst

general

terms

that

adequate provision be made for mental health patients, had
been construed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to mean
"that

the

treatment

least
and

restrictive

restriction

required

care

environment")

consistent
shall

be

accordingly,

with

adequate

employed"
though

("least

Pennhurst

should not be closed, the "least restrictive environment"
standard
living
CA3

requires

the

arrangements

also approved

state

for

each

to

designate

resident

appropriate

individually,

Fnd

the appointment of special masters to

supervise state officials in carrying out this mandate.
Pendant Jurisdiction
Under
this

was

a

jurisdiction

my dissenting view

proper
apart

case
from

for
any

the

in Hagans v.

Levine,

exercise

pendant

specific

of

11th

Amendment

,L. •

issue.

The

-----

"glimmers

-----

federal claims here were
of

merit".

They

far more than mere

had

been

sufficiently

substantive to result in the Pennhurst I litigation.

11th Amendment Issue
This
here.

is

the

basic

question,

and

one

that

is

The petitioners are both local and state officials,

but we do not need to determine which -

if any - are so

local as to be exempt from the 11th Amendment.
The state's view of Ex parte Young is that the
11th Amendment
conduct

of

not

not

state

to

be

officials

used as

a

conflicts

shield when
with

the

the

federal

The state then argues that this rationale

Constitution.
does

is

justify a

federal

court

in deciding

a case on

state law grounds.
Respondents
pendant

answer

that

this

case

is

here

is

jurisdiction,

on

fedeJral

~=-,""'--------

.

jurisdiction the Court
~

--------~----~~~~~~-

Mark's View of the 11th Amendment Issue
Mark
issue.
whether

would

affirm

CA3

on

the

11th

Amendment

~

He thinks the "only real question in this case" is
the

11th

Amendment

bars

a

federal

court

from

..

-------::
;;J

0

granting injunctive relief against state officials on the
basis of state law?
Mark
wrong

notes,

arguing

in

correctly,

that

eliminates

11th Amendment

that

11th

the

jurisdiction case.

Amendment

that

respondents

itself

pendant

jurisdiction

problem.

Edelman makes
apply

in

clear

a

pendant

It imposes a bar on federal

judicial

power whenever exercised,

does

are

but permits prospective relief

only.
The rationale for Mark's view - and it seems to
me

a

sound

is

one

Yeung/Edelman

is

that

that

the

the

combined

"nature of

effect

of

-

is

relief"

whether it is retroactive or prospective -

that

is the crucial

11th Amendment question.
In
doctrine

in

the

end,

this case,

in

applying

the

Yeung/Edelman

prudential considerations may

be

decisive.
Indeed,
doctrine that

the

key

consideration

may

be

the

federal constitutional questions should be

avoided, particularly where application of state law is an
alternative.

It is better to rely on specific state law

than to decide in this case, for example, what the federal

·.

----~~'"f.

Constitution

requires

mental hospitals.

with

respect

to

the

operation of

I had this problem in Romeo.

Comity
The state's comity argument is not substantial.
In effect, it is identical to its 11th Amendment argument.

f!h.d ~ t.~~ MU-'~
Special Masters

Aitno~

ni st of the parties and lawyers in this

case agree with the view Byron expressed in Pennhurst I,
namely,

that the DC went way too far

in the authority it

gave the special master and in effect decide what should
be

done

about

state

mental

master has now been discharged,
unscrambled.

But

hospitals.

the

special

and the "eggs" cannot be

A Hearing Master remains, and the issue with

respect to him may not be moot.
Perhaps all we need decide,

after making

c~ear

that the major problem has been eliminated, is that it is
quite

customary

for

matters to a master.

a

federal

court

to

refer

specific

The Hearing Master has nothing like

the oversight authority of the original masters.

'

' '

Argued 2/22/83

fL._!!':!-~~~

~~~~of~
77~ tiV( ~1/ d~,
/,~~~~~~~

~~frv'~J {~v~)
z. ~·-f ~~ /1~ ~ -'2A..~

~~'
~~q~~~~
~,5~~~~ (
~ ~ /lu~ h:> ~~~
.~~~~~~
~~~d.-~~~~~
~4_~'

k-<.-

~~~4rC4>~

-7>

~~

)--£u_

<;J4 Je,

~

~~~..[_

,J..
.

~

.if~. ~~~~&~

£-;c~J?-k~~~~~~

.

~~~~

.,

/lt}~(~fvP~t~~
k

~~ . L:v~~~
~~"--{~4~~a;:,~
'

"Th<-~~4 ~t~~~

.

~~~~~ ,, ~-& <.b-V~ JL.o ~

~

IDIJO

/<:IL t:_/z

~.

~~ · ~~

~.~4~~~~~~

~~~
~to~~~~,/

~ 1/~ ~·- n2Z4 ~-

~~~~~~'~~"

t-~s~·~.

fJ&-. ~~ ~~,to ~ ~

~

G- ~ NuA- ~~ PI :>JJf8l ~
~ ~Lf ful-~ ~,

S

~-4-,/(.~)
(~/l/U~~[A..,~ ~~
VI~~~~~~7

-

~~ -

~ r~~~~~ ~

~

~~~~~uf

~ ~.

-~ ~~.,p-~ ~

~4uv-~~~.

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 1.:~4-Lu.d/.
l/1~~~(1/~),

~

£::,4:. ~~~ -~,k.f~-

~
?7
.. ,

L

~~~- ·
~~4-v~~
~ 4- ~~/ ~fd- d-

fo-tl·

~~~ ~

~

- ~~-

~~~~~~~
.
.

~~-~- (~~)
-~~-h~~~~

J-d

t:..-f- ,.-(

~. ~ ; ~.

~.41 ~~~··4.~~~~

uv~

.

~Ft:vr+-(~)
~~

~~~L-c.L~ ~..

5~~~~~

'"· ..

,·

81-2101
No. _ _
__

Pennhurst v. Halderman

Conf. 2/25/83

The Chief Justice

P~~~~(~d~

~~~~~~
<--1-- ~4~/d~~

CJ!

Justice Brennan

Justice White

~

/? ~
~ jj'::f,~

'

~~·

~~.,~~~~...-~
j,

K

V

w~~~ht ~~
~~.
____.

Justice Marshall ·

t2.j..z ;:J(N

-

LJ-1(

~~1~
~ ~ ~-~~~~~~~

~~/S/?W~

0 r~k r~ ~ ~ r-:-~

·.

g~ ~t-~-k~~~~~

~'-'! l--td~~~~~''

~ ~·:..;-~, ~~~

~~ ~ ~ .;..kJ _.r~-t-e- ~.
~ ~~ ~~ 4:.- /2-~~4?<.41
c4:>

~

I

.;'

Justice Stevens ~ ~ .

IJ':f~ ~~~~

~~/~~~.

t!~~bU~~N~~~

Justice O'Connor

~

f~k,~~~~~~
wnd.A ~ RX) ~ k ~ ~-,
~ ~t- ~ lt!::f.~

~,

~~~~-HG&

·~~~~~~~~~
9f~~/l!f~~.. ~
~ ~a0 "' t-=- /J ~ w /f-1(. ~ ~~

~ -. ~~~ .e!e/. tdf.Hv ~~
~~ -.

lfp/ss 02/21/83
81-2101 Pennhurst State School v. Halderman
This is an incomplete memo dictated primarily to
held me sort out more clearly the issues in this case.

I

have now read Mark's helpful bench memo, and draw upon it
as well as the briefs.
Following

I,

CA3

reaffirmed its prior decision on state law grounds.

The

Pennsylvania

our

statute,

remand

in

requiring

in

Pennhurst

general

terms

that

adequate provision be made for mental health patients, had
been construed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to mean
"that

the

treatment

least
and

restrictive

restriction

required

environment") ,

should not be closed,
standard
living
CA3

care

requires

also approved

shall

be

~ccordingly,

with

adequate

employed"
though

("least

Pennhurst

the "least restrictive environment"

the

arrangements

consistent

state

for
the

each

to

designate

resident

appropriate

individually,

~~

appointment of special masters to

supervise state officials in carrying out this mandate.
Pendant Jurisdiction
Under
this

was

a

jurisdiction

my dissenting view

proper
apart

case
from

for
any

the

in Hagans v.

Levine,

exercise

pendant

specific

of

11th

Amendment

L. •

The

issue.

"glimmers

federal claims here were
of

merit".

They

far more than mere

had

been

sufficiently

substantive to result in the Pennhurst I litigation.

11th Amendment Issue
This
here.

is

the

basic

question,

and

one

that

is

The petitioners are both local and state officials,

but we do not need to determine which -

if any - are so

local as to be exempt from the 11th Amendment.
The state's view of Ex parte Young is that the
11th Amendment
conduct

of

state

not

not

to

be

officials

The state

Constitution.
does

is

justify a

used as

a

conflicts

shield when
with

the

the

federal

then argues that this rationale

federal

court

in deciding

a case on

state law grounds.

pendant

Respondents

answer

jurisdiction,

and

that
that

this
when

case

is

here

there

is

on

fedefal

jurisdiction the Court may apply federal law.
Mark's View of the 11th Amendment Issue
Mark
issue.
whether

would

affirm

CA3

on

the

11th

Amendment

He thinks the "only real question in this case" is
the

11th

Amendment

bars

a

federal

court

from

..)

.

granting injunctive relief against state officials on the
basis of state law?
Mark
wrong

in

notes,

arguing

correctly,

that

eliminates

11th Amendment

that

11th

the

jurisdiction case.

Amendment

that

respondents

pendant

jurisdiction

problem.

Edelman makes
apply

in

itself
clear

a

pendant

It imposes a bar on federal

j ud ic ial

power whenever exercised,

does

are

but permits prospective relief

only.
The rationale for Mark's view - and it seems to
me

a

sound

is

one

Young/Edelman

is

that

that

the

the

combined

"nature of

effect

of

-

is

relief"

whether it is retroactive or prospective -

that

is the crucial

11th Amendment question.
In
doctrine

in

the

end,

this case,

in

applying

the

Young/Edelman

prudential considerations may be

decisive.
Indeed,
doctrine that

the

key

consideration

may

be

the

federal constitutional questions should be

avoided, particularly where application of state law is an
alternative.

It is better to rely on specific state law

than to decide in this case, for example, what the federal

---------------------------------------~q.

Constitution

requires

mental hospitals.

with

respect

to

the

operation of

I had this problem in Romeo.

Comity
The state's comity argument is not substantial.
In effect, it is identical to its 11th Amendment argument.

Special Masters
Although most of the parties and lawyers in this
case agree with the view Byron expressed in Pennhurst I,
namely,

that the DC went way too far

in the authority it

gave the special master and in effect decide what should
be

done

about

state

mental

hospitals.

master has now been discharged,
unscrambled.

But

the

special

and the "eggs" cannot be

A Hearing Master remains, and the issue with

respect to him may not be moot.
Perhaps all we need decide,

after making

c~ear

that the major problem has been eliminated, is that it is
quite

customary

for

matters to a master.

a

federal

court

to

refer

specific

The Hearing Master has nothing like

the oversight authority of the original masters.
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CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

February 28, 1983

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
RE:

81-2101 - Pennhurst State School and Hospital v.
Halderman

My vote on this case is "Reverse".
Regards,

.._ _.

..•.,

lfp/ss 04/04/83
MF.MOTU\NDU\1

TO:

DA'T'E:
.:

F • Powell , ,J r •

''it

'I{'

81-2101 Pennhurst

read the first nraft of our opi.nion yesterday

I

with the qreatest interest

an~

admiration.

and scholarly niece of work, and

It is a thorough
with the views

consist~nt

we have dtscussed. ·
net~inq
\'~~:t; :I.

.'•

'1 ,\

~~:
'

,,

!'

over the obstacle of Greene is not easy,

but;i:·I ,: think you have ' de'a lt with this as oer.suasive1v as
t>

1

}~

,_'

.l

~>~e

r.··.~.·

',i't<

can.

~-·
),,

,.
t

''

Bitker since it carne aown and do

~. ~

'

~

'

not have

.I

~he

case clearly in mind.

~I

do not believe that it '

held that'";,the~ Fourteenth ., Amendment alone, without rather
q"

'

..1: "'

't'

explicit evidence
of congressional intention,
·t' .,
~-

J,

~

to

exception

the F.leventh
J.,,,_

Bitker did hold.
as

~:

noted. ~

); ,~

'J'l·d.s~.
.

Amendment~

~_..

cre~tes

an

/.1

But I ""<am not sure what
- ., •"

has promptel'l me to raise a question
~

'

PPrhaos this should be
"''·

clarified~

As mv marginal notes indicate, !I do
~i

that

Bdleman should be read as allowing a federal court to impose
any and all "tyoes of mandatory future requirements on a
state.

One can think of

exa~o1Ps

that would bankruPt some

states and constitute · th ~ most flagrant federal intrusion . '
Indeed, this is illustrated by the present case where per- •
haps the financial burden of the decisions below would not
be outrageous, the appointment of a federal master to impJe-

ment the DC's decree in effect substituted ongoing federal
authority over one of the more important of a state's re- ,
sponsibiliti.es.
~
t

Thls has been done, of course, with respect

to prison conditions in Alabama and in the Roston pubJic
school situation.

Roth of these assumptions of federal pow-

er navP beP n widely criticized, anii I woulfi not wish to say
anything to endorse them.
am I enchanted bv a limitless theory of pen-

~or

dent iurisdiction, and want our language in this respect
i .

•,,

also to he as narrow as,, we can make it.
~ ,~' ~~~.,~•Fede r a) iudqer-, inclurHnq Just ices, comPlain - and
I

ahout the ever increasing workload.

make ~speeches ~
rt

'!

Yet,

}.

while t he :. h undred , pl'~s '' social welfare ana civil right~ stat'
p'"'
ute~ tb f the lRst two ' necades hav~ been primarilv responsible
~;

for the ex9ansion of federal court iurisdiction and litiga!l'J"·~

1:'

t ion, t'1e

· fe~er a 1
~~

f

$~<o:

"i~

'

.'j

~

fY

·~

courts
•. themselves have been close behind.
'-'•
'

l:(\
••

•

. ~-

~,.,

~.• ~

./

<t~

The resu1t '. is· that t.he. federal courts are ovE"rburnened and
~·

the. state courts under-utilized.
,,

I

have practiced Jaw lona-

er than anyone else on t ,hir.:: Court, ann practi.cen in both

,, ·

-~

state a·no federal courts.. 'rhe la ,t ter have .np monopoly on
thorouqhly competent judges.

*

* *'

When your editor has reviewed the draft, unless
substantive changes are suggested (in which case, of course,
I would li.ke to see them) , let's qo promptly to a chambers
draft so that all five of us can take exceptionally careful
this important case.

"

'

·•

3.

I do think we are off to a good start, thanks primarily to your research and drafting.
~/'""

:g;·

:J8~

'li.

,. hW'

'~~'

.,

lfp/ss 04/07/83
81-2101 Pennhurst v. Halderman
This

memorandum,

for

my

own

assistance

in

reviewing the Chambers Draft, is a rough topical outline .

•

Part I
Part
litigation.
Court

of

reviews

I

history

the

of

Pennhurst

On the basis of the decision of the Supreme
Pennsylvania

concluded

that

judgment,

and

this

on

the

state

therefore

state's

statute

did

not

MH/MR

supported
reach

the

Act,
its

CA3
prior

issues

of

federal law.
CA3
Amendment
claim.

rejected

barred

the

federal

argument

court

that

review

of

the
a

Eleventh
state

law

It then concluded that the Amendment did not bar a

federal

court

from

granting

prospective

relief

on

the

basis of federal claims, and that the same result obtained
with respect to a pendant state law claim.
Part II
Petitioners
prohibits a

argue

that

the

argument,

issues.

Amendment

federal court from enjoining state officials

to conform their conduct to state law.
this

Eleventh

we

do

not

reach

the

As we agree with
comity

and

other

Subpart II-A
Reviewing early cases,
that

"the

principle

constitutional

of

sovereign

limitation on

established in Article III".
Although
Amendment

immunity

Amendment,

this

Congress

must

index
be

the draft states flatly

the

immunity

federal

is

a

judicial power

p. 7.
may
of

done

abrogate
§5

of

the

the

expressly.

§1983 does not override the immunity.

Eleventh
.Fourteenth

.For

example,

Quern v. Jordan (p.

8) •

The

draft

concludes

subpart

II-A

saying

"in

deciding this case we must be guided by the principles of
federalism that inform Eleventh Amendment doctrine".

(p.

9)
Subpart II-B
The Eleventh Amendment bars a suit against state
officials "when the state is the real party in interest"
(p. 10).

There are two exceptions:

(i) immunity does not

apply when an official has acted outside of his official
authority

(an exception that presents no problem here):

and (ii) the doctrine on Ex parte Young.

But even when

the

foregoing

exceptions

apply,

the rule that a suit against state officials constitutes a
suit
Thus,

against

the

state will

in Edelman we

not

1 imi ted

a

be wholly

federal

disregarded.

court's

remedial

power - relying on the Eleventh Amendment - to prospective
injunctive relief.
Part III
This
federal

addresses

court suit,

the

question

whether,

in

this

the claim that petitioners violated

state law is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
Respondents
Edelman,

the suit

prospective
claim

is

relief

not

rely

on

two arguments:

(i)

under

is not against the state because only
was

ordered;

and

( i i)

the

state

barred and properly was considered

law

in any

event under pendant jurisdiction.
Subpart III-A
In answering the first argument, the draft notes,
that Young and Edelman have not established a rule that a
suit seeking prospective relief always is exempt from the
Amendment.
prospective

Rather,
relief

the general rule
against

officials

is that a
is

still

suit

for

a

suit

against the state unless the officials acted in excess of

.·

.,.

their

authority.

Here,

there

is

no

claim

that

the

officials acted ultra vires.
[Note
any

claim

that

here

( official duties?
14, 15)

Is

to Mark:
the

III-A necessary?

officers

I would be

acted

Is

there

beyond

their

inclined to condense A (p.

into a short footnote,

and focus Part III on the

pendant claim.]

Subpart III-B
Here,

p.

16-20,

the

draft

argues

the pendant

claim issue.
It

is

noted

that

the

jurisdiction

in

this

case

only

District
because

Court obtained
the

complaint

alleged violation of federal as well as state laws.

The

draft then discusses pendent jurisdiction cases going back
to Osborne v. Bank
jurisdiction,

and

state

first

claim

question.

(1824).
also
to

These cases establish pendant

that

it

avoid

a

is proper

to consider a

federal

constitutional

In light of these cases, it is clear that apart

from the Eleventh Amendment, the Court of Appeals did have
jurisdiction to decide the state law question.

Thus, the

basic issue in this case is whether the Amendment applies
to this pendant state law claim.

The draft recognizes that Siler and Greene (1909
and 1917 cases)
on

a

pendant

did grant relief against state officials
jurisdiction

consider expressly whether

basis.

But

Siler

Ex parte Young -

did

not

despite the

policies of federalism reflected in the Eleventh Amendment
extended

to

pendant

state

law

Rather,

claims.

it

appears to have assumed that the Eleventh Amendment simply
does

not

Greene

apply.

against

state

involved

officials,

a

alleging

suit
tax

violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.

by

railroads

assessment

in

The Court rejected

the argument that the Eleventh Amendment barred the suit,
holding

that Young applied

against

state officials

to all constitutional claims

regardless of whether

the state

statute under which the officials acted was constitutional
or not.

The Greene Court then declared that the Court's

jurisdiction extended to the resolution of the state law
question, on which the case was decided.

., ,.
'

On p. 18, the draft notes that the implicit view
of these cases was that once

jurisdiction is established

on the basis of any federal question, no further Eleventh
Amendment
believe

inquiry
this

view

is necessary.
is

principles established

erroneous

The draft states:
and

contrary

to

"we
the

in Eleventh Amendment decisions."

(what decisions?)
Amendment

does

jurisdiction

The draft then states that the Eleventh
constitute

to

decide

a

limitation

certain

claims,

on

even

alternative basis for jurisdiction exists.
a reference back, presumably to Part II.
illustrates this with an example:

federal
where

an

Here there is

The in the draft

although a §1983 suit

alleges a constitutional claim directly against a state, a
federal
that

court

claim

as

barred by

even

Constitution.
cited

is

though

Quern v.

"see".

Thus,

the Amendment

the

claim

Jordan,
the

from

arises

deciding

under

and Alabama v.

Amendment

is

a

the

Pugh are

bar

against

hearing even federal claims that otherwise would be within
the jurisdiction of a federal court.

(Do I correctly read

p. 18?)
The
principle

draft

applies

then

also

to

states
claims

that
over

the
which

foregoing
a

federal

court exercises pendant jurisdiction, citing Edelman.
the

fact

that

there

was

jurisdiction over

the

And

pendent

claim did not prevent the Edelman Court from holding that
the Eleventh Amendment barred retroactive relief.
The
and

Greene,

draft
neither

then argues
pendant

that,

contrary

jurisdiction

nor

to Siler
any other

basis of jurisdiction may override the Eleventh Amendment.

A federal court must examine each claim in a case to see
if the Court's jurisdiction over the state claim is barred
by that Amendment.

At this point, we note that the draft

already has concluded that a claim of state violation by
state

officials

is

one

against

the

state

and

normally

barred by the Amendment.
Accordingly,

we

hold

that

"this

principle

applies as well to state law claims brought into federal
court

under

pendant

jurisdiction".

This

issue

has

not

previously been confronted directly, and we are not bound
by Siler and Greene.

(p. 19)

* * *
Note to Mark:
the

Chambers

clarification.

draft

My impression from this review of
is

that

Part

III

needs

some

As suggested above, I would be inclined to

eliminate, except for a footnote, subpart A of III.
The critical part of this opinion in III-B.

In

view of Siler and Greene this was not easy to write.

It

does not seem quite as convincing to me now as it did in
reading the typewritten draft.

The basic argument,

understand it, runs along the following lines:

as I

Given Young and Edelman, the law is settled that
where federal constitutional violations by state officials
are alleged a federal court has jurisdiction and may order
prospective relief regardless of ~~:r eventh Amendment.
This protects
settled

as

a

substantial
federal

the

supremacy of

general

basis

rule

for

pendant

La 1:!:@1 law.

Also,

it

is

there

is

a

jurisdiction

(e.g.,

a

federal

court

that

federal

constitutional

exercising

:!!

claim) ,

where

a

jurisdiction -

may

decide

state

issues without addressing the constitutional claim.
and Greene -on the authority of Ex parte Young -

law

Siler
seem to

have applied this pendant jurisdiction analysis to suits
against

state

officers.

assumed

that

the

deciding

state

Without

Eleventh

law

analysis,

Amendment

claims

on

the

II,

the

is

these

not

basis

a
of

cases

bar

to

pendant

jurisdiction.
As
reflects
because

shown

principles
the

the

Part

of

rationale

constitutional
federal

in

claims

federalism.
of
are

Young

is

asserted,

Eleventh

Amendment

This

important

that
the

is

where

federal

supremacy

of

law justifies what in effect is an exception to

Eleventh

considers

only

Amendment.
a

violation

But

where

a

of

state

law

federal
under

court
pendant

jurisdiction,

the

supremacy of

federal

law rationale

is

wholly inapplicable.

Principles of federalism, therefore,

operate

in

full

force

Eleventh Amendment.

this

The

case

as

reflected

in

the

state law claim thus cannot be

addressed under pendant jurisdiciton.
There also are prudential reasons - perhaps akin
to

arguments

comity

against

extending

pendant

jurisdiction to state claims that implicate the Eleventh
Amendment (state sovereignty).

Under basic principles of

federalism state claims are decided by state courts, and a
departure

from

this

lightly implied.
when

of

principle

may

not

be

assumed

or

Particularly, at a period in our history

unprecedented

federal

legislation

has

expanded

federal court jurisdiction, we should be hesitant - absent
explicit

authorization

to

assume

or

imply

a

further

expansion of federal court jurisdiction.
If

the

foregoing

summary

is

approximately

correct, I wonder if we couldn't reduce the length of IIIB, and try to make the reasoning somewhat clearer than it
now seems to be.

My impression is that III-B loses some

of its force because of too much explanation.
relationship

between

Part

II

and

Part

III

Nor is the
is

not made

quite as clearly as it could be.

"

.

I

am

not

entirely

hardly need say that I
pendant

jurisdiction.

at

home

in

this

area,

and

have never liked either Young or
I

therefore

am

particularly

interested what you and your co-clerks think, now that you
have had time to see the draft in print.
L.F.P., Jr.

ss

.ju.prtmt <!Jo-url o-f tJrt ~ttittb: .jtatts
'jiulfin:gto-tt, ~. <!J. 2llgt~~
C HAMBERS O F

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

April 14, 1983
Re:

No. 81-2101 Pennhurst State School & Hospital
v. Halderman

Dear Lewis:
Please join me.

Sincerel~

Justice Powell
cc:

The Conference

$5ttpTtutt ~curl d t£rt 'Jtti.tt~ .§bttts

jihtsftinghnt, ~. ~· 20.?~~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WJLLJAM H . REHNQUJST

April 14, 1983
Re:

No. 81-2101 Pennhurst State School & Hospital
v. Halderman

Dear Lewis:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

./

·tJ'r
l,
Justice Powell
cc:

The Conference

~ttpf~UU

Qfo:uri o:f tlf~Jtmt~b- ~fabg
,ru4tngto:n, ~. (!f. 2'll,;t'!.~

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

April 14, 1983

Re:

81-2101 - Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp.
v. Halderman

Dear Lewis:
In due course I shall circulate a dissent.
Respectfully,

/vL
Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

~up:r~uu

(!fqud d

tq~~tt~ ~tatt.&'

Jl'M.£rington. ~. "f.

2.0bi'1~
I

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

April 14, 1983

Re:

/

81-2101 - Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp.
v. Halderman

Dear Lewis:
In due course I shall circulate a dissent.
Respectfully,

/vL
Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

,ju.vrtmt Qfltltd a£ tqt ~ittb ,jtatt.&'
'~lht~fttngton, ~.

<If.

2llfi'!~

CHAMBERS OF'

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

April 18, 1983

No. 81-2101

Pennhurst State School &
Hospital v. Halderman

Dear Lewis,
Please join me.
Sincerely,

Justice Powell

Copies to the Conference

.iu.vutttt <qltltrt cf t4t ~itt~ ,jtait$'
'JIa,gfrhtgtcn, ~. <q. 2.ll.;tJt ~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

April 18, 1983

No. 81-2101

Pennhurst State School &
Hospital v. Halderman

Dear Lewis,
Please join me.
Sincerely,

Justice Powell

Copies to the Conference

April 27, 1983
CHAMBERS OF

..JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE

Re:

No. 81-2101, Pennh

Halderman

Dear Lewis,
Although it is likely that I shall JOin your circulating
draft, I would rather await John's dissent. Meanwhile, for what
they may be worth, I do have two suggestions.
First, I hope you would delete the part of footnote 13, page
13, which discusses whether a federal court could order the State
to pay damages to other plaintiffs due to the presence of the
United States and which questions whether the United States has
independent authority to assert federal-law claims?
I had
thought it settled since In re Debs, 158 u.s. 564 (1895), that
the United States has the right to sue to protect the public
interest.
Our more recent cases in which the United States
initiated suit or intervened and was then left as the sole
remaining party seem to confirm the point. E.g., New York Times
Co. v. United States, 403 u.s. 713 (1971); Pasadena City Bd. of
Education v. Spangler, 427 u.s. 424, 430-431 (1976).
Here the
United States'
ability to litigate these issues is on a
particularly strong footing since Congress expressly authorized
the Attorney General to bring such actions. See Civil Rights of
Institutionalized Persons Act, 94 Stat. 349, 42 u.s.c. 1997.
In
any event, consideration of whether the United States has
standing to bring federal-law claims is not necessary to decide
this case. As you say, it is quite clear that the United States
does not have standing to assert the state-law claims of thircl "
parties.
Second, I would prefer not to say that "the express
rationale of Ex parte Young is not logically persuasive." (p. 14)
I am not sure the idea that the state cannot commit an
unconstitutional act is illogical on its face.
In a sense, it is
another way of expressing that the Young doctrine is derived from
the supremacy of federal law.
But even if you are correct, I
would prefer not to undercut so directly one of the Court's
landmark decisions.
For the purposes of this case, it seems to
be enough to say that the rule of Ex Parte Young is predicated on
the supremacy of federal rights.
Sincerely,

Justice Powell
cpm

.jnvrtmt Qfllttrlltf tlrt ~tb .italtg
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<If.

2llgt~~

April 27, 1983
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE

Re:

No. 81-2101, Pennhurst State School v. Halderman

Dear Lewis,
Although it is likely that I shall JOln your circulating
draft, I would rather await John's dissent. Meanwhile, for what
they may be worth, I do have two suggestions.
First, I hope you would delete the part of footnote 13, page
13, which discusses whether a federal court could order the State
to pay damages to other plaintiffs due to the presence of the
United States and which questions whether the United States has
independent authority to assert federal-law claims?
I had
thought it settled since In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895}, that
the United States has the right to sue to protect the public
interest.
Our more recent cases in which the United States
initiated suit or intervened and was then left as the sole
remaining party seem to confirm the point. E.g., New York Times
Co. v. United States, 403 u.s. 713 (1971}: Pasadena City Bd. of
Education v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 430-431 ( 1976} •
Here the
United States'
ability to litigate these issues is on a
particularly strong footing since Congress expressly authorized
the Attorney General to bring such actions. See Civil Rights of
Institutionalized Persons Act, 94 Stat. 349, 42 u.s.c. 1997.
In
any event, consideration of whether the United States has
standing to bring federal-law claims is not necessary to decide
this case. As you say, it is quite clear that the United States
does not have standing to assert the state-law claims of third
parties.
Second, I would prefer not to say that "the express
rationale of Ex parte Young is not logically persuasive." {p. 14}
I am not sure the idea that the state cannot commit an
unconstitutional act is illogical on its face.
In a sense, it is
another way of expressing that the Young doctrine is derived from
the supremacy of federal law.
But even if you are correct, I
would prefer not to undercut so directly one of the Court's
landmark decisions.
For the purposes of this case, it seems to
be enough to say that the rule of Ex Parte Young is predicated on
the supremacy of federal rights.
Sincerely,

Justice Powell
cpm

.:§tqtrtnu <!Jettrl of tqt ~ttittlt .jmttg
JfuJrittgbm, !9.

<!J.
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CHAMBERS OF'

.JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

May 9, 1983

Re: No. 81-2101 - Pennhurst State School and Hospital
v. Halderman
Dear Lewis:
As you have surmised, I shall await the dissent in this
case.
Sincerely,

Justice Powell
cc: The Conference

.h.pum:t <!}.mrl ~f tlft ~ttitt~ ~llttts

-aslfitt:gtott. ~. <!}. 21l&f'!-~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

May 9, 1983

Re: No. 81-2101 - Pennhurst State School and Hospital
v. Halderman
Dear Lewis:
As you have surmised, I shall await the dissent in this
case.
Sincerely,

Justice Powell
cc: The Conference

June 16, 1983

81-2101 Pennhurst v. Halderman

Dear Chi..ef:
tn reviewing the status of. my five remaining Court
cases, T have "Courts" in all of them except Pennhurst.
When I first circulated my opinion in Pennhurst,
Byron - who had voted with you and me at Conference - wrote
me on April 27:
"~lthough it is likely that I shall join your
circulating draft, I would rather await
John's dissent."

The dissent has not yet been circulated, but the
"grapevine" news is that it may reach us any day.
If, as I hope, you are still "wi.th me", it might
be a plus with Byron for your "join" to be circulated so
that his vote then would be decisive.
In my oth8r four cases - with one exception - I am
awaiting dissents from other Chambers.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
lfp/ss

16" 1983

~ennhurst

v. Halderman

Dear C.hi..ef:
<:,.~if,; ,,
tn reviewinq the status o .f. my five remaining Court
cases,
I
have
"Courts" in all of them except Pennhurst.
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When I first circulated my opinion in Pennhurst,
Byron - who had voted with you and me at Conference - wrote
me on April 27:
,,
"Althouqh i~ ' is likely that I shall join your
circulating draft, I would rather await
John's dissent."
%

~

The dissent has not yet been circulated, but the
"grapevine" nP.ws is that it may reach us any day.
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that his vote then would be decisive.
In my oth~r four cases - with one
awaiti..nq ' diRsonts f~om other Chambers •
• l.,Y.

'f

am

.,,

~

IY/1- (

/?~
TIE p l z..

pt3-~~~~~~~

~
' - - - 7__ _../!.~.
r~.._.._..-P'

~-_/ . . . . A~.,

tY

~

...,..,

&41/w
, _.. c;JJ-.
"'ZJ.::;...r ~

~~~"""'~~· ~CA.3 '~M-''"~

~~ /~~
~ ~
/-o

I

I

.;
I
I

I.

J

~

~,

~""-~· ?'f-~
&

.4/-.

_,_'

~o/--~~W;r ~-~~~~
4U..
~ ~~ • ·

~~~-~

·..

~v-f-S'~,

·1~

1

C/1-'3

If"_

~

::t: ~

~a-

I

~4--~;;':f.lf)
a-( h=:r:J/

I ~(~~~~----~,
~~~~~~:4~

~

W'.G--1/v-d(p,p) ~ J/~~

.1.-.JI/11. ~ r,
./_.
1.,,J-r.
r:;;;:::r.
Vf ,,.., ~a
~~ v;> ~ ~~~~'---8-£.-

A... • •

~~
e::::;;ii
'

. ~M.{~~)P I~

C/1-3 .... ,. -..~ nU~~
1'1

II

y~~~~~
~~~!1!!'~(16

~~(J1'17);~~
J;
~ w-jo ~ ~11.#~

"

J;u.p:rmu OJour:tltf tqt ,-mtta j;tatts
._as4htght~ ~.

<.q.

2ll~~~

CHAMBERS OF"

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

June 20, 1983

RE:

Case No. 81-2101 - Pennhurst State School
and Hospital v. Halderman

Dear Lewis:
I will defer acting until I see your response
to John.
Regards,

Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference
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CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF .JUSTICE

June 20, 1983

RE:

Case N:o.- -81-2101 - Pennhurst State School
and Hospital v. Halderman

Dear Lewis:
I will defer acting until I see your response
to John.
Regards,

Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

/
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CHAMBERS Of'

THE CHIEF .JUSTICE

June 20, 1983

RE:

Case N:o. ·81-2101 - Pennhurst State School
and Hospital v. Halderman

Dear Lewis:
I will defer acting until I see your response
to John.
Regards,

Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference
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CHAMBERS OF'

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

June 20, 1983

RE:

Case No. 81-2101 - Pennhurst State School
and Hospital v. Halderman

Dear Lewis:
I will defer acting until I see your response
to John.
Regards,

Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

June 20, 1983
CONFIDENTIAL

81-2101 Pennhurst v. Halderman

Dear Chief:
I understand, of course, your preferring to see my
response to John before you come to rest in this case.
I now have re~pon~e~ at some l.enqth in the third
draft of Pennhurst circulated today. As you know, Byron has
joined me today, and in a conversation he ex?ressed the view
that I had convincingly answered John's opinjon.

In your longhan~ postscript to me, you said that
the "breadth of [my] opinion gives [you] pause". If you are
still in doubt after seeing my quite specific ~nswers to
John, ! would like the opportunity to visit with you for ten
minut~s.
~his case will have a maier effect on the continuing vitality of the Eleventh Amenrlment.
If you have suggestions f.or clarifvinq my opinion
-- or if there are other changes that would resolve your
doubts -- I will of course consider them. I need your vo•e '
for a Court.

Sincerely,

~he

Chief Justice

lfp/ss

~u:vr tutt ~trud trf tlr t

'J!ittitt b ~taks
'l!tiasltittgttrn, ~. <!f. 2llc?J!.~

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

June 20, 1983

Re:

No. 81-2101-Pennhurst State School & Hospital v.
Halderman

Dear John:
Please join me in your dissent.
Sincerely,

{. /ll.
T.M.

Justice Stevens
cc:

The Conference

I

.:§nvrttttt Qlltud ltf t£rt ~tb Jtaftg
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CHAMBERS 0 F

.JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

June 20, 1983

Re:

81-2101 - Pennhurst State School
and Hospital v. Halderman

Dear Lewis,
Please join me.
Sincerely yours,

Justice Powell
cc:
cpm

The Conference

,June 20, 1983

81-2101 Pennhurst v. Balderman

MEMORANDUM 't'O THE COI\'fFERENCE:

I will circulate responses to John's
today.

L.F.P., Jr.

ss

~issent

;§u:pumt Qfttltrlltf tlft ~tb .:§tatt.G'
Jlagltittghtn, ~. <!f. 2llgt~~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

June 20, 1983

Re:

81-2101 - Pennhurst State School
and Hospital v. Halderman

Dear Lewis,
Please join me.
Sincerely yours,

Justice Powell
cc:
cpm

The Conference

j;uputttt <!fourt ttf t:Irt ~b j>taftg
'lUlasfrittgttm. ~. <.g:. 2Ll.;i.ll-~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

June 20, 1983

Re:

No. 81-2101-Pennhurst State School & Hospital v.
Halderman

Dear John:
Please join me in your dissent.
Sincerely,

{.Pl.
T.M.

Justice Stevens
cc:

The Conference

v. Halderman

MEMORANDUM

today.

,,
~0

~HE CO~FERENCE:

..

I .wlll circulate responses to John's dissent
,,
'Iii\

•'1')i:~"

'

Jr.
ss

,•.
;•

,. : '

v. Halderman

Dear' Chief:

, . '·, I · understand, of course, your preferring to see my
response.. tq
John ' before vou . come to rest i.n this case.
,,
~'

f\_

(

,":(,~,,

~

:~

~

,;·/

, . .·· 'r now have reF"ponded at · some lenqth i.n the third ' ,

draft ' o:f Pennhurst circulated today. As you k.now, Byron has
joined. me today, and i.n a conversation he expressed the view
that I had coryvincinqly answere~ John's opin1on.
•

In your longhanc postscript to me, you said that
the "pre~dth of [my] ooinion gives [you] pause". If you ate·
still in doubt aft:eor seeing my quitP. Flpecific .=tnswers to
John~ I would like the opportuni.ty to vtsit with you for ten
inutes. 'T'h'is :case ' \vi ll.,have a major effect on the continu- ,
ing vitality o6 •the Eleventh Amendment.
r

·

·

.

.. ~:t;

1
~

If you have suggestions f.or clarifying my opinion
or if · there are other changes that would resolve your
doubts -- I will of course consider them. I need your vote
for "a"' Court. /•
~

"::'he

'

'

'

v. Halderman -

~

t'

You{ uncertainty in this case troubles me so much
write once more - hoping you will bear with me:
l.~

The two baste issues at stake here are: (i) the
jurisdictional character of the Eleventh Amendment, and (il)
pendent jurl.sdicti.on ot federal courts. Both implicate federalism. I have rechecked the cases on these two issues
decided over the past decade, and this confirms that in each
of the important cas~s you and I have been 100% together.
I

start - wit~

the federal jurisdiction cases:

O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 u.s. 488 (1974)J Rizzo v.
Goode, 423 u.s. 362 (1976); and City of Los Angeles v. Ly.QQ.§_, No. 81-1064 (Apr. 20, 1983).
These limited the opportunity of litigants to challenqe allegedly unconstitutional
state and local policies in federal courts. Edelman v. Jor, dan, 415 u.s. 651 (1974), of course, was a major Eleventh
Amendment jurisdiction case in which you and I were shoulder
to shoulder with Bill Rehnquist. See also Fair Assessment
in Real Esta.te Assn. v. McNary, 454 u.s. 100 (1981) (federal
courts have no juri5diction to hear §1983 challenges to
state tax systems).
~

In each of these cases, we recognized the importance of federalism and required litigants to take claims of
federal rights to state courts. In this key respect, these
cases were "broader" than Pennhurst, as it will hold only
that litigants must take state claims to state courts. The
intrusion on federalism would reach a new level if a federal
court could tell state officials how to comply with state
law.
;;~

,· Now, for the pendent jurisdiction cases:
Aldinger v. Howard, 427 u.s. 1 (1976) (federal
courts have no pendent-party jurisdiction on state~law mat-

2.

'

•l,lt

·~;

) ..

!"

In sum, since we have uniformly been together in ~·
all of these cases r have thought my opinion in Pennhurst
' accords fully with your views. Also, it is consistent with '
the cases decided since you became Chief Justice. And I am
completely convinced that my opinion is correct on the Eleventh Amendment issues. No doubt you have noted that John's
opinion - though persuasive>ly written - hinges almost altogether on a handful of 19th Century cases - cases that this
Court in Larson carefully,, and explicitly declined to foll0\'1. '

* * *
v· If we do not reverse CA3 on the above question,
the Court will have to address two other "sticky" issues
that I was able to avoid: (i) the comity argument, and (ii)
the question whether the DC abused its discretion in appointing the Special Masters, and taking control of the
1
state institution.

·;

'

Of course, I understand that each of us must make
hls own judgments. If the case wer.e not so important to the
principle of federalism I would not be subjecting you to
\ addi.tional reading. You hcwe my apologies in any event.
1.,

•.

· Sincerely,

'I

men

06/21/83
MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL

From: Mark
Re:

else?)/~~

Pennhurst (What

I apologize for troubling you wi:fh

G }-

~fghts"

on this

case, but I spent all of last evening puzzling over the question
I

of how one would answer the Chief's;

oncern about the "breadth"

of our holding.
Certain answers are rather obvious:
ment

is

jurisdictional,

(i) the Eleventh Amend-

so the holding has to be broad in the

sense that either there is jurisdiction or there isn't:

(ii) al-

though JPS tries to make it appear we are sweeping away lots of
precedent,

-

in fact

,1/S'

~is

c f se hinges on a handful o

century

cases he has unearthed -- and cases that Larson decided not to
f ollow:

(iii) to the extent anything is broad, it is JPS' dissent

expressly advocating getting

rid of the substance of sovereign

immunity.
It occurred to me, however, that there is a different tack
that could be successful.

I assume that the Chief has been par-

tially persuaded

result of our

that

the

"broad"

holding

wipe out a significant area of federal jurisdiction.

is to

Yet a re-

view of significant federal jurisdiction cases in the past decade
demonstrates that the Chief has been with LFP in every major case
limiting jurisdiction -- many of which had considerably broader
effects than Pennhurst will:
-O'Shea v.

Littleton,

414 U.S.

488

(1973), Rizzo v. Goode,

2.

423 U.S.

362

(1977), and City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, No.

81-

1064 (Apr. 20, 1983), have a drastic limiting effect on the abili ty of

litigants

to challenge allegedly unconstitutional state

and local policies.
-Epelman

v.

Jordan,

415

u.s.

"broad" as a holding could be:

651

(1974),

was

about

as

all retroactive relief for con-

stitutional violations is prohibited.
-Fair Assessment
100

in Real Estate Assn.

v. McNary,

454 u.S.

(1981), held that the federal courts have no jurisdiction to

hear any §1983 challenges to state tax systems.
The signficant thing about all these cases is that, because
of

the

importance of

federal

rights

Pennhurst

is

to

more

federalism,

state

limited:

claims to state court.
holding,

courts.
it

they force
In
tells

litigants

contrast,
litigants

the
to

to

take

result
take

of

state

Thus, although Pennhurst is an important

it is plain to me that Pennhurst is not as "broad" in

effect on federal jurisdiction as many of the other cases in recent years.

; '

It also is true that the Chief has never been a ---.
fan of pend~

427

jur is~cti~n.
U.S.

1

(1976),

He joined the Court
in

holding

that

in Aldinser v.
federal

pendent-party jurisdiction on state-law matters.
v.

Lavine,

415 U.S.

528

(197 4) ,

courts

Howard,
have

no

And in Hagans

he joined your dissent arguing

that the majority had unnecessarily expanded Siler and Gibbs.
In short, every position taken by the Chief in this Court's
federal jurisdiction cases suggests that he should join you here.
(It

is also noteworthy that he voted to grant cert

(along with

3.

BRW, WHR, SOC; LFP joined 3) and, of course, voted after conference to reverse;

this clearly indicates that he is outraged by

the relief granted below.)
is quite consistent with

If he can be shown that a join here
his prior votes,

he might be able to

quell his doubts about the "breadth" of the holding.
One

final

point

that

occurs

to

me.

If

the

Court

is

switched, JPS will have to write an opinion disposing not only of
the 11th Amendment issue, but also of the comity issue and the
question whether the DC abused its discretion in appointing the
special masters.

That means the Chief would have to join those

holdings as well;

in other words, he would have to reject every

federalism and comity argument raised in the case.
thinking in these terms.

He may not be

(I would have some slight hesitation in

raising this point unless necessary, for I would not want to suggest to the Chief that he might concur on one of these "narrower"
grounds.)

~~ men

1-tol
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MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL

From: Mark
Re:

Pennhurst (What
I apologize for

else?)~~ ~
troubling you wilt,

G

t-

~r:hts"

on this

case, but I spent all of last evening puzzling over the question
I

of how one would answer the Chief's;oncern about the "breadth"
of our holding.
Certain answers are rather obvious:
ment

is

jurisdictional,

(i) the Eleventh Amend-

so the holding has to be broad

sense that either there is jurisdiction or there isn't;

in the
(ii) al-

though JPS tries to make it appear we are sweeping away lots of
precedent,

in fact

,1/S'

~is

cfse hinges

o~

a

h~ul

qt 19th-century

cases he has unearthed -- and cases that Larson decided not to

-

follow;

(iii) to the extent anything is broad, it is JPS' dissent

expressly advocating getting

rid of the substance of sovereign

immunity.
It occurred to me, however, that there is a different tack
that could be successful.

I assume that the Chief has been par-

tially persuaded

result of our

that

the

"broad"

holding

wipe out a significant area of federal jurisdiction.

is to

Yet a re-

view of significant federal jurisdiction cases in the past decade
demonstrates that the Chief has been with LFP in every major case
limiting jurisdiction -- many of which had considerably broader
effects than Pennhurst will:
-O'Shea v.

Littleton,

414 U.S.

488

(1973), Rizzo v. Goode,

2.
423

u.s.

362

(1977),

and City of Los Angeles v.

Lyons, No.

81-

1064 (Apr. 20, 1983), have a drastic limiting effect on the abili ty

of

litigants

to challenge

allegedly unconstitutional

state

and local policies.
-Egelman

v.

Jordan,

415

U.S.

"broad" as a holding could be:

651

(1974),

was

about

as

all retroactive relief for con-

stitutional violations is prohibited.
-Fair Assessment
100

in Real Estate Assn.

v.

McNary,

454 U.S.

(1981), held that the federal courts have no jurisdiction to

hear any §1983 challenges to state tax systems.
The signficant thing about all these cases is that, because
of

the

importance

federal

rights

Pennhurst

is

of

to

more

federalism,

state

limited:

claims to state court.
holding,

courts.
it

they
In
tells

force

litigants

contrast,
litigants

the
to

to

take

result
take

of

state

Thus, although Pennhurst is an important

it is plain to me that Pennhurst is not as "broad"

in

effect on federal jurisdiction as many of the other cases in recent years.
It also is true that the Chief has never been a fan of pen~

d~ jurisd~cti~n.

427

u.s.

1

(1976),

pendent-party
v.

Lavine,

He

joined the Court
in

holding

that

in Aldinser v.
federal

jurisdiction on state-law matters.

415 U.S.

528

(1974),

courts

Howard,
have

And in

no

Haga~

he joined your dissent arguing

that the majority had unnecessarily expanded Siler and Gibbs.
In short, every position taken by the Chief in this Court's
federal jurisdiction cases suggests that he should join you here.
(It

is also noteworthy that he voted to grant cert

(along with

3.

BRW, WHR, SOC; LFP joined 3) and, of course, voted after conference to reverse;

this clearly indicates that he is outraged by

the relief granted below.)
is quite consistent with

If he can be shown that a join here
his prior votes,

he might be able

to

quell his doubts about the "breadth" of the holding.
One

final

point

that

occurs

to

me.

If

the

Court

is

switched, JPS will have to write an opinion disposing not only of
the 11th Amendment

issue,

but also of the comity issue and the

question whether the DC abused its discretion in appointing the
special masters.

That means the Chief would have to join those

holdings as well;

in other words, he would have to reject every

federalism and comity argument raised in the case.
thinking in these terms.

He may not be

(I would have some slight hesitation in

raising this point unless necessary, for I would not want to suggest to the Chief that he might concur on one of these "narrower"
grounds.)

.-
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To: The Chief Justice
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Powell
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor
From:

Justice Brennan
UJ~

2 2 1983

Circulated: -----~---

Recirculated: _ _ _ _ _ _ __

1st PRINTED DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 81-2101

PENNHUST STATE SCHOOL AND HOSPITAL, ET AL,
PETITIONERS v. TERRI LEE HALDERMAN ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
[June-, 1983]

JUSTICE BRENNAN, dissenting.
I join JUSTICE STEVENS' dissent. In any event, I adhere
to the view that the Eleventh Amendment "bars federal
court suits against States only by citizens of other States."
Yeomans v. Kentucky, 423 U. S. 983, 984 (1975) (BRENNAN,
J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). See Employees
v. Missouri Public Health Dept., 411 U. S. 279, 298 (1973)
(BRENNAN, J., dissenting).

men

06/23/83

From:

Re:

In

the event of

any discussion at Conference or with the

Chief on this case, I thought you might like to have the following facts available:

-Lawsuit first filed in 1974.
-Cert granted here on June 21, 1982.
(Chief, BRW, WHR,
SOC voted to grant, LFP to join 3.}
-Case argued on February 22, 1983.
-Conference on Feb. 25: 4-4, Chief didn't vote. (BRW, LFP
WHR, SOC all agreed to reverse on 11th Am.}
M «
J"'rO'
At". I
-Chief voted to reverse on Feb. 28, assigned to LFPA
-LFP opinion eire. on April 14 (2d longest op. this year}.
-WHR joined Apr. 14, SOC Apr. 18.
-LFP 2d draft circulated on Apr. 27.
-JPS ATEX dissent eire. on June 17, printed copy on June 20.
-BRW joined June 20.

~u.p:rtntt
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CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

June 23, 1983
PERSONAL

Re:

81-2101 - Pennhurst v. Halderman

Dear Lewis:
I send to you only my draft of a concurrence.

I will defer

circulation until I get back and have a chance to let you shoot
me down!

Justice Powell

( (5

No. 81-2101, Pennhurst v. Halderman
Chief Justice Burger concurring in the judgment:
In my view this case can be properly decided
on narrower grounds than those set forth in the
plurality opinion without overruling numerous
preced~ts on which the Court has long relied. 1

Under the plurality opinion, whenever a suit is
'?

brought against a state official, a federal court
faced with an open question of federal law would
be without authority to base its decision on state
law, even when the applicable principles of state
law are well-settled.

As JUSTICE STEVENS recog-

nizes in his dissent, post, at ___ , this result

1As I read the opinion, it would expressly overrule Siler v.
~
Louiville & Nashville R.R. Co., 213 u.s. 175 (1909); Greene v.
~AAJ
Louisville & Interurban R. Co., 244 u.s. 499 (1917); Louisville & /~ ·
9 ~~
Nashville R.R. Co. v. Greene, 244 u.s. 522 (1917), and does not
~
appear to accept the continuing validity of Ashwander v. TVA, 297 ~~
U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring); Osborn Bank v. ~,- ·
Bank of the United States, 22 u.s. (9 Wheat.) 738, 822-833
~II-{
(1824); and United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 u.s. 715, 726
~
( 1966) •

- 2 r~u~es

_

-

---

litigants to bifurcate
their claims and
_......,.,
~~,...-.,-

proceed in two tribunals simultaneously so that
the courts must duplicate effort.

I cannot be-

lieve that this is what the Framers of Article III
or the Eleventh Amendment intended.
In my view, the Court of Appeals erred by
~.-......,.....~---

failing properly to consider the unique burdens
=--

-

__..

that its decision imposes on the Commonwealth of

---

Pennsylvania.

){

\\

An added
step is required before a
_____.....

federal court may exercise pendent jurisdiction

over a state law claim mandating a remedy that
involves massive, institutional relief requiring
comprehensive supervision and the aid of two
court-appointed special masters.

The added step

-

is that the court must assure itself that the re-

sult it has ordered is unambiguously mandated by
the state law on which it relies.
The exercise of pendent jurisdiction has al-

&/

··~~ r
~~~~

L~~ r~

~

~~~

~~.v;! 1)
.j~

- 3 -

ways been considered to be discretionary, and we
have long cautioned that the decision to exercise
it must be made in light of the relationship between the state and federal systems, see, e. g.,
United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383
15 ( 19 66) •

u.s.

715, 726 n •

Absent explicit statutory directive or

squarely applicable state court decision, a federal court should decline to base a decision of this

.

7
magnitude on state-law grounds.

Although effi-

cient judicial administration and convenience are
significant considerations, they do not outweigh
the need to "be constantly mindful of the 'special
delicacy of the adjustment preserved between federal equitable power and State administration of
its own law.'"
(1976)

Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 378

(quoting Stefanelli v. Minard, 342

117, 120 (1951)).

u.s.

This concern is especially

weighty when the federal decision intrudes on the

- 4 -

State's ability to run its governmental institutions, see, e. g., Younger v. Harris, 401

u.s.

37,

44 (1971}; O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 499502 {1974}

(criminal justice system}; Rizzo v.

Goode, supra, at 378 {police department}; Juidice
v. Vail, 430

u.s.

327, 334-336 {1977}

(civil jus-

tice system); Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 423-430
(1979)

{department of human resources}; Trainor v.

Hernandez, 431

u.s.

434, 443-444 {1977}

{welfare

system} •
Administration of governmental institutions
is a political function involving political decisions, best served by elected representatives and
those they designate to execute the public responsibility.

A court, and particularly a federal

court, should intervene in the state's management
of such an institution only when it is clear that
its decision is mandated by law.
I\

See Fletcher,

,,

- 5 -

The Discretionary Constitution: Institutional Remedies and Judicial Legitimacy, 91 Yale L.J. 635,
692-697 (1982}.

In short, principles of comity

required the Court of Appeals to refrain from
resting this order on the slender thread of its
own understanding of state law.
I am mindful of the fact that the state law
in question was partially interpreted by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.

See In re Schmidt, 494

Pa. 86, 429 A.2d 631 (1981}.

I do not believe,

however, that the construction given in Schmidt
controls the case presented to the Court of Appeals.

That case was brought on behalf of a class

of "all persons who were or might become residents
of Pennhurst, the Pennsylvania Association for
Retarded Citizens, and the United States."
at 1.

Ante,

One of the principal issues in the case is

whether each inhabitant of Pennhurst has a right

- 6 -

to the least restrictive setting consistent with
his habilitative needs.

Ante, at 2.

In contrast,

Schmidt involved a single profoundly retarded
adult, for whom "the concept of normalization
[was] not a consideration."
637.

Schmidt, 429 A.2d, at

The only issue in Schmidt was whether the

county rather than the state was responsible for
his care.

Id., at 634; 638-639 (Larsen, J., con-

curring).

Although the Supreme Court of Pennsyl-

vania agreed with the concept of normalization, it
did so in dictum, based on the statement of policy
section of the Pennsylvania statute rather than
its substantive provisions, id., at 634 and n. 2,
and at least partially as a result of its understanding that the "doctrine of least restrictive
alternative [is] a constitutional requirement."
id., at 636.

I cannot believe the Pennsylvania

Court would feel constrained by its prior dictum

- 7 -

if faced with a case of the magnitude of this
one. 2

Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment

of the Court of Appeals, and remand for consider?
c

ation of the federal claims.

2 In Pennhurst State School v. Halderman 451 u.s. 1, 31 and n.
24 (1981), we remanded this case to the Court of Appeals for
consideration of the state-law issue. We did not, however, mean
to imply that the court must decide the case on state-law
grounds. Nor did we take a position on whether Schmidt cast
sufficient light on state law to allow the court to ground this
massive relief on its dictates.

.§ll.pTtmr ~ourl of ~t ~b ~tilis
JITcwJri:ngton. ~. (If. 20c?J!.~
CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

June 23, 1983

~N~
Re:

81-2101 - Pennhurst v. Halderman

Dear Lewis:
I

send to you only my draft of a concurrence.

circulation until I
me down!

Justice Powell

( (5

I

will defer

get back and have a chance to let you shoot

men

06/23/83
MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL

From: Mark
Re:

Dear

i _ef: ~V

c

1

~

.

~appreera~e

of a

¥&Ur sen d'1ng me

oncurrence, and giving
I

must say that

find - on June 23 dressing

the wrong

granted,

I

to
that from your perspective I have been ad-

issue

have viewed

parties did as well:

all along.

Ever

since

this case was

it as an Eleventh Amendment case.
their

The

briefing on the Eleventh Amendment

issue was far more detailed than on the other issues.

The same

was true of the Court of Appeals' opinion.
Moreover,
based

on

notes.)
point.

the votes

to

reverse at Conference were clearly

the Eleventh Amendment.

(See my

attached Conference

Byron, Bill Rehnquist, Sandra, and I all agreed on this , '
Only Sandra expressed a willingness to decide the case on

comity grounds - and Byron specifically said he would have difficulty reversing on such a theory.
the case to me,

I

When you voted and assigned

therefore had no reason whatever to believe

that my mandate was to do anything but write the case up on the
Eleventh Amendment.

And, to be sure of getting a Court, I adopt-

ed without substantial change the precise Eleventh Amendment theory put forward by the petitioners.
When I circulated my first draft, therefore, I fully expect-

,.

2.
ed that what I had written was in accord with our side of this 54 case.

Bill Rehnquist and Sandra joined up quickly; Byron told

me he was likely to join, though he wanted to see the dissent and right after

reading it he joined me.

I heard nothing from.

you, and therefore had no idea that you were not with the rest of
us on the Eleventh Amendment issue.
indication -

until Thursday -

Indeed, I never received any

that you saw this case as turning

on a different basis.
The result is that I am left in the rather embarrassing posture of announcing the judgment of the Court in a 26-page opinion
that is, in its entire legal analysis, a dissent.
position I would have agreed to had I
occur.

Moreover,

been aware that it might

this type of result is certainly bad for

Court as an institution.
all.

This is not a

the

Litigants will be given no guidance at

This case will come down without an opinion for the Court

on any issue.

Furthermore, the issue that ultimately proves de-

cisive in the case -

your comity ground -

is discussed only by

you.
It is still not entirely clear to me why you feel you must
reject my approach.
that

my opinion

Osborn, or Gibbs.

Initially, I would note that it is not true

rejects

the

continuing

vitality of Ashwander,

And, as discussed in my opinion, neither Siler

nor Greene decided the Eleventh Amendment raised
My opinion does

in this case.

reject the outcome of these latter cases.

But

this has often proven to be true in Eleventh Amendment cases, for
our decisions on sovereign immunity are anything but consistent.
See,

for

example, Edelman v.

Jordan,

415

u.s.

651,

(1974),

3.
where

we

Court.
diate

had

to

reject

several

prior

affirmances

by

our

own

And there can be no doubt that John's analysis does reputhe narrower

analysis of

later cases such as Larson and

Malone.
More importantly, I do not really understand why your analysis necessitates a different view from mine.

You begin by re-

jecting my Eleventh Amendment analysis on the ground that it "requires

litigants

tribunals
fort."

to

bifurcate

their

simultaneously so that

(at 2.)

¥0\:1

claims and

proceed

in two

the courts must duplicate ef-

Utef'e£ere Yet you then go on to hold pre-

cisely that the plaintiffs in this case cannot have their statelaw claims heard in federal court.

In other words, they neces-

sarily must bifurcate their claims and proceed in two courts at
once.
Moreover,

you

do

this

in

a

case

where

the

State Supreme

Court made a fairly explicit statement about the requirements of
state law.

It therefore is clear that when you say the result

must be "unambiguously mandated" by state law, requiring either ; "
an "explicit statutory directive" or a "squarely applicable state
court decision," you really do mean that state law must be clear.
But this cannot often be true in a federal case raising pendent
state-law issues;

where state law is as clear as you would re-

quire, litigants would be foolish to go to federal court.
Accordingly,

it would seem that your approach would - much

like mine - divest the federal courts of most of their jurisdiction

to decide

Ashwander

rule

state-law claims
seldom will

be

against

invoked;

state officials.
litigants will

in

The
fact

4.
either have to take their entire case to state courts, or will
have to bifurcate their claims between state and federal courts.
Given this outcome,
clear

rule,

as

I

would think it preferable to have a

under my Eleventh Amendment opinion,

rather

an

inherently vague rule that ousts the federal courts of pendent
jurisdiction whenever state law is "unclear."

It will be quite

difficult for the lower courts to develop any framework for deciding when the clarity is sufficient.
an

example

-

you

believe

This very case provides

that Pennsylvania

law

is

not

clear,

where all of the judges on CA3 believed otherwise.

-.. "
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CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

June 23, 1983

G~
Re:

81-2101 - Pennhurst v. Halderman

Dear Lewis:
I

send to you only my draft of a concurrence.

I

will defer

circulation until I get back and have a chance to let you shoot
me down!

Justice Powell

( (5

No. 81-2101, Pennhurst v. Halderman
Chief Justice Burger concurring in the judgment:
In my view this case can be properly decided
on narrower grounds than those set forth in the
plurality opinion without overruling numerous
precedents on which the Court has long relied. 1
Under the plurality opinion, whenever a suit is
brought against a state official, a federal court
(

J

faced with an open question of federal law would
be without authority to base its decision on state
law, even when the applicable principles of state
law are well-settled.

As JUSTICE STEVENS recog-

nizes in his dissent, post, at -

-' this result

1As I read the opinion, it would expressly overrule Siler v.
Louiville & Nashville R. R. Co., 213 U.S. 175 (1909); Greene v.
Louisville & Interurban R. Co., 244 U.S. 499 (1917); Louisville &
Nashville R.R. Co. v. Greene, 244 u.s. 522 (1917), and does not
ppear to accept the continuing validity of Ashwander v. TVA, 297
.s. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring); Osborn Bank v.
ank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 822-833
1824); and United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 u.s. 715, 726
19 6 6) •

G

-

2 -

requires litigants to bifurcate their claims and
proceed in two tribunals simultaneously so that
the courts must duplicate effort.

I cannot be-

lieve that this is what the Framers of Article III
or the Eleventh Amendment intended.
In my view, the Court of Appeals erred by
failing properly to consider the unique burdens
that its decision imposes on the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania.

An added step is required before a

federal court may exercise pendent jurisdiction
over a state law claim mandating a remedy that
involves massive, institutional relief requiring
comprehensive supervision and the aid of two
court-appointed special masters.

The added step

is that the court must assure itself that the result it has ordered is unambiguously mandated by
the state law on which it relies.
The exercise of pendent jurisdiction has al-

ways been considered to be discretionary, and we
have long cautioned that the decision to exercise
it must be made in light of the relationship between the state and federal systems, see, e. g.,
United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 n.
15 (1966).

-

Absent explicit statutory directive or

s quarely applicable state court decision, a federal court should decline to base a decision of this

------------

magnitude on state-law grounds.

Although effi-

cient judicial administration and convenience are
significant considerations, they do not outweigh

vM

the need to "be constantly mindful of

the ~

1

special

adjustment preserved between fedequitable power and State administration of
its own law.
(1976)

1

"

Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 378

(quoting Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S.

117, 120 (1951)).

This concern is especially

weighty when the federal decision intrudes on the

.

-,

..
~ :

State's ability to run its governmental institu-

I

r

-1-t:J~~

,

~

u.s.

t i ons, -s ee, e. g., Young r v. Harris, 401

~~~~
44

(1971); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414

u.s.

37,

488, 499-

~02~1l!t~~)1~ ~
~<le,t?d;Iff:7~~tment);
Juidice

v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 334-336 (1977)

(civil jus-

tice system); Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 423-430
(1979)

(department of human resources); Trainor v.

Hernandez, 431

u.s.

434, 443-444

(1977)

(welfare

system).
Administration of governmental institutions
is a political function involving political aeci~

sions, best served by elected representatives ana
those they designate to execute the public responsibility.

~

~·

~~

...

A court, ana particularly a federal

"'"'~
~
~urt, should intervene in the state's management

9-

_) ~ ...;~.A~~. -

~~~

of such an institution only when it is clear that
its decision is manaatea by law.

See Fletcher,

- 5 -

The Discretionary Constitution: Institutional Remedies and Judicial Legitimacy, 91 Yale L.J. 635,
69 2-697

( 198 2) .

In short, principles of comity

required the Court of Appeals to refrain from
resting this order on the slender thread of its

t:;~I~Gf~

~4.:.t_~ ~
,_,~ -4w-~c:b~
I am mindful of the fact that the state law

own understanding of state law : j

J4>.

in question was partially interpreted by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.

See In re Schmidt, 494

( )
Pa. 86, 429 A.2d 631 (1981).
~

lV

j1v-

~;u

however, that the construction given in Schmidt

o1

controls the case presented to the Court of Ap•

~~~

peals.

~ 1-o

~

/"~Jfi

That case was brought on behalf of a class

of "all persons who were or might become residents

~~ifo/
~- ~
+'

I do not believe,

of Pennhurst, the Pennsylvania Association for
-

~

Retarded Citizens, and the United States."

at 1.

Ante,

One of the principal issues in the case is

whether each inhabitant of Pennhurst has a right

~~9

- 6 to the least restrictive setting consistent with
his habilitative needs.

Ante, at 2.

In contrast,

Schmidt involved a single profoundly retarded
adult, for whom "the concept of normalization
[was] not a consideration."
637.

Schmidt, 429 A.2d, at

The only issue in Schmidt was whether the

county rather than the state was responsible for
his care.

Id., at 634; 638-639 (Larsen, J., con-

curring).

Although the Supreme Court of Pennsyl-

vania agreed with the concept of normalization, it
'--. _

did so in dictum, based on the statement of policy
-------~

section of the Pennsylvania statute

rathe~

than

its substantive provisions, id., at 634 and n. 2,
and at least partially as a result of its understanding that the "doctrine of least restrictive
alternative [is] a constitutional requirement."
id., at 636.

I cannot believe the Pennsylvania

Court would feel constrained by its prior dictum

_...-

...
- 7 -

if faced with a case of the magnitude of this
one. 2

Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment

of the Court of Appeals, and remand for consider-

ation ~ ~f~a~~aims.
1\

2 rn Pennhurst State School v. Halderman 451 u.s. 1, 31 and n.
24 (1981), we remanded this case to the Court of Appeals for
consideration of the state-law issue. We did not, however, mean
to imply that the court must decide the case on state-law
grounds. Nor did we take a position on whether Schmidt cast
sufficient light on state law to allow the court to ground this
{ massive relief on its dictates.

Gv

IV t;;

.,

'I

I

I "_,)....)

No. 81-2101, Pennhurst v. Halderman
Chief Justice Burger concurring in the judg-

)~C~f> ~&-2.--

lv ~ -'"1 ~ ~ : z_.u~ ~-2.__
In my view this case can be properly decided
on narrower grounds than those set forth in the
plurality opinion without overruling numerous
precedents on which the Court has long relied. 1
Under the plurality opinion, whenever a suit is
brought against a state official, a federal court
faced with an open question of federal law would
be without authority to base its decision on state

~~{

law, even when the applicable principles of state

~-------------------------------------~----

~t£-~ 2 --- ---~~ ftJ-11 ,

law are well-settled.

~~~~

As JUSTICE STEVENS recog-

nizes in his dissent, post, at

__,

this result

~·
1

J(_

...

@ .

As I read the opinion, it would ex p ressly overrule S1ler v.
Louiville & Nashville R.R. Co., 213 U. S . 175 (190 9
Greene v.
Louisville & Interurban R. Co., 244 U.S. 499 (1917 i/,1\_Louisville &
Nashville R.R. Co. v. 1 Greene, 244 U.S. 5~2 ~1917), ~ d does not
appear to a~eTt the c~nuing validity o~ s~der v. TVA, 297
U.S. 288, 3
1936) (Brandeis, J., cdncurring ~ sborn Bank v.
Bank of t
United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 822-833
(1824); a
United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 u.s. 715, 726
(1966).

~

~/~~,,/
~~
( ~
~" 4
I

~~w<'t>

-2-

requires litigants to bifurcate their claims and
proceed in two tribunals simultaneously so that

In my view, the Court of Appeals erred by
properly to consider the unique burdens

-

imposes on the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania.
~

An added step is required before a

I

)

federal court may exercise pendent jurisdiction
over a state law claim mandating a remedy that
involves massive, institutional relief requiring
comprehensive supervision and the aid of two
court - appointed special masters.

The added step

is that the court must assure itself that the re./;(

""

sult it has ordered is unambiguously mandated by

----------------

the state law on which it relies.
The exercise of pende~t jurisdiction has al~

ways been considered to be discretionary, and we
have long cautioned that the decision to exercise
it must be made in light of the relationship between the state and federal systems, see, e. g.,
United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 n.
15 (1966).

Absent explicit statutory directive or

squarely applicable state court decision, a federal court should decline to base a decision of this
magnitude on state-law grounds.

Although effi-

(
cient judicial administration and convenience are
significant considerations, they do not outweigh
the need to "be constantly mindful of

the~'special

delicacy of the adjustment preserved between federal equitable power and State administration of
its own law.'"
(1976)

Rizzo v. Goode, 423

u.s.

(quoting Stefanelli v. Minard, 342

117, 120 (1951)).

362, 378

u.s.

This concern is especially

weighty when the federal decision intrudes on the

' ..

- 4 -

--

State's ability to run its governmental institutions, see, e. g., Younger v. Harris, 401
44

(1971); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414

502 (1974)

u.s.

u.s.

37,

488, 499-

(criminal justice system); Rizzo v.

Goode, supra, at 378 (police department); Juidice
v. Vail, 430

u.s.

327, 334-336 (1977)

tice system); Moore v. Sims, 442
(1979)

u.s.

(civil jus415, 423-430

(department of human resources); Trainor v.

Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 443-444 (1977)

(welfare

system).
Administration of governmental institutions
is a political function involving political
deci...
sions, best served by elected representatives and
those they designate to execute the public responsibility.
court,

A court, and particularly a federal

~vene

in the state's management

of such an institution only when it is clear that
its decision is mandated by law.

See Fletcher,

;

,.

- 5 -

The Discretionary Constitution: Institutional Remedies and Judicial Legitimacy, 91 Yale L.J. 635,
692-697

(1982).

In short, principles of comity

required the Court of Appeals to refrain from
resting this order on the slender thread of its
own understanding of state law.
I am mindful of the fact that the state law
in question was partially interpreted by the Penn-

c)

sylvania Supreme Court.

See In re Schmidt, 494

Pa. 86, 429 A.2d 631 (1981).

I do not believe,

however, that the construction given in Schmidt
controls the case presented to the Court of
.. Appeals.

That case was brought on behalf of a class

of "all persons who were or might become residents
of Pennhurst, the Pennsylvania Association for
Retarded Citizens, and the United States."
at 1.

Ante,

One of the principal issues in the case is

whether each inhabitant of Pennhurst has a right

.;

,.

- 6 to the least restrictive setting consistent with
his habilitative needs.

Ante, at 2.

In contrast,

Schmidt involved a single profoundly retarded
adult, for whom "the concept of normalization
[was] not a consideration."
637.

Schmidt, 429 A.2d, at

The only issue in Schmidt was whether the

county rather than the state was responsible for
his care.

Id., at 634; 638-639 (Larsen, J., con-

curring).

Although the Supreme Court of Pennsyl-

vania agreed with the concept of normalization, it .
did so in dictum, based on the statement of policy
section of the Pennsylvania statute rathe{ than
'

its substantive provisions, id., at 634 and n. 2,
and at least partially as a result of its understanding that the "doctrine of least restrictive
alternative [is] a constitutional requirement."
id., at 636.

I cannot believe the Pennsylvania

Court would feel constrained by its prior dictum

I

- 7 if faced with a case of the magnitude of this
one. 2

Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment

of the Court of Appeals, and remand for consideration of the federal claims.

(

2 rn Pennhurst State School v. Halderman 451 u.s. 1, 31 and n.
24 (1981), we remanded this case to the Court of Appeals for
consideration of the state-law issue. We did not, however, mean
to imply that the court must decide the case on state-law
grounds. Nor did we take a position on whether Schmidt cast
sufficient light on state law to allow the court to ground this
massive relief on its dictates.
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BOMB SALLY-POW

81-2101 Pennhurst v. Halderman
Dear Chief:
My thanks for sending me a copy of a draft of a
possible concurrence, and giving me an opportunity to
"shoot it down."

I certainly will try!

I must say that it comes as a disquieting
surprise to find - on June 23 - that from your perspective
I have been addressing the wrong issue all along.

This

case was argued on February 22, was discussed and voted on
at Conference on February 25, and was assigned to me to
write on March 4.

My opinion was circulated on April 14.

From the filing of the petition for cert until yesterday,
I have understood that we have viewed the case - as did

2.

CA3 and the parties - as primarily an Eleventh Amendment
case.
The Conference discussion focused on the
Eleventh Amendment.

(See my attached Conference notes

that reflect the discussion only in a fragmentary manner.)
Only Sandra expressed a willingness to decide the case on
the comity ground, and others indicated either a negative
reaction or failed to mention it at all.

All four of us

who voted to reverse agreed to do so under the Eleventh
Amendment.
You simply passed at Conference.

Thereafter,;

,.

you voted to "reverse" without stating a reason, and
assigned the case to me.

With the exception of the

abortion cases, I have devoted substantially more time to
Pennhurst than to any other opinion assigned to me this

3.

Term.

Naturally, I wrote it on the Eleventh Amendment

issue as this was the only issue decided by the
Conference.

Moreover, the basic analysis in my opinion

is the same Eleventh Amendment analysis advanced by
petitioners.
When I circulated my first draft on April 14,
assumed your support for two reasons:

I

(i) I wrote the

opinion fully in accord with the Conference vote, and more fundamentally - (ii) you, WHR, and I have had a long
commitment to federalism and to preserving the vitality of
the Eleventh

Amendmen~I

had some concern about

Byron~

because he sometimes has tended to favor federal court
jurisdiction even at the expense of traditional state
Yet, when he joined me, he commented that
is dead wrong.

4.

If you should conclude to concur only in the
judgment and then only on an issue not decided at
Conference, I am left - in the last week of the Term - in

~-f f1 ~~~fo.a·«-cc~
a most unwelcome position.
"j..y.dgm_e.n..t;,,

~on

the

"

..wauld:::r evs,J se...-.-.-

~

-t;t
atl;tot t you would agree

.-r

with John that there is federal jurisdiction)

JfY opinion,

~

would be a dissent.

In

~

circumstances

Moreover, I am concerned about the effect on the
Court as an institution of another case- and quite

an ~

'

important one - in which we fail to provide any guidance
for the future.

This already has occurred in the chaos of

Guardians Association, and to a significant extent in
Bradshaw.

At least in those cases the Justices addressed

the same

at least there the Justices handin
judgment were not

~h~ t~ of

relying

that 5 others rejected for th

~~

1-4, no one will know

If this case comes
what the Court has decided •
.I

~ .J!JtAIB::;.,..

discussing the comity issue.

~ll""

...,

L ~gylg

be at

somethiR~

of • a

~~--~ UA./~~.d!A~s-

loss knowing wh-at positioR to tak.~A ~his Court has never

articulated standards that

govern~~pplica~~~

respond, but it would
to develop a coherent position

* * *

6.

I now turn specifically to the draft
sent me

~~ - ~

~

you

I certainly did not reject

the continuing vitality of Ashwander, Osborn or Gibbs.
Nothing in my opinion fairly can be read to the contrary.
One can argue, as John has, that my opinion is
incompatible with Siler and Greene.

This is true only

because of confusion in subsequent cases as to what Siler
and Greene actually decided.

The Eleventh Amendment

question was neither argued nor addressed by Siler.

Nor,

indeed, did Greene address or decide the Eleventh
Amendment question presented in this case.

These

essentially are pendent jurisdiction cases, and to the
extent they have been viewed

as~at
~

jurisdiction to Eleventh Amendment my opinion does not
A

follow them.

7.

fact is that there is no way in this case to avoid
rejecting some prior analysis, given the confusion in the
area.

John

neee~cO~y

repudiates the narrow : ; :soning of

later cases such as Larson and Malone, and indeed the test
set forth in his own opinion last Term in Treasure
Salvors.

And your own proposed concurrence necessarily

rejects the Ashwander rule here, even though the
unresolved federal constitutional issues could be avoided
by deciding the state law question.

Indeed, the

requirement you propose to add as a prerequisite to the,
exercise of pendent jurisdiction is one that never was
IFlA--

stated in Osborn,

S~l ;fPAGibbs, ~ ·

The point is that

this case simply cannot be resolved by "following

~

8.

~4Yf~~~, ..
precedent"; the issues are novell and some law must be
made.
Thus, I do not understand why the analysis
necessarily reflects a
view fro

~
would reject my

The ~draft

Eleventh Amendment analysis simply on the ground that it
"requires litigants to bifurcate their claims and proceed
in two tribunals simultaneously so that the courts must
duplicate effort" (at 2).

~

Yet your draft goes on be hold

specifically that the plaintiffs in this case cannot have
their state law claims heard in federal court.

In other '

words, the result is that the claims of the plaintiffs are
bifurcated and they are compelled to proceed in two
different courts.

9.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court was quite
explicit as to the requirements of state law.

The comity

draft says that state law must be "unambiguously mandated"
either by "explicit statutory directive" or by a "squarely
applicable state court decision".

This means, I take it,

that there must no doubt as to the mandate of state law.
But this rarely can be found in a federal case presenting
pendent state law issues.

If the state law is

unambiguously clear, litigants would be foolish to go to a
federal court.
.:::J.,...#

It seems to me, therefore, that

~~ comity

approach - in practical effect - divests federal courts of
jurisdiction to decide state law claims where state
officials are acting within the scope of their authority,
just as my opinion would.

Ashwander seldom would be

10.

invoked; litigants in fact would either have to present
their entire case to state courts, or bifurcate their
claims between state and federal courts.
The degree of uncertainty under your approach particularly given the difficulty of ever knowing whether
state law is unambiguously clear - suggests the
desirability of a clear and explicit rule.

Under my view

of the Eleventh Amendment, there simply would be no
pendent federal court jurisdiction when the law suit is
(hv-

against the state.

d..- ~ ~d4~~J

,

This is exactly what we did last Term

A

in Fair Assessment v. McNary, 454

u.s.

100 (1981}.

Despite Bill Brennan's dissent arguing that we should
simply have relied on the federal courts' discretionary
exercise of comity, we joined Bill Rehnquist in holding

11.

that there was no jurisdiction over any challenge to state
tax systems.
The advantage of having a principled
jurisdictional rule is well illustrated by this case.
believe that Pennsylvania law is not clear.

You

Yet, every

judge on CA3 who participated in the en bane decision
~

below believed otherwise.

Almost certainly,

~

"comity

rule" would produce a great deal of federal court
litigation on exactly when state law is sufficiently
"settled" - a result that is wholly at odds with the
"judicial economy, convenience and fairness to li tigant:s ;"
Gibbs, 383

u.s.,

at 726, that is supposed to underlie

pendent jurisdiction.
More importantly, there will be little we could
do to control the application of this comity doctrine.

12.

Federal judges who want to reach and decide major state
law issues will continue to do so, for they will know they
can be reversed only on some sort of abuse of discretion
theory.

In short, your approach may well do little to cut

back on the lower courts'

ala~ iaq

tendency to take

wholesale charge of prisons, mental hospitals, and other
state institutions.
I return to what is fundamental to me, and I had
thought also to you:

the reinforcing, whenever we have

the opportunity, of the substantive character of
federalism.

Few things are more important to that

principle than the protection afforded by the Eleventh
Amendment.
Sincerely,
The Chief Justice

~ 1 7 1 to;" I
J
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BOMB SALLY-POW

81-2101 Pennhurst v. Halderman
Dear Chief:
My thanks for sending me a copy of a draft of a
possible concurrence, and giving me an opportunity to
"shoot it down."

I certainly will try!

I must say that it comes as a disquieting
surprise to find - on June 23 - that from your perspective
I have been addressing the wrong issue all along.

This

case was argued on February 22, was discussed and voted on
at Conference on February 25, and was assigned to me to
write on March 4.

My opinion was circulated on April 14.

From the filing of the petition for cert until yesterday,
I have understood that we have viewed the case - as did

2

0

CA3 and the parties - as primarily an Eleventh Amendment
case.
The Conference discussion focused on the
Eleventh Amendment.

(See my attached Conference notes)

Only Sandra expressed a willingness to decide the case on
the comity ground, and others indicated either a negative
reaction or failed to mention it at all.

All four of us

who voted to reverse agreed to do so under the Eleventh
Amendment.
You simply passed at Conference.

Thereafter,

you voted to "reverse" without stating a reason, and
assigned the case to me.

With the exception of the

abortion cases, I have devoted substantially more time to
.Pennhurst than to any other opinion assigned to me this

3.

Term.

Naturally, I wrote it on the Eleventh Amendment

issue as this was the only issue decided by the
Conference.

Moreover, the basic analysis in my opinion

is the same Eleventh Amendment analysis advanced by
petitioners.
When I circulated my first draft on April 14,
assumed your support for two reasons:

I

{i) I wrote the

opinion fully in accord with the Conference vote, and more fundamentally - {ii) you, WHR, and I have had a long
commitment to federalism and to preserving the vitality of
the Eleventh Amendment.
If you should conclude to concur only in the
judgment, and then only on an issue not decided at
Conference, I am left - in the last week of the Term - in
~

a most unwelcome position that I could not have foreseen.

As you would agree
jurisdiction, my opinion
I would not be inclined to announce a

Moreover, I am concerned about the effect on the
Court as an institution of another case - and quite an
important one - in which we fail to provide any guidance
for the future.

This already has occurred in the chaos of

Guardians Association, and to a significant extent in
Bradshaw.

At least in those cases the Justices addressed

the same issues.
If this case comes down 4-1-4, no one will know
what the Court has decided.

You would be the only Justice

discussing the comity issue, unless fresh opinions are
written.

But writing in the last days of the Term would

5.

be particularly difficult.

This Court has never

articulated standards that govern the application of
comity to pendent state law claims against state
officials.

Yet I suppose John and I both would have to

write something.

~~11
~

~ ~~

me.

* * *

----~~ .~~..

specifically ~ the drart you sent

I certainly do not reject the continuing vitality of

Ashwander, Osborn or Gibbs.
can be read to the contrary.

Nothing in my opinion fairly
One can argue, as John has,

that my opinion is incompatible with Siler and Greene.
But the Eleventh Amendment question was neither argued nor
addressed by Siler.

Nor, indeed, did Greene address or

decide the Eleventh Amendment question presented in this
case.

These essentially are pendent jurisdiction cases,

6.

and to the extent they have been viewed as necessarily
extending that jurisdiction to override the Eleventh
Amendment my opinion does not follow them.
The fact is that there is no way in this case to
avoid rejecting some prior analysis, given the confusion
in the area.

John repudiates the narrow reasoning of

later cases such as Larson and Malone, and indeed the test
set forth in his own opinion last Term in Treasure
Salvors.

And your own proposed concurrence necessarily

rejects the Ashwander rule here, even though this case is
a classic situation where unresolved federal

z e Jll

-

+stl',a.. .

constitutional issues could be avoided by deciding a state
law question.

Indeed, the requirement you propose to add

as a prerequisite to the exercise of pendent jurisdiction
is one that never was stated in Osborn, Siler, or Gibbs.

7.

The point is that this case cannot be resolved simply by
"following precedent"; the issues are novel ones of great
importance and some law must be made.
Your draft would reject my Eleventh Amendment
analysis simply on the ground that it "requires litigants
to bifurcate their claims and proceed in two tribunals
simultaneously so that the courts must duplicate effort"
(at 2).

Yet your draft would hold specifically that the

plaintiffs in this case cannot have their state law claims
heard in federal court.

In other words, the result is

that the claims of the plaintiffs

~

bifurcated and they

are compelled to proceed in two different courts.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court was quite
explicit as to the requirements of state law.

But this

still failed to satisfy your draft's requirement that

8.

state law be "unambiguously mandated" either by "explicit
statutory directive" or by a "squarely applicable state
court decision".

This means, I take it, that there must

be no doubt as to the mandate of state law.

But this

rarely can be found in a federal case presenting pendent
state law claims against state officials.

If the state

law is unambiguously clear, litigants would be foolish to
go to a federal court.
It seems to me, therefore, that a comity
approach - in practical effect - divests federal courts of
jurisdiction to decide state law claims where state
officials are acting within the scope of their authority,
just as my opinion would.
invoked~

Ashwander seldom would be

litigants in fact would either have to present

their entire case to state courts, or bifurcate their

9.

claims between state and federal courts.

In short, under

both of our views the important concerns of federalism
prevail - as I think they should - over the interests that
underlie Ashwander and Siler.
In my view, the degree of uncertainty under your
approach - particularly the difficulty of ever knowing
whether state law is unambiguously clear - suggests the

-

o Itt·, ..t ..1', D\

desirability of a clear and explicit rule. J\ This is -------exactly what we did last Term in Fair Assessment v.
McNary, 454

u.s.

100 (1981).

Despite Bill Brennan's

.- "

dissent arguing that we should simply have relied on the
federal courts' discretionary exercise of comity, we
joined Bill Rehnquist in holding that there was no
jurisdiction over challenges to state tax systems.
would do the same thing here:

hold that there is no

I

10.

jurisdiction over these state law claims against state

l

officials.
The advantage of having a principled

jurisdictional rule is well illustrated by this case.
believe that Pennsylvania law is not clear.

You

Yet, every

judge on CA3 who participated in the en bane decision
below believed otherwise.

Almost certainly, then, a

"comity rule" would produce a great deal of federal court
litigation on exactly when state law is sufficiently
"settled" - a result that is wholly at odds with the
"judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants,"
Gibbs, 383

u.s.,

at 726, that is supposed to underlie

pendent jurisdiction.
More importantly, it will be quite difficult for
us to control the application of this comity doctrine.

11.

Federal judges who want to reach and decide major state
law issues will continue to do so, for they will know they
can be reversed only on some sort of abuse of discretion
theory.

In short, your approach would do little to

prevent the lower courts from taking wholesale charge - on
the basis of state law - of prisons, mental hospitals, and
other state institutions.
Indeed, I think it must be recognized that your
position is unlikely ever to become law.

Even in this

most egregious case of judicial overreaching, John, Bill
Brennan, Thurgood, and Harry have voted to reject the
comity argument.

Their view is "anything goes" - indeed,

as John's opinion makes clear, they will actively seek to
cut back on the immunity of government from suit.

And the

Conference discussion shows that it would be difficult to

12.

get the remaining five of us to agree on a comity theory.
The final result would be truly disappointing:

nothing

will prevent what happened below.
I thus return to what is fundamental to me, and
I had thought also to you:

the reinforcing, whenever we

have the opportunity, of the substantive character of
federalism.

Few things are more important to that

principle than the protection afforded by the Eleventh
Amendment.

The Amendment prohibits suits against States -

and I believe that a suit against state officials to
enforce state law must be recognized as a such a suit.

t, .F P-
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81-2101 Pennhurst v. Halderman
Dear Chief:
My thanks for sending me a copy of a draft of a
possible concurrence, and giving me an opportunity "to

shoot~ it

down. '' I certainly will try!
I must say that it comes as a disquieting

surprise to find - on June 23 - that from your perspective
I have been addressing the wrong issue all along.

This

case was argued on February 22, was discussed and voted on

-

at Conference on February 25, and was assigned to me to
write on March 4.
From

the~iling

~

My opinion was circulated on April 14.
of the petition for cert until yesterday,

I have understood that we have viewed the case - as did

2.

CA3 and the parties - as primarily an Eleventh Amendment
case.
The Conference discussion focused on the
Eleventh Amendment.

(See my attached Conference notes

reflect the discussion in a fragmentary manner.)
Only Sandra expressed a willingness to decide the case on
the comity ground, and others indicated either a negative
reaction 9r failed to mention it at all.
whb \lbttt( fz> vt;lle.(te_ o..qru...c(
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Thereafter,

you voted to "reverse" without stating a reason, and
assigned the case to me.

"fflis is

110~

aft

l:lRim~ortaAt

-

ang I doHet tnae any of ns wonld ha"e granted sort to
....coReider the never clearly

~ertned
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doctrine or comity.

With the exception of the abortion cases, I have devoted
substantially more time to Pennhurst than to any other

3.

.

\

or· "'' 0"'
eeoieioR

assigned to me this Term.

Naturally, I wrote it

on the Eleventh Amendment issue as this was the only issue
decided by the Conference.

Moreover, the basic analysis

sq~~te_

in my opinion is theAEleventh Amendment analysis advanced
by petitioners.
When I circulated my first draft on April 14,
assumed your support for two reasons:

I

(i) I wrote the

fvl~

opinion ~in

accord with the Conference vote, and - more

fundamentally -

(ii) you,

WH~and

I have had a }tong

commitment to federalism and to preserving the
the Eleventh Amendment.

or

vitality~

I had some concern about Byrod

SPI\o\ ~

t; "'~.S

becausel\he has tended to favor federal court jurisdiction
even at the expense of traditional state jurisdiction.

~le4

Yet, when he joined me, he tole me that John's opinion is
A

dead wrong.

4.

If you should conclude to concur only in the
judgment and then only on an issue not decided at
Conference, I am left - in the last week of the Term - in
a most unwelcome position.

I suppose I could announce the

"judgment", since you would reverse.
wi t h

J oh
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jurisdiction.

But you would agree
there i s fed e r al

My opinion, therefore, would be a dissent.
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5.

Moreover, I am concerned about the effect on the
Court as an institution of another case - and quite an
important one - in which we fail to provide any guidance
for the future.

This already has occurred in the chaos of

G-u4 vet;M\S ,ks.so c_; ~'o k.
{Jn•tiee Waite'• ease), and to a significant extent in
Bradshaw.
the same
will know
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* * *

I now turn specifically to the draft that you
sent me privately.

I~itia±±y, I certainly did not rejebt

the continuing vitality of Ashwander, Osborn or Gibbs.
Nothing in my opinion fairly can be read to the contrary.
One can argue, as John has, that my opinion is
incompatible with Siler and Greene.

This is true only

question was

either argued nor addressed by Siler.

indeed, did Green

address or decide the Eleventh

Amendment question pr sented in this case.

These

essentially are pendent
extent they have been viewed as extending that

follow
he
confusion

in Eleventh

confusion

9th

cases now

attention
e response I have made

diss

cases -

_ _ , p.

7.

in the most recent cases, particularly Larson, Malone and
Edelman.

~

~I

do not understand why the analysis in the

draft opinion you sent me necessarily reflects a different
view from mine.

The draft would reject my Eleventh

Amendment analysis simply on the ground that it "requires
litigants to bifurcate their claims and proceed in two
tribunals simultaneously so that the courts must duplicate

yJ

effort" (at 2). ~our draft goes on to hold specifically
that the plaintiffs in this case cannot have their state
law claims heard in federal court.

In other words, the ~

result is that the claims of the plaintiffs are bifurcated

8.

draft says that state law must be "unambiguously mandated"
either by "explicit statutory directive" or by a "squarely
applicable state court decision".

This means, I take it,

"• tbvLI ~r -h tk

~ltff.J,J.e_ .TBut this

rarely can be found in a federal case presenting pendent
state law issues.

If the state law is unambiguously

clear, litigants would be foolish to go to a federal
court.
It seems to me, therefore, that
approach - in practical effect - divests federal courts of
jurisdiction to decide state law claims where state
officials are acting within the scope of their authority
}.;

just as my opinion would.
invoked: litigants in fact would either have to present

~~
"tt
~ Q.,j A I

f f.:o• o-F '~') u,.,f

'·7 t,/

t.J~• ~d ~

11

n..et

•

~· 0 t-9."w4..A
1i

l
'
. ~~- /,._v~ i SSv-c.J wt/f u" f, ".,.(..
J..~J.. e_ rtA~" ~~ ~rff {t..f4o,J thy c~ ~-z-IP~
L
I.

JIJ

JO,

~J'S t

:1 ('
C) " ' ~

~-- (._. o-t-" tJ
~ )'~~
their ent~e

~ C611t~t? r~jl claims be ween
t't It 'I we. IF
f, '1ft(
f j,r
(c.
1k.
~ dflf ~~c ,'"1
{owe-¥ c..ovt- b ,,.c.ff11'"J
~~J -f. ~~l:- of the difficulty
wl,._,(s,(..._ ,C..."-vJ

ff ~"

k

1

1

,•"'..,

~~

1

1~ ~

$~At(_

j t?t-t 11 I

"'

,,......_Titl. tk<tO£/.
courts, or bifurc

their

/jltilt:o

state and federal courts.
1

v"-tlU' )~VY

,.;Jt'fl ~

e>.rt

degree of uncertainti - particularly given
f ever knowing whether state law is

~It
uAamb iguously

- suggests the desirability of a clear

AA~ o ~(.; • t.

~"'~rfvilrl~~

and explicit rule.

r my view of the Eleventh

Amendment, there simply wo ld be no pendent federal court

f.rJ,; ..J.1
~f

u<

J,J

i" ~ 'r~.St-~)~~ v ~(.~41_,

jurisdiction when the law suit is against the state.

Tt..r"'

-t"rf \), S.

tOD

The advantage of having

(tltit);

&c..&r; ~<.. &,(I .Bt'":"~ jurisdictional rule is well illustrate

tiu.su t "YJ"';}. '"I>{
1.1<- J/..,.,IJ Ji-./1.,) f't~
., 11 -11...'- J 1J'-t< Y,u •?

believe that Pennsylvania law is not

1.-e..(J

judge on CA3 who participated in the en bane

of CJ,,..,-1), "'<.
-tt,..J-- fl:vt.. "-'~5

case.

You

Yet, every

~'4 .JC..
J1.-0

:::Y,

jv"'Jiteh1111

otlf..,

~" ffu).(. fo

I ~ 1--k ~jJie-s.

below believed otherwise.
I return to what is fundamental to me, and I had
thought also to you:

the reinforcing, whenever we have

10.

the opportunity, of the substantive character of
federalism.

Few things are more important to that

principle than the protection afforded by the Eleventh
Amendment.
Sincerely,
The Chief Justice

lfp/ss 06/24/83

BOMB SALLY-POW

81-2101 Pennhurst v. Halderman
Dear Chief:
My thanks for sending me a copy of a draft of a
possible concurrence, and giving me an opportunity "to
shoot" it down.

I certainly will try!

I must say that it comes as a disquieting
surprise to find - on June 23 - that from your perspective
I have been addressing the wrong issue all along.
case was argued

on-:}~
-

on at Conference on ::J~
to write on YY/~
April

f .

I Lf .1JFrom the

This

J..-'2- , was discussed and voted

J..

~

,

and was assigned to m~ ,.

My opinion was circulated on

coHuReRoement of this ea:!e wi tfi the i f

filing of the petition for cert until yesterday, I have
understood that aii of us }fave

viewed)\~t primar ~ly

- as

'

2.

did

~~~~ ~ ~m~

an Eleventh Amendment case.

e principal part of their briefing
to this issue, as had the Court of Appeals in its opinion

Mot<e

impof.'-t.ene~er:I·ut~,

I

weul-d say- that- 9 5%

-<If ihef o scussion oR: §'nference) w

Amendment.

leventh

(See my attached Conference notes that only

reflect the discussion in a fragmentary manner.)

Only

Sandra expressed a willingness to decide the case on the
comity ground, and others indicated either a negative
reaction or failed to mention it at all.

You~at ConferenceA~thetlt id~ntifying
~

y~.

Thereafter, you voted to "reverse" without

stating a reason, and assigned the case to me.

This is

not an unimportant case, and I doubt that any of us would

have granted cert to consider the never clearly defined
aHa

iReee~iAabl~

doctrine of comity.

NGr has

~

th ~

With the exception of the
abortion cases, I have devoted substantially more time to
Pennhurst than to any other decision assigned to me this
Term.

Naturally, I wrote it on the Eleventh Amendment

issue as this was

~sely

tae issue

aHa the only issue

~ ~e7onference•. sl'C:llifie•l'-¥ ~the basic analysis in my opinion is

pr ~eely

Moreover,
the Eleventh

Amendment analysis advanced by petitioners.
When I circulated my first draft on April

because

11

o E 1 Mf' respee&i-"'e long commitment to 4be
~~J--·~~~

doetrine~ federalism and to ~~ iAteRdQ~~bY~
tv/the Eleventh Amendment tQ- bQ :f)rouided tbe

.A

,

~tat-e,S..i;i.---.:B -.1.-i..J ..J _

..
4.

~~~~~

about Byron because

~b~

tenQeney to

~e~ral

~or

1\

federal court jurisdiction even at the expense of
traditional state jurisdiction.
me) ~

~k..bcSkPI
Yet ~ ~y joined
~

hQ., read

John'~ eiosertts,~~

told me

that ~

.V'l./

~ John's opinion~&.& dead wrong.
If you should conclude to concur only in the
judgment and then only on an issue not decided at
Conference, I am left - in the last week of the Term - in
a most unwelcome position.

26-page opinion

suppose I could announce the "judgment", since you would
reverse,

R

~t

~

(.~~)

you wonle . be .Aagree ~~ oA- tl.:.le li:lQ•Jeath

Am~ent : i~sue

Jofifl at least to the extent that

wi~b

/A.../

there was no Sa£

to~

federal

jurisdiction.~ I-

am

AOt

su!'e

~~~/~
t...e.~ ~- ,

~5'-M-~

t.U--~)1~

9~ ~~--~
~~

my

cou~
week or more, as this Court has n ver articulated

t.C

standards that govern~i;.R.e applicat'on .. o£ very loosely

Court into July, I suppose I could simpl
actually has happened and
26-page opinion,

tach as an exhibit my
and John to have a Court

.

opinion

ly would be the case - and leave you , ,
opinion on the Eleventh Amendment
Putting this different my announcement of a

judgment, when the

6.

at~ 1-

L-(A;

~~ ~

>-~~~~~

.

o the contrary, is not a position that appeal

Moreover,
concerned about the

institution

of another case - and quite an "mportant one - in which we
fail to

~
guidance for

This already

provide ~

~
has occurred in the chaos of (Justic

and

to a significant extent in Bradshaw.

If this case comes

down 4-1-4,

~

~, no one will be ~e what the Court has decided.
m speaking in the frankness of our long relationship. ;
ould be less than candid if I failed to say that I have
of the "rug being pulled from
by the Chief Justice who assigned the case to me.
ourse, we all understand that there is

1\

7.

ur part not to come differently in the end.
view of the vote and reasoning
of events, this is

I was a 100% faithful)
not the usual case of
as you did,

Justice changing his mi d

properly, in Ruckelshaus where we al
issue debated and decided at the

* * *

Se-mocli~e

.fore.goi:-Rg aspect of" the

~

I now turn specifically to the
~h

draft that you sent me privately.

.

Initial-!-Y-r

I certainly did not reject the continuing vitality of
Ashwander, Osborn or Gibbs.
can be read to the contrary.

Nothing in my opinion fairly
One can argue, as John has,

that my opinion is incompatible with Siler and Greene.

8.

This is true only because of confusion in subsequent cases
as to what Siler and Greene actually decided.

The

Eleventh Amendment question was neither argued nor
addressed by Siler.

Nor, indeed, did Greene address or

decide the Eleventh Amendment question presented in this

extent they have been viewed as extending that
jurisdiction to Eleventh AmendmentJ jnrisdictiol'\
my opinion does not follow

~~has
~----~
of~

been

them~One

toA~~r

of my

degree ef

5".i:taotinn~ ~

purposes ~

ela<ific~n

the confusion that has existed in Eleventh Amendment

cases, a confusion caused primarily by the 19th Century
cases

~ed b~

Jehft

eases now rejected in large

5~

part.~ ~

invite your attention particularly to the response I have

9.

made to John's

_ _ , p.

~

i-n•.ri.te ¥0J.H' at ten treR

(A_

pa~<ti.Qu.la:rl.y toA wha ;~ said in the

most recent cases, particularly Larson, Malone and
Edelman.
I came Row ;--- Cai~f Ju~hat til so

I

~y

is6

do not understand why the

analysis in the draft opinion you sent me necessarily
reflects a different view from mine.

The draft would

reject my Eleventh Amendment analysis simply on the ground
that it "requires litigants to bifurcate their claims and
proceed in two tribunals simultaneously so that the couftE
must duplicate effort" (at 2).

Your draft goes on to hold

specifically that the plaintiffs in this case cannot have
their state law claims heard in federal court.
words, the result is that

~

the

In other

afthe

claims~

A

10.

-

plaintiffs are bifurcated and they are compelled to

~

proceed in two courts

(~t

will have been t'e'qtlired) at the

4\.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court

~

was quite explicit as to the requirements of state law.

~

The~

draft that ¥OY , eftt;me

~
state law must be

state ~ that

"unambiguously mandated" either by "explicit statutory
directive" or by a "squarely applicable state court
decision".

This means, I take it, that state law must be

unambiguously clear.

But this rarely can be

~
~ in a
1\

federal case presenting pendent state law issues.

.

If tge;

state law is unambiguously clear, litigants would be
foolish to go to a federal court.

~~-

It seems to me, therefore, that

~ approach~in

"

practical effect - divests federal courts of jurisdiction

•
11.

to decide state law claims where state officials are
acting within the scope of their authority just as my
opinion would.

Ashwander seldom would be invoked;

litigants in fact would either have to present their
entire case to state courts, or bifurcate their claims
between state and federal

courts.~his

degree of

uncertainty - particularly given the difficulty of ever
knowing whether state law is unambiguously clear -

~

Q•
•
..b
.
c:::L--.&
suggests t h eu;t,
nct&~eflt- to -e 1:1£ oysi:em --ur

clear and explicit rule.

\..

•

HaVll'l~

a -

Under my view of the Eleventh

Amendment ,~ t \iOI:lld--Be6QUle

tl.1e~ aw

you joi Q m ~ ;

if

~

~ there simply would be no pendent federal court

jurisdiction when

state ~ i~ . 17The

~<e~ eet

the law suit is against the
Q . . jjf

advantage of having a

~/;;-::

principled~rule

is well illustrated by this case.

-

~

12.

You believe that Pennsylvania law is not clear.

Yet,

every judge on CA3 who participated in the en bane
decision below believed otherwise.
I return to what is fundamental to me, and I had
thought also to you:
opportunity, of the

the reinforcing, whenever

~~~
doetrift ~of

~

we~

the

A

federalism, SG basic t o-0 ur

revitalize - the principles of federalism.
Few things are more important to that principle than the
protection afforded by the Eleventh Amendment.
Sincerely,
The Chief Justice

lfp/ss 06/25/83
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BOMBS SALLY-POW
·- --·-- ---- -·
discussed my dilemma briefly with Byron,

showing him your draft.

1-1

He shares my concern that

J
Unless~

can persuade you,

I

suppose one possibility

t\
would be a reargument.

There are, however, two strong

reasons to view this as a last resort:

(a) with the

possible exception of Sandra, seven membrs of the Court

-

~

d--.wl.t-h to decide the important Eleventh Amendment issue and
reached decisions on it; and (b) this case

"

A

reargument probably would extend it for another couple of
n the basis

2.

~~

.

of the Court, on

th~ issue,

is unlikely to be

the outcome of the reargument

different.~

I am attached to this letter (already too long!)
a brief memorandum that comments specifically on the
comity draft you sent me.

If you have the opportunity to

read it, I think it will assist you in coming to your
decision.
Finally, I return to what is fundamental for me,
and I had thought also for you:

the reinforcing - now

that we have the opportunity in this case - of the
substantive
1'\

~f

federalism.

~

important to that principle than the protection the
Eleventh Amendment was intended to afford states against
disruptive litigation.
Sincerely,
The Chief Justice
Addendum attached

"

Few things are mote

.. .

---~

lfp/ss 06/26/83
'·

In this addendum to my letter, I now address
specifically the draft you sent me.

~:~~~~~
, . - fC_;

reject the continuing vitality of Ashwander, Osborn or
Gibbs.

~~ ~
Nothing in m1j opinion fairly can be read to the

contrary.

..

One can argue, as John has, that my opinion is

incompatible with Siler and Greene.

•' .

But the Eleventh

'·
< •

Amendment question was neither argued nor addressed by
Siler.

Nor, indeed, did Greene address or decide the

Eleventh Amendment question presented in this case.

These

essentially are pendent jurisdiction cases, and to the
extent they have been viewed as necessarily extending that
jurisdiction to override the Eleventh Amendment my opinion
does not follow them.

'"<.

2.

The fact is that there is no way in this case to
avoid rejecting some prior analysis, given the confusion
John repudiates the

in the area.

~asoning

of

later cases such as Larson and Malone, and indeed the test
set forth in his own opinion last Term in Treasure
Salvors.

a.> c;...t:n.t.e, 66 >~ ~tb~· 1 ~ ~I . . !!:> P<'{:.:=fiQ
And4rour own proposed concurrence necessarily

rejects the Ashwander rule here, even though this case is
a classic situation where unresolved federal
constitutional issues could be avoided by
law question.

Indeed, the

decidi~g

a

s~

·e~uio opoft~P~~/-~
A
A

as a prerequisite to the exercise of pendent jurisdiction ,
is

never was stated in Osborn, Siler, or Gibbs.

The point is that this case cannot be resolved simply by
"following

precedent"~

the issues are novel ones of great

importance and some law must be made.

/

analysis simply on the ground that it "requires litigants
to bifurcate their claims and proceed in two tribunals
simultaneously so that the courts must duplicate effort"

~ _-.J.v>,-~~a~4~(at 2).

Yet

~r

..

draftj would hold specifically that the

plaintiffs in this case cannot have their state law claims
heard in federal court.

In other words, the result is

that the claims of the plaintiffs are bifurcated and they
are compelled to proceed in two different courts.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court was quite
explicit as to the requirements of state law.

J

stt:::;;il =;od
law be

.-'\

But

tA ~

~7-a;~~~~

"unambiguo~d"

either by "explicit

statutory directive" or by a "squarely applicable state
court decision".

This means, I take it, that there must

4.

be no doubt as to the mandate of state law.

But this

rarely can be found in a federal case presenting pendent
state law claims against state officials.

If the state

law is unambiguously clear, litigants would be foolish to
go to a federal court.
It seems to me, therefore, that a comity

)~~~~d-->'waa~{_~~
approac ~-

in ..pr:-a.ctieal effect: "7 divests federal courts of

jurisdiction to decide state law claims where state
officials are acting within the scope of their authority,
just as my opinion would.

Ashwander seldom would be

invoked: litigants in fact would either have to present
their entire case to state courts, or bifurcate their
claims between state and federal courts.

-- -·-·-:----:---In short,

views the important concerns of

fe ~

/"
(

hether state law is unambiguously clear ~ suggests the

,

~

desirability of a clear and explicit

~
~~~~

)

This is

exactly what we did last Term in Fair Assessment v.

{

·.

. .. J

~·~

~~
~
~
~
M-0

~·

McNary, 454 U.S. 100 (1981).

Despite Bill Brennan's

dissent arguing that we should simply have relied on the
federal courts' discretionary exercise of comity, we
joined Bill Rehnquist in holding that there was no
jurisdiction over challenges to state tax systems.
would do the same thing here:

I

hold that there is no

jurisdiction over these state law claims against state
officials.

6.

The advantage of having a principled
jurisdictional rule is well illustrated by this case.
believe that Pennsylvania law is not clear.

You

Yet, every

judge on CA3 who participated in the en bane decision
below believed otherwise.

Almost certainly, then, a

"comity rule" would produce a great deal of federal court
litigation on exactly when state law is sufficiently
"settled" - a result that is wholly at odds with the
"judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants,"
Gibbs, 383

u.s.,

at 726, that is supposed to underlie

pendent jurisdiction.
~

M~J_ t will be
1\

difficult for

us to control the application of this comity doctrine.
Federal judges who want to reach and decide major state
law issues will continue to do so, for they will know they

7.

can be reversed only on some sort of abuse of discretion
theory.

In short, your approach would do little to

prevent the lower courts from taking wholesale charge - on
the basis of state law - of prisons, mental hospitals, and
other state institutions.
Indeed, I think it must be recognized that your
position is unlikely ever to become law.

Even in this

most egregious case of judicial overreaching, John, Bill
Brennan, Thurgood, and Harry have voted to reject the
comity argument.

Tfieir......srim1- is "aRytbing...goes"

:i ndeed,

as John's opinion makes clear, they will actively seek to
cut back on the immunity

5

of{ governmen ~

from suit.

And the

Conference discussion shows that it would be difficult to
get the remaining five of us to agree on a comity theory.

8.

The fi_llal --r-e-saTt would be truly disappointing:

~rl~

I~t~h~u~s ~believe

that the Eleventh Amendment

approach of my opinion is the proper method of

resolving ~~

~ ~~ ~tuzt ~~A~

Athis case.

The Amendment prohibits suits against States -

and a suit against state officials to enforce state law
must be recognized as precisely such a suit.
L.F.P.
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In this addendum to my letter,
cally the draft you sent me.

I now address specifi-

I certainly do not reject the con-

tinuing vitality of Ashwander,

Nothing

Osborn or Gibbs.

opinion fairly can be read to the contrary.

in my

One can argue,

as

John has, that my opinion is incompatible with Siler and Greene.
But the Eleventh Amendment question was neither
dressed by Siler.

argued nor

Nor, indeed, did Greene address or decide the

Eleventh Amendment question presented in this case.
tially
have

are

pendent

been viewed

ad-

as

jurisdiction cases,

and

necessarily extending

to

These essen-

the

that

extent

they

jurisdiction to

override the Eleventh Amendment my opinion does not follow them.
The fact is that there is no way in this case to avoid
rejecting some prior analysis, given the confusion in the area.
John repudiates the reasoning of later cases such as Larson and
Malone,

and

indeed

the

Term in Treasure Salvors.

test set

a

classic

situation where

issues could be avoided

in his own opinion last

And your own proposed concurrence nee-

essarily rejects the Ashwander
is

forth

rule here, even though this case
unresolved

federal

constitutional

by deciding a state law question.

In-

deed, your comity draft would add, as a prerequisite to the exercise of pendent jurisdiction, a requirement that never was stated
in Osborn, Siler, or Gibbs.

The point is that this case cannot

be resolved simply by "following precedent"; the issues are novel
ones of great importance and some law must be made.

page 2.

As a

prerequisite

to pendent jurisdiction, your draft

would require that a decision on state law be "unambiguously mandated" either by "explicit statutory directive" or by a "squarely
This means,

applicable state court decision."

I

take

it,

there must be no doubt as to the mandate of state law -

that

indeed,

not even the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's explicit statements on
state mental health law are adequate.
will

be

found

in

a

federal

case

claims against state officials.

But such clarity rarely

presenting

pendent

state

law

If the state law is unambiguous-

ly clear, litigants would be foolish to go to a federal court.
It seems to me,
tially

the

same

usually would
state

law

track.

divest

claims

therefore, that we both are on essenThe

comity approach,

federal

where

state

courts

of

as

you

frame

jurisdiction

officials

are

acting

scope of their authority, just as my opinion would.

to

it,

decide

within

the

It therefore

is hard for me to see why you would reject my Eleventh Amendment
analysis on the ground that it "requires litigants to bifurcate

- ,

their claims and proceed in two tribunals simultaneously so thai
the courts must duplicate effort"

(at 2).

Your draft would gen-

erally have the effect - as in this very case - of telling plaintiffs they cannot have their state law claims against state officials

heard

in

federal

Litigants

court.

in

fact

would

either

have to present their entire case to state courts, or bifurcate
their claims between state and federal courts.
Although your comity approach often would

result

always would

in a conclusion of
be

the

difficult

no pendent

first

if not usually -

jurisdiction,

question of what

there

is state

page 3.

law.

The difficulty of ever knowing or determining whether state

law is unambiguously clear suggests the desirability of a clear
and explicit rule.

My opinion removes

this

ambiguity

(and the

additional litigation it would engender)

by holding simply that

there

is exactly what we did

is no federal

jurisdiction.

This

last Term in Fair Assessment v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100 (1981).

De-

spite Bill Brennan's dissent arguing that we should simply have
relied on the federal courts'
we

join~d

discretionary exercise of comity,

Bill Rehnquist in holding that there was no jurisdic-

tion over challenges to state tax systems.
thing here:

I would do the same

hold that there is no jurisdiction over these state

law claims against state officials.
The

advantage

of

having

a

rule is well illustrated by this case.
vania law is not clear.

principled

jurisdictional

You believe that Pennsyl-

Yet, every judge on CA3 who participated

in the en bane decision below believed otherwise.

Almost cer-

tainly, then, a "comity rule" would produce a great deal of federal court litigation on exactly when state law is sufficientli
"settled" -

a

result that is wholly at odds with the "judicial

economy, convenience and fairness to litigants," Gibbs, 383 U.S.,
at 726, that is supposed to underlie pendent jurisdiction.
It also will be difficult for us to control the application of this comity doctrine.
and

decide major

state

law

Federal judges who want to reach

issues will continue to do so,

for

they will know they can be reversed only on some sort of abuse of
disc.retion theory.
prevent the

In short,

lower courts

from

your

approach would do little

taking wholesale charge -

to

on the

page 4.

basis

of

state

law

-

of

prisons,

mental

hospitals,

and

other

state institutions.
Finally, as I

have mentioned in my letter, your posi-

tion is unlikely to command a Court even if all of us address the.
issue.
-

In this case - an egregious case of judicial overreaching

John, Bill Brennan, Thurgood,

view on

the

comity argument.

and Harry
Indeed,

indicated a negative

as John's opinion makes

clear, these Justices would like to cut back on the immunity of
state governments from .suit in federal court.

And the Conference

discussion shows that it also would be difficult to get the remaining five of us to agree on a comity theory.
As

contrasted

with

the

foregoing

probable

doubt

and

confusion, we have a Court if you join the four of us who agree
with my opinion.
tionale

is

the

We would hold that the Eleventh Amendment racorrect

constitutional

basis

for

resolving

extremely important problem presented by this case.
ment prohibits suits against States -

the

The Amend-

and a suit against state

officials to enforce state law must be recognized as precisely~
such a suit.

L.F.P., Jr.

,
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In this addendum to my letter,
cally the draft you sent me.

I now address specifi-·

I certainly do not reject the con-

tinuing vitality of Ashwander, Osborn or Gibbs.
opinion fairly can be read to the contrary.

Nothing

in my

One can argue, as

John has, that my opinion is incompatible with Siler and Greene.
But the Eleventh Amendment question was neither argued nor addressed by Siler.

Nor, indeed, did Greene address or decide the

Eleventh Amendment question presented in this case.
tially
have

are

pendent

been viewed as

jurisdiction cases,

and

These essen-

to the extent

necessarily extending that

they

jurisdiction to

override the Eleventh Amendment my opinion does not follow them.
The fact is that there is no way in this case to avoid
rejecting some prior analysis, given the confusion in the area.
John repudiates the reasoning of later cases such as Larson and
Malone,

and

indeed

the

Term in Treasure Salvors.

test set forth

in his own opinion last'" ·'

And your own proposed concurrence nee-

essarily rejects the Ashwander rule here, even though this case
is

a classic situation where unresolved

federal

constitutional

issues could be avoided by deciding a state law question.

In-

deed, your comity draft would add, as a prerequisite to the exercise of pendent jurisdiction, a requirement that never was stated
in Osborn, Siler, or Gibbs.

The point is that this case cannot

be resolved simply by "following precedent": the issues are novel
ones of great importance and some law must be made.

page 2.

4ts
As a prerequisite to pendent jurisdiction, your draft
would require that a decision on state law be "unambiguously mandated" either by "explicit statutory directive" or by a "squarely
applicable state court decision".

This means,

I

take

it,

there must be no doubt as to the mandate of state law -

that

indeed,

not even the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's explicit statements on
state mental health law are adequate.
will

be

found

in

a

federal

case

claims against state officials.

But such clarity rarely

presenting

pendent

state

law

If the state law is unambiguous-

ly clear, litigants would be foolish to go to a federal court.

I

It seems to me, therefore, that we both are on essen-

tially the

same

usually would
state

law

track.

divest

claims

The comity approach,

federal

where

courts of

state

as you frame

it,

jurisdiction to decide

officials

are

acting

scope of their authority, just as my opinion would.

within

the

It therefore

is hard for me to see why you would reject my Eleventh Amendment
analysis on the ground that it "requires litigants to bifurcate ; ,
their claims and proceed in two tribunals simultaneously so that
the courts must duplicate effort"

(at 2}.

Your draft would gen-

erally have the effect - as in this very case - of telling plaintiffs they cannot have their state law claims heard in federal
court.
tire

Litigants in fact would either have to present their en-

case

to

state

courts,

or

bifurcate

their

claims

between

state and federal courts.
Although your comity approach often -

if not usually -

would result

in a conclusion of no pendent jurisdiction,

always would

be

the difficult

first

question of what

there

is state

page 3.

law.

The difficulty of ever knowing or determining whether state

law is unambiguously clear suggests the desirability of a clear
and explicit rule.

My opinion removes this ambiguity

(and the

additional litigation it would engender)

by holding simply that

there is no federal

is exactly what we did

jurisdiction.

This

last Term in Fair Assessment v. McNary, 454

u.s.

100 (1981).

De-

spite Bill Brennan's dissent arguing that we should simply have
relied on the federal courts' discretionary exercise of comity,
we joined Bill Rehnquist in holding that there was
tion over challenges to state tax systems.
thing here:

~

jurisdic-

I would do the same

hold that there is no jurisdiction over these state

law claims against state officials.
The

advantage

of

having

a

rule is well illustrated by this case.
vania law is not clear.

principled

jurisdictional

You believe that Pennsyl-

Yet, every judge on CA3 who participated

in the en bane decision below believed otherwise.

Almost cer-

tainly, then, a "comity rule" would produce a great deal of federal court litigation on exactly when state law is sufficiently
"settled" -

a result that is wholly at odds with the "judicial

economy, convenience and fairness to litigants," Gibbs, 383 U.S.,
at 726, that is supposed to underlie pendent jurisdiction.
It also will be difficult for us to control the application of this comity doctrine.
and decide major

Federal judges who want to reach

state law issues will continue to do so,

for

they will know they can be reversed only on some sort of abuse of
discretion theory.

In short,

your approach would do little to

prevent the lower courts from taking wholesale charge -

on the

page 4.
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John's opinion makes clear,
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on the immunity of state governments from suit in federal court.
And the Conference discussion shows that
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be difficult to
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its suits against States - and a suit against state officials to
enforce state law must be recognized as precisely such a suit.
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In this addendum to my letter, I now address
specifically the draft you sent me.

I certainly do not reject

the continuing vitality of Ashwander, Osborn or Gibbs.
in my opinion fairly can be read to the contrary.

Nothing

One can argue,

as John has, that my opinion is incompatible with Siler and
Greene.

But the Eleventh Amendment question was neither argued

nor addressed by Siler.

Nor, indeed, did Greene address or

decide the Eleventh Amendment question presented in

~ case.

These essentially are pendent jurisdiction cases, and to the

f\

extent they have been viewed as necessarily extending that
jurisdiction to override the Eleventh Amendment my opinion

~oes

~

J

nG-t follow

-

The fact is that there is no way in this case to avoid
rejecting some prior analysis, given the confusion in the area.
John repudiates the reasoning of later cases such as Larson and
Malone, and indeed the test set forth in his own opinion last
Term in Treasure Salvors. / And your own proposed concurrence ~
necessarily rejects the Ashwander rule here, even though this
case is a classic situation where unresolved federal
constitutional issues could be avoided by deciding
question.

Indeed, your comity draft would add, as a prerequisite

to the exercise of pendent jurisdiction, a requirement that never
was stated in Osborn, Siler, or Gibbs.

The point is that this

case cannot be resolved simply by "following precedent": the

issues are novel ones of great importance and some law must be
made.
As a prerequisite to pendent jurisdiction, your draft
would require that a decision on state law be "unambiguously
mandated" either by "explicit statutory directive" or by a
"squarely applicable state court decision."

This means, I take

it, that there must be no doubt as to the mandate of state law indeed, not even the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's explicit
statements on

state mental health law are adequate.

But such

clarity rarely will be found in a federal case presenting pendent
state law claims against state officials.

If the state law is

unambiguously clear, litigants would be foolish to go to a
federal court.
It seems to me, therefore, that we both are on
essentially the same track.

The comity approach, as you frame

it, usually would divest federal courts of jurisdiction to decide
aw claims where state officials are acting within the
f their authority, just as my opinion would.

It therefore

is hard for me to see why you would reject my Eleventh Amendment
analysis on the ground that it "requires litigants to bifurcate
their claims and proceed in two tribunals simultaneously so that
the courts must duplicate effort" {at 2).

Your draft would

generally have the effect - as in this very case - of telling
plaintiffs they cannot have their state law claims against state
officials heard in federal court.

Litigants in fact would either

have to present their entire case to state courts, or bifurcate
their claims between state and federal courts.

Although your comity approach often - if not usually would result in a conclusion of no pendent jurisdiction, there
always would be the difficult first question of what is state
law.

~_____..-

-

-

...

The difficulty of ever knowing or determining whether state

law is unambiguously clear suggests the desirability of a clear
and explicit rule.

My opinion removes this ambiguity {and the

additional litigation it would engender) by holding simply that
there is no federal jurisdiction.

This is exactly what we did

last Term in Fair Assessment v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100 {1981).
Despite Bill Brennan's dissent arguing that we should simply have
relied on the federal courts' discretionary exercise of comity,
we joined Bill Rehnquist in holding that there was no
jurisdiction over challenges to state tax systems.
the same thing here:

I would do

hold that there is no jurisdiction over

these state law claims against state officials.
The advantage of having a principled jurisdictional

~

~
~

rule is well illustrated by this case.
~ Pennsylvania law is not clear.

You believe that

Yet, every judge on CA3 who

participated in the en bane decision below believed otherwise.
Almost certainly, then, a "comity rule" would produce a great
deal of federal court litigation on exactly when state law is
sufficiently "settled" - a result that is wholly at odds with the
"judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants," Gibbs,
383

u.s.,

at 726, that is supposed to underlie pendent

jurisdiction.
It also will be difficult for us to control the
application of this comity doctrine.

Federal judges who want to

reach and decide major state law issues will continue to do so,
for they will know they can be reversed only on some sort of
abuse of discretion theory.

In short, your approach would do

little to prevent the lower courts from taking wholesale charge on the basis of state law - of prisons, mental hospitals, and
other state institutions.
Finally, as I have mentioned in my letter, your
position is unlikely to command a Court even if all of us address
the issue.

In this case - an egregious case of judicial

overreaching - John, Bill Brennan, Thurgood, and Harry indicated
a negative view on the comity argument.

Indeed, as John's

opinion makes clear, these Justices would like to cut back on the
immunity of state governments from suit in federal court.

And

the Conference discussion shows that it also would be difficult
to get the remaining five of us to agree on a comity theory.
As contrasted with the foregoing probable doubt and
confusion, we have a Court if you join the four of us who agree
with my opinion.

We would hold that the Eleventh Amendment

rationale is the correct constitutional basis for resolving the
extremely important problem presented by this case.

The

Amendment prohibits suits against States - and a suit against
state officials to enforce state law must be recognized as
precisely such a suit.

L.F.P., Jr.
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81-2101 Pennhurst v. Halderman
Dear Chief:
My thanks for sending me a copy
a draft of a
possible concurrence, and giving me an op ortunity to "shoot
it down." I certainly will try!
I must say that it comes as a isquieting surprise
to find - on June 23 - that from your p rspective I have
been addressing the wrong issue all alo g. This case was
argued on February 22, was discussed an voted on at Conference on February 25, and was assigned o me to write on
March 4. My opinion was circulated o April 14. From the
filing of the petition for cert until ye&tQ~G&y, I have understood that we ~ viewed the case - as did CA3 and the
parties - as primarily an Eleventh Amendment case.
The Conference discussion focused on the Eleventh Amendment.
{See my attached Conference notes.) Only
Sandra expressed a willingness to decide the case on the
comity ground, and others indicated either a negative reaction or failed to mention it at all. All four of us who
voted to reverse agreed to do so under the Eleventh Amendment.
You simply passed at Conference. Thereafter, you
voted to "reverse" without stating a reason, and assigned
the case to me. With the exception of the abortion cases, ~ '
have devoted substantially more time to Pennhurst than to
any other opinion assigned to me this Term. Naturally, I
wrote it on the Eleventh Amendment issue as this was the
only issue decided by the Conference.
Moreover, the basic
analysis in my opinion is the same Eleventh Amendment analysis advanced by petitioners.
When I circulated my first draft on April 14, I
assumed your support for two reasons:
{i) I wrote the opinion fully in accord with the Conference vote, and - more
fundamentally - {ii) you, WHR, and I have had a long commitment to federalism and to preserving the vitality of the
Eleventh Amendment.
If you should conclude to concur only in the judgment, and then only on an issue not decided at Conference, I
am left - in the last week of the Term - in a most unwelcome
position that I could not have foreseen. As you would agree

with John that there is federal juris
would be a dissent. I would have the
substantially, and of answering you.
Moreover, I am concerned about the effect on the
Court as an institution of another case - and quite an important one - in which we fail to provide any guidance for
the future. This already has occurred in the chaos of
Guardians Association, and to a significant extent in
Bradshaw. At least in those cases the Justices addressed
the same issues.
If this case comes down 4-1-4, no one will know
what the Court has decided. You would be the only Justice
discussing the comity issue, unless fresh opinions are written. But writing in the last days of the Term would be particularly difficult. This Court has never articulated
standards that govern the application of comity to pendent
state law claims against state officials. Yet I suppose
John and I both would have to w~ite something.
Unless I can persuade you, I suppose one possibility would be a reargument. There are, however, two strong
reasons to view this as a last resort:
(a) with the possible exception of Sandra, seven members of the Court wish to
decide the important Eleventh Amendment issue and have
reached firm decisions on it; and (b) this case has been in
litigation already for nine years. A reargument probably
would extend it for another couple of years. On the basis
of the firm views of the Justices on the Eleventh Amendment
issue, the outcome of the reargument is unlikely to be different. The comity issue was expressly or implicitly rejected at Conference by John, Bill Brennan, Thurgood, and
; ,
Harry. I know that Byron also thinks it has little merit and I am doubtful.
I am attaching to this letter (already too long!)
a brief memorandum that comments specifically on the comity
draft you sent me. If you have the opportunity to read it,
I think it will assist you in coming to your decision.
Finally, I return to what is fundamental for me,
and I had thought also for you: the reinforcing of the substantive principle of federalism - especially now that we
have the rare opportunity afforded by this case. Few things
are more important to that principle than the protection the
Eleventh Amendment was intended to afford states against
disruptive litigation in federal courts.
Sincerely,
The Chief Justice
Addendum attached

June 25, 1983
81-2101 Pennhurst v. Halderman
Dear Chief:
My thanks for sending me a copy of a draft of a
possible concurrence, and giving me an opportunity to "shoot
it dO\'In." r certainly will try!
I must say that it comes as a disquieting surprise
to find - on June 23 - that from your perspective I have
been addressing the wrong issue all along. This case was
argued on February 22, was discussed and voted on at Conference on February 25, and was assigned to me to write on
March 4. My opinion was circulated on April 14. From the
filing of the petition for cert until seeing your draft, t
have understood that we viewed the case - as nid CA3 and the
parties - as primarily an Eleventh Amendment case.
The Conference discussion focused on the Eleventh Amendment. (See my attached Conference notes.) Only
Sandra expressed a willingness to decide the case on the
comity ground, and others indicated either a negative reaction or failed to mention it at all. All four of us who
voted to reverse aqreed to do so under the Eleventh Amendment.
You simply passed at· Conference. Thereafter, you
voted to "reverse" without stating a reason, and assigned
the case to me. With the exception of the abortion cases, I
have devoted substantially more time to Pennhurst than to
any other opinion assigned to me this Term. Naturally, I
wrote it on the Eleventh Amendment issue as this was the
only issue decided by the Conference.
~oreover, the basic
analysis in my opinion is the same Eleventh Amendment analysis advanced by petitioners.
When I circulated my first draft on April 14, I
assumed vour support for two reasons: (i) ! wrote the opinion fully in accord with the Conference vote, and - more
fundamentally - (ii) you, WHR, and I have had a long commitment to federalism and to preserving the vitality of the
F.leventh Amendment.
If you should conclude to concur only in the judgment, and then only on an issue not decided at Conference, I
am left - in the last week of the ~erm - in a most unwelcome
position that I could not have foreseen. As you would agree
with John that there is federal jurisdiction, my opinlon

l'''<
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would be a dissent. I would have the problem of revi5lng it
substantially, and of answering you. ,
Moreover, I am concer.ned about the effect on the
Court as an institution of another case - and quite an important one - in which we fail to provide any guidance for
the future. This already has occurred in tbe chaos of
Guardians Association, and to a significant extent in
Bradshaw. At least in those cases the Justices ~ddressed
the same i.ssues.

I

'

If this case comes down 4-1-4, no one will know
what the Court has decided. You would be the only Justice
discussing the comity issue, unless fresh opini.ons are wrltten. But writing in the last days of the Term would be particularly difficult. This Court has never articulated
standards that govern the a.pplicat ion of comity to pendent
state law claims against state officials. Yet I suppose
John and I both would have to write something.

Unless I can persuade you, I suppose one po~si.bil
ity would be a reargument. There are, however, two 9trong
reaAons to view this as a last resort: (a) with the possible exception of Sandra, seven members of the Court wish to
decide the important Eleventh Amendment issue and have
reached firm decisions on it, and (b) this case has been in
litigation alreadv for nine years. ~ reargument probably
would extend it for another couole of years. On the basis
of the firm vi.ews of the ,Tust ices on the Eleventh 1\mentimE>nt
issue, the outcome of the reargument is unlikely to be different. "!'he comi.ty issue was expressly or implicitly rejected at Conference by John, Bill Brennan, Thurgood, and
Harry. I know that Byron also thinks it has li..ttle merit and I am doubtful.
I am attachinq to this letter (already too long!)
a brief memorandum that comments specifically on the comlty
draft vou sent me. If you have the opportunity to read it,
I think it will assiqt you in coming to your decision.

Finally, T. return to what is fundamental for mP.,
and I had thought also for you: the reJnforcing of the substantive principle of federalism - especially now that we
have the rare opportunity afforded by this case. Few things
are more important to that principle than th~ protection the
Eleventh Amendment was intended to afford states against
disruptive litigation in federal courts.
Sincerely,
The Chief Justice
lfp/ss
Addendum attached
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81-2101 Pennhurst v. Halderman
Dear Chief:
My thanks for sending me a copy of a draft of a
possible concurrence, and giving me an opportunity to
"shoot it down."

I certainly will try!

I must say that it comes as a disquieting
surprise to find - on June 23 - that from your perspective
I have been addressing the wrong issue all along.

This

case was argued on February 22, was discussed and voted on
at Conference on February 25, and was assigned to me to
write on March 4.

My opinion was circulated on April 14.

From the filing of the petition for cert until yesterday,
I have understood that we have viewed the case - as did

2.

CA3 and the parties - as primarily an Eleventh Amendment
case.
The Conference discussion focused on the
Eleventh Amendment.

(See my attached Conference notes.)

Only Sandra expressed a willingness to decide the case on
the comity ground, and others indicated either a negative
reaction or failed to mention it at all.

All four of us

who voted to reverse agreed to do so under the Eleventh
Amendment.
You simply passed at Conference.

Thereafter,

you voted to "reverse" without stating a reason, and
assigned the case to me.

With the exception of the

abortion cases, I have devoted substantially more time to
Pennhurst than to any other opinion assigned to me this
Term.

Naturally, I wrote it on the Eleventh Amendment

3.

issue as this was the only issue decided by the
Conference.

Moreover, the basic analysis in my opinion

is the same Eleventh Amendment analysis advanced by
petitioners.
When I circulated my first draft on April 14,
assumed your support for two reasons:

I

(i) I wrote the

opinion fully in accord with the Conference vote, and more fundamentally - (ii) you, WHR, and I have had a long
commitment to federalism and to preserving the vitality of
the Eleventh Amendment.
If you should conclude to concur only in the
judgment, and then only on an issue not decided at
Conference, I am left - in the last week of the Term - in
a most unwelcome position that I could not have foreseen.
As you would agree with John that there is federal

4.

jurisdiction, my opinion would be a dissent.

I would have

the problem of revising it substantially, and of answering
you.
Moreover, I am concerned about the effect on the
Court as an institution of another case - and quite an
important one - in which we fail to provide any guidance
for the future.

This already has occurred in the chaos of

Guardians Association, and to a significant extent in
Bradshaw.

At least in those cases the Justices addressed

the same issues.
If this case comes down 4-1-4, no one will know
what the Court has decided.

You would be the only Justice

discussing the comity issue, unless fresh opinions are
written.

But writing in the last days of the Term would

be particularly difficult.

This Court has never

5.

articulated standards that govern the application of
comity to pendent state law claims against state
officials.

Yet I suppose John and I both would have to

write something.
Unless I can persuade you, I suppose one
possibility would be a reargument.

There are, however,

two strong reasons to view this as a last resort:

(a)

with the possible exception of Sandra, seven members of
the Court

~
w~

to decide the important Eleventh Amendment

issue and have reached firm decisions on it; and (b) this
case has been in litigation already for nine years.

A

reargument probably would extend it for another couple of
years.

On the basis of the firm views of a solid majority

of the Court, on the Eleventh Amendment issue, the outcome
of the reargument is unlikely to be different.

The comity

or
I am

attach~o

this letter

.1\

a brief memorandum that comments specifically on the
comity draft you sent me.

If you have the opportunity to

read it, I think it will assist you in coming to your
decision.
Finally, I return to what is fundamental for me,
and I had thought also for you:
that we have

the reinforcing -

th~ortunity ~s~~f

the

substantive principle of federalism
important to that principle than the protection the

more

7.

Eleventh Amendment was intended to afford states against

~u-~~L,~#R~
{~

disruptive litigation.
1\

Sincerely,
The Chief Justice
Addendum attached
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06/27/83
MEMORANDUM TO JUS'riCE POWELL

From: Mark
Re:

Pennhurst, No. 81-2101

You asked for a summary of what will happen on remand under
the present vote in this case.

The short answer is that CA3 will

have to decide whether the relief granted by the DC can be sustained on the basis of the Constitution.
The chronology of the litigation is as follows:
-The DC granted relief on the basis of federal constitutional law {primarily the Due Process Clause), federal statutory law,
and state law.
-CA3 affirmed, relying solely on a federal statute (the Developmentally Disabled Act).
-This Court reversed on this "DD" Act ground, and remanded.
-CA3 held that the relief could be sustained on the basis of
the Pennsylvania mental health statute.
-This Court now will REV:E:RSE, on two theories:
because

there

( i i)

(Chief)

cise

of

Court's

is

no

jurisdiction over

the

state

( i)

(LFP)

law issue, or

because the doctrine of comity precludes the exer-

pendent

jurisdiction

judgment

is

thus

over

that

state

the
law

state

law

should

issue.

not

have

The
been

used.
-On remand,
the

therefore,

relief can be

CA3 will be left to decide whether

sustained on

the

basis of the Constitution.

(There also are a couple of federal statutory issues remaining,
but they seem clearly meritless.)

.§u:prrmr Q}onrt of t!(c~ro ~tate.S'
~ fringLm.

gJ. CIJ. 2 0 gi)~ ~
June 27, 1983

CHAMBERS Of"

JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

Re:

81-2101 - Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman

Dear Chief,
Although I do not have the opinion in this case, I have joined
Lewis and was somewhat surprised when you indicated in . conference
that you would concur only in result.
Since the issue is jurisdictional and will have a large impact on the work of the federal
courts, the case is important, and I hope there will be a majority
opinion one way or the other---hopefully along Lewis's line.
I
should say that I have talked to Lewis about the status of the case.
I think that Ex Parte Young was a wise decision, and I accept it.
It nevertheless excludes from the reach of the Eleventh Amendment
suits claiming that state officers , who are doing exactly what a state
statute tells them to do 1 are not to be treated as state actors if it
is claimed that the statute on its face or as applied is unconstitutional under the Federal Constitution. But would the Eleventh Amendment also not bar suits against state officers who purport to be exercising the very authority given them by a state law but who, it is
claimed, h~ misconstrued the statute? Whatever might have been the
law before Larson, 337 U.S. 682 (1949), I thought that case had settled the issue:
as long as the officer was acting within the range
of his authority, the Amendmen
suit aga1nst him in fe eral
co~

Even if Larson did not settle it, I see little merit in permitting a suit in federal court brought by a non-resident against a
state officer and seeking an injunction on the ground that the defendant is misapplying a state statute.
The Eleventh Amendment
should bar such a suit, but under John's approach, it would not.
If
it would, however, what about the case where the suit alleges that
the statute is unconstitutional and that the state officer does not
understand the statute that he is administering? That is Pennhurst,
of course, and I agree with Lewis that the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction
is
an
insufficien
re s n
to
ove~e ~E_!eventh
Amendment's bar to a su1t aga1nst a state offfcer'--'Oasea sOlely on
st~nds.

Since I am treading on your territory, I would understand if you
consigned this to the wastebasket.
Cheers,

The Chief Justice

I

.§nprtmt <!Jourt of tJrt ~tll .§talt.G'
~fri:ngtmt. ~· <!J. 202)~~
June 27, 1983
CHAMBERS Of"

JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE

Re:

81-2101 - Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman

Dear Chief,
Although I do not have the opinion in this case, I have joined
Lewis and was somewhat surprised when you indicated in conference
that you would concur only in result.
Since the issue is jurisdictional and will have a large impact on the work of the federal
courts, the case is important, and I hope there will be a majority
opinion one way or the other---hopefully along Lewis's line.
I
should say that I have talked to Lewis about the status of the case.
I think that Ex Parte Young was a wise decision, and I accpnr
It nevertheless excludes from the reach of the Eleventh Amt
suits claiming that state officers , who are doing exactly what <
statute tells them to do 1 are not to be treated as state actor:
is claimed that the statute on its face or as applied is uncoJ
tional under the Federal Constitution. But would the Eleventh
ment ~lso not bar suits against state officers who purport to
ercising the very authority given them by a state law but who
claimed, h~ misconstrued the statute? Whatever might have b1
law before Larson, 337 U.S. 682 (1949), I thought that case h;
tled the issue:
as long as the officer was acting within th1
of his authority, the Amendmen
arrea suit aga1nst him in -

ir

co~

Even if Larson did not settle it, I see little merit in permitting a suit in federal court brought by a non-resident against a
state officer and seeking an injunction on the ground that the defendant is misapplying a state statute.
The Eleventh Amendment
should bar such a suit, but under John's approach, it would not.
If
it would, however, what about the case where the suit alleges that
the statute is unconstitutional and that the state officer does not
understand the statute that he is administering? That is Pennhurst,
of course, and I agree with Lewis that the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction
is
an
insufficien
re s n
to
ove~e _. .:.!:.h~__E_!eventh
Amendment's bar to a su1t aga1nst a state~f1cer"-1)ased sOlely on
staEe-~nds.

Since I am treading on your territory, I would understand if you
consigned this to the wastebasket.
Cheers,

The Chief Justice

.iu.prttttt afltlttt of t4t ~tth .itatts
..asftinght~ ~.

2ll~)!~

June 27, 1983

C H AMBERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

Re:

<If.

No. 81-2101 - Pennhurst v. Halderman

Dear Lewis:
My apologies must go to all for my taking so long to come
down with finality on this case, which I have found one of the
most difficult of the Term. Particularly I apologize to you for
you have labored hard and long.
I can brush aside all the issues save the 11th Amendment,
because I think the case can be resolved on narrow grounds
without overrulin~ numerous precedents on which the Court has
long relied. Under your araft, w~effever a suit is brought
against a state official, a federal court faced with an open
question of federal law would be without authority to base its
decision on state law, even when the applicable principles of
state law are well-settled. John has pointed out this result
requires litigants to b~rcate their claims and proceed in two
tribunals simultaneously, wrth a lot of duplicated effort. I
cannot believe that this is what the Framers of Article III or
the Eleventh Amendment intended.
This case, among others, illustrates why we should not
have 150 plus full scale opinions to deal with in a single year.

Re~£)
Justice Powell

Court ................... .

June 29, 1983
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CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

)

June 29, 1983

Re: 81-2101 -- Pennhurst State School & Hospital
v. Halderman
Dear Chief:
May I respectfully suggest that the reargument of this
case be limited to the Eleventh Amendment issue.
Federal-state comity is a prudential doctrine that
should not even be considered unless the . circumstances are
appropriate. A brief recitation of the history of this case
makes clear how inappropriate it would be to vacate the
judgment below on comity grounds. This case was filed in
1974. It proceeded through a 32-day trial in District Court
(April to June 1977), a decision on the merits (December
1977), hearings on relief and entry of an injunction (March
1978), argument before a panel of the Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit (January 1979), reargument before the
Court of Appeals en bane (September 1979) , a decision by the
Court of Appeals en bane (December 1979), remand proceedings
before the District Court resulting in amended judgments
(April and May 1980), a writ of certiorari (June 1980), two
hours of oral argument before this Court (December 1980) ,
and this Court's decision remanding to the Court of Appeals
(April 1981). At each stage the state law claims were fully
briefed and argued on the merits, and this Court
specifically directed the Court of Appeals to reconsider its
construction of the state statute.
It was only after all of
these proceedings that, for the first time, petitioners
raised the comity question. It would be
1sser ·
to the
orderly administration of justice to as for rear~ t on
this issue, and to send respondents t
state cour( to start
all over again on their state law con entions.
It is also clear that reargument should not
with regard to the District Court's us
f
rs.
Office of the Special Master has been abolished.
In an

)

1

- 2 -

order issued August 31, 1982, the District Court ordered
that the Special Master's functions be phased out and that
he cease operations completely by December 31, 1982.
It
would be impracticable and unfair to attempt to recoup the
funds that have been spent upon the Special Master; after
all, at the invitation of the District Court he devoted
considerable time and energy to this case. Though the case
may not technically be moot, it is clear to me that there is
not enough of a live controversy for us to decide the
circumstances under which the use of masters i? appropriate.
-

Petitioners point out that the Hearing Master's
position has not been terminated; but the propriety of
appointing the Hearing Master is not before us on this
petition for certiorari. The position was created by the
District Court's order of April 24, 1980, during the brief
period between the issuance of the Court of Appeals' mandate
and our decision to grant certiorari in No. 79-1404. The
petitions for certiorari filed in May 1980 did not encompass
the April 24 order creating the Hearing Master, and neither
the petitioner state officials nor the petitioner county
officials filed notices of appeal from that order.
Petitioner Pennhurst Parents-Staff Association did take an
appeal to the Third Circuit, but that appeal was dismissed
by the consent of all parties on July 25, 1980. · Therefore
the propriety of appointing the Hearing Master was never
even placed before the Court of Appeals. Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 3(a), 3(c). In its most recent
decision, the Court of Appeals majority did not consider the
Hearing Master position. The issue certainly is not before
us now.
Respectfully,

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference

.:§u.prmu

Clfcurl of tir~ ~ b .:§taftg

JfagJ:ringhtn. ~. <!f. 211bi.l!~
CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

June 30, 1983

Re:

81-2101 - Pennhurst State School -& Hospital v. Halderman

Dear John:
Your memo of June 29 leads me to agree that we do not need
the Special Master issues argued. I would vote to eliminate that
subject from the reargument.
I am inclined to let the comity issue remain, although, as
you know, my chief concern has been on the Eleventh Amendment.
Response

from other

Justice Stevens
Copies to the Conference

requested.

.§u:pumt <1Jttttric-f fltt 'Jlin:iUb- .§hrltg

'Jlaglfhtghtn, !1. <!J. 2n~"''
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

June 30, 1983

Re:

81-2101 - Pennhurst State School and
Hospital v. Halderman

Dear Chief:
Although my original preference was to limit the
argument to the Eleventh Amendment issue, as long as
there appears to be a consensus to exclude the question
concerning the Master, I will not dissent from an order
which includes the comity issue. -In other words, I am
willing to go along with your proposal.
Respectfully,

J~
The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference

;§n.puntt

Qfourl of tltt~?t .§tltftg

J.fas-fri:ngittt4 ~. <.q:.

20~'!,

/

CHAMBERS OF"

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

June 30, 1983
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE

RE:

81-2101 - Pennhurst State School & Hospital v.
Halderman

It appears that a majority wish to have the Eleventh
Amendment and comity issues argued.
;

!

- Regards,

/ J
LiPv/
!

I

cc:

Al Stevas

\

M 1., ~ft1J.

·

,

.;§u:pumt <1Jttttrlgf

f1tt ~b- ,®mug

1JI'rurlflnghnt. ~. <!f. 20&iJ!.~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

June 30, 1983

Re:

81-2101 - Pennhurst State School and
Hospital v. Halderman

Dear Chief:
Although my original preference was to limit the
argument to the Eleventh Amendment issue, as long as
there appears to be a consensus to exclude the question
concerning the Master, I will not dissent from an order
which includes the comity issue. -In other words, I am
willing to go along with your proposal.
Respectfully,

J~
The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference

.,.

.~

. .:.·

~npunu

"fonrl of tqt~b .ita.tts-

'J!Ilas £rhtghtn. ~. <!J.

2ll,?~ .;l

CHAMBERS OF"

THE CHIEF .JUSTICE

June 30, 1983
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE

RE:

81-2101 - Pennhurst State School & Hospital v.
Halderman

It appears that a majority wish to have the Eleventh
Amendment and comity issues argued.
, ·Regards,

cc:

Al Stevas

~-

-

-

- - - - ----·- ·- - - -

~u:punu ~aurt

af tift ~nittb ;itatts

Jlu.frin.ghm. ~.

~ 2.0.;t't.'

CHAMB E RS O F"

J USTICE JOHN PAUL S T EV E N'S

January 19, 1984

Re:

81-2101 - Pennhurst State School and
Hospital v. Halderman

Dear Henry:
Thank you for sending me a copy of the proposed
syllabus in this case. In the interest of accuracy, I
believe you should insert the words "from injunctive
relief" in the first sentence of paragraph (c) on page
3. The sentence would then read:
"The dissent's view is that an allegation
that official conduct is contrary to a state
statute would suffice to override the State's
protection from injunctive relief under the
Eleventh Amendment because such conduct is
ultra vires the official's authority."
Sincerely,

)-~;~it~
Mr. Henry Lind
Reporter of Decisions
cc:

Justice Powell

.:§up.u mt <!Jltud 1lf tltt ~b .;§taits
'BasJri:n:gtlln. ~. <!J. 2llp'!~
CHAMBERS OF

June 301 1983

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

Re:

No. 81-2101 - Pennhurst State School
and Hospital v. Halderman

Dear Chief:
I would prefer to limit to the Eleventh
Amendment issue.
Sincerely,

(jPvt
T.M.

The Chief Justice
cc:

The Conference

.§uttrtnu

<!Jmtrl of tfrt ~tb ~tldtg

'Jllirag fring ton, ;!I). Qf. 20~'1-.;l
C HAM BER S OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . R E HNQUIST

June 30, 1983
Re:

No. 81-2101 Pennhurst State School & Hospital
v. Halderman

Dear Chief:
While I have no objection to deleting the Special Master
issue from those to be reargued, I think the "comity" issue
as well as the Eleventh Amendment issue should remain in
the case.
Sincerely, ~~

tJv
The Chief Justice
cc:

The Conference

.-

"

<!fomi cf t!rt ~tb .:§t!Ws
~asfrittghm. l6. <!f. 20,?~~

;§u.prtmt

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

June 30, 1983
Re:

No. 81-2101 Pennhurst State School & Hospital
v. Halderman

Dear Chief:
While I have no objection to deleting the Special Master
issue from those to be reargued, I think the "comity" issue
as well as the Eleventh Amendment issue should remain in
the case.
Sincerely, ~~

lA
The Chief Justice
cc:

I
·II

!I
I
I

I

The Conference

r

.:§upunu

/

<!Jo-urt of tqt ~ttittb $Shtftg

1tailfri:ttgtott.:!B.

<q.

2.0c?J!.~

CHAMB E RS OF

.JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

Re:

June 30, 1983

No. 81-2101, Pennhurst State School
and Hospital V. Halderman

Dear Chief:
My preference is to
Eleventh Amendment issue.

confine

Sincerely,

11~'-

The Chief Justice
cc: The Conference

reargument

to

the

~tt}tumt <!feud of

t!tt 1!fuittb ~tafts

'Basfrhtgton.19. <!f. 21!.?'1-~ ·
CHAMBERS OF"

June 301 1983

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

Re:

No. 81-2101 - Pennhurst State School
and Hospital v. Halderman

Dear Chief:
I would prefer to limit to the Eleventh
Amendment issue.
Sincerely,

ch.vt
T.M.

The Chief Justice
cc:

The Conference

I

C H A MB E R S OF

.JU S TICE SA ND R A DAY O'CO NNOR

June 30, 1983

No. 81-2101

Pe nnhurst State School &
Hospital v. Halderman

Dear Chief,
I ' would prefer to have the reargument cover
the comity issue as well as the Eleventh Amendment
issue.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice

Copies to the Conference

.ttf ut~ ~ ~ ;§taftg
'JI'M!p:nghttt. ~. Qf. 2!lgTJ!.~

;§u:prmu QJ tntrl

CHAMBERS OF"

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

June · 30, 1983

Re:

81-2101 - Pennhurst State School .& Hospital v. Halderman

Dear John:
Your memo of June 29 leads me to agree that we do not need
the Special Master issues argued. I would vote to eliminate that
subject from the reargument.

you

I am inclined to let the comity issue remain, although, as
chief concern has been on the Eleventh Amendment.

Justice Stevens
Copies to the Conference

.§u:pumt <!J!turl af tfrt ~b .§tatt.G'
~aglri:nghm. ~.

<!J.

2llc?JI.~

CHAMBERS OF"

.JUSTICE

w .. .

.J. BRENNAN, JR.

June 30, 1983

No. 81-2101
Pennhur st State School
& Hospital v. Halderman

Dear Chief,
I agree with John's suggestion that
the reargument be limited to the
Eleventh Amendment issue.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference

.:§u.punu ~onrl of tltt ~nitt~ ~htttg
2ll~Jag!p:ng-ton. ~. ~· 202J!.~
CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

Re:

June 30, 1983

No. 81-2101, Pennhurst State School
and Hospital V. Halderman

Dear Chief:
My preference is to
Eleventh Amendment issue.

confine

,,,

Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
cc: The Conference

reargument

to

the

.®n:prtntt QJ!turl!tf tift ~b .®hrlt~
Jl'ZU!lpnghttt, ~.

QJ.

20gtJI.~

CHAMBERS OP'"

JUSTICE

w ...

J. BRENNAN, JR.

June 30, 1983

No. 81-2101
Pennhur st State School

& Hospital v. Halderman

Dear Chief,
I agree with John's suggestion that
the reargument be limited to the
Eleventh Amendment issue.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference

.June 30, 1983
:t~· !-.·~'

1..

-~,

:', I,P

81-2101

Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman

Dear Chief
I would prefer to have the rearqument cover the comity
issue as well as the F.l~venth Amendment issue.
[j

~ t"

.!11'\11:;;

SincerelY,

\

'

'

·~i .. 1}~\
I<

\

'

The Chief
!'11,'
·.....
1,\,

··~

f

Copie~ to the Conferenci
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[
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~
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07/01/83
MEMORANDUM TO NEW CLERKS

From: Mark
Re:

Pennhurst State School v. Halderman, No. 81-2101

This case was held over for
as well as the clerk 1 s

file

reargument.

that I

The central file,

have left,

tells the whole

sorry story.
The

problem with

this case,

from our

Chief, who we need as a fifth vote.
the outcome,
cause he

perspective,

is

the

He appears sympathetic to

but has refused to join the Justice 1 s opinion be-

believes

that

it overrules

too many prior cases.

In

particular, he refers to Siler and Greene; yet it also is noteworthy that his draft concurrence accused us of repudiating Osborn, Ashwander, and Gibbs as well.
The Justice would like a clerk to work on a memo that will
attempt to confront and rebut this accusation.

This will not be
~

easy;

the

result

in a case like Siler -- relief against state·

officials on the basis of state law -- will be forbidden under
our opinion.

But the goal is to indicate that the issue decided

in

was

Pennhurst

not

actually

addressed

before,

and

that

the

basic principles in these cases are preserved in non-11th Amendment cases.
What

the Justice would

like

is

a memo

that describes

the

facts and holdings in these basic cases, and traces their history
to present.

In conjunction with this, he also would like a sum-

mary of the cases that Justice Stevens 1

opinion will undercut,

2.

e.g., Malone,

Larson, Treasure Salvors.

We want to show that,

either way, some precedent is being ignored.
rial can be found

in the draft opinions;

Most of this mate-

the goal is to try to

write a concise memo that puts the best light on this matter.
It also may be worth just thinking a bit about the old cases
on which Justice Stevens relies.

Is there any additional argu-

ment for distinguishing these cases that our current draft does
not make?

For example,

Pennhurst-type
could
Siler)

have

suit

been

the cases came down at a time where a

{with

extraordinary

anticipated;

also,

some

relief)
of

the

seem to be "ultra vires" types of cases.

simply

never

cases

{e.g.,

In short, some

"creative lawyering" could be important in fending off the charge
that

we

are

overruling

countless

cases.

In

this

regard,

you

might look at the 2 or 3 diversity cases

{e.g., Scully v. Bird)

that Justice Stevens

these

relief on heavily;

are

have implicitly admitted do support the Stevens view.

the ones we

jen 08/31/83
MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL
From:

Joe
No. 81-2102 Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman

Re:

Here is a draft memorandum to the Chief Justice attempting to
answer his concerns about your opinion in this case.
This draft distinguishes many of the fourteen cases that Justice Stevens cites

as

allowing

injunctive relief against state

officials for violations of state law.
tinct ions
lace,

for

Glenn

six of them:
v.

Field

I was unable to find dis-

Packing Co.,

and Lee

v.

Bickell.

Since~-

packing this up to go to you it has occurred to me that the

Tax ~

a~

s iX..

Injunction Act of

1937,

(~
<
~

the Greene cases and Davis v. Wal-

28 usc §1341, would make all of these -f..:--!1

cases impossible today, because they are all state tax cases and
the courts did not inquire whether a plain, speedy and efficient
remedy could be had in state court.
have already been overruled.
the draft.

So in a sense these cases

I plan to add such a reference to

I send this along now so that you can take a look

the direction I

have taken should you so desire.

a~

I understand

this is the last "shipment."

1

tv

I have not included an appendix describing the cases, because
I

think the content

is generally included in the draft.

Since

the draft relies on the sparse citation of most of these cases to
show that

they have

been discarded,

an appendix

that might be

worth doing would give a list of each of the fourteen cases and a
brief description of the various contexts in which they have been
recently cited.

Except as to Siler, which has been cited by this

,

page 2.

Court thirteen times since 1949 and twenty-two times before, the
list would be fairly short.
is

~

long--sev~teen

pages

Nevertheless, since the memorandum

double-spaced--!

thought

better not to add to its already intimidating bulk.

it

might

be

If you think

otherwise, the information is in my notes for the most part and
could be quickly typed up.

jen 08/31/83
CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFT

)

MEMORANDUM TO THE CHIEF

RE:

81-2101 Pennhurst v. Halderman

This memorandum responds in greater detail to your
suggestion at the end of last Term that my draft opinion

in this case "overrul [es]

numerous

which the Court has long relied."

precedents on

My careful reexami-

nation of the cases to which both your proposed concurrenee

and John's dissent

refer has convinced me anew

that most if not all of those cases are distinguishable
or

have

they

are

previously

been

uniformly old

overruled.
cases,

dating

years of this century or earlier.

More
from

important,
the

early

Few have been cited

page 2.

by this Court with any frequency in recent years, and
none in the Eleventh Amendment context.
I do not think it can seriously be contended that
my draft refuses to accept the continuing vi tali ty of
the

doctrine

of

pendent

jurisdiction

enunciated

Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S.
738, 822-823

u.s.

383

in

(9 Wheat.}

(1824}, and United Mine Workers v. Gibbs,

715, 725-727 (1966}, or the doctrine of avoid-

ing constitutional questions contained in Ashwander v.
TVA,

297 U.S.

ring} .

288,

Both Gibbs

347

(1936}

(Brandeis, J.,

concur-

and Ashwander make plain that

the

respective doctrines apply only when the court has jurisdiction over

the

nonfederal

claim.

The

consider-

ations of "judicial economy, convenience, and fairness"
that

govern the exercise of pendent

looked to only after

jurisdiction are

the jurisdictional prerequisites

of a substantial federal question and a "common nucleus
of

operative

fact"

are met.

See Gibbs,

383 U.S.

at

page 3.

1

725.

In Ashwander, Justice Brandeis was explicit that

the rules set out there were prudential in character,
developed by this Court "for its own governance in the
cases confessedly within its jurisdiction."
at

My draft opinion does nothing more

346.

make

clear

state

297 U.S.

that

officials

suits
for

for

injunctive

official

relief

actions

than to
against

claimed

to

be

wrongful under state law are not within the jur isdiction of the federal courts.

This question was not ad-

dressed in Osborn, where the state actions were alleged

v-w-&:.1
to

be

J t__,_

I

~

uneons-ti.tu.tional,

t"

nor

in

Gibbs

or

Ashwander.

1\

Pendent jurisdiction and the Ashwander doctrine would
continue

to

have

their

full

operation

in

all

other

cases, such as those involving claims not against state
officials or claims that the actions of a state offi\

cial are ultra vires or contrary to federal law. 1
Much the same can be said in response to the assertion

that

my

opinion

will

overrule

the

doctrine

of

page 4.

Siler

v.

(1908)

V

X~
//

Louisville

Nashville

&

213

U.S.

175

~A--/11AJf- ~

/. /

That case A-as- net- eeme- -to b

enth Amendment decision.
~ince

years

R.R.,

se-en'\ as an Elev-

The citations to it in the

Larson was decided

in 1949 g · ve no hint

that it was a considered decision of an Eleventh Amendment

issue.

Ashwander

Rather,

doctrine

the

of

cases

cite

avoiding

Siler

for

constitutional

the
ques-

tions, or for the Osborn rule allowing decision of all
questions
Digest

in a case.

Assn.,

See,

Inc.,

443

e.g., Wolston v.
U.S.

("[T]he general principle [is]
of

statutory

reaching

and

local

Hutchinson

v.

(1979)

(Burger, C.J.)

•••• ");

ground

Hagans

v.

to be

issues.
Proxmire,

n.2

(1979)

treated

before
Siler

E •g • '

443

u.s.

111,

122

("Our practice is to avoid reach-

ing constitutional questions
stitutional

160

that dispositive issues

law are

constitutional

•••• ");

157,

Reader's

is

if a dispositive noncon-

available.

Lavine,

415

u.s.

See,
528,

e.g.,

Siler

546

(1974)

page 5.

("the state issues should be decided first and because
these claims were dispositive,
not be reached"

u.s.

389

429,

(citing Siler));
444

(1968)

(quoting Ashwander' s
Union

v.

Lincoln

cite

Mills,

Zschernig v. Miller,

(Harlan,

J.,

to Siler);
353

(Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
cases,

federal questions need

U.S.

concurring)

Textile Workers
448,

483

(In pendent jurisdiction

"federal courts may pass on state grounds for

recovery that are joined to a federal ground."
Siler

(1957)

•••• ) •

See •••

None of these or any other recent cases

referring to Siler raised any Eleventh Amendment issue.
While some are suits against state officials, they come
clearly within

the Young exception for

state statutes on federal grounds.

challenges

to

In contrast, none

)d-;LJ

I

of the Eleventh Amendment cases decided since 1949 make
any

mention

of

Siler.

See,

e.g.,

Florida Dep't

of

State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 50 U.S.L.W. 5056 (U.S.
1982);

Fitzpatrick

v.

Bitzer,

427

U.S.

445

(1976);

page 6.

Edelman v.

Jordan,

415 U.S.

Missouri Public Health
(1973).

651

(1974);

Employees v.

Welfare Dep't,

&

Even before Larson,

411 U.S.

279

no member of this Court

ever explicitly linked Siler with the Eleventh Amend"'Y~

The plain fact is that this Court has Ret

ment.
relied"

on Siler

as

an Eleventh Amendment

-s
~ather

/

l

~

-t•
~9

case.,

but

A

only as a pendent jurisdiction case.

The reason for this is that J a.s an El..Q.venth Amend~nt

case, Siler was

nrernarkable.

~he

Eleventh Amend-

ment was not raised in the brief nor addressed by the
Court.
there

The suit against the state railroad commission
fell

clearly within

the

doctrine

that

a

state

official acting ultra vires his authority cannot invoke
sovereign

immunity.

The

commission

had

promulgated

general maximum tariffs for the railroads in the state
under a statute empowering it to fix reasonable rates
whenever

a

railroad was

tionate tariffs.

found to have charged extor-

The Siler Court examined the statute

0

page 7.

under

which the commission purported to act and con-

eluded,
We cannot for one moment believe that under
such language as is contained in the section
the commission is clothed with jurisdiction,
either upon complaint or upon its own information, to enter upon a general investigation
of every rate upon every class of commodities
carried by all the roads of the State from or
to all points therein, and make a general
tariff of rates throughout the State, such as
has been made in this case.
Such action is, in our judgment,
founded upon a total misconstruction of the
statute and an assumption on the part of the
commission of a right and power to do that
which the statute itself gives it no authority whatever to do.
213 U.S. at 195-196 (Peckham, J.). It cannot be said,
~

¥---("

therefore,

that

my

proposed

opinion

t 1'1rr ~ >~ ~ 4c-t 'I ' , .
would I overrule

{
j

wflSiler, since the result there could be obtained after
/\
Pennhurst, see op. at 11 n.l2
principle).

~ opinion

(reaffirming ultra vires

bars from federal court only

., "

I

suits against state officials for actions within their
authority but otherwise tortious or illegal under state
law.

Siler did not touch that principle. 2
Most of the other cases referred to by you or John

are similarly distinguishable.

For example, Hopkins v.

Clemson Agricultural College, 221 U.S. 636

(1911), re-

page B.

lied upon in John's dissent, at 15-16, arose from the
state courts, in which the Eleventh Amendment does not
apply.

The question before this Court was thus whether

the state court could, consistently with due process,
extend sovereign immunity to a college chartered as a
public corporation.

The Court merely looked to Elev-

enth Amendment cases by analogy.
Amendment case,

Even as an Eleventh

however, Hopkins fell into the excep-

tion for suits against state officers alleging constitutional
presented

violations.
as

The

"whether a

Court

termed

the

question

public corporation can avail

itself of the State's immunity from suit, in a proceeding against it for so managing the land of the State as
to damage or take private property without due process
of law."

Id., at 642.

(The suit alleged that the col-

lege

bui 1 t

that

had

a

dike

had

caused

the

flood plaintiff's land on the opposite bank.)

river

to

In this

light, the Court's pronouncements regarding the liabil-

page Y.

ity of public agents when sued for
are either

dicta,

or perhaps an archaic reference to

unconstitutional action.
supported

by

references
See

id.,

the

to
at

their own "torts"

The latter interpretation is

Court's

apparently

interchangeable

"unconstitutional" actions
643-645.

In

any case,

if

and "torts."
viewed

as

an

Eleventh Amendment case, Hopkins would be unaffected by
my

opinion

in

Pennhurst

because

suits

against

state

officials to vindicate federal law would still be perrnitted. 3

o II
Similar distinctions can be

found

other cases relied upon by John.
Bird, 209 U.S.
plaint,

on

481, 486 (1908}

which

state official's

Court
acts

solely

were

in many of the

See, e.g., Scully v.

(ultra vires case; cornrelied,

"entirely

alleged

that

unauthorized

by

the State of Michigan" and that in committing the acts,
he was

"acting as a

Michigan,"

Record

private citizen of

at 11};

Reagan v.

the State of

Farmers'

Loan

&

page 10.

Trust Co • , 15 4 u . S • 3 6 2 ,
410

(1894)

3 91- 3 9 2 ,

3 9 4- 3 9 5 ,

396 ,

399 ,

(challenges to railroad rates were on con-

stitutional grounds; also, the state had waived immunity

as

to

the

railroad

commission);

Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270, 288 (1885)
law

unconstitutionally

impaired

Poindexter

v.

(challenge was that
obligation

of

contract); Cunningham v. Macon & Brunswick R. Co., 109
U.S. 446

(1883)

jurisdiction

(suit held to be against state, so that

was

lacking);

see

Lankford, 245 U.S. 541 (1918)

also

Johnson

v.

(suit was for money dam-

ages against state official, and was thus overruled by
1" (
. . . t t I !]),.. A~
y £.J ·-~- f. "'C..L.
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974)).

A

None of these

can be said to be overruled by my opinion. 4
More important, this Court has not "long relied" on
any of these cases.

I have examined the recent history
,.A'

j.,J. -4-

of each of the cases cited in John's dissent and your
"'1 ,_jl
concurrence
I

,./
I

for

I

I

•

•

the propos1 t1on that a federal court

can grant injunctive relief against state officials for

page 11.

non-ultra vires violations of state law.

Since 1949,

when the Larson case was decided, most have not been
relevantly

cited or

have

been cited

for

the

unques-

tioned proposition that unconstitutional action is not
action

of

the

state.

Illinois Central R.R.
(never

cited);

E.g. ,
v.

Hopkins

Lankford

Greene,
(never

(never

244 U.S.

cited);

cited) ;

555

(1917)

Scully

(never

cited); Reagan

(cited for proposition that unconstitu-

tiona!

is

action

not

action

of

state);

Poindexter

(same) ; see also Glenn v. Field Packing Co. , 290 U.S.
177

(1933)

(cited

only

for

proposition

that

Court

should avoid resting decision on state law since interpretation might be supplanted by state court decision) •
~ \The

cases that you cite, Greene v. Louisville & Inter-

urban R.R., 244 U.S. 499 (1917), and Louisville & Nashville R.R.

v. Greene,

244 U.S.

522

(1917),

have only

been relevantly cited once since 1949, and that for the
unexceptional dictum that "the Court has characteristi-

page 12.

cally dealt first with possibly dispositive state law
claims
Hagans

pendent
v.

to

Lavine,

federal
415 U.S.

constitutional
528,

pendent claims were federal).
v. Bickell, 292

u.s.

415

546

(1974)

claims."
(dictum;

The remaining cases, Lee

(1934), and Davis v. Wallace,

257 U.S. 478 (1922) ,have also been cited only in dicta,
and, like the citations to Siler, only in non-Eleventh
Amendment cases in which the pendent claim was a federal rather than a state one.

None of the cases cited by

you or John has controlled the result in any case in
the last generation.
There are several reasons why these cases have lost
any vitality they ever had as Eleventh Amendment doctrine.

As my opinion points out, this Court has subse-

quently considered with great care the extent to which
sovereign

immunity

bars

suits

against

officials

for

illegal acts, and has explicitly rejected the position
for

which these cases are said to stand.

Writing

in

page 13.

Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp.,

337 U.S.

682 (1949), Chief Justice Vinson could hardly have been
clearer:

Id.

Since we must therefore resolve [a] conflict
in doctrine we adhere • . • to the principle
which has been frequently repeated by this
Court • . . : the action of an officer of the
sovereign (be it holding, taking or otherwise
legally affecting the plaintiff's property)
can be regarded as so "illegal" as to permit
a suit for specific relief against the officer as an individual only if it is not within
the officer's statutory powers or, if within
those powers, only if the powers or their
exercise in the particular case, are constitutionally void.
at 701-702.
The Court specifically rejected

the

/7
notion,

advanced

by

dissent,

at 19,

that tor-

tious acts by an officer are not actions of the sovereign

because

the

sovereign

cannot

authorize

a

tort.

The Court noted that as a matter of agency law a principal

may

be

held

liable

for

tortious

acts

of

his

agent, id. at 694, and it rejected the contention that
sovereign

immunity

law

principles, id. at 695.
cise of

should

be

based

on different

"A claim of error in the exer-

[the officer's delegate]

sufficient" to invoke immunity.

power

is

Id. at 690.

• not

"

page 14.

J

t5'

John's dissent suggests that Larson is inapplicable
for three reasons:

first, that the language went "well

beyond what was necessary to decide the case"; second,
that the holding applies only to claims based on government contracts for

property,

per Justice Douglas's

Larson concurrence; and, third, that the Larson principles

should

rather

is

be

than federal,

16 n.l7.

it

not

applied

in

the context of

sovereign immunity.

state,

Dissent,

at

The first suggestion is easily answered, for

plain

that,

at

the

very

least,

the

Court

in

Larson had to decide whether sovereign immunity bars a
suit against an officer for wrongful but constitutional
exercise of a power
U.S., at 691-692
was

"illegal,"

that is concededly his.

See 337

(noting that plaintiff claimed action

but

that

allegation

was

not

based

unconstitutionality or lack of delegated power).
is the only principle in dispute in this case.

on

That

page 15.

1/

,b"ohn has not advanced any reason why the distinctions he points to--the contract nature of the claim
and the fact that the sovereign involved was the federal

government--should

make

any difference.

If

any-

thing, one would think that the far more intrusive extraordinary relief granted by the court below in this
case would be more likely to be barred by sovereign
immunity than the specific performance on a contract
that was sought in Larson.

The courts should be even

more disinclined to intrude on the delicate and complex
task of running a mental institution than to force compliance with a contract.

Similarly, one would think

that sovereign immunity would have even more force when
federalism

concerns

are

involved

rather

than

merely

separation of powers.
But regardless, the distinctions advanced have been
rejected.

As to the first, in Malone v. Bowdoin, 369

U.S.

648

643,

(1962}, the Court relied on Larson and

page 16.

only Larson to reject a "common law action of ejectment,"

id.

charged
land.

at

with

6 43,

administering

a Forest Service Officer
United

States

government

in Georgia Railroad & Banking Co. v.

Likewise,

Redwine,

against

342 U.S.

299

(1952),

the Court

applied

the

Larson analysis to a suit against a state tax commissioner

attempting

to collect

a

tax

from

a

railroad.

The Court allowed the suit because the railroad claimed
the tax was an unconstitutional impairment of the its
charter,

which

guaranteed

it

tax-free

status.

The

Court distinguished a prior case that had barred a similar suit on the explicit ground that there the plaintiff had alleged no constitutional violation but merely
a state-law breach of contract.
As

to

the

second

Id., at 305-306.

distinction,

in

Larson

itself,

Justice Frankfurter's dissent advanced many of the contentions advanced by John in his dissent here, relying
on both federal

and state cases.

Justice Frankfurter

page 17.

explicitly noted that as to the states, sovereign immunity "was written into the Constitution by the Eleventh
Amendment:

as to the United States,

it is derived by

implication • • • • The sources of immunity are formally
different but they present the same legal issues."
U.S., at 708.
ty

opinion

337

Likewise, two Terms ago, John's pluraliin

Florida

Dept.

Salvors, Inc., 50 U.S.L.W.

of

State

v.

Treasure

5056, 5061 (U.S. 1982), ex-

plicitly invoked the Larson analysis in an in rem suit
against
"' [I] t

Florida.
cannot

particular

The

opinion

be doubted

suit

noted

in

a

footnote,

that the question whether

a

is one against the State, within the

meaning of the Constitution, must depend upon the same
principles that determine whether a particular suit is
one

against

the

United

States.'"

(quoting Tindal v. Wesley, 167 U.S.
Malone,

in

discussing

the

line of

Id.

at

5060

204,213
cases

n.21

(1897)).

rejected

by

Larson, cited state and federal cases interchangeably.

page 18.

See

369

U.S.,

alia).
law

646

n. 6

See also Redwine,

contract

bar red) •
brought

at

claim

To hold,
in

federal

(citing

Cunningham,

inter

342 U.S., at 305-306 (state-

against

state

as John would,

officials

would

be

that a suit can be

court against a state officer

for

conduct in violation of state law would thus mean overruling the many cases that say that there is no distinction between federal and state sovereign immunity,
or

overruling

Larson

and

Malone

and

undermining

the

analysis in Treasure Salvors.
A second reason that the early cases cited by John
have not been applied as widely as their language might
have suggested they would be has to do with the broad
trends

in

the

jurisprudence

of

federalism.

Briefly

put, the time in which these cases were decided saw the
culmination of

efforts

after

the Civil War

to ensure

that federal courts would be available to protect federal

rights.

The change

began with the Civil Rights

page 19.

Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13 (current version at 42
§§1981-1985),
470

u.s.c.

and the Judiciary Act of 1875, 18 Stat.

(federal question jurisdiction), and ended with the

exception to the Eleventh Amendment carved out by Ex
parte Young, 209
v. Ledesma, 401

u.s.
u.s.

123

(1908).

82, 106-110

See generally Perez
(1971)

(Brennan, J.,

dissenting in part); Zwickler v. Keota, 389 U.S. 241,
245-247

(1967);

C. Jacobs, The Eleventh Amendment and

Sovereign Immunity 132-142 (1972).

Under the influence

of this urgent need to ensure the vindication of federal rights and having already hauled the state sovereign
into federal court under Young, the courts of the time
at first saw little merit in the objection that some of
the matters brought in were governed by state law.

The

major damage to state sovereign immunity was done, and
the state law matter must have seemed a quibble.
may explain the fact
Siler

This

that the early cases, of which

is the prime example, make

no mention of the

page 20.

Eleventh Amendment,

and are decided on pendent juris-

diction principles.
Since then,

however,

this Court has exhibited in-

creasing discomfort with deciding state law issues, and
instead has developed a heal thy respect for

the right

of the state courts to do so.

The abstention doctrine

is the prime example of this.

This Court's first con-

cern was

federal

that

decisions

state law are not final.

by a

court

based on

It therefore began to include

provision for the reopening of federal judgments should
the

resolution of

been erroneous.
415,

425-426

the
See,

(1934);

U.S. 177, 178-179

state law
e.g.,

issue prove

Lee v. Bickell,

to have
292 U.S.

Glenn v. Field Packing Co.,

(1933);

290

see also Railroad Comm'n v.

Pullman, 312 U.S. 496, 500 (1941)

("The reign of law is

hardly promoted if an unnecessary ruling of a federal
court is thus supplanted by a controlling decision of a
state court.").

page 21.

Later,

broader

concerns

state governance emerged.
noted,

with

interference

with

Thus in Pullman, the Court

"Few public interests have a higher claim upon

the discretion of a federal chancellor than the avoidance of needless friction with state policies •
Ibid.

II

The Court cited cases that it said showed proper

restraint of authority "because of

'scrupulous regard

for the rightful independence of the state governments'
and for
Id.,

the smooth working of the federal

at 501

Assn.,

(quoting Di Giovanni v. Camden Fire Ins.

296 U.S.

motivated

judiciary."

not

64,

only

73

(1935)).

These concerns were

by the abstract

need

to defer

to

state authority in its proper sphere, but also by experience with the practical effect of federal court construction of
Co • ,

state

319 U . S •

counted

the

315 ,

statutes.
3 2 7- 3 3 2

confusion

and

In Burford

v.

Sun Oil

(19 4 3) , Justice B1 a c k r e-

conflict

sown

by

federal

court decisions based on state law in the East Texas

page 22.

oil fields, resulting in special sessions of the legislature,

a declaration of martial

shifting

administrative

policy.

law,

and constantly

That

these

concerns

lay at the heart of abstention is shown by the decisions that ordered abstention even when no federal constitutional
Corp.

v.

question

W.S.

Ranch

was

present.

Co.,

391

See

u.s.

Kaiser

593

Steel

(1968)

(per

curiam)~ Hawks v. Hamill, 288 U.S. 52 (1933) • 5
Abstention is of course a doctrine of prudence, not
of jurisdiction.
for

the

ates.

inconvenience, waste, and uncertainty it ereSee,

378-379

As such it has been justly criticized

e.g.,

(1964)~

cal Examiners,

a

distinctly

v.

Bullitt,

377 U.S.

360,

England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medi375 U.S.

J., concurring).
be

Baggett

411,

425-426

(1964)

(Douglas,

For similar reason, this case would
inappropriate one

for

invoke the doctrine now only because I

abstention.

I

think it sug-

gests that experience has taught that the kind of fed-

page 23.

eral decision of state law advocated by John is unwise,
and

that

the

considered.

early

cases

he

relies

on

were

ill-

They wisely have been allowed to wither.

The Eleventh Amendment commands that the federal courts
shall

not

entertain suits against

against state officers for
in

effect

suits

against

the

states.

Suits

their official actions are

the

states.

They

should

be

allowed only where required by pressing need, such as
that of federal supremacy.

Suits to vindicate the au-

thority of

no

state

law have

need

to

be

in

federal

court, so the constitutionally imposed doctrine of sovereign immunity should not be weakened--obliterated, in
fact--on that account.
Pendent
expediency
override
states

jurisdiction,
and

the

that

essentially

efficiency,
explicit

they

be

should

not

constitutional

immune.

Pendent

a
be

doctrine

of

allowed

to

command

of

the

jurisdiction is

derived from the general Article III language confer-

.•

<

page 24.

ring power

to hear

all "cases" arising under

law and between diverse parties.
725.

By

any

standard

of

Gibbs,

construction,

federal

383 U.S., at
this

general

language should give way to the far more specific language

explicitly

excluding

from

the

suits prosecuted against the states.

judicial

power

The narrow hold-

ing of Young should not be extended to support jurisdiction over claims not justified by the supremacy rationale of that case.
will

require

federal

The possibility that my opinion

litigants

claims,

and

to

bring

bifurcate
them

in

their

state

different

and

courts,

should likewise not override the sovereign immunity of
the states.

As a practical matter, abstention already

requires such bifurcation, but with far more uncertainty and waste

than

under a clear

jurisdictional rule.

My experience in practice suggests that litigants will
tend to bring both kinds of claims together

in state

page 25.

court and will find their rights adequately protected
there, or, as a last resort, in this Court.
I

have indicated that John's opinion would effec-

tively

overrule

Larson

and Malone,

and

the

analysis

contained therein that has so recently been invoked by
this Court.

Your concurrence would likewise overrule

Siler, Davis v. Wallace, Glenn v.

Field Packing Co. ,

and Lee v. Bickell, among others, all of which involved
federal

rulings

on

unclear

believe my approach does
have

not

already

matters of

state

law.

I

not overrule any cases that

been substantially

undermined,

and,

more important, is consistent with or commanded by far
more recent decisions and the teachings of experience.

F/

1My proposed opinion cannot be said to be
contrary even to the spirit of Gibbs.

That

opinion noted that "[n]eedless decisions of state
law should be avoided," and quoted Chief Judge
Magruder•s view that " 1 [f]ederal courts should not
be overeager to hold on to the determination of
issues that might be more appropriately left to
settlement in state court litigation.•" 383 U.S.
at 726 & n.l5 (quoting Strachman v. Palmer, 177
F.2d 427, 431 (CAl 1949)
concurring)).

(Magruder, J.,

Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 545

(1974), which involved pendent jurisdiction over
another federal claim, distinguished Gibbs on this
ground.

Accord Romero v. International Term.

Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 380-381 (1959)
(pendent jurisdiction over maritime claim).

2while it is not entirely clear whether the
Court in Siler considered the Eleventh Amendment
problems of suits against state officers for
violations of state law--neither the opinion nor
the briefs mention the Amendment--there is
evidence that Justice Peckham was aware of the
traditional Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence
distinguishing between illegal actions of state
officials that are ultra vires and those that are

not.

u.s

Siler cites Barney v. City of New York, 193
430 (1904), a case concerning whether

unauthorized action is state action within the
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The Court in

Barney looked for analogies in Eleventh Amendment
case law:
There are many cases in this court
involving the application of the
Eleventh Amendment which draw the
distinction between acts of public
officers virtute officii, and their acts
without lawful right, colore officii;
and in Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, 140 U.
S. 1, Mr. Justice Lamar defined the two
classes to be, those brought against
officers of the State as representing
the State's actions and liability, and
those against officers of the State when
claiming to act as such without lawful
authority.
Id., at 440-441. The reference appears to be to
non-ultra vires and ultra vires acts.

See also

School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U.S.
94, 109-110 (1902)

(Peckham,

J.)

("The facts

show that the case is not one which by any
construction of those facts is covered or provided
for by the statute under which the Postmaster
General has assumed to act

and the courts,

therefore, must have power in a proper proceeding
to grant relief.").

3Also, as the Court alternatively held,
Hopkins was a suit against a corporation with

municipal powers, as to which sovereign immunity
does not apply.

221 U.S., at 645 ("But neither

public corporations nor political subdivisions are
clothed with that immunity from suit which belongs
to the State alone by virtue of its sovereignty,"
citing Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529
(1890)).

4To the extent that my opinion would overrule
any cases, I note that we are dealing with a
constitutional question as to which stare decisis
has less force, particularly where the old
decisions do not appear to have given full
consideration to the aspect later found
controlling.
670-671 (1974)

See Edelman v. Jordan, 415

u.s.

651,

(overruling, inter alia, Shapiro v.

Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), on this ground).

5Abstention is only the prime example of the
federal court's increasing respect for state
adjudication.
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938),
represents a similar realization of the need to
defer to state authority in areas of state
concern.

The deference there was to the state

courts' "legislative" role in developing the
common law, as opposed to their "judicial" role of
construing state statutes that was involved with
abstention.

Note that Erie was of constitutional

dimension, and, that it, like both abstention and
the situation before us, resulted from
dissatisfaction with the preexisting rule.

See

id., at 74 ("Experience in applying the doctrine
of Swift v. Tyson, had revealed its defects,
political and social •

. . .") ;

'd
~'

at 78-80

(constitutional nature of decision).
One commentator has suggested that Erie alone
requires rejection of the early cases that allowed
suit against state officials for acts in violation
of state law, because state law doctrines of
sovereign immunity will be followed where the
cause of action is state-created.

Field, The

Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity
Doctrines:

Part One, 126

u.

Pa. L. Rev. 515, 520

n. 24 (1978).
Federalism cases of the last decade exhibit a
similar respect for state courts.

See, e.g., Fair

Assessment in Real Estate Assn. v. McNary, 454

u.s. 100 (1981) (challenges to state tax systems
must be brought in state court); O'Shea v.
Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 502 (1974)

(federal court

will not hear challenge to state judicial

practices where state procedures could provide
relief); see also Edelman v. Jordan, 415
(1974)

u.s.

651

(prospective relief not available against

state officials) •
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DRAFT

MEMORANDUM TO THE CHIEF

81-2101 Pennhurst v. Halderman

RE:

This memorandum responds in greater detail to your
suggestion at the end of last Term that my draft opinion

in

this case "overrul [es]

numerous precedents on

which the Court has long relied."

My careful reexami-

nation of the cases to which both your proposed concurrenee

and John's dissent

that [] all
previously

of

those

cases

refer has convinced me anew
are

been overruled.

uniformly old

cases,

More

dating

this century or earlier.

distinguishable or

from

important,
the

early

Ac~

have

they
years

are
of

Few have been cited by this

page 2.

Court with any frequency in recent years, and none in
the Eleventh Amendment context.
I do not think it can seriously be contended that
my draft refuses to accept the continuing vitality of
the

doctrine

of

pendent

jurisdiction

enunciated

Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S.
738, 822-823

in

(9 Wheat.)

(1824), and United Mine Workers v. Gibbs,

383 U.S. 715, 725-727 (1966), or the doctrine of avoiding constitutional questions contained in Ashwander v.
TVA,

297 U.S.

ring) •

288,

Both Gibbs

347

(1936)

(Brandeis, J.,

concur-

and Ashwander make plain that the

respective doctrines apply only when the court has jurisdiction over

the

nonfederal

claim.~he consider-

9-

/

ations of "judicial economy, convenience, and fairness"
that

govern the exercise of pendent

jurisdiction are

\

I

I

I

)
looked to only after

the jurisdictional prerequisites

of a substantial federal question and a "common nucleus
\ of

operative

fact"

are met.

1

See Gibbs,

383 U.S.

at

page 3.

,.
'

725. j

In Ashwander, Justice Brandeis was explicit that

the rules set out there were prudential in character,

l

developed by this Court "for its own governance in the

~/f

297

cases confessedly within its jurisdiction."

'

at

My

346.

make

clear

state

draft opinion does
that

officials

suits
for

for

nothing more

injunctive

official

relief

actions

u.s.

than to
against

claimed

to

be

wrongful under state law are not within the j ur isdiction of the federal courts.

This question was not ad-

dressed in Osborn, where the state actions were alleged
to

be

unconstitutional,

f Pendent
I

nor

in

Gibbs

or

Ashwander.

jurisdiction and the Ashwander doctrine would

\ continue

to

have

their

full

operation

in

all

other

cases, such as those involving claims not against state
officials or claims that the actions of a state offi1

cial are ultra vires or contrary to federal law ~1
Much the same can be said in response to the assertion

that

my

opinion

will

overrule

the

doctrine

of

1

l

page 4.

Siler

v.

(1908) •

Louisville

Nashville

&

213

U.S.

175

That case has not come to be seen as an Elev-

enth Amendment decision.
years

R.R.,

The citations to it in the

since Larson was decided

in 1949 give no hint

that it was a considered decision of an Eleventh Amendment

issue.

Ashwander

Rather,

doctrine

the

of

cases

cite

avoiding

Siler

for

constitutional

the
ques-

tions, or for the Osborn rule allowing decision of all
questions
Digest

(,

in a case.

Assn.,

See,

Inc.,

443

e.g., Wolston v.

u.s.

("[T]he general principle [is]
of

statutory

reaching

and

local

(1979)

v.

(Burger, C.J.)

•••• ");

ground

Hagans

v.

to

be

issues.
Proxmire,

n.2

(1979)

treated

before

E.g. ,
443

Siler

U.S.

111,

122

("Our practice is to avoid reach-

ing constitutional questions
stitutional

160

that dispositive issues

law are

constitutional

.... ");Hutchinson

157,

Reader's

is

if a dispositive noncon-

available.

Lavine,

415

U.S.

See,
528,

e.g.,

Siler

546

(1974)

page 5.

{"the state issues should be decided first and because
these claims were dispositive,
not be reached"
389

u.s.

429,

{citing Siler));
444

{1968)

{quoting Ashwander's
Union

v.

Lincoln

cite

Mills,

Zschernig v. Miller,

{Harlan,
to Siler);
353

{Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
cases,

federal questions need

U.S.

J.,

concurring)

Textile Workers
448,

483

{In pendent jurisdiction

"federal courts may pass on state grounds for

recovery that are joined to a federal ground."
Siler

{1957)

•••• ) •

1

See •••

None of these or any other recent cases

referring to Siler raised any Eleventh Amendment issue.
While some are suits against state officials, they come
clearly within

the Young exception for

state statutes on federal grounds.

challenges to

In contrast, none

of the Eleventh Amendment cases decided since 1949 make
any

mention

of

Siler.

See,

e.g.,

Florida Dep't

of

State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 50 U.S.L.W. 5056 {U.S.
1982);

Fitzpatrick

v.

Bitzer,

427

U.S.

445

{1976);

page 6.

Edelman v.

Jordan,

415 U.S.

Missouri Public Health
(1973).

Even

&

651

(1974);

Employees v.

Welfare Dep't,

before Larson,

411 U.S.

279

no member of this Court

ever explicitly linked Siler with the Eleventh Amendment.

The plain fact is that this court has not "long

relied"

on Siler

as

an Eleventh Amendment

case,

but

rather only as a pendent jurisdiction case.
The reason for this is that, as an Eleventh Amendment case,

~was

unremarkable.

The Eleventh Amend-

ment was not raised in the brief nor addressed by the
Court.
there

The suit against the state railroad commission
fell

clearly within

the

doctrine

that

a

state

official acting ultra vires his authority cannot invoke
sovereign

immunity.

The

commission

had

promulgated

general maximum tariffs for the railroads in the state
under a statute empowering it to fix reasonable rates
whenever

a

railroad was

tionate tariffs.

found to have charged extor-

The Siler Court examined the statute

page 7.

und~

which

the

commission purported to act and con-

eluded,
We cannot for one moment believe that under
such language as is contained in the section
the commission is clothed with jurisdiction,
either upon complaint or upon its own information, to enter upon a general investigation
of every rate upon every class of commodities
carried by all the roads of the State from or
to all points therein, and make a general
tariff of rates throughout the State, such as
has been made in this case.
Such action is, in our judgment,
founded upon a total misconstruction of the
statut ~ nd~n-assumptio~ on the part of th
ommlssion of a right and power to do that
which the statute itself ives it no author~ whatever to do._r
--------Q l3 u.s. at 195-196 (Peckham, J.).
It cannot be said,
)

G

(

therefore,

that

my

proposed

opinion

would

overrule

Siler, since the result there could be obtained after
Pennhurst, see op. at 11 n.l2
principle).

(reaffirming ultra vires

The opinion bars from federal court

only~

suits against state officials for actions within their
authority but otherwise tortious or illegal under state

~w.

Siler did not touch that principle. 2
All of the other cases referred to by you or John

are

similarly

over~ruled.

distinguishable,

For

or

example,~Ekins

have

already

b~

v. Clemson Agricul-

,

page 8.

tur al

College,

221

U.S.

John's dissent, at 15-16,
in which

(1911) ,

636

~e

relied

upon

from the state

in

court~

the Eleventh Amendment does not apply.

The

question before this Court was thus whether the state
court could, consistently with due process, extend sovereign immunity to a college chartered as a public corporation.

The Court merely looked to Eleventh Amend-

ment cases by analogy.

Even as an Eleventh Amendment

case,

fell

-

r ·sui ts

however,
against

Hopkins
state

~olations.~The

officers

into

the

alleging

exception

for

constitutional )

Court termed the question presented as

"whether a public corporation can avail itself of the
State's immunity from suit, in a proceeding against it
for so managing the land of the State as to damage or
take

private

property

without

due

process

of

law."

~

/

(The suit

that the college had

built a dike that had ca

river to flood plain-

Id.,

at 642)

tiff's land on the opposite bank.)

In this light, the

page 9.

Court's pronouncements regarding the lia6ility of pub-

lie agents when sued for their own / orts" are either
dicta, or perhaps an archaic reference to unconsti tu-

/

tiona! action.

I
The latter interptetation is supported

inter~ngeable

by the Court's apparently

t

"unconstitutional" actions

"torts."

references to
See

id.,

at

In any case, if viewed as an Eleventh Amend-

643-645.

ment case, Hopkins would
Pennhurst because

/

fe unaffected
I

suits~gainst

by my opinion in

state officials to vin-

/
I

dicate federal law w~uld still be permitted. 3
Similar distinctions can be

found

/

other cases relied upon by John.
Bird, 209 U.S. 481, 486
plaint,

on

which

state official's

(1908)

Court
acts

solely

were

in many of the

See, e.g., Scully v.
case~

com-

alleged

that

(ultra vires
relied,

"entirely

unauthorized

.-

by

the State of Michigan" and that in committing the acts,
he was

"acting as

Michigan,"

Record

a private /itizen of
at

11)

~\ieagan

v.

the State of

Farmers'

Loan

&

,.

page 10.

T r us t
410

Co • ,
(1894)

15 4 u . S •

36 2 ,

3 91- 3 9 2 ,

3 9 4- 3 9 5 ,

39 6 ,

399 ,

(challenges to railroad rates were on con-

stitutional grounds; also, the state had waived immunity

as

to

the

railroad

Greenhow, 114 U.S.

270,

commission);

288

-------

law

unconstitutionally

(1885)

/ Poindexter

v.

(challenge was that

impaired

obligation

of

v. Macon & Brunswick R.

(1883)

(suit held to be against state,

jurisdiction was lacking).
Finally, many of these cases and ?11 of the remaining cases cited by you or John would no longer be possible today because they have already been overruled.
Johnson v.

Lankford,

245 U.S.

~'V
against

a

state

-..

IV-.'!

official,

;-.

t£

and

541
'C..

was

(1918), was a suit

v
thus

Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
isville
other

&

Interurban R.R.,

two Greene cases,

244 U.S.

Lee v.

overruled

by

Greene v. Lou499

Bickell,

(1917),

the

292 U.S.

415

(1934), Glenn ·v. Field Packing Co., 290 U.S. 177 (1933)

page 11.

(per

curiam),

(1922),

were

and
all

v.

actions

Wallace,

257

U.S.

478

to enjoin the collection of

If brought today, they would probably be ~

state taxes
\

Davis

-arred by the subsequently enacted Tax Injunction Act

~937,

28 U.S.C.

§1341. { ;hat

statute directs

the

.,

federal courts
...-

~6t

to "enjoin, suspend or restrain the

/ assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State
law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be

(cu z.
had in the courts of such State." ) Id.

I

FfJ

1

It is difficult

today to tell whether the state law remedies available
then

would

standard,
would.

meet
but

the

there

"plain,
is

strong

speedy

and

indication

efficient"
that

they

That standard has been held to be considerably

more stringent than the equity standard under which the
adequacy of state law remedies was evaluated in those
cases.

Rosewell v.

526 (1981)
islated

LaSalle Nat'l Bank,

450 U.S.

503,

("Indeed, Congress, among other things, leg-

to solve

an existing problem by cutting back

page 12.

federal equity jurisdiction."

(emphasis in original)).

More important, the prior equity standard did not take
into account injunctive remedies available under state
law,

as

the Act

requires

Id., at 534 & n.7

the

federal

courts

(Stevens, J., dissenting).

to do.
Prior to

1937, state statutes commonly provided for enjoining a
tax if it was invalid, id., at 523

(quoting H.R. Rep.

No.

(1937)),

1503,

75th Cong., 1st Sess.

2

and state

courts in any case entertained bills to enjoin collection of taxes or compel refunds where the remedies at
law would require a multiplicity of suits or were otherwise
S.W.

inadequate,
Ry.,

cases).

284

see,

U.S.

e.g.,

530,

532

Stratton
(1932)

v.

St.

Louis

(citing

state

It is thus highly probably that all of these

cases would today be sent back to the state courts for
decision.
them. 4

My opinion cannot be said to overrule any of

page 13.

More important, this Court has not "long relied" on
any of these cases.

I have examined the recent history

of each of the cases cited in John's dissent and your
concurrence

for

the proposition that a

federal

court

can grant injunctive relief against state officials for
non-ultra vires violations of state law.

Since 1949,

when the Larson case was decided, most have not been
relevantly

cited or

have

been cited

for

the

unques-

tioned proposition that unconstitutional action is not
act ion

of

the

state.

Illinois Central R.R.
(never

cited);

Hopkins

E.g. ,
v.

Lankford

Greene,
(never

(never

244 U.S.

cited);

cited) ;

555

(1917)

Scully

(never

cited); Reagan

(cited for proposition that unconstitu-

tional

is

action

not

action

of

state);

Poindexter

(same); see also Glenn [Xcited only for proposition that
Court should avoid resting decision on state law since
interpretation might be supplanted by state court decisian).

The cases that you cite, Greene v. Louisville &

page 14.

Interurban R.R., 244
Nashville R.R.

v.

u.s.

499

Greene,

(1917), and Louisville

244 U.S.

522

(1917),

only been relevantly cited once since 1949,

&

have

and that

for the unexceptional dictum that "the Court has characteristically
state

law

claims."
(dictum:

dealt

claims
Hagans v.

first

with

pendent

to

Lavine,

possibly

federal

415 U.S.

dispositive

constitutional
528,

pendent claims were federal).

546

(197 4)

The remaining

cases, Lee v. Bickell [land Davis v. Wallace,IJalso have
been cited only in dicta,
Siler,

I

only

and,

1}. ke the citations to

in non-Eleventh Amendment cases

in which

l

I

I

I

the

\

one.

\

\

pendent

claim was

a

federal

rather

None of the cases cited by you or John has con-

trolled the result in any case in the last generation.
There are several reasons why these cases have lost
any vitality they ever had as Eleventh Amendment doctrine.

I

than a state

As my opinion points out, this Court has subse-

quently considered with great care the extent to which

\

page 15.

sovereign

immunity

bars

suits

against

officials

for

illegal acts, i nd has explicitly rejected the position
for

cases are said to stand.

which thes

Writing

Larson v. Dome tic & Forei n Commerce Cor .,

in

337 U.S.

\

:::a~:::9), Chi ~ Justice Vinson could hardly have been

\

Id.

(

Since we must 1 therefore resolve [a] conflict
in doctrine we adhere • . • to the principle
which has been frequently repeated by this
Court • • . : the action of an officer of the
sovereign (be it holding, taking or otherwise
legally affecting the plaintiff's property)
can be regarded ~s so "illegal" as to permit
a suit for speci~ic relief against the officer as an individual only if it is not within
the officer's statutory powers or, if within
those powers, onlY. if the powers or their
exercise in the pai.ticular case, are constitutionally void.
at 701-702.
The Court specifically rejected

\

'

the

notion, advanced by John's dissent, at 19, that tor-, \
tious acts by an officer are not actions of the sovereign

because

the

sovereign

cannot

authorize

a

tort.

The court noted that as a matter of agency law a principal

may

be

held

liable

for

tortious

acts

of

his

agent, id. at 694, and it rejected the contention that
sovereign

immunity

law

should

be

based

on different

page 16.

principles, id. at 695.
cise of

"A claim of error in the exer-

[the officer's delegate]

sufficient" to invoke immunity.

power

is

• not

Id. at 690.

John's dissent suggests that Larson is inapplicable
for three reasons:

first, that the language went "well

beyond what was necessary to decide the case"; second,
that the holding applies only to claims based on government contracts for

property, per Justice Douglas's

Larson concurrence; and, third, that the Larson principles

should

rather

is

be

than federal,

16 n.l7.
it

not

applied

in

the context of

sovereign immunity.

state,

Dissent,

at

The first suggestion is easily answered, for

plain

that,

at

the

very

least,

the

Court

in

Larson had to decide whether sovereign immunity bars a
suit against an officer for wrongful but constitutional
exercise of a power that is concededly his.

U.s.,
was

at 691-692

"illegal,"

See 337

(noting that plaintiff claimed action

but

that

allegation was

not

based

on

page 17.

unconstitutionality or lack of delegated power).

That

is the only principle in dispute in this case.
John has not advanced any reason why the distinctions he points to--the contract nature of the claim
and the fact that the sovereign involved was the federal

government--should

make

any

difference.

If

any-

thing, one would think that the far more intrusive extraordinary relief granted by the court below in this
case would be more likely to be barred by sovereign
immunity than the specific performance on a contract
that was sought in Larson.

The courts should be even

more disinclined to intrude on the delicate and complex
task of running a mental institution than to force compliance with a contract.

Similarly, one would think

that sovereign immunity would have even more force when
federalism

concerns

separation of powers.

are

involved

rather

than

merely

page 18.

But regardless, the distinctions advanced have been
rejected.

As to the first,

U.S.

648

643,

(1962),

in Malone v. Bowdoin, 369

the Court relied on Larson and

only Larson to reject a "common law action of ejectment,"

id.

charged
land.

at

with

643,

a Forest Service Officer

administering

United

States

government

in Georgia Railroad & Banking Co. v.

Likewise,

Redwine,

against

342 U.S.

299

(1952),

the Court

applied

the

Larson analysis to a suit against a state tax commiss ioner

at tempting

to collect

a

tax

from

a

railroad.

The Court allowed the suit because the railroad claimed
the tax was an unconstitutional impairment of the its
charter,

which

guaranteed

it

tax-free

status.

The

Court distinguished a prior case that had barred a similar suit on the explicit ground that there the plaintiff had alleged no constitutional violation but merely
a state-law breach of contract.

Id., at 305-306.

page 19.

As

to

the

second

distinction,

in

Larson

itself,

Justice Frankfurter's dissent advanced many of the contentions advanced by John in his dissent here, relying
on both federal

and state cases.

Justice Frankfurter

explicitly noted that as to the states, sovereign immunity "was written into the Constitution by the Eleventh
Amendment;

as

to the United States,

it

is derived by

implication • • • . The sources of immunity are formally
different but they present the same legal issues."

u.s.,
ty

at 708.

opinion

337

Likewise, two Terms ago, John's pluraliin

Florida

Dept.

of

State

v.

Treasure

Salvors, Inc., 50 U.S.L.W. 5056, 5061 (U.S. 1982), explicitly invoked the Larson analysis in an in rem suit
against
"' [I] t

Florida.
cannot

particular

The

opinion

be doubted

suit

noted

in

a

footnote,

that the question whether

a

is one against the State, within the

meaning of the Constitution, must depend upon the same
principles that determine whether a particular suit is

page 20.

one

against

the

United

Id.

States.'"

(quoting Tindal v. Wesley, 167 U.S.
Malone,

in

discussing

the

line

of

204,
cases

at

5060

213

n.21

(1897)).

rejected

by

Larson, cited state and federal cases interchangeably.
See

369

alia).
law

U•S • ,

6 46 n • 6

( c i t in g

Cunningham ,

i nt e r

See also Redwine, 342 U.S., at 305-306 (state-

contract

barred).
brought

at

claim

To hold,
in

federal

against

state

as John would,

officials

would

be

that a suit can be

court against a state officer for

conduct in violation of state law would thus mean overruling

the many cases that say that there is no dis-

tinction between federal and state sovereign immunity,
or

overruling

Larson

and Malone

and

undermining

the

analysis in Treasure Salvors.
A second reason that the early cases cited by John
have not been applied as widely as their language might
have suggested they would be has to do with the broad
trends

in

the

jurisprudence

of

federalism.

Briefly

page 21.

put, the time in which these cases were decided saw the
culmination of

efforts after

the Civil war

to ensure

that federal courts would be available to protect federal

rights.

The change

began with the Civil Rights

Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13 (current version at 42 U.S.C.
§§1981-1985), and the Judiciary Act of 1875, 18 Stat.
470

(federal question jurisdiction), and ended with the

exception to the Eleventh Amendment carved out by Ex
parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
v. Ledesma,

401

u.s.

82, 106-110

dissenting in part);
245-247

(1967);

Sovereign
Young,

c.

Immunity

See generally Perez
(1971)

Zwickler v. Keota,

(Brennan, J.,
389 U.S.

241,

Jacobs, The Eleventh Amendment and
132-142

in particular,

(1972).

The

holding

in

"permitted the Civil War Amend-

ments to the Constitution to serve as a sword, rather
than merely as a shield, for those whom they were designed to protect."

Edelman,

415

u.s.

at 664.

Under

the influence of this urgent need to ensure the vindi-

page 22.

cation of federal rights and having already hauled the
state

sovereign

courts of

the

into

time

federal

at

first

court

under

Young,

saw little merit

the

in the

objection that some of the matters brought in were governed by state law.

The major damage to state sover-

eign immunity was done, and the state law matter must
have seemed a quibble.

This may explain the fact that

the early cases, of which Siler is the prime example,
make

no mention of

the Eleventh Amendment,

and

are

decided on pendent jurisdiction principles.
Since then,

however,

this Court has exhibited in-

creasing discomfort with deciding state law issues, and
instead has developed a healthy respect for

the right

of the state courts to do so.

The abstention doctrine

is the prime example of this.

This Court's first con-

cern was

federal

that

decisions

state law are not final.

by a

court based on

It therefore began to include

provision for the reopening of federal judgments should

page 23.

the

resolution of

been erroneous.

the state law

issue prove

to have

See, e.g., Lee v. Bickell, 292 u.s.[Jat

425-4 26[; Glenn v. Field Packing Co. , 290 U.S.~
J\ 178-179;

,

see also Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman, 312 U.S. 496, 500
(1941)

("The reign of law is hardly promoted if an un-

necessary ruling of a federal court is thus supplanted
by a controlling decision of a state court.").
Later,

broader

concerns

state governance emerged.

with

interference

with

Thus in Pullman, the Court

noted, "Few public interests have a higher claim upon
the discretion of a federal chancellor than the avoidance of needless friction with state policies •
Ibid.

"

The Court cited cases that it said showed proper

restraint of authority "because of

'scrupulous regard

for the rightful independence of the state governments'
and for the smooth working of the federal
Id.,

at 501

Assn.,

judiciary."

(quoting Di Giovanni v. Camden Fire Ins.

296 u.s.

64,

73

(1935)).

These concerns were

page 24.

motivated

not

only

by the

abstract

need

to defer

to

state authority in its proper sphere, but also by experience with the practical effect of federal court construction of
Co.,

u.s.

319

counted

state

the

315,

statute~Burford
327-332

confusion

and

v.

Sun Oil

(1943}, Justice Black reconflict

sown

by

federal

court decisions based on state law in the East Texas
oil fields, resulting in special sessions of the legislature,
shifting

a

declaration of martial
administrative

policy. j

law,

and

constantly

That

these

concerns

and not merely avoiding constitutional questions lay at
the heart of abstention is shown by the decisions that
ordered abstention even when no federal constitutional
question was present.
Ranch Co.,

391

u.s.

See Kaiser Steel Corp. v. W.S.

593

(1968}

(per curiam}; Hawks v.

Ham i 11 , 2 8 8 u . S • 52 (19 3 3 } • 5
Abstention is of course a doctrine of prudence, not
of jurisdiction.

As such it has been justly criticized

page 25.

for

the

ates.

inconvenience, waste, and uncertainty it ereSee,

e.g.,

Baggett v.

Bullitt,

377

u.s.

360,

378-379 (1964); England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners,
J.,
be

375 U.S.

concurring).
a distinctly

411,

425-426

(1964)

(Douglas,

For similar reason, this case would
inappropriate one

for

invoke the doctrine now only because I

abstention.

I

think it sug-

gests that experience has taught that the kind of federal decision of state law advocated by John is unwise,
and

that

considered.

the

early

he

relies

on

were

ill-

They wisely have been allowed to wither.

The Eleventh Amendment
shall

cases

comma~s

that the federal courts

not entertain suits against

the states.

Suits

against state officers for their official actions are
in effect

suits

against

the

They should

states.

be

allowed only where required by pressing need, such as
that of federal supremacy.

Suits to vindicate the au-

thor i ty of

no

state

law

have

need

to

be

in

federal

page 26.

court, so the constitutionally imposed doctrine of sovereign immunity should not be weakened--obliterated, in
fact--on that account.
Pendent
expediency
override
states

jurisdiction,
and

the

that

essentially

efficiency,
explicit

they be

should

not

constitutional

immune.

Pendent

derived from the general Article I I I
ring

power

to hear

a

doctrine

of

allowed

to

be

command

of

the

jurisdiction is
language confer-

all "cases" arising under

federal

\
law and between diverse parties.
725.

By

any

standard

of

Gibbs,

construction,

383 U.S., at
this

general

language should give way to the far more specific language

explicitly

excluding

from

the

suits prosecuted against the states.

judicial

power

The narrow hold-

ing of Young should not be extended to support jurisdiction over claims not justified by the supremacy rationale of that case.
will

require

litigants

The possibility that my opinion
to

bifurcate

their

state

and

I
)

page 27.

federal

claims,

and

bring

them

in different courts,

should likewise not override the sovereign immunity of
the states.

As a practical matter, abstention already

requires such bifurcation, but with far more uncertainty and waste than under a clear jurisdictional rule.
My experience in practice suggests that litigants will
tend to bring both kinds of claims together in state
court and will find their rights adequately protected
there, or, as a last resort, in this Court.
If John's approach prevails, the Eleventh Amendment
would be left as an effective bar to only two narrow
classes of actions:

diversity cases against state of-

ficials, and suits for damages against state officials.
The first class of cases is insignificant, since in my
experience

any

lawyer

can

come

up

with

a

"substantial," though meritless, federal question that
will get most state-law issues into federal court under
pendent jurisdiction.

I suspect that the second bar to

page 28.

actions against state officers--a bar raised by Edelman
v. Jordan--would not be long-lived, because John's dissent would remove the principle underlying it.

Edelman

v. Jordan can only sensibly be seen as an elaboration
on

the

Young

doctrine:

it

finds

Young

necessary

in

order to allow the Civil War Amendments "to serve as a
sword,

rather

than merely as a shield,"

415 U.S.,

at

664, but holds that damage actions are not essential to
that purpose.
distinguish
seeking

Extending the line drawn in Edelman to

state-law

injunctions

support.

suits

would

for

be

damages

without

from

any

those

principled

If a state officer is stripped of his author-

ity when he acts illegally in injunctive actions, the
theory on which John's dissent relies, there is no reason

he

is

not

stripped

seeking damages.
action,

he

is

dissent--and,

of

his

authority

in

actions

If he is a private actor in the one
as

by

well

in

the

implication,

other.

your

Thus,

John's

concur renee--would

page 29.

substantially

undermine Edelman

and

the

cases

relied

upon there, and would leave the Eleventh Amendment with
virtually no present force.
I

have

indicated

that

John's

opinion

would

also

effectively overrule Larson and Malone, and the analysis contained therein that has so recently been invoked
by this Court.
rule Siler,
Co.,

law.
that

Davis v. Wallace, Glenn v.

and Lee

involved

Your concurrence would likewise over-

v.

federal

Bickell,

among others,

Field Packing
all of which

rulings on unclear matters of

state

I believe my approach does not overrule any cases
have

not

already

been substantially

undermined,

and, more important, is consistent with or commanded by
far more recent decisions and the teachings of experience.

Fl

lMy proposed opinion cannot be said to be
contrary even to the spirit of Gibbs.

That

opinion noted that "[n]eedless decisions of state
law should be avoided," and quoted Chief Judge
Magruder's view that "' [f]ederal courts should not
be overeager to hold on to the determination of
issues that might be more appropriately left to
settlement in state court litigation.'" 383 U.S.
at 726 & n.l5 (quoting Strachman v. Palmer, 177
F.2d 427, 431 (CAl 1949}
concurring}}.

(Magruder, J.,

Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 545

(1974}, which involved pendent jurisdiction over
another federal claim, distinguished Gibbs on this
ground.

Accord Romero v. International Term.

Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 380-381 (1959}
(pendent jurisdiction over maritime claim}.

2while it is not entirely clear whether the
Court in Siler considered the Eleventh Amendment
problems of suits against state officers for
violations of state law--neither the opinion nor
the briefs mention the Amendment--there is
evidence that Justice Peckham was aware of the
traditional Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence
distinguishing between illegal actions of state
officials that are ultra vires and those that are

not.

u.s

Siler cites Barney v. City of New York, 193
430 (1904), a case concerning whether

unauthorized action is state action within the
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The Court in

Barney looked for analogies in Eleventh Amendment
case law:
There are many cases in this court
involving the application of the
Eleventh Amendment which draw the
distinction between acts of public
officers virtute officii, and their acts
without lawful right, colore officii;
and in Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, 140 U.
S. 1, Mr. Justice Lamar defined the two
classes to be, those brought against
officers of the State as representing
the State's actions and liability, and
those against officers of the State when
claiming to act as such without lawful
authority.
Id., at 440-441. The reference appears to be to
non-ultra vires and ultra vires acts.

See also

School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U.S.
94, 109-110 (1902)

(Peckham, J.)

("The facts

show that the case is not one which by any
construction of those facts is covered or provided
for by the statute under which the Postmaster
General has assumed to act

and the courts,

therefore, must have power in a proper proceeding
to grant relief.").

3Also, as the Court alternatively held,
Hopkins was a suit against a corporation with

F3

municipal powers, as to which sovereign immunity
does not apply.

221 U.S., at 645 {"But neither

public corporations nor political subdivisions are
clothed with that immunity from suit which belongs
to the State alone by virtue of its sovereignty,"
citing Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529
{1890)).

4To the extent that my opinion would overrule
any cases, I note that we are dealing with a
constitutional question as to which stare decisis
has less force, particularly where the old
decisions do not appear to have given full
consideration to the aspect later found
controlling.
670-671 {1974)

See Edelman v. Jordan, 415

u.s.

651,

{overruling, inter alia, Shapiro v.

Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 {1969), on this ground).

~

5Abstention is only the prime example of this
Court's increasing respect for state adjudication.
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 {1938),
represents a similar realization of the need to
defer to state authority in areas of state
concern.

The deference there was to the state

courts' "legislative" role in developing the

,

ry
common law, as opposed to their "judicial" role of
construing state statutes that was involved with
abstention.

Note that Erie was of constitutional

dimension, and, that it, like both abstention and
the situation before us, resulted from
dissatisfaction with the preexisting rule.

See

id., at 74 ("Experience in applying the doctrine
of Swift v. Tyson, had revealed its defects,
political and social . • • • "); id., at 78-80
(constitutional nature of decision).
One commentator has suggested that Erie alone
requires rejection of the early cases that allowed
suit against state officials for acts in violation
of state law, because state law doctrines of
sovereign immunity will be followed where the
cause of action is state-created.

Field, The

Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity
Doctrines:

Part One, 126 U. Pa. L. Rev. 515, 520

j

!

n. 24 (1978).
Federalism cases of the last decade exhibit a
similar respect for state courts.

See, e.g., Fair

Assessment in Real Estate Assn. v. McNary, 454
U.S. 100 (1981)

(§1983 challenges to state tax

systems must be brought in state court); O'Shea v.
Littleton, 414

u.s. 488, 502 (1974) (federal court

will not hear challenge to state judicial
practices where state procedures could provide

,

relief); see also Edelman v. Jordan,. 415
(1974)

u.s.

651

(prospective relief not available against

state officials).
At about the same time that this Court began
to cut back on federal court decision of state-law
questions, and prompted by the same concerns,
Congress similarly began to limit federal
jurisdiction to issue orders against state
officials.

See Tax Injunction Act of 1937, 28

U.S.C. §1341; Johnson Act of 1934, 28

u.s.c.

§1342

(barring federal injunctions against state utility
ratemaking orders); see also Rosewell v. LaSalle
Nat'l Bank, 450

u.s.,

at 527 ("the reasons

supporting noninterference [with state tax
administration] are as compelling today as they
were in 1937":

state tax administration might be

thrown into disarray, collection of revenue might
be obstructed, state law issues should be
in state court) .

decided ~

,
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PENN SALLY-POW
Pennhurst
~~a..-1......:

The purpose of this memo is to reexamine -

~

-1

refresh my recollection
the CJ declined to join.

-T

my opinion last Term that

What follows is a rough outline

of the opinion in its fifth draft.
)'t.u._

..9 ~ ~

~--~- 4-~~ . ~..
I

'?~-/-:£_

~ )<eviews satisfactorily the history of this

prolonged litigation.
Important to our decision here, is the fact that
CA3 - the decision before us - held that the Pennsylvania
statute supported its prior judgment, and therefore it was
unnecessary to reach the federal law issues.

CA3 then

M..t_~~
rejected the ll~h Amendm~n t barred a federal court from
./\

2.

t!Qn.~,
considering this pendent state law

c~.

It also

1\

rejected the abstention argument based on comity.

II
Petitioners presented three grounds for
reversal, including the argument that the 11th Amendemnt
prohibited the DC from ordering state officials to conform
their conduct to state law.
I did not reach the comity issue or the
challenge to the appointment of masters to oversee the
state officials.

A

~·

r

I.

3.

The 11th Amendment, overruling Chisholm, is

~~-~
A

significant because of its affirmation that the
fundamental principle of sovereign immunity limits the
grant of judicial authority in Article III.

Thus, in Hans

v. Louisiana the Court held - despite the limited language
of the Amendment - that a federal court could not
entertain a suit brought by a citizen against his own
state.

The judicial power of the United States does not

reach that far.

The

·~

Ex parte State of New York (p.

7, 8 of my opinion) is particularly strong.
I see no reason to revise this subsection A. l?~f-

~

// q

~~~~~
~ ~---_.(_

~ ~;.- ~

--~-~-;;~-;;<-~ ~ ;jo flilu- ~ . ~ ~
)f:.

_g

This subsection recognizes that a question may

~;[~M ·whether

a particular suit in fact is a suit

4.

against a state".

Although there are close cases the

general rule is that the 11th Amendment "bars a suit
against state officials when the state is the real,
substantial party in interest" (see cases cited p. 10).
There are two principal exceptions to the rule that the
11th Amendment protects a state against federal court
action.

The first, and

~
~t

important, is that created by

Ex parte Young in which a federal court enjoined the
Attorney General of Minnesota from bringing suit to
enforce a state statute that alleged violated the 14th
~

Amendment.

The Court held that where the state act is

alleged to be violative of the federal Constitution, the
Amendment does not prohibit issuance of a federal court
injunction.

5.

In Edelman v. Jordan, we held in a suit against
state officials that "a federal court's remedial power,
consistent with the 11th Amendment, is necessarily limited
to prospective injunctive relief".

It is important to

remember that Edelman was a federal court suit in which it
was alleged that the state officials were violating a
federal statute

~ not ~taee

baw (portion of the Social

Security Act, aid to the aged, blind, etc.).

I add here

that on p. 12 of my opinion this distinction should be
made a little clearer on p. 12.
A second exception to the 11th Amendment
sovereign immunity is where it is alleged that the state
1\

official has acted ultra vires.
only in n. 12, p. 11.
text.

My opinion discusses this

PDssibly this should be put in the

This footnote cites Larson for the first time.

6.

III
Up to this point in my opinion, apart from the
history of the case,

principles.

~ outline~ thp~

In this Part III the opinion addresses the

two principal arguments advanced by respondents.

They

contend (i) that under Edelman the suit is not against the
state because the courts below ordered only prospective
injunctive relief: and (ii) that the state law claim

~

properly was <3-enied because of pendent jurisdiction.
/\
A

Respondents argue that Edelman allows a federal
court to enjoin violations of state law exactly as it
permits prospective relief against violation of federal

7.

law.

My opinion states that this argument misconstrues

the basis of the doctrine established in Young and
reiterated in Edelman.

Young has been accepted as

necessary to permit federal courts to vindicate federal
rights as

~

the supreme law of the land.

The Edelman

distinction between prospective and retroactive relief
with respect to federal law is consistent with Ex parte
Young.

But Edelman, at same time, preserved the 11th

Amendment immunity of the states with respect to
~

retroactive

relief ~~

t recognition of the

continuing vitality of the Arne dment.

interests (federal v. s

te) is wholly absent when a

state law.

&.

~ A.zd.L:~ ~

~~ . ~ ·~~

8.

doctrine of Young and Edelman

·~

the

1~)[ cas~

In

~~~
there is no

supremacy of federal law.

R@@Q~~

. d'1ca9\
~
v1n
tue

Yet the intrustion on state

sovereignty can be extensive indeed - as the federal
District court orders in this case demonstrate so
dramatically.
Note to myself:
John Stevens'

a~uiR~

I

~
convinced (despite

~~y

~>

tae contrary) that the reasoning and
A
~

conclusion in subpart III-A (p. 13-16) 4s

<t

,~,

and sou{f } t may be~ that som~

"'

pp. 14, 15 - would be helpful.

B (Pendent Jurisdiction)

~.

~h

principled

9.

In rejecting the 11th Amendment argument, CA3
relied primarily - not on the 11th Amendment cases, but on
pendent jurisdiction cases.

This required me to address

the relationship between pendent jurisdiciton and the 11th
Amendment.
As early as Osborn, and particularly reiterated
in Gibbs (1966), this Court has held that a federal court
may resolve a case solely on the basis of a pendent state
law claim (see Siler), and that a court usually should do
so to avoid a federal constitutional question.
(Brandeis).

Ashwander

Thus, apart from an 11th Amendment bar a

federal court may exercise pendent jurisdiction over a
state law claim.

Because of the line of cases approving

this pendent jurisdiction, John Stevens' dissent contends
that CA3's decision was correct and that my opinion would

10.

n effect

overrule many if not most of these pendent

jurisdiction cases.
The short answer - and one that may not be made
~~~
as clearly as possible - is that not one of the cases

"

relied upon by CA3 and Justice Stevens

~

addressed~ the

~1-d,~~~~

Eleventh Amendment questio~.

Some of the cases ~

assumed sub silento that the Amendment does not apply to

I-LLpendent claims.

This is illustrated by Green v. Lousville

<-._.~- c~
R. Co.

(1917) ~ n

A

which plaintiff railroads sued state

officials, alleging tax assessments were excessive under

~

the 14th Amendment.

The Court reiterated that Ex parte

Young authorizes federal court jurisdiction whenever a

L_RL.
federal constitutional violation is alleged,
jurisdiction exists

ov~ - ~

eo~noaJ

and~ once

u.Jthis

qu9etion the

federal court may determine "all questions involved in the

11.

~

case, including those of state law, irrespective
disposition of the federal question" or whether it was
necessary to decide it at all.
The

can be viewed as implying that once
is established on the basis of any federal
question, no further 11th Amendment inquiry is necessary
to other claims raised in

decisions" none of which has been addressed and

ex~licit ~

s~b<t!J~Iv

·
· d. t'
rejected in the pen d en t JUris
1c 10n case. ATne >«sic ~

~~~:
principle

bhe ~ after

was stated

tha-~ "the

11th Amendment

is an explicit limitation on the judicial power of the
United States".

Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U.S., at 25.

?)
1
tf"t~ !-', ~~

A

12.

federal court's power over a pendent claim necessarily
derives from Article III, see Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S.
1, 9, and the 11th Amendment

t!i!J~~~

is~~

independent limitation

on all exercises of Article III power.

If "we were to

hold otherwise, a federal court could award damages
against a state on the basis of a pendent claim, a result
that could not be squared with Edelman where even with
respect to federal we held that the Amendment barred an
award of retroactive relief on the basis of a pendent
claim.
~

Hil!Zti!in g

13.

c
Respondents argue (and the CJ has expressed a
similar concern) that application of the 11th Amendment to
pendent state law claims will have a disruptive effect on
litigation against state officials.

Reliance is placed on

the considerations of judicial economy that underlie
pendent jurisdiction.

Also, and again the CJ has

expressed tentative agreement, the policy of avoiding
constitutional decisions favors federal jurisdiction.
My answer is that these policy considerations
may

c.

Perhaps some of the material added to the footnotes in

response to John Stevens' opinion (see n. 23 and 24, p.
24)

~~
mftY
~ be

incorporated into the text.

Also, take a look

14.

at my personal letter to the CJ, and particularly the memo
or addendum attached thereto.

At

lea5t ~ s

tentative view

(as I understand it) could lead to less "judicial economy"
I must remember, however, that the

rather than more.
Chief's draft

crcrrf~
a~)C
~nt~~~~r~F~e~R~ce

the Conference.

has not been circulated to

I have not thought this through, but

perhaps we can anticipate his concern by pointing out how
little judicial economy is being served in this very
litigation.

In the end, if the principles underlying the

11th Amendment are made clear, there

~licy
A

~~

~boY~d ~

no

~~

reasons -f'c:rr pendent jurisdiction lth-an the

"\

A

that underlie the principles of fe
a~welr

~

as the 11th Amendment.
-1

greate ~

iltrong~

"

alism

15.

--

IV

This deals with the county official issue, and
probably needs no revision.
L.F.P., Jr.
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Pennhurst
The purpose of

this memo is to reexamine -

as

well as refresh my recollection of - my opinion last Term
that

the CJ declined

to

join.

What

follows

outline of the opinion in its fifth draft.

is a rough

I will follow

the present structure.
I

Part

I

reviews

satisfactorily

the

history

of

this prolonged litigation.
Important to our decision here, is the fact that
CA3 -

the decision before us - held that the Pennsylvania

statute supported its prior judgment, and therefore it was
unnecessary
rejected
federal

to

the
court

controversy.

reach

the

argument
from
It

federal

that

the

considering

also

rejected

law

issues.

11th Amendment
this
the

pendent
abstention

CA3

then

barred
state

a

law

argument

based on comity.

II

Petitioners
reversal,

presented

three

grounds

for

including the argument that the 11th Amendemnt

2.

prohibited the DC from ordering state officials to conform
their conduct to state law.
I

did

not

challenge to the

reach

the

comity

issue

appointment of masters

or

the

to oversee

the

Chisholm,

is

state officials.

A

The

11th

Amendment,

overruling

vi tally significant because of its affirmation that the
fundamental

principle

of

sovereign

immunity

grant of judicial authority in Article III.

limits

the

Thus, in Hans

v. Louisiana the Court held - despite the limited language
of

the

Amendment

entertain a
state.

suit

that
brought

a
by a

federal

court

could

not

citizen against his own

The judicial power of the United States does not

reach that far.

The quote from Ex parte State of New York

(p. 7, 8 of my opinion) is particularly strong.
I

see no reason to revise this

subsection A.

But the significance of the history of the 11th Amendment
and the Court's broad interpretation of it in Hans well
could

be

jurisdiction).

reemphasized

in

Part

III-B

(pendent

3•

B

This subsection recognizes

that a question may

arise as to "whether a particular suit in fact is a
against

a

state".

general

rule

against

state

is

Although
that

the

officials

substantial party

in

there

11th
when

are

Amendment
the

interest"

close

state

cases

"bars
is

s~it

a

the

the
suit

real,

(see cases cited p.

10).

There are two principal exceptions to the rule that the
11th

Amendment

action.
Ex

a

state

against

federal

court

The first, and more important, is that created by

parte

Young

Attorney
enforce

protects

in

General
a

of

state

Amendment.

which

federal

Minnesota

statute

The Court

a

that

held

court

enjoined

from

bringing

alleged

violated

that where

the

suit
the

to
14th

the state act

is

alleged to be violative of the federal Constitution, the
Amendment does not prohibit

issuance of a federal court

injunction.
In Edelman v. Jordan, we held in a suit against
state officials

that

"a federal

court's

remedial power,

consistent with the 11th Amendment, is necessarily limited
to

prospective

injunctive

relief".

It

is

important

to

remember that Edelman was a federal court suit in which it
was

alleged

that

the

state

officials

were

violating

a

4.

federal statute

(portion of the Social Security Act, aid

to the aged, blind, etc.).

I add here that on p. 12 of my

opinion this distinction should be made a little clearer.
A

second

exception

to

the

11th

Amendment

sovereign immunity is found where it is alleged that the
state

official

has

acted

ultra

vires.

discusses this only in n. 12, p. 11.
be put

in the text.

My

opinion

Possibly this should

This footnote cites Larson for

the

first time.

III
Up

from

the

history of the case, outlines the relevant principles.

In

this

Part

to

III

this

the

point

opinion

my

opinion,

addresses

arguments advanced by respondents.
under Edelman the suit
the

courts

relief;

and

below
( i i)

two

principal

They contend

(i) that

is not against the state because

ordered
that

the

apart

only

the state

prospective

-"
injunctive

law claim properly was

considered because of pendent jurisdiction.

5.

A

The Edelman argument
Respondents argue that Edelman allows a fedetal
court

to enjoin

violations of

permits prospective relief
law.
the

state

law exactly as

against violation of

it

federal

My opinion states that this argument misconstrues
basis

of

the

reiterated

in

Edelman.

necessary
rights

doctrine

established

Young

has

in

been

Young

and

accepted

as

to permit federal courts to vindicate federal

as

the

distinction

supreme

between

law

of

the

prospective

and

land.

The

Edelman

retroactive

relief

with respect to federal law is consistent with Ex parte
Young.

But

Amendment

Edelman,
immunity

at
of

same
the

time,
states

preserved
with

the

11th

respect

to

retroactive relief even where a federal statute had been
violated.

This

was

an

important

recognition

of

the

continuing vitality of the Amendment.
Moreover,
interests

(federal

the
v.

need
state)

to
is

reconcile
wholly

competing

absent

when

a

plaintiff alleges that a state official has violated only
state law.

In such a case, the entire justification for

the doctrine of Young and Edelman simply does not exist.
In the case before us, there is no question of vindicating

6.

the supremacy of federal law.
sovereignty
District

can

Court

be

Yet the intrusion on state

extensive

orders

in

as

indeed
this

case

the

federal

demonstrate

so

dramatically.
Note
John

to myself:

Stevens'

contrary

I

remain

views)

that

convinced
the

(despite

reasoning

and

conclusion in subpart III-A (p. 13-16) are principled and
sound.

It

may

be,

however,

that

some

revision

particularly on pp. 14, 15 - would be helpful.

My views

in light of John's argument, probably can be stated more
clearly.

B (Pendent Jurisdiction)
In

rejecting

the

11th Amendment

argument,

CA3

relied primarily - not on the 11th Amendment cases, but on
pendent

jurisdiction cases.

This required me to address

"
the relationship between pendent jurisdiciton and the l~lth

Amendment.
As early as Osborn, and particularly reiterated
in Gibbs

(1966), this Court has held that a federal court

may resolve a case solely on the basis of a pendent state
law claim (see Siler), and that a court usually should do
so to avoid a federal constitutional question.

Ashwander

7.

(Brandeis).
federal

Thus,

apart

from

an

11th Amendment

court may exercise pendent

state law claim.

bar

a

jurisdiction over

a

Because of the line of cases approving

this pendent jurisdiction, John Stevens' dissent contends
that CA3's decision was correct and that my opinion would
overrule many if not most of these pendent jurisdiction
cases.
The short answer - and one that may not be made
as clearly as possible in my opinion - is that not one of
the cases relied upon by CA3 and Justice Stevens addressed
specifically the Eleventh Amendment question presented in
this case.

Some of the cases may have assumed sub silento

that the Amendment does not apply to pendent claims.
is

illustrated by the Green v.

Lousville R.

Co.

This
(1917)

cases in which plaintiff railroads sued state officials,
alleging

tax

assessments were excessive

under

the 14th
J

Amendment.

The

Court

reiterated

that

Ex

parte

"

Young

authorizes federal court jurisdiction whenever a federal
constitutional violation is alleged,

and held that once

this jurisdiction exists the federal court may determine
"all questions involved in the case, including those of
state law, irrespective of the disposition of the federal
question" or whether it was necessary to decide it at all.

8.

The Green cases
once

jurisdiction

federal

question,

can be viewed as implying that

is

established

no

further

on

the

basis

11th Amendment

of

any

inquiry

is

necessary with respect to other claims raised in the case.
But there was no such holding.
Now that the

jurisdictional

issue

is squarely

presented, we should consider it as an undecided question.
Hagans

v.

Lavine.

My

opinion

would

hold

that

Green

"cannot be reconciled with" the principles established in
our

11th

Amendment

decisions"

none

of

which

has

been

addressed and rejected in the pendent jurisdiction cases.
Subsequent to Green, the basic principle was reiterated:
"the

11th

Amendment

is

an

explicit

judicial power of the United States".
290

u.s.,

at 25.

limitation

on

\

the

Missouri v. Fiske,

A federal court's power over a pendent

claim necessarily derives from Article III, see Aldinger
v.

Howard,

427 U.S.

1,

9,

and the 11th Amendment i5 "a

separate and independent limitation on all exercises of
Article

III

power.

If

"we

were

to

hold

otherwise,

a

federal court could award damages against a state on the

)

basis

\

of

a

pendent claim,

a

result

that

could

not

be

squared with Edelman where even with respect to federal

9.

claims

we

held

that

the

Amendment

barred

an

award

of

retroactive relief on the basis of a pendent claim.

c
Respondents argue

(and the CJ has expressed a

similar concern) that application of the 11th Amendment to
pendent state law claims will have a disruptive effect on
litigation against state officials.
the

considerations

of

pendent jurisdiction.
has

expressed

avoiding

judicial

Reliance is placed on
economy

that

underlie

Also they argue, and again the CJ

tentative

agreement,

constitutional

that

decisions

the

policy of

favors

federal

jurisdiction.
My answer

is that

these policy considerations

may not override constitutional limitations.
Although this should be a controlling answer, we
should try to strengthen this subpart C.

"
Perhaps some- of

the material added to the footnotes in response to John
Stevens' opinion (see n. 23 and 24, p. 24} properly could
be incorporated into the text.

Also, take a look at my

personal letter to the CJ, and particularly the memo or
addendum
understand

attached
it)

thereto.

could

lead

His
to

tentative

less

view

"judicial

(as

I

economy"

10.

rather

than

more.

I

must

remember,

however,

that

the

Chief's draft has not been circulated to the Conference.
I

have

not

thought

this

through,

but

perhaps

we

can

anticipate his concern by pointing out how little judicial
economy is being served in this very litigation.

In the

end, if the principles underlying the 11th Amendment are
made

clear,

the

policy

reasons

supporting

pendent

jurisdiction hardly should have the weight of those that
underlie

the

principles

of

federalism

and

the

11th

Amendment.

IV
This deals with the county official issue, and
probably needs no revision.
L.F.P., Jr.

ss

lfp/ss 09/09/83 PENNl SALLY-POW
81-2101 Pennhurst v. Halderman
TO:
FROM:

The Chief Justice
LFP, Jr.
This refers to our exchange of views last Term

about

this

case.

I

appreciate

your

suggesting

a

reargument, and saying to me privately that you would keep
an open mind when we reconsider the case in October.
Before I get too deeply committed to preparation
for our September Conference and the October arguments, I
have reviewed with some care the writing in Pennhurst, and
particularly
your

the personal exchanges between you and me:

preliminary draft of

a possible concurring opinion

(sent with your note of June 23), and my letter to you and
accompanying

memo

of

June

2 5.

I

think

it

may

be

as

2.

helpful as it has been to me to refresh my recollection
and thinking about this important case.
The
rest,

I hope,

purpose

of

this

memorandum

1),

accept

to

set

at

your concern that my opinion for the Court

disregarded established precedents.
n.

is

In your draft (p. 1,

you suggested that my opinion did not appear to
the

"continuing validity of Ashwander

(Brandeis,

J., concurring), Osborn Bank, and United Mine Workers v.
Gibbs.

I

think

a

rereading

of

my

opinion

will

make

perfectly clear that it does accept - and contains nothing
to

weaken

the

Ashwander

principle

of

avoiding

constitutional questions when appropriate, or the doctrine
of pendent jurisdiction enunciated in Osborn and Gibbs.
Both Gibbs
respective

doctrines

and Ashwander
apply

only

make
when

plain
the

that
court

the
has

3.

jurisdiction

over

considerations

of

the

nonfederal

"judicial

economy,

claim.

The

convenience,

and

fairness" that govern the exercise of pendent jurisdiction
are looked to only after the jurisdictional prerequisities
of a substantial federal question and a "common nucleus of
operative fact" are met.

u.s.

See Gibbs, 383

at 725.

In Ashwander, Justice Brandeis was explicit that
the

rules

developed

set
by

out

this

there
Court

were
"for

prudential

in

its own governance

cases confessedly within its jurisdiction."
346.

My

clear

that

officials
under

draft

suits
for

state

federal

opinion
for

official

does

nothing

injunctive
actions

claimed

This

question

was

in the

297 U.S., at

more

relief

law are not within the

courts.

character,

than

to make

against
to

be

state

wrongful

jurisdiction of
not

addressed

the
in

4.

Osborn,

where

the

state

actions

were

alleged

to

be

unconstitutional and the Ashwander doctrine would continue
to have their full operation in all other cases, such as
those

involving

claims

not

against

state

officials

or

claims that the actions of a state official re ultra vires
or contrary to federal law. 1
Nor can it fairly be said that my opinion would
"overrule"

Siler,

decided

in

1908.

I

have

now had an

opportunity to consider with some care the entire history

1 My proposed opinion cannot be said to be
contrary even to the spirit of Gibbs. That opinion noted
that
"[n]eedless decisions of state
law should be
avoided," and quoted Chief Judge Magruder's view that
"' [f]ederal courts should not be overeager to hold on to
the
determination
of
issues
that
might
be
more
appropriately
left
to
settlement
in
state
court
litigation.'" 383 u.s., at 726 & n. 15 (quoting Strachman
v. Palmer, 177 F.2d 427, 431 (CAl 1949) (Magruder, J.,
concurring)). Hagans v. Lavine, 415 u.s. 528, 545 (1974),
which involved pendent jurisdiction over another federal
claim, distinguished Gibbs on this ground. Accord Romero
v. International Term. Operating Co., 358 u.s. 354, 380381 (1959) (pendent jurisdiction over maritime claim).

5.

of Siler.

I

believe

before Larson,

I

can

no member

of

state

as

fact

that even

this Court ever

explicitly

linked Siler with the 11th Amendment.

a

The plain fact is

that this Court has not "long relied" on Siler as an 11th
Amendment case, but rather only as a pendent jurisdiction
case.

The reason for

this is understandable.

Amendment was not raised
the

Court.

Commission,
state

The

suit

The 11th

in the briefs nor addressed by

was

against

the

state

Railroad

and came clearly within the doctrine that a

official

acting

ultra

invoke sovereign immunity.

vires

his

authority cannot

The Commission has promulgated

maximum tariffs for railroads in the state under a state
empowering it to fix reasonable rates.

Siler examiner the

statute, and Judge Peckham - writing for the Court - said
that the state Commission's action was

6.

"Founded upon a total misconstruction of the
statute and an assumption on the part of the
Commission of a right and power to do that which
the statute itself gave it no authority whatever
to do." 213 u.s., at 195-196.
Judge Peckham also observed that the Commission
lacked

"jurisdiction"
Siler

to

rates.

Thus,

against

state officials

prescribe

bars

from
for

a

general

federal

actions.

tariff of

court only

suits

In

Siler

a

word,

found that the action of the Commission ultra vires,
exception
opinion

from

the

expressly

11th

Amendment

reaffirms.

See

that
p.

11,

my

an

Pennhurst

n.

12.

If,

Chief, you wish this to be expressed more clearly I will
certainly do so if the case is reassigned to me to write.
Much the same can be said about the two Green
decisions
suggest

that
for

me

you

thought

appropriate

might

be

language

overruled.
to

(Joe:

support

this

statement.)

(I dicontinued this memo at ths point.
to reconsider what I send to the Chief).

I want

~ 09/28/83
CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFT

MEMORANDUM

RE:

I

TH_E CHIEF

c-

81-2101 Pennhurst v. Halderman

You have told me that you are re-examining this case from
scratch.

J

E.

While I trust that you will include in your review the

views I set forth in my opinion of last Term, I write now briefly
to reemphasize the main points.

First, I believe(f.he basic ques-

I'

tion presented by this case--whether a suit against state offi- r
cials to enforce state law is barred by the Eleventh Amendment-remains an open one.
/ issue.

This Court has never squarely decided the

Second, permitting such suits would be squarely contrary \

' to this Court's recent Eleventh Amendment and sovereign immunity
cases and would leave the Amendment with essentially no present
force.

Third, pendent jurisdiction does not provide the

juris-~

"

diction that the Eleventh Amendment explicitly takes away.
1.

I~a~e caLefully reexamined

The question is still open.

~Zeas)s thatl JPS sa~s supPprt al owing 'suits ag inst state
ficials to enforce state law.

There are three reasons why

~

~

not think any of them \can be regarded

\ I

s controlling.

•--ft1~

First,

none of them squarely holds that a suit against a state official
for prospective relief under state law is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

Second, the theory on which these cases rely was

definitively rejected in Larson v.

Domestic

&

Foreign Commerce

-

page 2.

Corp., 337

u.s.

682 (1949).

Third, probably for these two rea-

sons, none of these cases has been thought to have any force as
Eleventh Amendment doctrine for over thirty years.
The cases JPS cites divide into two categories: those that
discuss the Eleventh Amendment question for which they are now
~

cited, and those that do not.
11

v

Wh~e I d~u

c

JPS's reading of

those cases that discuss the Eleventh Amendment issue, 1 the im~
•
.
JA,.
portant point is that ali of them are di~tinguishable from the

present case, and the pronouncements JPS quotes are broad dicta.
These cases, with one exception, appear to fall into one or the
other of the two recognized except ions to the rule that suits
against state officials are suits against states: the plaintiffs
in these cases alleged either acts by state officials completely
ultra vires their authority 2 or actions contrary to the federal

lThe language of these cases must be understood in
terms of the pleading rules of the day. See, e.g., Scully v.
Bird, 209 u.s. 481, 485-486 (1908). The reason these actions
were not to be dismissed "at the threshold" for lack of
jurisdiction, see JPS dissent at 12, is that such a dismissal
looked only to the allegations of the complaint. If the
complaint alleged an individual tortious action unconnected to
the officer's authority, the court presumptively had jurisdiction
of the cause unless the state officer could show that his actions
were within his authority. The cases nevertheless maintained the
essential distinction between suits alleging wrongful
administration of a statute, which were barred, and those
alleging individual torts, which were presumptively ultra vires.
See, e.g., Hopkins v. Clemson Agricultural College, 221 U.S. 636,
647 (1911) (there was jurisdiction because the action did not
allege a wrong "committed in the prosecution of any governmental
function," since the College "was not acting in any governmental
capacity"); Cunningham v. Macon & B• • Co., 109 u . . 446, 452
(1883) (when officer is sued in tort, "he is not sued as, or
because he is, the officer of the government, but as an
individual"); id., at 453 (a suit alleging wrongful exercise of
- - Footnote continued on next page.
Footnote(s) 2 will appear on following pages.

-

page 3.

Constitution. 3

The exception is Johnson v.

Lankford, 245 u.s.

541 (1918), but that was a suit against a state official for mon-

ey damages, which would be barred today by Edelman v. Jordan, 415
u.s. 651 (1974).
Other cases did allow a suit to be brought against state official for prospective relief under state law, even though the
allegations did not fall into one of the well-recognized exceptions, but none of these so much as mentions the Eleventh Amendment in connection with the state-law claims. 4

These cases ap-

governmental discretion is barred).
2

E.g., Siler v. Louisville & N. R•• , 213 u •• 175, 195-196
(Commission is not "clothed w1th jurisdiction" to set
general rates, to do so was "an assumption ••• of a right and
power to do that which the statute itself gives it no authority
whatever to do"); Scully, 209 u.s., at 481 (1908) (semble)
(complaint, on which Court solely relied, alleged that state
official's acts were "entirely unauthorized by the State of
Michigan" and that in committing the acts, he was "acting as a
private citizen of the State," Record at 11). It also appears
that the Court in Scully adhered to the now-discarded theory that
a suit is against a state for jurisdictional purposes only if the
state is a named party. Id., at 485-486.
(1908)

3

E.g., Hopkins v. Clemson Agricultural College, 221 u.s.
(question presented was whether a municipal
corporation could claim the state's sovereign immunity in a
proceeding alleging that it had "damage[d] or take[n] property
without due process of law"); Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust
Co., 154 u.s. 362, 390-391, 396, 399, 410 (1894) (challenges to
railroad rates were on constitutional grounds; also, the state
had waived immunity); Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 u.s. 279, 288
(1885) (challenge was that law unconstitutionally impaired
obligation of contract). See also Cunningham v. Macon &
Brunswick R. Co., 109 u.s. 446 (1883) (suit held to be against
state, so that jurisdiction was lacking).
636, 642 (1911)

4 see Lee v. Bickell, 292 u.s. 415 (1934); Glenn v. Field
Packing
290 u.s. 177 (1933) (per curiam); Davis v. Wallace,
257 u.s. 478 (1922); Greene v. Louisville & Interurban R•• Co.,
244 u.s. 499 (1917); Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Greene,

co:;

Footnote continued on next page.

page 4.

pear to have relied on the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction to
establish jurisdiction over the state law claims, not considering
whether

that doctrine might have a different scope applied to

suits against the state.

When old decisions do not appear to

have given full consideration to a constitutional question later
found to be important, we have not hesitated to depart from them.
See Edelman v. Jordan, 415
inter alia,

Shapiro v.

u.s.

651, 670-671 (1974)

Thompson,

394 U.S.

618

(overruling,

(1969), on this

ground) • 5

244 u.s. 522 (1917); Illinois C. R.R. v. Greene, 244 u.s. 555
(1917). See also Siler (Eleventh Amendment question neither
briefed nor adressed).
5Moreover, all of the cases in this latter class would no
longer be possible today. They were all actions to enjoin the
collection of state taxes, and, if brought today, would
presumably be barred by the subsequently enacted Tax Injunction
Act of 1937, 28 u.s.c. §1341: "The district courts shall not
enjoin, suspend, or restrain the assessment, levy or collection
of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient
remedy may be had in the courts of such State."
The "plain,
speedy and efficient" standard has been held to be considerably
more stringent than the equity standard under which the adequacy
of state law remedies was evaluated in prior cases. Rosewell v.
LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 450 u.s. 503, 526 (1981) ("Indeed, Congress,
among other things, legislated to solve an existing problem by
cutting back federal equity jurisdiction." (emphasis in
original)). More important, the prior equity standard did not
take into account injunctive remedies available under state law,
as the Act requires the federal courts to do. Id., at 534 & n.7
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Prior to 1937, state statutes
commonly provided for enjoining a tax if it was invalid, id., at
523 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 1503, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1937)),
and state courts in any case entertained bills to enjoin
collection of taxes or compel refunds where the remedies at law
would require a multiplicity of suits or were otherwise
inadequate, see, e.g., Stratton v. St. Louis s.w. Ry., 284 u.s.
530, 532 (1932) (citing state cases). It is thus highly probable
that all of these cases would today be sent back to the state
courts for decision.

page 5.

r

all of the cases cited by JPS are distinguish-

In addition,

/ able in that they could not possibl,

have contemplated the kind

of extraordinary relief, with its consequent expenditure of state
funds and ongoing administration of a state institution, ordered
in the present case.
ative

action

treasury,

that

Because they generally did not seek affirmwould

they were

require

further

expenditures

from

the

state

J

removed from the state's essential

interests. /
Even if these early cases were not distinguishable or had not
been overruled on their facts,

the theory of sovereign immunity

on which they rely has been definitively rejected by this Court
in a closely related context.

The theory is that a state offi-

cial who acts contrary to state law is acting without authority,
and

therefore

is being sued

dissent at 13-19.

in his private capacity.

See JPS

Faced with an identical claim in the case of a

federal officer acting contrary to federal law,
jected this theory in Larson.

this Court re-

Recognizing "the conflict in doc-

,
trine," the Court ruled that a government officer's action may be :
regarded as so illegal as to override sovereign immunity "only if
it

is not within the officer's statutory powers or,

if within

those powers, only if the powers or their exercise in the partieular

case,

are

claim of error
not sufficient."

constitutionally

void."

in the exercise of

Id.,

at

[the officer's]

701-702.

"A

power is

...

Id., at 690.

Although Larson involved the federal government's sovereign
immunity, and not the states', our cases have recognized no distinction between the two doctrines.

See, e.g., Florida Dept. of

page 6.

State v.
(1982)

Treasure Salvors,

Inc.,

50 U.S.L.W.

5056,

5060 n.21

("' [I]t cannot be doubted tha\ the question whether a par-

ticular suit is one against the State, within the meaning of the
Constitution, must depend upon the same principles that determine
whether a particular suit is one against the United States.'")
(quoting Tindal v.
case,

Wesley,

167 U.S.

204,

213

(1897)).

In any

there is no reason to think that the state courts would

have less protection in federal court than does the federal government.
opposite.

Principles of federalism would,

in fact, suggest the

Moreover, the two-part analysis of Larson was invoked

just last Term in an in rem suit against the State of Florida.
Treasure Salvors.
The contract nature of the claim in Larson also does not distinguish that case.

Again, one would think that the far more

intrusive extraordinary relief granted by the court below in this
case would be more likely to be barred by sovereign immunity than
the specific performance on a contract that was sought in Larson.
The distinction has in any case been rejected.
Bowdoin, 369

u.s.

See Malone v. ;

643, 648 (1962); Georgia Railroad & Banking Co.

v • Redwine , 3 4 2 U• S • 2 9 9 , 3 0 5-3 0 6 (19 5 2 ) •
Finally,

and most

important,

none of these cases has been

relied upon in an Eleventh Amendment context for at least a generation.

These are long dead cases that have not previously been

attributed the importance that JPS gives to them.
cited most often.

Siler has been

But until JPS's proposed dissent of last Term,

no member of the Court had ever explicitly linked Siler with the
Eleventh Amendment

in

a

published opinion.

Since 1949,

when

,

page 7.

Larson was decided, no case citing Siler has raised any Eleventh
Amendment questions.

The few that are against state officials do

not raise any state law claims.

Siler has come to be cited only

for the Ashwander doctrine of avoiding constitutional questions,
or for the Osborn-Gibbs rule allowing decision of all questions
in a case. 6

Similarly, none of the other cases cited by JPS has

been cited since 1949 for the proposition he says they support.?
None of these cases, moreover, has been mentioned in any of the
Eleventh Amendment cases decided since 1949.

See, e.g., Florida

Dept. of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 50 u.S.L.W. 5056 (U ••
1982);

Fitzpatrick v.

Bitzer,

427 u.s.

445

(1976); Edelman v.

6 see, e.g., Wolston v. Reader's Digest Assn., Inc., 443
u.s. 157, 160 n.2 (1979) ("[T]he general principle [is] that
dispositive issues of statutory and local law are to be treated
before reaching constitutional issues. E.g., ... Siler .... ");
Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 122 (1979) (Burger, C.
("Our practice is to avoid reaching constitutional questions if a
dispositive nonconstitutional ground is available. See, e.g.,
Siler .... "); Hagans v. Lavine, 415 u.s. 528, 546 (1974) ("the
state issues should be decided first and because these claims
were dispositive, federal questions need not be reached" (citing
Siler)); Zschernig v. Miller, 389 u.s. 429, 444 (1968) (Harlan,
J., concurring) (quoting Ashwander's cite to Siler); Textile
Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 u.s. 448, 483 (1957)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (In pendent jurisdiction cases,
"federal courts may pass on state grounds for recovery that are
joined to a federal ground." See ••• Siler •••• ).
7E.g., Lankford (never cited); Hopkins (never cited);
Greene (cited once for proposition that court will decide pendent
state law claims to avoid constitutional question); Scully (never
cited); Reagan (cited for proposition that unconstitutional
action is not action of state); Poindexter (same); Glenn (cited
only for proposition that Court should avoid resting decision on
state law since interpretation might be supplanted by state court
decision); Lee v. Bickell (only cited in cases in which the
pendent claim was a federal rather than a state one) ; Davis
(same).
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Jordan, 415

u.s.

651 (1974); Employees v. Missouri Public Health

& Welfare Dept., 411
In sum,

u.s.

279 (1973).

this Court has never

squarely held,

in an opinion

that considers the Eleventh Amendment, that that provision permi ts

the

kind of

suits

that would

courts under my opinion.

be barred from the federal

More important, a contrary result would

contradict our more recent sovereign immunity cases, either overruling without explanation the cases that hold federal and state
sovereign
holding

immunity

of

Salvors.

Larson

to

be

and

identical,

undermining

or

overruling

the

analysis

the
of

square

Treasure

By contrast, if the result I urge questions any cases,

they are far older and of little present vitality.
/\

2.

Sovereign immunity bars suits to enforce state law.

JPS's main line of attack is that a suit alleging that state officials

have violated the law--either federal or state--is not

bar red by the Eleventh Amendment.

As indicated, ·~~ this

approach was considered and rejected by Larson.

The Court there

,
cogently noted that this theory "confuses the doctrine of sover- :
eign immunity with the requirement that a plaintiff state a cause
337

u.s.,

In addition,

such

of action."

Eleventh Amendment

at 692-693.
a

209

u.s.

would

jurisprudence,

Amendment of any force.
te Young,

rule

123

be

contrary

and would

to our

recent

ultimately sap the

The primary conflict is over how Ex par(1908),

is explained.

JPS 's theory is

that a state officer acting illegally is stripped of his authority.

This approach is far broader than the explanation offered

by our recent cases.

The orthodox explanation for that case was

page 9.

summed up in Edelman v. Jordan, 415

u.s.

651, 664

(1974): "This

holding has permitted the Civil War Amendments to the Constitution to serve as a sword,

rather than merely as a shield,

those whom they were designed to protect."
limitation

of

the

Eleventh

for

The theory is that a

Amendment--allowing

suits

that are

plainly against the state--was necessary to ensure that federal
law was vindicated.

See

c.

Sovereign Immunity 142-143
of theoretical niceties.

Jacobs,
(1972).

The Eleventh Amendment and
This is not merely a matter

Under JPS 's proposed holding in this

case, the Eleventh Amendment would, on the face of things, continue to bar two kinds of actions

(other than suits naming the

state as a party): diversity actions against state officials, and
suits for damages against state officials.
JPS's

opinion,

however,

principled support.
thority

when he

neither

of

Under the theory of

these prohibitions has

any

If a state officer is stripped of his au-

acts

illegally

in

an

injunctive

suit brought

under pendent jurisdiction, there is no reason he is not stripped
of his authority in actions seeking damages or in diversity
tions.

ac- ~

Presumably neither of these prohibitions would be very

long-lived,

therefore,

and

the

Eleventh

Amendment

would have been read out of the Constitution.

effectively

This may be the

motivating force behind JPS's view, see dissent at 22-23, but I
do not think an amendment specifically passed by the states to
correct this Court's prior interpretation can be treated so cavalierly.
3.

Pendent

jurisdiction does

not

supply

that is excluded by the Eleventh Amendment.

the

jurisdiction

Although CA3 in this

_,

page 10.

case acknowledged or

assumed

that the state-law claim standing

would be barred by the Eleventh Amendment, it found that the doctrine of pendent

jurisdiction supplies the federal courts with

I~ 1his

power to decide such claims.
cally and practically unsound.

theory is theoreti-

Pendent jurisdiction, essentially

a doctrine of expediency and efficiency, should not be allowed to

IA"~I

override the explicit constitutional command ef the states 'bha t

-

.A

~

~hey

Art.

be immune.
I I I

~.y

~

•

Pendent jurisdictidn i

1-

I. ..,.

language conferring power to hear all

By any standard of construction,

rf

~

•

,.-;,.

A
•

.I-'{

"cases" arising
Gibbs, 383

thi~

u.s.,

general language

~, 4...
, ~ ~./.1 / ,
should give way to the far more specific language~ explicitly ex-

the

~-4./ ~?~'1i

/

derived from the general

under federal law and between diverse parties.
at 725.

,I

judicial

power

LJ,

cluding

from

suits

prosecuted

against

the

states.

Any contrary ruling would as surely, though indirectly,

obliterate the Eleventh Amendment as would allowing these suits
under the Amendment itself.
Such a reading may well result in more federal claims being
brought

in

claims.

That

state

court,

or,

less

likely,

in

is not uncommon in this area.

bifurcation

of

Under Edelman,

a

suit for money damages against state officials must be brought in
state court.

Under

the abstention doctrine,

unclear

state law are commonly referred to the state courts
sulting

in far greater waste and uncertainty than

been brought

there

in

the

first

place).

Moreover,

issues of
(often re-

if they had
it

is not

clear to me that allowing federal intrusion into state governance
does not have pitfalls of its own.
319

u.s.

315, 327-332

(1943)

See Burford v. Sun Oil Co.,

(recounting confusion and conflict

1

page 11.

sown in East Texas oil fields by federal court rulings on state
law, resulting in special sessions of the legislature, a declaration of martial law, and constantly shifting administrative policy).

In addition, the considerations of "judicial economy, con-

venience, and fairness" that govern the exercise of pendent jurisdiction, Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725, will themselves sow wasteful
/M. L t·f-""f -;-./1' ~'
-~ )-t--f'} ......( ,4~,/~-) ~1 1
litigation avoided by a clear
e-&4;- of- wher:-e a claim must be

'\

hr_ought.

\

J Bu '

~he red b~

regardless,

the considerations of efficiency f,..IJi l

the doctrine of pendent

jurisdiction have ..-not bee )

t hought sufficient to justify subverting an expl1cit limitatio
imposed by the Constitution.

See Edelman (pendent jurisdictio

did not override Eleventh Amendment ban on suits for money dam
ges); cf. Aldinger v. Howard, 427

u.s.

1, 14-15 (1976)

(judicial

economy does not override jurisdictional bar on pendent parties).

'

believe an honest reading of the Eleventh Amendment requires

that any suits that are in effect suits against the state be narrowly and compellingly justified.

~ fficiency

The requirements of judicial

are neither narrow nor compelling.

; "

lfp/ss 09/28/83
Larson v. Domestic and Foreign COtf?•, 337

u.s. 682 (1949)

The purporse of this memo is to abstract Larson
for my personal use.

The opinion in it was written by Chief

Justice Vinson and joined by Black, Douglas, Murphy and
Reed.

~

Rutledge concurred in the result, and Frankfurter

~h
~

.Yh·

dissented.
This was a private suit against a federal officer
(Administrator of War Assets), alleging tortious violation
of a contract, and praying violation for iniunctive relief.

The question was whether such relief was barred by sovereign
immunity.

This, in turn, presented the question whether the

suit in effect was a suit "against the sovereign".

This was

recognized as being jurisdictional.
The Court recognized two types of cases in which
it is clear that suits against an officer are not viewed as
suits against the sovereign.

First, if the officer's action

is ultra vires, and second, where the "statute or order"
conferring power upon the officer to act in the sovereign's
name is claimed to be unconstitutional.

(p. 690)

In both

of these situations the officer would be acting beyond or
contrary to his lawful authority.
The Court recognized that there had been a "conflict in doctrine" in prior decisions that must be "resolved".

(p. 701)

The Court then held:

"The action of an officer of the sovereign
can be reqarded as so 'illegal' as to permit

2.

a suit for specific relief against the officer as an individual only if it is not within
the officer's statutory powers or, if within
those powers, only if the powers, or their
exercise in the particular case, are constitutionally void."

Despite the clumsy language of the above "holding", when
read in context it says - in substance - that where the officer acts within the scope of this authority, and under
valid statutory authority, his actions are those of the sovereign and immunity exists.

The opinion makes clear that

the rule applies both to state and federal governments.
In the final paragraph the opinion noted:
"It is argued that the principle of sovereign
immunity is an archaic hangover not consonant
with modern morality, and that it should
therefore be limited whenever possible.
There may be substance in such a viewpoint as
applied to suits for damages. The Congress
has increasingly permitted such suits to be
maintained. • • But the reasoning is not
applicable to suits for specific relief.
For, it is one thing to provide a method by
which a citizen may be compensated for a
wrong done to him by the government. It is a
far different matter to permit a court to
exercise its compulsory powers to restrain
the government from acting, or to compel it
to act. There are the strongest reasons of
public policy for the rule that such relief
cannot be had against the sovereign." (o.
703, 704)

L.F.P., Jr.

ss

;

,.
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Larson v. Domestic and Foreign Corp., 33 1 U.S. 682 (1949)
The purporse of this memo is to abstract Larson
for my personal use.

The opinion in it was written by Chief

Justice Vinson and joined by Black, Douglas, Murphy and
Reed.

Rutledge concurred in the result, and Frankfurter

dissented.
This was a private suit against a federal officer
(Administrator of War Assets), alleging tortious violation
of a contract, and praying violation for injunctive relief.
The question was whether such relief was barred by sovereign
immunity.

This, in turn, presented the question whether the

suit in effect was a suit "against the sovereign".

This was

recognized as being jurisdictional.
The Court recognized two types of cases in which
it is clear that suits against an officer are not viewed as
suits against the sovereign.

First, if the officer's action

is ultra vires, and second, where the "statute or order"
conferring power upon the officer to act in the sovereign's
name is claimed to be unconstitutional.

(p. 690)

In both

of these situations the officer would be acting beyond or
contrary to his lawful authority.
The Court recognized that there had been a "conflict in doctrine" in prior decisions that must be "resolved".

(p. 701)

The Court then held:

"The action of an officer of the sovereign
can be regarded as so 'illegal' as to permit

2

0

a suit for specific relief against the officer as an individual only if it is not within
the officer's statutory powers or, if within
those powers, only if the powers, or their
exercise in the particular case, are consti~
tu1:_Lonally void. II
~~: I I a~ ..._uv
.
~~~J....-q~

a.;t::.p"

..

P-1~~iA...~ ~,,

~.
Despite the clumsy language of the above "holding", when

read in context it says - in substance - that where the officer acts within the scope of this authority, and under

-

valid statutory authority, his actions are those of the sovereign and immunity exists.

The opinion makes clear that

the rule applies both to state and federal governments.
In the final paragraph the opinion noted:
"It is argued that the principle of sovereign
immunity is an archaic hangover not consonant
with modern morality, and that it should
therefore be limited whenever possible.
There may be substance in such a viewpoint as
applied to suits for damages. ~ The Congress
has increasingly permitted such suits to be
maintained. . . But the reasoning is not
applicable to suits for specific relief.
For, it is one thing to provide a method by
which a citizen may be compensated for a
wrong done to him by the government. It is a
far different matter to permit a court to
exercise its compulsory powers to restrain
the government from acting, or to compel it
to act. There are the strongest reasons of
p~blit ~ca for the rule that such relief
canno b
a against the sovereign." (p.
703, 704)

L.F.P., Jr.

(
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services are discriminatory and unlawful.
[21] As the Court heretofore found,
Lloyd v. Regional Transportation Authori- these plaintiffs did suffer serious injury
ty, 548 F.2d 1277 (7th Cir. 1977); Barnes v. during their residence at Pennhurst. HowConverse College, 436 F.Supp. 635 (D.S.C., ever, there was no evidence introduced at
filed July 12, 1977); Gurmankin v. Costan- trial that any one of the above named dezo, 411 F.Supp. 982 (E.D.Pa.1976) aff'd, 556 fendant.S was, in any way, personally inF.2d 184 (3d Cir. 1977); 42 Fed.Reg. 22687 . volved with the physical abuses inflicted
(1977); cf. Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 94 upon these residents. To the contrary, the
S.Ct. 786, 39 L.Ed.2d 1 (1974). On the basis evidence shows that the defen
;d'"in'" '
of this record, we find that the rights of the the utmos $2
"
retarded at Pennhurst under Section 504 of ,kno~ nor reasonabfJ: should fia~"'"'ii'OWil
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 have been . th.!!:., the actions wh~~ took, or ?ailea
and are being violated.
. to t~e, within the s~re of their official
· .. resgonsibihlies we~'ein an• way viofa.Gve of
V. Liability of the Individual Defendants the ffglttS of tlie r:ei:ar e res1 en
at
Penn hurst F;r t:hemostp~rt,'t!le ~dence
Plaintiffs Terri Lee Halderman, Larry sho?e'd that those affiliated with the adTaylor, Kenny Taylor, Robert Sobetsky, ministration of Pennhurst were dedicated
Theresa Sobetsky, Nancy Beth Bowman, and sincere in their efforts to habilitate the
George Sorotos, and Linda Taub 60 are re- retarded who came within the sphere of
tarded individuals who resided at Penn- their supervision. They apparently took evhurst. They seek monet~ry" damages for ery means available to them to reduce the
injuries received while at the institution incidents of abuse and injury, but were
1
from the folloJing defendants: Frank S. constantly faced with staff shortages. In
Beal (Secretary of the Pennsylvania De- addition, as we nave already f0'7md, the
partment of Public W!)[are); Stanley Mey- administration at Pennhurst was saddled
ers (Deputy Secretary for Mental Retarda- with an institution which by its very ~e
tion, Pennsylvania Department of Public prMuced an atmosphere conducive to injuWelfare); Helen Wohlgemuth {former Sec- ry. The Court, therefore, finds that the
retary of the Pennsylvania Department ~f defendants have met their tntrden of conPublic Welfare); Aldo Colautti (Executive vin Ci ng us by a preponderance of the eviDeputy Secretary, Pennsylvania' Depart- aencel.ha'tl:hey=-al'e"enlitleLJ"lne g:ood ~
·
ment of Public Welfare); Wilbur Hobbs fai1h immun j.ly from damages afi or<k'd tQ_
(Deputy Secretary for Southeastern Region, SUCh om cfals in COnnection With the injurieS
I
Pennsylvania Department of Public Wel- still'ered....by the named plaintif!s. O'Connor
fare); Russell Rice, Jr. · (Commissioner of v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576- 77, 95 S.Ct.
Mental Retardation for Southeastern Re- 2486, 45 L.Ed.2d 396 (1975); Wood v.
gion, Pennsylvania Department of Public Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 95 S.Ct. 992, 43
Welfare); C. Duane Youngberg (Superin- L.Ed.2d 214 (1975); Thompson v. Burke, 556
tendent of Pennhurst); Robert Smilovitz F.2d 231, 239-40 (3d Cir. 1977); Skehan v.
(former Assistant Superintendent of Penn- Board of Trustees of Bloomsburg State Colsylvania); Joseph Foster (Assistant •Super- lege, 538 F.2d 53, 59- 62 (3d Cir. 1976). We \
intendent of Pennhurst); Margaret Green find that the individual defendants are ded(employee at Pennhurst); Betty Uphold (a icated professionals in the field of retardasupervisor on Unit 9 at Pennhurst); Alice tion who were given very little with which
Barton (a supervisor on Unit 7 at Penn- to accomplish the habilitation of the retardhurst); P. E. (Pauline) Klick (charge aid on ed at Pennhurst.
Unit 7 at P~nnhurst); Dr. Parocca (a forAccordingly, we find that there is no
mer Pennhurst physician) and Helen Fran- basis for awarding monetary damages in
cis (Director of Nursing at Pennhurst).
this case.

d

60.

Mr. Taub testified that neither he nor his

spite the allegation in the complaint to the

92
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sonably be seen as an invasion of the powers of Congress. Before relief can be given
in such a suit, one branch, the executive,
must seek it, while a second branch, the
judiciary, must agree that it is authorized
by the law promulgated by a third branch.
If the judiciary has, in an individual case,
misconstrued the law, Congress can, constitutional pronouncements aside, change the
rule for the future. If Congress wishes to
withhold from the ex ecutive branch the civil remedies available under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, it can by specific
legislation say so. Thus, we find unconvincing the separation of powers argument
invoked by the Solomon court to reject executive branch enforcement of federallaw. 8
[1] In this case, however, we need not
decide whether absent the Halderman action the United States could indepe~d~~tfy
have sued. The suit was already pending.
Moreover, in its constitutional dimensions
the suit was expressly authorized by 42
U.S.C. § 1983. We holq that the initial
plaintiffs have standing to enforce federal
statutory claims as well. See p. 95 infra.
Thus Congress has made the decision that
someone could seek the injunctive relief i~ .
question. Intervention presented no dan- ·
ger that the federal executive would be
initiating a lawsuit that Congress somehow
never intended. Intervention was sought
pursuant to Rule 24, Fed.R.Civ.P. 24, and
there was ample justification for permitting
it. Under Rule 24(bX2), a district court
may allow intervention when an applicant's
claim or defense and the main action have
common questions of law or fact. Rule
24(b) makes specific provision for intervention by governmental agencies interested in
statutes, regulations, or agreements relied '
upon by the parties in the action. Here, as
noted below, there is extensive federal legislation directed toward the well-being of
the mentally retarded. Several executive
branch agencies, especially the Department
of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW),
have important responsibilities under that
8.

See Gibbons, The Interdependence of Legitimacy: An Introduction to the Meaning of Separation of Powers, 5 Seton Hall L.Rev. 435
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legislation. Large amounts of federal
funds flow to Pennsylvania from the federal government, and the United States is
vitally interested in the enforcement of the
conditions on which those grants are made.
One su<;h condition is compliance with governing federal law. Had the United States
sought to do so, it could have brought suit
to enforce the conditions attached to its
grants.• Clearly, then, the .district court did
not abuse its discretion in permitting intervention under Rule 24.
III.

FACTUAL FifDINGS

Neither the Commonwealth nor the
County defendants take serious issue with
the court's findings of fact respecting the
abominable conditions to which Pennhurst
residents have been subjected. They do
contend, however, that despite those findings there was no legal basis for the grant
of any injunctive relief, and, alternatively,
that the scope of the relief ordered was
broader than was warranted by the facts or
the law.
At the time of trial Pennhurst housed
1230 mentally retarded individuals, some of

whom also suffered from physical disabilities. The residents are not mentally ill,
have broken no laws, and are not a danger
to others, although, in severe cases, some
are unable to care for themselves. Mental
retardation is an impairment in learning
capacity and adaptive behavior, and is not
treatable, like mental illness, by means of
drugs or psychotherapy. While the mentally retarded do suffer educational difficulties, the level of their functioning can be
improved by individualized training.

.-

Residents come to Pennhurst either because of a commitment order from a state
court, or by a "voluntary" admission initiated by a parent or guardian. In either case,
the admission is arranged through Base
Service Units, operated by the County defendants pursuant to the Pennsylvania
9.

10. Pa.Stat.
1969), sta t
(d) .
authorit i
ment [o
followin
tion sen

See United States v. Solomon, 563 F.2d at
1129 (Butzner, J ., concurring), and cases cited.

•
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Mental Health and Mental Retardation
Act. 10 The Base Service Units are responsihle for evaluating the needs of retarded
individuals and determining the appropriate
habilitative services.
In addition to large residential institu~ ,
tions like Pennhurst, Pennsylvania operates
smaller and less isolated programs referred ,
to as Community Living Arrangements
(CLAs). The latter programs reflect a recognition of the principles of normalization·
for the habilitation of the retarded. 11 ·un.: '
der normalization principles, retarded persons are treated as much as possible like
nonretarded persons. The purpose of such
treatment is remediation of the delayed
learning process so as to develop maximum
potential in self-help, language, personal,
social, educational, vocational, and recreationa! skills. These remediation efforts, the
trial court found, are in general, much more
likely to succeed in smaller living units
which are closer to and more reflective of
the normal society. In large separate isolated institutions like Pennhurst, however,
the retarded generally suffer apathy, stunted growth, and even regression in the skills
referred to. The effective result is the
imposition or facilitation of increased retardation. Such large institutions, the court
also determined, are more expensive to operate than community based alternatives.
Perhaps for those and other reasons, it had
been the current intention of the Department of Public Welfare to transfer residents from Pennhurst to community residential facilities, supported by specialized
services., by some time in the early 1980's.
In the five county area, 530 retarded persons already live in CLAs, inclucling 186
former Pennhurst residents.
The district court also found that the
environment at Pennhurst is not merely
10. Pa.Stat.Ann. tit. 50 § 430l(d)(9) (Purdon
1969), states in relevant part:
(d) .
. it shall be the duty of local
authorities in cooperation with the depart·
ment [of Public Welfare] to insure that the
following mental health and mental retardation services are available:

•

•

•

•

•

•

inconsistent with normalization principles,
but is actually hazardous to residents. Because of the inadequacies in programming
attributable to staff shortages, residents
were found to have lost skills already
learned. Organized programs of appropriate education and training were found to be
inadequate or unavailable. Evaluations of
resident progress do not meet minimum
professioJlal standards, and record keeping
is inadequate.
Moreover, the Pennhurst environment
was found to be unsanitary. There is often
urine and excrement on the ward floors.
Infectious diseases are common. Obnoxious
odors and excessive noise permeate the institution. Most toilet areas do not have
towels, soap or toilet paper. Injuries to
residents by other residents or through selfabuse are common. Serious injuries inflicted by staff members, including sexual assaults, have occurred. Physical restraints,
which may be physically harmful and which
have caused injuries and at least one death,
are resorted to more frequently than appropriate because of shortages of staff. Dangerous psychotropic drugs are used for purposes of behavior control and staff convenience, rather than for legitimate treatment needs. Such drug misuse produces
lethargy, hypersensitivity to sunlight, inability to maintain gait, and other disabilities. Seclusion in solitary confinement has
been used to punish aggressive behavior
which might not have occurred if a proper
regimen of training were available. Diet
control is not possible because residents
dine in large group eating areas without
adequate staff supervision.

'l
.]

u

a
t
.1

(

cl

.(

1:

1

J

ll

d
·i
!

;J
\

The federal government is a substantial
partner in the Commonwealth's and Counties' provision of services generally available, although not always provided, to the
(9) Unified procedures for intake for all
county services and a central place providing
referral services and information .
11. For a description of the normalization principle in the care of the mentally retarded, see B.
Nirje, The Normalization Principle, Changing
Patterns in Reside ntial Services for the Mentally Retarded, President's Committee on Mental
Retardation, 231 (Rev.ed. l976).
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mentally retarded. The Commonwealth do not understand the available alternatives
Department of Welfare receives federal to institutionalization, or are physically ungrants under both the Developmentally Dis- able to express an interest in leaving, or
abled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42 have no adequate alternative living arU.S.C. §§ 6001--£081 (1976), and the Educa- rangement. Thus the notion of voluntarition for All Handicapped Children Act of ness in admission and retention was found
1975, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1461 (1976). The to be illusory.
Commonwealth, in turn, makes funds available to the Counties for purposes of devel- IV. PREFERRED LEGAL BASES FOR
oping and maintaining their CLAs. Thus it
. . RELIEF
is clear that there are county based pro- ,., , ,·....
grams open and available to the mentally
Appella~ts, as we noted abo~e, do not
retarded which receive federal financial as- quarrel Wlth the facts; they dispute only
sistance. The trial court found that the the legal significance of those facts. They
Counties have made an insufficient effort reject both the court's conclusion that the
to provide community based services to the mentally retarded have a legal right to
retarded. 12 The population of Pennhurst treatment or habilitation and its conclusion
has thus remained high, effectively preclud- that treatment or habilitation must be proing the residents from taking :i{<'J.vantage vided in the least restrictive environment.
not only of federally funded programs ex- Moreover, even assuming that these rights
pressly intended for the care of the retard- exist, appellants challenge the court's ined, but also of various other federally fund- junctive order as overbroad. We consider
ed facilities such as education and transpor- in turn each of these objections.
tation.
The district court's determination that
appellees have a right to treatment was
predicated upon constitutional, federal, and
state statutory grounds. The federal courts
have long been directed to decide whether
causes of action can be supported on statutory grounds before they adjudicate constitutional law issues.ts

staff determines that there is no place for
him in the community, or that he is not
ready for community living, a petition for
involuntary commitment is made. The
court found, moreover, that many residents
12. The trial court found that because the Commonwealth has chosen to pay all of Pennhurst's costs not fed e rally funded, while requiring the Counties to pay 10% of the cost of
some community based services, the Counties
have a financial incentive to send retarded residents to Pennhurst rather than attempting habilitation within the community. 446 F.Supp. at
1312. See Record, Vol. 30, at 12, 23 (testimony
of Ms. E. A. Ballard). The County defendants

Moreover, while federal courts can interpret federal legislation definitively, subject
only to Supreme Court review, their interpretation of a state statute arguably supporting the judgment might be rejected by
the state's courts. The preferred order,
therefore, is to turn first to the federal
statutory issues. Thereafter, we will consider state statutory grounds for the trial
court's decision.
urge that the finding that they have such a
financial incentive is clearly erroneous. We
need not resolve that question, since the basis
on which we decide the legal issues is not
dependent upon the motive of the Counties.
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13. See Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 543, 94
S .Ct. 1372, 39 L.Ed .2d 577 (1974); Siler v.
Louisville & Nashville RR Co., 213 U .S. 175,
193, 29 S .Ct. 451, 53 LEd. 753 (1909).

sta n
(i

dail

dis:

SESSION OF 1970.

Act

~o.

256

773

No. 256
A SUPPLEMENT
SB 1304
To the act of November 25, 1969 (P.L.310), e ntitled "An act providing for the
capital budget for the fiscal year 1969-1970," itemizing public improveme nt
projects to be acquired or constructed by the General Sta te Authority, toge ther
with their estimated financial costs.

The General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania hereby
enacts as follows:
Section 1. Short Title.-This act shall be known and may be cited as
the "Capital Budget Act for Fiscal Year 1969-1970, Public Improvement
Project Itemization Supplement-General State Authority."
Section 2. Itemization and Authorization of Projects.-Additional
capital projects in the category of public improvement projects to be
acquired or constructed by the General State Authority, its successors or
assigns, and to be financed by the incurring of debt, are hereby itemized,
together v.ith their respective estimated financial costs and the total
additi onal amount authorized for public improvement projects, as follows:
A.

Total Project Authorization ............................................. ~ $442,047,860
I. Department of Agriculture .. ......................................... ......... 883,000
(1) Regional Office: District No. 6 ............................ ................ 401,000
(Base Construction Cost $321,000)
(2) Regional Office: District No. 3 ............................................ 482,000
(Land Acquisition $450,000)
II. Department of Commerce .............. .................................... 17,661,573
(1) Cover for Delaware Avenue: Penn's Landing, Philadelphia ....... ................ .... ............... ............................ .......... ...... 4,036,573
(Base ·construction Cost $3,000,000)
(2) Additional Funds for GSA 650-1, "Philadelphia Civic
Center ................................. ............................................... 1,875,000
(Base Construction Cost $1,500,000)
(3) Additional Funds for GSA 1201-1, Convention-Exposition Center, City of Pittsburgh .................................... 11,750,000
(Base Construction Cost $9,378,000)
III. Department of Forests and Waters ..........................:..... 32,279,050
(1) Flood Protection Project: Blakely Borough............. ........... 978,000
(Base Construction Cost $782,000)
(2) Flood Protection Project: Glenside Area ........... ................. 773,000
(Base Construction Cost $618,000)
(3) Flood Protection Project: Philipsburg Area ...................... 795,000
(Base Construction Cost $636,000)
(4) Inflatable Dam: Pine Creek.............................. .................... 278,000
(Base Construction Cost $222,000)
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(1 0) Renovation of Electrical Distribution System-Phase III:
Laurelton State School and Hospital ............................ 1,583,000
(Base Construction Cost $1,266,000)
(11) Renovation of Utilities: Pennhurst State School and
Hospital .................................................... .......................... 2,678,000
(Base Construction Cost $2,142,000)
(12) Renovation of Patient Building-F emale l: Pennhurst
State School and Hospital ....... ......................................... 2,300,000
(Base Construction Cost $1,840,000)
(13) Renovation of Patient Building-Female 2: Pennhurst
State School and Hospital ................................. .. ............ . 2,300,000
(Base Construction Cost $1,840,000)
(14) Additional Funds for GSA 551-14, Patient Building for
Hyperactive Children, Air Conditioning: Pennhurst
State School and Hospital................................................ 387,500
(Base Construction Cost $310,000)
(15) New Boiler Plant: Polk State School and Hospital ...... .. 3,868,000
(Base Construction Cost $3,094,000)
(16) Additional Funds for GSA 518-l, Altoona Geriatric
Center ............................... ......... .......... .......................... .... 2,620,345
(Base Construction Cost $2,097 ,000)
(17) Additional Funds for GSA 534-5, Main Hospital Building
and Renovate Maternity Wing: Hazle ton State
General Hospital... ........ ..................................................... 1,468,800
(Base Construction Cost $1,175,000)
(18) Renovations to Boiler Plant: Scranton State General
Hospital .... ................................ .. .. .. .................. ................ .. 250,000
(Base Construction Cost $200,000)
(19) Philadelphia Diagnostic and Rehabilitation Center ...... 2,649,800
(Ba$e· Cqn struction Cost $2,000,000)
(Land Acquisition $140,000)
(20) Construction of Annex to Philadelphia State Hospital for
Resident Treatment Addiction Center for Rehabilitation of Alcoholics and Narcotics Patients: St. Lukes
and Chiidren's Medical Center, Philadelphia .............. 5,625,000
(Base Construction Cost $4,500,000)
(21) For planning, design and construction of mental
retardation service units; and, acquisition of
property, total population survey and social system
analysis as required to provide definitive treatment
and normalizing accommodations for mentally
retarded residents of Bucks, Chester, D elaware,
Montgomery and Philadelphia Counties and to be
located in the same counties. The units are to
provide accommodations for approximately 900
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patients to reduce Lhe population at Pennhurst State
School and Hospital to a maximum of 1,000. This
capital investment to provide logical dispersal and
reorientation into the community for Pennhurst
residents and alternatives to institutionalization for
the Pennhurst waiting list population and other
mentally retarded citizens of the area who require
such treatment and accommodations. This program
is to be completed as expeditiously as possible so that
the first units may be occupied not later than two
years from the effective date of this act.. ............... ... 21,079,000
(Base Construction Cost, Acquisition, Survey and
Analysis $16,863,000)
·
XI. D epartment of Reve nue ........ ....... .... .. ... .......... ..... .. ............. 562,500
(1) Driver Examination Point: Cumberland County .............. 285,000
(Base Construction Cost $210,000)
(Land Acquisition $21 ,000)
(2) Driver Examination Point: Columbia County .... ~ .. ........... 277,500
(Base Construction Cost $210,000)
(Land Acquisition $14,000)
XII. Pennsylvania State Police ................................................ 12,591 ,700
(1) Substation and Driver Examination Point: Bucks County
752,000
(Base Construction Cost $581,000)
(Land Acquisition $24,000)
(2) Troop Headquarters: D auphin County .................. ... .. ...... . 2,125,000
(Base Construction Cost $1,700,000)
(3) Substation: Delaware County.. ................................. .... ......... 433,200
(Base Construction Cost $326,000)
(Land Acquisition $24,000)
(4) Substation: Montgomery County ...................... ................. ... 4.46,000
(Base Construction Cost $336,000)
- (Land Acquisition $24,000)
(5) Substation: Venango County ........................ ........................ 168,750
(Base Construction Cost $135,000)
(6) State Police Crime Laboratory, Wyoming Barracks:
Luzerne County ............................. ........... ........... ............. 243,750
·
,
(Base Construction Cost $195,000)
(7)' Regimental Headquarters: Dauphin County .................... 8,423,000
(Base Construction Cost $6,711,000)
(Land Acquisition $32,000)
XIII. Department of Transportation.. ...................................... .. 900,000
(1) Emergency Equipment and Maintenance Building,
Olmsted State Airport ........................... ... .. .... .................. 900,000
(Base Construction Cost $720,000)
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81-2101 Pennhurst v. Halderman
Dear Chief:
In

preparation

I

have

focused primarily on a

reexamination of Pennhurst.

The

case presents

constitutional question.

a

major

Court accepts John 1 s

for

next

views,

week 1 s

cases,

there will be

If the

little

force

left in the Eleventh Amendment.
In view of your willingness to exchange views
with me, I enclose a memorandum that I hope you will find
helpful.

Although the memorandum was prepared primarily

by one of my new clerks,

he and

together in its preparation.

I have worked closely

At my request, he reviewed

every case relied upon by John and me in our respective
draft

I

opinions.

conclusions

reached

think
in

you

the

will

find

memorandum

are

that

-

the"

strongly

supported both on principle and judicial authority.
I

do

not

suggest,

authority supporting John 1 s

Chief,

that

there

is

no

view that a federal court -

exercising pendent jurisdiction - may ignore the Eleventh
Amendment.

I do make two statements unequivocally:

(i)

the cases relied upon by John did not expressly address

2.

and

hold

against
state

that

a

the

state

law;

and

Eleventh

official
(ii)

Amendment

for

permits

prospective

the cases he cites,

a

relief

suit
under

quoting dicta,

were early decisions and the theory on which they relied
was specifically addressed and rejected in Larson.
Larson was decided in 1949,

Since

I know of no case that even

arguably supports the reasoning of John's draft.
In addition,

John's treatment of Larson in his

draft dissent is flatly inconsistent with his treatment of
that case only a year earlier in his plurality opinion for
the

Court

Salvors,

in

Inc.

Florida

Department

of

State

- an opinion which you joined.

v.

Treasure

In Treasure

Salvors, John stressed that Larson controls the issue of
Eleventh Amendment immunity when state officials are sued
in federal court for alleged violations of state law.
U.S.L.W.

5056,

5061

(1982).

Treasure Salvors as whether

John

stated

the

the conduct was

50
' ,.
test ' in

"undertaken

without any authority whatever." 50 u.S.L.W., at 5063.
his proposed dissent

in Pennhurst,

however,

In

John simply

repudiates Larson as "nothing more than a simple contract
dispute

regarding

property,"

without

the

sale

relevance

dissent, at 16-17, n. 17.

of
beyond

surplus
that

government

context.

He goes on to state:

JPS

"To the

3.

extent that Larson suggests that sovereign immunity bars
all suits based on actions that state officials claim to
be

within

the

necessary

or

scope

of

official

appropriate

Eleventh Amendment."

to

Ibid.

authority,

read

that

it

rule

is

not

into

the

He thereby rejects not only

the standard reading of Larson, but also the very reading
of Larson contained in both the plurality opinion and the
dissent, 50 U.S.L.W., at 5067-68, in Treasure Salvors.
Even

if

Larson

had

not

rejected

the

theory

relied upon by John, our recent Eleventh Amendment cases
have

definitely

official

is

contrary

to

done

so.

stripped

of

state

law

individual in equity,
official cannot be

If,

as

his

so

then

John

says,

a

state

authority

when

he

acts

he

may

be

sued

there is no basis for

sued

for

damages

at

as

an

saying that

law.

If he

is
'

;'

stripped of his authority in the one action, he should 'be
as well in the other.
bars

the

latter

Yet Edelman v.
John's

action.

Jordan explicitly

opinion

would

thus

undertmine the vitality of that nine-year old decision.
I
convenience
pendent

add only a
a

goal

word
we

all

jurisdiction promotes

about

judicial economy and

support.
this

goal.

In

many
But,

cases,
pendent

jurisdiction is a judge-made prudential rule based on the

4.

general language of Article III.

The Eleventh Amendment

is an explicit jurisdictional limitation on Article III.
The

Amendment,

because

control.Moreover,

of

its

any

in

narrow

language,

balancing

should

prudential

of

considerations, public policy - as well as the principles
of federalism - weigh heavily in favor of the Amendment.
JPS's

implicit

outmoded

argument

concept

application
principal

was
of

that

that

sovereign

should

made

and

sovereign

be

restricted

rejected

immunity

immunity

in

is

in

Larson:

supported

u.s.,

337

strongest reasons of public policy".

is

an
its

"the
by

the

at 703,

704 (opinion written by Chief Justice Vinson and joined by
Black,

Douglas,

concurring).

Murphy

and

Reed,

with

Although Larson involved federal

its holding and

Rutledge
immunity,

reasoning apply also to state immunity.
' ,.

.

See memo p. 6.

Finally, we retained the comity issue in setting
this case for
and

Sandra

reargument.

were

the

only

Unless the votes change, you
Justices

who

expressed

any

interest in a comity resolution, and Sandra subsequently
concluded we should decide the Eleventh Amendment issue.
As

I

indicated in our correspondence in June, comity in

practice is a

"chancellor's foot" doctrine.

Because its

'

.
5.

boundaries

are

ill

defined,

it

inhibits litigation.
Sincerely,
The Chief Justice

invites

rather

than

~

09/29/83
Powell Chambers

MEMORANDUM

81-2101 Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman

RE:

In light of the divergent views of past precedents taken in
the draft opinion by JUSTICE POWELL (LFP) and the dissent by JUSTICE STEVENS

(JPS) ,

this memorandum summarizes a re-examination

of the cases debated

(chiefly in the footnotes)

in the two opin-

ions.
The memorandum reaffirms the following conclusions:

( i)

the

cases cited by JPS do not control the Eleventh Amendment issue
~

presented

in this case;

(ii)

permitting suits such as this one

would be directly contrary to this Court's recent Eleventh Amendment and sovereign immunity cases; and (iii) pendent jurisdiction
cannot properly be relied upon to provide jurisdiction that the
Eleventh

Amendment explicitly

takes

away.

The memorandum con- , ,.
!

eludes
force

in addition that

if suits against state officers to en-

state law are permitted,

either as a direct exception to

the Eleventh Amendment or because of pendent jurisdiction,
will be no principled basis for

there

finding any significant present

force in the Eleventh Amendment.
1.

The question is still open.

none of the early cases
controlling.
a

suit

There are three reasons why

relied upon by JPS can be regarded as

First, practically none of them squarely holds that

against

a

state

official

for

prospective

relief

under

p a ge L.

state law is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

Second, the

theory on which

rejected

these cases

rely was definitively

in

Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949).
Third,

probably for

these two reasons,

none of these cases has

been thought to have any force as Eleventh Amendment doctrine for
over thirty years.
The cases JPS cites divide

into two categories:

those that

discuss the Eleventh Amendment question for which they are now
cited,

and those that do not.

With regard to those cases that

discuss the Eleventh Amendment issue, the important point is that
all of

them--with

infra--are

the possible exceptions

distinguishable

from

the

noted

present

pronouncements JPS quotes are broad dicta. 1

in

footnote

case,

and

2

the

These cases all fall

1 JPS's broad reading of the language in these cases is also
subject to dispute.
First, that language must be understood in
terms of the pleading rules of the day.
See, e.g., Scully v.
Bird, 209 u.s. 481, 485-486 (1908). The reason these actions
were not to be "dismissed at the threshold" for lack of
jurisdiction, see JPS dissent at 12, is that such a dismissal
looked only to the allegations of the complaint.
If the
complaint alleged an individual tortious action unconnected to
the officer's authority, the court presumptively had jurisdiction
of the cause unless the state officer could show that his actions
were within his authority. The cases nevertheless maintained the
essential distinction between suits alleging wrongful
administration of a statute, which were barred, and those
alleging individual torts, which were presumptively ultra vires.
See, e.g., Hopkins v. Clemson Agricultural College, 221 u.s. 636,
64 7 ( 1911) (there was jurisdiction because the act ion did not
allege a wrong "committed in the prosecution of any governmental
function"; the College "was not acting in any governmental
capacity"); Cunningham v. Macon & B. R. Co., 109 u.s. 446, 452
(1883) (when officer is sued in tort, "he is not sued as, or
because he is, the officer of the government, but as an
individual"); id., at 453 (a suit alleging wrongful exercise of
governmental discretion is barred).
Second, the language JPS cites by no means represented
Footnote continued on next page.

into one or

the

other of the

two

recognized exceptions to the

rule that suits against state officials are suits against states:
the plaintiffs in these cases alleged eithei . acts by state officials completely ultra vires their authority or actions contrary
to the federal Constitution. 2

settled doctrine.
To the contrary, a number of cases from the
same period suggest in holdings and dicta a rule like that set
forth in LFP's opinion, disallowing state-law cases against state
officers from being heard in federal court.
See, e.g., In re
Ayers, 123 u.s. 443, 503-503 (1887) (suit alleging only a breach
of the state's contract by state officials barred by the Eleventh
Amendment); Allen v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 114 u.s. 311, 316
(1885) (the exercise of jurisdiction to remedy constitutional
violations "is to vindicate the supremacy of the Constitution,
and to maintain the integrity of the powers and rights which it
confers and secures").
2

E.g., Hopkins v. Clemson Agricultural College, 221 u.s.
636, 642 (1911) (question presented was whether a municipal
corporation could claim the state's sovereign immunity in a
proceeding alleging that it had "damage[d] or take[n] property
withou.t due process of law"); Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust
Co., 154 u.s. 362, 390-391, 396, 399, 410 (1894) (challenges to
railroad rates were on constitutional grounds; also, the state
had waived immunity); Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 u.s. 279, 288
(1885) (challenge was that law unconstitutionally impaired
obligation of contract). See also Cunningham v. Macon & B. R.R.,
109 U.S. 446 (1883) (suit held to be against state, so that
jurisdiction was lacking).
Two cases cited by JPS--Scully and Johnson v. Lankford, 245
U.S. 541 (1918)--do not fit comfortably into either of these two
categories (although Scully arguably was an ultra vires case).
Nevertheless, they have little precedential value. The holding
in Scully appears to turn importantly on the fact that the Court
was confined to the allegations of the complaint in reversing the
grant of a dismissal. See supra note 1.
It also appears that
the Court in Scully adhered to the now-discarded theory that a
suit is against a state for jurisdictional purposes only if the
state is a named party.
Id., at 485-486.
In Lankford no brief
in opposition was filed.
Moreover, the case was a suit for money
damages and was thus overruled by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 u.s. 651
(1974).
In any case, this Court has recognized the somewhat
quirky nature of these cases and has not cited either of them
since Larson was decided in 1949.

Other cases did allow a suit to be brought against state officials for prospective relief under state law, even though the
allegations did not fall

into one of the well-recognized excep-

tions, but none of these so much as mentions the Eleventh Amendment in connection with the state-law claims. 3
pear

These cases ap-

to have relied on the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction to

establish jurisdiction over the state law claims, not considering
whether that doctrine might have a different scope when applied
to suits against the state.

When old decisions do not appear to

have given full consideration to a constitutional question later
found to be important, the Court has not hesitated to depart from
them.
ruling,

See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 u.s. 651, 670-671 (1974)
inter alia, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 u.s. 618

(over-

(1969), on

this ground) .4

3 see Lee v. Bickell, 292 u.s. 415 (1934); Glenn v. Field
Packing C~ 290 u.s. 177 (1933) (per curiam); Davis v. Wallace,
257 u.s. 478 (1922); Greene v. Louisville & Interurban R.R. Co.,
244 u.s. 499 (1917); Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Greene,
244 u.s. 522 (1917); Illinois C. R.R. v. Greene, 244 u.s. 555
(1917). See also Siler v. Louisville & N. R.R., 213 u.s. 175,
195-196 (1908) (ultra vires case, Eleventh Amendment question
neither briefed nor adressed).
4 Moreover, it appears that all of the cases in this latter
class were before long placed beyond the power of the federal
courts. They were all actions to enjoin the collection of state
taxes, and, if brought today, they would presumably be barred by
the subsequently enacted Tax Injunction Act of 1937, 28 u.s.c.
§1341: "The district courts shall not enjoin, suspend, or
restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under
State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had
in the courts of such State." Congress pased this law in order
to remedy the previous federal interference in state fiscal
operations, see Rosewell v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 450 u.s. 503,
522, 526-527 (1981), a consideration "just as compelling today as
[it was] in 1937," id., at 527.
Footnote continued on next page.

In addition, all of the cases cited by JPS are of little or
no precedential force for the further reason that they could not
possibly have contemplated the kind of extraordinary relief ordered by the federal courts in the present case.

As we know from

the

relief

several

Pennhurst

cases,

the

injunctive

awarded '

against Pennsylvania empowered a federal court to take over the
administration of a major state institution as well as the expenditure of many millions of dollars of state funds.
the cases relied upon

In contrast,

in JPS's dissent involved no such compre-

hensive intrusion upon a state's traditional responsibilities.
Even if these early cases were not distinguishable or had not
been overruled on their facts,

the theory of sovereign immunity

on which they rely has been definitively rejected by this Court
in a closely related context.

The theory is that a state offi-

cial who acts contrary to state law is acting without authority,
and

therefore

is being

sued

in his

private capacity.

See JPS

Under the act, all the tax cases cited by JPS most likely
would be sent back to the state courts for decision. The "plain,
speedy and efficient" standard has been held to be considerably
more stringent than the equity standard under which the adequacy
of state law remedies was evaluated in prior cases.
Id., at 526.
More important, the prior equity standard did not take into
account injunctive r e medies available under state law, as the Act
requires the federal courts to do.
Id., at 534 & n.7 (Stevens,
J., dissenting). Prior to 1937, state statutes commonly provided
for enjoining a tax if it was invalid, id., at 523 (quoting H.R.
Rep. No. 1503, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1937)), and state courts
in any case entertained bills to enjoin collection of taxes or
compel refunds where the remedies at law would require a
multiplicity of suits or were otherwise inadequate, see, e.g. ,
Stratton v. St. Louis S.W. Ry., 284 u.s. 530, 532 (1932) (citing
See
state cases). Similar provisions appear to exist today.
Ro s ewell, 450 u.s., at 508 nn. 6 & 7.

~'

dissent at 13-19.

Faced with an identical claim in the case of a

federal officer acting contrary to federal

law,

this Court re-

Recognizing ~the conflict in doc-

jected this theory in Larson.

trine," the Court ruled that a government officer's action may be
regarded as so illegal as to override sovereign immunity "only if
it

is not within the officer's

statutory powers or,

if within

those powers, only if the powers or their exercise in the partieular case, are constitutionally void."
claim of error

in the exercise of

not sufficient."

337

u.s.,

at 701-702.

[the officer's]

power

"A

is

Id., at 690.

Although Larson

involved the federal government's sovereign

immunity, and not the states', our cases have recognized no distinction between the two doctrines.
State
(1982)

v.

Treasure

Salvors,

Inc.,

See, e.g., Florida Dept. of
50

U.S.L.W.

5056,

5060

n.21

("' [I]t cannot be doubted that the question whether a par-

ticular suit is one against the State, within the meaning of the
Constitution, must depend upon the same principles that determine
whether a particular
(quoting
case,

Tindal

there

is

suit is one against the United States.'")

v.

Wesley,

no

reason

167
to

u.s.

think

204,
that

213
the

(1897)).
state

In

any

governments

would have less protection in federal court than does the federal
government.
opposite.

Principles of federalism would, in fact, suggest the
Moreover, the two-part analysis of Larson was invoked

just last Term in an in rem suit against the State of Florida.
Treasure Salvors.
The contract nature of the claim in Larson also does not distinguish

that case.

Again,

one would

think

that

the

far more

intrusive extraordinary relief granted by the court below in this
case would be more likely to be barred by sovereign immunity than
the specific performance on a contract that was sought in Larson.
The distinction has

in any case been

rejected.

See Malone v.

Bowdoin, 369 u.s. 643, 648 (1962); Georgia Railroad & Banking Co.
v. Redwine, 342 U.S. 299, 305-306 (1952).
Finally,

and

most

important,

none of

these cases has been

relied upon in an Eleventh Amendment context for at least a generation.

These are long dead cases that have not previously been

attributed the importance that JPS gives to them.
cited most often.

Siler has been

But until JPS's proposed dissent of last Term,

no member of the Court had ever explicitly linked Siler with the
Eleventh

Amendment

in

a

published

opinion.

Since

1949,

when

Larson was decided, no case citing Siler has raised any Eleventh
Amendment questions.

The few that are against state officials do

not raise any state law claims.

Siler has come to be cited only

for the Ashwander doctrine of avoiding constitutional questions,
or for the Osborn-Gibbs rule allowing decision of all questions
in a case. 5

Similarly, none of the other cases cited by JPS has

5 see, e.g., Wolston v. Reader's Digest Assn., Inc., 443
u.s. 157, 160 n.2 (1979) ("[T]he general principle [is] that
dispositive issues of statutory and local law are to be treated
before reaching constitutional issues.
E.g., ... Siler .•.• ");
Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 122 (1979) (Burger, C.J.)
("Our practice is to avoid reaching constitutional questions if a
dispositive nonconstitutional ground is available. See, e.g.,
Siler ..•• "); Hagans v. Lavine, 415 u.s. 528, 546 (1974) ("the
state issues should be decided first and because these claims
were dispositive, federal questions need not be reached" (citing
Siler)); Zschernig v. Miller, 389 u.s. 429, 444 (1968) (Harlan,
J., concurring) (quoting Ashwander's cite to Siler); Textile
Footnote continued on next page.
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been cited since 1949 for the proposition he says they support. 6
None of these cases, moreover, has been mentioned in any of the
Eleventh Amendment cases decided since 1949.
Salvors; Fitzpatrick v.

Bitzer,

u.s.

427

See, e.g., Treasure

445

(1976); Edelman v.

Jordan; Employees v. Missouri Public Health & Welfare Dept., 411 ·

u.s.

279 (1973).
In

sum,

this Court has

never

squarely held,

in an opinion

that considers the Eleventh Amendment,

that that provision per-

mi ts

barred

the

courts
would

kind

under

of

suits

that would

LFP 's opinion.

contradict

the

More

Court's

be

important,

more

recent

from

the

federal

a contrary result
sovereign

immunity

cases, either overruling without explanation the cases that hold
federal and state sovereign immunity to be identical, or overruling the square holding of Larson and undermining the analysis of
Treasure Salvors.

By contrast,

if the result reached

in LFP's

opinion questions any cases, they are far older and of little or
no

present vitality.

Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 u.s. 448, 483 (1957)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (In pendent jurisdiction cases,
"federal courts may pass on state grounds for recovery that are
joined to a federal ground." See •.• Siler .... ) .
6 E.g., Lankford (never cited); Hopkins (never cited);
Greene (cited once for proposition that court will decide pendent
state law claims to avoid constitutional question); Scully (never
cited); Reagan (cited for proposition that unconstitutional
action is not action of state); Poindexter (same); Glenn (cited
only for proposition that Court should avoid resting decision on
state law since interpretation might be supplanted by state court
decision); Lee v. Bickell (only cited in cases in which the
pendent claim was a federal rather than a state one) ; Davis
(s a me) •

2.

Sovereign

immunity

bars

suits

to

enforce

state

law.

JPS 1 s main line of attack is that a suit alleging that state officials have violated
barred by

the

the

law--either

Eleventh Amendment.

As

was considered and rejected by Larson.

federal or

state--is not

indicated,

this approach

The Court there cogently ·

noted that this theory "confuses the doctrine of sovereign immunity with the requirement that a plaintiff state a cause of action."

337 U.S., at 692-693.

In addition,

such a

rule would

be

contrary to the Court 1 s

recent Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence, and would ultimately sap
the Amendment of any force.
parte Young,

209

u.s.

123

The primary conflict is over how Ex
(1908), is explained.

JPS 1 s theory is

that a state officer acting illegally is stripped of his authority.

This approach is far broader than the explanation offered

by any recent case.

The orthodox explanation for that case was

summed up in Edelman v. Jordan,

415 U.S.

651,

664

(1974):

"This

holding has permitted the Civil War Amendments to the Constitution to serve as a

sword,

rather

than merely as a

those whom they were designed to protect."
limitation

of

the

Eleventh

shield,

for

The theory is that a

Amendment--allowing

suits

that

are

plainly against the state--was necessary to ensure that federal
law was vindicated.

See

c.

Sovereign Immunity 142-143
of

theoretical

case,

niceties.

Jacobs,
(1972).

Under

The Eleventh Amendment and
This

JPS 1 s

is not merely a matter

proposed holding

in this

the Eleventh Amendment would, on the face of things, con-

tinue to bar

two kinds of actions

(other than suits naming the

state as a party): diversity actions against state officials, and

suits for damages against state officials.
JPS's

opinion,

however,

principled support.
thority

when

he

neither

If a

acts

of

these

state officer

illegally

in

an

Under the theory of
prohibitions

has

any

is stripped of his auinjunctive

suit

brought

under pendent jurisdiction, there is no reason he is not stripped
of his authority in actions seeking damages or in diversity actions.

Presumably neither

long-lived,

therefore,

of

and

these prohibitions would be very

the

Eleventh

Amendment

effectively

would have been read out of the Constitution.
3.

Pendent

jurisdiction

does

not

supply

that is excluded by the Eleventh Amendment.
case acknowledged or

assumed

alone would be bar red by

that

the

the

jurisdiction

Although CA3 in this

state-law claim standing

the Eleventh Amen omen t,

it found

that

the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction supplies the federal courts
with power to decide such claims.

This theory is theoretically

and

jurisdiction,

practically

unsound.

Pendent

doctrine of expediency and efficiency,

essentially

a

should not be allowed to

override the explicit constitutional command that the states be
immune.

Pendent

jurisdiction

is

a

prudential doctrine

derived

from the general Art.

III language conferring power to hear all

"cases"

federal

Gibbs,

arising
383

general

u.s.,

under

at 725.

law and between

ai verse

parties.

By any standard of construction, this

language should give way to the far more specific lan-

guage of the subsequently adopted Eleventh Amendment, which explicitly

excludes

against the states.

from

the

judicial

power

suits

prosecuted

Any contrary ruling would as surely, though

ina irectly,

obliterate

the Eleventh Amendment as would allowing

these suits under the Amendment itself.
Such a reading may well result in more federal claims being
brought

in

state

claims.

That

court,

is not

or,

less

uncommon

in

likely,

this

in

area.

bifurcation

of

Under Edelman,

a

suit for money damages against state officials must be brought in
state court.
state

the

abstention doctrine,

law are commonly referred

sulting
been

Under

in

far

brought

greater

there

in

waste
the

unclear

to the state courts

and

uncertainty

first

place) .

than

Moreover,

issues of
(often re-

if they had
it

is

not

clear to me that allowing federal intrusion into state governance
does not have pitfalls of its own.
319

u.s.

315,

327-332

(1943)

See Burford v. Sun Oil Co.,

(recounting confusion and conflict

sown in East Texas oil fields by federal court rulings on state
law, resulting in special sessions of the legislature, a declaration of martial law, and constantly shifting administrative policy).

In addition, the considerations of "judicial economy, con-

venience,

and fairness"

that goverjn the exercise of pendent ju~ ~ry

risdiction, Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725, will themselves sow wasteful

by~

litigation that would be avoided
ard.

1) t h ,
1

t,

{ftt

/1

J.1JC

1<1

7

'

t-rA.,..

clear jurisdictional stand-

{I.JV'

In any event, this Court's recent cases exclude the position
that

prudential

considerations

of

j ud ic ial

economy

and

conve-

nience are sufficient to justify subverting an explicit limitation imposed by the Constitution.

In Edelman,

for example, the

District Court exercised pendent jurisdiction in hearing the federal statutory claims,

415

u.s.,

at 653 n.l,

but that did not

,

override the Eleventh Amendment ban on suits for money damages.
Cf. Aldinger v. Howard, 427

u.s.

1, 14-15 (1976)

(judicial econo-

my does not override jurisdictional bar on pendent parties).
recent case has been found to the contrary.
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MEMORANDUM

81-2101 Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman

RE:

In light of the divergent views of past precedents taken in
the draft opinion by JUSTICE POWELL (LFP) and the dissent by JUSTICE STEVENS

(JPS),

this memorandum summarizes a re-examination

of the cases debated (chiefly in the footnotes)

in the two opin-

ions.
The memorandum reaffirms the following conclusions:

(i) the

cases cited by JPS do not control the Eleventh Amendment issue
presented in this case;

(ii)

permitting suits such as this one

would be directly contrary to this Court's recent Eleventh Amendment and sovereign immunity cases; and (iii) pendent jurisdiction
cannot properly be relied upon to provide jurisdiction that the '
Eleventh Amendment explicitly takes away.
eludes

The memorandum con-

in addition that if suits against state officers to en-

force state law are permitted,

either as a direct exception to

the Eleventh Amendment or because of pendent jurisdiction,

there

will be no principled basis for finding any significant present
force in the Eleventh Amendment.
1.

The question is still open.

There are three reasons why

none of the early cases relied upon by JPS can be regarded as
controlling.
a

suit

.

;.,,

First, practically none of them squarely holds that

against

a

state

official

for

prospective

relief

under

page 2.

state law is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

Second, the

theory on which these cases rely was definitively rejected in
Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337

u.s.

682 (1949).

Third, probably for these two reasons, none of these cases has
been thought to have any force as Eleventh Amendment doctrine for
over thirty years.
The cases JPS cites divide into two categories: those that
discuss the Eleventh Amendment question for which they are now
cited, and those that do not.

With regard to those cases that

discuss the Eleventh Amendment issue, the important point is that
all of them--with the possible exceptions noted in footnote 2
infra--are

distinguishable

from

the

present

pronouncements JPS quotes are broad dicta. 1

case,

and

the

These cases all fall

1 JPS's broad reading of the language in these cases is also
subject to dispute. First, that language must be understood in
terms of the pleading rules of the day. See, e.g., Scully v.
Bird, 209 u.s. 481, 485-486 (1908). The reason these actions
were not to be "dismissed at the threshold" for lack of
jurisdiction, see JPS dissent at 12, is that such a dismissal
looked only to the allegations of the complaint. If the
complaint alleged an individual tortious action unconnected to
the officer's authority, the court presumptively had jurisdiction
of the cause unless the state officer could show that his actions
were within his authority. The cases nevertheless maintained the
essential distinction between suits alleging wrongful
administration of a statute, which were barred, and those
alleging individual torts, which were presumptively ultra vires.
See, e.g., Hopkins v. Clemson Agricultural College, 221 u.s. 636,
647 (1911) (there was jurisdiction because the action did not
allege a wrong "committed in the prosecution of any governmental
function"; the College "was not acting in any governmental
capacity"); Cunningham v. Macon & B. R. Co., 109 U•• 446, 452
(1883) (when officer is sued in tort, "he is not sued as, or
because he is, the officer of the government, but as an
individual"); id., at 453 (a suit alleging wrongful exercise of
governmental discretion is barred) •
Second, the language JPS cites by no means represented
Footnote continued on next page.
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into one or the other of the two recognized exceptions to the
rule that suits against state officials are suits against states:
the plaintiffs in these cases alleged either acts by state officials completely ultra vires their authority or actions contrary .
to the federal Constitution. 2

settled doctrine. To the contrary, a number of cases from the
same period suggest in holdings and dicta a rule like that set
forth in LFP's opinion, disallowing state-law cases against state
officers from being heard in federal court. See, e.g., In re
Ayers, 123 u.s. 443, 503-503 (1887) (suit alleging only a breach
of the state's contract by state officials barred by the Eleventh
Amendment); Allen v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 114 u.s. 311, 316
(1885) (the exercise of jurisdiction to remedy constitutional
violations "is to vindicate the supremacy of the Constitution,
and to maintain the integrity of the powers and rights which it
confers and secures").
2E.g., Hopkins v. Clemson Agricultural College, 221 U.S.
636, 642 (1911) (question presented was whether a municipal
corporation could claim the state's sovereign immunity in a
proceeding alleging that it had "damage[d] or take[n] property
without due process of law"); Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust
Co., 154 u.s. 362, 390-391, 396, 399, 410 (1894) (challenges to
railroad rates were on constitutional grounds; also, the state
had waived immunity); Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 u.s. 279, 288
(1885) (challenge was that law unconstitutionally impaired
obligation of contract). See also Cunningham v. Macon & B. R.R.,
109 u.s. 446 (1883) (suit held to be against state, so that
jurisdiction was lacking).
Two cases cited by JPS--Scully and Johnson v. Lankford, 245
u.s. 541 (1918)--do not fit comfortably into either of these two
categories (although Scully arguably was an ultra vires case).
Nevertheless, they have little precedential value. The holding
in Scully appears to turn importantly on the fact that the Court
was confined to the allegations of the complaint in reversing the
grant of a dismissal. See supra note 1. It also appears that
the Court in Scully adhered to the now-discarded theory that a
suit is against a state for jurisdictional purposes only if the
state is a named party. Id., at 485-486. In Lankford no brief
in opposition was filed. Moreover, the case was a suit for money
damages and was thus overruled by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651
(1974). In any case, this Court has recognized the somewhat
quirky nature of these cases and has not cited either of them
since Larson was decided in 1949.

,.
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Other cases did allow a suit to be brought against state officials for prospective relief under state law, even though the
allegations did not fall into one of the well-recognized exceptions, but none of these so much as mentions the Eleventh Amend- ment in connection with the state-law claims.3

These cases ap-

pear to have relied on the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction to
establish jurisdiction over the state law claims, not considering
whether that doctrine might have a different scope when applied
to suits against the state.

When old decisions do not appear to

have given full consideration to a constitutional question later
found to be important, the Court has not hesitated to depart from
them.

See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 u.s. 651, 670-671 (1974)

(over-

ruling, inter alia, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 u.s. 618 (1969), on
this ground) • 4
3 see Lee v. Bickell, 292 u.s. 415 (1934); Glenn v. Field
Packing co:-;- 290 u.s. 177 (1933) (per curiam); Davis v. Wallace,
257 u.s. 478 (1922); Greene v. Louisville & Interurban R.R. Co.,
244 u.s. 499 (1917); Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Greene,
244 u.s. 522 (1917); Illinois C. R.R. v. Greene, 244 u.s. 555
(1917). See also Siler v. Louisville & N. R.R., 213 u.s. 175,
195-196 (1908) (ultra vires case, Eleventh Amendment question
neither briefed nor adressed).
4Moreover, it appears that all of the cases in this latter
class were before long placed beyond the power of the federal
courts. They were all actions to enjoin the collection of state
taxes, and, if brought today, they would presumably be barred by
the subsequently enacted Tax Injunction Act of 1937, 28 U.S.C.
§1341: "The district courts shall not enjoin, suspend, or
restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under
State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had
in the courts of such State." Congress pased this law in order
to remedy the previous federal interference in state fiscal
operations, see Rosewell v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 450 u.s. 503,
522, 526-527 (1981), a consideration "just as compelling today as
[it was] in 1937," id., at 527.
Footnote continued on next page.
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In addition, all of the cases cited by JPS are of little or
no precedential force for the further reason that they could not
possibly have contemplated the kind of extraordinary relief ordered by the federal courts in the present case.

As we know from

the

relief

several

Pennhurst

cases,

the

injunctive

awarded

against Pennsylvania empowered a federal court to take over the
administration of a major state institution as well as the expenditure of many millions of dollars of state funds.

In contrast,

the cases relied upon in JPS's dissent involved no such comprehensive intrusion upon a state's traditional responsibilities.
Even if these early cases were not distinguishable or had not
been overruled on their facts, the theory of sovereign immunity
on which they rely has been definitively rejected by this Court
in a closely related context.

The theory is that a state offi-

cial who acts contrary to state law is acting without authority,
and therefore is being sued in his private capacity.

See JPS

Under the act, all the tax cases cited by JPS most likely
would be sent back to the state courts for decision. The "plain,
speedy and efficient" standard has been held to be considerably
more stringent than the equity standard under which the adequacy
of state law remedies was evaluated in prior cases. Id., at 526.
More important, the prior equity standard did not take into
account injunctive remedies available under state law, as the Act
requires the federal courts to do. Id., at 534 & n.7 (Stevens,
J., dissenting). Prior to 1937, state statutes commonly provided
for enjoining a tax if it was invalid, id., at 523 (quoting H.R.
Rep. No. 1503, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1937)), and state courts
in any case entertained bills to enjoin collection of taxes or
compel refunds where the remedies at law would require a
multiplicity of suits or were otherwise inadequate, see, e. 9. '
Stratton v. St. Louis s.w. Ry., 284 u.s. 530, 532 (1932) (citing
state cases). Similar provisions appear to exist today. See
Rosewell, 450 u.s., at 508 nn. 6 & 7.
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dissent at 13-19.

Faced with an identical claim in the case of a

federal officer acting contrary to federal law,
jected this theory in Larson.

this Court re-

Recognizing "the conflict in doc-

trine," the Court ruled that a government officer's action may be
regarded as so illegal as to override sovereign immunity "only if
it

is not within the officer's statutory powers or,

if within

those powers, only if the powers or their exercise in the partieular case, are constitutionally void."
claim of error

in the exercise of

not sufficient."

337

u.s.,

at 701-702.

[the officer's]

"A

power is

Id., at 690.

Although Larson involved the federal government's sovereign
immunity, and not the states', our cases have recognized no distinction between the two doctrines.
State
(1982)

v.

Treasure

Salvors,

Inc.,

See, e.g., Florida Dept. of
50

U.S.L.W.

5056,

5060 n.21

("' [I]t cannot be doubted that the question whether a par-

ticular suit is one against the State, within the meaning of the
'

Constitution, must depend upon the same principles that determine·
whether a particular suit is one against the United States.'")
(quoting Tindal v.

Wesley,

case,

reason

there

is no

167
to

u.s.

think

204,
that

213
the

(1897)).

In any

state governments

would have less protection in federal court than does the federal
government.
opposite.

Principles of federalism would, in fact, suggest the
Moreover, the two-part analysis of Larson was invoked

just last Term in an in rem suit against the State of Florida.
Treasure Salvors.
The contract nature of the claim in Larson also does not distinguish

that case.

Again,

one would

think

that

the far more

"
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intrusive extraordinary relief granted by the court below in this
case would be more likely to be barred by sovereign immunity than
the specific performance on a contract that was sought in Larson.
The distinction has in any case been rejected.

See Malone v.

Bowdoin, 369 U.S. 643, 648 (1962); Georgia Railroad & Banking Co.
v • Redwine , 3 4 2 u • S • 2 9 9 , 3 0 5-3 0 6 ( 19 5 2 ) •
Finally,

and most important,

none of these cases has been

relied upon in an Eleventh Amendment context for at least a generation.

These are long dead cases that have not previously been

attributed the importance that JPS gives to them.
cited most often.

Siler has been

But until JPS's proposed dissent of last Term,

no member of the Court had ever explicitly linked Siler with the
Eleventh

Amendment

in

a

published opinion.

Since 1949,

when

Larson was decided, no case citing Siler has raised any Eleventh
Amendment questions.

The few that are against state officials do

not raise any state law claims.

Siler has come to be cited only

for the Ashwander doctrine of avoiding constitutional questions,
or for the Osborn-Gibbs rule allowing decision of all
in a case. 5

questions ~

"

Similarly, none of the other cases cited by JPS has

5 see, e.g., Wolston v. Reader's Digest Assn., Inc., 443
u.s. 157, 160 n.2 (1979) ("[T]he general principle [is] that
dispositive issues of statutory and local law are to be treated
before reaching constitutional issues. E.g., ••• Siler •••• ");
Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 u.s. 111, 122 (1979) (Burger, C.J.)
("Our practice is to avoid reaching constitutional questions if a
dispositive nonconstitutional ground is available. See, e.g.,
Siler •••• "); Hagans v. Lavine, 415 u.s. 528, 546 (1974) ("the
state issues should be decided first and because these claims
were dispositive, federal questions need not be reached" (citing
Siler)); Zschernig v. Miller, 389 u.s. 429, 444 (1968) (Harlan,
J., concurring) (quoting Ashwander's cite to Siler); Textile
Footnote continued on next page.
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been cited since 1949 for the proposition he says they support.6
None of these cases, moreover, has been mentioned in any of the
Eleventh Amendment cases decided since 1949.

See, e.g., Treasure

Salvors; Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976); Edelman v.
Jordan; Employees v. Missouri Public Health & Welfare Dept., 411

u.s.

279 (1973).
In sum,

this Court has never squarely held,

in an opinion

that considers the Eleventh Amendment, that that provision permi ts the kind of suits that would be barred from the federal
courts under LFP 's opinion.
would

contradict

the

More important, a contrary result

Court's

more

recent

sovereign

immunity

cases, either overruling without explanation the cases that hold
federal and state sovereign immunity to be identical, or overruling the square holding of Larson and undermining the analysis of
Treasure Salvors.

By contrast,

if the result reached in LFP 's

opinion questions any cases, they are far older and of little or
no

present vitality.

Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 u.s. 448, 483 (1957)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (In pendent jurisdiction cases,
"federal courts may pass on state grounds for recovery that are
joined to a federal ground." See ••• Siler •••• ).
6E.g., Lankford (never cited); Hopkins (never cited);
Greene (cited once for proposition that court will decide pendent
state law claims to avoid constitutional question); Scully (never
cited); Reagan (cited for proposition that unconstitutional
action is not action of state); Poindexter (same); Glenn (cited
only for proposition that Court should avoid resting decision on
state law since interpretation might be supplanted by state court
decision); Lee v. Bickell (only cited in cases in which the
pendent claim was a federal rather than a state one) ; Davis
(same).

page 9.

2.

Sovereign

immunity

bars

suits

to

enforce

state

law.

JPS's main line of attack is that a suit alleging that state officials have violated the law--either federal or state--is not
barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

As indicated,

was considered and rejected by Larson.

this approach

The Court there cogently

noted that this theory "confuses the doctrine of sovereign immunity with the requirement that a plaintiff state a cause of action."

337

u.s.,

In addition,

at 692-693.
such a

rule would be contrary to the Court's

recent Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence, and would ultimately sap
the Amendment of any force.

The primary conflict is over how Ex

parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908}, is explained.

JPS's theory is

that a state officer acting illegally is stripped of his authority.

This approach is far broader than the explanation offered

by any recent case.

The orthodox explanation for that case was

u.s.

summed up in Edelman v. Jordan, 415

651, 664

(1974}: "This

holding has permitted the Civil War Amendments to the Constitution to serve as a sword,

rather than merely as a shield,

those whom they were designed to protect."
limitation

of

the

Eleventh

for

The theory is that a

Amendment--allowing

suits

that

are

plainly against the state--was necessary to ensure that federal
law was vindicated.

See

c.

Sovereign Immunity 142-143
of theoretical niceties.

Jacobs,
(1972}.

The Eleventh Amendment and
This is not merely a matter

Under JPS 's proposed holding in this

case, the Eleventh Amendment would, on the face of things, continue to bar two kinds of actions

(other than suits naming the

state as a party}: diversity actions against state officials, and

~

"
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suits for damages against state officials.
JPS 's opinion,

however,

principled support.
thor i ty

when

he

neither

of

Under the theory of

these prohibitions has

any

If a state officer is stripped of his au-

acts

illegally

in

an

injunctive

suit brought .

under pendent jurisdiction, there is no reason he is not stripped
of his authority in actions seeking damages or in diversity actions.

Presumably neither of

long-lived,

therefore,

and

these prohibitions would be very

the

Eleventh

Amendment

effectively

would have been read out of the Constitution. \ This may be th€f)
motivating force behind JPS's view, see dissent at 22-23, but it J
would seem that an amendment passed by the states specifically to l
correct this Court's prior interpretation should not be treated
so cavalierl¥·
3.

\

J

Pendent

jurisdiction does

not

supply

that is excluded by the Eleventh Amendment.
case acknowledged or assumed

the

jurisdiction

Although CA3 in this

that the state-law claim standing

alone would be barred by the Eleventh Amendment,

it found that

the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction supplies the federal courts ;
with power to decide such claims.
and

practically

unsound.

Pendent

This theory is theoretically
jurisdiction,

essentially

a

doctrine of expediency and efficiency, should not be allowed to
override the explicit constitutional command that the states be
immune.

Pendent

jurisdiction is a prudential doctrine derived

from the general Art.

III language conferring power to hear all

"cases" arising

federal

Gibbs,

383

~

u.s.,

under

at 725.

law and between diverse parties.

By any standard of construction, this

general language should give way to the far more specific lan-

,.
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guage of the subsequently adopted Eleventh Amendment, which explicitly

excludes

from

against the states.

the

judicial

power

suits

prosecuted

Any contrary ruling would as surely, though

indirectly, obliterate the Eleventh Amendment as would allowing these suits under the Amendment itself.
Such a reading may well result in more federal claims being
brought

in

state

claims.

That

court,

or,

less

is not uncommon

likely,

in

in this area.

bifurcation

of

Under Edelman,

a

suit for money damages against state officials must be brought in
Under

state court.

the abstention doctrine,

unclear

state law are commonly referred to the state courts
sulting

in far

been brought

issues of
(often re-

greater waste and uncertainty than if they had

there

in

the

first

place).

Moreover,

it

is

not

clear to me that allowing federal intrusion into state governance
does not have pitfalls of its own.
319

u.s.

315, 327-332

(1943)

See Burford v. Sun Oil Co.,

(recounting confusion and conflict

sown in East Texas oil fields by federal court rulings on state
law, resulting in special sessions of the legislature, a

declara- ~

tion of martial law, and constantly shifting administrative policy).

In addition, the considerations of "judicial economy, con-

venience, and fairness"

that govern the exercise of pendent ju-

risdiction, Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725, will themselves sow wasteful
litigation that would be avoided by a clear jurisdictional standard.
In any event, this Court's recent cases exclude the position
that

prudential

considerations

of

judicial

economy

and

conve-

nience are sufficient to justify subverting an explicit limita-

,

page 12.

tion imposed by the Constitution.

In Edelman, for example, the

District Court exercised pendent jurisdiction in hearing the federal statutory claims,

415 U.S.,

at 653 n.l,

but that did not

override the Eleventh Amendment ban on suits for money damages.
Cf. Aldinger v. Howard, 427

u.s.

1, 14-15 (1976)

(judicial econo-

my does not override jurisdictional bar on pendent parties).
recent case has been found to the contrary.

No
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81-2101 Pennhurst v. Halderman
Dear Chief:
In preparation for next week's cases, I have
focused primarily on a reexamination of Pennhurst.
case presents a major constitutional question.
~/

/

The

If the

Court accepts John's views, there will be little force lef f
in the Eleventh Amendment.
In view of your willingness to exchange views
with me, I enclose a memorandum that I hope you will find
' ,

.

helpful.

Although the memorandum was prepared primarily

by one of my new clerks, he and I have worked closely
together in its preparation.

At my request, he reviewed

every case relied upon by John and me in our respective

2.

draft opinions.

I think you will find that the

conclusions reached in the memorandum are strongly
supported both on principle and judicial authority.
I do not suggest, Chief, that there is no
authority supporting John's view that a federal court exercising pendent jurisdiction - may ignore the Eleventh
Amendment.

I do make two statements unequivocally:

(i)

J,J nol
~ e£

the cases relied upon by John expressly

\Of

and hMld that the Eleventh

1

addresse ~

fV n f.s
Amendment~oes=n~

a suit

against a state official for prospective relief under
state law; and (ii) the cases he cites, quoting dicta,
were early decisions and the theory on which they relied
was specifically addressed and rejected in Larson.

Since

Larson was decided in 1949, I know of no case that even
arguably supports the reasoning of John's draft.

3.

I add only a word about judicial economy and
convenience - a goal we all support.

In many cases,

pendent jurisdiction promotes this goal.

This case,

however, presents a constitutional issue.

Pendent

jurisdiction is a judge-made prudential rule based on the
general language of Article III.

The Eleventh Amendment

is an explicit jurisdictional limitation on Article III.
Moreover, in any balancing of prudential considerations,
public policy - as well as the principles of federalism weigh heavily in favor of the Amendment.

It was argued in

Larson, as it is argued implicitly in JPS's opinion (at
least as I read it), that sovereign immunity is an
outmoded concept that should be restricted in its
application.

This identical argument was made and

rejected in Larson (opinion written by Chief Justice

.. .

4.

Vinson and joined by Black, Douglas, Murphy and Reed, with
Rutledge concurring):

"the principal of sovereign

immunity is supported by the strongest reasons of public
policy".

337

u.s.,

at 703, 704.

Although Larson involved

federal immunity, its holding and reasoning apply also to
state immunity.

See memo p. 6.

Finally, we retained the comity issue in setting
this case for reargument.

Unless the votes change, you

and Sandra were the only Justices who expressed any
interest in a comity resolution, and Sandra subsequently
concluded we should decide the Eleventh Amendment issue.
As I indicated in our correspondence in June, comity in
practice is a "chancellor's foot" doctrine.

Because its

boundaries are ill defined, it invites rather than
inhibits litigation.

50

Sincerely,
The Chief Justice
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~e~afe~is ~et£4ea±~ inconsistent with his treatment of ~
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""'

&ame case only a year earlier in his plurality opinion for the
A

Court in Florida Department of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc.-an opinion which you joined.

In Treasure Salvors, John stressed

that Larson controls the issue of Eleventh Amendment immunity
when state officials are sued in federal court for alleged
violations of state law.

50 U.S.L.W. 5056, 5061 {1982).

John

stated the test in Treasurer Salvors as whether the conduct was
"undertaken without any authority whatever."

50 U.S.L.w

7

at

5063. ~

~ ~is

proposed dissent in Pennhurst, however, John

simply repudiates Larson as "nothing more than a simple contract
dispute regarding the sale of surplus government property,"
without relevance beyond that context.
16-17, n. 17.

He goes on to state:

"To the extent that Larson

- 2 -

suggests that sovereign immunity bars all suits based on actions
that state officials claim to be within the scope of official
authority, it is not necessary or appropriate to read that rule

]biJ

into the Eleventh Amendment." ~ He thereby rejects not only
the standard reading of Larson, but also the very reading of
Larson contained in both the plurality opinion and the dissent,
50 U.S.L.Wy at 5067-68, in Treasure Salvors.
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Powell Chambers

MEMORANDUM

!. !v'~f~kt)
81-2101 Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman

RE:

In light of the divergent views of past precedents taken in
the draft opinion by JUSTICE POWELL (LFP) and the dissent by JUSTICE STEVENS

(JPS),

this memorandum summarizes a re-examination

of the cases debated

(chiefly in the footnotes)

in the two opin-

ions.
The memorandum reaffirms the following conclusions:

( i) the

cases cited by JPS do not control the Eleventh Amendment issue
presented in this case;

(ii)

permitting suits such as this one

would be directly contrary to this Court's recent Eleventh Amendment and sovereign immunity cases; and (iii) pendent jurisdiction
cannot properly be relied upon to provide jurisdiction that the
Eleventh Amendment explicitly
eludes
force

in addition that

takes

away.

The memorandum con-

if suits against state officers to en-

state law are permitted,

either as a direct exception to

the Eleventh Amendment or because of pendent jurisdiction,
will be no principled basis for

there

finding any significant present

force in the Eleventh Amendment.
1.

The question is still open.

none of the early cases
controlling.
a

suit

There are three reasons why

relied upon by JPS can be regarded as

First, practically none of them squarely holds that

against

a

state

official

for

prospective

relief

under

paye

L..

state law is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

Second, the

theory on which

rejected

these cases

rely was definitively

Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337
Third,

probably for

these

two reasons,

u.s.

in

682 (1949).

none of these cases has

been thought to have any force as Eleventh Amendment doctrine for
over thirty years.
The cases JPS cites divide

into two categories:

discuss the Eleventh Amendment question for
cited,

and those

that do not.

those that

which they are now

With regard to those cases that

discuss the Eleventh Amendment issue, the important point is that
all of

them--with

infra--are

the possible

distinguishable

from

except ions noted
the

present

pronouncements JPS quotes are broad dicta. 1

in

footnote

case,

and

2

the

These cases all fall

1 JPS's broad reading of the language in these cases is also
subject to dispute.
First, that language must be understood in
terms of the pleading rules of the day. See, e.g., Scully v.
Bird, 209 u.s. 481, 485-486 (1908). The reason these actions
were not to be "dismissed at the threshold" for lack of
jurisdiction, see JPS dissent at 12, is that such a dismissal
looked only to the allegations of the complaint.
If the
complaint alleged an individual tortious action unconnected to
the officer's authority, the court presumptively had jurisdiction
of the cause unless the state officer could show that his actions
were within his authority. The cases nevertheless maintained the
essential distinction between suits alleging wrongful
administration of a statute, which were barred, and those
alleging individual torts, which were presumptively ultra vires.
See, e.g., Hopkins v. Clemson Agricultural College, 221 U.S. 636,
647 (1911) (there was jurisdiction because the action did not
allege a wrong "committed in the prosecution of any governmental
function"; the College "was not acting in any governmental
capacity"); Cunningham v. Macon & B. R. Co., 109 u.s. 446, 452
(1883) (when officer is sued in tort, "he is not sued as, or
because he is, the officer of the government, but as an
individual"); id., at 453 (a suit alleging wrongful exercise of
governmental discretion is barred).
Second, the language JPS cites by no means represented
Footnote continued on next page.

into one or

the

other of the

two

recognized exceptions to the

rule that suits against state officials are suits against states:
the plaintiffs in these cases alleged eithei . acts by state officials completely ultra vires their authority or actions contrary
to the federal Constitution. 2

settled doctrine. To the contrary, a number of cases from the
same period suggest in holdings and dicta a rule like that set
forth in LFP's opinion, disallowing state-law cases against state
officers from being heard in federal court.
See, e.g., In re
Ayers, 123 u.s. 443, 503-503 (1887) (suit alleging only a breach
of the state's contract by state officials barred by the Eleventh
Amendment); Allen v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 114 U.S. 311, 316
(1885) (the exercise of jurisdiction to remedy constitutional
violations "is to vindicate the supremacy of the Constitution,
and to maintain the integrity of the powers and rights which it
confers and secures").
2 E.g., Hopkins v. Clemson Agricultural College, 221 U.S.
636, 642 (1911) (question presented was whether a municipal
corporation could claim the state's sovereign immunity in a
proceeding alleging that it had "damage[d] or take[n] property
without due process of law"); Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust
Co., 154 u.s. 362, 390-391, 396, 399, 410 (1894) (challenges to
railroad rates were on constitutional grounds; also, the state
had waived immunity); Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 u.s. 279, 288
( 1885) (challenge was that law unconstitutionally impaired
obligation of contract). See also Cunningham v. Macon & B. R.R.,
109 U.S. 446 (1883) (suit held to be against state, so that
jurisdiction was lacking).
Two cases cited by JPS--Scully and Johnson v. Lankford, 245
U.S. 541 (1918)--do not fit comfortably into either of these two
categories (although Scully arguably was an ultra vires case).
Nevertheless, they have little precedential value.
The holding
in Scully appears to turn importantly on the fact that the Court
was confined to the allegations of the complaint in reversing the
grant of a dismissal. See supra note 1.
It also appears that
the Court in Scully adhered to the now-discarded theory that a
suit is against a state for jurisdictional purposes only if the
state is a named party.
Id., at 485-486.
In Lankford no brief
in opposition was filed.
Moreover, the case was a suit for money
damages and was thus overruled by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 u.s. 651
(1974).
In any case, this Court has recognized the somewhat
quirky nature of these cases and has not cited either of them
since Larson was decided in 1949.

Other cases did allow a suit to be brought against state officials for prospective relief under state law, even though the
allegations did not fall

into one of the well-recognized excep-

tions, but none of these so much as mentions the Eleventh Amendment in connection with the state-law claims. 3
pear

These cases ap-

to have relied on the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction to

establish jurisdiction over the state law claims, not considering
whether that doctrine might have a different scope when applied
to suits against the state.

When old decisions do not appear to

have given full consideration to a constitutional question later
found to be important, the Court has not hesitated to depart from
them.
ruling,

See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 u.s. 651, 670-671 (1974)
inter alia, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 u.s. 618

(over-

(1969), on

this ground) .4

3 see Lee v. Bickell, 292 u.s. 415 (1934); Glenn v. Field
Packing C~ 290 u.s. 177 (1933) (per curiam); Davis v. Wallace,
257 u.s. 478 (1922); Greene v. Louisville & Interurban R.R. Co.,
244 u.s. 499 (1917); Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Greene,
244 u.s. 522 (1917); Illinois C. R.R. v. Greene, 244 u.s. 555
(1917). See also Siler v. Louisville & N. R.R., 213 u.s. 175,
195-196 (1908) (ultra vires case, Eleventh Amendment question
neither briefed nor adressed).
4 Moreover, it appears that all of the cases in this latter
class were before long placed beyond the power of the federal
courts. They were all actions to enjoin the collection of state
taxes, and, if brought today, they would presumably be barred by
the subsequently enacted Tax Injunction Act of 1937, 28 u.s.c.
§1341: "The district courts shall not enjoin, suspend, or
restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under
State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had
in the courts of such State." Congress pased this law in order
to remedy the previous federal interference in state fiscal
operations, see Rosewell v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 450 u.s. 503,
522, 526-527 (1981), a consideration "just as compelling today as
[it was] in 1937," id., at 527.
Footnote continued on next page.
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In addition, all of the cases cited by JPS are of little or
no precedential force for the further reason that they could not
possibly have contemplated the kind of extraordinary relief ordered by the federal courts in the present case.

As we know from

the

relief

several

Pennhurst

cases,

the

against Pennsylvania empowered a

injunctive

awarded

federal court to take over the

administration of a major state institution as well as the expenditure of many millions of dollars of state funds.

In contrast,

the cases relied upon in JPS's dissent involved no such comprehensive intrusion upon a state's traditional responsibilities.
Even if these early cases were not distinguishable or had not
been overruled on their facts,

the theory of sovereign immunity

on which they rely has been definitively rejected by this Court
in a closely related context.

The theory is that a state offi-

cial who acts contrary to state law is acting without authority,
and

therefore

is being

sued

in his private capacity.

See JPS

Under the act, all the tax cases cited by JPS most likely
would be sent back to the state courts for decision. The "plain,
speedy and efficient" standard has been held to be considerably
more stringent than the equity standard under which the adequacy
of state law remedies was evaluated in prior cases.
Id., at 526.
More important, the prior equity standard did not take into
account injunctive remedies available under state law, as the Act
requires the federal courts to do.
Id., at 534 & n.7 (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
Prior to 1937, sta~statutes commonly provided
for enjoining a tax if it was invalid, id., at 523 (quoting H.R.
Rep. No. 1503, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1937)), and state courts
in any case entertained bills to enjoin collection of taxes or
compel refunds where the remedies at law would require a
multiplicity of suits or were otherwise inadequate, see, e.g. ,
Stratton v. St. Louis s.w. Ry., 284 u.s. 530, 532 (1932) (citing
See
state cases).
Similar provisions appear to exist today.
Rosewell, 450 u.s., at 508 nn. 6 & 7.

.~..- -

dissent at 13-19.

:J-

-

...

Faced with an identical claim in the case of a

federal officer acting contrary to federal
jected this theory in Larson.

law,

this Court re-

Recognizing "the conflict in doc-

trine," the Court ruled that a government officer's action may be
regarded as so illegal as to override sovereign immunity "only if
it

is not within

the officer's

statutory powers or,

if within

those powers, only if the powers or their exercise in the partieular case, are constitutionally void."
claim of error

in the exercise of

not sufficient."

337

u.s.,

at 701-702.

[the officer's]

power

"A

is

Id., at 690.

Although Larson

involved the

federal government's

sovereign

immunity, and not the states', our cases have recognized no distinction between the two doctrines.
State
(1982)

v.

Treasure

Salvors,

Inc.,

See, e.g., Florida Dept. of
50

U.S.L.W.

5056,

5060

n.21

("' [I]t cannot be doubted that the question whether a par-

ticular suit is one against the State, within the meaning of the
Constitution, must depend upon the same principles that determine
whether a particular

suit

(quoting Tindal

v.

Wesley,

case,

no

reason

there

is

is one against the United States.'")
167
to

U.S.

think

204,
that

213
the

(1897)).
state

In

any

governments

would have less protection in federal court than does the federal
government.
opposite.

Principles of federalism would, in fact, suggest the
Moreover, the two-part analysis of Larson was invoked

just last Term in an in rem suit against the State of Florida.
Treasure Salvors.
The contract nature of the claim in Larson also does not distinguish

that

case.

Again,

one would

think

that

the

far more

intrusive extraordinary relief granted by the court below in this
case would be more likely to be barred by sovereign immunity than
the specific performance on a contract that
The distinction has

in any case

been

~~s

sought in Larson.

rejected.

See Malone v.

Bowdoin, 369 U.S. 643, 648 (1962); Georgia Railroad & Banking Co.
v . Redwine , 3 4 2 U. S . 2 9 9 , 3 0 5-3 0 6 ( 19 52) •
Finally,

and

most

important,

none

of these

cases has been

relied upon in an Eleventh Amendment context for at least a generation.

These are long d e ad cases that have not previously been

attributed the importance that JPS gives to them.
cited most often.

Siler has been

But until JPS's proposed dissent of last Term,

no member of the Court had ever explicitly linked Siler with the
Eleventh

Amendment

in

a

published

opinion.

Since

1949,

when

Larson was decided, no case citing Siler has raised any Eleventh
Amendment questions.

The few that are against state officials do

not raise any state law claims.

Siler has come to be cited only

for the Ashwander doctrine of avoiding constitutional questions,
or for

the Osborn-Gibbs rule allowing decision of all questions

in a case. 5

Similarly, none of the other cases cited by JPS has

5 see, e.g., Wolston v. Re ader's Digest Assn., Inc., 443
u.s. 157, 160 n.2 (1979) ("[T]he general principle [is] that
dispositive issues of statutory and local law are to be treated
before reaching constitutional issues.
E.g., ... Siler .... ");
Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 u.s. 111, 122 (1979) (Burger, C.J.)
("Our practice is to avoid reaching constitutional questions if a
dispositive nonconstitutional ground is available. See, e.g.,
Siler •..• "); Hagans v. Lavine, 415 u.s. 528, 546 (1974) ("the
state issues should be decided first and because these claims
were dispositive, federal questions need not be reached" (citing
Siler)); Zschernig v. Miller, 389 u.s. 429, 444 (1968) (Harlan,
J., concurring) (quoting As h wa nd e r's cite to Siler); Textile
Footnote continued on next page.

been cited since 1949 for the proposition he says they support. 6
None of these cases, moreover, has been mentioned in any of the
Eleventh Amendment cases decided since 1949.
Salvors; Fitzpatrick v.

Bitzer,

u.s.

427

See, e.g., Treasure

445

(1976); Edelman v.

Jordan; Employees v. Missouri Public Health & Welfare Dept., 411

u.s.

279 (1973).
In sum,

this Court has

never

squarely . held,

in an opinion

that considers the Eleventh Amendment,

that that provision per-

mits

barred

the

kind

courts under
would

of

suits

that would

LFP 's opinion.

contradict

the

More

Court's

be

important,

more

recent

from

the

federal

a contrary result
sovereign

immunity

cases, either overruling without explanation the cases that hold
federal and state sovereign immunity to be identical, or overruling the square holding of Larson and undermining the analysis of
Treasure Salvors.

By contrast,

if

the

result

reached

in LFP's

opinion questions any cases, they are far older and of little or
no

present vitality.

Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 u.s. 448, 483 (1957)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (In pendent jurisdiction cases,
"federal courts may pass on state grounds for recovery that are
joined to a federal ground." See ... Siler .... ).
6 E.g., Lankford (never cited); Hopkins (never cited);
Greene (cited once for proposition that court will decide pendent
state law claims to avoid constitutional question); Scully (never
cited); Reagan (cited for proposition that unconstitutional
action is not action of state); Poindexter (same); Glenn (cited
only for proposition that Court should avoid resting decision on
state law since interpretation might be supplanted by state court
decision); Lee v. Bickell (only cited in cases in which the
pendent claim was a federal rather than a state one) ; Davis
(same).

2.
JPS

1

S

Sovereign

immunity

bars

suits

to

enforce

state

law.

main line of attack is that a suit alleging that state of-

ficials

have

bar red by

violated

the

the

Eleventh

law--either

Amendment.

As

was considered and rejected by Larson.

federal or

state--is not

indicated,

this approach

The Court there cogently

noted that this theory "confuses the doctrine of sovereign immunity with the requirement that a plaintiff state a cause of action."

u.s.,

337

In addition,

at 692-693.
such a

rule

would

be contrary

to the Court 1 s

recent Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence, and would ultimately sap
the Amendment of any force.
parte Young,

209

u.s.

123

The primary conflict is over how Ex
(1908}, is explained.

JPS 1 s theory is

that a state officer acting illegally is stripped of his authority.

This approach is far broader than the explanation offered

by any recent case.

The orthodox explanation for that case was

summed up in Edelman v. Jordan,

415

u.s.

651,

664

(1974}:

"This

holding has permitted the Civil War Amendments to the Constitution to serve as a

sword,

rather

than merely as a

those whom they were designed to protect."
limitation

of

the

Eleventh

shield,

for

The theory is that a

Amendment--allowing

suits

that

are

plainly against the state--was necessary to ensure that federal
law was vindicated.

See C.

Sovereign Immunity 142-143
of

theoretical

niceties.

Jacobs,
(1972}.

Under

The Eleventh Amendment and
This is not merely a matter

JPS 1 s

proposed holding

in this

case,

the Eleventh Amendment would, on the face of things, con-

tinue

to bar

two kinds of actions

(other than suits naming the

state as a party}: diversity actions against state officials, and

Jf2~

l!cll:lt!

suits for damages against state officials.
JPS's

opinion,

however,

principled support.
thority

when

he

neither

If a

acts

of

these

state officer

illegally

in

an

.LUo

Under the theory of
prohibitions

has

any

is stripped of his auinjunctive

suit

brought

under pendent jurisdiction, there is no reason he is not stripped
of his authority in actions seeking damages or in diversity actions.

Presumably neither of

long-lived,

therefore,

and

these prohibitions would be very

the

Eleventh

Amendment

effectively

would have been read out of the Constitution.
3.

Pendent

jurisdiction

does

not

supply

that is excluded by the Eleventh Amendment.
case acknowledged or

assumed

that

the

jurisdiction

Although CA3 in this

the state-law claim standing

alone would be bar red by the Eleventh Amendment,

it found that

the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction supplies the federal courts
with power to decide such claims.

This theory is theoretically

and

jurisdiction,

practically

unsound.

Pendent

essentially

a

doctrine of expediency and efficiency, should not be allowed to
override the explicit constitutional command that the states be
immune.

Pendent

jurisdiction

is

a

prudential doctrine

derived

from the general Art.

III language conferring power to hear all

"cases" arising

federal

Gibbs,

383

u.s.,

under

at 725.

law and between diverse parties.

By any standard of construction, this

general language should give way to the far more specific language of the subsequently adopted Eleventh Amendment, which explicitly

excludes

against the states.

from

the

judicial

power

suits

prosecuted

Any contrary ruling would as surely, though

ina irectly,

obliterate

the Eleventh Amendment as would allowing

these suits under the Amendment itself.
Such a reading may well result in more federal claims being
brought

in

state

claims.

That

court,

is

or,

less

not uncommon

in

likely,

this

in

area.

bifurcation

of

Under Edelman,

a

suit for money damages against state officials must be brought in
state court.
state

Under

the

abstention doctrine,

law are commonly referred

sulting

in

far

been brought

greater

there

in

issues of

to the state courts

waste and
the

unclear

first

uncertainty
place).

than

Moreover ,

(often reif

they had
it

is

not

clear to me that allowing federal intrusion into state governance
does not have pitfalls of its own.
319

u.s.

315,

327-332

(1943)

See Burford v. Sun Oil Co.,

(recounting confusion and conflict

sown in East Texas oil fields by federal court rulings on state
law, resulting in special sessions of the legislature, a declaration of martial law, and constantly shifting administrative policy).

In addition,

venience,

the considerations of "judicial economy, con-

and fairness"

risdiction, Gibbs,

383

that govern the exercise of pendent ju-

u.s.

at 725, will themselves sow wasteful

litigation that would be avoided by a clear jurisdictional standard.
In any event, this Court's recent cases exclude the position
that

prudential

considerations

of

judicial

economy

and

conve-

nience are sufficient to justify subverting an explicit limitation imposed by the Constitution.

In Edelman,

for example, the

District Court exercised pendent jurisdiction in hearing the federal statutory claims,

415

u.s.,

at 653 n.l,

but that did not

override the Eleventh Amendment ban on suits for money damages.
Cf. Aldinger v. Howard, 427

u.s.

1, 14-15 (1976)

(judicial econo-

my does not override jurisdictional bar on pendent parties).
recent case has been found to the contrary.

No
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September 29, 1983
PERSONAL
81-2101 Pennhurst v. Halderman

Dear Chief:
In preparation for next week's cases, I have focused primarily on a reexamination of Pennhurst. The case
presents a major constitutional question. If the Court accepts ~ohn's views, there will he little force left in the
Eleventh Amendment.
In view of your willingness to exchanqe views with
me, T enclose a memorandum thC~t I hope VC\U will find helpful. Althouqh the me:tflorandum was prepared primari.lv by one
of my new clerks, he and I have worked closely together in
its preparation. At my request, he reviewed everv case reli.ed upon bv ..John ano me in our respective draft opinions.
I think vou will find that the conclusions reached in the
memorandum are stronqly supported both on principle and judicial authority.
I do not suggest, Chief, that there is no authority supporting John's view that a federal court - exercising
pendent jurisdiction - may ignore the Eleventh Amenc1ment. I
do make two statements unequivocallv: (i) the cases relied
upon by ~ohn did not expressly address and hold that the
Eleventh Amendment permits a suit against a state official
for prosPective relief under state law1 and (ii) thP cases
he cites, quotinq dicta, were early decisions and the theory
on which they relied was specjfically addressed and rejected
in Larson. Since Larson was decided in 1.949, I know of no
casP. that even arguably supports the reasoning of John's
draft.
In addition, John's treat.ment of r.arson in his
draft dissent is flatly it"'consistent with his treatment of
that cas@ only a year earlier in his plurality opinion for
the Court in Florida De artment of State v. Treasure
Salvors, !nc. -an opinton which you _oined. In Treasure
Salvors, John stressed that Larson controls the issue of
Eleventh Amendment immunity when state officials are sued in
federal court for alleged viol~tions of state law. 50
U.S.L.W. 5056, 5061 (1982). John stated the test in Treas-

2.

ure Salvors as whether t.he conduct was "undertaken without
any authoritv whatever." 50 u.s.L.W., at 5063. In his proposed dissent in Pennhurst, however, John simply repudiates
Larson as "nothinq more than a simple contract dispute ~P.
qardinq the sale of surplus government property," without
relevance beyond that context. ~JPS dissent, at 16-17, n.
17. He goes on to state: "To the extent that Larson suggests that sovereign immunity bars all suits based on actionR that state officials claim to be within the scope of
official author:ity, it i.s not necessary or appropriate to
read that rule into the Eleventh Amendment." !bid. He
thereby rejects not only the standard reading of Larson, but
also the very reading of Larson contained in both the plurality opinion and the dissent, 50 u.s.L.W., at 5067-68, in
Treasure Salvors.
Even if Larson had not rejecte~ the theory relied
upon by John, our recent Eleventh Amendment cases have definitively done so. If, as John says, a state official is
stripperl of his authority when he acts contrary to st~te l~w
so that he may be sued as an individual in equity, there is
no basis for saying that an official cannot be sued for damages at law. If he is stripped of his authority in the one
action, he should be as well in the other. Yet Edelman v.
Jordan explicitly bars the latter action. John's opinion
would thus under.mine the vitality of that nine-year-olo decision.
'
I add only a word about judicial economy a.nd convenience - a goal we all support. ln many cases, pendent
jurisdiction promotes this goal. ~ut, pendent jurisdiction
is a judge-made prudential rule based on the general 1anguaqe of Article III. The Eleventh Ame~nment is an explicit
jurisdictional limitation on Article III. The narrow language of the Amendment should control the general. Moreover, in any balancing of prudential considerations, public
policy - as well as the principles of federalism - weigh
heavily in favor of the Amendment. JPS's implici.t argument
that sovereign immunity is an outmoded concept that should
be restricted in its application was made and rejected in
Larson: "the principal of sovereign immunity is supported
by the strongest reasons of public policy". 337 u.s., at
703, 704 (opinion written by Chief Justice Vinson and joined
by Black, Douglas, Murphy and Reed, with Rutledge concurring). Although r.arson involved federal immunity, its holding and reasoning applv also to state immunity. See memo p.
6.
Fi.nally, we retained the comi.ty i.ssue in settinq
this case for rearqument. Unless the votes change, you and
Sandra were the only Justices who expresse~ any interest in

J

3.

a comity resolution, and San~ra subsequently concluded we
should oecide the Eleventh Amendment issue. As I inoicated
in our correspondence in June, comity in practice is a
"chancellor's foot" doctrine. Becauae its boundaries are
ill defined, it invites rather than inhibits litigation.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice

lfp/ss 10/03/83

HURST5 SALLY-POW
81-2101 Pennhurst v. Halderman

Possible Questions of Mr. Gilhool
Your brief states the question in this case as
"whether Siler should be overruled • • • " Was the Eleventh
Amendment addressed in Siler? Was it argued by counsel?
When was the last time Siler was cited as an Eleventh
Amendment? Has it ever been so cited?
Siler is cited for pendent jurisdiction, and also
for the Ashwander doctrine of avoiding constitutional issues.
Possible Questions for Mr. Ferleger
1. Your brief (p. 35) argues that where state
officials act in "violation of state" law, Eleventh Amendment immunity is no bar.
Do you say the officials here acted beyond the
scope of their authority? Did either the DC or CA3 so hold?
Was it well settled in Pennsylvania prior to your
court's decision in In re Schmidt (1981) that Pennhurst had
been operating for decades in volation of state law.
In Larson (p. 690) the Court said:
"A claim of error by an officer in exercise
of his authority is not enough" to come within the ultra vires exception to the Eleventh
Amendment.
The Larson Court said:
"The action of an officer of a sovereign can
be regarded as so 'illegal' as to permit a
suit • . . only if it is not within the officer's statutory powers or - if within those
powers - only if the statute is unconstitutional." (p. 701).
2. Defendants here at the Department of Public
Welfare of the state and its officers, past and present.
Also named are various local officials. In your view, is
the suit against the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania?

2.

3. Your brief states that:
"This case is a classic example of action falling within Ex parte Young." (Brief
2la). It involved an alleged federal constitutional
violation.
There is also an ultra vires exception to the
Eleventh Amendment when officers act beyond the scope of
their authority.
Did not Larson in 1949 make this clear?
case since Larson ingored this distinction?
It was reaffirm in Treasure Salvors.
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MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL
From:
Re:

Joe
Ultra vires argument in No. 82-2101 Pennhurst v. Halderman

,....,..,
In light of the _, argument in this case, it is possible that
~

the Chief or Justice Stevens will claim that the state and county
officials were acting ultra vires their authority in committing
the wrongs found by the District Court.

If the state officials

were acting entirely outside their authority, accepted Eleventh
Amendment

principles

would

dictate

that

the

suit here

is not

against the state and the Amendment would not apply.

This memo-

randum summarizes the arguments against such a view.

In sum, I

do not think the ultra vires exception would apply here without J
stretching it to include virtually any violation of state law.
1.

The District Court found that the defendants were acting

"within the sphere of their official responsibilities."
denied

the plaintiffs'

request for money damages,

The DC

holding that

the officials had qualified immunity (presumably under §1983).
[T]he evidence shows that the defendants acted in the
utmost good faith and they did not know nor reasonably
should have known that the actions which they took, or
failed to take, within the sphere of their official
responsibilities were in any way violative of the
rights of the retarded residents at Pennhurst.

V

446 F. Supp., at 1324 (Dec. 1977 judgment on merits) (emphasis
.~
c~~
pi!;
added).
See also 612 F.2d, at 94 (n ~ ng that DC found "state

f~ ' action"

~~m~e

~~~

"across the board").

This finding was not appealed.

It

argued that a finding of state action under §1983 does not

mean

there

Amendment.

is

state

tion

This

the

Treasure Salvors,

for

the

purposes

of

the

Eleventh

"well-recognized irony" referred to in
Ct., at 3315.

That irony, however, re-

fers to a finding that the state official is not the state under
Ex parte Young.

Since it is the rights guaranteed by the Four-

teenth Amendment that Young seeks to vindicate,
utterly necessary.

that result

is

The ultra vires exception is not justified by

reference to the Fourteenth Amendment but rather by the common
sense notion that an official on a frolic cannot claim immunity.
There is no reason a finding of state action under that Amendment
should not suffice to negate a suggestion of ultra vires.
2.

The argument that defendants actions were ultra vires was

not raised below.

Neither CA3 nor

the DC discussed the ultra

·LA- ~e::.~ ,

vires doctrine directly,

even though CA3 's opinions dealt with

other reasons why the suit was not barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

See 673 F. 2d,

jurisdiction supplies

at 656-659

(on remand from S. Ct., pendent

jurisdiction)~

612 F.2d, at 109

appeal, this suit is not barred by Edelman).

The

~J./~ that each of the defendants
~ law." Second Amended Complaint 119.
~~ fendants, the complaint points out
/'

"acted under
Also,

law

for

physical

It does as-

color

of

state

in describing the de-

Id.

111123-40.

plaint alleges three state law causes of action.
common

The

with respect to each of them

their responsibilities under state law.

the

in the

~~---

complaint did not allege ultra vires action.

complaint does not mention the Eleventh Amendment.

~~
~/

brie ~

-----~

?

court of appeals do not make the argument.
3.

Resp's

(original

injuries

to

the

The com-

One is under

plaintiffs,

id.

mean

there

Amendment.

is

state

This

i

tion
the

for

the

purposes

of

the

Eleventh

"well-recognized irony" referred to in

Treasure Salvors, 102 S. Ct., at 3315.

That irony, however, re-

fers to a finding that the state official is not the state under
Ex parte Young.

Since it is the rights guaranteed by the Four-

teenth Amendment that Young seeks to vindicate,
utterly necessary.

that result

is

The ultra vires exception is not justified by

reference to the Fourteenth Amendment but rather by the common
sense notion that an official on a frolic cannot claim immunity.
There is no reason a finding of state action under that Amendment
should not suffice to negate a suggestion of ultra vires.
2.

The argument that defendants actions were ultra vires was

not raj
vires
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3.

The

NOt

Atv0 t£-.r yov k/V'dW

h Amendpendent
original } : ,.

__

fs in
_.,_

complaint did not allege ultra vires act:J.On.

complaint does not mention the Eleventh Amendment.

~}./ ~ that each of the defendants
~ law." Second Amended Complaint ,[9.
,....

"acted under
Also,

~~

fendants,

~~
~/

their responsibilities under state law.

the \

The

It does as-

color

of

state

in describing the de-

the complaint points out with respect to each of them
Id.

,[,[23-40.

plaint alleges three state law causes of action.
the

he ultra

common

law

for

physical

injuries

to

the

The com-

One is under

plaintiffs,

id.

~~162-164;

tion.
ment

that may arguably be an allegation of ultra vires ac-

The other two are clearly based on the failure to implesome broad,

reason of
treatment),

statutory command devolving

their office.
168

Id.

,1,1153

on defendants

by

(denied statutory right

to

(failure to implement community living plans).

If any action in violation of state law is not ultra vires,

it

would seem that the failure to take a complex, affirmative, official action would be.

It is like the failure to comply with the

terms of a contract with the state in Larson; the duty only exists because of the officer's official position.

See also point

5 infra.
4.
A

The 1970 statute does not limit the defendants' authority

1/)

J-~ so as to make all their actions ultra vires.

>~

At argument, resp

and Justice Stevens suggested that Act No. 256 of the 1970 Pennsylvania General Assembly took from defendants the power to run
Pennhurst.

That statute

---

(attached,

relevant pages are pp.

788) does not order that Pennhurst be

--.....

institutionalization

clo~ed,

787-

as resp suggested,

~

few cases in which
is the only practical possibility,

as CA3
;

ultimately ordered,

612 F.2d,

at 113-115.

Rather,

,.

the statute

only requires that the population of Pennhurst be reduced by 900
to a total of 1000, beginning in 1972.

Thus, even if this stat-

ute can be read as removing from defendants the authority to run
a mental institution of more than 1000 patients, it does not make
their actions in running a smaller institution ultra vires.
complaint and the lower courts' orders,

however,

The

extend to the

running of Pennhurst generally and appear to be designed to re-

'.

duce the population of that institution to far below 1000.

The

orders make clear that compliance with Act No. 256 was only part
of the relief ordered.

They also order complex relief based on

the asserted right to treatment in the least restrictive environment.

Thus, Act No. 256 does not support all of the relief or-

dered against the state officials here. ,~--

._;17_ ·~-.J~~ ~-" ~.
t~~\ (~t~~l -y

5.

In re

Schmidt ~ also

77<
~

31

does not limit the scope of the defen- ~

dants' authority so as to make their actions ultra vires.
tice Stevens also suggested that the Pennsylvania s.ct.'s

Jus-

place plaintiffs in any other than the least restrictive

t9. ~

.4__,£~

environ-~~:·

There does not seem to be any suggestion that the statute

on which Schmidt

is based

is explicit enough to make contrary

actions by the defendants ultra vires.

To the contrary, while

that statute contained a statement of policy stating that "the
least

restrictions consistent with adequate

employed,"

treatment shall be

it commanded only that the state assure "the avail-

ability and equitable provision of adequate ••• mental retardation services" and that it assign each state facility "such duties

for

the

care

shall prescribe."
1981).

of

the mentally disabled,

as

50 P.S. §§ 7102, 4201(1), 4201(4)

the

secretary ·

(Supp. 1980-

This is the classic language of discretion, with guide-

lines on its exercise, and does not suggest a limitation on scope
of authority.

This

is quite different

from Treasure Salvors,

where the statute limited its grant of authority to hold property
to things

found on state land.

Here the limitations on state

authority were only that the care be "adequate."

~

be.

deci-~

sion in In re Schmidt might deprive defendants of authority

ment.

~
~-

T'

Justice Stevens's may argue, however, that In re Schmidt construed the statute so as to limit the discretion provided.

That

case did suggest that the state and county must exercise its discretion so as to provide the least restriction cons is tent with
adequate treatment.

But its comments were pure dicta aimed at

rebutting a suggestion made by the county during the litigation
that it only had to provide interim care and not local community
residences.

The

holding

of

the case was

that since Schmidt's

need for institutionalization was unquestioned, the state had the
responsibility to provide it.

More important,

I do not think a

duty to provide least restrictive treatment may be said to take
authority from the state to place part of its mentally retarded
population in institutions.
patients

could

only

be

Schmidt clearly envisioned that some

cared

for

in

institutions.

Thus,

the

state and county officials have the authority to determine whether

to

use

institutions,

treatment method

(e.g., horne care).

claim," Treasure Salvors,
use

community

institutions

to house

s.

102
the

facilities,

or

some

other

They thus have "a colorable

Ct., at 3321, that they could

residents of Pennhurst.

A view

that the state officials' decision was beyond the scope of their·
authority would mean that ultra vires would mean virtually the
same

thing

as

"contrary

to

law."

At

bottom,

the

command

in

Schmidt to use least restrictive treatment is not nearly as specific or ministerial as the command in Justice Stevens's hypothetical to close Pennhurst or the command in Treasure Salvors
~~----------------~

-

not to claim articles not found on state land.

You asked what mention Justice Stevens's dissent made of the
ultra vires doctrine.

The answer is, almost none.

The dissent

plainly rests on the proposition that "a plaintiff [can] bring a
suit under state law against a state official even if he did not
allege that the defendant had acted ultra vires," dissent at 18.
The dissent therefore does not argue that the state officials'
actions

in this case were ultra vires.

It does cite Treasure

-----~

Salvors, but only to quote language discussing the theory of the
ultra vires doctrine in support of the dissent's position that
any violation of state law strips the state actor of authority,
dissent at 19 n.l9.

~

The dissent does not acknowledge that the

quotes are taken out of context.
You also asked about last Term's oral argument.

It appears

that Mr. Ferleger for resps did open with the argument that the
defendants here were acting ultra vires, based on the state statutes and Schmidt.

Tr. at 23-26.

Their brief here mentions the

point, but defines ultra vires to include any dereliction of duty
or action contrary to state law,
Stevens relies on.

Br.

citng the early cases Justice

for Resps at 33-35.

not consistent with Treasure Salvors or Larson.

This definition is
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MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL
From:
Re:

Joe
Ultra vires argument in No. 82-2101 Pennhurst v. Halderman

o"'~

In light of theY argument in this case,

it is possible that

1\

the Chief or Justice Stevens will claim that the state and county
officials were acting ultra vires their authority in committing
the wrongs found by the District Court.

If the state officials

were acting entirely outside their authority, accepted Eleventh
Amendment

principles

would

dictate

that

the

suit here

is not

against the state and the Amendment would not apply.

This memo-

randum summarizes the arguments against such a view.

In sum, I

do not think the ultra vires exception would apply here without
stretching it to include virtually any violation of state law.
1.

The District Court found that the defendants were acting

"within the sphere of their official responsibilities."
denied the plaintiffs'

request for money damages,

The DC

holding that

the officials had qualified immunity {presumably under §1983}.
[T]he evidence shows that the defendants acted in the
utmost good faith and they did not know nor reasonably
should have known that the actions which they took, or
failed to take, within the sphere of their official
responsibilities were in any way violative of the
rights of the retarded residents at Pennhurst.
446 F.

Supp.,

added}.

Sef!

at 1324
o..l so

{Dec.

612.. r.~J.

1

action" "across the board"}.

1977 judgment on merits}

o.. t

~~~

{emphasis

(,.ot ing that DC found "state

This finding was not appealed.

It

may be argued that a finding of state action under §1983 does not

page 2.

mean

there

Amendment.

is

state

This

action

is the

for

the

purposes

of

the

Eleventh

"well-recognized irony" referred to in

Treasure Salvors, 102 S. Ct., at 3315.

That irony, however, re-

fers to a finding that the state official is not the state under
Ex parte Young.

Since it is the rights guaranteed by the Four-

teenth Amendment that Young seeks to vindicate,
utterly necessary.

that result

is

The ultra vires exception is not justified by

reference to the Fourteenth Amendment but rather by the common
sense notion that an official on a frolic cannot claim immunity.
There is no reason a finding of state action under that Amendment
should not suffice to negate a suggestion of ultra vires.
2.

The argument that defendants actions were ultra vires was

not raised below.

Neither CA3 nor

vires doctrine directly,

the DC discussed the ultra

even though CA3 's opinions dealt with

other reasons why the suit was not barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

See 673 F. 2d,

at 656-659

(on remand from S. Ct., pendent

jurisdiction supplies jurisdiction); 612 F.2d, at 109

.Resp's br~f

appeal, this suit is not barred by Edelman) •

_pearL of appeals de Rot make tbe argYmeRt.
3.

jn

The complaint did not allege ultra vires action.

sert that each of

the defendants

law." Second Amended Complaint ,19.
fendants,

t~

~

complaint does not mention the Eleventh Amendment.
"acted under
Also,

The

It does as-

color of

state

in describing the de-

the complaint points out with respect to each of them

their responsibilities under state law.

Id.

,1,123-40.

plaint alleges three state law causes of action.
the

(original

common

law

for

physical

injuries

to

the

The com-

One is under

plaintiffs,

id.

page 3.

~~162-164:

tion.
ment

that may arguably be an allegation of ultra vires ac-

The other two are clearly based on the failure to implesome

reason of
treatment),

broad,
their
168

statutory command devolving on defendants by
office.

Id.

(failure to

1111153

(denied statutory right

to

implement community living plans).

If any action in violation of state law is not ultra vires,

it

would seem that the failure to take a complex, affirmative, official action would be.

It is like the failure to comply with the

terms of a contract with the state in Larson: the duty only exists because of the officer's official position.

See also point

5 infra.
4.

The 1970 statute does not limit the defendants' authority

so as to make all their actions ultra vires.

At argument, resp

and Justice Stevens suggested that Act No. 256 of the 1970 Pennsylvania General Assembly took from defendants the power to run
Pennhurst.

That statute

(attached,

relevant pages are pp.

787-

788) does not order that Pennhurst be closed, as resp suggested,
or even that Pennhurst only be used for those few cases in
institutionalization
ultimately ordered,

is the only practical possibility,
612 F.2d,

at 113-115.

Rather,

which ~'

as CA3

the statute

only requires that the population of Pennhurst be reduced by 900
to a total of 1000, beginning in 1972.

Thus, even if this stat-

ute can be read as removing from defendants the authority to run
a mental institution of more than 1000 patients, it does not make
their actions in running a smaller institution ultra vires.
complaint and the lower courts' orders, however,

The

extend to the

running of Pennhurst generally and appear to be designed to re-

page 4.

duce the population of that institution to far below 1000.

The

orders make clear that compliance with Act No. 256 was only part
of the relief ordered.

They also order complex relief based on

the asserted right to treatment in the least restrictive environment.

Thus, Act No. 256 does not support all of the relief or-

dered against the state officials here.
5.

In re Schmidt also does not limit the scope of the defen-

dants' authority so as to make their actions ultra vires.

Jus-

tice Stevens also suggested that the Pennsylvania S.Ct.'s decision in In re Schmidt might deprive defendants of authority to
place plaintiffs in any other than the least restrictive environment.

There does not seem to be any suggestion that the statute

on which Schmidt

is based

is explicit enough to make contrary

actions by the defendants ultra vires.

To the contrary, while

that statute contained a statement of policy stating that "the
least

restrictions consistent with adequate

employed,"

treatment shall be

it commanded only that the state assure "the avail-

ability and equitable provision of adequate •.• mental retarda- : '
tion services" and that it assign each state facility "such duties

for

the

care of

shall prescribe."
1981).

the mentally disabled,

as

50 P.S. §§ 7102, 4201(1), 4201(4)

the

secretary

(Supp. 1980-

This is the classic language of discretion, with guide-

lines on its exercise, and does not suggest a limitation on scope
of

authority.

This

is quite

different

from Treasure Salvors,

where the statute limited its grant of authority to hold property
to things

found on state land.

Here

the

limitations on state

authority were only that the care be "adequate."

page 5.

Justice Stevens's may argue, however, that In re Schmidt construed the statute so as to limit the discretion provided.

That

case did suggest that the state and county must exercise its discretion so as to provide the least restriction consistent with
adequate treatment.

But its comments were pure dicta aimed at

rebutting a suggestion made by the county during the litigation
that it only had to provide interim care and not local community
residences.

The

holding

of the case was

that since Schmidt's

need for institutionalization was unquestioned, the state had the
responsibility to provide it.

More important,

I do not think a

duty to provide least restrictive treatment may be said to take
authority from the state to place part of its mentally retarded
population in institutions.
patients

could

only

be

Schmidt clearly envisioned that some

cared

for

in

institutions.

Thus,

the

state and county officials have the authority to determine whether

to

use

institutions,

treatment method

(e.g., home care).

claim," Treasure Salvors,
use

community

institutions

102 S.

to house the

facilities,

or

some

other

They thus have "a colorable

Ct.,

at 3321, that they could

residents of Pennhurst.

A view

that the state officials' decision was beyond the scope of their
authority would mean that ultra vires would mean virtually the
same

thing

as

"contrary

to

law."

At

bottom,

the

command

in

Schmidt to use least restrictive treatment is not nearly as specific or ministerial as the command in Justice Stevens's hypothetical to close Pennhurst or the command in Treasure Salvors
not to claim articles not found on state land.
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You asked what mention Justice Stevens's dissent made of the
ultra vires doctrine.

The answer is, almost none.

The dissent

plainly rests on the proposition that "a plaintiff [can] bring a
suit under state law against a state official even if he did not
allege that the defendant had acted ultra vires," dissent at 18.
The dissent therefore does not argue that the state officials'
actions

in this case were ultra vires.

It does cite Treasure

Salvors, but only to quote language discussing the theory of the
ultra vires doctrine in support of the dissent's position that
any violation of state law strips the state actor of authority,
dissent at 19 n.l9.

The dissent does not acknowledge that the

quotes are taken out of context.
You also asked about last Term's oral argument.
that Mr.

It appears

Ferleger for resps did open with the argument that the

defendants here were acting ultra vires, based on the state statutes and Schmidt.

Tr.

at 23-26.

Their brief here mentions the

point, but defines ultra vires to include any dereliction of duty
or action contrary to state law,
Stevens relies on.

Br.

citng the early cases Justice ; "

for Resps at 33-3 5.

not consistent with Treasure Salvors or Larson.

This definition is
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81-2101 Pennhurst v. Halderman

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERSNCE:
We debated this case again yesterday, and last
Term John and I circulated numerous drafts of our respective
views •

.

'

,,,.,

I must say that in light of this extraordinary
degree of past consideration, and the vote yesterday to reverse, I thought we had reached the opinion writing stage.
I therefore am reluctant to begin ~swa~ping" memos again,
but I agree that enlightenment - however belated - always
is welcome.
I therefore will circu~ate a brief response to
John. With the Conference scheduled tomorrow, it may be a
day or two before I get to this. If the case is assigned to
me, I will then proceed, in accord with our customary practice, to prepare a Court opinion generally along the lines
; '
of the analysis relied on last Term {subject, of course, to
consideration of suggestions the Chief indicated he will
make).
.. ._. , :-

''t • F • P • ,
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CI·U,MBERS OF"

...JUSTICE ...JOHN PAUL STEVENS

October 6, 1983

Re:

81-2101 - Pennhurst State School and

Hospital v. Halderman
Dear Chief:
A brief restatement of the point I tried to
develop orally at Conference may be helpful to you in
your consideration of this case.
The Larson opinion teaches us that the actions of
a state official can be considered "ultra vires" for
sovereign immunity purposes in two different types of
situations:
(1) when the official is engaged in
conduct that the sovereign has not authorized, and (2)
when he has engaged in conduct that the sovereign has
forbidden. That doctrine is inescapable. The common
law of agency teaches that a principal cannot author~e
~ agent to violate the law.
When an agent does so,
as Pennhurst officials did here, he is liable for his
own conduct under the common law--his illegal actions
are ultra vires.
Both types of ultra vires conduct are plainly
identified in this paragraph from the Larson opinion:
"There may be, of course, suits for specific
relief against officers of the sovereign which are
not suits against the sovereign. If the officer
purports to act as an individual and not as an
official, a suit directed against that action is
not a suit against the sovereign. If the War
Assets Administrator had completed a sale of his
personal home, he presumably could be enjoined
from later conveying it to a third person. On a
similar theory, where the officer's powers are
limited by statute, his actions beyond those
limitations are considered individual and not
sovere1gn act1ons. The off1cer 1s not doing the

-

-2-

business which the sovereign has empowered him to
do or he is doing it in a way which the sovereign
has forbidden. His actions are ultra vires his
authority and therefore may be made the object of
specific relief. It is important to note that in
such cases the relief can be granted, without
impleading the sovereign, only because of the
officer's lack of delegated power. A claim of
~rror in the exercise of that power 1s therefore
not sufficient, And, since the jurisdiction of
the court to hear the case may depend, as we have
recently recognized, upon the decision which it
ultimately reaches on the merits, it is necessary
that the plaintiff set out in his complaint the
statutory limitation on which he relies." 337
u.s., at 689-690 (emphasis supplied).
The many cases considering the question whether an
action against an official should be treated as an
action against his sovereign can be grouped in two
broad categories, corresponding roughly to the
distinction between proprietary and governmental
~ nctions.
In cases like Larson, Malone v. Bowdoin,
and-Treasure Salvors in which the merits claim involved
a dispute over title to property or contractual rights,
the ultra vires issue can be resolved by applying
normal principles of agency law. But in cases in which
the validity of a state regulatory program is at issue,
the ultra vires question should be answered by asking
whether the officials' conduct is forbidden by state
law. Cases such as Siler, Greene and Pennhurst fit
f' ,.,.Lr-(..:
into this category. If the conduct is forbidden, there
I~ ~~
is no Eleventh Amendment or sovereign immunity bar •
.tl · c
·sr1"'t.h.M This Court has specifically so held over and over
1~
~
again. Since the agent who violates the law acts ultra
<;kiJ ("\ r
vires, he is not entitled to immunity. Here, the
L,...,
plaintiffs pleaded a specific statutory limitation on
0
~. ~ .~~vvt,;~ the authority of the officials running Pennhurst.
~. ;;_ 1fl" fdv
State law prohibited the officials from doing what they
r~·
did. Under Larson and many, many other cases, that
means the officials are not entitled to the sovereign's
immunity.

1

w1 ':U

If there were merit in Lewis' novel view, it is
indeed remarkable that in the entire history of our

-3-

Nation prior to 1983, it never occurred to anyone else
that a federal court may never order a state official
to obey state law.
Although I am reluctant to burden you with
additional reading material, in a few days I shall
circulate a memorandum that incorporates the results of
some of our research this summer. I earnestly submit
that the number of cases that will be repudiated by the
adoption of Lewis' position is a matter that should be
carefully weighed before taking this plunge.
Respectfully,

I

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference

.
J
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..JUSTICE ..JOHN PAUL STEVENS

October 6, 1983

Re:

81-2101 - Pennhurst State School and

Hospital v. Halderman
Dear Chief:
A brief restatement of the point I tried to
develop orally at Conference may be helpful to you in
your consideration of this case.
The Larson opinion teaches us that the actions of
a state official can be considered "ultra vires" for
sovereign immunity purposes in two different types of
situations:
(1) when the official is engaged in
conduct that the sovereign has not authorized, and (2)
when he has engaged tn conduct that the sovereign has
forbidden. That doctrine is inescapable. The common
law of agency teaches that a principal cannot authorize
its agent to violate the law. When an agent does so,
as Pennhurst officials did here, he is liable for his
own conduct under the common law--his illegal actions
are ultra vires.
Both types of ultra vires conduct are plainly
identified in this paragraph from the Larson opinion:
"There may be, of course, suits for specific
relief against officers of the sovereign which are
not suits against the sovereign. If the officer
purports to act as an individual and not as an
official, a suit directed against that action is
not a suit against the sovereign. If the War
Assets Administrator had completed a sale of his
personal home, he presumably could be enjoined
from later conveying it to a third person. On a
similar theory, where the officer's powers are
limited by statute, his actions beyond those
limitations are considered individual and not
sovere1gn act1ons. The officer is not doing the

business which the sovereign has empowered him to
do or he is doing it in a way which the sovereign
has forbidden. His actions are ultra vires his
authority and therefore may be made the object of
specific relief. It is important to note that in
such cases the relief can be granted, without
impleading the sovereign, only because of the
officer's lack of delegated power. A claim of
error in the exercise of that power is therefore
not sufficient. And, since the jurisdiction of
the court to hear the case may depend, as we have
recently recognized, upon the decision which it
ultimately reaches on the merits, it is necessary
that the plaintiff set out in his complaint the
statutory limitation on which he relies." 337
U.S., at 689-690 (emphasis supplied).
The many cases considering the question whether an
action against an official should be treated as an
action against his sovereign can be grouped in two
broad categories, corresponding roughly to the
distinction between proprietary and governmental
functions. In cases like Larson, Malone v. Bowdoin,
and Treasure Salvors in which the merits claim involved
a dispute over title to property or contractual rights,
the ultra vires issue can be resolved by applying
normal principles of agency law. But in cases in which
the validity of a state regulatory program is at issue,
the ultra vires question should be answered by asking
whether the officials' conduct is forbidden by state
law. Cases such as Siler, Greene and Pennhurst fit
into this category. If the conduct is forbidden, there
is no Eleventh Amendment or sovereign immunity bar.
This Court has specifically so held over and over
again. Since the agent who violates the law acts ultra
vires, he is not entitled to immunity. Here, the
plaintiffs pleaded a specific statutory limitation on
the authority of the officials running Pennhurst.
State law prohibited the officials from doing what they
did. Under Larson and many, many other cases, that
means the officials are not entitled to the sovereign's
immunity.
If there were merit in Lewis' novel view, it is
indeed remarkable that in the entire history of our

-3-

Nation prior to 1983, it never occurred to anyone else
that a federal court may never order a state official
to obey state law.
Although I am reluctant to burden you with
additional reading material, in a few days I shall
circulate a memorandum that incorporates the results of
some of our research this summer. I earnestly submit
that the number of cases that will be repudiated by the
adoption of Lewis' position is a matter that should be
carefully weighed before taking this plunge.
Respectfully,

I

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference

v. Halderman

MEMORANDUM

~0

~HE

CONFERENCE:

We debated this cas~ again yesterday, and last
Term John ' and T circulated numerous drafts , of our respective
views.
,,
t rou~t say that in light of this extraordinary
'
degree of past consideration, and the vote yesterday to reverse, I thought we had reached th~ opinion writing stage. ·"
r therefore am reluctant to begin · "swa.oping" memos again,
but I agree that enlightenment - however belated - always
is welcome.
'

.

I therefore will circulate a brief response to
John. With the Conference scheduled tomorrow, it may be a
day or two before I get to this. If the case is assigned to
me, I will then proceed, in accord with our customary practice, to prepare a Court opinion generally along the lines
of the analysis relied on last Term (subject, of course, to
consideration of suggestions the Chief indicated he will
make).

.,
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HURST5 SALLY-POW
81-2101 Pennhurst v. Halderman

Possible Questions of Mr. Gilhool
Your brief states the question in this case as
"whether Siler should be overruled • • • " Was the Eleventh
Amendment addressed in Siler? Was it argued by counsel?
When was the last time Siler was cited as an Eleventh
Amendment? Has it ever been so cited?
Siler is cited for pendent jurisdiction, and also
for the Ashwander doctrine of avoiding constitutional issues.
Possible Questions for Mr. Ferleger
1. Your brief (p. 35) argues that where state
officials act in "violation of state" law, Eleventh Amendment immunity is no bar.
Do you say the officials here acted beyond the
scope of their authority? Did either the DC or CA3 so hold?
Was it well settled in Pennsylvania prior to your
court's decision in In re Schmidt (1981) that Pennhurst had
been operating for decades in volation of state law.
In Larson (p. 690) the Court said:
"A claim of error by an officer in exercise
of his authority is not enough" to come within the ultra vires exception to the Eleventh
Amendment.
The Larson Court said:
"The action of an officer of a sovereign can
be regarded as so 'illegal' as to permit a
suit • . . only if it is not within the officer's statutory powers or - if within those
powers - only if the statute is unconstitutional." (p. 701).
2. Defendants here at the Department of Public
Welfare of the state and its officers, past and present.
Also named are various local officials. In your view, is
the suit against the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania?

2.

3. Your brief states that:
"This case is a classic example of action falling within Ex parte Young." (Brief
2la). It involved an alleged federal constitutional
violation.
There is also an ultra vires exception to the
Eleventh Amendment when officers act beyond the scope of
their authority.
Did not Larson in 1949 make this clear?
case since Larson ingored this distinction?
It was reaffirm in Treasure Salvors.

,,

Has any
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MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL
From:
Re:

Joe
Ultra vires argument in No. 82-2101 Pennhurst v. Halderman

o"'~

In light of theY argument in this case,

it is possible that

1\

the Chief or Justice Stevens will claim that the state and county
officials were acting ultra vires their authority in committing
the wrongs found by the District Court.

If the state officials

were acting entirely outside their authority, accepted Eleventh
Amendment

principles

would

dictate

that

the

suit here

is not

against the state and the Amendment would not apply.

This memo-

randum summarizes the arguments against such a view.

In sum, I

do not think the ultra vires exception would apply here without
stretching it to include virtually any violation of state law.
1.

The District Court found that the defendants were acting

"within the sphere of their official responsibilities."
denied the plaintiffs'

request for money damages,

The DC

holding that

the officials had qualified immunity (presumably under §1983).
[T]he evidence shows that the defendants acted in the
utmost good faith and they did not know nor reasonably
should have known that the actions which they took, or
failed to take, within the sphere of their official
responsibilities were in any way violative of the
rights of the retarded residents at Pennhurst.
446 F.
added).

Supp., at 1324

5e(

t:\ls o

612..

(Dec.
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action" "across the board").

1977 judgment on merits)

o.t

~~~

(emphasis

(,.ot ing that DC found "state

This finding was not appealed.

It

may be argued that a finding of state action under §1983 does not

page 2.

mean

there

is

state

This

Amendment.

action

is the

for

the

purposes

of

the

Eleventh

"well-recognized irony" referred to in

Treasure Salvors, 102 S. Ct., at 3315.

That irony, however, re-

fers to a finding that the state official is not the state under
Ex parte Young.

Since it is the rights guaranteed by the Four-

teenth Amendment that Young seeks to vindicate,
utterly necessary.

that result

is

The ultra vires exception is not justified by

reference to the Fourteenth Amendment but rather by the common
sense notion that an official on a frolic cannot claim immunity.
There is no reason a finding of state action under that Amendment
should not suffice to negate a suggestion of ultra vires.
2.

The argument that defendants actions were ultra vires was

not raised below.

Neither CA3 nor

vires doctrine directly,

the DC discussed the ultra

even though CA3 's opinions dealt with

other reasons why the suit was not barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

See 673 F. 2d,

at 656-659

(on remand from S. Ct., pendent

jurisdiction supplies jurisdiction);

612 F.2d,

3.

The

complaint did

arg~meat.

that each of

the

not allege ultra vires action.

defendants

law." Second Amended Complaint ,,9.
fendants,

"acted under
Also,

t~

The

It does as-

color

of

state

in describing the de-

the complaint points out with respect to each of them

their responsibilities under state law.
plaint alleges three state
the

jn

~

complaint does not mention the Eleventh Amendment.
sert

(original

.Resp's br~f

appeal, this suit is not barred by Edelman).
_pearL of appeals de not make tbe

at 109

common

law

for

Id.

,1,123-40.

law causes of action.

physical

injuries

to

the

The com-

One is under

plaintiffs,

id.
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~~162-164;

tion.
ment

that may arguably be an allegation of ultra vires ac-

The other two are clearly based on the failure to implesome broad,

reason of
treatment),

their
168

statutory command devolving on defendants
office.

Id.

(failure to

,1,1153

by

(denied statutory right to

implement community living plans).

If any action in violation of state law is not ultra vires,

it

would seem that the failure to take a complex, affirmative, official action would be.

It is like the failure to comply with the

terms of a contract with the state in Larson; the duty only exists because of the officer's official position.

See also point

5 infra.
4.

The 1970 statute does not limit the defendants' authority

so as to make all their actions ultra vires.

At argument, resp

and Justice Stevens suggested that Act No. 256 of the 1970 Pennsylvania General Assembly took from defendants the power to run
Pennhurst.

That statute

(attached,

relevant pages are pp.

787-

788) does not order that Pennhurst be closed, as resp suggested,
or even that Pennhurst only be used for those few cases in which
institutionalization
ultimately ordered,

is

the only practical possibility,

612 F.2d,

at 113-115.

Rather,

as CA3

the statute

only requires that the population of Pennhurst be reduced by 900
to a total of 1000, beginning in 1972.

Thus, even if this stat-

ute can be read as removing from defendants the authority to run
a mental institution of more than 1000 patients, it does not make
their actions in running a smaller institution ultra vires.
complaint and the lower courts' orders, however,

The

extend to the

running of Pennhurst generally and appear to be designed to re-

~

'
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duce the population of that institution to far below 1000.

The

orders make clear that compliance with Act No. 256 was only part
of the relief ordered.

They also order complex relief based on

the asserted right to treatment in the least restrictive environment.

Thus, Act No. 256 does not support all of the relief or-

dered against the state officials here.
5.
dants'

In re Schmidt also does not limit the scope of the defenauthority so as to make their actions ultra vires.

Jus-

tice Stevens also suggested that the Pennsylvania s.ct.'s decision in In re Schmidt might deprive defendants of authority to
place plaintiffs in any other than the least restrictive environment.

There does not seem to be any suggestion that the statute

on which Schmidt

is based

is explicit enough to make contrary

actions by the defendants ultra vires.

To the contrary, while

that statute contained a statement of policy stating that "the
least

restrictions consistent with adequate

employed,"

treatment shall be

it commanded only that the state assure "the avail-

ability and equitable provision of adequate ..• mental retardation services" and that it assign each state facility "such duties

for

the care of

shall prescribe."
1981}.

the mentally disabled,

as

50 P.S. §§ 7102, 4201(1}, 4201(4}

the

secretary

(Supp. 1980-

This is the classic language of discretion, with guide-

lines on its exercise, and does not suggest a limitation on scope
of

authority.

This

is quite different

from Treasure Salvors,

where the statute limited its grant of authority to hold property
to things

found on state land.

Here the limitations on state

authority were only that the care be "adequate."

page 5.

Justice Stevens's may argue, however, that In re Schmidt construed the statute so as to limit the discretion provided.

That

case did suggest that the state and county must exercise its discretion so as to provide the least restriction consistent with
adequate treatment.

But its comments were pure dicta aimed at

rebutting a suggestion made by the county during the litigation
that it only had to provide interim care and not local community
residences.

The

holding

of the case was

that since Schmidt's

need for institutionalization was unquestioned, the state had the
responsibility to provide it.

More important,

I do not think a

duty to provide least restrictive treatment may be said to take
authority from the state to place part of its mentally retarded
population in institutions.
patients

could

only

be

Schmidt clearly envisioned that some

cared

for

in

institutions.

Thus,

the

state and county officials have the authority to determine whether

to

use

institutions,

treatment method

(e.g., home care}.

claim," Treasure Salvors,
use

community

institutions

to house

102 S.

facilities,

or

some

other

They thus have "a colorable

Ct.,

at 3321, that they could

the residents of Pennhurst.

A view

that the state officials' decision was beyond the scope of their
authority would mean that ultra vires would mean virtually the
same

thing

as

"contrary

to

law."

At

bottom,

the

command

in

Schmidt to use least restrictive treatment is not nearly as specific or ministerial as the command in Justice Stevens's hypothetical to close Pennhurst or the command in Treasure Salvors
not to claim articles not found on state land.

page 6.

You asked what mention Justice Stevens's dissent made of the
ultra vires doctrine.

The answer is,

almost none.

The dissent

plainly rests on the proposition that "a plaintiff [can] bring a
suit under state law against a state official even if he did not
allege that the defendant had acted ultra vires," dissent at 18.
The dissent therefore does not argue that the state officials'
actions

in this case were ultra vires.

It does cite Treasure

Salvors, but only to quote language discussing the theory of the
ultra vires doctrine in support of the dissent's position that
any violation of state law strips the state actor of authority,
dissent at 19 n.l9.

The dissent does not acknowledge that the

quotes are taken out of context.
You also asked about last Term's oral argument.
that Mr.

It appears

Ferleger for resps did open with the argument that the

defendants here were acting ultra vires, based on the state statutes and Schmidt.

Tr.

at 23-26.

Their brief here mentions the

point, but defines ultra vires to include any dereliction of duty
or action contrary to state law,
Stevens relies on.

Br.

citng the early cases

for Resps at 33-35.

not consistent with Treasure Salvors or Larson.

Justice ~

This definition is

'

October 6, 1983

81-2101 Pennhurst v. Halderman

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
We debated this case again yesterday, and last
Term John and I circulated numerous drafts of our respective
views.
•
I must say that in light of this extr~ordinary
degree of past consideration, and the vote yesterday to reverse, I thought we had reached the opinion writing stage.
I therefore am reluctant to begin ~swa9ping" memos again,
but I agree that enlightenment - however belated - always
is welcome.
I therefore will circulate a brief response to
John. With the Conference scheduled tomorrow, it may be a
day or two before I get to this. If the case is assigned to
me, I will then proceed, in accord with our customary practice, to prepare a Court opinion generally along the lines
of the analysis relied on last Term (subject, of course, to
consideration of suggestions the Chief indicated he will

make) •

... .. • :-

''t.F.P., Jr.
lfp/ss

•

.Su:punu C!Jgnrl .nf tlf~ ~a ,Smug
:.hurltinghtn. ~. <lJ. 2ll~~
CHAMBERS Of"

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

October 6, 1983

Re:

81-2101 - Pennhurst State School and

Hospital v. Halderman
Dear Chief:
A brief restatement of the point I tried to
develop orally at Conference may be helpful to you in
your consideration of this case.
The Larson opinion teaches us that the actions of
a state official can be considered "ultra vires" for
sovereign immunity purposes in two different types of
situations:
(1) when the official is engaged in
conduct that the sovereign has not authorized, and (2)
when he has engaged in conduct that the sovereign has
forbidden. That doctrine is inescapable. The common
law of agency teaches that a principal cannot author~e
~ agent to violate the law.
When an agent does so,
as Pennhurst officials did here, he is liable for his
own conduct under the common law--his illegal actions
are ultra vires.
Both types of ultra vires conduct are plainly
identified in this paragraph from the Larson opinion:
"There may be, of course, suits for specific
relief against officers of the sovereign which are
not suits against the sovereign. If the officer
purports to act as an individual and not as an
official, a suit directed against that action is
not a suit against the sovereign. If the War
Assets Administrator had completed a sale of his
personal horne, he presumably could be enjoined
from later conveying it to a third person. On a
similar theory, where the officer's powers are
limited by statute, his actions beyond those
limitations are considered individual and not
sovere1gn act1ons. The off1cer 1s not doing the

-

-2-

business which the sovereign has empowered him to
do or he is doing it in a way which the sovereign
has forbidden. His actions are ultra vires his
authority and therefore may be made the object of
specific relief. It is important to note that in
such cases the relief can be granted, without
impleading the sovereign, only because of the
officer's lack of delegated power. A claim of
~rror in the exercise of that power 1s therefore
not sufficient, And, since the jurisdiction of
the court to hear the case may depend, as we have
recently recognized, upon the decision which it
ultimately reaches on the merits, it is necessary
that the plaintiff set out in his complaint the
statutory limitation on which he relies." 337
u.s., at 689-690 (emphasis supplied).
The many cases considering the question whether an
action against an official should be treated as an
action against his sovereign can be grouped in two
broad categories, corresponding roughly to the
distinction between proprietary and governmental
~ nctions.
In cases like Larson, Malone v. Bowdoin,
and-Treasure Salvors in which the merits claim involved
a dispute over title to property or contractual rights,
the ultra vires issue can be resolved by applying
normal principles of agency law. But in cases in which
the validity of a state regulatory program is at issue,
the ultra vires question should be answered by asking
whether the officials' conduct is forbidden by state
law. Cases such as Siler, Greene and Pennhurst fit
Lt~;"'1
into this category. If the conduct is forbidden, there
~v
is no Eleventh Amendment or sovereign immunity bar.
1
t · c ·sr1 "t.~-iM This Court has specifically so held over and over
i~
~
again. Since the agent who violates the law acts ultra
<:~IJ ,.,\ t
vires, he is not entitled to immunity. Here, the
o~LY-' w'j- ~ plaintiffs pleaded a specific statutory limitation on

I( . -. ..

~.:::- ;:";:••':1" ~~= t! ui:~r ~~~h~ ~ i ~:~ ~~: ~! ~~~ i ~~~n ~~;mP~~~~~ r~~~ t

1

r~·

they
did. Under Larson and many, many other cases, that
means the officials are not entitled to the sovereign's
immunity.

If there were merit in Lewis' novel view, it is
indeed remarkable that in the entire history of our

-3-

Nation prior to 1983, it never occurred to anyone else
that a federal court may never order a state official
to obey state law.
Although I am reluctant to burden you with
additional reading material, in a few days I shall
circulate a memorandum that incorporates the results of
some of our research this summer. I earnestly submit
that the number of cases that will be repudiated by the
adoption of Lewis' position is a matter that should be
carefully weighed before taking this plunge.
Respectfully,

I

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference

.fuprttttt Qf1tttrl .&tf tltt ~ihb .ftirltg
,_u~. ~.

<If.

2.llp~$

CHA .. I!IERS OF"

.JUSTICE .JOHN PAUL STEVENS

October 14, 1983

Re:

81-2101 - Pennhurst State School &

Hospital v. Halderman
Dear Chief:
Because I remain hopeful that your respect for
prior decisions of the Court will prove decisive in
this case, I submit the enclosed Memorandum for your
consideration. Although it is rather lengthy, I have
tried not to repeat much of what is found in my draft
dissent last spring. If this is -ultimately converted
into a dissent, I shall, of course, include much of
that material as well.
Respectfully,

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference

~~~~ ~ $ _l'
r~-1' ~r
~~

...
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MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL
From:
Re:

Joe
Justice Stevens' Memorandum in Pennhurst v. Halderman

Here

is

a

quick

October 14, 1983.

summary of

Justice

sovereign's officers--such

thority.

memorandum of .

JPS makes two main points. ~ sovereign

irnrnuni ty historically has not extended
the

Stevens'

~ this

to the unlawful acts of

acts were ultra vires

their au-

Court's cases have rejected the proposi-

tion that the Eleventh Amendment bars suits against state off icers alleging violations of state law.

Since the first point was
'.

foreshadowed by JPS's recent letter, the memorandum adds nothing
significantly new.

It confirms that the major point of disagree-

rnent is now the breadth of the ultra vires doctrine.
JPS begins his discussion of the history of sovereign irnrnunity with English law, which, he says, traditionally distinguished
between the king and his agents on the theory that the king could
not authorize unlawful conduct.

As early as the fifteenth centu-

ry,

held

servants

of

the

king

were

liable

for

their

unlawful ; "

acts, whether in the course of their employment or not.

The corn-

rnand

the

of

the

king

could

not protect

them,

for

"' [ i] f

king

really had given such commands or instructions, he must have been
deceived,'" p.

3

(quoting Holdsworth}.

American courts adopted

the distinction between the sovereign and its officers.

Ex parte

Young is an example, because the theory of that case is that the
absence of valid authority left the state officer stripped of his
authority.
vires

Thus,

action.

unconstitutional action is a species of ultra

Larson makes

clear

that sovereign

irnrnuni ty does

page 2.

not protect conduct which has been prohibited by the sovereign.

Under Larson, there

are~f ~

the sovereign has not authorized, an
forbidden.

vires

action~onduct

conduct the sovereign has

Thus, when the state has placed specific limitations

on the manner in which state officials may perform their duties,
actions

contrary

to

those

limitations

are

ultra

vires.

Here,

petrs' conduct was forbidden by statute.
There are two important points in the footnotes to this secFirst,

tion.

JPS points out that if Young is iustified on the

basis of federal supremacy, why does federal supremacy not override

severe ign

Alabama v.

immunity when

Pugh,

438

u.s.

781

the

state

(1978)

itself

(pc)?

P.

is

a party,

7,

n.

9.

see
(One

answer may be that Young is a judge-made doctrine with respect to
how broadly the Eleventh Amendment should be interpreted.

Judges

have seen in the Civil War Amendments an important reason not to
interpret the Eleventh Amendment expansively, but they have been
unwilling to say that they repealed the language of the latter
,..

provision.)

The

second

point

is

the

argument

that

the

reason;

actions for money damages were barred in Edelman v. Jordan does
not have to do with federal supremacy but with the fact that the
money damages would be paid out of state treasury, so it could
not be said that the action ran only against the state's agents.
Injunctive relief runs only against the state's officers.

n. 10.

P. 8,

(The answer to this point is that if one can look to the

reality of the situation with respect to money damages--and recognize

that

they will be paid by the state--one should do the

same with injunctive relief and recognize that they control the

jen 10/17/83
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MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL
From:

J

~-)

) U /-··M--· y-t

Joe
Justice Stevens' Memorandum in Pennhurst v. Halderman

Here

is a quick summary of Justice Stevens' memorandum of

October 14, 1983.

JPS makes two main points.~ sovereign

immunity historically has not extended to the unlawful acts of
the sovereign's officers--such acts were ultra vires their authority.

~this

Court's cases have rejected the proposi-

tion that the Eleventh Amendment bars suits against state officers alleging violations of state law.

Since the first point was

'.

foreshadowed by JPS's recent letter, the memorandum adds nothing
significantly new.

It confirms that the major point of disagree-

ment is now the breadth of the ultra vires doctrine.
JPS begins his discussion of the history of sovereign immunity with English law, which, he says, traditionally distinguished
between the king and his agents on the theory that the king could
not authorize unlawful conduct.
ry,

servants of

the

As early as the fifteenth centu-

king were held

liable

for

their

-

unlawfut

acts, whether in the course of their employment or not.

The com-

mand of

the king

the

king could not protect them,

for

"' [ i] f

really had given such commands or instructions, he must have been
deceived,"' p.

3

(quoting Holdsworth).

American courts adopted

the distinction between the sovereign and its officers.

Ex parte

Young is an example, because the theory of that case is that the
absence of valid authority left the state officer stripped of his
authority.

Thus,

vires action.

unconstitutional action is a species of ultra

Larson makes clear that sovereign immunity does

,..

page 2.

not protect conduct which has been prohibited by the sovereign.

Under Larson, there

are~f ~a

the sovereign has not authorized,
forbidden.

an

vires

action~conduct

conduct the sovereign has

Thus, when the state has placed specific limitations

on the manner in which state officials may perform their duties,
actions

contrary

to

those

limitations

are

ultra

vires.

Here,

petrs' conduct was forbidden by statute.
There are two important points in the footnotes to this section.

First,

JPS points out that if Young is justified on the

basis of federal supremacy, why does federal supremacy not override

sovereign

Alabama v.

immunity when

Pugh,

u.s.

438

781

the

state

(1978)

itself

(pc)?

P.

is

a party,

7,

n.

9.

see
(One

answer may be that Young is a judge-made doctrine with respect to
how broadly the Eleventh Amendment should be interpreted.

Judges

have seen in the Civil War Amendments an important reason not to
interpret the Eleventh Amendment expansively, but they have been
unwilling to say that
provision.)

The

they

second

repealed the language of the latter

point

is

the

argument

that

the

.
'

reason

actions for money damages were barred in Edelman v. Jordan does
not have to do with federal supremacy but with the fact that the
money damages would

be paid out of state treasury,

so it could

not be said that the action ran only against the state's agents.
Injunctive relief runs only against the state's officers.

n. 10.

P. 8,

(The answer to this point is that if one can look to the

reality of the situation with respect to money damages--and recognize

that

they will be paid by the state--one should do the

same with injunctive relief and recognize that they control the

page 3.

state's actions by controlling the only way a state can act.

The

real explanation of Edelman is that money damages were not deemed
necessary

to

enforce

the

Civil

War

Amendments.

We

should

be

aware, however, that JPS's explanation is closer to the language
of Edelman.)
JPS makes the second part of his argument--that this Court's
cases have interpreted the Eleventh Amendment to allow this kind
of suits--by reciting the now familiar interpretation of Greene,
Hopkins, etc.

The only important change is the addition of a new

case to that line, Rolston v. Missouri Fund Comm'rs, 120
(1887).

JPS concludes with a

u.s.

391

recitation of the numerous cases

your opinion assertedly will overrule, including a number of preLarson
against

federal
officers

ultra

vires

acting

cases

within

that

their

he

says

allowed

suit

authority but unlawfully.

These cases were cited in Larson and not disapproved, he says.
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CHA ... I!IERS OF

..JUSTICE ..JOHN PAUL STEVENS

October 14, 1983

Re:

81-2101 - Pennhurst State School &

Hospital v. Halderman
Dear Chief:
Because I remain hopeful that your respect for
prior decisions of the Court will prove decisive in
this case, I submit the enclosed Memorandum for your
consideration. Although it is rather lengthy, I have
tried not to repeat much of what is found in my draft
dissent last spring. If this is -ultimately converted
into a dissent, I shall, of course, include much of
that material as well.
Respectfully,

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference
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MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL
From:
Re:

Joe
Justice Stevens' Memorandum in Pennhurst v. Halderman

Here

is

a

quick

October 14, 1983.

summary of

Justice

Stevens'

memorandum of

JPS makes two main points. ~ sovereign

irnrnuni ty historically has not extended to the unlawful acts of
the

sovereign's

thority.

officers--such

~ this

acts were ultra vires

their au-

Court's cases have rejected the proposi-

tion that the Eleventh Amendment bars sui. ts against state officers alleging violations of state law.

Since the first point was

foreshadowed by JPS's recent letter, the memorandum adds nothing
significantly new.

It confirms that the major point of disagree-

rnent is now the breadth of the ultra vires doctrine.
JPS begins his discussion of the history of sovereign irnrnunity with English law, which, he says, traditionally distinguished
between the king and his agents on the theory that the king could
not authorize unlawful conduct.

As early as the fifteenth centu-

ry,

held

servants

of

the

king

were

liable

for

their

unlawful ; "

acts, whether in the course of their employment or not.

The corn-

rnand

the

of

the

king

could

not protect

them,

for

"' [ i] f

king

really had given such commands or instructions, he must have been
deceived,"' p.

3

(quoting Holdsworth}.

American courts adopted

the distinction between the sovereign and its officers.

Ex parte

Young is an example, because the theory of that case is that the
absence of valid authority left the state officer stripped of his
authority.
vires

-

......

_

Thus,

action.

unconstitutional action is a species of ultra

-----------------------

Larson makes clear

that sovereign

irnrnuni ty does

I

page 2.

not protect conduct which has been prohibited by the sovereign.

Under Larson, there

are~f ~

the sovereign has not authorized
forbidden.

an

vires

action~conduct

conduct the sovereign has

Thus, when the state has placed specific limitations.

on the manner in which state officials may perform their duties,
actions

contrary

to

those

limitations

are

ultra

vires.

Here,

petrs' conduct was forbidden by statute.
There are two important points in the footnotes to this section.

First,

JPS points out that if Young is justified on the

basis of federal supremacy, why does federal supremacy not override

sovereign

Alabama v.

immunity when

Pugh,

438

u.s.

781

the

state

(1978)

itself

(pc}?

P.

is

a party,

7,

n.

9.

see
(One

answer may be that Young is a judge-made doctrine with respect to
how broadly the Eleventh Amendment should be interpreted.

Judges

have seen in the Civil War Amendments an important reason not to
interpret the Eleventh Amendment expansively, but they have been
unwilling to say that they repealed the language of the latter
provision.)

The

second

point

is

the

argument

that

the

reason ~ "

actions for money damages were barred in Edelman v. Jordan does
not have to do with federal supremacy but with the fact that the
money damages would be paid out of state treasury, so it could
not be said that the action ran only against the state's agents.
Injunctive relief runs only against the state's officers.

n. 10.

P. 8,

(The answer to this point is that if one can look to the

reality of the situation with respect to money damages--and recognize

that

they will be paid by the state--one should do the

same with injunctive relief and recognize that they control the
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MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL
From:
Re:

Joe
Justice Stevens' Memorandum in Pennhurst v. Halderman

Here

is a quick summary of Justice Stevens' memorandum of

October 14, 1983.

JPS makes two main points.~ sovereign

immunity historically has not extended to the unlawful acts of
the sovereign's officers--such acts were ultra vires their authority.

~this

Court's cases have rejected the proposi-

tion that the Eleventh Amendment bars suits against state officers alleging violations of state law.

Since the first point was
'.

foreshadowed by JPS's recent letter, the memorandum adds nothing
significantly new.

It confirms that the major point of disagree-

ment is now the breadth of the ultra vires doctrine.
JPS begins his discussion of the history of sovereign immunity with English law, which, he says, traditionally distinguished
between the king and his agents on the theory that the king could
not authorize unlawful conduct.
ry,

servants of

the

As early as the fifteenth centu-

king were held

liable for

their

'

unlawful

acts, whether in the course of their employment or not.

The com-

mand of

the king

the

king could not protect them,

for

11

•

[

i] f

really had given such commands or instructions, he must have been
deceived,'

11

p.

3 (quoting Holdsworth).

American courts adopted

the distinction between the sovereign and its officers.

Ex parte

Young is an example, because the theory of that case is that the
absence of valid authority left the state officer stripped of his
authority.

Thus,

vires action.

unconstitutional action is a species of ultra

Larson makes clear that sovereign immunity does

page 2.

not protect conduct which has been prohibited by the sovereign.

Under Larson, there

are~f

the sovereign has not authorized,
forbidden.

ulz a vires

an

action~conduct

conduct the sovereign has

Thus, when the state has placed specific limitations

on the manner in which state officials may perform their duties,
actions

contrary

to

those

limitations

are

ultra

vires.

Here,

petrs' conduct was forbidden by statute.
There are two important points in the footnotes to this secFirst,

tion.

JPS points out that if Young is justified on the

basis of federal supremacy, why does federal supremacy not override

sovereign

Alabama v.

immunity when

Pugh,

438

u.s.

781

the

state

(1978)

itself

(pc)?

P.

is

a party,

7,

n.

9.

see
(One

answer may be that Young is a judge-made doctrine with respect to
how broadly the Eleventh Amendment should be interpreted.

Judges

have seen in the Civil War Amendments an important reason not to
interpret the Eleventh Amendment expansively, but they have been
unwilling

to say that

provision.)

The

they repealed the language of the latter

second

point

is

the

argument

that

the

.
'

reason

actions for money damages were barred in Edelman v. Jordan does
not have to do with federal supremacy but with the fact that the
money damages would be paid out of state treasury,

so it could

not be said that the action ran only against the state's agents.
Injunctive relief runs only against the state's officers.

n. 10.

P. 8,

(The answer to this point is that if one can look to the

reality of the situation with respect to money damages--and recognize

that

they will be paid by the state--one should do the

same with injunctive relief and recognize that they control the

-·

--

page 3.

state's actions by controlling the only way a state can act.

The

real explanation of Edelman is that money damages were not deemed
necessary

to

enforce

the

Civil

War

Amendments.

We

should

be

aware, however, that JPS's explanation is closer to the language
of Edelman.)
JPS makes the second part of his argument--that this Court's
cases have interpreted the Eleventh Amendment to allow this kind
of suits--by reciting the now familiar interpretation of Greene,
Hopkins, etc.

The only important change is the addition of a new

case to that line, Rolston v. Missouri Fund Comm'rs, 120
(1887).

JPS concludes with a

recitation of

u.s.

391

the numerous cases

your opinion assertedly will overrule, including a number of preLarson
against

federal
officers

ultra

vires

acting

cases

within

that

their

he

says

authority

allowed

but

suit

unlawfully.

These cases were cited in Larson and not disapproved, he says.
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HURSTl SALLY-POW

81-2101 Pennhurst v. Halderman
Dear Bill:
Perhaps you have read or will read John's
memorandum of October 14.
I have taken a preliminary look, and my clerk Joe Neuhaus - has given me the enclosed quick summary of
John's new arguments.
I am inclined to think, subject to more
thoughtful consideration, that the English history is of
little or no relevancy in light of the adoption of the
., ,.

Eleventh Amendment, and more important its interpretation
by this Court.

Moreover, I suspect that there are

contemporaneous English cases on the other side of the
question.

L. •

John's inclusion in ultra vires of any action
p.V'~Vt~..lr/71
that a plaintiff can claim ~den by statute is new

"

doctrine that - to my knowledge - has never been
articulated by any Court.

He appears to ignore the

language in Larson that an "incorrect decision as to law
or fact" cannot be the basis for suit.
of his theory, until In re Schmidt was decided in 1981 it
could not fairly be argued that the legislature had placed
"specific limitations", JPS memo p. 13, on the manner in
which Pennhurst was run.

The

comm~d of the MH/MR Act was

to provide "adequate" mental health activities.

And the

legislature had never provided funds adequate to

implem~nt

.;

the 1970 statute.

,.

The legislature certainly knew the

situation at Pennhurst, continued to fund it and otherwise
tolerated the operation of Pennhurst.

3.

John repeats his charge that we are overruling a
host of cases.

Although none of the cases he cites

specifically addressed the issue before us, it is fair to
argue that there was implicit acceptance in some cases of
his view.

The short answer, often given by this Court, is

that when the issue is now expressly before us we have
even greater freedom than otherwise to limit or overrule
prior mistakes.
I write you, however, not to repeat these
arguments.

You are our genuine "expert" in this area, and

therefore - if you find the time - I would very much
welcome

~~

a ~memo

from you ae

<7.1<. ~

new arguments.
Sincerely,
Justice Rehnquist

~

~~wA best ~ aedr~~s

4:> ; ,

John's

.i'uprmtt Clftnttl ""f tltt ~ltb ,Blatt.&'

-..u.friqhtn. ~- Clf. 21l.;i~~

)

CHAMI!IERS OF"

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

/

October 14, 1983

Re:

81-2101 - Pennhurst State School &
Hospital v. Halderman

Dear Chief:
Because I remain hopeful that your respect for
prior decisions of the Court will prove decisive in
this case, I submit the enclosed Memorandum for your
consideration. Although it is rather lengthy, I have
tried not to repeat much of what is found in my draft
dissent last spring. If this is -ultimately converted
into a dissent, I shall, of course, include much of
that material as well.
Respectfully,

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference

jen 10/17/83
MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE P,OWELL
From:
Re:

Joe
Justice Stevens' Memorandum in Pennhurst v. Halderman

Here

is

a

quick

October 14, 1983.

summary of

Justice Stevens'

JPS makes two main points.

immunity historically has not extended
the

memorandum of

First, sovereign

to the unlawful acts of

sovereign's officers--such acts were ultra vires their au-

thority.

Second,

this Court's cases have rejected the proposi-

tion that the Eleventh Amendment bars suits against state officers alleging violations of state law.

Since the first point was

foreshadowed by JPS's recent letter, the memorandum adds nothing
significantly new.

It confirms that the major point of disagree-

ment is now the breadth of the ultra vires doctrine.
JPS begins his discussion of the history of sovereign immunity with English law, which, he says, traditionally distinguished
between the king and his agents on the theory that the king could
not authorize unlawful conduct.

As early as the fifteenth centu-

ry,

held

servants

of

the

king

were

liable

for

their

unlawful

acts, whether in the course of their employment or not.

The com-

mand

the

of

the

king

could

not protect

them,

for

"' [ i] f

king

really had given such commands or instructions, he must have been
deceived,'" p.

3

(quoting Holdsworth).

American courts adopted

the distinction between the sovereign and its officers.

Ex parte

Young is an example, because the theory of that case is that the
absence of valid authority left the state officer stripped of his
authority.
vires

Thus,

action.

unconstitutional action is a species of ultra

Larson makes clear

that sovereign immunity does

not protect conduct which has been prohibited by the sovereign.
Under Larson, there are two types of ultra vires action:
the sovereign has not authorized,
forbidden.

conduct

and conduct the sovereign has

Thus, when the state has placed specific limitations

on the manner in which state officials may perform their duties,
actions

contrary

to

those

1 imitations

are

ultra

vires.

Here, ·

petrs' conduct was forbidden by statute.
There are two important points in the footnotes to this secFirst,

tion.

JPS points out that if Young is justified on the

basis of federal supremacy, why does federal supremacy not override

sovereign

Alabama v.

immunity when

Pugh,

438 U.S.

781

the

state

(1978)

itself

(pc)?

P.

is

a party,

7,

n.

9.

see
(One

answer may be that Young is a judge-made doctrine with respect to
how broadly the Eleventh Amendment should be interpreted.

Judges

have seen in the Civil war Amendments an important reason not to
interpret the Eleventh Amendment expansively, but they have been
unwilling to say that they repealed the language of the latter
provision.)

The

second

point

is

the argument

that

the

reason

actions for money damages were barred in Edelman v. Jordan does
not have to do with federal supremacy but with the fact that the
money damages would be paid out of state treasury, so it could
not be said that the action ran only against the state's agents.
Injunctive relief runs only against the state's officers.

n. 10.

P. 8,

(The answer to this point is that if one can look to the

reality of the situation with respect to money damages--and recognize

that

they will be paid by the state--one should do the

same with injunctive relief and recognize that they control the

state's actions by controlling the only way a state can act.

The

real explanation of Edelman is that money damages were not deemed
necessary

to

enforce

the

Ci vi 1

War

Amendments.

We

should

be

aware, however, that JPS's explanation is closer to the language
of Edelman.)
JPS makes the second part of his argument--that this Court's
cases have interpreted the Eleventh Amendment to allow this kind
of suits--by reciting the now familiar interpretation of Greene,
Hopkins, etc.

The only important change is the addition of a new

case to that line, Rolston v. Missouri Fund Comm'rs, 120
(1887).

JPS concludes with a

recitation of

u.s.

391

the numerous cases

your opinion assertedly will overrule, including a number of preLarson
against

federal
officers

ultra

vires

cases

acting within

that

their

he

says

authority

allowed

but

suit

unlawfully.

These cases were cited in Larson and not disapproved, he says.

October 17, 1983

81-2101 Pennhurst v. Halderman

MEMORANDUM "'0 't'HF. CONFBRENCE:

As t think it is best for me to follow customary
procedure, I will not respond to John's memoran~um of October 14 at this time beyond sayinq that - \ntere~ting as it
is - I do not think his memorandum sheds significant new
light on the issues we debate~ at length last Term.
I will, of course, address John's qeneral argument
in the draft opinion for the Court that in due time I will
circulate. 't'o the. e>tten t his specific points are incorporated into a dissent, I will respond in the opinion where
necessary.

r..• F.P., ,Jr.
ss

October 17, 1983
81-2101 Pennhurst v. Halderman

Dear Bill:
Perhaps you have read or will read John's memorandum of October 14.
t have taken a preliminary look, ann my clerk ,"Toe Neuhaus - has given me the enclosed quick summary of
,John's net\? arguments.
I am inclined to think, subject to ~ore thoughtful
consideration, that the English historv is of little or no
relevancy in light of the adoption of th~ l!:leventh l\mendment, and more important its i.nterpr~tation by thi.s Court.
Moreover, 1 suspect that there ~re contemporaneous Bnqlish
cases on the other side of the question.

John's inclusion in ultra vires of any action that
a plaintiff can claim is arguably forhiddPn by statute is
new doctrine thnt - to my know1edge - has never been articulated bv anv Court. He appears to i.qnore the lanquaqe in
Larson that an "incorrect decision as to law or fact" cannot
he the basis for suit.
John repeats his charge that we are overruling a
host of cases. Although none of the cases he cites specifically addressed the issue befo~e us, it is fair to argue
that there was implicit acceptance in some cases of his
view. The short answer, often qiven by this Court, is that
when the issue is now expressly before us we have even
greater freedom than otherwise to 1\mit or overrule prior
mistakes.
t 'ltr i te vou, however, not to repeat these arguments. You are our genuine "expert" in this area, and
therefore - if vou find the time - I would very much welcome
a brief memo from you on the best answers to John's new
arquments.

Sincerely,

Justice Rehnquist
lfp/ss

~u:pr.tntt

Clfttud ttf .ur~ ~niit~ j>taf.tg
...ag.ltingt1ln. ~. <!J. 2l1~'!$

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

October 17, 1983

Re:

81-2101 - Pennhurst State School &
Hospital v. Halderman

Dear Lewis:
You and I may have different recollections of the
conference discussion of this case following the
reargument. It was my understanding that the final
assignment of the majority opinion was contingent upon
the circulation of a memorandum by the Chief Justice
setting forth a more narrow analysis of the case than
was contained in any of the drafts that circulated last
spring. Had it not been for that understanding, I
would have followed the customary procedure of waiting
for the author of the majority to circulate the first
draft.
I am disappointed that you did not find my
memorandum convincing, but I continue to hope that the
doctrine of stare decisis will have some influence on
one or more of the adherents to your ground-breaking
position.

Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

October 1.7, 1Q83
81-2101 Pennhurst v. Halderman

Dear Bi lJ :
dum of

P(l'rhaps von have reBd or wi1, rean John's memoran14.

Octob~r

t

have taken a preliminary look, and mv clerk -

,Joe Neuhaul=l - has qiven me the enclosed quick summary of

,John's ne•"' arguments.
I am inclined to think, subiect to mnre thouqhtful
consideration, that the Bngltsh historv is 0f little or no
relevancy in light of the adopt on of thP Bleventh mendment, and more important 'ts i.nterprfl>tat'on y this Court.
Mor over, J su~Pect that there are contemporaneous ~nq ish
cases on the other side of the question.

John's inclusion in ultra vires of anv action that
a plaint i · f can c1 a i.J'Tl is "rgnah1 forht~den hy ta tut.e is
new doctrine th?tt - to mv know1edqe - has never been arti.culaten bv nnv Court. He apnears to ignore the 1anquage in
Larson that an "incorrect decision as to law or fact" cannot
b the ryasis for ~uit.
John repeats his charg that we are overruling a
host of cases. Although none of the cases he cites specificallv addressed the issue before us, it is fair to argue
that there \tTas imP icit acceptance in some cases of his
view. ~he short answer, often qiven by this rourt, is that
hen the issue is now expressly before us we havP even
qreater freedom than otherwise to limit or overrule prior
mistake~.

I trite vou, however, not to rep at these arguments. You arc our qenuine "exPert" in thts area, and
therefore - if vou find the time - I would verv much welcome
a brief memo from you on the best answers to John's new
arquments.

Sincerely,

Justice Rehnquist
lfp/ss

j\u:puuu Ofltltrl .nf .tlrt J{niltb ~taUs
..ultington. ~. Of. 21Tbf_,.~
CHAM!SERS OF"

.JUSTICE .JOHN PAUL STEVENS

October 17, 1983

Re:

81-2101 - Pennhurst State School &
Hospital v. Halderman

Dear Lewis:
You and I may have different recollections of the
conference discussion of this case following the
reargument. It was my understanding that the final
assignment of the majority opinion was contingent upon
the circulation of a memorandum by the Chief Justice
setting forth a more narrow analysis of the case than
was contained in any of the dra~ts that circulated last
spring. Had it not been for that understanding, I
would have followed the customary procedure of waiting
for the author of the majority to circulate the first
draft.
I am disappointed that you did not find my
memorandum convincing, but I continue to hope that the
doctrine of stare decisis will have some influence on
one or more of the adherents to your ground-breaking
position.

Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

October 18, 1983

Re:

No. 81-2101

Pennhurst v. Halderman

Dear Lewis:
After receiving your letter of October 17th, I re-read
John's memorandum of October 14th in this case. I think his
propensity to "chase rabbits" has never been more manifest;
he has now devoted twenty-six printed pages to argue against
the conclusion in a single footnote (fn 12, page 11) of your
circulating fourth draft last June. While John's
circulation may cause concern among the law clerks, I see no
reason at all why you should not be able to respond to it to
the satisfaction of all those who voted with you at
Conference •
. I think the fundamental thesis which you enunciate in
your opinion is absolutely sound as a matter of logic and
principle. As you developed it in your fourth draft of last
spring, pages 14-18, we begin with the proposition that (1)
the holding in Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) was
necessitated by the need to reconcile the provisions of the
Eleventh and the Fourteenth Amendments. If a suit against a
state official charging that he was acting under a state
statute which violated the Fourteenth Amendment could not be
brought in federal court, there would be no possible use of ,
the Civil War Amendments as "swords" rather than "shields" '
in the federal courts. The Court therefore developed the
fiction that a state official who was acting in violation of
the federal Constitution was acting "ultra vires."
(2) But
there is no need for a similar "ultra vires" fiction where
the claimed need is for federal courts to decide state law
issues in the face of an Eleventh Amendment claim; sure~
the state courts may be expected to give authoritative
exposition of state law claims, and, unlike the situation in
Ex parte Young, there is no countervailing need for federal
courts to do so.

- 2 Had it not been for the op1n1on in Treasure Salvors two
Terms ago, I think you could have stopped with this in your
opinion of last Term. The proposition which I have
summarized in the proceeding paragraph does not require any
"ultra vires" exception to it to be perfecf!Y log!cal anCt
sound: where one of the clai~ 1s that a state official has
violated state law, there is no need under any circumstances
whatever for a federal court to decide the case in the face
of a claim of immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. I ha.ve
a strong suspicion that you could obtain five votes for that
proposition, if you were agreeable to it, in this case. I
realize that it means overruling cases such as Siler and
Green, but I think we all knew that going into the case last
Term.
Perhaps feeling compelled by the two op1n1ons in
Treasure Salvors, you went on to say in your opinion last
Term (footnote 12, page 11) that there was an "ultra vires"
exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity based on Larson v.
Domestic and Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 702
(1949). You went on to say that it didn't apply in this
case, observing "Even if petitioner officials violated state
law in carrying out some of their official duties, they
unquestionably acted under colorable state authority in
operating Pennhurst and the state's system of care for the
mentally retarded. In short, these officials were not
acting ultra vires, but rather were 'exercising the powers
delegated to [them] by the sovereign.'"
I think the "ultra vires" doctrine has been mischievous
in the Eleventh Amendment area, where it really is not even
necessary; it has also been mischievous in the area of
sovereign immunity, but there it appears to be a necessary
tool of analysis. If you feel you must maintain an "ultra
vires" exception to the Eleventh Amendment immunity to
pendent jurisdiction in a case such as this, I would simply ,
state the exception extremely narrowly, as you have in
·
footnote 12. You may get 52 pages of response from John,
rather than merely the 26 of his recent memorandum, but this
is only testimony to the Sargasso Sea potential of the
"ultra vires" doctrine. I think you could justify narrowing
it considerably, as I think you did in footnote 12, by
observing that the line of cases from United .States v. Lee,
106 U.S. 196, to Maio e v. Bowdine, 367 U.S. 643 (1962)~nd
perhaps all the way to Treasure Salvors) was an extremely
tortured one, as was recognized in both Larson, supra, and
Ma ~he Frankfurter dissent in Larson sa1d that the
Court was overruling a number of the cases on which John

1

-

3 -

relied in his memorandum, and I think you could simply
expand footnote 12 to contain these observations and a
statement that from now on the exception will be the narrow
one presently stated in your footnote 12. Larson and Malone
can be treated as together marking a watershed in "ultra
vires" doctrine which renders analysis of the nice point of
earlier cases unnecessary.
In short, stay with the high ground. Leave the stamp
album approach to John.
Sincerely,

Justice Powell

jen 10/19/83
MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL
From:
Re:

Joe
No. 81-2101 Pennhurst v. Halderman

I apologize for troubling you with more paper, but I continue
to doubt whether it is wise for the opinion in this case to endorse the ultra vires doctrine, as the revised draft opinion now
does.

Justice Rehnquist's suggestion that the doctrine be elimi-

nated

is attractive.

specifically
justify.

to

At the least,

reinforce

a

it does seem inappropriate

concept

This memorandum fleshes

that we

find

difficult

out the approach

I

to

suggested

yesterday.
As I said, it is hard to find any rationale for the doctrine
under

the

logic of

the Pennhurst opinion.

As

the opinion now

stands, it calls the use of ultra vires doctrine in Young a "fiction," and declines to extend it to the logical extreme to which
Justice Stevens takes it.
is

that

an

action

against the state,
ment,

if

the

Under the opinion, the "general rule"

against
and

relief

a

state

officer

is

in

effect

one

therefore barred by the Eleventh Amend-

sought

would

operate

against

the

latter.

This alone would seem to be a sufficient test of whether a suit
is "against one of the United States" within the meaning of the
Amendment.

The ultra vires doctrine looks to the quite different

question of whether the officer was acting with valid authority.
But

if

the

relief

would

run

against

the

state,

state have the the benefit of its immunity?

shouldn't

the

More important, it

is virtually impossible to draw either a clear or a principled
line

between

actions

that

are

merely

contrary

to

state

law--

"

page 2.

including abuse of discretion--and actions that are "completely"
outside the officer's authority and so ultra vires.

This will be

the focus of much Eleventh Amendment litigation in the years to
come.
Eliminating the ultra vires doctrine would, however, require
extensive damage to the Court's precedents.

It is not the early

cases that Justice Stevens relies on that are of concern--like
Young, nearly all of them are in fact cases alleging violations
of

the Constitution.

They invoke ultra vires language for

the

same reason that Young did, and it is a fiction we reject in the
opinion.

Those

that

do not

fall

into

this category are--with

perhaps two exceptions--cases alleging torts, not statutory violations, and Larson specifically overruled them.
cult
joined

is

distinguishing
the majority) .

Treasure
Moreover,

Salvors
the

have to be altered if not discarded.

(in

analysis

What is diffiwhich

the

Chief

in Larson

would

(Justice Rehnquist says the

doctrine "appears to be a necessary tool of analysis" in the area
) of sovereign immunity but not in the area of the Eleventh Amend)

ment, but I cannot see what he means.

I

· have been treated the same.

The two areas historically

While federalism may in some cases

make a difference, it is hard to see how the ultra vires doctrine
should apply in one case and not the other.)

I therefore doubt

that the Chief would join an outright rejection of the doctrine.
-Thankfully, there is no need or warrant in the present opinion to eliminate the doctrine.

It might, however, be questioned.

Justice Stevens' dissent may serve us in this regard.
the following course:

I suggest

,

page 3.

(1)

Initially, the opinion should make as little mention as

possible of the ultra vires doctrine.
one

of

their

primary

should be answered.

arguments

in

Since respondents do cast
terms

of

the

doctrine,

it

~:

Respondents suggest that petitioners' action was
ultra vires their authority, and therefore should not
be considered to be action against the state for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment.
But petitioners' actions in running this mental health institution were
plainly not beyond their authority, since state statutes gave them broad discretion to provide "adequate"
mental health services, Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 50,
§4201 (1) (Purdon 19
) • See, e.g., Larson v. Domestic
& Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U. S. 682, 689-690 (1949)
(a "claim of error in the exercise of [delegated] power" cannot be the basis for suit).
(2) When Justice Stevens recirculates his broad argument that
the ultra vires doctrine bars all action contrary to state law,
your opinion could

take advantage of the fact that such a view

both is the logical extreme of the ultra vires doctrine and would
virtually eliminate sovereign immunity.

For example:

The dissent argues that any action that is arguably
contrary to a state statute is in fact ultra vires the
actor's official authority and not immune. The breadth
of this proposition is startling.
As the Court in
Larson noted, "It confuses the doctrine of sovereign
immunity with the requirement that a plaintiff state a
cause of action."
Id., at 692-693.
The first answer
to it is that the view was conclusively rejected by the
Court in Larson • . . .
While the dissent's view thus can draw no legitimate support from Larson, it is true that its broad
interpretation of the ultra vires doctrine does little
more than take the accepted rationale of that doctrine
to its logical extreme. The theory of that doctrine is
that a state official is stripped of his authority when
he acts outside the explicit bounds of his authority.
Justice Stevens' theory is that the actor is stripped
of his authority when he acts contrary to any arguable
statutory limitation on his discretion. While the dissent's result may be logical, in that it is difficult
to draw principled lines short of that end, that view
would virtually eliminate the constitutional doctrine

page 4.

of sovereign immunity.
It is a result from which the
Court in Larson wisely recoiled. We do so again today.
At bottom, the problem may be that the ultra vires doctrine is based fundamentally on the theory advanced in
Ex parte Young that, as we note below, is open to serious question after Edelman v. Jordan.
See infra page
For present purposes, we hold only that to the extent the doctrine is consistent with the analysis of
this opinion, it is a very narrow doctrine that will
allow suit only when the state officer is acting "without any authority whatever." Florida Dept. of State v.
Treasure Salvors, 458 u. S.
,
(1982) (opinion of
STEVENS, J.); accord id., at--- (WHITE, J., concurring
in judgment in part and dissenting in part) (test is
whether there is no "colorable basis for the exercise
of authority by state officials").
The cases the dissent relies on are not to the contrary •...

(3) Show the above to the Chief to see if he would think this
would go too far.
I do not see any costs in this approach.

Our reason for ex-

panding the ultra vires section of the opinion was the fear that
the Chief was concerned about our overruling many cases in this
area.

Merely questioning the doctrine overrules no cases, and it

is consistent with the the theory of the opinion as a whole.
his worries persist, we can resort to the original tack.

If
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MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL
From:
Re:

Joe
Pennhurst v. Halderman

Here is the revised version of the opinion in this case.

In

brief, the changes are as follows:
' Page 9 - Stylistic change.
Pages 11-12 - Some of the discussion of ultra vires moved
into text and the rationale for this exception suggested.
I have
also indicated that the theory of Young has been abandoned.
Page 14 n.l4 - We should not hold that jurisdiction will be
proper on remand.
Page 15 - Clarification.
Note that as far as I can recall
this will be the first majority opinion to call the theory of
Young a "fiction."
You used the term in dissent in Cory v.
White, 4 57 u. S. 8 5, 9 6 ( 19 8 2) •
Page 15 n. 15 - Responses to prior dissent deleted.
this is now on pp. 11-12.

Much of

Page 20 - Changes intended to make point more forcefully.
Page 20 n.l7 - Response to prior dissent deleted.
Page 21 A - Last few sentences of p.
think this placement is more logical.

22 moved to here.

I

Page 21 B - I have expanded this argument.
Page 22 -Moved top. 21, rider "A."
Pages 23-24 - Changes add the policy considerations contrary
to those resps advance~ Stylistic editing, also. Note 21 is in
rider. Notes 23 & 24 ~ere responses to the prior dissent.
I did not find any English case law that seemed appropriate
to insert at this stage.

,•f

V/0/
1

('/0

11-J I 0 I

y.

RIDER PP. 11-12

The Court has recognized two necessary exceptions to
this

general

apply

rule.

First,

sovereign

irnrnuni ty

does

not

in a suit against an official who allegedly acted

entirely

outside

Domestic

&

(1949) . 1 ~

his

Foreign
This

authority.

Commerce

ultra

vires

See,

Corp.,

e.g.,

337

exception

U.
is

common sense notion that an official on a

Larson

v.

682,

702

on

the

S.
based

frolic cannot

claim immunity, even when he acts for the benefit of the
state.
\,/

See

id.,

at

689

(ultra

vires

actions

Ol
purely personal sale of official's horne).
"(

are

like

The exception

is thus quite limited, governing only those situations in

1

~hile Larson involved the federal government's
sovereign immunity, and not the states', this Court's
cases recognize no distinction between the two doctrines.
See,
e.g., Florida Department of State v. Treasure
Salvors, Inc., 458 u. s. __, __, n. 21 (1982) (opinion
of STEVENS' J.)
(II I rI] t
cannot be doubted that the
question whether a particular suit is one against the
State, within the meaning of the Constitution, must depend
upon
the
same
principles
that determine whether
a
particular suit is one against the United States.'")
(quoting Tindal v. Wesley, 167 u. s. 204, 213 (1897)).
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which

a

government

authority.

See,

officer

e.g.,

of STEVENS, J.)

acts

Florida

Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458

2.

u. s.

without

any

official

of

State · v.

Department

__, - - (1982)

(opinion

(test is whether the official's conduct is

undertaken "without any authority whatever"):

id., at

(WHITE, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting
in part)
for

(test

is whether

there was no "colorable basis

the exercise of authority by state officials").

As

the Larson Court explained, "It is important to note that
in

such

impleading

cases

the

relief

the sovereign,

lack of delegated power.

can

be

granted,

only because of

without

the officer's

A claim of error in the exercise

of that power is therefore not sufficient."

337

u. s.,

at

689-690. 13
,.
exception clearly is
inapplicable
in this
case.
Pennsylvania statutes plainly provided the state
officers discretionary authority in operating Pennhurst
and the State's system of care for the mentally retarded.
See, e.g., Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 50, §4201(1), (4) (Purdon
19
) (state has duty to assure "adequate mental health
and mental retardation services for all" and shall assign
to state facilities "such duties for the care of the
mentally disabled, as the secretary shall prescribe"): cf.
§7102 (it is state policy to employ "least restrictions
consistent with adequate treatment").
The complaint
alleged only errors in the exercise of that authority.
Respondents suggest that the ultra vires exception is
Footnote continued on next page.
13 This
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The second well established exception to the general

in fact substantially broader than the quoted language
from Larson suggests, and includes wrongful administration
of state laws or official action in dereliction of state
law duties.
See Brief for Respondents at 33-35.
They
rely largely on language in several old cases, e.g.,
Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 u. S. 270,
287
(1884);
Cunningham v. Macon & Brunswick R. Co., 109 u. s. 446, 452
(1883), to the effect that a state officer sued in tort
must show that his state authority was sufficient in law
to protect him.
We note first that respondent reads the language of
these cases too broadly.
It is largely dicta because the
federal courts had jurisdiction over nearly all these
cases under the well accepted exception to sovereign
immunity for unconstitutional conduct.
See infra at 1213. Moreover, although there are isolated exceptions, the
language cited generally refers to torts by individual
officers, which were considered presumptively ultra vires,
specifically distinguishing the case of errors in carrying
out discretionary duties placed on a government officer by
statute.
See, e.g., Cunningham, supra, at 453 (noting
that suit is barred where the statutory duty involves any
"element of discretion to be exercised by the officer");
Hopkins v. Clemson Agricultural College, 221 U. S. 6 36,
647 (1911) (College "was not acting in any governmental
capacity"); see also, e.g., Wells v. Roper, 246 u. S. 335-,
337-338 (1918) (" [T]he case does not fall into any of the
exceptions to the rule that the United States many not be
sued without its consent
It cannot successfully be
... denied that the duty of the Postmaster General ..• was
executive in character, not ministerial, and required an
exercise of official discretion."); Louisiana v. Jumel,
107 u. S. 711, 727-728 (1883) (court has no jurisdiction
"to supervise the conduct of all persons charged with any
official duty in respect to the levy, collection, and
disbursement of the tax in question" in order to ensure
that bonds were paid).
The short answer to respondents' contention, however,
is that it has been decisively repudiated by this Court's
Footnote continued on next page.
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bar

on

actions

against

state

officers

4.

is

that

a

suit

recent cases. In Larson, this Court squarely rejected the
proposition
that
state
officials
can
be
sued
for
constitutional actions within the scope of their delegated
authority.
As
noted
in text,
the Court expressly
reaffirmed that the ultra vires doctrine applies only to
actions completely beyond the officers' authority, not to
errors in exercising discretion.
See also id., at 695
("[W)e have heretofore rejected the argument that official
action is invalid if based on an incorrect decision as to
law or fact, if the officer making the decision was
empowered to do so.
Adams v. Nagle, 303 u. S. 532, 542
(1938). ");
Florida Department of
State v.
Treasure
Salvors, Inc., 458 u. s. __, ____ (1982) (opinion of
STEVENS, J.) (invoking Larson ultra vires analysis).
To
read Larson any other way twists its language and ignores
its fundamental thrust.
That the cases cited by respondents have lost any
vitality they may have had is shown by their recent
history.
Since 1949, many of them have not been cited by
this Court at all, e.g., Johnson v. Lankford, 245 u. S.
541 (1918); Scully v. Bird, 209 u. s. 481 (1908); Hopkins,
supra, and none has been cited for the proposition that
wrongful exercise of delegated authority can be ultra
vires.
We note further that an expansion of the ultra vires
doctrine would be unsound in principle.
As the Court . i~
Larson noted, "It
[would]
confus[e]
the doctrine ' of
sovereign immunity with the requirement that a plaintiff
state a cause of action." Id., at 692-693. In this case,
for example, the statutes under which petitioners acted
charged them with the broad duty to assure "adequate"
mental health services.
Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 50 §4101(1)
(Purdon 19 ) • They were also instructed to construct new
mental health facilities and to reduce the size of
Pennhurst to 1000.
1970 Pa. Laws No. 256.
To say that,
in
failing
to
provide
individualized,
presumptively
community-based
treatment
for
all
the
residents
of
Pennhurst
and
those
people
on
the
waiting
list,
petitioners were acting ultra vires their authority is to
Footnote continued on next page.
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jJ);/t

((II

challenging

the

actions

not

is

constitutionality
one

against

of

the

u.

holding in Ex parte Young, 209

a

state

State.

official's

This

S. 123

was

the

(1908), in which

a federal court enjoined the Attorney General of the State
of Michigan from bringing suit to enforce a state statute
that

allegedly

Court held

violated

that

the

the

Fourteenth

This

Amendment.

Eleventh Amendment did not prohibit

issuance of this injunction.

The theory of the case was

that an unconstitutional enactment is "void" and therefore
does

not

"impart

responsibility
Id.,

States."
authorize

the

official or

to

to

[the

the

supreme

at

160.

action,

the

officer]

any

authority

Since

the

officer

was

immunity
of

State

representative character and

the

rule

permitting

suits

United

could

"stripped
[was]

to the consequences of his official conduct."
While

the

from

of

not
his

subjected

Ibid.

alleging

,.
conduct

contrary to "the supreme authority of the United States"
has survived, the theory of Young has not been provided an

deprive sovereign immunity of any substantive meaning
whatsoever.
Respondents
simply
disagreed
with
petitioners' interpretation of what "adequate" meant and
sought to have the federal court exercise the discretion
vested in state officials.

expansive interpretation.

u.

Thus, in Edelman v. Jordan, 415

S. 651 {1974), the Court held that a plaintiff suing a

state

official

and

alleging

a

violation

of

federal

law

could recover only prospective injunctive relief and not
the award of damages.

Under the theory of Young, such a

suit would not be one against the State since the federallaw

allegation

would

official authority.

strip

the

state

officer

of

his

Nevertheless, retroactive relief was

barred by the Eleventh Amendment.l 4

14.The theory of Young is the same as that sometimes
advanced for the proposition that an illegal act is per se
ultra vires: since a principal cannot validly authorize
illegal action, the state official alone will be held
responsible and the act will be treated as unauthorized.
The Court in Larson firmly rejected this notion:
"It has been said, in a very special sense,
that, as a matter of agency law, a principal may
never lawfully authorize the commission of a
,.
tort by his agent.
But that statement, in its
usual context, is only a way of saying that an
agent's liability for torts committed by him
cannot be avoided by pleading the direction or
authorization of his principal.
The agent is
himself liable whether or not he has been
authorized or even directed to commit the tort.
This,
of
course,
does
not mean
that
the
principal is not liable nor that the tortious
action may not be regarded as the action of the
principal." Larson, supra, at 694.
(

No. 81-2101 Pennhurst v. Halderman

The opinion in Larson noted that a similar argument had
been
advanced
in
an
effort
to
avoid
corporate
responsibility: since a corporation is not authorized to
act illegally, it cannot confer valid power to do so and
illegal actions of corporate agents are therefore beyond
their power.
The argument was "decisively rejected."
Id., at 694 & n. 16.

8.
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RIDER P. 15

But we declined to extend the fiction of Young to permit
retroactive

relief,

for

to

do

so

would

effectively

eliminate the constitutional immunity of the States.
at

665

(retroactive

relief

would

"'fall

afoul

!d.,

of

the

Eleventh Amendment if that basic constitutional provision
is

to

be

conceived

of

as

having

any

present

force'")

(quoting Rothstein v. Wyman, 467 F. 2d 226, 237 (CA2 1972)
(McGowan,
U.
the

s.

J.,

sitting by designation), cert. denied,

921 (1973)).

411

The opinion in Edelman recognized that

difference between

injunctions and money damages

is

not "that between day and night," because the former may
often have a greater impact on state treasuries than the
latter.

Id., at 667.

Implicit in the holding of Edelman
~

was the view that retroactive relief is of less importa~ce
in

ensuring

injunctions.

the

vindication

Thus,

of

federal

law

than

are

Edelman was an accommodation between

No. 81-2101 Pennhurst v. Halderman

9.

the interest defined in Young in ensuring the enforcement
of the Civil War Amendments and the interest articulated
in the Eleventh Amendment in maintaining the immunity of
the States.

No. 81-2101 Pennhurst v. Halderman

10.

Y'J/..

RIDER P. 20

In none of these cases, however, did the Court so much · as
mention

the

state-law
assumed

Eleventh

claim.

that once

federal-law

claim,

Amendment

Rather,

the

in

connection

Court

appears

with
to

have

jurisdiction was established over
the

doctrine

of

pendent

the

jurisdiction

would establish power to hear the state-law claims.

A..

the

..

Court \ d-i"d not address , whether that doctrine migh}

The

!1.. t

have 1\ a

different scope when applied to suits against the State.
This is illustrated by Greene ••••

,; ,
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RIDER "A" P. 21
These
question

cases

thus

before

did

not

"[W]hen

us.

directly

questions

confront

of

the

jurisdiction

have been passed on in prior decisions sub silentio, this
Court has never considered itself bound when a subsequent
case finally brings

the jurisdictional issue before us."
/'(

Hagans v.

Lavine,

S.

415 U.

528,

533,

n.

1

( 19 7 4) : ?' we

5

therefore view the question as an open one.
As noted, the implicit view of , th

these cases seems

to have been that once jurisdiction is established on the
basis

'"'

of

aRy

Amendment

federal

inquiry

is

question,
necessary

no
with

further

Eleventh

respect

to

other

claims raised in the case.

RIDER "B" P. 21 [!/,
Pendent

jurisdiction

expediency

and

is

a

judge-made

efficiency derived

from

doctrine

of

the general Art.

III language conferring power to hear all "cases" arising
under federal law or between diverse parties.

l'f Jt( Footnote

20.]

18"

is

the

same

as

the

See United

current

footnote
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Mine Workers v. Gibbs,

383 U. S.

12.

715, 725

(1966) .

Under

ordinary rules of construction, this general language must
give way to the far more specific command of the Eleventh
Amendment,

which

explicitly

excludes

power suits prosecuted against States.

from

the

judicial

The history of the

adoption and development of the Amendment, see supra, at
6-9, confirms that it is an independent limitation on all
exercises of Art.

III power:

"the entire

judicial power

granted by the Constitution does not embrace authority to
entertain suit brought by private parties against a State
without consent given," Ex parte State of New York No. 1,
256

u. s.

490, 497 (1921).

13.
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RIDER P. 23

m<

It

may

be

that

applying

the

Eleventh

Amendment · to

pendent claims results in federal claims being brought in
state

court,

or

in bifurcation of claims.

uncommon in this area.
suit

for

That

is

not

Under Edelman v. Jordan, supra, a

money damages against

state officials,

whether

based on federal or state law, must be brought in state
court.

Challenges

under 42

u.s.c.

to the validity of state tax systems

§1983 also must be brought in state court.

Fair Assessment in Real Estate Assn. v. McNary, 454 U. S.
100 (1981).

Under the abstention doctrine, unclear issues

of state law commonly are

split off and referred to the

state courts.
Moreover,
based on

allowing

state

claims

against

law to be brought

in

state

the

federal courts

pol <'er "'

does

not

necessarily

convenience and

foster

fairness

the

officials
, ,

"judicial

econo~y,

to litigants," Gibbs, supra,

at

~

726,

that

'J--o--,v

i
-~

•

-supposed
'

t<D

uh derlie pendent

jurisdiction.

I

Firs-t, when a f~deral decision on state law is obtained,

c l''il.

the federal court's construction~ is n~ce sarily uncertain
and ephemeral.

Particularly in cases of ongoing oversight

of a state pr6gram such as this one
t_::d unfairness can result.

waste, inconvenience,

See, e.g., Burford v. Sun Oil
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Co.,

319

u. s.

315,

327

(1943)

14.

("Delay, misunderstanding

of local law, and needless conflict with the state

poli~y,

are the inevitable product of this double [i.e., federal/ state]

system of review") • / But in many cases, waste and

delay may occur long before any federal decision of state
law

is obtained.

For

example,

cons ide rat ions of comity

have been said to have special force when relief is sought
on state-law grounds.
Hamill,

288

U.

s.

52,

See Gibbs, supra, at 726: Hawks v.
61

(1933)

("Reluctance

there has

been to use the process of federal courts in restraint of
state

officials

though

the

rights

asserted

by

the

complainants be strictly federal in origin. There must be
reluctance even greater when the rights are strictly local
.•.• ")

(citations omitted).

As

a

result,

dismissals on

the basis of comity can be expected to be common in such
suits,

causing

unusual

uncertainty,

waste,

and

~

"dll

delay.

~' Petitioners in this case, for example, contend that
the policy considerations advanced by respondents are
outweighed by considerations of comity, arguing that the
Court of Appeals "has authorized a severe intrusion on the
right of state officials to run their own programs, basing
that intrusion on nothing more than its view of state
law."
Brief
for
Petitioners 9.
In
light of our
disposition of this case, we need not balance these
competing considerations.

No. 81-2101 Pennhurst v. Halderman

I Another

15.

source of delay in such cases is abstention, which

may be called for when state law is unclear.
v.

Bullitt,

377

u.

S.

360,

378-379

See

(1964)

Bagg~tt

{"abstention

operates to require piecemeal adjudication in many courts,
thereby delaying

ultimate adjud i.cation on the merits for

an undue length of time")
Regardless
however,
such

the

of

{citations omitted). 1

these

answer

to

considerations

of

countervailing
respondents'
policy

can

policy

concerns,

assertions
not

is

that

override

the

constitutional limitation on the authority of the federal
judiciary

to

adjudicate

Missouri v. Fiske,
convenience

open

290

suits

u.

no

against

a

State.

See

S, at 25-26 {"Considerations of
avenue

of

escape

from

the

[Amendment's] restriction") . ~;L That a litigant's choice of
forum is reduced "has long been understood to be a part of
the

tension

inherent

in

our

system

of

-

Employees v. Missouri Public Health & Welfare Dept.,

u.

s.

279,

298

{1973)

{MARSHALL,

J.,

,

federalis~."

concurring

result) .

~~ [Footnote 22 is the same as current footnote 22.]
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MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL
From:
Re:

Joe
No. 81-2101 Pennhurst v. Halderman

I apologize for troubling you with more paper, but I continue
to doubt whether it is wise for the opinion in this case to endorse the ultra vires doctrine, as the revised draft opinion now
does.

Justice Rehnquist's suggestion that the doctrine be elimi-

nated

is attractive.

specifically
justify.

to

At the least,

reinforce

it does seem inappropriate

a concept

This memorandum fleshes

that we

find

difficult

out the approach

I

to

suggested

yesterday.
As I said, it is hard to find any rationale for the doctrine
under

the

logic of

the Pennhurst opinion.

As

the opinion now

stands, it calls the use of ultra vires doctrine in Young a "fiction," and declines to extend it to the logical extreme to which
Justice Stevens takes it.
is

that

an

action

against the state,
ment,

if

the

Under the opinion, the "general rule"

against

a

state

officer

is

in

effect

one

and therefore barred by the Eleventh Amend- -;

relief

sought

would

operate

against

the

latter.

This alone would seem to be a sufficient test of whether a suit
is "against one of the United States" within the meaning of the
Amendment.

The ultra vires doctrine looks to the quite different

question of whether the officer was acting with valid authority.
But

if

the

relief

would

run

against

the

state,

state have the the benefit of its immunity?

shouldn't

the

More important, it

is virtually impossible to draw either a clear or a principled
line

between

actions

that

are

merely

contrary

to

state

law--

~

page 2.

including abuse of discretion--and actions that are "completely"
outside the officer's authority and so ultra vires.

This will be

the focus of much Eleventh Amendment litigation in the years to
come.
Eliminating the ultra vires doctrine would, however, require
extensive damage to the Court's precedents.

It is not the early

cases that Justice Stevens relies on that are of concern--like
Young, nearly all of them are in fact cases alleging violations
of

the Constitution.

They invoke ultra vires language for

the

same reason that Young did, and it is a fiction we reject in the
opinion.

Those

that

do not

fall

into this category are--with

perhaps two exceptions--cases alleging torts, not statutory violations, and Larson specifically overruled them.
cult

is

joined

distinguishing
the

majority).

Treasure
Moreover,

Salvors
the

have to be altered if not discarded.

(in

analysis

What is diffiwhich
in

the

Chief

Larson would

(Justice Rehnquist says the

doctrine "appears to be a necessary tool of analysis" in the area
of sovereign immunity but not in the area of the Eleventh Amend- ; ;
ment, but I cannot see what he means.
have been treated the same.

The two areas historically

While federalism may in some cases

make a difference, it is hard to see how the ultra vires doctrine
should apply in one case and not the other.)

I therefore doubt

that the Chief would join an outright rejection of the doctrine.
Thankfully, there is no need or warrant in the present opinion to eliminate the doctrine.

It might, however, be questioned.

Justice Stevens' dissent may serve us in this regard.
the following course:

I suggest

page 3.

(1)

Initially,

the opinion should make as little mention as

possible of the ultra vires doctrine.
one

of

their

primary

should be answered.

arguments

in

Since respondents do cast
terms

of

the

doctrine,

it

E.g.:

Respondents suggest that petitioners' action was
ultra vires their authority, and therefore should not
be considered to be action against the state for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment.
But petitioners' actions in running this mental health institution were
plainly not beyond their authority, since state statutes gave them broad discretion to provide "adequate"
mental health services, Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 50,
§4201(1) (Purdon 19
) • See, e.g., Larson v. Domestic
& Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 u. S. 682, 689-690 (1949)
(a "claim of error in the exercise of rdelegated] power" cannot be the basis for suit).
(2) When Justice Stevens recirculates his broad argument that
the ultra vires doctrine bars all action contrary to state law,
your opinion could

take advantage of the fact that such a view

both is the logical extreme of the ultra vires doctrine and would
virtually eliminate sovereign immunity.

For example:

The dissent argues that any action that is arguably
contrary to a state statute is in fact ultra vires the
actor's official authority and not immune. The breadth
of this proposition is startling.
As the Court in
Larson noted, "It confuses the doctrine of sovereign
immunity with the requirement that a plaintiff state a
cause of action."
Id., at 692-693.
The first answer
to it is that the view was conclusively rejected by the
Court in Larson. • ••
While the dissent's view thus can draw no legitimate support from Larson, it is true that its broad
interpretation of the ultra vires doctrine does little
more than take the accepted rationale of that doctrine
to its logical extreme. The theory of that doctrine is
that a state official is stripped of his authority when
he acts outside the explicit bounds of his authority.
Justice Stevens' theory is that the actor is stripped
of his authority when he acts contrary to any arguable
statutory limitation on his discretion. While the dissent's result may be logical, in that it is difficult
to draw principled lines short of that end, that view
would virtually eliminate the constitutional doctrine

,

page 4.

of sovereign immunity.
It is a result from which the
Court in Larson wisely recoiled. We do so again today.
At bottom, the problem may be that the ultra vires doctrine is based fundamentally on the theory advanced in
Ex parte Young that, as we note below, is open to serious question after Edelman v. Jordan.
For present purposes, we hold only that to the extent the doctrine is consistent with the analysis of
this opinion, it is a very narrow doctrine that will
allow suit only when the state officer is acting "without any authority whatever." Florida Dept. of State v.
Treasure Salvors, 458 u. s.
,
(1982) (opinion of
STEVENS, J.); accord id., a t - - (WHITE, J., concurring
in judgment in part and dissenting in part) (test is
whether there is no "colorable basis for the exercise
of authority by state officials").
The cases the dissent relies on are not to the contrary ....
(3) Show the above to the Chief to see if he would think this
would go too far.
I do not see any costs in this approach.

Our reason for ex-

panding the ultra vires section of the opinion was the fear that
the Chief was concerned about our overruling many cases in this
area.

Merely questioning the doctrine overrules no cases, and it

is consistent with the the theory of the opinion as a whole.
his worries persist, we can resort to the original tack.

If
,
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MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL
From:
Re:

Ot..AFr

' o /zo

Joe
No. 81-2101 Pennhurst v. Halderman

Here is a second revised draft of the opinion in this case.
; ,. tl..(. f';,.~t-1.- ,,.;.. ;11',

The new changes are marked

in blue.

+J.tA..r

(Changes,., you have already

seen are marked in red.)
Page 10 n.ll
of resps' ultra
approval of the
that we question

- This is an expanded version of the discussion
vires argument.
I have tried to show as little
doctrine as possible without tipping our hand
it.

Page 11-12 - The discussion of the ultra vires doctrine has
been dele ted. Ft)~t.,. .f,,p..H! /'-( ·t~ t-1.. t {;r>+ .-e..vt~(<M (.,..t,,.< h Ye. ,..,H t4- ..., ...J..vrA"' ce r-l,q_ ..... 34' "'"'1"
""ril'h"l{

6-r

1-~t ..,)tw.. ,;...-eJ do c.+v;""') !,._. .._b. I.UA-. ~ .

Page 19 - I have not changed your revision of these two sentences.
I also agree that former footnote 16 can go.
Page 20 B - I have divided the first sentence of your revision into two sentences.
Page 21 A

This merely implements your comments in the mar-

gin.
Page 21 B - The cite to Hagans is new, per your suggestion.
Page 23 - I have put all the countervailing policy considerations into a footnote (n. 17).
The first point about federal , "
intrusion, while valid, is not so strong or convincing as to mer-·
it the attention that placement in text produces.
I have edited
your changes here slightly.
The other considerations have been
condensed into a single sentence at the end of the note.
Former
footnote 21 re comity has been deleted.
Attached
sion.

for

reference are

the

riders

from the first

revi-

,.

/,.,
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MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL
From:
Re:

Joe
David's revisions of the opinion in Pennhurst v. Halderman

David has made a number of editorial suggestions.
important change

is

intended to bring

the opinion's

Edelman closer to the actual language of that case.

The most
reading of

We have dis-

cussed the changes and here is what we have come up with:

~age

4 n.

3 -

The contempt order was not against Pennsylva-

nia.

~age 11 - The relief in Edelman was not money damages, but an
equitable injunction for retroactive monetary relief.
This
change actually makes the argument in the opinion stronger.
Pages 14-15 - The opinion in Edelman does not really bear
this paragraph's reading of it.
It does not say that injunctions
may have a greater impact than money damages on state treasuries-in fact a footnote specifically rebuts the dissent's statement
to that effect--and it does not necessarily suggest that retroactive relief is of less importance in ensuring the vindication of
federal rights than is prospective relief.
What the opinion in
Edelman actually argues is that monetary relief is generally more
of an intrusion on state sovereignty than prospective relief.
What the Edelman opinion safely can be cited for is the proposition that the Court drew a balance between the need to vindicate federal law and the state's immunity.
It was not that the
federal interest was any less but that the state interest in im- ~
munity was generally greater.
David thought that the paragraph
in the last Term's draft--altered to eliminate the suggestion
that retroactive relief is unnecessary to enforce federal law-adequately stated that Edelman involved an accommodation of the
various interests involved.
I agree that the original language,
with a new first sentence, will be satisfactory.
Therefore, we
recommend the indicated rider.

~ Page 18 - David thought that this argument added nothing to
the very strong surrounding arguments, and that the maxim of construction cited here does ot apply well to the two constitutional provisions in question.
I agree that his rewrite is an im7ment.
Pages 19-20 - Same change as on page 11.

t~~~~
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~
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~ulfington. ~. (!f. 2Dc?_,.~
CHA. .. I!IERS 01'

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

October 17, 1983

Re:

81-2101 - Pennhurst State School &
Hospital v. Halderman

Dear Lewis:
You and I may have different recollections of the
conference discussion of this case following the
reargument. It was my understanding that the final
assignment of the majority opinion was contingent upon
the circulation of a memorandum by the Chief Justice
setting forth a more narrow analysis of the case than
was contained in any of the dra~ts that circulated last
spring. Had it not been for that understanding, I
would have followed the customary procedure of waiting
for the author of the majority to circulate the first
draft.
I am disappointed that you did not find my
memorandum convincing, but I continue to hope that the
doctrine of stare decisis will have some influence on
one or more of the adherents to your ground-breaking
position.

Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

,

.inprmu <qttmi Df tJrr1lttiUb ,ibrlt.eJT•~· ~.

cq.

2Ll?~~

CHA .. BERS 0,.

.JUSTICE .JOHN PAUL STEVENS

October 27, 1983

Re:

81-2101 - Pennhurst State School and

Hospital v. Halderman
Dear Lewis:
Instead of simply writing the customary letter
indicating that I will be circulating a dissent in due
course, I think it may be constructive if I promptly
make three observations about the opinion you
circulated this morning.
In my letter of October 6, 1983, addressed to the
Chief Justice, I quoted the paragraph from Larson that
makes it clear that the conduct of a state agent may be
ultra vires either because it exceeds the limits of his
authority or because he has acted in a way that has
been prohibited by the sovereign. I note that in your
footnote 11 on page 11 of the opinion you circulated
today, you quote the portion of Larson that refers to
the first type of ultra vires conduct but you ignore
the second. It is, of course, the second type that is
relevant here.
In my memorandum circulated on October 14, 1983, I
rather laboriously explained that Ex parte Young was
merely an application of the long-settled doctrine that
an illegal act of a state official is not protected by
the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
(This same point
is made much more succinctly by the Solicitor General
at page 23 of his brief.) I note that your circulation
omits the quotation from Ex parte Young that appeared
on page 12 of your draft of June 22, 1983: in that
quotation the Court had used this sentence to explain
the basis of its decision:
"It is simply an illegal act upon the part of a
state official in attempting by the use of the

-2-

name of the State to enforce a legislative
enactment which is void because unconstitutional."
The Solicitor General correctly perceived the
importance of that sentence when he wrote at p. 23 of
his brief that"··· this Court has no power to create
any exception to a constitutional bar to federal court
jurisdiction •••• Ex parte Young rests instead on
recognition that the Eleventh Amendment simply does not
apply to suits seeking to restrain illegal acts by
state officials--whether those acts are illegal because
they violate the Constitution, as in Young, or federal
or state law."
Although your letter of October 17, 1983, led me
to expect a response to my general argument, I gather
that you have instead decided to stand on your earlier
draft. In all events, I will elaborate on these
comments as soon as I can get back into the case.
Respectfully,

1vL
'I

Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

.

~uvrtmt

aj:tmrt ttf tqt 'Jnittb ~tait.tl'
Jfa,gJringtttn. ~. aj:. 2llbi'!~

CHAMBERS OF

I

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

November 1, 1983

No. 81-2101

Pennhurst State School & Hospital
v. Halderman

Dear Lewis,
Please join me.
Sincerely,

Justice Powell

Copies to the Conference

~u:vrmu

<ijourt ttf tlf~ ~ttiU~ ,ita.ug

._ulfittgbrn. ~.

<!f.

2.Ll£i.l!.;l

C HAMBE R S OF

.JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

Re:

November 11, 1983

No. 81-2101 - Pennhurst State school
and Hospital v . Halderman

Dear Lewis:
I shall await John ' s dissent in this case .
Sincerely,

Justice Powell
cc:

The Conference

;iu;rutttt <lJourl of tltt ~tlt ;itatt.ll'
~£tittgtmt. ~. <lJ. 20~~~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

November 11, 1983

Re:

81-2101 - Pennhurst State School
& Hospital v. Halderman

Dear Lewis,
Please join me.
Sincerely,

Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference
cpm

,ju.p:rttttt <!Jourt ~ t4t ~b ,jbdts
~asfri:nghtn, ~. <!J. 2ll~,_.~

CHAMBERS OF

November 17, 1983

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

Re:

I

No. 81-2101

Pennhurst State School, Et al. v.
Halderman

Dear Lewis:
I join. As I told you, I may have some "thoughts" depending
on what John has to say.

Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

jen 12/12/83
MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL
From:
Re:

Joe
Responses to JPS dissent in Pennhurst

Attached
Most of

is a

revised version of

the opinion in this case.

the substantive changes are to respond to Justice Ste-

vens's dissent.

There are many things in the dissent to which we

could respond.

He also makes some telling points to which we do

not have a devastating reply

(~,

p.

25, n.

37).

I have con-

fined my recommended responses to answering those of his points
that I think go to the heart of our analysis.
seen these suggestions.

(David has not yet

Would you like him to go over them be-

fore your review?)
P. 11, n. 11--This is the basic response to JPS 1 s ultra vires
argument that we discussed earlier.
The third paragraph is a
fairly frank admission of the main way in which the theory of
this opinion diverges from prior law.
Even though the Chief has
joined, it might still be a good idea to run these changes hy him
(and perhaps others in your Court). This might be done ' under the
guise of soliciting the "suggestions" he said he might make.
P. 14, ,f 2-- I had in tended to add these words to
draft, but I think they inadvertently were deleted
quent revision.
P. 15, n.
Edelman.

14--Th is

P. 17, n. 15--This
jurisdiction cases.

answers
rebuts

the
the

dissent 1 s

dissent 1 s

last Term 1 s
in a subse-

characterization
view of

the

of

pendent-

P. 20, n. 19 (formerly n. 17)--This attempts to rebut in a general way the policy arguments of the dissent (~, pp. 34-35).

; "
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MEMORANDUM
DATE:

TO:

Joe

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

Dec. 15, 1983

81-2101 Pennhurst
I have now read JPS's dissent with some care all 38 pages.
with

I

adjectives:

attack",

have

rarely seen an opinion so larded

"blatant",

"incredible",

"desperate

"irrational",

"distressing

lack

of

knowledge",

etc., etc.
1.

If I read his dissent correctly, it would be

fair to say something along the following lines:
"The views expressed in Justice Stevens' 38 page
dissenting opinion would (i) extend Ex parte
Young to any alleged violation of state law,
ignoring the settled construction of Young to
federal constitutional violations; 1 (ii) would
expand the doctrine of ultra vires beyond any
prior articulation of its boundaries;
(iii)
would
read
Larson,
Edleman,
and
Treasure
Salvors, contrary to their plain meaning; and
( i v) if these views were adopted, the Eleventh
Amendment would be emasculated.
1 Joe, is there any case authority for John's
view in this respect?

2.

..

Summary of JPS's main points
2.

In

arguing

his

view

that

Ex

parte Young

applies to the states, John says that when an officer acts
tortiously or contrary to state law he is "stripped of his
immunity"

(p.

"absolutely

18,

no

He

22)

authority"

inapplicable to state law.

states
for

the

(p. 24).

also

that

there

is

view

that

Young

is

(Joe:

Do we have an

answer to this) •

In the early part of his opinion (pp. 7-11),

3.

JPS relies on tort cases.

As I read his draft, JPS says

that "all" of the tort cases (p. 6-11) "expressly" address
the Eleventh Amendment (p. 12).

Perhaps they do, but only

to say that a tort is not an action by the state, rather
it

is

a

suit

against

conduct unrelated

the

individual

for

his

personal

to the official scope of his off ice. ..

JPS goes on, however, to say - as he argues later - that
the

tort

rule

applies

when

officers

violate

state

statutes.
4.

unpersuasive.

JPS's

reliance

and -

English

law

is

He quotes Blackstone for the view that "the

King could do no wrong".
country,

on

But we have no king

in this

as Joe has noted in one of his proposed

3.

footnotes - unlike a king, a state can act only through
its officers.

Under John's theory, I suppose the Eleventh

Amendment would be a defense only where it
that

the

officers

delegated

acted

authority,

discretionary

strictly

as

authority

within

contrasted
that

is conceded
specifically

with

any

broad

the

department

or

administrative agency necessarily must have.
5.
p. 25.

JPS finally gets to "ultra vires" at about

He first attempts to distinguish Larson, and as we

already have shown the distinction he would draw undercuts
both the language and rationale of Larson.
on

the

phrase

"beyond

their

authority"

He does rely
in

the

Larson

opinion for the view that Pennhurst officers acted beyond
their
vires

powers.

He

conduct

then

describes

26) :

{p.

(a)

"two

where

types"
the

of

ultra

agent

acts

individually, as committing a tort or crime, and thus po-t
within

the

scope

of

his

authority~

and

(b)

where

an

officer acts contrary to "state law" (p. 26, 27).
6.

At p. 35, JPS states that "one basic fact"

under 1 ies this case:
conduct".

Thus,

"the state prohibited respondent's

the centerpiece of his dissent is that

this was not a suit against the state at all because here
the individual defendants acted in violation of state.

4

0

* * *
Thoughts I share with Joe:
What would you think of adding a separate part,
a textual response broadly dissent?

but not lengthly -

to the

It might be helpful to have in the text, perhaps

as the first sentence, a statement that the dissent would
emasculate

the

separately but

Eleventh
briefly

Amendment.

the

Then

elements of

address

JPS's analysis.

They seem to me to be that Young applies to state law to
the same extent
that

in

being

this

sued

it does

case

to federal constitutional law,

the parties defendant are

individually

rather

than

in

in effect

their

official

capacities, and therefore that the state is not the real
or

substantial

ident if iedas

party

being

officers

sued,

the

illegally and ultra vires.

and

that

defendants

although
were

acting

Thus, the state has not

n~ee

of immunity.
Our

opinion

already

contains

believe, to each of these positions.

good

answers,

I

Yet, John's dissent

- on its face - is a powerful indictment of our opinion.
I

am

inclined

forceful

to

answer

contentions.

think
in

we

which

should
we

include

a

specifically

I think they are vulnerable.

brief

but

meet

his

5.

Would
answer,
the

it not be desirable,

in this sort of an

to focus primarily on this suit as an answer to

claim

that

it

is

not

an

action

against

the

state?

Perhaps first, we could use the language in the District
Court's 1978 opinion in which the officials were expressly
exonerated

not

only

of

personal misconduct or
the DC's opinion.

liability

but

even negligence.

indeed

of

any

See p.

1324 of

It also was noted by the DC that the

state had not provided adequate staffs, and - implicitly that adequate funding has not been provided. 2
No subsequent decision this long litigation has
suggested ultra vires.

At most the opinions can be read

as saying that the defendants did not discharge their duty
adequately under

Pennsylvania law.

This might reach the

level of negligence but hardly of acting beyond the scope
of their general authority.
constructing
working for

a

highway

might

A state officer in
fail

the City of Richmond)

(as

I

did

charge ~ o~

once

when

to give the contractor

accurate grades or make other mistakes in overseeing the

2 Joe, we checked the complaint, as I recall,
but do not remember whether it made any allegations of an
ultra vires character against the individual defendants •

6

work.

0

There might be negligence, but committed within the

full scope of authority.
There

are

other

answers

to

important, subject to Joe's views.

John

that

seem

John says little or

nothing about the fact that the principal defendants are
the

State Department of Welfare

itself.

and

Pennhurst Hospital

Were they also acting beyond the scope of their

authority?

They may not have done everything that they

reasonably could have done, or even have been guilty of
some negligence (though the District Court certainly found
none), but again this does not suggest acting beyond the
scope of authority.
The federal courts,

including the DC and CA3,

repeatedly refer to the "state" -

the state itself - as

having failed to provide what the Constitution requires.
I have not looked again at the "bottom line" order of
in

the

case

before

us.

My

recollection

is

that

CA~

'

it

adopted, by incorporation, about 90% of the DC's order of
1978

(p.

addressed

1326-28)

to

the

0

Some

provision

"Commonwealth

and

of

the

county

order

are

defendants".

These terms would include the department and the hospital.
Several paragraphs are directly only to the Commonwealth
defendants.

No

personal

relief,

as

distinguished

from

7.

ordering

action

in

official

capacities,

is

directed

against any one of the defendants individually.

This, it

seems to me, is an important point.
Finally,
injunctive
This,

as

relief
I

no one denies that the burden of the
falls

heavily

have understood,

upon

the

state

itself.

it has been the touchstone

that usually determines whether a suit - though nominally
against named defendants - in reality is against the state
itself.

Here,

ordered relief

it

is

not

easy

to

identify any of

the

that would not require state funding and

, action, indeed, by the same officials or their successors.
It ignores reality even to argue this suit is not against
the state.
In sum, I think we have the opportunity to make
a rather devastating reply to JPS along these lines.

Yet,

I restrain my enthusiasm until I hear your views.

* * *
Apart from an answer to JPS on his fundamental
position, possibly we are letting him off a bit too easily
on his claim of 29 cases being overruled.
some egregious examples.

You do identify

Perhaps we could characterize

generally as to his cases, recognizing that some of the
older

ones

support

specific

points

but

not

his

basic

8.

rationale.

Even

those

that

appear

to

lend

him

some

support cannot be reconciled with Larson, Treasure Salvors
and Edleman.

Maybe your draft notes are adequate in this

respect, but I'd like your views.

L.F.P., Jr.

ss
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PENN SALLY-POW
81-2101 Pennhurst

MEMO TO FILE:
Halderman v. Pennhurst, et al, 46 F. Supp. 1295
(1977),

is

the

litigation.
ultimate

first

Both

facts

federal

JPS

as

and

to

court

I

the

case

described
gross

District

Court,

though

this

long

summary

inadequacy

facilities and treatment at Pennhurst.
federal

in

in

of

the
the

The opinion of the

denouncing

unequivocally

these derelictions, gave not the slightest hint of ultra
vires

action.

The DC did

constitutional violations had been violated.

But,

find

that

-

in additional

to

the Pennsylvania statute also

though the suit was against the

Department of Public Welfare, the institution of Pennhurst
which was operated by the Department, and numerous state
and

county

officials

connected

with

these

i nst i tut ioAs:

the basic finding as to responsibility was placed on the
Commonwealth:
"On the basis of this record, we find that both
the Commonwealth and the counties have violated
their statutory obligations to provide minimally
adequate habilitation to the retarded residents
of Pennhurst.
In particular, the Commonwealth
has violated its statutory mandate to supervise
and control the program of minimally adequate
habilitation to these individuals."
Id., at
1323.
-

2.

At
that

the

the conclusion of

"Commonwealth

its opinion,

defendants

are

the DC held

hereby

enjoined"

from various conduct and to take additional conduct.

They

were described as a group including the institutions and
the individuals.

Id., at 1326-1329.

A second
"Liability
this

of

the

memorandum

discussion of

of

DC's

Individual

are

such

the

two

pages

opinion

is

Defendants".
that

devoted

to

Attached

to

include

liability, finding

the

entire

that none existed.

The pages are appended hereto.
Among the findings of the DC:
"The evidence shows that the defendants acted in
the utmost good faith and they did not know nor
reasonably should have known that the actions
which they took, or failed to take, within the
sphere of their official responsibilities were
in any way violative of the rights of the
retarded residents at Pennhurst".
Id., at 1324.
The
individuals
to

DC

noted

that

"for

the

most

part"

the

"were dedicated and sincere in their efforts

habilitate

the

retarded

They

apparently

took

every means available to them to reduce the incidence of
abuse

and

shortages".

injury,

but

were

Id., at 1324.

constantly

faced

with

staff

3

The
Pennhurst

DC also noted

was

saddled

with

that
an

the

0

"administration of

institution

which

by

its

very nature produced an atmosphere conducive to injury",
and the DC found that the "defendants •
to

the

good

officials".

faith

immunity

from

• are entitled

damages

afforded

such

Id., at 1324.

In addition, the DC found:
"That the individual defendants are dedicated
professionals in the field of retardation who
were given very little with which to accomplish
the habilitation of the retarded of Pennhurst."

The Court of Appeals largely affirmed the DC in
Halderman,
the

et al v.

outset

of

its

Pennhurst State Hospital, et al.

At

opinion,

as

CA3

described

the

case

follows:
"This is an appeal from an order granting class
action injunctive relief against the cent inued
maintenance
of
Pennhurst
State
School
and
Hospital.
• Pennhurst is operated under
the direction of the Pennsylvania Department of
Public Welfare •
"
The defendants were characterized, as in the DC,
as "Commonwealth defendants".
In holding
Act

of

1966)

that state law

supported

the

DC's

(primarily the MH/MR
judgment,

CA3

relied

,_

4.

primarily on §201 of the Act, that provides in pertinent
part:
"The Department shall have power, and its duty
shall be:
1.
To
assure
within
the
state
the
availability and equitable provision of adequate
mental health and mental retardation services
for all persons who need them."

It was further
state's

'duty'

adequate

mental health and mental retardation services •

• That

is

broad

assure

and

the

that "§201 refers to the
of

language

to

noted

availability

determined:

the

obligation

to

provide services to the mentally handicapped on the basis
of need."

Id., at 100.

At another point in its opinion, CA3 commented
generally

about

the

inadequacy

indeed

the

"horror", of
~ ·"

conditions in mental institutions:
"Over
the
past
few
years
the
horrifying
conditions which exist in most of the public
residential
institutions
for
the
mentally
retarded . • • provide shocking testimony to the
inhuman way we care for such persons.
The
conditions at Willowbrooke, at Partlow, Alabama,
and Rosewood
in Maryland,
and many other
institutions have shown beyond a shadow of a
doubt that the treatment of these individuals is
worse than all of us would like to admit".

.

5.

CA3

with

directing

the

admission

to

the

exception

closing

of

Pennhurst,

of

the

Pennhurst,
and

DC's

banning

providing

order
fut1,1re

alternative

employment for employees, CA3 concluded that "the judgment
of

the

Id.,

trial court will

at

judgment

116.
was

(It

will

expressed

"Commonwealth",

be

affirmed

be

noted

in

rather

terms

than

in all

above
of

that

being

against

respects".

any

the

DC's

against

the

individual.

Similarly, in the dissent of Judge Seitz, he repetitively
spoke of it being the "state's duty to provide appropriate
relief".

Id., at 116, et seq.

* * *
My

recollection is that one of

the subsequent

CA3 decisions accepted the DC's decision with respect to
the good faith and absence of liability of the individeai
defendants.

But

I

have

not made

a careful search

for

this.
I should look at the decision of CA3 from which
this appeal is taken.
above

views

state",
beyond

that

with
the

no

scope

the

I believe it will accord with the
suit

suggestion
of

their

essentially
that

the

general

is

against

individuals

authority".

"the
acted

I

have

6.

taken a look at Joe's memo of 9/29
seems

to

me

that

he

makes

a

(uncirculated), and it

stronger

showing

of

the

unsoundness of JPS's views than we have in the opinion or
even in Joe's preliminary drafts of responses.
On

thought

that

passes

through

my

mind

as

I

dictate this, is the possible effect of JPS's views on the
law of ultra vires with respect to corporations.
if

it

would

be

helpful

to

take

a

look

I wonder

at Fletcher

and

other authorities on corporate law?
Returning to the subject at hand, I have taken a
look at In re Schmidt and I don't think it helps or hurts
us.
of

It does not say the officers acted beyond the scope
their

refer

to

authority or
their

regulations.

duty

intimate
to

that.

implement

It
the

did,
state

however,
Act

and

But I do not perceive a breach of duty to be

" "
the equivalent of acting wholly beyond the scope of their

authority - that is, ultra vires.

J

lfp/ss 12/27/83
MEMORANDUM
TO:

Joe

DATE:

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

Dec. 27, 1983

Pennhurst
I spent most of the afternoon of the "day after
Christmas"
dissent.

reviewing
I

agree

your

enlarged

that you have

response

followed

to

the

the outline we

discussed, and done so extremely well.
At the outset,

I express admiration for the way

you have dealt with the cases relied upon by the dissent.
As I am not familiar with the great majority of them, and
will not have the opportunity to read them,

I rely on -

but am not surprised - by the way you analyzed them.
I

have dictated

three possible

riders,

and

am

open to discussion on all of them.
The only part of your draft that is not clear to
me are

the

three or

four

sentences

that

begin with

the

citation of Larson on page 5 and continue to the end of
that paragraph.

I really do not understand the relevance

to this case of the statement in Larson to the effect that
the

plaintiff

statement of

,,.

was
a

confusing

cause of

sovereign

act ion.

Is

immunity with
there

a problem

the
in

\

..

2.

this case of

stating a cause of action?

self evident may

at least to me -

be compared with

a

Also it is not

that a tort suit fairly

claim that

state officials have

failed to act in accordance with a statutory command.
would

think

that

these

few

sentences

could

I

be omitted,

though I am open to persuasion.
The next paragraph on page 6 would follow your
reasoning
fact

logically.

that

an

expressly

As you make clear

agent

may

delegated

act

improperly

authority

does

absolve the principal from liability.
Larson

states

still

troubled

as

much.

by

the

While
tort

emphasize that sovereign

I

law

as

against

I
the

recall,

had

acted

in

good

not

the

beyond

necessarily

Your quotation from

analogy

immunity is at

this,

unless

I

we

am

also

issue here to a

The plaintiffs in this

originally sought to recover dama<JeS

officials

ultimately awarded.

even

understand

far greater extent than in Larson.
case,

in note 21,

as

well

as

the

injunctive

relief

But the DC found that the officials
faith,

were

entitled

to

personal

immunity, and no question has remained in the case as to
relief

against

anyone

except

the

individuals

in

official capacity, i.e., against the state itself.

their

3.

One other point, Joe, that confuses me.

Larson

speaks of "stripping of the official" of his immunity (see
p.

5 of your draft).

Larson

was

personally
remain

a

tort

case)

liable,

with

But on the tort law analogy
the

officials

and

the

soverign

to

the

state.

respect

still

could

immunity
Here,

(and
be

question

there

is

no

question of stripping officials individually as they have
been exonerated of personal liability.
Perhaps I am missing something.

Of course, feel

free to enlighten me.
Bascially, I think your response to the dissent
is devastatingly strong.

* * *
I

suggest

you

that

give

priority to get it off of our desks.
in accord,

ask David

Pennhurst

continued

When you and I are

to take a critical look

prompt~Y'

Then get what in effect will be a Chambers draft for the
three of us to see in print.
I

know

that

you

have

an

important

antitrust

opinion to draft, and we have less than two weeks before
the January arguments.

The bench memos are

the

lowest

order of priority, though I would 1 ike to have prior to
Conference a summary - possibly as brief as two or three

4.

pages - of your recommendation with a bare outline of your
reasoning.

I will have read the briefs with some care.

L.F.P., Jr.
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CHAMI!IERS 01""

.JUSTICE

w... .J.

BRENNAN, .JR.

December 20, 1983

No. 81-2101
Pennhurst State School & Hospital
v. Halderman

Dear John,
Please join me in your dissent in
the above.
Sincerely,
1

·-

~

Justice Stevens
Copies to the Conference

.iu:prtuu <!}tturt ttf tlrt ~b .ihdts
'BasJri:ngton. ~. <!}. 2ll.;iJl.;l .
CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

December 20, 1983

Re:

No. 81-2101-Pennhurst v. Halderman

Dear John:
Please join me in your dissent.
Sincerely,

~·
T.M.

Justice Stevens
cc:

The Conference

I

<g01ttt of tfrt 1J:ltti.tt~ ;ita!ts
2M'tt.nlp.tt¢ott. ~. <g. 20~'!-~ '

;%iuprttru

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

22, 1983

Re: No. 81-2101 - Pennhurst State School and Hospital
v. Halderman
Dear John:
I now am the last vote out in this case. My tentative
vote was to affirm, and r ·· remain of that view.
I understand, however, that Lewis plans to respond to your writing.
Under the circumstances, I may withhold my final vote until
the writings are more complete.
Sincerely,

~
Justice Stevens
cc: The Conference

jen 12/23/83
MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL
From:
Re:

Joe
Response to dissent in Pennhurst

Here is a revised and expanded draft of our responses to the
dissent in Pennhurst v. Halderman.
the outline we discussed.

I have followed approximately

The argument I have suggested on the

ultra vires issue is essentially as follows:
(1) the dissent's theory ignores

reality; ~

( 2) the early cases the dis sent relies upon do not hold that a
mere allegation that a state officer has exceeded his authority
wrll suffice to override sovereign immunity--in fact, many suggest that an allegation that a state officer has erred in implementing a statute commanding a discretionary duty (like the one
here) is insufficient;
( 3) while the language of some of these cases does supper t the
dissent's broad theory (although, as indicated in (2), no case
has carried the theory as far as the dissent does) , even that
theory has been undermined by Larson and Edelman;
(4) as a result, the cases on which the dissent relies for this
language are moribund--they have not been cited relevantly since
Larson;
( 5) the reason is that this Court's cases have recognized that
following the dissent's theory would emasculate the Eleventh
Amendment, a result that repeatedly has been rejected.
I believe all of the above is fair, and on the whole treats the
cases far more honestly than does JPS.
We can expect a blistering response to the second paragraph
of footnote

22, in which we question the viability of the ultra

vires doctrine.

This point carries our theory further than the

Court ever has before.
tant

(1)

Nonetheless, I think the point is impor-

to emphasize that the ultra vires exception is narrow,

and (2) to allow the lower courts to begin to question the doctrine in light of the post-Larson evolution of Eleventh Amendment
law.

.J en

I ;1./27 /83

MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL
From:
Re:

Joe
Response to dissent in Pennhurst

This memorandum responds to your review of our proposed responses to the dissent in Pennhurst v. Halderman.
1.

I have been unclear in discussing--and thinking about--

Larson.

Partly in order to clarify my own thinking, and partly

to make you aware of the choices I have made, let me set forth at
some length my views of the significance of the Larson case.
Larson is important to us for
sons:

( 1)

~ rson

three somewhat distinct rea-

refused to read the Eleventh Amendment out of

the Constitution, which is the logical result of both JPS's and
the Larson plaintiff's arguments:

( 2) "in fact, the two arguments

are in practice identical because any given case under both JPS's

---

argument and the argument rejected in Larson will turn on whether
there was statutory authority for the official action complained

-

of: and

( 3)

the ~wo arguments are based to some extent on the : "

s ame
theory
of agency law.
...
__...,.

I think we should make at least the

first and third of these arguments.

I am inclined to think that

for tactical reasons it might be best to rest only lightly on the
second.
The first argument is the one that I failed to make clearly
in my earlier draft.
t i vely
Larson.

the

same

It is that JPS's argument would have effec-

result as

the argument made--and

rejected--in

The argument there was that an allegation that a state

official had committed a tort would serve to strip the official

page 2.

~ ~:;;;~

6--' /)"-·~

/

of his authority.
state

official

authority--which

JPS's argument is that an allegation that a

had

violated

any

statutory

limitation

on

his

includes all state laws--would serve to strip

the official of his authority.

The result in both cases is that .

all a plaintiff need allege to sue a state official is that his
legal

rights have

been

invaded.

Larson

rejected

this

result,

because it would give no content to sovereign immunity.

That is,

if a plaintiff stated a cause of action, that alone would be suf-

~'--------~-----~--------'---------------------~
ficient
to override sovereign immunity.

This is what I tried to

hint at in quoting the language in Larson that the plaintiff's
argument

"confuses the doctrine of severe ign immunity with the

requirement that a plaintiff state a cause of action."
is

essentially

Larson

recoiled

{ vires doctrine.

the

point made

in

footnote

from an expansive

22:

the

interpretation of

The point
Court

in

the ultra

I still think this is an important reason why

the case is significant, but I see now that I must make the point
more clearly.
The
first.

't"

second

reason

Larson

is

important

is

related

to

The plaintiff's argument in Larson not only would lead to

r

· the same result as JPS's argument here, but they are essentially
the same argument, an argument Larson explicitly rejected.

When

a plaintiff alleges a tortious injury against a state officer,
there

are

three possible defenses:

injured,

(1)

the plaintiff was not

(2) the defendant did not cause the injury, and (3) the
4<:. L_... W" / ~ ~ ~ 6( .,L..;..... a.~·
defendant wasA empowered ~o cause the 1njury. Of these, the third

u,

is essentially the sovereign immunity defense, what I called "the
defense on the law."

It seems to me that this defense is essen-

W.e.

~ ~ ~

a---~~!(_,~'-?~

~..,~

r;..

-

~

page 3.

~·~As ~

/U..61-

~~~~~-.h1-~

tially the same as will be interposed in an action in which the ~+

ha~

plaintiff argues under JPS's theory that the state official
acted in a way forbidden by statute.

The dissent appears to

~

rec- ~

ognize this when it says on p. 30:
"In the tort cases, if the plaintiff proves his case,
there is by definition no state-law defense to shield
the defendant. Similarly, when the state officer violates a state statute, the sovereign has by definition
erected no shield against liability."
(Emphasis in
original.)
Also, the reason many of JPS's cases are difficult to classify as
either tort or statutory cases is that the plaintiffs alleged a
tort,

but much of the discussion in the opinion is whether the

defendant had statutory authority to do what he did.

The point
"""=

is that an allegation that a state official has committed a tort
is generally the same as an allegation that a state official did
not have authority to do what he did or that he had a duty to do
[ somethin;

in a

~ t~in

way and did not do it.

Larson explicitly

rejected the argument that such an allegation would suffice to
override sovereign immunity.
The trouble is that in doing so, it rested on the ultra vires
doctrine:
"It is argued that an officer given the power to make
decisions is only given the power to make correct decisions.
If his decisions are not correct, then his action based on those decisions is beyond his authority
and not the action of the sovereign~ There is no warrant for such a contention in cases in which the decision made by the officer does not relate to the terms
of his statutory authority. Certainly the jurisdiction
of a court to decide a case does not disappear if its
decision on the merits is wrong.
And we have heretofore rejected the argument that official action is
invalid if based on an incorrect decision as to law or
fact, if the officer making the decision was empowered
to do so." 337 u.s., at 695 (emphasis added).
jk

~l.<.·

l

~~

J.t-..._c~~ A~~~~~

?~J-r;e...~

c:...-. ... c...;-v.-.

;244

Lv--~ ~-~

...

page 4.

Thus, if we were to show that Larson in fact addressed the argument advanced by the dissent we would have to rest on the fact
that the state officers had discretion
sions

in

running

basic

ultra

Pennhurst.

This

to make

implies

vi res doctrine propounded

incorrect deci-

that

we

accept

in Larson--i.e.,

the .

that an

action in the officer's official capacity that is beyond a specific statutory limitation can be the basis for suit.

The focus

of our disagreement with JPS then would be whether this complaint
alleged

a

violation

of

such

a

specific

statutory

limitation.

(Our argument on this question is strong, since it cannot be said
that

the MH/MR Act's command

care was a specific command.

that the state provide

"adequate"

The dissent has a better argument

with respect to the command of the 1970 Act that the population
of

Pennhurst

be

that argument.)

reduced

by 900 residents,

but

But in fact, partly because of Edelman, we find

even the limited ultra vires doctrine set forth
questionable.

it has not made

Therefore,

in

the

rewrite

of

in Larson to be

our

responses

set

forth below, I have relegated this second argument to a footnote. ~ '
The third reason Larson is important is that the plaintiff's
argument there was based on the same theory as JPS's argument is.
That theory is that a sovereign would not and could not authorize
a tort or a violation of law.

It is based on agency law, and is

plainly

I

ground

rejected
alone

appears.

by

because

Larson.
it

is

not

Larson considered only

could not authorize a tort.

am

reluctant

necessarily

as

to

rest

on

strong as

the argument that a

this
first

sovereign

The heart of JPS's argument is that

the sovereign not only would not or could not authorize a viola-

page 5.

tion of
has

in

its own statutory commands, but that the sovereign here
fact

prohibited

certain conduct--has given

that the agent shall not act in a certain way.

instructions

While it might be

possible to say, as Larson does, that a sovereign has envisioned
that an agent might act tortiously, it is more difficult to say
that a sovereign envisioned that an agent might act contrary to
the sovereign's express commands.
I

offer

below

a

redraft

of

along the lines set out above.
ments.

the

section

discussing

Larson

I mean to incorporate your com-

Your point about the term "stripping the official of the

sovereign's

immunity"

phrasing Larson.

is

well-taken;

I

was

too

loose

in para-

I do not quite understand your comment on the

bottom of p. 2 regarding the argument that sovereign immunity is
at issue here to a far greater extent than in Larson.

~e

~

the

that is true:
State's

I am not

in Larson, the plaintiff sought possession of

property;

here,

the plaintiff

sought

to

force

the

"""""
~
State to spend money and open new institutions.

REWRITTEN DISCUSSION OF LARSON (p. 5 of prior rider)

Thus,
vances

while

there

is

language

the authority-stripping

in

the early cases that ad-

theory advocated by the dissent,

this theory has never been pressed as far as the dissent would do
in this case.

Rather, when the expansive approach of the dissent

has been advanced, this Court plainly and explicitly has rejected
it.

In Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337

u.s.

682

(1949), the Court was faced with the argument that an allegation

page 6.

that a government official committed a tort sufficed to distinguish the official from the severe ign. Therefore, the argument
went, a suit for an injunction to remedy the injury would not be
against the sovereign.

The Court rejected the argument, noting

that it would make the doctrine of sovereign immunity superfluous.

A plaintiff would need only to "claim an invasion of his

legal rights" in order to override sovereign immunity.
693.

Id. , at

In the Court's view, the argument "confuse[d] the doctrine

of sovereign immunity with the requirement that a plaintiff state
a cause of action."

Id., at 692-693.

have the same ef feet. 20

The dissent's theory would

Under the dissent's view, a plaintiff

nraR
~
wou ld nee d on 1 y to c 1 a1· ~
crrtteeEI by statute in order

1
~o f r1g
· h ts protect ~
d or ~~-vr~ ~
.
1~
to override sovereign immunity. 1\ I--t-

r ~ as1o~

would make the constitutional doctrine of severe ign immunity a
nullity.

"/A 1 I- .

-~-"fA;·-£+ ~ ~ ~~
-

.

;I

).na.......-t-t-rv·~..,; ... ~ 1.
·~

~

tt:.P··?·?"/!~d -

/ ,:~./.

L

20 In fact,

as the dissent rec gnizes, the argument in Larson
that an allegation of tortious ac ivity overrides sovereign immuni ty is essentially the same as the dissent's argument that an : ·"
allegation of conduct contrary
o statute overrides sovereign
immunity. See post, at 30. The ~fense in both cases generally
will be that the defendant state official was empowered to do
what he did;J See also Land v. Dollar, 330 u.s. 731, 738 (1947)
(" [P] ubl ic officials may become tor t-feasors by exceeding the
limits of their authority."); Larson, 337 u.s., at 685 (controversy on merits concerned whether officer had interpreted government contract correctly); id., at 716-717, 721-722 (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting) (in cases alleging a tort, the "official seeks to
screen himself behind the sovereign"). What the dissent fails to
note is that the Court in Larson rejected the view "that an officer given the power to make decisions is only given the power to
make correct decisions."
Id., at 695. That is essentially the
argument of the dissent in this case. Yet, there can be no question that the defendants here were "given the power to make decisions" about the operation of Pennhurst. See n. 11, sup_ra

,.,.

,,

page 7 •

.. ~ · ~~l~f ~

/

Larson

~~~~e:)'......;~~~~~-nd £~~

the dissent's argument is based.
e ign,

1 ike

the

the<i.~*

on which

The theory is that "fa) sover-

any other principal, cannot authorize its agent to

violate the law," so that when the agent does so he cannot be .

J."!> t-

II.. t. ,

,

acting~ eGnsist~n~l¥

I

,

with his instructions.

Post, at 25-26; see

also post, at 15, 21, 30; cf. Larson, supra, at 693-694 ("It is
argued •.• that the commission of a tort cannot be authorized by
the sovereign •••. It is on this contention that the respondent's
position fundamentally rests •••• ").

It is a view of agency law

that the Court in Larson explicitly rejected:
"It has been said, in a very special sense, that, as a
matter of agency law, a principal may never lawfully
authorize the commission of a tort by his agent. But
that statement, in its usual context, is only a way of
saying that an agent's liability for torts committed by
him cannot be avoided by pleading the direction or authorization of his principal.
The agent is himself
liable whether or not he has been authorized or even
directed to commit the tort. This, of course, does not
mean that the principal is not liable nor that the tortious action may not be regarded as the action of the
principal." Id., at 694 (footnote omitted).
Larson thus made clear that, at least insofar as injunctive re- ~ '
lief is sought, an error of law by state officers acting in their
official capacities will not suffice to override the sovereign
immunity of the State where the relief
690,

695. 21

"outweigh fed]

Any

resulting

I.A./

~~ against

disadvantage

to

the

it.

Id., at

plaintiff

was

by "the necessity of permitting the Government to

carry out its functions unhampered by direct judicial intervention."

Id. ,

at

7 0 4.

If

anything,

this

public

greater when questions of federalism are involved.

need

is

even

See supra, at

8-9.22

[FOOTNOTES 21 & 22 ARE AS IN ORIGINAL DRAFT.]

page 8.

2.

I am not opposed to a footnote along the 1 ines of your

rider A, p. 1, although I am a 1 i ttle concerned that it essentially
would

repeats
offer

what

the

is

already

following

~aid

rewrit~ ,

substantive suggestions:

in text.

incorporating

~.,rl

\

-

In any case,

~

I

stylistic and
/ ' ,,...

&11 . . .~

f'

13we are prompted to respopd at s~e length to Justice Stevens' 38-page dissen~ by its ,.J b~a-€1 -mi-&et;a
'"'-*-m'f!>1'1'~ of this Court's cases_,,.J Examination of the old
decisions the dissent cites simply does not support its
statement that "the Court today blithely overrules at
least 29 cases," post, at 1.
The dissent moreover
fails adequately to explain this Court's recent cases.
While we do not claim that all the old decisions are
harmonious with our approach today, it is plain that
the dis sent's theory, advocated here to its extreme
limits for the first time, would come close to reading
e Eleventh Amendment out of the Constitution.
3.

I

f?-1,~

l

-7

Here is a suggested clarification of the beginning of the

paragraph on page 10:
The
the
have

reason

ultra

vi res

force

only

is obvious.
doctrine,
in

the

Under
the

rare

the dissent's view of

Eleventh

case

in

Amendment

which

a

would

plaintiff

foolishly attempts to sue the State in its own name, or -: "
where he cannot produce some state statute that has been
violated

to his asserted

injury.

Thus ,

the u 1 t r a vi res

doctrine, a narrow and questionable exception, would swallow the general rule that a suit is against the State if
the relief will run against it.
4.

The changes in green are relatively minor stylistic sug-

gestions.
draft.

It may be easier for you to review them in chambers

.
•

II

'•

~~:
/
II

.

. ~~-~.., ~ ~

''

~~~~a-4c4f~?
..;!._;;~Lis'~'-"--~

~

c!!-~ / d.t...d. ~ ~

~~~:
II

z..k.~~~~.J.;~
:• H..-c- ~ ~ ~ <¥- tl $
?nz: ~
I

!•

~f-V'S.

~~s,

~~ ~
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MEMO TO FILE: (
In

~~ ~)

rereading

the

DC's

opinion

(446

F.Supp.

1298), the following points are of some interest - though

perhaps not enough to include in our opinion:
1.

jury over

a

The case was tried by the court without a
period of

32 days.

Testimony was

solely to the issue of liability".
2.

"limited

p. 1298.

Among the court's "findings of fact" are the

following:
(a)
retarded,

"Pennhurst,

as

was on trial.

assault upon such

institution

for

the

Recent years have witnessed an

institutions.

review article cited

an

therein.)

(See,
At

n.

6 and

the law

issue is whether the

residents at Pennhurst have been the victims of violati~ns
of

their

statutory

or

constitutional

rights

in

failing to provide them with minimally adequate education,
training and care".
(b)
and

"History

mistreatment

from a book.

of

the

p. 1299.

is

replete with misunderstanding

retarded"

-

citing

and

quoting

We should cite these pages of the

2.

DC' s

opinion

to

the

language

I

suggest

adding

on

the

hsitory of mental institutions.
(c)
The

era

"Pennhurst was the product of this era".

being one

community

in which

(in which)

"asylums

viewed

as

a

permanent

deviant.

from the

instead of providing the individual

with education and training •
be

isolated

• the asylum grew to

residential

facility

for

the

(with a distinction being made between

"retarded"

and

groups)

"deviant"

"came

increased

insolation and increased size permitting little time for
habilitation.

See generally Wolfensberger.

Pennhurst was

the product of this era."
(d)

Since its founding in 1908, the institution

(Pennhurst) has been overcrowded and understaffed • • • .
• All parties concede that the institution has undergone
tremendous

improvement since the 1950s

even

these

with

improvements

it

was

(but)
admitted

by

the

defendants that Pennhurst does not presently meet minimum
standards

for

the

habilitation

(e)

"At

best,

of

its

residents".

p.

1302.
Pennhur st

is

typical of

large

residential state institutions for the retarded
"many

\

.. , . :

of

the

problems

at

Pennhurst

result

from

3.

overcrowding and understaffing".
19

professionals

replaced".

have

left

"In the last two years

the

staff

without

being

p. 1303.
(f)

agreement

"All

that

parties

in

Pennhurst

inappropriate and

this

as
It

inadequate.

litigation

an

are

institution

in
is

is also admitted that

the inadequacies in programing at Pennhurst are directly
attributable to staff shortages".
3.

The

DC

did,

p. 1304.

however,

make

a

series

of

findings of failures at Pennhurst to do what should have
been

done,

retarded
rights.

had

and

the

been

court's

denied

conclusion

was

that

constitutional

and

statutory

And the DC's injunctive order is directed to the

Commonwealth
capacities.

and

county

defendants

in

their

No individual judgment was rendered.

L.F.P., Jr.
ss

the

official

'•

jen 01/12/84
MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL
From:
Re:

Joe
Justice Stevens' latest changes to his dissent in Pennhurst

I think that your opinion requires very little modification
in the light of the third draft of the dissent.

The opinion al-

ready contains answers to much that the dissent now says.
follows

What

is a brief explanation of the suggested changes I have

made in the attached copy of the opinion, followed by an explanation of why in my view other changes in the dissent do not need
responses.
LFP OPINION:
There are purely technical changes on ~ 15, 16, 18-24, and
27. As to the change on page 15, note tha~PS no longer claims
the Court "overrules" 28 cases.
(This change was one of the unmarked ones.)
Later, however, he has left in language that some
cases are "overruled." See p. 41, n. ~ may be an oversight.
(..5 rk(.J.,·rs'_:])
page 11 fn--I think "which" is correct here.
17 fn--I found some additional governmental sources.
18 fn--JPS' s discussion of South Carolina v. Wesley on p.
25, n. 33 of his dissent is an erroneous, but not utterly impossible, reading of the case.
This is to clarify our view of the
case.
~,

19 n. 19-~JPS no longer mentions Noble v. Union River Logso this cite must be moved.
19 n. 20--The parenthetical to Larson needed strengthening.

-----

21 fn--The new sentence is to respond to one new place where
JPS goes too far.
~
25--In the footnote on page 21 of the dissent (which begins
on p. 20), JPS now explicitly rejects the federalism basis of the
Eleventh Amendment.
Thus, I have added this cite. My only concern is that the cite may actually weaken the foregoing statement
by-rmplying that JPS only rejects federalism in one small place.
Actually, his entire approach does so.

page 2.

27 fn--One of JPS's unmarked changes deleted his assertion
that the briefs discussed the Eleventh Amendment in connection
with the state-law claims. Compare p. 12, n.l4 in the 1st and 3d
drafts of the dissent. I have rewritten and condensed this footnote to take account of this change.
JPS DISSENT-j page 5 n. 4--This is mere rhetoric and adds nothing new.
Our
~ affirmative support is Larson and Edelman, which are already discussed in your opinion.

~

7 n. ?--Answered on p. 21 of your opinion.

8 fn--The language of Clemson may "deal with" more than unconstitutional conduct, but the holding does not. We l)a~
e already said this on p. 20 of your opinion. ~- tt)t2_~ •t
.
.
1

.

c::1~4)A...
-

II z. o

,_

11

'~ ~· +-U'

/Ca~ I t'"'
10 fn--As to Martin, once again the language supports JPS;m, c.
q
' g:1
1
the holding does not. "M<
'T"oott-utt :.:...1.w .
JPS makes a v~r:t_ ~og_p~i!lt about the cases seeking damages
rJ
against the indiV17fiiat- -of:f1cer.
He says an award of damages
'Q... ,
against state officials has the same coercive effect as injunc~ .
tive relief against them. We claim that individual damage ac~
·
tions are not touched by our holding. See LFP op. at 19, n. 20.
~
I think the only answer is that injunctive relief interferes to a
'
greater extent with state sovereignty because it commands affirm"
ative official action--i.e., the relief is more clearly against
~
the State. This answer-rs-already hinted at in note 20 of your
~
op1n1on in discussing Belknap (injunctive relief "run[s) more
\\"'
directly against the State"} • It is not a terribly strong an~
swer, so I think we should not make it any more explicit.
As for JPS's discussion of O'Connor, I do not understand what
he is getting at, and I presume no one else will either.

'i

13--This simply summarizes JPS's view of the cases; our answer is on pp. 20 et seq.
~.A<..~~ ._&Mo.~
13-14--This paragraph is based on a mischaracter ization of
our discussion of the DC's good faith findings. We use them not
~
for their technical, legal content, but simply to illustrate how
far JPS's view has strayed from reality. A footnote to this ef~~
feet might be added to page 16 or 17 of your opinion, but I am
r.~
inclined to think it's not worth it. The point of the discussion
'.~ is clear enough as it is, and a footnote would only emphasize
~~ JPS's rather collateral point.

I

~

u-.

~D

21 fn--This
thesis.
~.,.
.
22 f n-- Th 1s

~~

addition broadly attacks the m~jori~~ :s _ge ~e; ~l~'- --~
~ -x. z 1
.e.a.-bt- ~ ~~. a f a1r,
.
b u t t r1v1a
. . 1 , cr1't'1c1sm.
.
~
J/~d~. ct1s
~:;:;]._

a ...

24 fn--Discussed re p. 10 above.

/J-1A.

~~
lA..C.. ~~cJ

~

' p ~ d-L~ :.j.._
/)U.#fl. ~~

:J.(..

4-z...~

~~

Z.)

· ~~~

25 fn--I think

thi~~lain

misreading of

page 3.

~-

~opinion,cut the point is not..\"orth arguing over.

z

V\'\€.'-"' ~ .2.Sj "'' rJS.J

-

Wes--

33 fn-- e answer to JPS' s point that Larson cited these
cases with approval and only overruled Goltra, is that the Court
in Malone v. Bowdoin said that these other cases were also rejected. This answer is already in your opinion in two places, p.
20, n. 20, and p. 23, n. 25.

Having read through nearly all of JPS's dissent again, I am
It is now forty-one pages long!
'·

\

'

' RIDER p. 27, n. 27--

The case was argued in the same way.

The Eleventh Amendment

argument in the briefs is confined to the federal constitutional
claims.

See, e.g., Brief for Louisville & N. R. Co., Louisville

& N. R. Co. v. Greene 15-38 (jurisdiction over federal claims);

id., at 38-39 (pendent jurisdiction over state claims).

Indeed,

the State's brief somewhat curiously closes with a concession
that the federal courts had jurisdiction.

Brief for State Board

and Officers, Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Greene 139; see Reply
Brief,

Louisvill~

concession).

l

& N. R. Co. v. Greene 2 (pointing out

Thus, while the State's position on the Court's

jurisdiction over the federal claims is somewhat unclear, the
State never argued that there might not be jurisdiction over the
local-law claims if the Court found jurisdiction over the federal
questions in the case.

' RIDER p. 19, n. 20--

N t1--t "'d
0

i

i"

0

vr

0

f i "'i""'

tll u c..-£,, e J

t-Lt .c c..e. ~.,

ASimilarly, the Court in Larson specifically distinguished between
cases seeking money damages against the individual officer in
tort, and those seeking injunctive relief against the officer in
his official capacity.

It held that the latter sought relief

against the sovereign, while the former might not.

337

u.s.,

at

687-688, and nn. 7, 8. [:Thus, the dissent's view that damages
against the individual officer and injunctive relief run equally
against the State, post, at 10, n. 10, reaches a question that we
need not and do not

decide~

' RIDER p. 17, new footnote (to be numbered 17)--

The dissent appears to be confused about our argument here.
See~,

at 13-14.

It is of course true, as the dissent says,

that the finding below that petitioners acted in good faith and
therefore were immune from damages does not affect whether an
injunction might be issued against them by a court possessed of
jurisdiction.

The point is that the courts below did not have

jurisdiction because the relief ordered so plainly ran against
the State.

No one questions that the petitioners in operating

Pennhurst were acting in their official capacity.

Nor can it be

questioned that the judgments under review commanded action that
could be taken by petitioners only in their official capacity-and, of course, only if the State provided the necessary funding.
It is evident that the dissent would vest in federal courts
authority, acting solely under state law, to ignore the
sovereignty of the States that the Eleventh Amendment was adopted
to protect.

Article III confers no jurisdiction on this Court to
A~IL"'c.t. -e..ll\t-

strip an explicit(Articlj of the Constitution of its substantive
meaning.
Contrary to the dissent's view, see post, at 21, n. 27, an
injunction based on federal law stands on very different footing,
particularly in light of the Civil War Amendments.

As we have

explained, in such cases this Court is vested with the
constitutional duty to vindicate "the supreme authority of the
United States," Young, 209

u.s.,

at 160.

There is no

corresponding mandate to enforce state law.

?

lfp/ss 01/13/84
MEMORANDUM
DATE:

TO:

Joe

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

Jan. 13, 1984

Pennhurst
The changes you suggest in our opinion, in response to the third draft of JPS's dissent, look fine to me.
I have made a couple of minor language changes.
The textual additions made by JPS on p. 13-14, as
you suggest, merits some response.

He states that we "con-

fuse two distinct concepts", and that "good faith immunity
from damages liability is irrelevant to the availability of
injunctive relief".

(p. 14)

opinion, that "confuses •

.

It is the dissent, not our

. distinct

concepts".

I suppose it is true that whether the officials
acted in "good faith" is immaterial, so long as they acted
within the scope of their authority.

They most certainly

did in this case, as there is no charge that they acted in
individual capacities.

They were operating, as we have

said, a major state institution even if operating it badly
for the reasons we stated.

And the injunctive relief at

issue is not against the individuals: it is against the
state itself.

Relief - whether damages or injunctive -

against the individuals would accomplish nothing.

Thus, in

the end, JPS's additional language on p. 12-13 makes sense
only in the absence of the Eleventh Amendment.

As we have

said, JPS would read the Eleventh Amendment out of the Con-

2.

stitution whenever it could be argued - with or without reason - that state officials had failed to do their duty correctly in the performance of their official responsibilities.
Although we have said all of this, I do think it
would be well to reply specifically to the new language on
p. 13-14 in a footnote.

Perhaps the note could say that

this argument by the dissent emphasizes its basic - though
often unarticulated - theme that the Eleventh Amendment already is moribund and we should give it the coup-de-grace.
We could conclude by emphasizing that nothing in Article III
confers on us authority to strip an explicit Article of the
Constitution of its substantive meaning.

Indeed, our sworn

duty is to "obey and sustain the Constitution of the United
States".

(Joe, I don't think this is precisely the oath but

I have it).

As you suggest, note 27 (p. 20-21) does attack our ; ,
general thesis, and on its face it is at least a strong debating point.
it.

Also, some of JPS's cases probably support

Yet, the only way that Young itself can be reconciled
,s

4L

,

with the Eleventh Amendment only because a state cannot authorize its officers to violate the "supreme authority of
the United States".

It may be true that the impact of a

Young injunction for the violation of the federal Constitution can be as severe on the state as that of an injunction
based on a violation of state law, but Article III confers

3.

jurisdiction on federal courts to enforce federal law.
There is no corresponding authority to enforce state law in
the face of the Eleventh Amendment.

This is a jurisdiction-

al case.

John relies a good deal on English law.

I have

not paid a great deal of attention to this as I think it
basically irrelevant.

I do note his point - see n. 21, for

example - that English law permitted suits against the
King's officers because the King himself was immune.

We

agree that if state officials commit torts, for example,
they may be sued pesonally.

we have said this somewhere.

At 11:00 p.m. in the evening (with interruptions from the
Chief and others about the Hutchins capital case) , I have
not checked to see what we did say about personal suits.
I do not understand your reference to footnote 24
that is a "string cite" of 19th Century cases.

* * *
Although this memo is longer than it would be if I
were not a bit tired, I am not suggesting substantial additions.

It does seem to me that we do have a couple of op-

portunities to make rather telling answers to arguments that
have a good deal of superficial merit.

L.F.P., Jr.
ss

..

jen 01/13/84
MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL
From:

Joe

Re:

2d draft of our response to JPS's 3d draft in Pennhurst
( o. il« clul)

With regard to your memorandum of January
1.

1~:

I have added a single footnote on page 17 of your opinion

that is meant to respond both to the textual addition on pp. 1314 of the dissent and to the additions to JPS's note 27
21).

With respect to the answer to pp. 13-14,

(pp. 20-

I am not sure I

have fully understood what you were getting at in your comments.
See what you think.

Also,

I have purposefully avoided the word

"moribund" since we use it again on page 23.

Finally, from what

I can tell, the oath that you took in taking this job is codified
at 28

u.s.c.

tution.
With

§453.

I have quoted its only mention of the Consti-

Is there another oath that I did not find?
regard

to

the

answer

to

note

27,

I

have

tracked your language with one important exception.

essentially
I am reluc-

tant to speak of the precise mechanics of how it is that a Young
injunction does not violate the Eleventh Amendment.

As you say,

Young was justified on the theory that a State cannot authorize
its

officers

States."

to

violate

the

"supreme

authority

of

the

United

But we have taken great pains to show that this theory-

-that if a State cannot (or did not) authorize something then the
individual officer is acting on his own and is not protected by
the

State's

immunity--is

no

longer

called the theory a "fiction."
ing

whether

sovereign

immunity

viable.

In

fact

we

have

The only real question in decidapplies

is

whether

the

relief

page 2.

sought runs against the State.

Young

is an except ion to that

general rule, based on the Civil War Amendments and overriding
necessity.

Therefore,

I

have

not

mentioned

the

authority-

stripping theory of Young.
2.

As you say, we have not foreclosed suits (for money dam-

ages)

against state officials who commit torts.

opinion (p. 19)

Note 20 of our

reserves the question of whether such suits are

barred by sovereign immunity.

Whether such suits will be permit-

ted after Pennhurst will depend on whether the relief is deemed
to run against the State.

JPS argues that damages against the

individual officer have the same effect on the State as an injunction against that officer· (notes 10

&

32)

~

In fact, this may

be so, but it is a question your opinion can leave for another
day.

Note 20 does so.

I have added a rider to make note 20 more

explicit, and to take the opportunity to rebut one of JPS's new
arguments.
3.

On page 13 of

the dissent,

you asked whether CA3 had

held, as JPS says, that petitioners had "no discretion whatsoever
to disregard their duties."

I take JPS' s comment as merely a

rhetorical way of saying that CA3 found petitioners not to have
complied with their state-law duties under In re Schmidt.

I can-

not think of any snappy reply.
4.

I have rewritten the last sentence of the rider on page

27 of your opinion to make it clearer (I hope).

V

'd1e . "Cb;l.ef' J usti oe
' · Justice White
,-·:sti ee Marshal l
.· .J.3tioe Blackmun
~t-ioe Powell
"•.ls·t 1ce Rehnqui st
'.st1oe Stevens

'1 '0 :

PENNHURST STATE SCHOOL & HOSPITAL v. HALDERMANc1stiee O' Connor
Fr::u.n : Jus t ice ·Brennan

No. 81-2101

Circulated,~

JIAIN

Reo1rou1a.ted:: _ _ _ _ _ _~ ,,

JUSTICE BRENNAN, dissenting.

I fully agree with JUSTICE STEVENS' dissent.

Nevertheless,

I write separately to explain that in view of my continued belief
that the Eleventh Amendment "bars federal court suits against
States only by citizens of other States," Yeomans v. Kentucky,
423 U.S. 983,984 (1975)

(BRENNAN, J., dissenting), I would hold

that petitioners are not entitled to invoke the protections of
that Amendment in this federal court suit by citizens of
Pennsylvania.

See Employees v. Missouri Public Health & Welfare

Dept. , 411 U.S. 279, 298

( 1973)

(BRENNAN, J. , dissenting) •

In my

view, Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890), upon which the Court
today relies, ante, at 7, recognized that the Eleventh Amendment,
by its terms, erects a limited constitutional barrier prohibiting
suits against States by citizens of another State1 the decision,
however, "accords to nonconsenting States only a
nonconstitutional immunity from suit by its own citizens."
Employees v. Missouri Public Health & Welfare Dept., supra, at
313

(BRENNAN, J., dissenting)

3 1984

(emphasis added).

To the extent

that such nonconstitutional sovereign immunity may apply to
petitioners, I agree with JUSTICE STEVENS that since petitioners'
conduct was prohibited by state
immunity do not extend to them.

l~w,

the protections of sovereign

To: The Chief Justice
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
t.J.astlce Powell
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor
From:

Justice Brennan

Circulated:

I

J!GjPI

I

· 1ate d: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Recrrcu

?;-v.hJ
1st DRAFT
;\

SUPREME COURT OF mE UNITED STATES
No. 81-2101

PENNHURST STATE SCHOOL AND HOSPITAL, ET AL.,
PETITIONERS v. TERRI LEE HALDERMAN ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
[January-, 1984]

JUSTICE BRENNAN, dissenting.
I fully agree with JUSTICE STEVENS' dissent. Nevertheless, I write separately to explain that in view of my continued belief that the Eleventh Amendment "bars federal court
suits against States only by citizens of other States," Yeomans v. Kentucky, 423 U. S. 983, 984 (1975) (BRENNAN, J.,
dissenting), I would hold that petitioners are not entitled to
invoke the protections of that Amendment in this federal
court suit by citizens of Pennsylvania. See Employees v.
Missouri Public Health & Welfare Dept., 411 U. S. 279, 298
(1973) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting). In my view, Hans v.
Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1 (1890), upon which the Court today
relies, ante, at 7, recognized that the Eleventh Amendment,
by its terms, erects a limited constitutional barrier prohibiting suits against States by citizens of another State; the decision, however, "accords to nonconsenting States only a nonconstitutional immunity from suit by its own citizens."
Employees v. Missouri Public Health & Welfare Dept.,
supra, at 313 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
To the extent that such nonconstitutional sovereign immunity may apply to petitioners, I agree with JUSTICE STEVENS
that since petitioners' conduct was prohibited by state law,
the protections of sovereign immunity do not extend to them.
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JUSTICE BRENNAN, dissenting.
I fully agree with JUSTICE STEVENS' dissent. N evertheless, I write separately to explain that in view of my continued belief that the Eleventh Amendment "bars federal court
suits against States only by citizens of other States," Yeomans v. Kentucky, 423 U. S. 983, 984 (1975) (BRENNAN, J.,
dissenting), I would hold that petitioners are not entitled to
invoke the protections of that Amendment in this federal
court suit by citizens of Pennsylvania. See Employees v.
Missouri Public Health & Welfare Dept., 411 U. S. 279, 298
(1973) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting); Edelman v. Jordan, 415
U. S. 651, 697 (1974) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting). In my
view, Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1 (1890), upon which the
Court today relies, ante, at 7, recognized that the Eleventh
Amendment, by its terms, erects a limited constitutional barrier prohibiting suits against States by citizens of another
State; the decision, however, "accords to nonconsenting
States only a nonconstitutional immunity from suit by its
own citizens." Employees v. Missouri Public Health & Welfare Dept., supra, at 313 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting) (emphasis
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U. S. 651, 697 (1974) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting). In my
view, Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1 (1890), upon which the
Court today relies, ante, at 7, recognized that the Eleventh
Amendment, by its terms, erects a limited constitutional barrier prohibiting suits against States by citizens of another
State; the decision, however, "accords to nonconsenting
States only a nonconstitutional immunity from suit by its
own citizens." Employees v. Missouri Public Health & Welfare Dept., supra, at 313 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting) (emphasis
e .
r scholarly discussions supporting this view,
s e Gibbons, T e Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign
munit ·
Reinterpretation, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1889,
18
94 (1983); Field, The Eleventh Amendment and
Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: Part One, 126 U. Pa.
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L. Rev. 515, 538-540 and n. 88 (1978). To the extent that
such nonconstitutional sovereign immunity may apply to petitioners, I agree with JUSTICE STEVENS that since petitioners' conduct was prohibited by state law, the protections of
sovereign immunity do not extend to them.
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PENNHURST STATE SCHOOL AND HOSPITAL ET AL.
v. HALDERMAN ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 81-2101.

Argued February 22, 1983-Reargued October 3, 1983Decided January - - , 1984

Respondent Halderman, a resident of petitioner Pennhurst State School
and Hospital, a Pennsylvania institution for the care of the mentally retarded, brought a class action in Federal District Court against
Pennhurst and various state and county officials (also petitioners). It
was alleged that conditions at Pennhurst violated various federal constitutional and statutory rights of the class members as well as their
rights under the Pennsylvania Mental Health and Mental Retardation
Act of 1966 (MH/MR Act). Ultimately, the District Court awarded injunctive relief based in part on the MH/MR Act, which was held to provide a right to adequate habilitation. The Court of Appeals affirmed,
holding that the MH/MR Act required the State to adopt the "least restrictive environment" approach for the care of the mentally retarded,
and rejecting petitioners' argument that the Eleventh Amendment
barred a federal court from considering this pendent state-law claim.
The court reasoned that since that Amendment did not bar a federal
court from granting prospective injunctive relief against state officials on
the basis of federal claims, citing Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123, the
same result obtained with respect to a pendent state-law claim.
H eld: The Eleventh Amendment prohibited the District Court from ordering state officials to conform their conduct to state law. Pp. 6-33.
(a) The principle of sovereign immunity is a constitutional limitation
on the federal judicial power established in Art. III of the Constitution.
The Eleventh Amendment bars a suit against state officials when the
State is the real, substantial party in interest, regardless of whether the
suit seeks damages or injunctive relief. The Court in E x parte Young,
supra, recognized an important exception to this general rule: a suit
I

II
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challenging the federal constitutionality of a state official's action is not
one against the State. Pp. 6-12.
(b) In Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, this Court recognized that
the need to promote the supremacy of federal law that is the basis of
Young must be accommodated to the constitutional immunity of the
States. Thus, the Court declined to extend the Young doctrine to encompass retroactive relief, for to do so would effectively eliminate the
States' constitutional immunity. Edelman's distinction between prospective and retroactive relief fulfilled Young's underlying purpose of
vindicating the supreme authority of federal law while at the same time
preserving to an important degree the States' constitutional immunity.
But this need to reconcile competing interests is wholly absent when a
plaintiff alleges that a state offical has violated state law. In such a case
the entire basis for the doctrine of Young and Edelman disappears. A
federal court's grant of relief against state officials on the basis of state
law, whether prospective or retroactive, does not vindicate the supreme
authority of federal law. When a federal court instructs state officials
on how to conform their conduct to state law, this conflicts directly with
the principles of federalism that underlie the Eleventh Amendment.
Pp. 12-15. J I
vs'
.
(c) The.Ms~ view is that an allegation that official conduct is contrary to a state st~lute would suffice to override the State's protection
from injunctive relief under the Eleventh Amendment because such conduct is ultra vires the official's authority. This view rests on fiction, is
wrong on the law, and would emasculate the Eleventh Amendment. At
least insofar as injunctive relief is sought, an error of law by state officers acting in their official capacity will not suffice to override the sovereign immunity of the State where the relief effectively is against it.
Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U. S. 682. Under
the-dissent's view, the ultra vires doctrine, a narrow and questionable
exception, would swallow the general rule that a suit is against the State
if the relief will run against it. Pp. 1~2A.
(d) The principle that a claim that state officials violated state law in
carrying out their official responsibilities is a claim against the State that
is protected by the Eleventh Amendment applies as well to state-law
claims brought into federal court under pendent jurisdiction. Pp. 2fi-30.
(e) While it may be that applying the Eleventh Amendment to pendent state-law claims results in federal claims being brought in state
court or in bifurcation of claims, such considerations of policy cannot
override the constitutional limitation on the authority of the federal judiciary to adjudicate suits against a State. Pp. 30..:.3!.
(f) The judgment below cannot be sustained on tfie basis of the statelaw obligation of petitioner county officials, since any relief granted
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against these officials on the basis of the MH/MR Act would be partial
and incomplete at best. Such an ineffective enforcement of state law
would not appear to serve the purposes of efficiency, convenience, and
fairness that must inform the exercise of pendent jurisdiction. Pp.

3j-33.
673' F. 2d 647, reversed and remanded.
POWELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J.,
and WHITE, REHNQUIST, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed
a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN, MARSHALL, ana BLACKMUN, JJ.,
joined.
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HALDERMAN v. PENNHURST STATE SCHOOL & HOSPITAL
Cite as 446 F.Supp. 1295 (1977)_
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On Injunctive Relief March 17, 1978.
Class action was brought on behalf of
former and present retarded residents at
large institution operated by CommonThe District
wealth of Pennsylvania.
Court, Raymond J. Broderick, J., held that:
(1) retarded residents had constitutional
right to minimally adequate habilitation, to
be free from harm, and to nondiscriminatory habilitation; (2) constitutional rights of
retarded residents had been violated because of the inadequate rehabilitation afforded by large, isolated institution; (3)
retarded residents had statutory rights both
under federal and Pennsylvania statutes to
minimally adequate and nondiscriminatory
habilitation, and (4) while named plaintiffs
had shown that they had suffered serious
InJUnes, defendant administrators had
borne burden of showing that they were
entitled to good-faith immunity from damage claims.
Order entered for defendants and a
hearing scheduled for purpose of determining appropriate relief.
L Constitutional Law <~~=255(5)
Where it is claimed that the constitutional rights of retarded at institution have

Since only justifiable purpose for commitment of the retarded is habilitation, if
habilitation is not provided the nature of
commitment bears no reasonable relation to
its purpose and individual's due process
rights have been violated. U.S.C.A.Const.
Amends. 8, 14.
4. Mental Health <~~=51
Commitment of retarded can withstand
constitutional scrutiny only when it is coupled with minimally adequate habilitation.
U.S.C.A.Const. Amends. 8, 14.
Health <~~=51
·'Wneri state involuntarily commits retarded persons, it must provide them with
such habilitation as will afford them a reasonable opportunity to acquire and maintain those life skills necessary to cope as
effect,iyely as their capacities permit. U.S.
C.A.Const. Amends. 8, 14.

5.

Mei:~tal

6. Mental Health <~~=51
Evidence in class action on behalf of
former and present retarded residents confined at Commonwealth run institution
showed that retarded residents of institution had not received and were not receiving minimally adequate habilitation and
that minimally adequate habilitation could
not be provided in such large institution
which did not provide atmosphere conducive
to normalization but rather provided con-
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Cite as 446 F.Supp. 1295 (1977)

Terri Lee HALDERMAN, a retarded citizen, by her mother and guardian, Winifred Halderman, et al., Plaintiffs,
Pennsylvania Association for Retarded
Citizens et al., on behalf of themselves
and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Intervenors,
United States of America,
Plain tiff-Intervenor,
v.

PENNHURST STATE SCHOOL &
HOSPITAL et al., Defendants.
Civ. A. No. 74-1345.
United States District Court,
E. D. Pennsylvania.
Dec. 23, 1977.
On Injunctive Relief March 17, 1978.
Class action was brought on behalf of
former and present retarded residents at
large institution operated by Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. The District
Court, Raymond J. Broderick, J., held that:
(1) retarded residents had constitutional
right to minimally adequate habilitation, to
be free from harm, and to nondiscriminatory habilitation; (2) constitutional rights of
retarded residents had been violated because of the inadequate rehabilitation afforded by large, isolated institution; (3)
retarded residents had statutory rights ooth
under federal and Pennsylvania statutes to
minimally adequate and nondiscriminatory
habilitation, and (4) while named plaintiffs
had shown that they had suffered serious
InJunes, defendant administrators had
borne burden of showing that they were
entitled to good-faith immunity from damage claims.
Order entered for defendants and a
hearing scheduled for purpose of determining appropriate relief.
1. Constitutional Law <3=255(5)
Where it is claimed that the constitutional rights of retarded at institution have

1295

been violated because of inadequate treatment, it does not suffice to show that conditions have been upgraded at institution,
that the situation will continue to improve,
and that even more treatments would be
forthcoming i( it were not for restrictions
imposed by legislature; it is court's duty to
assure that every resident of institution receives at least minimally adequate care and
treatment consonant with full and true
meaning of due process clause.
2. Mental Health <3=36
Only permissible justifications for committing me ntally ill are danger to individual, danger to others, and need for treatment.
. ,·,
3. Constitutionaf"Law
®=255(5)
.
.
Since only justifiable purpose for commitment of the retarded is habilitation, if
habilitation is not provided the nature of
commitment bears no reasonable relation to
its purpose and individual's due process
rights have been violated. U.S.C.A.Const.
Amends. 8, 14.
4. Mental Health ®=51
Commitment of retarded can withstand
constitutional scrutiny only when it is coupled with minimally adequate habilitation.
U.S.C.A .Const. Amends. 8, 14.
Mei:~tal

Health ®=51
·'Wlie ri state involuntarily commits retarded persons, it must provide them with
such habilitation as will afford them a reasonable opportunity to acquire and maintain those life skills necessary to cope as
effect,i,vely as their capacities permit. U.S.
C.A.Const. Amends. 8, 14.
5.

6. Mental Health ®=51
Evidence in class action on behalf of
former and present retarded residents confined at Commonwealth run institution
showed that retarded residents of institution had not received and were not receiving minimally adequate habilitation and
that minimally adequate habilitation could
not be provided in such large institution
which did not provide atmosphere conducive
to normalization but rather provided con-
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A final hearing was held on January 16,
1978, at which time the parties informed
the Court that they did not intend to introduce any additional evidence. All the parties agreed that the record in this case
contained all the evidence necessary for the
Court to formulate its Order.
Accordingly, we shall this date enter an
Order of judgment in favor of the plaintiffs
and against the defendants, and shall mandate the appropriate injunctive relief necessary to remedy the constitutional and statutory violations which the Court in its Opinion of December 23, 1977 found are being
suffered by the retarded residents at Pennhurst.
· : · -·· ~
ORDER
AND NOW, this 17th day of March, 1978,
pursuant to findings of fact and conclusions
of Jaw made by the Court in an Opinion
filed December 23, 1977, it is hereby ORDERED that judgv~~nt is entered in favor
of the plaintiffs and against the defendants,
and injunctive relief is ORDERED as follows:
1. Commonwealth and county defendants, their successors, and their officers,
agents, servants, employees, attorneys and
all persons in active concert or participation
with them are permanently enjoined to provide suitable coinm\1nity living arrangements for the retarded residents of Pennhurst, and those retarded persons on its
waiting list, together with such community
services as are necessary to provide them
with minimally adequate habilitation until
such time as the retarded individual is no
longer in need of such living arrangement
and/or community service.
2. Commonwealth and county defendants, as aforesaid, are permanently enjoined
to develop and to provide a written individualized program plan, formulated in accordance with professional standards (Opinion,
page 25; Roos N.T. 1- 115, 1- 116, Hare N.T.
8- 168) to each member of plaintiff class, to
provide to each an individualized habilitation program, to provide annual periodic
review thereof and the opportunity to each
member of plaintiff class and to his or her
next friend to be heard thereon.

3. Commonwealth and county defendants, as aforesaid, are permanently enjoined
to provide all necessary and proper monitoring mechanisms to assure that community
living arrangements and other community
services of the necessary quantity and quality are provided and maintained.
4. Commonwealth and county defendants, as aforesaid, are permanently enjoined
to implement with dispatch Act 256 of the
1970 Pennsylvania General Assembly, the
specific schedule to be set by further Order
pf this Court upon recommendation of the
Master as set forth in paragraph 6(a) below.
5. The Court, on the basis of nine weeks'
testimony in this case and the submissions
of all parties, finds that the implementation
of this Order will be impossible without the
appointment of a Special Master, and,
therefore, pursuant to Rule 53, Fed.R.
Civ.P., and in the exercise of the Court's
equitable powers, the Court shall appoint a
Special Master with the power and duty to
plan, organize, direct, supervise and monitor the implementation of this and any further Orders of the Court. Commonwealth
and county defendants, their successors, officers, agents, servants, employees, attorneys and all persons in active concert or
participation with them shall provide the
Master with access to all premises, records,
documents and personnel and residents and
with every other cooperation and service
necessary to the discharge of the Master's
duties and shall make available to the ~as
ter all professional and other resodrces of
the Department of Public Welfare, the
Pennhurst State School and Hospital, the
County Offices of Mental Retardation and
the Base Service Units as may be necessary
to execute this Court's Orders.
6. The Special .M aster shall prepare and
present to this Court for its approval and
Order a Plan of Implementation which shall
include the following:
(a) A plan specifying the quantity and
type of community living arrangements
and other community services necessary
for the habilitation of all plaintiffs in the
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least separate, most integrated, least restrictive community setting, taking into
account the existing community services
in the five county area and including, by
county, specification of the residential,
program and staffing patterns necessary,
the delineation of responsibility for their
creation and maintenance, their funding
and a specified time frame for their provision.
(b) A report specifying resources,' 'procedures, and a schedule for individual
evaluations and the formulation of individual exit and community program plans
required for the habilitation of .~ach
member of plaintiff class ang ~~r, i}?t!ir
periodic review.
·
(c) A plan for the recruitment, hiring
and training of a sufficient number of
qualified community staff to be detailed
to each Base Service Unit to manage the
preparation of individual exit and community program plans for each member
of plaintiff class and ,upon completion of
such plans to assist in the execution of
the responsibility to create, develop,
maintain, and monitor the community living arrangements and other services required.
(d) A plan for the creation, development and maintenance of mechanisms to
monitor a system of community services
to assure that community' living arrangements and other community services of
the necessary quality and quantity are
continuously provided to retarded persons
in the least separate, most integrated,
least restrictive community setting,
which plan shall include but shall not be
limited to the provision of friend-advocates to assist in the protection of the
rights of each member of plaintiff class.
(e) A plan to provide retarded people,
members of the class, with continuing
information concerning the effect and the
implementation of the Court's decision,
concerning the plans to provide all necessary community living arrangements and
other community services to them and
any other general or specific information
regarding the conditions necessary to
habilitation of retarded persons and to
provide for consultation with them.

* Deleted by order of CA3.

(f) A plan to provide parents and family of the members of the class with continuing information concerning the effect
and the implementation of the Court's
decision, concerning the plans to provide
all necessary community living arrangements and other community services to
their relative and any other general or
specific information regarding the conditions necessary to habilitation of retarded
persons and to provide for consultation
with them.

7. Within not more than sixty (60) days
after appointment, the Master shall file
with this Court the reports required at
paragraphs 6(a) and (b) above and 11 below.
A hearing will then be scheduled by the
Court within fifteen (15) days from the date
of their filing. Following the adoption of
any plan by Order of the Court, it shall be
implemented forthwith.
8. The Master shall engage such staff of
his or her own as he or she finds necessary,
subject to the approval of the Court. The
Master and his or her staff shall be compensated by commonwealth defendants at a
rate to be set by the Court; the expenses of
the mastership shall be borne by the commonwealth defendants. The Master shall
promptly submit to the Court a form of
Order with respect to these matters.

-* .
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ending or in any way counselling that a
idual be committed to Pennhurst nd
of any
advancfor admis-

er enjoined
from pro ding a residence and/ habilitation
Pennhurst to any retarde
erson
is not as of this date a reside
11. The Special Maste;:, 'as · ~~foresaid,
shall prepare and present to the Court for
its Order a plan for the interim operation of
Pennhurst pending its prompt replacement
by community living arrangements and other community services. The plan shall address, but need not be limited to, the matters referenced··lh paragraphs 12- 19 below,
any other condition at Pennhurst which
threatens the· life, safety or well-being of
any Pennhurst resident, and measures to
assure that the interim operation of Pennhurst, including all activities therein, contributes to the prompt provision of services
in the community. necessary to the habilitation of each Penn}(urst resident.
' .t

'

12. Commonwealth defendants are hereby mandated to take every precaution to
prevent the physical or psychological abuse,
neglect or mistreatment of any Pennhurst
resident. Each and every alleged incident
of abuse, neglect or mistreatment shall be
promptly investigated. The manner and
mechanisms of such investigations shall be
developed and established by the plan referenced in paragraph 11.
13. Commonwealth defendants are hereby enjoined to exert the maximum effort in
enforcing the following Department of
Public Welfare regulations on the "Use of
Restraints in Treating Patients/Residents"
and "Personnel Rules and Institutional Policy on Acts of Abuse Against Patients/Residents" (promulgated in 7 Pennsylvania Bulletin 3199 (October 29, 1977)) which include
inter alia the following requirements:

a. That mechanical restraints controlling involuntary movement or lack of
muscular control due to organic conditions be employed only as part of an
individual program plan, upon a finding
of the program team trained in the use of
such restraints, and only when necessary
to 1) prevent injury to self or others, or 2)
promote normative body positioning and
physical functioning.
b. That restraints shall be used to
control acute or episodic, aggressive behavior only when a resident is acting in
such a manner as to be a clear and
present danger to self or others and only
when less restrictive measures and techniques have been proven to be less effective.
c. That mechanical restraints may be
used only upon the order of a qualified
mental retardation professional for a period not to exceed two hours; that the
resident must be checked every fifteen
minutes and must be examined by a physician before the initial order is renewed.
d. That chemical restraints may be
administered only upon the order of a
physician.
e. That seclusion (practice of placing a
resident alone in a locked room) is prohibited in all cases except where it is apparent that there e>;ists a clear and present
danger to the resident, other residents or
staff and all other less restrictive methods have failed or have been deemed inappropriate. (Title XIX- ICF- MR 249.13 and State Agency Letter No. ,..77- 30
issued December 14, 1977.)
'
f. That individual program plans shall
require and document that all possible
attempts be made at preventing assaultive behavior by positive, constructive intervention.
g. That acts of abuse by employees
directed at residents are absolutely prohibited and are cause for disciplinary action including dismissal.
h. That an abusive act is any action
which may cause or causes physical or
emotional harm or injury and includes
any willful action which violates the regulations on use of restraints.
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14. Commonwealth defendants are hereby enjoined from:
(a) Administering excessive or unnecessary medications to class members;
(b) Using medication as punishment,
for the convenience of the staff, as a
substitute for programming, or in quantities that interfere with a Pennhurst resident's functioning;
(c) Failing to ensure that only appropriately trained staff are allowed to administer drugs to residents;
(d) Failing to provide training programs to staff who administer drugs to
residents. The nature of such training
programs, and the qualifications to be
required of staff members who adminis- ,
ter drugs to residents shall be established
in the plan;
(e) Administering drugs to residents on
a p, r, n. basis. Written policies and
procedures governing the safe administration and handling of medications shall
be established pursuant to guidelines developed in the plan;
(f) Failing to monitor and to provide
for at least monthly reviews by a physician of each resident's medications.
15, Commonwealth defendants are enjoined from failing to provide a program of
medical and health related services for residents which provides accessibility, quality
and continuity of care for physical illness or
injury, The plan of implementation shall
develop and establish detailed standards for
the provision of adequate medical and
health related services to residents,
16, Commonwealth defendants are hereby enjoined from failing to provide individualized adaptive wheelchairs to each physically handicapped resident who needs them,
Each and every individual resident shall be
immediately evaluated to ascertain the need
for such equipment.

17, Commonwealth defendants are hereby enjoined from feeding any resident in
the supine position or in any position less
than the maximum upright position consistent with their capabilities and handi caps.

18. Commonwealth defendants are hereby enjoined from denying any resident programmed activities as punishment.

19. Commonwealth defendants are enjoined to take every precaution to keep
every Pennhurst building currently housing
residents clean, odorless and insect-free at
all times.
20, All bulletins, memoranda, directives
of official policy issued by the defendants in
connection with the implementation of this
Court's Order, shall, upon issuance, be sent
to counsel for each of the plaintiffs.
21. Jurisdiction is retained by this Court
until further Order.

. .,,-,.

In re THC FINANCIAL CORP., a
Hawaii Corpol'ation, Debtor.
In re The HAWAII CORPORATION, a
Hawaii Corporation, Debtor.
Nos. 76-0493 and 76-0512.
United States District Court,
D. Hawaii.
Dec. 27, 1977.
Corporations, debtors under Chapter X
of Bankruptcy Act, moved to reject alleged
executo~y contracts for indemnity of officers and directors or for alternative rl!lieL
The District Court, Pence, J., held that: (1)
trustee was not entitled to reject as executory an agreement requiring corporation,
debtor under Chapter X of Bankruptcy Act,
to indemnify its officers and directors for
suits brought against them in their corporate capacities, where officers and directors
had already served in such capacities, they
had performed their side of agreement and
nothing remained save corporation's obligation to indemnify, even though there were
various ministerial tasks attendant upon
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Restrict Federal Suits

- _-~ -. . .. By Fred Barbaah
· ', ~ : : -~.,.S&arrwrttM
'l'be Supreme Court ruled y!steray lhat auita apinst •tate officials
f~ . violation&, of atate .laM-as oppoeed to violations of federal law or
. 'the U.S. Constitution---annat be
brought in the nation's federal

volved around an iitterpretation of

Official Violations the 11th Amendment to the Conati. tution, which immunizes the atates
from certain private suits in federal
Of State Law Barred courts
to protect state sovereignty.
1
'1t il difficult to thin'k 9f a greater
From U.S. Courts · - ·intnllion
on ,tate sovereignty than

when a federal court instructs atate
tution when they might have been officials on how to conform their
The 5-to-4 decision, a \'idory for able to decide them on narrower conduct to state law," Powell wrote
atates in their battle ~gainst expan- · state grounds. He ~ the ma- yesterday. •such a result conflicts
'live federal court rullngs affecting jority of making "a voya,ge into the directly with the principles of fed · their operat~ laid ·a f~eral ap- aea of undisciplined lawmaking."
eralism that underlie the 11th
Powell, in turn, laid Stevens' dis- Amendment."
peala 'COUrt exceeded its. authority
The gro1.1ps challenging Pennhurst
wben it invoked Pennsylvania law to eent •rest.'! on fiCtion, is wrong on the
·order far-reaching reforms at Penn- law, ·· and, most important, would had argued that the federal courts
.Jwrat State School and H<l8pital, an emaaculate" constitutional guaran- are free to consider state-law claims
• when they are mixed with allega ·
iPatitl!tion for the mentally retarded. tees of state sovereignty.
. · Suita alleging official violations of
Yesterday's case stemmed from a tions under federal law. Powell re· «ate law, Justice Lewia F. Powell Jr. long-running controwrsy about the jected that argument, acknowledging
wnK.e for the majority, can be enter- .tleatment of retarded persons at that ttys might mean that separete
Pennhurat. Patients there, the Penn- suits-one in federal court and one
&ained only in state courts.
The ruling may preeent an obsta- aylvania Aaaociation for Retarded in state court-might be brought.
While that might be inefficient or
de to future :'Public interest" auita Citizens and federal officiala sued in
bued on atate laws but brought in 1974, alleging physical abuse, unnec- inconvenient, he said, "such considfederal court& where judges aome- essary adminiltering of drugs by erations ·of policy cannot override
times are eeen u more liberal. But ataff members and generally inad- · the c:onatitutional limitation on the
lawyers interviewed yesterday ·aug- equate cooditiona for treating the federal judiciary to adjudicate suits
. rested that it was a limited obatacle·, handicapped.
against a state."
l Iince most auch complaint.'! involve
A U.S. District Court ordered the
Stevens said the ruling will create
removal and relocation of the resi- •duplicative litigation and the un ·
1 alleged violation& of federitl law or
the Conatitution.
dents, aaying that Pennhurat vio- necessary decision of federal consti ·
The ruling is nonetheless pf con- lated the federal Developmentally tutional questions." In addition, he
:aiderible significance for Pennsylva- Disabled Aaiistance and Bill of laid, it hanna state authority. StateS:
ala officials, who have been fighting Rights Act and the Pennsylvania through legislation, may c.ure defects
the cue for years, and for organiza- Mental Health and Mental Retar- found in their laws by federal courts.
tions preaaing major institutional dation Act.
They cannot alter federal law.
"Leaving violations of state law
In a 1981 decision the Supreme
cbancea there.
It was also aignificant in the view Court laid the federal law was too unredressed and enauring that the
of the four dissenters, led by Justice ·vague to justify auch an expensive decisions of federal courts may never
John Paul Stevens, wbo accused the remedy. The 3rd U.S. Circuit Court be reexamined by the states hardly
majority in an UllUIIually heated . of Appeals aubeequently upheld the c:omporta with the respect for states
atatement of disregarding ~ previ- aame reforms at Pennhurat, this u aovereign entities commanded by
oua Supreme Court decilions to iasue time baaing its' decision solely on the 11th Amendment," Stevens said.
an t<unprecedented" ruling. ·
Pennsylvania law. The Supreme
Justices William J. Brennan Jr.,
Stevens laid that by precluding Court held the caee over from ita last Thurgood Marshall and Harry A.
Blackmun joined Stevens' dissent.
deciaions based on state laws the term.
ruling will force ·federal courts to
The cue, Pennhu.rst State School Brennan also wrote a separate statetum to federal law eel the Consti- and Hospital v. Halderman , re- ment.
~.
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Supreme Court Limits Federal Judges' Jurisdiction
Spedali.O lba New Yen T"-

WASHINGTON, Jan. 23 - The Supreme Court, in a bitterly disputed~~
4 ded.aioo, today set a significant new
limit on lbe jurisdiction of the Federal
cowu to bear suits againat state officia.la and ageocies.
Tbe Court overturned a decision by a
Federal appeals court in Pennsylvania,
which bad ordered officials of that
state to correct·cooditioos at the Pennhunt State Scbool and H06pital. The inatit\Uioo bas been the subject of litigatioo for a decade. including two other
Supreme Court decisioos in the last
three yean.
ln an opinion by .o\BSOciate Justice
Lewia F . Powell Jr., the Court ruled
today that tbe Federal courts were
barred by tbe Constitution from ordering state officials to comply with state
law. Tbe appeals court bad baaed its
ordel" on a Peonaylvania meotal-bealth
law, because a 1981 Supreme Court
decision bad eliminated tbe principle
questloo of Federal law from tbe case.
' llepttdi•t• at l..eut 2.8 eaae.•
In tbe past, tmder a series of Supreme Court decisioos dating to early
this century, Federal courts bad routinely decided questions of state law
that were intertwined with Federal
~in a case before them.
, ' Tbe decision today bad the effect of
severely limiting, if not explicitly overruling, a number of the Supreme
Court's precedents on Federal court
jurisdiction. The dissenting opinion, by
Associate Justice Jobn Paul Stevens,

said the ruling "repudiates at least 28
cases," an allegation the majority
opinion disputed.
Although the Court is often divided
and~~ decisions are hardly extraordinary, the tones of the majority and
dissenting opinions today were unusually angry. The case was argued twice,
last February and again in October,
and was ~dently the focus of a pro.
longed contest between the conservative and liberal factions on the Court.
Justice Powell, in his majority opinion, said Justice Stevens's dissenting
opinion "rests on fiction," "is wrong on
the law" and "is out of touch with reality."
Soverelpty of Sta*
Justice Stevens called the ruling a
"voyage into the sea of undisciplined
lawmaking."
Tbe doctrine at the source of the dispute was state sovereignty as embodied in the 11th Amendment. The
amendment protects states from suits
by tbei.r citizens in Federal court.
In recent years, the Court has given
new life to the onC&-Obscure amendment. The Court ruled in 1974 that the
amendment barred Federal courts
from ordering retroactive damage
awards to be paid out of state treasuries.
The decision today expanded the
boundaries of the states' immunities
three ways. First, the Court ruled injunctions against state officials, as well
as damage awards, are barred it based
on state law.
Offlelala Had Beeo Llable
Second, the Court substantially expanded the category of state officials
who, as individuals, may enjoy the 11th
Amendment immunity the Constitu~on
gives to the states.
Past Supreme Court decisions had
held state officials lost their 11th
Amendment imm\lD;itY and ~t be

.

-~.

sued in Federal court if they ha(l acted
Nonetheless, the decision is ~ to
"without any authority whatever" or if unsettle the assumption the Federal
they bad acted in their nominal4tuthor- courts are available aa forums for the
ity but in ·violation of state law. The entire range of litigation involving the
theory waa that an unautllorized or lll&- conduct of state officials.
gal act by a state official waa not eotiEvidence of bow the expansive view
Ued to share the state's i~Jununity .
of the majority waa a surprise wasp~
The decision today restored im- vided by a brief filed in the case by the
munity in the secood category, for Civil Rights Division of the Justice Deviolations of state laws. "It is difficult partment, which in the Reagan Adminto think of a greater intrusion on state istration is not known as an adv~te of
sovereignty," Justice Powell said, expansive Federal jurisdiction. The
"tban when a Federal court inlltructs brief told the Court that the Federal a~
state officials on bow to conform their peals court should be upheld and that
cooduct to state law.
the 11th Amendment arguments by the
"Such a result conflicts directiy with state were without merit.
the principles of federalism that UDderJustice Powell's opinion waa joined
lie the 11th Amendment."
by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger and
Associate Justices Byron R. White,
lle8ldlata Movbt& Out
William H. Rebnquist and Sandra Day
The third way in which today's deci,. O'Connor.
sion expands the ~es waa in
Associate Justices William J. Brenlimiting a Federal court's Fedtradi- nan Jr., Thurgood Marshall and Harry
tional resolution of questions of state A. Blaclunun joined Justice Stevens's
law intenningled with federal ~ues disaeot.
in a particular suit, or pendent jurisdiction. Past Supreme Court decisions
have instructed Federal courts to d&cide cases on the narrowest basis possible ar1f1 to decide statutory issues before reaching constitutional questions.
The case today, Pennhurst v. Halderman, No. 81-2101, involved a highly
technical area of constitutional law,
and its full implications may not become clear for some time.
It may have the least impact, ironically, on the Pennhurst litigation.
Pennsylvania has moved nearly half
the 1,~ residents of the institution into I I
small, community-based homes and
announced late last year that it planned
to close Pennhurst by the end of 1986.
1
The decision does not limit the jurisdiction of the Federal courts to hear
suits against states and their officials
based on the Constitution, such as a d&segregation case based on the equalprotection clause of the 14th Amendment.

ll
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Suprem·e Court Limits Federal Judges' Jurisdiction
Special 11> Tile New York T~

WASHINGTON, Jan. 23- The Supreme eoun, in a bitterly disputed >to• dedaim, today set a significant new
limit oo tbe jwildictioo of the Federal
courta to bear auitl apiDit atate offidala aod qenciea.
Tbe Coun overturned a decision by a
F~ appeals court in Pennsylvania,
which bad ordered officials of that
state to correct.amditiooa at the Pennbunt State Scbool and H06pital. Tbe inatitutioo baa been the subject of litigatioo for a decade, including two other
Supreme Coun deciaioos in the last
tbreeyean.
In an opinion by ABsociate Justice
Lewil F. Powell Jr., the Court ruled
today that the Federal courts were
barred by the Cooatitution from orderill8 1tate officials to comply with state
law. Tbe appeals court bad based its
order oo a Peonaylvania meota.l-bealth
law, because a 1981 Supreme Court
decisioo bad eliminated the principle
queatioo of Federal law from the case.
•..,........ at Leut 28 eaa.·
In the past, Wlder a series of Supreme Coun deci.siooa dating to early
this century, Federal couns bad routinely decided questiooa of state law
that were intertwined with Federal
iuUea in a case before them.
'' Tbe decision today had the effect of
severely limiting, it not explicitly overruling, a number of the Supreme
Court's precedents on Federal court
jurisdiction. Tbe dissenting opinion, by
Associate Justice Jobn Paul Stevens,

said the ruling "repudiates at least 28 sued in Federal court if they ha(l acted

Nonetheless, the decision is botQ!d to

cases," an allegation the majority "without any authority whatever" or if unsettle the assumption the Federal
opinion disputed.
they had acted in their oomiQal author- courts are available as forums for the
Although the Court is often divided ity but in ·violation of state law. The entire range of litigation involving the
and>~ decisiooa are hardly extraor- theory was that an unautllorize4 or W&dinary, the tones of the majority and gal act by a state official was not entidissenting opinions today were unusu- tied to share the SU.lte's i.Qlmunlty.
The decision today · re.nored imally angry. The case was argued twice,
last February and again in October, munity in the secood category, for
and was evjdently the focus of a pro. violations of state laW11. "It ia difficult
longed contest between the conserva- to think of a greater intrulion on state
sovereignty," Justice Powell said,
tive and liberal factions on the Court.
Justice Powell, in his majority opin- "than when a Federal court inatructs
ion, said Justice Stevens's dissenting state officials on how to ~onn their
opinioo "rests on fiction," "is wrong on conduct 1() state law.
"Such a result confiicts directly with
the law" and "is out of touch with reali-

conduct of state officials.
Evidence of bow the expansive view
of the majority was a surprise was provided by a brief filed in the case by the
Civil Rights Division of the Justice J>e.
partmeiit, which in the Reagan Administration is not !mown as an adv~te of
. expansive Federal jurisdiction. The
brief told the Court that the Federal appeals court should be upheld and that
the 11th Amendment arguments by the
state were without merit.
the principles of federalism tlijlt underJustice Powell's opinion was joined
ty."
by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger and
lie the 11th Amendment."
Soverei&Dty of Sta'JleMica.au Movta& Out
Associate Justices BYTOil R. White,
Justice Stevens called the ruling a
,_d way m
· which •""'-y'
,......,. William H. Rebnquilt and Sandra Day
The ...
"voyage into the sea of undisciplined
.....
........ s.......,.
O'Connor
lawmaking.''
sion expands the boundaries was in
Associ · J
·
w·ru J B
The doctrine at the source of the dis- ~ting a F~eral court_'s Fedtradi- nan Jr., ~urs~C:an:~':nd H~
pute was state sovereignty as em- uo~ resol_u tion of quesuons of_state A. Blackmun joined Justice Stevens's
bodied in the 11th Amendment. The law mtermingled with federal lSSuea dissent
·
amendment protects states from suits in a particular suit, or pendenJ jurisdic..
by thei.r citizens in Federal court .
tion. Past Supreme Court decisions
In recent years, the Court has given have instructed Federal courts to d&new life to the once-obscure amend- cide cases on the narrowest basis possiment. The Court ruled in 1974 that the ble aDf1 to decide statutory issues beamendment barred Federal courts fore reaching constitutional questions.
Tbe case today, Pennhurst v. Halderfrom ordering retroactive damage
awards to be paid out of state treas- man, No. 81-2101, involved a highly
technical area of constitutional law,
uries.
The decision today expanded the and its full implications may not beboundaries of the states' immunities com~:: clear for some time.
It may have the least impact, ironithree ways. First, the Court ruled injunctions against state officials, as well cally, on the Pennhurst litigation.
as damage awards, are barred if based Pennsylvania has moved nearly half
the 1,~ residents of the institution into
on state law.
small, community-based homes and
Officlala Had Been Uable
announced late last year that it planned
Second, the Court substantially ex- to close Pennhurst by the end of 1986.
panded the category of state officials
The decision does not limit the juris- 1
who, as individuals, may enjoy the 11th diction of the Federal courts to bear
Amendment immunity the Constitution suits against states and their officials
gives to the states.
based on the Constitution, such as a dePast Supreme Court decisions had ~gregation case based on the equalheld state officials lost their 11th protection clause of the 14th AmendAmendment imm~ty and mi~t be ment.

=============

I'

.

~··--

January 25 , 1984

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFBRF.NCE
81-2363 Pennhurst State Sc hool & Rosottal v . Halderman

·<
I

~

~his is the only case h~ld for 81-2101 PPnnhurst State
School & nosoital v . Halderman . •rh~ heln casF! concerns the
D1strict Court's or1er holding thP state d~fenaant~ in contempt and ordering them to pay fines of $10,000 per cay fnr
failinq to nay the expnnnes of the MasterA . ThA court tater
purger1 the contempt and u~Pd the finer-; to pay the> ?.!asters .
CA3 held that the c:i vi l contempt order wa. ~ lnterlocutory and
could only be reviewe(l on appeal from a clcni l of a motion
under Ped . R. ~iv. P • .::iO (b) for rel i.~f from thP o . er . The
defendants had not made such a motion .
~he procedural ruling below will not be affected by the
Court 1 s cHsoosition of 81-21.01. 'T'hc> contempt or.,er Has not
haser1 on f'tate law . See also Jlut t o v. Finney, tt37 u.s . 678,
6(\0-691 (1978) ('~l. ev<mth Ame ndment does not bar contempt
orders ancillary to valid in 1uncttonA) . There appears to be
no conflict on CA3's procedural ruJing.
I recommend D'CNIAT. .

L . F .P., Jr .

Supreme Court of the United States
Memorandum
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81-2101 Pennhurst State School and Hos. v. Halderman
LFP for the Court
1st draft 4/14/83
2nd draft 4/28/83
3rd draft 6/20/83
4th draft 6/22/83
Joined by BRW, WHR, SOC
JPS dissent
Atex draft 6/17/83
1st printed draft 6/20/83
2nd draft 6/21/83
Joined by WJB, TM
WJB dissent
Typed draft 6/22/83
1st printed draft 6/22/83
HAB awaiting dissent
Copy to Mr. Lind 6/20/83

(Mark)
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CHAMBERS OF

January 12, 1984

JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

Re:

/

No. 81-2101 - Pennhurst State School and Hospital
v. Halderman

Dear John:
Please join me in your dissent.
Sincerely,

Justice Stevens
cc: The Conference

'.,,

lfp/ss 01/13/84
MEMORANDUM
TO:

Joe

DA'T'E:

FROM:

Lewis P. Powell, Jr.

,Jan.

Pennhurst
The changes you suggest in our opinion, in response to the third draft of JPS's dissent, look fine to me.
I have made a couple of minor language changes.
The textual additions made by JPS on p. 13-14, as
you suggest, merits some response.

Re states that we "con-

fuse two distinct concepts", and th a t "good faith immunity
from damages liability is irrelevant to the availability of
iniunctive relief".

(p. 14)

opinion, that "confuses •

It is the disqent, not our

. . distinct

concepts".

I suppose it i.s true that whether the officials
acted in "good
fait'11" -is immaterial, so long as they acted
.
within the scope of their authority.

~hev

most certainly

did in this case, as there is no charge that they acted in
individual capacities.

Thev were operating, as we have

said, a major state institution even if opern.ti..ng i.t badly
for the reasons we stated.

And the injunctive relief at

issuP is not against the individuals, it is against the
state itself.

Relief -whether damages or injunctive -

agai.nst the individuals woulrJ accomplish nothing.

Thus, in

the end, JPS's additional language on p. 12-13 makes sense
only ln the absence of the Eleventh Amendment.

As we have

said, JPS would read the Eleventh Amendment out of the Con-

2.

stitution whenever it could be argued - with or. without reason - that state officials had failed to do their duty correctly in the performance of their officia l responsibil-

Although we have said all of this, I do think it •
would be well to reply
p. 13-14 in a footnote.

~peciftcally

to the neq language on

Perhaps the note could sav that

this argument by the dissent emphasizes its basic - though
often unarticulated - theme that the Eleventh Amendment already is moribund and we should give tt the coup-de-grace.
We could conclude bv emphasizinq that nothtnq in Article TII
confers on us authority to strip an explicit Article of the
Constitution of its substantive meaninq.

Indeed, our sworn

duty is to "obev and sustain the Constitution of the United
States".

(Joe, I don't think this is precisely the oath but

I have it).
,,

'I

As you suggest, note 27 (p. 20-21) does attack our
general thesis, and on its face it is at least a strong dPbating point.
it.

Also, some of JPS's cases orobably support

Yet, the only way that Young itself can be reconciled

with the Eleventh Amendment only because a state cannot authorize its officers to violate the "supreme authority of
the United States".

It may be true that the iml?act of a

Young injunction for the violation of the federal Constitution can be as severe on the state as that of an injunction
based on a violation of state law, but Article III confers

.. ,, .
_..

>

~

'

3.

jurisdiction on federal courts to enforce federal law.
There is no corresponding authority to enforce state law in
the face of the Eleventh .Amendment.

This i.s a jurisoiction-

al case.

John relies a good deal on Enqlish law.

t have

not paid a great deal of attention to this as I think it
basically irrelevant.

I

~o

note his point - see n. 21, for

example - that English law permitted suits against the
King's officers because the Kinq himself was

i~mune.

We

agree that if state officials commit torts, for example,
they may be sued pesonally.

We have said this somewhere.

At 11:00 p.m. in the evening (with interruptions from the
Chief and others about the Hutchins capital case), I have
not chPcked to see what we did say about personal suits.
I do not understand your reference to footnote 24
~

tha ~

is a "string cite" of 19th Century cases.

* * *
Although this memo is longer than it would be if I
were not a bit tired, I am not suggesting substantial additions.

It does seem to me that we do have 'a couple of op-

portunities to make rather telling answers to arguments that
have a good deal of superficial merit.

L.F.P., Jr.

ss

lfp/ss 01/23/84
e1-2101 Pennhurst State School & Hospital et al. v.

Halderman, et al.
-1-c;...-YL--

This case is here on writ of certiorari to the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit. _/

~nhurst

74

t.rj-

~

~ ~c:::::L. ~
~- ~ ~ ..

is a Pennsylvania institution; ior the care of

the mentally retarded.

A class consisting primarily of res-

idents~sued Pennhurst -

agencies;fand~ficials

along with the state and county
who

r~n

it.

The suit was brought in federal court.

It alleged that

conditions and treatment in Pennhurst;lv iolated rights under
the federal Constitution,j certain federal statutes, and a
Pennsylvania statute.
The District Court granted the requested relief.
ordered that Pennhurst be

tt

closed~and the residents moved to

smaller living arrangements.

The court appointed a special

.

master to oversee implemeptation of its order .
The Court of Appeal affirmed most of the District
Court's judgment, j basing its holding on a federal statute.
In 1981, this Court reversed that judgment.
the federal statute relied

upon~ id

We held that

not create any substan-

tive rights.
)

··,

On remana, the Court of Appeals reaffirmed its earlier
judgment, relying this time solely on state law.

The court

rejected the argument advanced by Pennhurst;fana the s~ate
a

that the Eleventh Amendment of _ the
\~~--~~..

federal

Constitution~barred tne relie ~ ordered.

-~

74-~

~ relied

on this Court's pendent jurisdiction cases.
We now reverse.

The Eleventh Amendment, embodying the

principle of sovereign immunity, /prohibits federal courts
;~

A...-r.a..a..-

from ordering state officials~and~gencies~to comply with
state law.

Under that Amendment, a State generally cannot

be sued in federal courtsJ ' ithout its consent.
The fact
state's

~

that~ ~

suit Re6e was nominally against the

officers ~agencies~ s

not determinative.

The

entire relief that was ordered~ran only against the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
The doctrine of pendent jurisdiction, upon which the
Third Circuit relied,;4 s a judicially created doctrine of
efficiency and prudence.

It cannot override the constitu-

tiona! principle of sovereign immunity.

&81-2101 Pennhurst v. Halderman (Joe)#
LFP for the Court 10/7/83
1st draft 10/27/83
2nd draft 1/4/84
3rd draft 1/17/84
4th draft 1/20/84
Joined by WHR 10/28/83
soc 11/18/83
WEB 11/17/83
BRW 11/11/83
JPS dissenting
1st draft 12/7/83
2nd draft 12/8/83
3rd draft 1/12/84
4th draft 1/20/84
Joined by WJB 12/20/83
Joined by TM 12/21/83
Joined by HAB 1/12/84
WJB dissenting
Typed draft 1/13/84
1st printed draft 1/16/84
2nd printed draft 1/18/84

To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor
From:

Justice Powell

.APR \ 4 \9Sl
Circulated: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Recirculated: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 81-2101

PENNHURST STATE SCHOOL & HOSPITAL, ET AL.,
PETITIONERS v. TERRI LEE HALDERMAN, ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
[April - , 1983]

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether a federal court
may award injunctive relief against state officials on the basis
of state law.
I
This litigation, here for the second time, concerns the conditions of care at petitioner Pennhurst State School and Hospital, ·a Pennsylvania institution for the care of the mentally
retarded. See Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1 (1981). Although the litigation's history is set forth in detail in our prior opinion, see id., at 5--10,
it is necessary for purposes of this decision to review that
history.
·
This suit originally was brought in 1974 by respondent
Terri Lee Halderman, a resident of Pennhurst, in the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Ultimately, plaintiffs included a class consisting of all persons
who were or might become residents of Pennhurst; the Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Citizens (P ARC); and the
United States. Defendants were Pennhurst and various
Pennhurst officials; the Pennsylvania Department of Public
Welfare and several of its officials; and various county commissioners, county mental retardation administrators, and

81-2101-0PINION
2

PENNHURST STATE SCHOOL & HOSP. v. HALDERMAN

other officials of five Pennsylvania counties surrounding
Pennhurst. Respondents' amended complaint charged that
conditions at Pennhurst violated the class members' rights
under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; § 504 of the
· Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 87 Stat. 394, as amended, 29
U. S. C. § 794 (1976 ed. and Supp. V); the Developmentally
Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U. S. C.
§§ 6001-6081 (1976 ed. and Supp. V); and the Pennsylvania
Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966 (the
"MH/MR Act"), Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 50, §§4101-4704
(Purdon 1969 and Supp. 1982). Both damages and injunctive
relief were sought.
In 1977, following a lengthy trial, the District Court rendered its decision. 446 F. Supp. 1295 (1977). As noted in
our prior opinion, the court's findings were undisputed: "Conditions at Pennhurst are not only dangerous, with the residents often physically abused or drugged by staff members,
but also inadequate for the 'habilitation' of the retarded. Indeed, the court found that the physicial, intellectual, and
emotional skills of some residents have deteriorated at
Pennhurst." 451 U. S., at 7 (footnote omitted). The District Court held that these conditions violated each resident's
right to "minimally adequate habilitation" under the Due
Process Clause and the MH/MR Act, see 446 F. Supp., at
1314-1318, 1322-1323; "freedom from harm" under the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, see id., at 1320-1321;
and "nondiscriminatory habilitation" under the Equal Protection Clause and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, see id., at
1321-1324. Furthermore, the court found that "due process
demands that if a state undertakes the habilitation of a retarded person, it must do so in the least restrictive setting
consistent with that individual's habilitative needs." Id., at
1319 (emphasis added). After concluding that the large size
of Pennhurst prevented it from providing the necessary
habilitation in the least restrictive environment, the court ordered "that immediate steps be taken to remove the retarded
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residents from Pennhurst." I d., at 1325. Petitioners were
ordered "to provide suitable community living arrangements" for the class members, id., at 1326, and the court appointed a Special Master "with the power and duty to plan,
organize, direct, supervise and monitor the implementation
of this and any further Orders of the Court." Ibid. 1
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed most
of the District Court's judgment. 612 F. 2d 84 (1979) (en
bane). It agreed that respondents had a right to habilitation
in the least restrictive environment, but it grounded this
right solely on the "bill of rights" provision in the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42
U. S. C. § 6010. See 612 F. 2d, at 95-100, 104-107. The
court did not consider the constitutional issues or § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act, and while it affirmed the District Court's
holding that the MH/MR Act provides a right to adequate
habilitation, see id., at 100-103, the court did not decide
whether that state right encompassed a right to treatment in
the least restrictive setting.
On the question of remedy, the Court of Appeals affirmed
except as to the District Court's order that Pennhurst be
closed. The court observed that some patients would be unable to adjust to life outside an institution, and it determined
that none of the legal provisions relied on by plaintiffs precluded institutionalization. I d., at 114-115. It therefore remanded for "individual determinations by the [District
Court], or by the Special Master, as to the appropriateness of
an improved Pennhurst for each such patient," guided by "a
presumption in favor of placing individuals in [community living arrangements]." Ibid. 2
' The District Court determined that the individual defendants had acted
in good faith and therefore were immune from the damage claims. 446 F.
Supp, at 1324.
2
In a companion case, the 8ourt of Appeals affirmed the District
Court's denial of a motion to intervene for purposes of appeal by the
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On remand the District Court established detailed procedures for determining the proper residential placement for
each patient. A team consisting of the patient, his parents
or guardian, and his case manager must establish an individual habilitation plan providing for habilitation of the patient
in a designated community living arrangement. The plan is
subject to review by the Special Master. A second master,
called the Hearing Master, is available to conduct hearings,
upon request by the resident, his parents or his advocate, on
the question whether the services of Pennhurst would be
more beneficial to the resident than the community living arrangement provided in the resident's plan. The Hearing
Master then determines where the patient should reside,
subject to possible review by the District Court. See App.
123a-134a (Order of April 24, 1980). 3
This Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals,
finding that 42 U. S. C. § 6010 did not create any substantive
rights. 451 U. S. 1 (1981). We remanded the case to the
Court of Appeals to determine if the remedial order could be
supported on the basis of state law, the Constitution, or § 504
of the Rehabilitation Act. See id;, at 31. 4 We also rePennhurst Parents-Staff Association, finding the denial hannless error.
See 612 F . 2d 131 (1979) (en bane). The Association subsequently was
granted leave to intervene and is a petitioner in this Court.
3
0nJuly 1, 1981, Pennsylvania enacted an appropriations bill~
that only $35,000 would be paid for the Masters' expenses for the fiscal
year July 1981 to June 1982. The District Court held Pennsylvania and its
Secretary of the Department of Public Welfare in contempt, and imposed a
fine of $10,000 per day. Pennsylvania paid the fines, and the contempt
was purged on January 8, 1982. On appeal the Court of Appeals affinned
the contempt order. Halderman v. Pe'Yf-nhurst State School & Hospital,
673 F. 2d 628 (1982), cert. pending, No. 81-2363.
' Three Justices dissented from the Court's construction of the Act, but
concluded that the District Court should not have adopted the "far-reaching remedy" of appointing "a Special Master to decide which of the
Pennhurst inmates should remain and which should· be moved to community-based facilities. . . . [T]he court should not have assumed the task of
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manded for consideration of whether any relief was available
under other provisions of the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act. See id., at 27-30 (discussing
42 U. S. C. §§ 601l(a), 6063(b)(5)).
On remand the Court of Appeals affirmed its prior judgment in its entirety. 673 F. 2d 647 (1982) (en bane). It de. termined that in a recent decision the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania had "spoken definitively" in holding that the
MH/MR Act required the State to adopt the "least restrictive
environment" approach for the care of the mentally retarded.
Id., at 651 (citing In re Schmidt, 494 Pa. 86, 429 A. 2d 631
(1981)). The Court of Appeals concluded that this state statute fully supported its prior judgment, and therefore did not
reach the remaining issues of federal law. It also rejected
petitioners' argument that the Eleventh Amendment barred
a federal court from considering this pendent state-law claim.
The court noted that the Amendment did not bar a federal
court from granting prospective injunctive relief against
state officials on the basis of federal claims, see 673 F. 2d, at
656 (citing Ex Parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908)), and concluded that the same result obtained with respect to a
pendent state-law claim. It reasoned that because Siler v.
Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 213 U. S. 175 (1909), an important case in the development of the doctrine of pendent
jurisdiction, also involved state officials, "there cannot be ...
an Eleventh Amendment exception to that rule." 673 F. 2d,
at 658. 5 Finally, the court rejected petitioners' argument
that it should have abstained from deciding the state-law
managing Pennhurst .... "

451 U. S., at 54 (WHITE J ., dissenting in

part).
6
The Court of Appeals also noted that "the United States is an intervening plaintiff ... against which even the state itself cannot successfully
plead the Eleventh Amendment as a bar to jurisdiction," and that "the
counties, even as juridical entities, do not fall within the coverage of the
Eleventh Amendme11t. Against those defendants even money damages
may be awarded." 673 F. 2d, at 656 (citation omitted).

.
j
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claim under principles of comity, see id., at 659--660, andrefused to consider petitioners' objections to the District
Court's use of a special master, see id., at 651 and n. 10.
Three judges dissented in part, arguing that under principles
of federalism and comity the establishment of a special master to supervise compliance was an abuse of discretion. See
id., at 662 (Seitz, C.J., joined by Hunter, J., dissenting in
part); ibid. (Garth, J., concurring in part and dissenting as to
relief). See also id., at 661 (Aldisert, J., concurring) (seriously questioning the propriety of the order appointing the
Special Master, but concluding that a retroactive reversal of
that order would be meaningless). 6
We granted certiorari,-- U. S. - - (1982), and now reverse and remand.
II
Petitioners raise three challenges to the judgment of the
Court of Appeals: (i) the Eleventh Amendment prohibited
the District Court from ordering state officials to conform
their conduct to state law; (ii) the doctrine of comity prohibited the District Court from issuing its injunctive relief; and
(iii) the District Court abused its discretion in appointing two
masters to supervise the decisions of state officials in implementing state law. We need not reach the latter two issues,
for we find the Eleventh Amendment challenge dispositive.
A

Article III, § 2 of the Constitution provides that the federal
judicial power extends, inter alia, to controversies "between
a State and Citizens of another State." Relying on this language, this Court in 1793 assumed original jurisdiction over a
suit brought by a citizen of South Carolina against the State
of Georgia. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419 (1793). The
The Office of the Special Master was abolished in December 1982.
See App. 220a (Order of August 12, 1982). The Hearing Master remains
in operation.
6
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decision "created such a shock of surprise that the Eleventh
Amendment was at once proposed and adopted." Monaco v.
Mississippi, 292 U. S. 313, 325 (1934). The Amendment
provides:
"The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States
by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects
of any Foreign State."
The Amendment's language overruled the particular result
in Chisholm, but this Court has recognized that its greater
significance lies in its affirmation that the fundamental principle of sovereign immunity limits the grant of judicial authority in Art. III. Thus, in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1
(1890), the Court held that, despite the limited terms of the
Eleventh Amendment, a federal court could not entertain a
suit brought by a citizen against his own State. After reviewing the constitutional debates concerning the scope of
Art. III, the Court determined that federal jurisdiction over
suits against unconsenting States "was not contemplated by
the Constitution when establishing the judicial power of the
United States." Id., at 15. See Monaco v. Mississippi,
supra, at 322-323 (1934). 7 In short, the principle of sovereign immunity is a constitutional limitation on the federal judicial power established in Art. III:
"That a State may not be sued without its consent is a
fundamental rule of jurisprudence having so important a
7
See Employees v. Missouri Public Health Dep't, 411 U. S. 279,
291-292 (1973) (MARSHALL, J., concurring in judgment) (The Eleventh
Amendment "clariftied] the intent of the .Framers concerning the reach of
federal judicial power" and "restore(d] the original understanding" that
States could not be made unwilling defendants in federal court). See also
Nevada v. Hall, 440 U. S. 410, 430-431 (1979) (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting);
id., at 437 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting).

.
J
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bearing upon the construction of the Constitution of the
United States that it has become established by repeated
decisions of this court that the entire judicial power
granted by the Constitution does not embrace authority
to entertain a suit brought by private parties against a
State without consent given: not one brought by citizens
of another State, or by citizens or subjects of a foreign
State, because of the Eleventh Amendment; and not
even one brought by its own citizens, because of the fundamental rule of which the Amendment is but an exemplification." Ex parte State of New York No. 1, 256
U. S. 490, 497 (1921) (emphasis added). 8
A sovereign's immunity may be waived, and the Court consistently has held that a State may consent to suit against it
in federal court. See, e. g., Clark v. Barnard, 108 U. S.
436, 447 (1883). We have insisted, however, that the State's
consent be unequivocally expressed. See, e. g., Edelman v.
Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 673 (1974). Similarly, although Congress has power with respect to the rights protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment immunity, see Fitzpatrick v. Bitker, 427 U. S. 445
(1976), we have required an unequivocal expression of congressional intent to "overturn the constitutionally guaranteed immunity of the several States." Quern v. Jordan, 440
U. S. 332, 342 (1979) (holding that 42 U. S. C. § 1983 does not
override States' Eleventh Amendment immunity). Our reluctance to infer that a State's immunity from suit in the federal courts has been negated stems from recognition of the
The limitation deprives federal courts of any jurisdiction to entertain
such claims, and thus may be raised at any point in a proceeding. "The
Eleventh Amendment declares a policy and sets forth an explicit limitation
on federal judicial power of such compelling force that this Court will consider the issue arising under this Amendment . . . even though urged for
the first time in this Court." Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury,
8

323

u. s. 459, 467 (1945).

81-2101-0PINION
PENNHURST STATE SCHOOL & HOSP. v. HALDERMAN

9

vital role of the doctrine of sovereign immunity in our federal
system. A State's constitutional interest in immunity encompasses not merely whether it may be sued, but where it
may be sued. 9 As JuSTICE MARSHALL has noted well, "[b]ecause of the problems of federalism inherent in making one
sovereign appear against its will in the courts of the other, a
restriction upon the exercise of the federal judicial power has
long been considered to be appropriate in a case such as this."
Employees v. Missouri Public Health & Welfare Dep't, 411
U. S. 279, 294 (1973) (MARSHALL, J., concurring in result). 10
Accordingly, in deciding this case we must be guided by
"[t]he principles of federalism that inform Eleventh Amendment doctrine." Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678, 691 (1978).
B

This Court's decisions thus establish that "an unconsenting
State is immune from suits brought in federal courts by her
own citizens as well as by citizens of another state." Em9

For this reason, the Court consistently has held that a State's waiver
of sovereign immunity in its own courts is not a waiver of the Eleventh
Amendment immunity in the federal courts. See, e. g., Florida Department of Health v. Florida Nursing Home Assn. 450 U. S. 147, 150 (1981)
(per curiam). "[l]t is not consonant with our dual system for the federal
courts ... to read the consent to embrace federal as well as state courts .
. . . [A] clear declaration of the state's intention to submit its fiscal problems to other courts than those of its own creation must be found." Great
Northern Life Insurance Co. v. Read, 322 U. S. 47, 54 (1944).
10
See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U. S., at 418-419 (States were "vitally interested" in whether they would be subject to suit in the federal courts, and
the debates about state immunity focused on the question of federal judicial
power). Cf. id., at 430-431 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting) (sovereign immunity is "a guarantee that is implied as an essential component of federalism"
and is "sufficiently fundamental to our federal structure to have implici~
constitutional dimension"); id., at 437 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting) ("[T]he
States that ratified the Eleventh Amendment thought that they were
putting an end to the possibility of individual States as unconsenting defendants in foreign jurisdictions").
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ployees, supra, at 280. There may be a question, however,
whether a particular suit in fact is a suit against a State. It
is clear, of course, that in the absence of consent a suit in
which the State or one of its agencies or departments is
named as the defendant is proscribed by the Eleventh
Amendment. See, e. g., Florida Department of Health v.
Florida Nursing Home Assn, 450 U. S. 147 (1981) (per
curiam); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978) (per
curiam). This jurisdictional bar applies regardless ofthe nature of the relief sought. See, e. g., Missouri v. Fiske, 290
U. S. 18, 27 (1933) ("Expressly applying to suits in equity as
well as at law, the Amendment necessarily embraces demands for the enforcement of equitable rights and the prosecution of equitable remedies when these are asserted and
prosecuted by an individual against a State").
When the suit is brought only against state officials, a
question arises as to whether that suit is a suit against the
State itself. Although prior decisions of this Court have not
been entirely consistent on this issue, certain principles are
well established. The Eleventh Amendment bars a suit
against state officials when "the state is the real, substantial
party in interest." Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U. S. 459, 464 (1945). See, e. g., In re Ayers , 123
U. S. 443, 487-492 (1887); Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U. S.
711, 720-723, 727-728 (1882). Thus, "[t]he general rule is
that relief sought nominally against an officer is in fact
against the sovereign if the decree would operate against the
latter." Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U. S. 57, 58 (1963) (per
curiam). 11 And, as when the State itself is named as the defendant, a suit against state officials that is in fact a suit
See also Dugan v. Rank, 372 U. S. 609, 620 (1963) ("The general rule
is that a suit is against the sovereign if 'the judgment sought would expend
itself on the public treasury or domain, or interfere with the public administration,' or if the effect of the judgment would be 'to restrain the Government from acting, or to compel it to act.'") (citations omitted).
11
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against a State is barred regardless of whether it seeks damages or injunctive relief. See Cory v. White, - - U. S.
-,-(1982).
The Court has recognized an important exception to this
general rule: a suit challenging the constitutionality of a state
official's action is not one against the State. 12 This was the
holding in Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908), in which a
federal court enjoined the Attorney General of the State of
Minnesota from bringing suit to enforce a state statute that
allegedly violated the Fourteenth Amendment. This Court
held that the Eleventh Amendment did not prohibit issuance
of this injunction:
"The act to be enforced is alleged to be unconstitutional,
and if it be so, the use of the name of the State to enforce
an unconstitutional act to the injury of complainants is a
proceeding without the authority of and one which does
not affect the State in its sovereign or governmental capacity. It is simply an illegal act upon the part of a state
official in attempting by the use of the name of the State
to enforce a legislative enactment which is void because
The Court also has held that sovereign immunity does not apply in a
suit against an official who allegedly acted entirely outside his official authority. See, e. g., Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337
U. S. 682, 702 (1949). This ultra vires exception is quite limited, governing only those situations in which a government official acts without any
official justification. See, e. g., Florida Department of State v. Treasure
Salvors, Inc.,-- U.S.--,-- (1982) (opinion of STEVENS, J.) (test is
whether the official's conduct was undertaken "without any authority
whatever"); id., at-- (WHITE, J., concurring in judgment in part and
dissenting in part) (test is whether there was no "colorable basis for the
exercise of authority by state officials"). This exception clearly is inapplicable in this case. Even if petitioner officials violated state law in carrying
out some of their official duties, they unquestionably acted under colorable
state authority in operating Pennhurst a,nd the State's system of care for
the mentally retarded. In short, these officials were not acting ultra vires, but rather were "exercising the powers delegated to [them] by the
sovereign." Larson, supra, at 693.
12
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unconstitutional. If the act which the state Attorney
General seeks to enforce be a violation of the Federal
Constitution, the officer in proceeding under such enactment comes into conflict with the superior authority of
that Constitution, and he is in that case stripped of his
official or representative character and is subjected to
the consequences of his official conduct. The State has
no power to impart to him any immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States."
209 U. S., at 159-160.
The Court subsequently has made clear that, even where this
exception applies, the rule that a suit against state officials
constitutes a suit against the State continues to have force.
Thus, in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651 (1974), the Court
held that in a suit against state officials "a federal court's remedial power, consistent with the Eleventh Amendment, is
necessarily limited to prospective injunctive relief, and may
not include a retroactive award which requires the payment
of funds from the state treasury." I d., at 677 (citations
omitted).
III
With these principles in mind, we now turn to the question
whether the claim that petitioners violated state law in carrying out their official duties at Pennhurst is one against the
State and therefore barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
Respondents advance two principal arguments in support of
the judgment below. 13 First, they contend that under the
13
We reject respondents' additional contention that Pennsylvania has
waived its immunity from suit in federal 'court. At the time the suit was
filed, suits against Pennsylvania were permitted only where expressly authorized by the legislature, see, e. g., Freach v. Commonwealth, 471 Pa.
558, 370 A. 2d 1163 (1977), and respondents have not referred us to any
provision expressly waiving Pennsylvania's Eleventh Amendment immunity. The State now has a statute governing sovereign immunity, includ-
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doctrine of Edelman v. Jordan, supra, the suit is not against
the State because the courts below ordered only prospective
injunctive relief. Second, they assert that the state-law
claim properly was decided under the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction. Respondents rely on decisions of this Court
awarding relief against state officials on the basis of a pendent state-law claim. See, e. g., Siler v. Louisville & Nashing an express preservation of its immunity from suit in federal court:
"Federal courts.-Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be construed
to waive the immunity of the Commonwealth from suit in Federal courts
guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States." 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8521(b) (1980).
We also do not agree with respondents that the presence of the United
States as a plaintiff in this case removes the Eleventh Amendment from
consideration. Although the Eleventh Amendment does not bar the
United States from suing a State in federal court, see, e. g., Monaco v.
Mississippi, 292 U. S. 313, 329 (1934), the United States' presence in the
case for any purpose does not eliminate the State's immunity for all purposes. For example, the fact that the federal court could award injunctive
relief to the United States on federal constitutional claims would not mean
that the court could order the State to pay damages to other plaintiffs. In
any case, we think it clear that the United States does not have standing to
assert the state-law claims of third-parties. Indeed, in this case there was
some question whether the United States had independent authority to assert even the federal-law claims of Pennhurst's residents. The Court of
Appeals declined to decide this question, holding only that, because the
lawsuit already was pending, "[i]ntervention presented no danger that the
federal executive would be initiating a lawsuit that Congress somehow
never intended." 612 F. 2d, at 92. Cf. United States v. Philadelphia,
644 F. 2d 187 (CA3 1980) (absent specific statutory authorization, United
States may not bring suit against city and city police officials to vindicate
citizens' Fourteenth Amendment rights); United States v. Solomon, 563 F.
2d 1121 (CA4 1977) (absent specific statutory authorization, United States
may not bring suit against officials at a state mental hospital to vindicate
patients' Eighth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights). For
these reasons, the applicability of the Eleventh Amendment to respondents' state-law claim is unaffected by the United States' participation in the
case.
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ville R.R. Co., 213 U. S. 175, 193 (1909).
A
We first address the contention that respondents' state-law
claim is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment because it
seeks only prospective relief as defined in Edelman v. Jordan, supra. The Court of Appeals held that if the judgment
below rested on federal law, it could be entered against petitioner state officials under the doctrine established in
Edelman and Young even though the prospective financial
burden was substantial and ongoing. 14 See 673 F. 2d, at 656.
As discussed above, this result has been justified, notwithstanding the obvious impact on the State itself, on the view
that sovereign immunity does not apply because an official
who acts unconstitutionally is "stripped of his official or representative character," Young, 209 U. S., at 160. The Court
of Appeals assumed, and respondents assert, that this reasoning applies as well when the official acts in violation of
state law. This argument misconstrues the basis of the doctrine established in Young and Edelman.
It hardly need be said that the express rationale of Ex
parte Young is not logically persuasive. As the dissent in
Young argued, to enjoin a state attorney general from bringing a suit on behalf of the State is, "for every practical or
legal purpose, to enjoin the State itself." Id., at 199 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Moreover, there is the "well-recognized
irony" that the result of Young is that an official's unconstitutional conduct constitutes state action under the Fourteenth
Although the District Court thus has jurisdiction to grant prospective
relief on the basis of federal law, the scope of that relief is constrained by
principles of comity and federalism. "Where, as here, the exercise of authority by state officials is attacked, federal courts must be constantly
mindful of the 'special delicacy of the adjustment to be preserved between
federal equitable power and State administration of its own law.'" Rizzo
v. Goode, 423 U. S. 362, 378 (1976) (quoting Stefanelli v. Minard, 342
u. s. 117, 120 (1951)).
14
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Amendment but not the Eleventh Amendment. Florida Department of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc.,-- U.S.--,
- - (1982) (opinion of STEVENS, J.). Nonetheless, the
Young doctrine has been accepted as necessary to permit the
federal courts to vindicate federal rights and hold state officials responsible to "the supreme authority of the United
States." Young, 209 U. S., at 160. As JusTICE BRENNAN
has observed, "Ex parte Young was the culmination of efforts
by this Court to harmonize the principles of the Eleventh
Amendment with the effective supremacy of rights and powers secured elsewhere in the Constitution." Perez v.
Ledesma, 401 U. S. 82, 106 (1971) (BRENNAN, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part). Our decisions repeatedly
have emphasized that the Young doctrine rests on the need
to promote the vindication of federal rights.
See, e. g.,
Quern v. Jordan, 440 U. S. 332, 337 (1979); Scheuer v.
Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232,237 (1974); GeorgiaR. & Banking Co.
v. Redwine, 342 U. S. 299, 304 (1952).
The Court also has recognized, however, that the Young
exception should not be applied where unnecessary to promote the supremacy of federal law. This is the significance
of Edelman v. Jordan, supra. We recognized that the prospective relief authorized by Young "has permitted the Civil
War Amendments to the Constitution to serve as a sword,
rather than merely a shield, for those whom they were designed to protect." 415 U. S., at 664. But we declined to
extend Young to encompass retroactive relief, for to do so
would effectively eliminate the constitutional immunity of the
States. Accordingly, we concluded that although the difference between permissible and impermissible relief "will not
in many instances be that between day and night," id., at
667, an award ofretroactive reliefnecessarily "'fall[s] afoul of
the Eleventh Amendment if that basic constitutional provision is to be conceived of as having any present force.'" I d.,
at 665 (quoting Rothstein v. Wyman, 467 F. 2d 226, 237 (CA2
1972) (McGowan, J., sitting by designation), cert. denied, 411

.-
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U. S. 921 (1973)). In sum, Edelman's distinction between
prospective and retroactive relief fulfills the underlying purpose of Ex parte Young while at the same time preserving to
an important degree the constitutional immunity of the
States.
This need to reconcile competing interests is wholly absent, however, when a plaintiff alleges that a state official has
violated state law. In such a case the entire basis for the
doctrine of Young and Edelman disappears. A federal
court's grant of relief against state officials on the basis of
state law, whether prospective or retroactive, does not vindicate the supreme authority of federal law. On the contrary,
it is difficult to think of a greater intrusion on state sovereignty than when a federal court instructs state officials on
how to conform their conduct to state law. Such a result
conflicts directly with the principles of federalism that underlie the Eleventh Amendment. We conclude that Young and
Edelman are inapplicable in a suit against state officials on
the basis of state law.
B
The reasoning of our decisions on sovereign immunity thus
leads to the conclusion that a federal suit against state officials on the basis of state law contravenes the Eleventh
Amendment. In reaching a contrary conclusion, the Court
of Appeals relied principally on a separate line of cases dealing with pendent jurisdiction. The crucial point for the
Court of Appeals was that this Court has granted relief
against state officials on the basis of a pendent state-law
claim. See 673 F. 2d, at 657-658. We therefore must consider the relationship between pendent jurisdiction and the
Eleventh Amendment.
This Court long has held generally that when a federal
court obtains jurisdiction over a federal claim, it may adjudicate other related claims over which the court otherwise
would not have jurisdiction. See, e. g., Mine Workers v.
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Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966); Osborn v. Bank of the
United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 819-823 (1824). The Court also
has held that a federal court may resolve a case solely on the
basis of a pendent state-law claim, see Siler, supra, at
192-193, and that in fact the court usually should do so in
order to avoid federal constitutional questions, see id., at
193; Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis,
J., concurring) ("[I]f a case can be decided on either of two
grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a
question of statutory construction or general law, the Court
will decide only the latter"). Under these principles, it
seems clear that, apart from the possible Eleventh Amendment bar, the Court of Appeals had a proper jurisdictional
basis on which to decide the claim based on Pennsylvania
law. 15 The question therefore is whether the Amendment
applies to this pendent state-law claim.
As the Court of Appeals noted, in Siler and subsequent
cases concerning pendent jurisdiction relief was granted
against state officials on the basis of state-law claims that
were pendent to federal constitutional claims. The Court
never held directly that the rationale of Ex parte Young
should be extended to pendent state-law claims, but rather
appears to have assumed that the Eleventh Amendment simply does not apply to pendent claims. This is illustrated by
Greene v. Louisville & Interurban R. Co., 244 U. S. 499
(1917), in which the plaintiff railroads sued state officials, al16

This does not necessarily mean that pendent jurisdiction properly was
exercised here. "Pendent jurisdiction over state claims [is] a doctrine of
discretion not to be routinely exercised without considering the advantages
of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to the litigants." Hagans
v. Lavine, 415 U. S. 528, 545 (1974). In particular, "[n]eedless decisions
of state law should be avoided both as a ·matter of comity and to promote
justice between the parties, by procuring for them a surer-footed reading
of applicable law." Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U. S. 715, 726 (1966).
Because of our disposition of the case under the Eleventh Amendment, we
need not decide this important comity issue.
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leging that certain tax assessments were excessive under the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Court first rejected the officials' argument under the Eleventh Amendment, finding that
Ex parte Young applied to all constitutional claims against
state officials, regardless of whether the state statute under
which the officials acted was constitutional or unconstitutional. See id., at 507. Having determined that the Eleventh Amendment did not deprive the federal court of jurisdiction over this constitutional question, the Court declared
that the court's jurisdiction extended "to the determination of
all questions involved in the case, including questions of state
law, irrespective of the disposition that may be made of the
federal question, or whether it be found necessary to decide
it at all." Id., at 508. The case then was decided solely on
state-law grounds. Accord, Lousiville & Nashville R .R.
Co . v. Greene, 244 U. S. 522 (1917).
The implicit view thus seems to have been that once jurisdiction is established on the basis of any federal question, no
further Eleventh Amendment inquiry is necessary with respect to other claims raised in the case. We believe this
view is erroneous and contrary to the principles established
in our Eleventh Amendment decisions. "The Eleventh.
Amendment is an explicit limitation on the judicial power of
the United States." Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U. S., at 25. It
deprives a federal court of power to decide certain claims
against States that otherwise would be within the scope of
Art. III's grant of jurisdiction. For example, if a lawsuit
against state officials under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 alleges a constitutional claim, the federal court is barred from awarding
damages against the state treasury even though the claim
arises under the Constitution. See Quern v. Jordan, 440
U. S. 332 (1979). Similarly, if a § 1983 action alleging a constitutional claim is brought directry against a State, the Eleventh Amendment bars a federal court from granting any relief on that claim. See Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U. S. 781
(1978) (per curiam). The Amendment thus is a specific con-
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stitutional bar against hearing evenfederal claims that otherwise would be within the jurisdiction of the federal courts. 16
This constitutional bar applies to pendent claims as well.
A federal court's power over a pendent claim necessarily derives from Art. III, see Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U. S. 1, 9
(1976), and the Eleventh Amendment is an independent limitation on all exercises of Art. III power. See supra, at 7-8.
If we were to hold otherwise, a federal court could award
damages against a State on the basis of a pendent claim.
Our decision in Edelman v. Jordan, supra, makes clear that
pendent jurisdiction does not permit such an evasion of the
immunity guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment. We
there held that "the District Court was correct in exercising
pendent jurisdiction over [plaintiffs'] statutory claim," 415
U. S., at 653, n. 1, but then concluded that the Eleventh
Amendment barred an award of retroactive relief on the
basis of that pendent claim. I d., at 678.
In sum, contrary to the analysis implicit in decisions such
as Greene, supra, neither pendent jurisdiction nor any other
basis of jurisdiction may override the Eleventh Amendment. 17 A federal court must examine each claim in a case to
see if the court's jurisdiction over that claim is barred by the
Eleventh Amendment. We concluded above that a claim
that state officials violated state law in carrying out their official responsibilities is a claim against the State that is protected by the Eleventh Amendment. See supra, at 16. We
now hold that this principle applies as well to state-law claims
brought into federal court under pendent jurisdiction. This
issue has not previously been confronted directly, and we
See, e. g. , Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U. S. 313, 322 (1934) ("[A]lthough a case may arise under the Constitution and laws of the United
States, the judicial power does not extend to it if the suit is sought to be
prosecuted against a State, without her·consent, by one of her own citizens"); Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U. S. 18, 2&-26 (1933).
17
See Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U. S., at 27 ("This is not less a suit against
the State because the bill is ancillary and supplemental.").
16

.-

"
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therefore are not bound by prior decisions assuming a contrary conclusion. "[W]hen questions of jurisdiction have
been passed on in prior decisions sub silentio, this Court has
never considered itself bound when a subsequent case finally
brings the jurisdictional issue before us." Hagans v.
Lavine, 415 U. S. 528, 533, n. 5 (1974). 18

c
Respondents urge that application of the Eleventh Amendment to pendent state-law claims will have a disruptive effect
on litigation against state officials. They argue that the
"considerations of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to litigants" that underlie pendent jurisdiction, see
Gibbs, supra, at 726, counsel against a result that may cause
litigants to split causes of action between state and federal
courts. They also contend that the policy of avoiding unnecessary constitutional decisions will be contravened if plaintiffs choose to forgo their state-law claims and sue only in federal court or alternatively, that the policy of Ex parte Young
will be hindered if plaintiffs choose to forgo their right to a
federal forum and bring all of their claims in state court.
We agree that, depending on the circumstances of the case,
these considerations of policy may be important, 19 but they
may not override the constitutional limitations on the authority of the federal judiciary to adjudicate suits against a State.
8
' See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 671 (1974) ("Having now had
an opportunity to more fully consider the Eleventh Amendment issue after
briefing and argument, we disapprove the Eleventh Amendment holdings
of [certain prior] cases to the extent that they are inconsistent with our
holding today").
19
Petitioners contend that in this case these policy considerations are
outweighed by considerations of comity, arguing that the Court of Appeals
"has authorized a severe intrusion on the right of state officials to run their
own programs, basing that intrusion on nothing more than its view of state
law." Brief for Petitioners 9. In light of our disposition of this case, we
need not balance these competing considerations.
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See Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U. S., at 25-26 ("Considerations
of convenience open no avenue of escape from the [Amendment's] restriction"). 20 In a suit brought by private litigants
against state officials, these constitutional limitations do not
preclude a federal court from granting prospective relief to
vindicate federal law. But the Eleventh Amendment deprives federal courts of power to consider other claims raised
against the State or its officials. Any inconvenience in
choice of forum that may be caused to litigants who wish to
raise both federal and state claims is a necessary consequence
of this limitation on federal judicial power. 21 The constitutional principle of sovereign immunity, embodied in the Eleventh Amendment, demands that claims against state officials
on the basis of state law be resolved in state courts.
IV
Respondents contend that, regardless of the applicability
of the Eleventh Amendment to their state claims against petitioner state officials, the judgment may still be upheld
20
Cf. Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U. S. 1, 14-15 (1976) (Although "considerations of judicial economy" would be served by permitting pendent-party
jurisdiction, "the addition of a completely new party would run counter to
the well-established principle that federal courts, as opposed to state trial
courts of general jurisdiction, are courts of limited jurisdiction marked out
by Congress")
21
This limitation on federal judicial power imposes the same inconvenience on a plaintiff who has certain federal claims that may not be raised
in federal court. Under Edelman v. Jordan, supra, a plaintiff with a
claim for monetary relief against a State on the basis of federal law must
resort to state court. If he wishes to press a related claim for prospective
relief, he must forgo the damages claim, or split his related causes of action
between federal and state courts, or taKe the entire case to state court.
As JUSTICE MARSHALL has observed, the fact that some federal rights
may have to be enforced in a state forum is "a part of the tension inherent
in our system of federalism." Employees v. Missouri Public Health &
Welfare Dept., 411 U. S. 279, 298 (1973) (MARSHALL, J., concurring in
result).
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against petitioner county officials. We are not persuaded.
Even assuming that these officials are not immune from suit
challenging their actions under the MH/MR Act, 22 it is clear
that without the injunction against the state institutions and
officials in this case, an order entered on state-law grounds
necessarily would be limited. The relief substantially concerns Pennhurst, an arm of the State that is operated by
state officials. Moreover, funding for the county mental retardation programs comes almost entirely from the State, see
Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 50, §§4507-4509 (Purdon 1969 and Supp.
1982), and the costs of the masters have been borne by the
State, see 446 F. Supp., at 1327. Finally, the MH/MR Act
contemplates that the state and county officials will cooperate
We have held that the Eleventh Amendment does not apply to "counties and similar municipal corporations." Mt. Healthy City School District
v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274, 280 (1977); see Lincoln County v. Luning, 133
U. S. 529, 530 (1890). At the same time, we have applied the Amendment
to bar relief against county officials "in order to protect the state treasury
from liability that would have had essentially the same practical consequences as a judgment against the State itself." Lake Country Estates,
Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U. S. 391, 401 (1979). See,
e. g., Edelman v. Jordan, supra (Eleventh Amendment bars suit against
state and county officials for retroactive award of welfare benefits). The
Courts of Appeals are in general agreement that a suit against officials of a
county or other governmental entity is barred if the relief obtained runs
against the State. See, e. g., Moore v. Tangipahoa Parish School Board,
594 F. 2d 489, 493 (CA5 1979); Carey v. Quern, 588 F. 2d 230, 233-234
(CA71978); Incarcerated Men of Allen County Jail v. Fair, 507 F. 2d 281,
287-288 (CA6 1974); Harris v. Tooele County School District, 471 F. 2d
218, 220 (CAlO 1973). Given that the actions of the county commissioners
and mental health adminstrators are dependent on funding from the State,
it may be that relief granted against these county officials, when exercising
their functions under the MH/MR Act, effectively runs against the State.
Cf. Farr v. Chesney, 441 F. Supp. 127, 130-132 (MD Pa. 1977) (holding
that Pennsylvania county commissioners, acting as members of the board
of the county office of mental health and retardation, may not be sued for
back pay under the Eleventh Amendment). We need not decide this issue
in light of our disposition above.
22
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in operating mental retardation programs. See In re
Schmidt, 494 Pa. 86, 95--96, 429 A. 2d 631, 635--636 (1981).
In short, the present judgment could not be sustained on the
basis of the state-law obligations of petitioner county officials. Indeed, any relief granted against the county officials
on the basis of the state statute would be partial and incomplete at best. Such an ineffective enforcement of state law
would not appear to serve the purposes of efficiency, convenience, and fairness that must inform the exercise of pendent
jurisdiction.

v

The Court of Appeals upheld the judgment of the District
Court solely on the basis of Pennsylvania's MH/MR Act.
We hold that the courts lacked jurisdiction to enjoin petitioner state institutions and state officials on the basis of this
state law. The District Court also rested its decision on the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. See supra, at 2. On remand the
Court of Appeals may consider to what extent, if any, the
judgment may be sustained on these bases. 23 The court also
may consider whether relief may be granted to respondents
under the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of
Rights Act, 42 U. S. C. §§ 6011, 6063. The judgment of the
Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.
;

On the Fourteenth Amendment issue, the court should consider
Youngberg v. Romeo,- U. S . - (1982), a decision that was not available when the District Court issued its decision.
23
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JuSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether a federal court
may award injunctive relief against state officials on the basis
of state law.
I
This litigation, here for the second time, concerns the conditions of care at petitioner Pennhurst State School and Hospital, a Pennsylvania institution for the care of the mentally
retarded. See Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1 (1981). Although the litigation's history is set forth in detail in our prior opinion, see id., at 5-10,
it is necessary for purposes of this decision to review that
history.
This suit originally was brought in 1974 by respondent
Terri Lee Halderman, a resident of Pennhurst, in the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Ultimately, plaintiffs included a class consisting of all persons
who were or might become residents of Pennhurst; the Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Citizens (P ARC); and the
United States. Defendants were Pennhurst and various
Pennhurst officials; the Pennsylvania Department of Public
Welfare and several of its officials; and various county commissioners, county mental retardation administrators, and
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other officials of five Pennsylvania counties surrounding
Pennhurst. Respondents' amended complaint charged that
conditions at Pennhurst violated the class members' rights
under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 87 Stat. 394, as amended, 29
U. S. C. § 794 (1976 ed. and Supp. V); the Developmentally
Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U. S. C.
§§ 6001-6081 (1976 ed. and Supp. V); and the Pennsylvania
Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966 (the
"MH/MR Act"), Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 50, §§ 4101-4704
(Purdon 1969 and Supp. 1982). Both damages and injunctive
relief were sought.
In 1977, following a lengthy trial, the District Court rendered its decision. 446 F. Supp. 1295 (1977). As noted in
our prior opinion, the court's findings were undisputed: "Conditions at Pennhurst are not only dangerous, with the residents often physically abused or drugged by staff members,
but also inadequate for the 'habilitation' of the retarded. Indeed, the court found that the physicial, intellectual, and
emotional skills of some residents have deteriorated at
Pennhurst." 451 U. S., at 7 (footnote omitted). The District Court held that these conditions violated each resident's
right to "minimally adequate habilitation" under the Due
Process Clause and the MH/MR Act, see 446 F. Supp., at
1314-1318, 1322-1323; "free~om from harm" under the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, see id., at 1320-1321;
and "nondiscriminatory habilitation" under the Equal Protection Clause and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, see id., at
1321-1324. Furthermore, the court found that "due process
demands that if a state undertakes the habilitation of a retarded person, it must do so in the least restrictive setting
consistent with that individual's habilitative needs." I d., at
1319 (emphasis added). After concluding that the large size
of Pennhurst prevented it from providing the necessary
habilitation in the least restrictive environment, the court ordered "that immediate steps be taken to remove the retarded
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residents from Pennhurst." I d., at 1325. Petitioners were
ordered "to provide suitable community living arrangements" for the class members, id., at 1326, and the court appointed a Special Master "with the power and duty to plan,
organize, direct, supervise and monitor the implementation
of this and any further Orders of the Court." Ibid.'
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed most
of the District Court's judgment. 612 F. 2d 84 (1979) (en
bane). It agreed that respondents had a right to habilitation
in the least restrictive environment, but it grounded this
right solely on the "bill of rights" provision in the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42
U. S. C. § 6010. See 612 F. 2d, at 95-100, 104-107. The
court did not consider the constitutional issues or § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act, and while it affirmed the District Court's
holding that the MH/MR Act provides a right to adequate
habilitation, see id., at 100-103, the court did not decide
whether that state right encompassed a right to treatment in
the least restrictive setting.
On the question of remedy, the Court of Appeals affirmed
except as to the District Court's order that Pennhurst be
closed. The court observed that some patients would be unable to adjust to life outside an institution, and it determined
that none of the legal provisions relied on by plaintiffs preclu<ied institutionalization. Id., at 114-115. It therefore remanded for "individual determinations by the [District
Court], or by the Special Master, as to the appropriateness of
an improved Pennhurst for each such patient," guided by "a
presumption in favor of placing individuals in [community living arrangements]." Ibid. 2
' The District Court determined that the individual defendants had acted
in good faith and therefore were immune from the damage claims. 446 F.
Supp, at 1324.
2
In a companion case, the 8ourt of Appeals affirmed the District
Court's denial of a motion to intervene for purposes of appeal by the
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On remand the District Court established detailed procedures for determining the proper residential placement for
each patient. A team consisting of the patient, his parents
or guardian, and his case manager must establish an individual habilitation plan providing for habilitation of the patient
in a designated community living arrangement. The plan is
subject to review by the Special Master. A second master,
called the Hearing Master, is available to conduct hearings,
upon request by the resident, his parents or his advocate, on
the question whether the services of Pennhurst would be
more beneficial to the resident than the community living arrangement provided in the resident's plan. The Hearing
Master then determines where the patient should reside,
subject to possible review by the District Court. See App.
123a-134a (Order of April 24, 1980). 3
This Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals,
finding that 42 U. S. C. § 6010 did not create any substantive
rights. 451 U. S. 1 (1981). We remanded the case to the
Court of Appeals to determine if the remedial order could be
supported on the basis of state law, the Constitution, or§ 504
of the Rehabilitation Act. See id., at 31. 4 We also rePennhurst Parents-Staff Association, finding the denial harmless error.
See 612 F. 2d 131 (1979) (en bane). The Association subsequently was
granted leave to intervene and is a petitioner in this Court.
3
On July 1, 1981, Pennsylvania enacted an appropriations bill providing
that only $35,000 would be paid for the Masters' expenses for the fiscal
year July 1981 to June 1982. The District Court held Pennsylvania and its
Secretary of the Department of Public Welfare in contempt, and imposed a
fine of $10,000 per day. Pennsylvania paid the fines, and the contempt
was purged on January 8, 1982. On appeal the Court of Appeals affirmed
the contempt order. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hospital,
673 F. 2d 628 (1982), cert. pending, No. 81-2363.
• Three Justices dissented from the Court's construction of the Act, but
concluded that the District Court should not have adopted the "far-reaching ·remedy'' of appointing "a Special Master to decide which of the
Pennhurst inmates should remain and which should be moved to community-based facilities. . . . [T]he court should not have assumed the task of
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manded for consideration of whether any relief was available
under other provisions of the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and B1ll of Rights Act. See id., at 27-30 (discussing
42 U. S. C. §§ 6011(a), 6063(b)(5)).
On remand the Court of Appeals affirmed its prior judgment in its entirety. 673 F. 2d 647 (1982) (en bane). It determined that in a recent decision the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania had "spoken definitively" in holding that the
MH/MR Act required the State to adopt the "least restrictive
environment" approach for the care of the mentally retarded.
Id., at 651 (citing In re Schmidt, 494 Pa. 86, 429 A. 2d 631
(1981)). The Court of Appeals concluded that this state statute fully supported its prior judgment, and therefore did not
reach the remaining issues of federal law. It also rejected
petitioners' argument that the Eleventh Amendment barred
a federal court from considering this pendent state-law claim.
The court noted that the Amendment did not bar a federal
court from granting prospective injunctive relief against
state officials on the basis of federal claims, see 673 F. 2d, at
656 (citing Ex Parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908)), and concluded that the same result obtained with respect to a
pendent state-law claim. It reasoned that because Siler v.
Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 213 U. S. 175 (1909), an important case in the development of the doctrine of pendent
jurisdiction, also involved state officials, "there cannot be ...
an Eleventh Amendment exception to that rule." 673 F. 2d,
at 658. 5 Finally, the court rejected petitioners' argument
that it should have abstained from deciding the state-law
managing Pennhurst .... " 451 U. S., at 54 (WHITE J., dissenting in
part).
6
The Court of Appeals also noted that "the United States is an intervening plaintiff ... against which even the state itself cannot successfully
plead the Eleventh Amendment as a bar to jurisdiction," and that "the
counties, even as juridical entities, do not fall within the coverage of the
Eleventh Amendment. Against those defendants even money damages
may be awarded." 673 F. 2d, at 656 (citation omitted).
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claim under principles of comity, see id., at 659--660, andrefused to consider petitioners' objections to the District
Court's use of a special master, see id., at 651 and n. 10.
Three judges dissented in part, arguing that under principles
of federalism and comity the establishment of a special master to supervise compliance was an abuse of discretion. See
id., at 662 (Seitz, C.J., joined by Hunter, J., dissenting in
part); ibid. (Garth, J., concurring in part and dissenting as to
relief). See also id., at 661 (Aldisert, J., concurring) (seriously questioning the propriety of the order appointing the
Special Master, but concluding that a retroactive reversal of
that order would be meaningless). 6
We granted certiorari,-- U. S. - - (1982), and now reverse and remand.
II
Petitioners raise three challenges to the judgment of the
Court of Appeals: (i) the Eleventh Amendment prohibited
the District Court from ordering state officials to conform
their conduct to state law; (ii) the doctrine of comity prohibited the District Court from issuing its injunctive relief; and
(iii) the District Court abnsed its discretion in appointing two
masters to supervise the decisions of state officials in implementing state law. We need not reach the latter two issues,
for we find the Eleventh Amendment challenge dispositive.
A

Article III, § 2 of the Constitution provides that the federal
judicial power extends, inter alia, to controversies "between
a State and Citizens of another State." Relying on this language, this Court in 1793 assumed original jurisdiction over a
suit brought by a citizen of South Carolina against the State
of Georgia. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419 (1793). The
• The Office of the Special Master was abolished in December 1982.
See App. 220a (Order of August 12, 1982). The Hearing Master remains
in operation.
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decision "created such a shock of surprise that the Eleventh
Amendment was at once proposed and adopted." Monaco v.
Mississippi, 292 U. S. 313, 325 (1934). The Amendment
provides:
"The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States
by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects
of any Foreign State."
The Amendment's language overruled the particular result
in Chisholm, but this Court has recognized that its greater
significance lies in its affirmation that the fundamental principle of sovereign immunity limits the grant of judicial authority in Art. III. Thus, in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1
(1890), the Court held that, despite the limited terms of the
Eleventh Amendment, a federal court could not entertain a
suit brought by a citizen against his own State. After reviewing the constitutional debates concerning the scope of
Art. III, the Court determined that federal jurisdiction over
suits against unconsenting States "was not contemplated by
the Constitution when establishing the judicial power of the
United States." !d., at 15. See Monaco v. Mississippi,
supra, at 322-323 (1934). 7 In short, the principle of sovereign immunity is a constitutional limitation on the federal judicial power established in Art. III:
"That a State may not be sued without its consent is a
fundamental rule of jurisprudence having so important a
7
See Employees v. Missouri Public Health Dep't, 411 U. S. 279,
291-292 (1973) (MARSHALL, J., concurring in judgment) (The Eleventh
Amendment "clarif[ied] the intent of the Framers concerning the reach of
federal judicial power" and "restore[d] the original understanding" that
States could not be made unwilling defendants in federal court). See also
Nevada v. Hall, 440 U. S. 410, 430-431 (1979) (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting);
id., at 437 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting).
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bearing upon the construction of the Constitution of the
United States that it has become established by repeated
decisions of this court that the entire judicial power
granted by the Constitution does not embrace authority
to entertain a suit brought by private parties against a
State without consent given: not one brought by citizens
of another State, or by citizens or subjects of a foreign
State, because of the Eleventh Amendment; and not
even one brought by its own citizens, because of the fundamental rule of which the Amendment is but an exemplification." E x parte State of New York No. 1, 256
U. S. 490, 497 (1921) (emphasis added). 8
A sovereign's immunity may be waived, and the Court consistently has held that a State may consE;!nt to suit against it
in federal court. See, e. g., Clark v. Barnard, 108 U. S.
436, 447 (1883). We have insisted, however, that the State's
consent be unequivocally expressed. See, e. g., Edelman v.
Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 673 (1974). Similarly, although Congress has power with respect to the rights protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment immunity, see Fitzpatrick v. Bitker, 427 U. S. 445
(1976), we have required an unequivocal expression of congressional intent to "overturn the constitutionally guaranteed immunity of the several States." Quern v. Jordan, 440
U. S. 332, 342 (1979) (holding that 42 U. S. C. § 1983 does not
override States' Eleventh Amendment immunity). Our reluctance to infer that a State's immunity from suit in the federal courts has been negated stems from recognition of the
8
The limitation deprives federal courts of any jurisdiction to entertain
such claims, and thus may be raised at any point in a proceeding. "The
Eleventh Amendment declares a policy and sets forth an explicit limitation
on federal judicial power of such compelling force that this Court will consider the issue arising under this Amendment ... even though urged for
the first time in this Court." Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury ,

323

u. s. 459, 467 (1945).
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vital role of the doctrine of sovereign immunity in our federal
system. A State's constitutional interest in immunity encompasses not merely whether it may be sued, but where it
may be sued. 9 As JUSTICE MARSHALL has noted well, "(b]ecause of the problems of federalism inherent in making one
sovereign appear against its will in the courts of the other, a
restriction upon the exercise of the federal judicial power has
long been considered to be appropriate in a case such as this."
Employees v. Missouri Public Health & Welfare Dep't, 411
U. S. 279, 294 (1973) (MARSHALL, J., concurring in result). 10
Accordingly, in deciding this case we must be guided by
"[t]he principles of federalism that inform Eleventh Amendment doctrine." Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678, 691 (1978).
B
This Court's decisions thus establish that "an unconsenting
State is immune from suits brought in federal courts by her
own citizens as well as by citizens of another state." Em9
For this reason, the Court consistently has held that a State's waiver
of sovereign immunity in its own courts is not a waiver of the Eleventh
Amendment immunity in the federal courts. See, e. g., Florida Department of Health v. Florida Nursing Home Assn. 450 U. S. 147, 150 (1981)
(per curiam). "[I]t is not consonant with our dual system for the federal
courts ... to read the consent to embrace federal as well as state courts .
. . . [A] clear declaration of the state's intention to submit its fiscal problems to other courts than those of its own creation must be found." Great
Northern Life Insurance Co. v. Read, 322 U. S. 47, 54 (1944).
10
See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S., at 418-419 (States were "vitally interested" in whether they would be subject to suit in the federal courts, and
the debates about state immunity focused on the question of federal judicial
power). Cf. id., at 430-431 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting) (sovereign immunity is "a guarantee that is implied as an essential component of federalism"
and is "sufficiently fundamental to our federal structure to have implicit
constitutional dimension"); id., at 437 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting) ("[T]he
States that ratified the Eleventh Amendment thought that they were
putting an end to the possibility of individual States as unconsenting defendants in foreign jurisdictions").

.-

,.
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ployees, supra, at 280. There may be a question, however,
whether a particular suit in fact is a suit against a State. It
is clear, of course, that in the absence of consent a suit in
which the State or one of its agencies or departments is
named as the defendant is proscribed by the Eleventh
Amendment. See, e. g., Florida Department of Health v.
Florida Nursing Home Assn, 450 U. S. 147 (1981) (per
curiam); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U. S. 781 (1978) (per
curiam). This jurisdictional bar applies regardless of the nature of the relief sought. See, e. g., Missouri v. Fiske, 290
U. S. 18, 27 (1933) ("Expressly applying to suits in equity as
well as at law, the Amendment necessarily embraces demands for the enforcement of equitable rights and the prosecution of equitable remedies when these are asserted and
prosecuted by an individual against a State").
When the suit is brought only against state officials, a
question arises as to whether that suit is a suit against the
State itself. Although prior decisions of this Court have not
been entirely consistent on this issue, certain principles are
well established. The Eleventh Amendment bars a suit
against state officials when "the state is the real, substantial
party in interest." Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U. S. 459, 464 (1945). See, e. g., In re Ayers, 123
U. S. 443, 487-492 (1887); Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U. S.
711, 720-723, 727-728 (1882). Thus, "[t]he general rule is
that relief sought nominally against an officer is in fact
against the sovereign if the decree would operate against the
latter." Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U. S. 57, 58 (1963) (per
curiam). 11 And, as when the State itself is named as the defendant, a suit against state officials that is in fact a suit
11
See also Dugan v. Rank, 372 U. S. 609, 620 (1963) ("The general rule
is that a suit is against the sovereign if 'the judgment sought would expend
itself on the public treasury or domain, or interfere with the public administration,' or if the effect of the judgment would be 'to restrain the Government from acting, or to compel it to act.'") (citations omitted).
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against a State is barred regardless of whether it seeks damages or injunctive relief. See Cory v. White, - - U. S.
-,-(1982).
The Court has recognized an important exception to this
general rule: a suit challenging the constitutionality of a state
official's action is not one against the State. 12 This was the
holding in Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908), in which a
federal court enjoined the Attorney General of the State of
Minnesota from bringing suit to enforce a state statute that
allegedly violated the Fourteenth Amendment. This Court
held that the Eleventh Amendment did not prohibit issuance
of this injunction:
"The act to be enforced is alleged to be unconstitutional,
and if it be so, the use of the name of the State to enforce
an unconstitutional act to the injury of complainants is a
proceeding without the authority of and one which does
not affect the State in its sovereign or governmental capacity. It is simply an illegal act upon the part of a state
official in attempting by the use of the name of the State
to enforce a legislative enactment which is void because
12
The Court also has held that sovereign immunity does not apply in a
suit against an official who allegedly acted entirely outside his official authority. See, e. g., Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337
U. S. 682, 702 (1949). This ultra vires exception is quite limited, governing only those situations in which a government official acts without any
official justification. See, e. g., Florida Department of State v. Treasure
Salvors, Inc.,- U. S. - , - - (1982) (opinion of STEVENS, J.) (test is
whether the official's conduct was undertaken "without any authority
whatever"); id., at-- (WHITE, J., concurring in judgment in part and
dissenting in part) (test is whether there was no "colorable basis for the
exercise of authority by state officials"). This exception clearly is inapplicable in this case. Even if petitioner officials violated state law in carrying
out some of their official duties, they unquestionably acted under colorable
state authority in operating Pennhurst and the State's system of care for
the mentally retarded. In short, these officials were not acting ultra vires, but rather were "exercising the powers delegated to [them] by the
sovereign." Larson, supra, at 693.

;

,.
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unconstitutional. If the act which the state Attorney
General seeks to enforce be a violation of the Federal
Constitution, the officer in proceeding under such enactment comes into conflict with the superior authority of
that Constitution, and he is in that case stripped of his
official or representative character and is subjected to
the consequences of his official conduct. The State has
no power to impart to him any immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States."
209 U. S., at 159-160.
The Court subsequently has made clear that, even where this
exception applies, the rule that a suit against state officials
constitutes a suit against the State continues to have force.
Thus, in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651 (1974), the Court
held that in a suit against state officials "a federal court's remedial power, consistent with the Eleventh Amendment, is
necessarily limited to prospective injunctive relief, and may
not include a retroactive award which requires the payment
of funds from the state treasury." Id., at 677 (citations
omitted).
III
With these principles in mind, we now turn to the question
whether the claim that petitioners violated state law in carrying out their official duties at Pennhurst is one against the
State and therefore barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
Respondents advance two principal arguments in support of
the judgment below. 13 First, they contend that under the
We reject respondents' additional contention that Pennsylvania has
waived its immunity from suit in federal court. At the time the suit was
filed, suits against Pennsylvania were permitted only where expressly authorized by the legislature, see, e. g., Preach v. Commonwealth, 471 Pa.
558, 370 A. 2d 1163 (1977), and respondents have not referred us to any
provision expressly waiving Pennsylvania's Eleventh Amendment immunity. The State now has a statute governing sovereign immunity, including an express preservation of its immunity from suit in federal court:
13
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doctrine of Edelman v. Jordan, supra, the suit is not against
the State because the courts below ordered only prospective
injunctive relief. Second, they assert that the state-law
claim properly was decided under the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction. Respondents rely on decisions of this Court
awarding relief against state officials on the basis of a pendent state-law claim. See, e. g., Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 213 U. S. 175, 193 (1909).
A

We first address the contention that respondents' state-law
claim is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment because it
seeks only prospective relief as defined in Edelman v. Jordan, supra. The Court of Appeals held that if the judgment
below rested on federal law, it could be entered against peti- .
tioner state officials under the doctrine established in
Edelman and Young even though the prospective financial
burden was substantial and ongoing. 14 See 673 F. 2d, at 656.
'"Federal courts.-Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be construed
to waive the immunity of the Commonwealth from suit in Federal courts
guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States." 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8521(b) (1980).
We also do not agree with respondents that the presence of the United
States as a plaintiff in this case removes the Eleventh Amendment from
consideration. Although the Eleventh Amendment does not bar the
United States from suing a State in federal court, see, e. g., Monaco v.
Mississippi, 292 U. S. 313, 329 (1934), the United States' presence in the
case for any purpose does not eliminate the State's immunity for all purposes. For example, the fact that the federal court could award injunctive
relief to the United States on federal constitutional claims would not mean
that the court could order the State to pay damages to other plaintiffs. In
any case, we think it clear that the United States does not have standing to
assert the state-law claims of third-parties. For these reasons, the applicability of the Eleventh Amendment to respondents' state-law claim is
unaffected by the United States' participation in the case.
14
Although the District Court thus has jurisdiction to grant prospective
relief on the basis of federal law, the scope of that relief is constrained by

. .

o111. 1s s ro "

81-2101-0PINION
14

PENNHURST STATE SCHOOL & HOSP. v. HALDERMAN

The court assumed, and respondents assert, that this reasoning applies as well when the official acts in violation of state
law. This argument misconstrues the basis of the doctrine
established in Young and Edelman.
As discussed above, the injunction in Young was justified,
notwithstanding the obvious impact on the State itself, on the
view that sovereign immunity does not apply because an official who acts unconstitutionally is "stripped of his official or
representative character," Young, 209 U. S., at 160. This
rationale, of course, created the "well-recognized irony" that
an official's unconstitutional conduct constitutes state action
under the Fourteenth Amendment but not the Eleventh
Amendment. Florida Department of State v. Treasure
Salvors, Inc., - - U. S. - - , - - (1982) (opinion of STEVENS, J.). Nonetheless, the Young doctrine has been accepted as necessary to permit the federal courts to vindicate
federal rights and hold state officials responsible to "the supreme authority of the United States." Young, 209 U. S.,
at 160. As JUSTICE BRENNAN has observed, "Ex parte
Young was the culmination of efforts by this Court to harmonize the principles of the Eleventh Amendment with the
effective supremacy of rights and powers secured elsewhere
in the Constitution." Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U. S. 82, 106
(1971) (BRENNAN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Our decisions repeatedly have emphasized that the
Young doctrine rests on the need to promote the vindication
See, e. g., Quern v. Jordan, 440 U. S.
of federal rights.
332, 337 (1979); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232, 237 (1974);
Georgia R. & Banking Co. v. Redwine, 342 U. S. 299, 304
principles of comity and federalism. "Where, as here, the exercise of authority by state officials is attacked, federal courts must be constantly
mindful of the 'special delicacy of the adjustment to be preserved between
federal equitable power and State administration of its own law."' Rizzo
v. Goode, 423 U. S. 362, 378 (1976) (quoting Stefanelli v. Minard , 342
u. s. 117, 120 (1951)).
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(1952).
The Court also has recognized, however, that the Young
exception should not be applied where unnecessary to promote the supremacy of federal law. This is the significance
of Edelman v. Jordan, supra. We recognized that the prospective relief authorized by Young "has permitted the Civil
War Amendments to the Constitution to serve as a sword,
rather than merely a shield, for those whom they were designed to protect." 415 U. S., at 664. But we declined to
extend Young to encompass retroactive relief, for to do so
would effectively eliminate the constitutional immunity of the
States. Accordingly, we concluded that although the difference between permissible and impermissible relief "will not
in many instances be that between day and night," id., at
667, an award of retroactive relief necessarily '"fall[s] afoul of
the Eleventh Amendment if that basic constitutional provision is to be conceived of as having any present force."' Id.,
at 665 (quoting Rothstein v. Wyman, 467 F. 2d 226, 237 (CA2
1972) (McGowan, J., sitting by designation), cert. denied, 411
U. S. 921 (1973)). In sum, Edelman's distinction between
prospective and retroactive relief fulfills the underlying purpose of Ex parte Young while at the same time preserving to
an important degree the constitutional immunity of the
States.
This need to reconcile competing interests is wholly absent, however, when a plaintiff alleges that a state official has
violated state law. In such a case the entire basis for the
doctrine of Young and Edelman disappears. A federal
court's grant of relief against state officials on the basis of
state law, whether prospective or retroactive, does not vindicate the supreme authority of federal law. On the contrary,
it is difficult to think of a greater intrusion on state sovereignty than when a federal court instructs state officials on
how to conforin their conduct to state law. Such a result
conflicts directly with the principles of federalism that underlie the Eleventh Amendment. We conclude that Young and
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Edelman are inapplicable in a suit against state officials on
the basis of state law.
B
The reasoning of our decisions on sovereign immunity thus
leads to the conclusion that a federal suit against state officials on the basis of state law contravenes the Eleventh
Amendment. In reaching a contrary conclusion, the Court
of Appeals relied principally on a separate line of cases dealing with pendent jurisdiction. The crucial point for the
Court of Appeals was that this Court has granted relief
against state officials on the basis of a pendent state-law
claim. See 673 F. 2d, at 657-658. We therefore must consider the relationship between pendent jurisdiction and the
Eleventh Amendment.
This Court long has held generally that when a federal
court obtains jurisdiction over a federal claim, it may adjudicate other related claims over which the court otherwise
would not have jurisdiction. See, e. g., Mine Workers v.
Gibbs, 383 U. S. 715, 726 (1966); Osborn v. Bank of the
United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 819-823 (1824). The Court also
has held that a federal court may resolve a case solely on the
basis of a pendent state-law claim, see Siler, supra, at
192-193, and that in fact the court usually should do so in
order to avoid federal constitutional questions, see id., at
193; Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis,
J., concurring) ("[I]f a case can be decided on either of two
grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a
question of statutory construction or general law, the Court
will decide only the latter"). Under these principles, it
seems clear that, apart from the possible Eleventh Amendment bar, the Court of Appeals had a proper jurisdictional
basis on which to decide the claim based on Pennsylvania
law. 15 The question therefore is whether the Amendment
applies to this pendent state-law claim.
16

This does not necessarily mean that pendent jurisdiction properly was
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As the Court of Appeals noted, in Siler and subsequent
cases concerning pendent jurisdiction relief was granted
against state officials on the basis of state-law claims that
were pendent to federal constitutional claims. The Court
never held directly that the rationale of Ex parte Young
should be extended to pendent state-law claims, but rather
appears to have assumed that the Eleventh Amendment simply does not apply to pendent claims. This is illustrated by
Greene v. Louisville & Interurban R. Co., 244 U. S. 499
(1917), in which the plaintiff railroads sued state officials, alleging that certain tax assessments were excessive under the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Court first rejected the officials' argument under the Eleventh Amendment, finding that
Ex parte Young applied to all constitutional claims against
state officials, regardless of whether the state statute under
which the officials acted was constitutional or unconstitutional. See id., at 507. Having determined that the Eleventh Amendment did not deprive the federal court of jurisdiction over this constitutional question, the Court declared
that the court's jurisdiction extended "to the determination of
all questions involved in the case, including questions of state
law, irrespective of the disposition that may be made of the
federal question, or whether it be found necessary to decide
it at all." I d., at 508. The case then was decided solely on
state-law grounds. Accord, Lousiville & Nashville R.R.
Co. v. Greene, 244 U. S. 522 (1917).
The implicit view thus seems to have been that once jurisexercised here. "Pendent jurisdiction over state claims [is] a doctrine of
discretion not to be routinely exercised without considering the advantages
of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to the litigants." Hagans
v. Lavine, 415 U. S. 528, 545 (1974). In particular, "[n]eedless decisions
of state law should be avoided both as a matter of comity and to promote
justice between the parties, by procuring for them a surer-footed reading
of applicable law." Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U. S. 715, 726 (1966).
Because of our disposition of the case under the Eleventh Amendment, we
need not decide this important comity issue.
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diction is established on the basis of any federal question, no
further Eleventh Amendment inquiry is necessary with respect to other claims raised in the case. We believe this
view is erroneous and contrary to the principles established
in our Eleventh Amendment decisions. "The Eleventh
Amendment is ~n explicit limitation on the judicial power of
the United States." Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U. S., at 25. It
deprives a federal court of power to decide certain claims
against States that otherwise would be within the scope ·of
Art. III's grant of jurisdiction. For example, if a lawsuit
against state officials under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 alleges a constitutional claim, the federal court is barred from awarding
damages against the state treasury even though the claim
arises under the Constitution. See Quem v. Jordan, 440
U. S. 332 (1979). Similarly, if a§ 1983 action alleging a constitutional claim is brought directly against a State, the Eleventh Amendment bars a federal court from granting any relief on that claim. See Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U. S. 781
(1978) (per curiam). The Amendment thus is a specific constitutional bar against hearing even federal claims that otherwise would be within the jurisdiction of the federal courts. 16
This constitutional bar applies to pendent claims as well.
A federal court's power over a pendent claim necessarily derives from Art. III, see Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U. S. 1, 9
(1976), and the Eleventh Amendment is an independent limitation on all exercises of Art. III power. See supra, at 7-8.
If we were to hold otherwise, a federal court could award
damages against a State on the basis of a pendent claim.
Our decision in Edelman v. Jordan, supra, makes clear that
pendent jurisdiction does not permit such an evasion of the
See, e. g., Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322 (1934) ("[A]lthough a case may arise under the Constitution and laws of the United
States, the judicial power does not extend to it if the suit is sought to be
prosecuted against a State, without her consent, by one of her own citizens"); Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U. S. 18, 25-26 (1933).
16
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immunity guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment. We
there held that "the District Court was correct in exercising
pendent jurisdiction over [plaintiffs'] statutory claim," 415
U. S., at 653, n. 1, but then concluded that the Eleventh
Amendment barred an award of retroactive relief on the
basis of that pendent claim. I d., at 678.
In sum, contrary to the analysis implicit in decisions such
as Greene, supra, neither pendent jurisdiction nor any other
basis of jurisdiction may override the Eleventh Amendment. 17 A federal court must examine each claim in a case to
see if the court's jurisdiction over that claim is barred by the
Eleventh Amendment. We concluded above that a claim
that state officials violated state law in carrying out their official responsibilities is a claim against the State that is protected by the Eleventh Amendment. See supra, at 16. We
now hold that this principle applies as well to state-law claims
brought into federal court under pendent jurisdiction. This
issue has not previously been confronted directly, and we
therefore are not bound by prior decisions assuming a contrary conclusion. "[W]hen questions of jurisdiction have
been passed on in prior decisions sub silentio, this Court has
never considered itself bound when a subsequent case finally
brings the jurisdictional issue before us." Hagans v.
Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 533, n. 5 (1974). 18

c
Respondents urge that application of the Eleventh Amendment to pendent state-law claims will have a disruptive effect
See Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U. S., at 27 ("This is not less a suit against
the State because the bill is ancillary and supplemental. ").
18
See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 671 (1974) ("Having now had
an opportunity to more fully consider the Eleventh Amendment issue after
briefing and argument, we disapprove the Eleventh Amendment holdings
of [certain prior] cases to the extent that they are inconsistent with our
holding today").
17
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on litigation against state officials. They argue that the
"considerations of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to litigants" that underlie pendent jurisdiction, see
Gibbs, supra, at 726, counsel against a result that may cause
litigants to split causes of action between state and federal
courts. They also contend that the policy of avoiding unnecessary constitutional decisions will be contravened if plaintiffs choose to forgo their state-law claims and sue only in federal court or, alternatively, that the policy of Ex parte Young
will be hindered if plaintiffs choose to forgo their right to a
federal forum and bring all of their claims in state court.
We agree that, depending on the circumstances of the case,
these considerations of policy may be important, 19 but they
may not override the constitutional limitations on the authority of the federal judiciary to adjudicate suits against a State.
See Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U. S., at 25-26 ("Considerations
of convenience open no avenue of escape from the [Amendment's] restriction"). 20 In a suit brought by private litigants
against state officials, these constitutional limitations do not
preclude a federal court from granting prospective relief to
vindicate federal law. But the Eleventh Amendment deprives federal courts of power to consider other claims raised
against the State or its officials. Any inconvenience in
choice of forum that may be caused to litigants who wish to
Petitioners contend that in this case these policy considerations are
outweighed by considerations of comity, arguing that the Court of Appeals
"has authorized a severe intrusion on the right of state officials to run their
own programs, basing that intrusion on nothing more than its view of state
law." Brief for Petitioners 9. In light of our disposition of this case, we
need not balance these competing considerations.
20
Cf. Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U. S. 1, 14-15 (1976) (Although "considerations of judicial economy" would be served by permitting pendent-party
jurisdiction, "the addition of a completely new party would run counter to
the well-established principle that federal courts, as opposed to state trial
courts of general jurisdiction, are courts of limited jurisdiction marked out
by Congress")
19
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raise both federal and state claims is a necessary consequence
of this limitation on federal judicial power. 21 The constitutional principle of sovereign immunity, embodied in the Eleventh Amendment, demands that claims against state officials
on the basis of state law be resolved in state courts.
IV
Respondents contend that, regardless of the applicability
of the Eleventh Amendment to their state claims against petitioner state officials, the judgment may still be upheld
against petitioner county officials. We are not persuaded.
Even assuming that these officials are not immune from suit
challenging their actions under the MH/MR Act, 22 it is clear
This limitation on federal judicial power imposes the same inconvenience on a plaintiff who has certain federal claims that may not be raised
in federal court. Under Edelman v. Jordan, supra, a plaintiff with a
claim for monetary relief against a State on the basis of federal law must
resort to state court. If he wishes to press a related claim for prospective
relief, he must forgo the damages claim, or split his related causes of action
between federal and state courts, or take the entire case to state court.
As JUSTICE MARSHALL has observed, the fact that some federal rights
may have to be enforced in a state forum is "a part of the tension inherent
in our system of federalism." Employees v. Missouri Public Health &
Welfare Dept., 411 U. S. 279, 298 (1973) (MARSHALL, J., concurring in
result).
22
We have held that the Eleventh Amendment does not apply to "counties and similar municipal corporations." Mt. Healthy City School District
v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274, 280 (1977); see Lincoln County v. Luning, 133
U. S. 529, 530 (1890). At the same time, we have applied the Amendment
to bar relief against county officials "in order to protect the state treasury
from liability that would have had essentially the same practical consequences as a judgment against the State itself." Lake Country Estates,
Inc . v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U. S. 391, 401 (1979). See,
e. g., Edelman v. Jordan, supra (Eleventh Amendment bars suit against
state and county officials for retroactive award of welfare benefits). The
Courts of Appeals are in general agreement that a suit against officials of a
county or other governmental entity is barred if the relief obtained runs
against the State. See, e. g., Moore v. Tangipahoa Parish School Board,
21
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that without the injunction against the state institutions and
officials in this case, an order entered on state-law grounds
necessarily would be limited. The relief substantially concerns Pennhurst, an arm of the State that is operated by
state officials. Moreover, funding for the county mental retardation programs comes almost entirely from the State, see
Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 50, §§4507-4509 (Purdon 1969 and Supp.
1982), and the costs of the masters have been borne by the
State, see 446 F. Supp., at 1327. Finally, the MH/MR Act
contemplates that the state and county officials will cooperate
in operating mental retardation programs. See In re
Schmidt, 494 Pa. 86, 95-96, 429 A. 2d 631, 635-636 (1981).
In short, the present judgment could not be sustained on the
basis of the state-law obligations of petitioner county officials. Indeed, any relief granted against the county officials
on the basis of the state statute would be partial and incomplete at best. Such an ineffective enforcement of state law
would not appear to serve the purposes of efficiency, convenience, and fairness that must inform the exercise of pendent
jurisdiction.

v

The Court of Appeals upheld the judgment of the District
Court solely on the basis of Pennsylvania's MH/MR Act.
We hold that the courts lacked jurisdiction to enjoin peti594 F. 2d 489, 493 (CA5 1979); Carey v. Quern, 588 F. 2d 230, 23~234
(CA71978); Incarcerated Men of Allen County Jail v. Fair, 507 F. 2d 281,
287-288 (CA6 1974); Harris v. Tooele County School District, 471 F. 2d
218, 220 (CAlO 1973). Given that the actions of the county commissioners
and mental health adminstrators are dependent on funding from the State,
it may be that relief granted against these county officials, when exercising
their functions under the MH/MR Act, effectively runs against the State.
Cf. Farr v. Chesney, 441 F. Supp. 127, 130-132 (MD Pa. 1977) (holding
that Pennsylvania county commissioners, acting as members of the board
of the county office of mental health and retardation, may not be sued for
back pay under the Eleventh Amendment). We need not decide this issue
in light of our disposition above.
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tioner state institutions and state officials on the basis of this
state law. The District Court also rested its decision on the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. See supra, at 2. On remand the
Court of Appeals may consider to what extent, if any, the
judgment may be sustained on these bases. 23 The court also
may consider whether relief may be granted to respondents
under the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of
Rights Act, 42 U. S. C. §§ 6011, 6063. The judgment of the
Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

On the Fourteenth Amendment issue, the court should consider
Youngberg v. Romeo, U. S . - (1982) , a decision that was not available when the District Court issued its decision.
23
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 81-2101

PENNHURST STATE SCHOOL & HOSPITAL ET AL.,
PETITIONERS v. TERRI LEE HALDERMAN ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
[October -

, 1983]

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether a federal court
may award injunctive relief against state officials on the basis
of state law.
I
This litigation, here for the second time, concerns the conditions of care at petitioner Pennhurst State School and Hospital, a Pennsylvania institution for the care of the mentally
retarded. See Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1 (1981). Although the litigation's history is set forth in detail in our prior opinion, see id. , at &-10,
it is necessary for purposes of this decision to review that
history.
This suit originally was brought in 1974 by respondent
Terri Lee Halderman, a resident of Pennhurst, in the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Ultimately, plaintiffs included a class consisting of all persons
who were or might become residents of Pennhurst; the Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Citizens (P ARC); and the
United States. Defendants were Pennhurst and various
Pennhurst officials; the Pennsylvania Department of Public
Welfare and several of its officials; and various county commissioners, county mental retardation administrators , and
other officials of five Pennsylvania counties surrounding
Pennhurst. Respondents' amended complaint charged that
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conditions at Pennhurst violated the class members' rights
under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 87 Stat. 394, as amended, 29
U. S. C. § 794 (1976 ed. and Supp. V); the Developmentally
Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U. S. C.
§§ 6001-6081 (1976 ed. and Supp. V); and the Pennsylvania
Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966 (the
"MH/MR Act"), Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 50, §§ 4101-4704
(Purdon 1969 and Supp. 1982). Both damages and injunctive
relief were sought.
In 1977, following a lengthy trial, the District Court rendered its decision. 446 F. Supp. 1295 (1977). As noted in
our prior opinion, the court's findings were undisputed: "Conditions at Pennhurst are not only dangerous, with the residents often physically abused or drugged by staff members,
but also inadequate for the 'habilitation' of the retarded. Indeed, the court found that the physicial, intellectual, and
emotional skills of some residents have deteriorated at
Pennhurst." 451 U. S., at 7 (footnote omitted). The District Court held that these conditions violated each resident's
right to "minimally adequate habilitation" under the Due
Process Clause and the MH/MR Act, see 446 F. Supp., at
1314-1318, 1322-1323; "freedom from harm" under the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, see id., at 1320-1321;
and "nondiscriminatory habilitation" under the Equal Protection Clause and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, see id., at
1321-1324. Furthermore, the court found that "due process
demands that if a state undertakes the habilitation of a retarded person, it must do so in the least restrictive setting
consistent with that individual's habilitative needs." Id., at
1319 (emphasis added). After concluding that the large size
of Pennhurst prevented it from providing the necessary
habilitation in the least restrictive environment, the court ordered "that immediate steps be taken to remove the retarded
residents from Pennhurst." I d., at 1325. Petitioners were
ordered "to provide suitable community living arrange-
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ments" for the class members, id., at 1326, and the court appointed a Special Master "with the power and duty to plan,
organize, direct, supervise and monitor the implementation
of this and any further Orders of the Court." Ibid. 1
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed most
of the District Court's judgment. 612 F. 2d 84 (1979) (en
bane). It agreed that respondents had a right to habilitation
in the least restrictive environment, but it grounded this
right solely on the "bill of rights" provision in the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42
U. S. C. § 6010. See 612 F. 2d, at 95-100, 104-107. The
court did not consider the constitutional issues or § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act, and while it affirmed the District Court's
holding that the MH/MR. Act provides a right to adequate
habilitation, see id., at 100-103, the court did not decide
whether that state right encompassed a right to treatment in
the least restrictive setting.
On the question of remedy, the Court of Appeals affirmed
except as to the District Court's order that Pennhurst be
closed. The court observed that some patients would be
unable to adjust to life outside an institution, and it determined that none of the legal provisions relied on by plaintiffs
precluded institutionalization. Id., at 114-115. It therefore
remanded for "individual determinations by the [District
Court], or by the Special Master, as to the appropriateness of
an improved Pennhurst for each such patient," guided by "a
presumption in favor of placing individuals in [community living arrangements]." Ibid. 2
The District Court determined that the individual defendants had acted
in good faith and therefore were immune from the damage claims. 446 F.
Supp., at 1324.
2
In a companion case, the Court of Appeals affirmed the District
Court's denial of the Pennhurst Parents-Staff Association's motion to intervene for purposes of appeal, finding the denial harmless error. See 612
F. 2d 131 (1979) (en bane). The Association subsequently was granted
leave to intervene and is a petitioner in this Court.
1
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On remand the District Court established detailed procedures for determining the proper residential placement for
each patient. A team consisting of the patient, his parents
or guardian, and his case manager must establish an individual habilitation plan providing for habilitation of the patient
in a designated community living arrangement. The plan is
subject to review by the Special Master. A second master,
called the Hearing Master, is available to conduct hearings,
upon request by the resident; his parents or his advocate, on
the question whether the services of Pennhurst would be
more beneficial to the resident than the community living arrangement provided in the resident's plan. The Hearing
Master then determines where the patient should reside,
subject to possible review by the District Court. See App.
123a-134a (Order of April 24, 1980). 3
This Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals,
finding that 42 U. S. C. § 6010 did not create any substantive
rights. 451 U. S. 1 (1981). We remanded the case to the
Court of Appeals to determine if the remedial order could be
supported on the basis of state law, the Constitution, or§ 504
of the Rehabilitation Act. See id., at 31. 4 We also remanded for consideration of whether any relief was available
under other provisions of the Developmentally Disabled AsOn July 1, 1981, Pemo ylvania enacted an appropriations bill providing
that only $35,000 would be paid for the Masters' expenses for the fiscal
year July 1981 to June 1982. The District Court held the Pennsylvania
Department of Public Welfare and its Secretary in contempt, and imposed
a fine of $10,000 per day. Pennsylvania paid the fines, and the contempt
was purged on January 8, 1982. On appeal the Court of Appeals affirmed
the contempt order. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hospital,
673 F. 2d 628 (1982), cert. pending, No. 81-2363.
'Three Justices dissented from the Court's construction of the Act, but
concluded that the District Court should not have adopted the "far-reaching remedy" of appointing "a Special Master to decide which of the Pennhurst inmates should remain and which should be moved to communitybased facilities. . . . [T]he court should not have assumed the task of
managing Pennhurst.... " 451 U. S., at 54 (WHITE J., dissenting in
part).
3
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sistance and Bill of Rights Act. See id., at 27-30 (discussing
42 U. S. C. §§ 6011(a), 6063(b)(5)).
On remand the Court of Appeals affirmed its prior judgment in its entirety. 673 F. 2d 647 (1982) (en bane). It de- ·
termined that in a recent decision the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania had "spoken definitively" in holding that the
MH/MR Act required the State to adopt the "least restrictive
environment" approach for the care of the mentally retarded.
ld., at 651 (citing In re Schmidt, 494 Pa. 86, 429 A. 2d 631
(1981)). The Court of Appeals concluded that this state statute fully supported its prior judgment, and therefore did not
reach the remaining issues of federal law. It also rejected
petitioners' argument that the Eleventh Amendment barred
a federal court from considering this pendent state-law claim.
The court noted that the Amendment did not bar a federal
court from granting prospective injunctive relief against
state officials on the basis of federal claims, see 673 F. 2d, at
656 (citing Ex Parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908)), and concluded that the same result obtained with respect to a
pendent state-law claim. It reasoned that because Siler v.
Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 213 U. S. 175 (1909), an important case in the development of the doctrine of pendent
jurisdiction, also involved state officials, "there cannot be ...
an Eleventh Amendment exception to that rule." 673 F. 2d,
at 658. 5 Finally, the court rejected petitioners' argument
that it should have abstained from deciding the state-law
claim under principles of comity, see id., at 659-660, andrefused to consider petitioners' objections to the District
Court's use of a special master, see id., at 651 and n. 10.
Three judges dissented in part, arguing that under principles
5
The Court of Appeals also noted that "the United States is an intervening plaintiff ... against which even the state itself cannot successfully
plead the Eleventh Amendment as a bar to jurisdiction," and that "the
counties, even as juridical entities, do not fall within the coverage of the
Eleventh Amendment. Against those defendants even money damages
may be awarded." 673 F. 2d, at 656 (citation omitted).
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of federalism and comity the establishment of a special master to supervise compliance was an abuse of discretion. See
id., at 662 (Seitz, C. J., joined by Hunter, J., dissenting in
part); ibid. (Garth, J., concurring in part and dissenting as to
relief). See also id., at 661 (Aldisert, J., concurring) (seriously questioning the propriety of the order appointing the
Special Master, but concluding that a retroactive reversal of
that order would be meaningless). 6
We granted certiorari, 457 U. S. 1131 (1982), and now reverse and remand.
II
Petitioners raise three challenges to the judgment of the
Court of Appeals: (i) the Eleventh Amendment prohibited
the District Court from ordering state officials to conform
their conduct to state law; (ii) the doctrine of comity prohibited the District Court from issuing its injunctive relief; and
(iii) the District Court abused its discretion in appointing two
masters to supervise the decisions of state officials in implementing state law. We need not reach the latter two issues,
for we find the Eleventh Amendment challenge dispositive.
A

Article III, § 2 of the Constitution provides that the federal
judicial power extends, inter alia, to controversies "between
a State and Citizens of another State." Relying on this language, this Court in 1793 assumed original jurisdiction over a
suit brought by a citizen of South Carolina against the State
of Georgia. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419 (1793). The
decision "created such a shock of surprise that the Eleventh
Amendment was at once proposed and adopted." Monaco v.
Mississippi, 292 U. S. 313, 325 (1934). The Amendment
provides:
6
The Office of the Special Master was abolished in December 1982.
See App. 220a (Order of August 12, 1982). The Hearing Master remains
in operation.
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"The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States
by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects
of any Foreign State."
The Amendment's language overruled the particular result
in Chis holm, but this Court has recognized that its greater
significance lies in its affirmation that the fundamental principle of sovereign immunity limits the grant of judicial authority in Art. III. Thus, in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1
(1890), the Court held that, despite the limited terms of the
Eleventh Amendment, a federal court could not entertain a
suit brought by a citizen against his own State. After reviewing the constitutional debates concerning the scope of
Art. III, the Court determined that federal jurisdiction over
suits against unconsenting States "was not contemplated by
the Constitution when establishing the judicial power of the
United States." ld., at 15. See Monaco v. Mississippi,
supra, at 322-323 (1934). 7 In short, the principle of sovereign immunity is a constitutional limitation on the federal judicial power established in Art. III:
"That a State may not be sued without its consent is a
fundamental rule of jurisprudence having so important a
bearing upon the construction of the Constitution of the
United States that it has become established by repeated
decisions of this court that the entire judicial power
granted by the Constitution does not embrace authority
to entertain a suit brought by private parties against a
State without consent given: not one brought by citizens
7
See Employees v. Missouri Public Health Dep't, 411 U. S. 279,
291-292 (1973) (MARSHALL, J., concurring in judgment) (The Eleventh
Amendment "clarif[ied] the intent of the Framers concerning the reach of
federal judicial power" and "restore[d] the original understanding" that
States could not be made unwilling defendants in federal court). See also
Nevada v. Hall, 440 U. S. 410, 430-431 (1979) (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting);
id., at 437 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting).
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of another State, or by citizens or subjects of a foreign
State, because of the Eleventh Amendment; and not
even one brought by its own citizens, because of the fundamental rule of which the Amendment is but an exemplification." Ex parte State of New York No. 1, 256
U. S. 490, 497 (1921) (emphasis added). 8
A sovereign's immunity may be waived, and the Court consistently has held that a State may consent to suit against it
in federal court. See, e. g., Clark v. Barnard, 108 U. S.
436, 447 (1883). We have insisted, however, that the State's
consent be unequivocally expressed. See, e. g., Edelman v.
Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 673 (1974). Similarly, although Congress has power with respect to the rights protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment immunity, see Fitzpatrick v. Bitker, 427 U. S. 445
(1976), we have required an unequivocal expression of congressional intent to "overturn the constitutionally guaranteed immunity of the several States." Quern v. Jordan, 440
U. S. 332, 342 (1979) (holding that 42 U. S. C. § 1983 does not
override States' Eleventh Amendment immunity). Our reluctance to infer that a State's immunity from suit in the federal courts has been negated stems from recognition of the
vital role of the doctrine of sovereign immunity in our federal
system. A State's constitutional interest in immunity encompasses not merely whether it may be sued, but where it
may be sued. 9 As JusTICE MARSHALL well has noted, "[b]eThe limitation deprives federal courts of any jurisdiction to entertain
such claims, and thus may be raised at any point in a proceeding. "The
Eleventh Amendment declares a policy and sets forth an explicit limitation
on federal judicial power of such compelling force that this Court will consider the issue arising under this Amendment ... even though urged for
the first time in this Court." Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury,
323 u. s. 459, 467 (1945).
• For this reason, the Court consistently has held that a State's waiver
of sovereign immunity in its own courts is not a waiver of the Eleventh
Amendment immunity in the federal courts. See, e. g., Florida Department of Health v. Florida Nursing Home Assn., 450 U. S. 147, 150 (1981)
8
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cause of the problems of federalism inherent in making one
sovereign appear against its will in the courts of the other, a
restriction upon the exercise of the federal judicial power has
long been considered to be appropriate in a case such as this."
Employees v. Missouri Public Health & Welfare Dep't, 411
U. S. 279, 294 (1973) (MARSHALL, J., concurring in result). 10
Accordingly, in deciding this case we must be guided by
"[t]he principles of federalism that inform Eleventh Amendment doctrine." Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678, 691 (1978).
B

This Court's decisions thus establish that "an unconsenting
State is immune from suits brought in federal courts by her
own citizens as well as by citizens of another state." Employees, supra, at 280. There may be a question, however,
whether a particular suit in fact is a suit against a State. It
is clear, of course, that in the absence of consent a suit in
which the State or one of its agencies or departments is
named as the defendant is proscribed by the Eleventh
Amendment. See, e. g., Florida Department of Health v.
Florida Nursing Home · Assn., 450 U. S. 147 (1981) (per
curiam); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U. S. 781 (1978) (per
curiam). This jurisdictional bar applies regardless of the
(per curiam). "[l]t is not consonant with our dual system for the federal
courts . . . to read the consent to embrace federal as well as state
courts. . . . [A] clear declaration of the state's intention to submit its fiscal
problems to other courts than those of its own creation must be found."
Great Northern Life Insurance Co. v. Read, 322 U. S. 47, 54 (1944).
10
See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U. S., at 41~19 (States were "vitally interested" in whether they would be subject to suit in the federal courts, and
the debates about state immunity focused on the question of federal judicial
power). Cf. id., at 430-431 (BLACKMUN, J ., dissenting) (sovereign immunity is "a guarantee that is implied as an essential component of federalism"
and is "sufficiently fundamental to our federal structure to have implicit
constitutional dimension"); id., at 437 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting) ("[T]he
States that ratified the Eleventh Amendment thought that they were putting an end to the possibility of individual States as unconsenting defendants in foreign jurisdictions").
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nature of the relief sought. See, e. g., Missouri v. Fiske,
290 U. S. 18, 27 (1933) ("Expressly applying to suits in equity
as well as at law, the Amendment necessarily embraces demands for the enforcement of equitable rights and the prosecution of equitable remedies when these are asserted and
prosecuted by an individual against a State").
When the suit is brought only against state officials, a
question arises as to whether that suit is a suit against the
State itself. Although prior decisions of this Court have not
been entirely consistent on this issue, certain principles are
well established. The Eleventh Amendment bars a suit
against state officials when "the state is the real, substantial
party in interest." Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U. S. 459, 464 (1945). See, e. g., In re Ayers, 123
U. S. 443, 487-492 (1887); Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U. S.
711, 720-723, 727-728 (1882). Thus, "[t]he general rule is
that relief sought nominally against an officer is in fact
against the sovereign if the decree would operate against the
latter." Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U. S. 57, 58 (1963) (per
curiam). 11 And, as when the State itself is named as the de11
"The general rule is that a suit is against the sovereign if 'the judgment
sought would expend itself on the public treasury or domain, or interfere
with the public administration,' or if the effect of the judgment would be 'to
restrain the Government from acting, or to compel it to act.'" Dugan v.
Rank, 372 U. S. 609, 620 (1963) (citations omitted).
Respondents do not dispute that the relief sought and awarded below operated against the state in each of the foregoing respects. They suggest,
however, that the suit here should not be considered to be against the state
for the purposes of the Eleventh Amendment because, they say, petitioners were acting ultra vires their authority. Respondents rely largely on
Florida Dep't of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc ., 458 U. S. - - (1982),
which in turn was founded upon Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce
Corp., 337 U. S. 682 (1949). These cases provide no support for this argument. These and other modern cases make clear that a state officer may
be said to act ultra vires only when he acts "without any authority whatever.'' Treasure Salvors, supra, at-- (opinion of STEVENS, J.); accord
id., at-- (WHITE, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in
part) (test is whether there was no "colorable basis for the exercise of au-
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fendant, a suit against state officials that is in fact a suit
against a State is barred regardless of whether it seeks damages or injunctive relief. See Cory v. White, 457 U. S. 85,
91 (1982).
The Court has recognized an important exception to this
general rule: a suit challenging the constitutionality of a state
official's action is not one against the State. This was the
holding in Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908), in which a
federal court enjoined the Attorney General of the State of
Minnesota from bringing suit to enforce a state statute that
allegedly violated the Fourteenth Amendment. This Court
held that the Eleventh Amendment did not prohibit issuance
of this injunction. The theory of the case was that an unconstitutional enactment is "void" and therefore does not "impart to [the officer] any immunity from responsibility to the
supreme authority of the United States." !d., at 160. Since
the State could not authorize the action, the officer was
"stripped of his official or representative character and [was]
subjected to the consequences of his official conduct." Ibid.
While the rule permitting suits alleging conduct contrary
to ''the supreme authority of the United States" has survived, the theory of Young has not been provided an expansive interpretation. Thus, in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S.
651 (1974), the Court emphasized that the Eleventh Amendment bars some forms of injunctive relief against state officials for violation of federal law. !d., at 666-667. In particular, Edelman held that when a plaintiff sues a state
official alleging a violation of federal law, the federal court
thority by state officials"). As the Court in Larson explained, an ultra
vires claim rests on "the officer's lack of delegated power. A claim of error
in the exercise of that power is therefore not sufficient." Larson, supra,
at 690. Petitioners' actions in operating this mental health institution
plainly were not beyond their delegated authority in this sense. Pennsylvania statutes gave them broad discretion to provide "adequate" mental
health services. Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 50,§ 4201(1) (Purdon 1969). The essence of respondents' claim is that petitioners have not provided such services adequately.
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may award an injunction that ward~ retroactive monetary
relief. Under the theory of Young,
sm wou not e
one against the State since the federal-law allegation would
strip the state officer of his official authority. Nevertheless,
retroactive relief was barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

III
With these principles in mind, we now turn to the question
whether the claim that petitioners violated state law in carrying out their official duties at Pennhurst is one against the
State and therefore barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
Respondents advance two principal arguments in support of
the judgment below. 12 First, they contend that under the
doctrine of Edelman v. Jordan, supra, the suit is not against
12
We reject respondents' additional contention that Pennsylvania has
waived its immunity from suit in federal court. At the time the suit was
filed, suits against Pennsylvania were permitted only where expressly authorized by the legislature, see, e. g., Freach v. Commonwealth, 471 Pa.
558, 370 A. 2d 1163 (1977), and respondents have not referred us to any
provision expressly waiving Pennsylvania's Eleventh Amendment immunity. The State now has a statute governing sovereign immunity, including an express preservation of its immunity from suit in federal court:
"Federal courts.-Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be construed
to waive the immunity of the Commonwealth from suit in Federal courts
guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States." 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8521(b) (1980).
We also do not agree with respondents that the presence of the United
States as a plaintiff in this case removes the Eleventh Amendment from
consideration. Although the Eleventh Amendment does not bar the
United States from suing a State in federal court, see, e. g., Monaco v.
Mississippi, 292 U. S. 313, 329 (1934), the United States' presence in the
case for any purpose does not eliminate the State's immunity for all purposes. For example, the fact that the federal court could award injunctive
relief to the United States on federal constitutional claims would not mean
that the court could order the State to pay damages to other plaintiffs. In
any case, we think it clear that the United States does not have standing to
assert the state-law claims of third-parties. For these reasons, the applicability of the Eleventh Amendment to respondents' state-law claim is
unaffected by the United States' participation in the case.
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the State because the courts below ordered only prospective
injunctive relief. Second, they assert that the state-law
claim properly was decided under the doctrine of pendent
jurisdiction. Respondents rely on decisions of this Court
awarding relief against state officials on the basis of a pendent state-law claim. See, e. g., Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 213 U. S. 175, 193 (1909).
A
We first address the contention that respondents' state-law
claim is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment because it
seeks only prospective relief as defined in Edelman v. Jordan, supra. The Court of Appeals held that if the judgment
below rested on federal law, it could be entered against petitioner state officials under the doctrine established in Edelman and Young even though the prospective financial burden
was substantial and ongoing. 13 See 673 F. 2d, at 656. The
court assumed, and respondents assert, that this reasoning
applies as well when the official acts in violation of state law.
This argument misconstrues the basis of the doctrine established in Young and Edelman.
As discussed above, the injunction in Young was justified,
notwithstanding the obvious impact on the State itself, on the
view that sovereign immunity does not apply because an official who acts unconstitutionally is "stripped of his official or .
representative character," Young, 209 U. S., at 160. This
rationale, of course, created the "well-recognized irony" that
an official's unconstitutional conduct constitutes state action
We do not decide whether the District Court would have jurisdiction
under this reasoning to grant prospective relief on the basis of federal law,
but we note that the scope of any such relief would be constrained by principles of comity and federalism. "Where, as here, the exercise of authority by state officials is attacked, federal courts must be constantly mindful
of the 'special delicacy of the adjustment to be preserved between federal
equitable power and State administration of its own law.'" Rizzo v.
Goode, 423 U. S. 362, 378 (1976) (quoting Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U. S.
117, 120 (1951)).
18
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under the Fourteenth Amendment but not the Eleventh
Amendment. Florida Department of State v. Treasure
Salvors, Inc., - - U. S. - - , - - (1982) (opinion of STEVENS, J.). Nonetheless, the Young doctrine has been accepted as necessary to permit the federal courts to vindicate
federal rights and hold state officials responsible to "the supreme authority of the United States." Young, 209 U. S.,
at 160. As JUSTICE BRENNAN has observed, "Ex parte
Young was the culmination of efforts by this Court to harmonize the principles of the Eleventh Amendment with the effective supremacy of rights and powers secured elsewhere in
the Constitution." Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U. S. 82, 106
(1971) (BRENNAN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Our decisions repeatedly have emphasized that the
Young doctrine rests on the need to promote the vindication
of federal rights. See, e. g., Quern v. Jordan, 440 U. S.
332, 337 (1979); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232, 237 (1974);
Georgia R. & Banking Co. v. Redwine, 342 U. S. 299, 304
(1952).
The Court also has recognized, however, that the need to
promote the supremacy of federal law must be accommodated
to the constitutional immunity of the States. This is the significance of Edelman v. Jordan, supra. We recognized that
the prospective relief authorized by Young "has permitted
the Civil War Amendments to the Constitution to serve as a
sword, rather than merely a shield, for those whom they
were designed to protect." 415 U. S., at 664. But we declined to extend Young to encompass retroactive relief, for to
do so would effectively eliminate the constitutional immunity
of the States. Accordingly, we concluded that although the
difference between permissible and impermissible relief "will
not in many instances be that between day and night," id., at
667, an award of retroactive reliefnecessarily "'fall[s] afoul of
the Eleventh Amendment if that basic constitutional provision is to be conceived of as having any present force.'" I d.,
at 665 (quoting Rothstein v. Wyman, 467 F. 2d 226, 237 (CA2
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1972) (McGowan, J., sitting by designation), cert. denied, 411
U. S. 921 (1973)). In sum Edelman's distinction between
prospective and retroactive relief fulfills the underlying
~pose of Ex parte Young while at the same time preserving
to aiW important degree the constitutional immunity of the
States.
This need to reconcile competing interests is wholly absent, however, when a plaintiff alleges that a state official has
violated state law. In such a case the entire basis for the
doctrine of Young and Edelman disappears. A federal
court's grant of relief against state officials on the basis of
state law, whether prospective or retroactive, does not vindicate the supreme authority of federal law. On the contrary,
it is difficult to think of a greater intrusion on state sovereignty than when a federal court instructs state officials on
how to conform their conduct to state law. Such a result
conflicts directly with the principles of federalism that underlie the Eleventh Amendment. We conclude that Young and
Edelman are inapplicable in a suit against state officials on
the basis of state law.
B
The reasoning of our decisions on sovereign immunity thus
leads to the conclusion that a federal suit against state officials on the basis of state law contravenes the Eleventh
Amendment. In reaching a contrary conclusion, the Court
of Appeals relied principally on a separate line of cases dealing with pendent jurisdiction. The crucial point for the
Court of Appeals was that this Court has granted relief
against state officials on the basis of a pendent state-law
claim. See 673 F. 2d, at 657-658. We therefore must consider the relationship between pendent jurisdiction and the
Eleventh Amendment.
This Court long has held generally that when a federal
court obtains jurisdiction over a federal claim, it may adjudicate other related claims over which the court otherwise
would not have jurisdiction. See, e. g., Mine Workers v.
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Gibbs, 383 U. S. 715, 726 (1966); Osborn v. Bank of the
United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 819-823 (1824). The Court also
has held that a federal court may resolve a case solely on the
basis of a pendent state-law claim, see Siler, supra, at
192-193, and that in fact the court usually should do so in
order to avoid federal constitutional questions, see id., at
193; Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis,
J., concurring) ("[I]f a case can be decided on either of two
grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a
question of statutory construction or general law, the Court
will decide only the latter"). But pendent jurisdiction is a
judge-made doctrine inferred from the general language of
Art. III. The question presented is whether this doctrine
may be viewed as displacing the explicit limitation on federal
jurisdiction contained in the Eleventh Amendment.
As the Court of Appeals noted, in Siler and subsequent
cases concerning pendent jurisdiction relief was granted
against state officials on the basis of state-law claims that
were pendent to federal constitutional claims. In none of
these cases, however, did the Court so much as mention the
Eleventh Amendment in connection with the state-law claim.
Rather, the Court appears to have assumed that once jurisdiction was established over the federal-law claim, the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction would establish power to hear
the state-law claims as well. The Court has not addressed
whether that doctrine has a different scope when applied to
suits against the State. This is illustrated by Greene v. Louisville & Interurban R. Co., 244 U. S. 499 (1917), in which
the plaintiff railroads sued state officials, alleging that certain tax assessments were excessive under the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Court first rejected the officials' argument that the Eleventh Amendment barred the federal constitutional claim. It held that Ex parte Young applied to all
allegations challenging the constitutionality of official action,
regardless of whether the state statute under which the officials purported to act was constitutional or unconstitutional.

)
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See id., at 507. Having determined that the Eleventh
Amendment did not deprive the federal court of jurisdiction
over the Fourteenth Amendment question, the Court declared that the court's jurisdiction extended "to the determination of all questions involved in the case, including questions of state law, irrespective of the disposition that may be
made of the federal question, or whether it be found necessary to decide it at all." I d., at 508. The case then was
decided solely on state-law grounds. Accord, Louisville &
Nashville R. Co. v. Greene, 244 U. S. 522 (1917).
These cases thus did not directly confront the question before us. "[W]hen questions of jurisdiction have been passed
on in prior decisions sub silentio, this Court has never considered itself bound when a subsequent case finally brings the
jurisdictional issue before us." Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U. S.
528, 533, n. 5 (1974). 14 We therefore view the question as an
open one.
As noted, the implicit view of these cases seems to have
been that once jurisdiction is established on the basis of a federal question, no further Eleventh Amendment inquiry is
necessary with respect to other claims raised in the case.
This is an erroneous view and contrary to the principles established in our Eleventh Amendment decisions. "The
Eleventh Amendment is an explicit limitation on the judicial
power of the United States." Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U. S.,
at 25. It deprives a federal court of power to decide certain
claims against States that otherwise would be within the
scope of Art. III's grant of jurisdiction. For example, if a
lawsuit against state officials under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 alleges
a constitutional claim, the federal court is barred from awarding damages against the state treasury even though the claim
See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 671 (1974) ("Having now had
an opportunity to more fully consider the Eleventh Amendment issue after
briefing and argument, we disapprove the Eleventh Amendment holdings
of [certain prior] cases to the extent that they are inconsistent with our
holding today").
1
'
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arises under the Constitution. See Quern v. Jordan, 440
U. S. 332 (1979). Similarly, if a§ 1983 action alleging a constitutional claim is brought directly against a State, the Eleventh Amendment bars a federal court from granting any relief on that claim. See Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U. S. 781
(1978) (per curiam). The Amendment thus is a specific constitutional bar against hearing evenfederal claims that otherwise would be within the jurisdiction of the federal courts. 15
This constitutional bar applies to pendent claims as well.
As noted above, pendent jurisdiction is a judge-made doctrine of expediency and efficiency derived from the general
Art. III language conferring power to hear all "cases" arising
under federal law or between diverse parties. See Mine
Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U. S. 715, 725 (1966). See also Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U. S. 528, 545 (1974) (terming pendent
jurisdiction "a doctrine of discretion"). The Eleventh
Amendment should not be construed to apply with less force
to this implied form of jurisdiction than it does to the explicitly granted power to hear federal claims. The history of the
adoption and development of the Amendment, see supra, at
6--9, confirms that it is an independent limitation on all exercises of Art. III power: "the entire judicial power granted by
the Constitution does not embrace authority to entertain suit
brought by private parties against a State without consent
given," Ex parte State of New York No.1, 256 U. S. 490, 497
(1921). If we were to hold otherwise, a federal court could
award damages against a State on the basis of a pendent
claim. Our decision in Edelman v. Jordan, supra, makes
clear that pendent jurisdiction does not permit such an evasion of the immunity guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment. We there held that "the District Court was correct in
15
See, e. g., Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322 (1934) ("[A]lthough a case may arise under the Constitution and laws of the United
States, the judicial power does not extend to it if the suit is sought to be
prosecuted against a State, without her consent, by one of her own citizens"); Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U. S. 18, 25-26 (1933).
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exercising pendent jurisdiction over [plaintiffs'] statutory
claim," 415 U. S., at 653, n. 1, but then concluded that the
Eleventh Amendment barred an award of retroactive relief
on the basis of that pendent claim. I d., at 678.
In sum, contrary to the view implicit in decisions such as
Greene, supra, neither pendent jurisdiction nor any other
basis of jurisdiction may override the Eleventh Amendment. 16 A federal court must examine each claim in a case to
see if the court's jurisdiction over that claim is barred by the
Eleventh Amendment. We concluded above that a claim
that state officials violated state law in carrying out their official responsibilities is a claim against the State that is protected by the Eleventh Amendment. See supra, at 16. We
now hold that this principle applies as well to state-law claims
brought into federal court under pendent jurisdiction.
/

c
Respondents urge that application of the Eleventh Amendment to pendent state-law claims will have a disruptive effect
on litigation against state officials. They argue that the
"considerations of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to litigants" that underlie pendent jurisdiction, see
Gibbs, supra, at 726, counsel against a result that may cause
litigants to split causes of action between state and federal
courts. They also contend that the policy of avoiding unnecessary constitutional decisions will be contravened if plaintiffs choose to forgo their state-law claims and sue only in federal court or, alternatively, that the policy of Ex parte Young
will be hindered if plaintiffs choose to forgo their right to a
federal forum and bring all of their claims in state court.
It may be that applying the Eleventh Amendment to pendent claims results in federal claims being brought in state
court, or in bifurcation of claims. That is not uncommon in
this area. Under Edelman v. Jordan, supra, a suit against
16
See Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U. S., at 27 ("This is not less a suit against
the State because the bill is ancillary and supplemental.").
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state officials for retroactive monetary relief, whether based
on federal or state law, must be brought in state court.
Challenges to the validity of state tax systems under 42
U. S. C. § 1983 also must be brought in state court. Fair
Assessment in Real Estate Assn. v. McNary, 454 U. S. 100
(1981). Under the abstention doctrine, unclear issues of
state law commonly are split off and referred to the state
courts.' 7
In any case, the answer to respondents' assertions is that
such considerations of policy cannot override the constitutional limitation on the authority of the federal judiciary to
adjudicate suits against a State. See Missouri v. Fiske, 290
U. S., at 25-26 ("Considerations of convenience open no avenue of escape from the [Amendment's] restriction"). 18 That a
17
Moreover, allowing claims against state officials based on state law to
be brought in the federal courts does not necessarily foster the policies of
"judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants," Mine Workers v.
Gibbs, 383 U. S. 715, 726 (1966), that underlie pendent jurisdiction. For
example, when a federal decision on state law is obtained, the federal
court's construction often is uncertain and ephemeral. In cases of ongoing
oversight of a state program that may extend over years, as in this case,
the federal intrusion is likely to be extensive. Duplication of effort, inconvenience, and uncertainty may well result. See, e. g., Burford v. Sun Oil
Co., 319 U. S. 315, 327 (1943) ("Delay, misunderstanding of local law, and
needless conflict with the state policy, are the inevitable product of this
double [i. e., federal-state] system of review"). Waste and delay may also
result from abstention, which often is called for when state law is unclear,
see Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U. S. 360, 378--379 (1964) ("abstention operates
to require piecemeal adjudication in many courts, thereby delaying ultimate adjudication on the merits for an undue length of time") (citations
omitted), or from dismissals on the basis of comity, which has special force
when relief is sought on state-law grounds, see Gibbs, supra, at 726;
Hawks v. Hamill, 288 U. S. 52, 61 (1933).
18
Cf. Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U. S. 1, 14-15 (1976) (Although "considerations of judicial economy" would be served by permitting pendent-party
jurisdiction, "the addition of a completely new party would run counter to
the well-established principle that federal courts, as opposed to state trial
courts of general jurisdiction, are courts of limited jurisdiction marked out
by Congress").
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litigant's choice of forum is reduced "has long been understood to be a part of the tension inherent in our system of federalism." Employees v. Missouri Public Health & Welfare
Dept., 411 U. S. 279, 298 (1973) (MARSHALL, J., concurring
in result).

IV

Respondents contend that, regardless of the applicability
of the Eleventh Amendment to their state claims against petitioner state officials, the judgment may still be upheld
against petitioner county officials. We are not persuaded.
Even assuming that these officials are not immune from suit
challenging their actions under the MH/MR Act, 19 it is clear
that without the injunction against the state institutions and
officials in this case, an order entered on state-law grounds
19
We have held that the Eleventh Amendment does not apply to "counties and similar municipal corporations." Mt. Healthy City School District
v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274, 280 (1977); see Lincoln County v. Luning, 133
U. S. 529, 530 (1890). At the same time, we have applied the Amendment
to bar relief against county officials "in order to protect the state treasury
from liability that would have had essentially the same practical consequences as a judgment against the State itself." Lake Country Estates,
Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U. S. 391, 401 (1979). See,
e. g., Edelman v. Jordan, supra (Eleventh Amendment bars suit against
state and county officials for retroactive award of welfare benefits). The
Courts of Appeals are in general agreement that a suit against officials of a
county or other governmental entity is barred if the relief obtained runs
against the State. See, e. g., Moore v. Tangipahoa Parish School Board,
594 F. 2d 489, 493 (CA5 1979); Carey v. Quern, 588 F. 2d 230, 23~234
(CA71978); Incarcerated Men of Allen County Jail v. Fair, 507 F. 2d 281,
287-288 (CA6 1974); Harris v. Tooele County School District, 471 F. 2d
218, 220 (CAlO 1973). Given that the actions of the county commissioners
and mental-health administrators are dependent on funding from the State,
it may be that relief granted against these county officials, when exercising
their functions under the MH/MR Act, effectively runs against the State.
Cf. Farr v. Chesney, 441 F. Supp. 127, 130-132 (MD Pa. 1977) (holding
that Pennsylvania county commissioners, acting as members of the board
of the county office of mental health and retardation, may not be sued for
back pay under the Eleventh Amendment). We need not decide this issue
in light of our disposition above.
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necessarily would be limited. The relief substantially concerns Pennhurst, an arm of the State that is operated by
state officials. Moreover, funding for the county mental retardation programs comes almost entirely from the State, see
Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 50, §§4507-4509 (Purdon 1969 and Supp.
1982), and the costs of the masters have been borne by the
State, see 446 F. Supp., at 1327. Finally, the MH/MR Act
contemplates that the state and county officials will cooperate in operating mental retardation programs. See In re
Schmidt, 494 Pa. 86, 9&-96, 429 A. 2d 631, 63&-636 (1981).
In short, the present judgment could not be sustained on the
basis of the state-law obligations of petitioner county officials. Indeed, any relief granted against the county officials
on the basis of the state statute would be partial and incomplete at best. Such an ineffective enforcement of state law
would not appear to serve the purposes of efficiency, convenience, and fairness that must inform the exercise of pendent
jurisdiction.

v

The Court of Appeals upheld the judgment of the District
Court solely on the basis of Pennsylvania's MH/MR Act.
We hold that these federal courts lacked jurisdiction to enjoin
petitioner state insti' ·1tions and state officials on the basis of
this state law. The District Court also rested its decision on
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. See supra, at 2. On remand the
Court of Appeals may consider to what extent, if any, the
judgment may be sustained on these bases. 20 The court also
may consider whether relief may be granted to respondents
under the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of
Rights Act, 42 U. S. C. §§ 6011, 6063. The judgment of the
On the Fourteenth Amendment issue, the court should consider
Youngberg v. Romeo,- U. S . - (1982), a decision that was not available when the District Court issued its decision.
20
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Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether a federal court
may award injunctive relief against state officials on the basis
of state law.
I

This litigation, here for the second time, concerns the conditions of care at petitioner Pennhurst State School and Hospital, a Pennsylvania institution for the care of the mentally
retarded. See Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1 (1981). Although the litigation's history is set forth in detail in our prior opinion, see id., at 5--10,
it is necessary for purposes of this decision to review that
history.
This suit originally was brought in 1974 by respondent
Terri Lee Halderman, a resident of Pennhurst, in the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Ultimately, plaintiffs included a class consisting of all persons
who were or might become residents of Pennhurst; the Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Citizens (P ARC); and the
United States. Defendants were Pennhurst and various
Pennhurst officials; the Pennsylvania Department of Public
Welfare and several of its officials; and 'various county commissioners, county mental retardation administrators, and
other officials of five Pennsylvania counties surrounding
Pennhurst. Respondents' amended complaint charged that
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conditions at Pennhurst violated the class members' rights
under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 87 Stat. 394, as amended, 29
U. S. C. § 794 (1976 ed. and Supp. V); the Developmentally
Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U. S. C.
§§ 6001-6081 (1976 ed. and Supp. V); and the Pennsylvania
Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966 (the
"MH/MR Act"), Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 50, §§ 4101-4704
(Purdon 1969 and Supp. 1982). Both damages and injunctive
relief were sought.
In 1977, following a lengthy trial, the District Court rendered its decision. 446 F. Supp. 1295 (1977). As noted in
our prior opinion, the court's findings were undisputed: "Conditions at Pennhurst are not only dangerous, with the residents often physically abused or drugged by staff members,
but also inadequate for the 'habilitation' of the retarded. Indeed, the court found that the physicial, intellectual, and
emotional skills of some residents have deteriorated at
Pennhurst." 451 U. S., at 7 (footnote omitted). The District Court held that these conditions violated each resident's
right to "minimally adequate habilitation" under the Due
Process Clause and the MH/MR Act, see 446 F. Supp., at
1314-1318, 1322-1323; "freedom from harm" under the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, see id., at 1320-1321;
and "nondiscriminatory habilitation" under the Equal Protection Clause and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, see id., at
1321-1324. Furthermore, the court found that "due process
demands that if a state undertakes the habilitation of a retarded person, it must do so in the least restrictive setting
consistent with that individual's habilitative needs." I d., at
1319 (emphasis added). After concluding that the large size
of Pennhurst prevented it from providing the necessary
habilitation in the least restrictive environment, the court ordered "that immediate steps be taken to remove the retarded
residents from Pennhurst." I d., at 1325. Petitioners were
ordered "to provide suitable community living arrange-

::..
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ments" for the class members, id., at 1326, and the court appointed a Special Master "with the power and duty to plan,
organize, direct, supervise and monitor the implementation
of this and any further Orders of the Court." Ibid. 1
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed most
of the District Court's judgment. 612 F. 2d 84 (1979) (en
bane). It agreed that respondents had a right to habilitation
in the least restrictive environment, but it grounded this
right solely on the "bill of rights" provision in the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42
U. S. C. § 6010. See 612 F. 2d, at 95--100, 104-107. The
court did not consider the constitutional issues or § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act, and while it affirmed the District Court's
holding that the MH/MR Act provides a right to adequate
habilitation, see id., at 100-103, the court did not decide
whether that state right encompassed a right to treatment in
the least restrictive setting.
On the question of remedy, the Court of Appeals affirmed
except as to the District Court's order that Pennhurst be
closed. The court observed that some patients would be
unable to adjust to life outside an institution, and it determined that none of the legal provisions relied on by plaintiffs
precluded institutionalization. I d., at 114-115. It therefore
remanded for "individual determinations by the [District
Court], ot: by the Special Master, as to the appropriateness of
an improved Pennhurst for each such patient," guided by "a
presumption in favor of placing individuals in [community living arrangements]." Ibid. 2
1
The District Court determined that the individual defendants had acted
in good faith and therefore were immune from the damage claims. 446 F.
Supp., at 1324.
2
In a companion case, the Court of Appeals affirmed the District
Court's denial of the Pennhurst Parents-Staff Association's motion to intervene for purposes of appeal, finding the denial harmless error. See 612
F . 2d 131 (1979) (en bane). The Association subsequently was granted
leave to intervene and is a petitioner in this Court.
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On remand the District Court established detailed procedures for determining the proper residential placement for
each patient. A team consisting of the patient, his parents
or guardian, and his case manager must establish an individual habilitation plan providing for habilitation of the patient
in a designated community living arrangement. The plan is
subject to review by the Special Master. A second master,
called the Hearing Master, is available to conduct hearings,
upon request by the resident, his parents or his advocate, on
the question whether the services of Pennhurst would be
more beneficial to the resident than the community living arrangement provided in the resident's plan. The Hearing
Master then determines where the patient should reside,
subject to possible review by the District Court. See App.
123a-134a (Order of April 24, 1980). 3
This Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals,
finding that 42 U. S. C. § 6010 did not create any substantive
rights. 451 U. S. 1 (1981). We remanded the case to the
Court of Appeals to determine if the remedial order could be
supported on the basis of state law, the Constitution, or § 504
of the Rehabilitation Act. See id., at 31. 4 We also remanded for consideration of whether any relief was available
under other provisions of the Developmentally Disabled As3
On July 1, 1981, Pennsylvania enacted an appropriations bill providing
that only $35,000 would be paid for the Masters' expenses for the fiscal
year July 1981 to June 1982. The District Court held the Pennsylvania
Department of Public Welfare and its Secretary in contempt, and imposed
a fine of $10,000 per day. Pennsylvania paid the fines, and the contempt
was purged on January 8, 1982. On appeal the Court of Appeals affirmed
the contempt order. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hospital,
673 F. 2d 628 (1982), cert. pending, No. 81-2363.
'Three Justices dissented from the Court's construction of the Act, but
concluded that the District Court should not have adopted the "far-reaching remedy" of appointing "a Special Master to decide which of the Pennhurst inmates should remain and which should be moved to communitybased facilities. . . . [T]he court should not have assumed the task of
managing Pennhurst.... " 451 U. S., at 54 (WHITE J., dissenting in
part).
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sistance and Bill of Rights Act. See id., at 27-30 (discussing
42 U. S. C. §§ 6011(a), 6063(b)(5)).
On remand the Court of Appeals affirmed its prior judgment in its entirety. 673 F. 2d 647 (1982) (en bane). It determined that in a recent decision the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania had "spoken definitively" in holding that the
MH/MR Act required the State to adopt the "least restrictive
environment" approach for the care of the mentally retarded.
Id ., at 651 (citing In re Schmidt, 494 Pa. 86, 429 A. 2d 631
(1981)). The Court of Appeals concluded that this state statute fully supported its prior judgment, and therefore did not
reach the remaining issues of federal law. It also rejected
petitioners' argument that the Eleventh Amendment barred
a federal court from considering this pendent state-law claim.
The court noted that the Amendment did not bar a federal
court from granting prospective injunctive relief against
state officials on the basis of federal claims, see 673 F. 2d, at
656 (citing Ex Parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908)), and concluded that the same result obtained with respect to a
pendent state-law claim. It reasoned that because Siler v.
Louisville & Nashville R . Co., 213 U. S. 175 (1909), an important case in the development of the doctrine of pendent
jurisdiction, also involved state officials, "there cannot be . . .
an Eleventh Amendment exception to that rule." 673 F. 2d,
at 658. 5 Finally, the court rejected petiti{)ners' argument
that it should have abstained from deciding the state-law
claim under principles of comity, see id., at 659-660, andrefused to consider petitioners' objections to the District
Court's use of a special master, see id., at 651 and n. 10.
Three judges dissented in part, arguing that under principles
5

The Court of Appeals also noted that "the United States is an intervening plaintiff ... against which even the state itself cannot successfully
plead the Eleventh Amendment as a bar to jurisdiction," and that "the
counties, even as juridical entities, do not fall within the coverage of the
Eleventh Amendment. Against those defendants even money damages
may be awarded." 673 F. 2d, at 656 (citation omitted).
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of federalism and comity the establishment of a special master to supervise compliance was an abuse of discretion. See
id., at 662 (Seitz, C. J., joined by Hunter, J., dissenting in
part); ibid. (Garth, J., concurring in part and dissenting as to
relief). See also id., at 661 (Aldisert, J., concurring) (seriously questioning the propriety of the order appointing the
Special Master, but concluding that a retroactive reversal of
that order would be meaningless). 6
We granted certiorari, 457 U. S. 1131 (1982), and now reverse and remand.
II
Petitioners raise three challenges to the judgment of the
Court of Appeals: (i) the Eleventh Amendment prohibited
the District Court from ordering state officials to conform
their conduct to state law; (ii) the doctrine of comity prohibited the District Court from issuing its injunctive relief; and
(iii) the District Court abused its discretion in appointing two
masters to supervise the decisions of state officials in implementing state law. We need not reach the latter two issues,
for we find the Eleventh Amendment challenge dispositive.
A

Article III, § 2 of the Constitution provides that the federal
judicial power ex~ends, inter alia, to controversies "between
a State and Citizens of another State." Relying on this language, this Court in 1793 assumed original jurisdiction over a
suit brought by a citizen of South Carolina against the State
of Georgia. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419 (1793). The
decision "created such a shock of surprise that the Eleventh
Amendment was at once proposed and adopted." Monaco v.
Mississippi, 292 U. S. 313, 325 (1934). The Amendment
provides:
6
The Office of the Special Master was abolished in December 1982.
See App. 220a (Order of August 12, 1982). The Hearing Master remains
in operation.
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"The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States
by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects
of any Foreign State."
The Amendment's language overruled the particular result
in Chisholm, but this Court has recognized that its greater
significance lies in its affirmation that the fundamental principle of sovereign immunity limits the grant of judicial authority in Art. III. Thus, in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1
(1890), the Court held that, despite the limited terms of the
Eleventh Amendment, a federal court could not entertain a
suit brought by a citizen against his own State. After reviewing the constitutional debates concerning the scope of
Art. III, the Court determined that federal jurisdiction over
suits against unconsenting States "was not contemplated by
the Constitution when establishing the judicial power of the
United States." Id., at 15. See Monaco v. Mississippi,
supra, at 322-323 (1934). 7 In short, the principle of sovereign immunity is a constitutional limitation on the federal judicial power established in Art. III:
"That a State may not be sued without its consent is a
fundamental rule of jurisprudence having so important a
bearing upon the construction of the Constitution of the
United States that it has become established by repeated
decisions of this court that the entire judicial power
granted by the Constitution does not embrace authority
to entertain a suit brought by private parties against a
State without consent given: not one brought by citizens
7

See Employees v. Missouri Public Health Dep't, 411 U. S. 279,
291-292 (1973) (MARSHALL, J ., concurring in judgment) (The Eleventh
Amendment "clarif[ied] the intent of the Framers concerning the reach of
federal judicial power" and "restore[d] the original understanding" that
States could not be made unwilling defendants in federal court). See also
Nevada v. Hall, 440 U. S. 410, 430-431 (1979) (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting);
id., at 437 (REHNQUIST, J ., dissenting).
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of another State, or by citizens or subjects of a foreign
State, because of the Eleventh Amendment; and not
even one brought by its own citizens, because of the fundamental rule of which the Amendment is but an exemplification." Ex parte State of New York No. 1, 256
U. S. 490, 497 (1921) (emphasis added). 8
A sovereign's immunity may be waived, and the Court consistently has held that a State may consent to suit against it
in federal court. See, e. g., Clark v. Barnard, 108 U. S.
436, 447 (1883). We have insisted, however, that the State's
consent be unequivocally expressed. See, e. g., Edelman v.
Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 673 (1974). Similarly, although Congress has power with respect to the rights protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment immunity, see Fitzpatrick v. Bitker, 427 U. S. 445
(1976), we have required an unequivocal expression of congressional intent to "overturn the constitutionally guaranteed immunity of the several States." Quern v. Jordan, 440
U. S. 332, 342 (1979) (holding that 42 U. S. C. § 1983 does not
override States' Eleventh Amendment immunity). Our reluctance to infer that a State's immunity from suit in the federal courts has been negated stems from recognition of the
vital role of the doctrine of sovereign immunity in our federal
system. A State's constitutional interest in immunity encompasses not merely whether it may be sued, but where it
may be sued. 9 As JuSTICE MARSHALL well has noted, "[b]e8
The limitation deprives federal courts of any jurisdiction to entertain
such claims, and thus may be raised at any point in a proceeding. "The
Eleventh Amendment declares a policy and sets forth an explicit limitation
on federal judicial power of such compelling force that this Court will consider the issue arising under this Amendment ... even though urged for
the first time in this Court." Ford Motor Co . v. Department of Treasury,
323 u . s. 459, 467 (1945).
9
For this reason, the Court consistently has held that a State's waiver
of sovereign immunity in its own courts is not a waiver of the Eleventh
Amendment immunity in the federal courts. See, e. g., Florida Department of Health v. Florida Nursing Home Assn. , 450 U. S. 147, 150 (1981)
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cause of the problems of federalism inherent in making one
sovereign appear against its will in the courts of the other, a
restriction upon the exercise of the federal judicial power has
long been considered to be appropriate in a case such as this."
Employees v. Missouri Public Health & Welfare Dep't, 411
U.S. 279, 294 (1973) (MARSHALL, J., concurring in result). 10
Accordingly, in deciding this case we must be guided by
"[t]he principles of federalism that inform Eleventh Amendment doctrine." Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678, 691 (1978).
B
This Court's decisions thus establish that "an unconsenting
State is immune from suits brought in federal courts by her
own citizens as well as by citizens of another state." Employees , supra, at 280. There may be a question, however,
whether a particular suit in fact is a suit against a State. It
is clear, of course, that in the absence of consent a suit in
which the State or one of its agencies or departments is
named as the defendant is proscribed by the Eleventh
Amendment. See, e. g., Florida Department of Health v.
Florida Nursing Home Assn., 450 U. S. 147 (1981) (per
curiam); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U. S. 781 (1978) (per
curiam). This jurisdictional bar applies regardless of the
(per curiam). "[l]t is not consonant with our dual system for the federal
courts . . . to read the consent to embrace federal as well as state
courts . . . . [A] clear declaration of the state's intention to submit its fiscal
problems to other courts than those of its own creation must be found."
Great Northern Life Insurance Co. v. R ead, 322 U. S. 47, 54 (1944).
10
See N evada v. Hall , 440 U. S. , at 418-419 (States were "vitally interested" in whether they would be subject to suit in the federal courts, and
the debates about state immunity focused on the question of federal judicial
power). Cf. id., at 430-431 (BLACKMUN, J. , dissenting) (sovereign immunity is "a guarantee that is implied as an essential component of federalism"
and is "sufficiently fundamental to our federal structure to have implicit
constitutional dimension"); id. , at 437 (REHNQUIST, J ., dissenting) ("[T]he
States that ratified the Eleventh Amendment thought that they were putting an end to the possibility of individual States as unconsenting defendants in foreign jurisdictions").
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nature of the relief sought. See, e. g., Missouri v. Fiske,
290 U. S. 18, 27 (1933) ("Expressly applying to suits in equity
as well as at law, the Amendment necessarily embraces demands for the enforcement of equitable rights and the prosecution of equitable remedies when these are asserted and
prosecuted by an individual against a State").
When the suit is brought only against state officials, a
question arises as to whether that suit is a suit against the
State itself. Although prior decisions of this Court have not
been entirely consistent on this issue, certain principles are
well established. The Eleventh Amendment bars a suit
against state officials when "the state is the real, substantial
party in interest." Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U. S. 459, 464 (1945). See, e. g., In re Ayers, 123
U. S. 443, 487-492 (1887); Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U. S.
711, 720-723, 727-728 (1882). Thus, "[t]he general rule is
that relief sought nominally against an officer is in fact
against the sovereign if the decree would operate against the
latter." Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U. S. 57, 58 (1963) (per
curiam). 11 And, as when the State itself is named as the de11
"The general rule is that a suit is against the sovereign if 'the judgment
sought would expend itself on the public treasury or domain, or interfere
with the public administration,' or if the effect of the judgment would be 'to
restrain the Government from acting, or to compel it to act.'" Dugan v.
Rank, 372 U. S. 609, 620 (1963) (citations omitted).
Respondents do not dispute that the relief sought and awarded below operated against the state in each of the foregoing respects. They suggest,
however, that the suit here should not be considered to be against the state
for the purposes of the Eleventh Amendment because, they say, petitioners were acting u ltra vires their authority. Respondents rely largely on
Florida Dep't of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc. , 458 U. S. - - (1982),
which in turn was founded upon Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce
Corp ., 337 U. S. 682 (1949). These cases provide no support for this argument. These and other modern cases make clear that a state officer may
be said to act ultra vires only when he acts "without any authority whatever.'' Treasure Salvors , supra, at-- (opinion of STEVENS, J.); accord
id., at-- (WHITE, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in
part) (test is whether there was no "colorable basis for the exercise of au-
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fendant, a suit against state officials that is in fact a suit
against a State is barred regardless of whether it seeks damages or injunctive relief. See Cory v. White, 457 U. S. 85,
91 (1982).
The Court has recognized an important exception to this
general rule: a suit challenging the constitutionality of a state
official's action is not one against the State. This was the
holding in Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908), in which a
federal court enjoined the Attorney General of the State of
Minnesota from bringing suit to enforce a state statute that
allegedly violated the Fourteenth Amendment. This Court
held that the Eleventh Amendment did not prohibit issuance
of this injunction. The theory of the case was that an unconstitutional enactment is "void" and therefore does not "impart to [the officer] any immunity from responsibility to the
supreme authority of the United States." !d., at 160. Since
the State could not authorize the action, the officer was
"stripped of his official or representative character and [was]
subjected to the consequences of his official conduct." Ibid.
While the rule permitting suits alleging conduct contrary
to ''the supreme authority of the United States" has survived, the theory of Young has not been provided an expansive interpretation. Thus, in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S.
651 (1974), the Court emphasized that the Eleventh Amendment bars some forms of injunctive relief against state officials for violation of federal law. ld., at 666-667. In particular, Edelman held that when a plaintiff sues a state
official alleging a violation of federal law, the federal court
thority by state officials"). As the Court in Larson explained, an ultra
vires claim rests on "the officer's lack of delegated power. A claim of error
in the exercise of that power is therefore not sufficient. " Larson, supra,
at 690. Petitioners' actions in operating this mental health institution
plainly were not beyond their delegated authority in this sense. Pennsylvania statutes gave them broad discretion to provide "adequate" mental
health services. Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 50, § 4201 (1) (Purdon 1969). The essence of respondents' claim is that petitioners have not provided such services adequately.
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may award an injunction that governs the official's future
conduct, but not one that awards retroactive monetary relief.
Under the theory of Young, such a suit would not be one
against the State since the federal-law allegation would strip
the state officer of his official authority. Nevertheless, retroactive relief was barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

III
With these principles in mind, we now turn to the question
whether the claim that petitioners violated state law in carrying out their official duties at Pennhurst is one against the
State and therefore barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
Respondents advance two principal arguments in support of
the judgment below. 12 First, they contend that under the
doctrine of Edelman v. Jordan, supra, the suit is not against
We reject respondents' additional contention that Pennsylvania has
waived its immunity from suit in federal court. At the time the suit was
filed, suits against Pennsylvania were permitted only where expressly authorized by the legislature, see, e. g., Freach v. Commonwealth, 471 Pa.
558, 370 A. 2d 1163 (1977), and respondents have not referred us to any
provision expressly waiving Pennsylvania's Eleventh Amendment immunity. The State now has a statute governing sovereign immunity, including an express preservation of its immunity from suit in federal court:
"Federal courts.-N othing contained in this subchapter shall be construed
to waive the immunity of the Commonwealth from suit in Federal courts
guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States." 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8521(b) (1980).
We also do not agree with respondents that the presence of the United
States as a plaintiff in this case removes the Eleventh Amendment from
consideration. Although the Eleventh Amendment does not bar the
United States from suing a State in federal court, see, e. g., Monaco v.
Mississippi, 292 U. S. 313, 329 (1934), the United States' presence in the
case for any purpose does not eliminate the State's immunity for all purposes. For example, the fact that the federal court could award injunctive
relief to the United States on federal constitutional claims would not mean
that the court could order the State to pay damages to other plaintiffs. In
any case, we think it clear that the United States does not have standing to
assert the state-law claims of third-parties. For these reasons, the applicability of the Eleventh Amendment to respondents' state-law claim is
unaffected by the United States' participation in the case.
12
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the State because the courts below ordered only prospective
injunctive relief. Second, they assert that the state-law
claim properly was decided under the doctrine of pendent
jurisdiction. Respondents rely on decisions of this Court
awarding relief against state officials on the basis of a pendent state-law claim. See, e. g., Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 213 U. S. 175, 193 (1909).
A

We first address the contention that respondents' state-law
claim is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment because it
seeks only prospective relief as defined in Edelman v. Jordan, supra. The Court of Appeals held that if the judgment
below rested on federal law, it could be entered against petitioner state officials under the doctrine established in E delman and Young even though the prospective financial burden
was substantial and ongoing. 13 See 673 F. 2d, at 656. The
court assumed, and respondents assert, that this reasoning
applies as well when the official acts in violation of state law.
This argument misconstrues the basis of the doctrine established in Young and Edelman.
As discussed above, the injunction in Young was justified,
notwithstanding the obvious impact on the State itself, on the
view that sovereign immunity does not apply because an official who acts unconstitutionally is "stripped of his official or
representative character," Young, 209 U. S., at 160. This
rationale, of course, created the "well-recognized irony" that
an official's unconstitutional conduct constitutes state action
We do not decide whether the District Court would have jurisdiction
under this reasoning to grant prospective relief on the basis of federal law,
but we note that the scope of any such relief would be constrained by principles of comity and federalism. "Where, as here, the exercise of authority by state officials is attacked , federal courts must be constantly mindful
of the 'special delicacy of the adjustment to be preserved between federal
equitable power and State administration of its own law."' R izzo v.
Goode , 423 U. S. 362, 378 (1976) (quoting Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U. S.
117, 120 (1951)).
'

3
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under the Fourteenth Amendment but not the Eleventh
Amendment. Florida Department of State v. Treasure
Salvors, Inc., - - U. S. - - , - - (1982) (opinion of STEVENS, J.). Nonetheless, the Young doctrine has been accepted as necessary to permit the federal courts to vindicate
federal rights and hold state officials responsible to "the supreme authority of the United States." Young, 209 U. S.,
at 160. As JUSTICE BRENNAN has observed, "Ex parte
Young was the culmination of efforts by this Court to harmonize the principles of the Eleventh Amendment with the effective supremacy of rights and powers secured elsewhere in
the Constitution." Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U. S. 82, 106
(1971) (BRENNAN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Our decisions repeatedly have emphasized that the
Young doctrine rests on the need to promote the vindication
of federal rights. See, e. g., Quern v. Jordan, 440 U. S.
332, 337 (1979); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232, 237 (1974);
Georgia R. & Banking Co. v. Redwine, 342 U. S. 299, 304
(1952).
The Court also has recognized, however, that the need to
promote the supremacy of federal law must be accommodated
to the constitutional immunity of the States. This is the significance of Edelman v. Jordan, supra. We recognized that
the prospective relief authorized by Young "has permitted
the Civil War Amendments to the Constitution to serve as a
sword, rather than merely a shield, for those whom they
were designed to protect." 415 U. S., at 664. But we declined to extend Young to encompass retroactive relief, for to
do so would effectively eliminate the constitutional immunity
of the States. Accordingly, we concluded that although the
difference between permissible and impermissible relief "will
not in many instances be that between day and night," id. , at
667, an award of retroactive relief necessarily '"fall[s] afoul of
the Eleventh Amendment if that basic constitutional provision is to be conceived of as having any present force.'" I d.,
at 665 (quoting Rothstein v. Wyman, 467 F. 2d 226, 237 (CA2
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1972) (McGowan, J., sitting by designation), cert. denied, 411
U. S. 921 (1973)). In sum Edelman's distinction between
prospective and retroactive relief fulfills the underlying
purpose of Ex parte Young while at the same time preserving
to an important degree the constitutional immunity of the
States.
This need to reconcile competing interests is wholly absent, however, when a plaintiff alleges that a state official has
violated state law. In such a case the entire basis for the
doctrine of Young and Edelman disappears. A federal
court's grant of relief against state officials on the basis of
state law, whether prospective or retroactive, does not vindicate the supreme authority of federal law. On the contrary,
it is difficult to think of a greater intrusion on state sovereignty than when a federal court instructs state officials on
how to conform their conduct to state law. Such a result
conflicts directly with the principles of federalism that underlie the Eleventh Amendment. We conclude that Young and
Edelman are inapplicable in a suit against state officials on
the basis of state law.
B
The reasoning of our decisions on sovereign immunity thus
leads to the conclusion that a federal suit against state officials on the basis of state law contravenes the Eleventh
Amendment. In reaching a contrary conclusion, the Court
of Appeals relied principally on a separate line of cases dealing with pendent jurisdiction. The crucial point for the
Court of Appeals was that this Court has granted relief
against state officials on the basis of a pendent state-law
claim. See 673 F. 2d, at 657-658. We therefore must consider the relationship between pendent jurisdiction and the
Eleventh Amendment.
This Court long has held generally that when a federal
court obtains jurisdiction over a federal claim, it may adjudicate other related claims over which the court otherwise
would not have jurisdiction. See, e. g., Mine Workers v.
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Gibbs, 383 U. S. 715, 726 (1966); Osborn v. Bank of the
United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 819--823 (1824). The Court also
has held that a federal court may resolve a case solely on the
basis of a pendent state-law claim, see Siler, supra, at
192-193, and that in fact the court usually should do so in
order to avoid federal constitutional questions, see id., at
193; Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis,
J., concurring) ("[l]f a case can be decided on either of two
grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a
question of statutory construction or general law, the Court
will decide only the latter"). But pendent jurisdiction is a
judge-made doctrine inferred from the general language of
Art. III. The question presented is whether this doctrine
may be viewed as displacing the explicit limitation on federal
jurisdiction contained in the Eleventh Amendment.
As the Court of Appeals noted, in Siler and subsequent
cases concerning pendent jurisdiction relief was granted
against state officials on the basis of state-law claims that
were pendent to federal constitutional claims. In none of
these cases, however, did the Court so much as mention the
Eleventh Amendment in connection with the state-law claim.
Rather, the Court appears to have assumed that once jurisdiction was established over the federal-law claim, the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction would establish power to hear
the state-law claims as well. The Court has not addressed
whether that doctrine has a different scope when applied to
suits against the State. This is illustrated by Greene v. Louisville & Interurban R. Co., 244 U. S. 499 (1917), in which
the plaintiff railroads sued state officials, alleging that certain tax assessments were excessive under the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Court first rejected the officials' argument that the Eleventh Amendment barred the federal constitutional claim. It held that Ex parte Young applied to all
allegations challenging the constitutionality of official action,
regardless of whether the state statute under which the officials purported to act was constitutional or unconstitutional.
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See id., at 507. Having determined that the Eleventh
Amendment did not deprive the federal court of jurisdiction
over the Fourteenth Amendment question, the Court declared that the court's jurisdiction extended "to the determination of all questions involved in the case, including questions of state law, irrespective of the disposition that may be
made of the federal question, or whether it be found necessary to decide it at all." I d., at 508. The case then was
decided solely on state-law grounds. Accord, Louisville &
Nashville R. Co. v. Greene, 244 U. S. 522 (1917).
These cases thus did not directly confront the question before us. "[W]hen questions of jurisdiction have been passed
on in prior decisions sub silentio, this Court has never considered itself bound when a subsequent case finally brings the
jurisdictional issue before us." Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U. S.
528, 533, n. 5 (1974). 14 We therefore view the question as an
open one.
As noted, the implicit view of these cases seems to have
been that.once jurisdiction is established on the basis of a federal question, no further Eleventh Amendment inquiry is
necessary with respect to other claims raised in the case.
This is an erroneous view and contrary to the principles established in our Eleventh Amendment decisions. "The
Eleventh Amendment is an explicit limitation on the judicial
power of the United States." Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U. S.,
at 25. It deprives a federal court of power to decide certain
claims against States that otherwise would be within the
scope of Art. III's grant of jurisdiction. For example, if a
lawsuit against state officials under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 alleges
a constitutional claim, the federal court is barred from awarding damages against the state treasury even though the claim
14
See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 671 (1974) ("Having now had
an opportunity to more fully consider the Eleventh Amendment issue after
briefing and argument, we disapprove the Eleventh Amendment holdings
of [certain prior] cases to the extent that they are inconsistent with our
holding today").
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arises under the Constitution. See Quern v. Jordan, 440
U. S. 332 (1979). Similarly, if a§ 1983 action alleging a constitutional claim is brought directly against a State, the Eleventh Amendment bars a federal court from granting any relief on that claim. See Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U. S. 781
(1978) (per curiam). The Amendment thus is a specific constitutional bar against hearing evenfederal claims that otherwise would be within the jurisdiction of the federal courts. 15
This constitutional bar applies to pendent claims as well.
As noted above, pendent jurisdiction is a judge-made doctrine of expediency and efficiency derived from the general
Art. III language conferring power to hear all "cases" arising
under federal law or between diverse parties. See Mine
Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U. S. 715, 725 (1966). See also Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U. S. 528, 545 (1974) (terming pendent
jurisdiction "a doctrine of discretion"). The Eleventh
Amendment should not be construed to apply with less force
to this implied form of jurisdiction than it does to the explicitly granted power to hear federal claims. The history of the
adoption and development of the Amendment, see supra, at
6-9, confirms that it is an independent limitation on all exercises of Art. III power: "the entire judicial power granted by
the Constitution does not embrace authority to entertain suit
brought by private parties against a State without consent
given," Ex parte State of New York No.1, 256 U.S. 490, 497
(1921). If we were to hold otherwise, a federal court could
award damages against a State on the basis of a pendent
claim. Our decision in Edelman v. Jordan, supra, makes
clear that pendent jurisdiction does not permit such an evasion of the immunity guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment. We there held that "the District Court was correct in
See, e. g., Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U. S. 313, 322 (1934) ("[A]lthough a case may arise under the Constitution and laws of the United
States, the judicial power does not extend to it if the suit is sought to be
prosecuted against a State, without her consent, by one of her own citizens"); Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U. S. 18, 25-26 (1933).
'

5
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exercising pendent jurisdiction over [plaintiffs'] statutory
claim," 415 U. S., at 653, n. 1, but then concluded that the
Eleventh Amendment barred an award of retroactive relief
on the basis of that pendent claim. I d., at 678.
In sum, contrary to the view implicit in decisions such as
Greene, supra, neither pendent jurisdiction nor any other
basis of jurisdiction may override the Eleventh Amendment. 16 A federal court must examine each claim in a case to
see if the court's jurisdiction over that claim is barred by the
Eleventh Amendment. We concluded above that a claim
that state officials violated state law in carrying out their official responsibilities is a claim against the State that is protected by the Eleventh Amendment. See supra, at 16. We
now hold that this principle applies as well to state-law claims
brought into federal court under pendent jurisdiction.

c
Respondents urge that application of the Eleventh Amendment to pendent state-law claims will have a disruptive effect
on litigation against state officials. They argue that the
"considerations of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to litigants" that underlie pendent jurisdiction, see
Gibbs, supra, at 726, counsel against a result that may cause
litigants to split causes of action between state and federal
courts. They also contend that the policy of avoiding unnecessary constitutional decisions will be contravened if plaintiffs choose to forgo their state-law claims and sue only in federal court or, alternatively, that the policy of E x parte Young
will be hindered if plaintiffs choose to forgo their right to a
federal forum and bring all of their claims in state court.
It may be that applying the Eleventh Amendment to pendent claims results in federal claims being brought in state
court, or in bifurcation of claims. That is not uncommon in
this area. Under Edelman v. Jordan, supra, a suit against
See Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U. S., at 27 ("This is not less a suit against
the State because the bill is ancillary and supplemental.").
16

;
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state officials for retroactive monetary relief, whether based
on federal or state law, must be brought in state court.
Challenges to the validity of state tax systems under 42
U. S. C. § 1983 also must be brought in state court. Fair
Assessment in Real Estate Assn. v. McNary, 454 U. S. 100
(1981). Under the abstention doctrine, unclear issues of
state law commonly are split off and referred to the state
courts. 17
In any case, the answer to respondents' assertions is that
such considerations of policy cannot override the constitutional limitation on the authority of the federal judiciary to
adjudicate suits against a State. See Missouri v. Fiske, 290
U. S., at 25-26 ("Considerations of convenience open no avenue of escape from the [Amendment's] restriction"). 18 That a
Moreover, allowing claims against state officials based on state law to
be brought in the federal courts does not necessarily foster the policies of
"judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants," Mine Workers v.
Gibbs, 383 U. S. 715, 726 (1966), that underlie pendent jurisdiction. For
example, when a federal decision on state law is obtained, the federal
court's construction often is uncertain and ephemeral. In cases of ongoing
oversight of a state program that may extend over years, as in this case,
the federal intrusion is likely to be extensive. Duplication of effort, inconvenience, and uncertainty may well result. See, e. g., Burford v. Sun Oil
Co., 319 U. S. 315, 327 (1943) ("Delay, misunderstanding of local law, and
needless conflict with the state policy, are the inevitable product of this
double [i. e., federal-state] system of review"). Waste and delay may also
result from abstention, which often is called for when state law is unclear,
see Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U. S. 360, 378--379 (1964) ("abstention operates
to require piecemeal adjudication in many courts, thereby delaying ultimate adjudication on the merits for an undue length of time") (citations
omitted), or from dismissals on the basis of comity, which has special force
when relief is sought on state-law grounds, see Gibbs, supra, at 726;
Hawks v. Hamill, 288 U. S. 52, 61 (1933).
8
' Cf. Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1976) (Although "considerations of judicial economy'' would be served by permitting pendent-party
jurisdiction, "the addition of a completely new party would run counter to
the well-established principle that federal courts, as opposed to state trial
courts of general jurisdiction, are courts of limited jurisdiction marked out
by Congress").
17
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litigant's choice of forum is reduced "has long been understood to be a part of the tension inherent in our system of federalism." Employees v. Missouri Public Health & Welfare
Dept., 411 U. S. 279, 298 (1973) (MARSHALL, J., concurring
in result).
IV
Respondents contend that, regardless of the applicability
of the Eleventh Amendment to their state claims against petitioner state officials, the judgment may still be uphe1d
against petitioner county officials. We are not persuaded.
Even assuming that these officials are not immune from suit
challenging their actions under the MH/MR Act, 19 it is clear
that without the injunction against the state institutions and
officials in this case, an order entered on state-law grounds
19

We have held that the Eleventh Amendment does not apply to "counties and similar municipal corporations." Mt. Healthy City School District
v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274, 280 (1977); see Lincoln County v. Luning, 133
U. S. 529, 530 (1890). At the same time, we have applied the Amendment
to bar relief against county officials "in order to protect the state treasury
from liability that would have had essentially the same practical consequences as a judgment against the State itself." Lake Country Estates,
Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U. S. 391, 401 (1979). See,
e. g., Edelman v. Jordan, supra (Eleventh Amendment bars suit against
state and county officials for retroactive award of welfare be"'efits). The
Courts of Appeals are in general agreement that a suit agains . officials of a
county or other governmental entity is barred if the relief obtained runs
against the State. See, e. g., Moore v. Tangipahoa Parish School Board,
594 F. 2d 489, 493 (CA5 1979); Carey v. Quern, 588 F. 2d 230, 233-234
(CA71978); Incarcerated Men of Allen County Jail v. Fair, 507 F. 2d 281,
287-288 (CA6 1974); Harris v. Tooele County School District, 471 F. 2d
218, 220 (CAlO 1973). Given that the actions of the county commissioners
and mental-health administrators are dependent on funding from the State,
it may be that relief granted against these county officials, when exercising
their functions under the MH/MR Act, effectively runs against the State.
Cf. Farr v. Chesney, 441 F. Supp. 127, 130-132 (MD Pa. 1977) (holding
that Pennsylvania county commissioners, acting as members of the board
of the county office of mental health and retardation, may not be sued for
back pay under the Eleventh Amendment). We need not decide this issue
in light of our disposition above.

;
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necessarily would be limited. The relief substantially concerns Pennhurst, an arm of the State that is operated by
state officials. Moreover, funding for the county mental retardation programs comes almost entirely from the State, see
Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 50, §§4507-4509 (Purdon 1969 and Supp.
1982), and the costs of the masters have been borne by the
State, see 446 F. Supp., at 1327. Finally, the MH/MR Act
contemplates that the state anq county officials will cooperate in operating mental retardation programs. See In re
Schmidt, 494 Pa. 86, 95-96, 429 A. 2d 631, 635-636 (1981).
In short, the present judgment could not be sustained on the
basis of the state-law obligations of petitioner county officials. Indeed, any relief granted against the county officials
on the basis of the state statute would be partial and incomplete at best. Such an ineffective enforcement of state law
would not appear to serve the purposes of efficiency, convenience, and fairness that must inform the exercise of pendent
jurisdiction.

v

The Court of Appeals upheld the judgment of the District
Court solely on the basis of Pennsylvania's MH/MR Act.
We hold that these federal courts lacked jurisdiction to enjoin
petitioner state institut )ns and state officials on the basis of
this state law. The District Court also rested its decision on
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. See supra, at 2. On remand the
Court of Appeals may consider to what extent, if any, the
judgment may be sustained on these bases. 20 The court also
may consider whether relief may be granted to respondents
under the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of
Rights Act, 42 U. S. C. §§ 6011, 6063. The judgment of the
20
On the Fourteenth Amendment issue, the court should consider
Youngberg v. Romeo,- U. S . - (1982), a decision that was not available when the District Court issued its decision.

81-2101-0PINION
PENNHURST STATE SCHOOL & HOSP. v. HALDERMAN

23

Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether a federal court
may award injunctive relief against state officials on the basis
of state law.
I
This litigation, here for the second time, concerns the conditions of care at petitioner Pennhurst State School and Hospital, a Pennsylvania institution for the care of the mentally
retarded. See Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1 (1981). Although the litigation's history is set forth in detail in our prior opinion, see id., at 5-10,
it is necessary for purposes of this decision to review that
history.
This suit originally was brought in 1974 by respondent
Terri Lee Halderman, a resident of Pennhurst, in the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Ultimately, plaintiffs included a class consisting of all persons
who were or might become residents of Pennhurst; the Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Citizens (P ARC); and the
United States. De~~nts were"1>ennhurst and various
Pennhurst officials; t
ennsylvania Department of Public
Welfare and several of its officials; and various county commissioners, county mental retardation administrators, and
other officials of five Pennsylvania counties surrounding
Pennhurst. Respondents' amended complaint charged that
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conditions at Pennhurst violated the class members' rights
under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 87 Stat. 394, as amended, 29
U. S. C. § 794 (1976 ed. and Supp. V); the Developmentally
Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U. S. C.
§§ 6001-6081 (1976 ed. and Supp. V); and the Pennsylvania
Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966 (the
"MH/MR Act"), Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 50, §§4101-4704
(Purdon 1969 and Supp. 1982). Both damages and injunctive
relief were sought.
In 1977, following a lengthy trial, the District Court rendered its decision. 446 F. Supp. 1295 (1977). As noted in
our prior opinion, the court's findings were undisputed: "Conditions at Pennhurst are not only dangerous, with the residents often physically abused or drugged by staff members,
but also inadequate for the 'habilitation' of the retarded. Indeed, the court found that the physicial, intellectual, and
emotional skills of some residents have deteriorated at
Pennhurst." 451 U. S., at 7 (footnote omitted). The District Court held that these conditions violated each resident's
right to "minimally adequate habilitation" )rllder the Due
Process Clause and the MH/MR Act, see ~46 F. Supp., at
1314-1318, 1322-1323; "freedom from harm" under the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, see :1., at 1320-1321;
and "nondiscriminatory habilitation" under the Equal Protection Clause and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, see id., at
1321-1324. Furthermore, the court found that "due process
demands that if a state undertakes the habilitation of a retarded person, it must do so in the least restrictive setting
consistent with that individual's habilitative needs." I d., at
1319 (emphasis added). After concluding that the large size
of Pennhurst prevented it from providing the necessary
habilitation in the least restrictive environment, the court ordered "that immediate steps be taken to remove the retarded
residents from Pennhurst." I d., at 1325. Petitioners were
ordered "to provide suitable community living arrange-
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ments" for the class members, id., at 1326, and the court appointed a Special Master "with the power and duty to plan,
organize, direct, supervise and monitor the implementation
of this and any further Orders of the Court." Ibid. 1
The Court of Appeals for the T~ Circuit affirmed most
of the District Court's judgment. 612 F. 2d 84 (1979) (en
bane). It agreed that respondents had a right to habilitation
in the least restrictive environment, but it grounded this
right solely on the "bill of rights" provision in the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42
U. S. C. § 6010. See 612 F. 2d, at 95-100, 104-107. The
court did not consider the constitutional issues or § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act, and while it affirmed the District Court's
holding that the MH/MR Act provides a right to adequate
habilitation, see id., at 100-103, the court did not decide
whether that state right encompassed a right to treatment in
the least restrictive setting.
On the question of remedy, the Court of Appeals affirmed
except as to the District Court's order that Pennhurst be
closed. The court observed that some patients would be
unable to adjust to life outside an institution, and it determined that none of the legal provisions relied on by plaintiffs
precluded institutionalization. I d., at 114-115. It therefore
remanded for '" 1dividual determinations by the [District
Court], or by the Special Master, as to the appropriateness of
an improved Pennhurst for each such patient," guided by "a
presumption in favor of placing individuals in [community living arrangements]." Ibid. 2
'The District Court determined that the individual defendants had acted
in good faith and therefore were immune from the damage claims. 446 F.
Supp., at 1324.
2
In a companion case, the Court of Appeals affirmed the District
Court's denial of the Pennhurst Parents-Staff Association's motion to intervene for purposes of appeal, finding the denial harmless error. See 612
F. 2d 131 (1979) (en bane). The Association subsequently was granted
leave to intervene and is a petitioner in this Court.
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On remand the District Court established detailed procedures for determining the proper residential placement for
each patient. A team consisting of the patient, his parents
or guardian, and his case manager must establish an individual habilitation plan providing for habilitation of the patient
in a designated community living arrangement. The plan is
subject to review by the Special Master. A second master,
called the Hearing Master, is available to conduct hearings,
upon request by the resident, his parents or his advocate, on
the question whether the services of Pennhurst would be
more beneficial to the resident than the community living arrangement provided in the resident's plan. The Hearing
Master then determines where the patient should reside,
subject to possible review by the District Court. See App.
123a-134a (Order of April 24, 1980). 3
This Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals,
finding that 42 U. S. C. § 6010 did not create any substantive
rights. 451 U. S. 1 (1981). We remanded the case to the
Court of Appeals to determine if the remedial order could be
supported on the basis of state law, the Constitution, or§ 504
of the Rehabilitation Act. See id., at 31. 4 We also remanded for consideration of whether any relief was available
under other provisions of the Developmentally Disabled AsOn July 1, 1981, Pennsylvania enacted an appropriations bill providing
that only $35,000 would be paid for the Masters' expenses for the fiscal
year July 1981 to June 1982. The District Court held the Pennsylvania
Department of Public Welfare and its Secretary in contempt, and imposed
a fine of $10,000 per day. Pennsylvania paid the fines, and the contempt
was purged on January 8, 1982. On appeal the Court of Appeals affirmed
the contempt order. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hospital,
673 F. 2d 628 (1982), cert. pending, No. 81-2363.
' Three Justices dissented from the Court's construction of the Act, but
concluded that the District Court should not have adopted the "far-reaching remedy" of appointing "a Special Master to decide which of the Pennhurst inmates should remain and which should be moved to communitybased facilities. . . . [T]he court should not have assumed the task of
managing Pennhurst.... " 451 U. S., at 54 (WHITE J., dissenting in
part).
3
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sistance and Bill of Rights Act. See id., at 27-30 (discussing
42 U. S. C. §§ 6011(a), 6063(b)(5)).
On remand the Court of Appeals affirmed its prior judgment in its entirety. 673 F. 2d 647 (1982) (en bane). It determined that in a recent decision the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania had "spoken definitively" in holding that the
MI:I/MR Act required the State to adopt the "least restrictive
environment" approach for the care of the mentally retarded.
Id., at 651 (citing In re Schmidt, 494 Pa. 86, 429 A. 2d 631
(1981)). The Court of Appeals concluded that this state statute fully supported its prior judgment, and therefore did not
reach the remaining issues of federal law. It also rejected
petitioners' argument that the Eleventh Amendment barred
a federal court from considering this pendent state-law claim.
The court noted that the Amendment did not bar a federal
court from granting prospective injunctive relief against
state officials on the basis of federal claims, see 673 F. 2d, at
656 (citing Ex Parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908)), and concluded that the same result obtained with respect to a
pendent state-law claim. It reasoned that because Siler v.
Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 213 U. S. 175 (1909), an important case in the development of the doctrine of pendent
jurisdiction, also involved state officials, "there cannot be ...
an Eleventh Amendment exception to that rule." 673 F. 2d,
at 658. 5 Finally, the court rejected petitioners' argument
that it should have abstained from deciding the state-law
claim under principles of comity, see id., at 659-660, andrefused to consider petitioners' objections to the District
Court's use of a special master, see id., at 651 and n. 10.
Three judges dissented in part, arguing that under principles
"The Court of Appeals also noted that "the United States is an intervening plaintiff ... against which even the state itself cannot successfully
plead the Eleventh Amendment as a bar to jurisdiction," and that "the
counties, even as juridical entities, do not fall within the coverage of the
Eleventh Amendment. Against those defendants even money damages
may be awarded." 673 F. 2d, at 656 (citation omitted).

r
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of federalism and comity the establishment of a special master to supervise compliance was an abuse of discretion. See
id., at 662 (Seitz, C. J., joined by Hunter, J., dissenting in
part); ibid. (Garth, J., concurring in part and dissenting as to
relief). See also id., at 661 (Aldisert, J., concurring) (seriously questioning the propriety of the order appointing the
Special Master, but concluding that a retroactive reversal of
that order would be meaningless). 6
We granted certiorari, 457 U. S. 1131 (1982), and now reverse and remand.
II
Petitioners raise three challenges to the judgment of the
Court of Appeals: (i) the Eleventh Amendment prohibited
the District Court from ordering state officials to conform
their conduct to state law; (ii) the doctrine of comity prohibited the District Court from issuing its injunctive relief; and
(iii) the District Court abused its discretion in appointing two
masters to supervise the decisions of state officials in implementing state law. We need not reach the latter two issues,
for we find the Eleventh Amendment challenge dispositive.
A

Article III, § 2 of the Constitution provides that the federal
judicial power extends, inter alia, to controversies "between
a State and Citizens of another State." Relying on this language, this Court in 1793 assumed original jurisdiction over a
suit brought by a citizen of South Carolina against the State
of Georgia. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419 (1793). The
decision "created such a shock of surprise that the Eleventh
Amendment was at once proposed and adopted." Monaco v.
Mississippi, 292 U. S. 313, 325 (1934). The Amendment
provides:
6
The Office of the Special Master was abolished in December 1982.
See App. 220a (Order of August 12, 1982). The Hearing Master remains
in operation.
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"The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States
by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects
of any Foreign State."
The Amendment's language overruled the particular result
in Chisholm, but this Court has recognized that its greater
significance lies in its affirmation that the fundamental principle of sovereign immunity limits the grant of judicial authority in Art. III. Thus, in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1
(1890), the Court held that, despite the limited terms of the
Eleventh Amendment, a federal court could not entertain a
suit brought by a citizen against his own State. After reviewing the constitutional debates concerning the scope of
Art. III, the Court determined that federal jurisdiction over
suits against unconsenting States "was not contemplated by
the Constitution when establishing the judicial power of the
United States." Id., at 15. See Monaco v. Mississippi,
supra, at 322-323 (1934). 7 In short, the principle of sovereign immunity is a constitutional limitation on the federal judicial power established in Art. III:
"That a State may not be sued without its consent is a
fundamental rule of jurisprudence having so important a
bearing upon the construction of the Constitution of the
United States that it has become established by repeated
decisions of this court that the entire judicial power
granted by the Constitution does not embrace authority
to entertain a suit brought by private parties against a
State without consent given: not one brought by citizens
7

See Employees v. Missouri Public Health Dep't, 411 U. S. 279,
291-292 (1973) (MARSHALL, J ., concurring in judgment) (The Eleventh
Amendment "clarif[ied] the intent of the Framers concerning the reach of
federal judicial power" and "restore[d] the original understanding" that
States could not be made unwilling defendants in federal court). See also
N evada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410,430-431 (1979) (BLACKMUN, J. , dissenting);
id., at 437 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting).
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of another State, or by citizens or subjects of a foreign
State, because of the Eleventh Amendment; and not
even one brought by its own citizens, because of the fundamental rule of which the Amendment is but an exemplification." Ex parte State of New York No. 1, 256
U. S. 490, 497 (1921) (emphasis added). 8
A sovereign's immunity may be waived, and the Court consistently has held that a State may consent to suit against it
in federal court. See, e. g., Clark v. Barnard, 108 U. S.
436, 447 (1883). We have insisted, however, that the State's
consent be unequivocally expressed. See, e. g., Edelman v.
Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 673 (1974). Similarly, although Congress has power with respect to the rights protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment immunity, see Fitzpatrick v. Bitker, 427 U. S. 445
(1976), we have required an unequivocal expression of congressional intent to "overturn the constitutionally guaranteed immunity of the several States." Quern v. Jordan, 440
U. S. 332, 342 (1979) (holding that 42 U. S. C. § 1983 does not
override States' Eleventh Amendment immunity). Our reluctance to infer that a State's immunity from suit in the federal courts has been negated stems from recognition of the
vital role of the doctrine of sovereign immunity in our federal
system. A State's constitutional interest in immunity encompasses not merely whether it may be sued, but where it
may be sued. 9 As JUSTICE MARSHALL well has noted, "[b]e8
The limitation deprives federal courts of any jurisdiction to entertain
such claims, and thus may be raised at any point in a proceeding. "The
Eleventh Amendment declares a policy and sets forth an explicit limitation
on federal judicial power of such compelling force that this Court will consider the issue arising under this Amendment . . . even though urged for
the first time in this Court." Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury,
323 u. s. 459, 467 (1945).
9
For this reason, the Court consistently has held that a State's waiver
of sovereign immunity in its own courts is not a waiver of the Eleventh
Amendment immunity in the federal courts. See, e. g., Florida Department of Health v. Florida Nursing Home Assn., 450 U. S. 147, 150 (1981)
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cause of the problems of federalism inherent in making one
sovereign appear against its will in the courts of the other, a
restriction upon the exercise of the federal judicial power has
long been considered to be appropriate in a case such as this."
Employees v. Missouri Public Health & Welfare Dep't, 411
U. S. 279, 294 (1973) (MARSHALL, J., concurring in result). 10
Accordingly, in deciding this case we must be guided by
"[t]he principles of federalism that inform Eleventh Amendment doctrine." Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678, 691 (1978).
B
This Court's decisions thus establish that "an unconsenting
State is immune from suits brought in federal courts by her
own citizens as well as by citizens of another state." Employees, supra, at 280. There may be a question, however,
whether a particular suit in fact is a suit against a State. It
is clear, of course, that in the absence of consent a suit in
which the State or one of its agencies or departments is
named as the defendant is proscribed by the Eleventh
Amendment. See, e. g., Florida Department of Health v.
Florida Nursing Home Assn., 450 U. S. 147 (1981) (per
curiam); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U. S. 781 (1978) (per
curiam). This jurisdictional bar applies regardless of the
(per curiam). "[l]t is not consonant with our dual system for the federal
courts . . . to read the consent to embrace federal as well as state
courts . ... [A] clear declaration of the state's intention to submit its fiscal
problems to other courts than those of its own creation must be found."
Great Northern Life Insurance Co . v. Read, 322 U. S. 47, 54 (1944).
10
See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U. S. , at 418-419 (States were "vitally interested" in whether they would be subject to suit in the federal courts, and
the debates about state immunity focused on the question of federal judicial
power). Cf. id., at 430-431 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting) (sovereign immunity is "a guarantee that is implied as an essential component of federalism"
and is "sufficiently fundamental to our federal structure to have implicit
constitutional dimension"); id. , at 437 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting) ("[T]he
States that ratified the Eleventh Amendment thought that they were putting an end to the possibility of individual States as unconsenting defendants in foreign jurisdictions").
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nature of the relief sought. See, e. g., Missouri v. Fiske,
290 U. S. 18, 27 (1933) ("Expressly applying to suits in equity
as well as at law, the Amendment necessarily embraces demands for the enforcement of equitable rights and the prosecution of equitable remedies when these are asserted and
prosecuted by an individual against a State").
When the suit is brought only against state officials, a
question arises as to whether that suit is a suit against the
State itself. Although prior decisions of this Court have not
been entirely consistent on this issue, certain principles are
well established. The Eleventh Amendment bars
suit
against state officials when "the state is the real, substantial
party in interest." Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U. S. 459, 464 (1945). See, e. g., In re Ayers, 123
U. S. 443, 487--492 (1887); Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U. S.
711, 720-723, 727-728 (1882). Thus, "[t]he general rule is
that relief sought nominally against an officer is in fact
against the sovereign if the decree would operate against the
latter." Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U. S. 57, 58 (1963) (per
curiam). 11 And, as when the State itself is named as the de-

a

11
"The general rule is that a suit is against the sovereign if 'the judgment
sought would expend itself on the public treasury or domain, or interfere
with the public administration,' or if the effect of the judgment would be 'to
restrain the Government from acting, or to compel it to act.'" Dugan v.
Rank, 372 U. S. 609, 620 (1963) (citations omitted).
Respondents do not dispute that the relief sought and awarded below operated against the state in each of the foregoing respects. They suggest,
however, that the suit here should not be considered to be against the state
for the purposes of the Eleventh Amendment because, they say, petitioners were acting ultra vires their authority. Respondents rely largely on
Florida Dep't of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U. S. --,r-- (1982),
which in turn was founded upon Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce
Corp., 337 U. S. 682 (1949). These cases provide no support for this argument. These and other modern cases make clear that a state officer may
be said to act ultra vires only when he acts "without any authority whatever." Treasure Salvors, supra, at 7t- (opinion of STEVENS, J.); accord
id., at ---tt;- (WHITE, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in
part) (test is whether there was no "colorable basis for the exercise of au-

670

-)y ?

116
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fendant, a suit against state officials that is in fact a suit
against a State is barred regardless of whether it seeks damages or injunctive relief. See Cory v. White, 457 U. S. 85,
91 (1982).
The Court has recognized an important exception to this
general rule: a suit challenging the constitutionality of a state
official's action is not one against the State. This was the
holding in Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908), in which a
federal court enjoined the Attorney General of the State of
Minnesota from bringing suit· to enforce a state statute that
allegedly violated the Fourteenth Amendment. This Court
held that the Eleventh Amendment did not prohibit issuance
of this injunction. The theory of the case was that an unconstitutional enactment is "void" and therefore does not "impart to [the officer] any immunity from responsibility to the
supreme authority ofthe United States." !d., at 160. Since
the State could not authorize the action, the officer was
"stripped of his official or representative character and [was]
subjected to the consequences of his official conduct." Ibid.
While the r.ule permitting suits alleging conduct contrary
to ''the supreme authority of the United States" has survived, the theory of Young has not been provided an expansive interpretation. Thus, in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S.
651 (1974), the Court emphasized that the Eleventh Amendment bars some forms of injunctive relief against state officials for violation of federal law. !d., at 66tH367. In particular, Edelman held that when a plaintiff sues a state
official alleging a violation of federal law, the federal court
thority by state officials"). As the Court in Larson explained, an ultra
vires claim rests on "the officer's lack of delegated power. A claim of error
in the exercise of that power is therefore not sufficient." Larson, supra,
at 690. Petitioners' actions in operating this mental health institution
plainly were not beyond their delegated authority in this sense. Pennsylvania statutes gave them broad discretion to provide "adequate" mental
health services. Pa. Stat. Ann. , Tit. 50, § 4201(1) (Purdon 1969). The essence of respondents' claim is that petitioners have not provided such services adequately.
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may award an injunction that governs the official's future
conduct, but not one that awards retroactive monetary relief.
Under the theory of Young, such a suit would not be one
against the State since the federal-law allegation would strip
the state officer of his official authority. Nevertheless, retroactive relief was barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

III
With these principles in mind, we now turn to the question
whether the claim that petitioners violated state law in carrying out their official duties at Pennhurst is one against the
State and therefore barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
Respondents advance two principal arguments in support of
the judgment below. 12 First, they contend that under the
doctrine of Edelman v. Jordan, supra, the suit is not against
We reject respondents' additional contention that Pennsylvania has
waived its immunity from suit in federal court. At the time the suit was
filed, suits against Pennsylvania were permitted only where expressly authorized by the legislature, see, e. g., Freach v. Commonwealth, 471 Pa.
558, 370 A. 2d 1163 (1977), and respondents have not referred us to any
provision expressly waiving Pennsylvania's Eleventh Amendment immunity. The State now has a statute governing sovereign immunity, including an express preservation of its immunity from suit in federal court:
"Federal courts.-Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be construed
to waive the immunity of the Commonwealth from suit in Federal courts
guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States." 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8521(b) (1980).
We also do not agree with respondents that the presence of the United
States as a plaintiff in this case removes the Eleventh Amendment from
consideration. Although the Eleventh Amendment does not bar the
United States from suing a State in federal court, see, e. g., Monaco v.
Mississippi, 292 U. S. 313, 329 (1934), the United States' presence in the
case for any purpose does not eliminate the State's immunity for all purposes. For example, the fact that the federal court could award injunctive
relief to the United States on federal constitutional claims would not mean
that the court could order the State to pay damages to other plaintiffs. In
any case, we think it clear that the United States does not have standing to
assert the state-law claims of third-parties. For these reasons, the applicability of the Eleventh Amendment to respondents' state-law claim is
unaffected by the United States' participation in the case.
12
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the State because the courts below ordered only prospective
injunctive relief. Second, they assert that the state-law
claim properly was decided under the doctrine of pendent
jurisdiction. Respondents rely on decisions of this Court
awarding relief against state officials on the basis of a pendent state-law claim. See, e. g., Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R . Co., 213 U. S. 175, 193 (1909).
A

We first address the contention that respondents' state-law
claim is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment because it
seeks only prospective relief as defined in Edelman v. Jordan, supra. The Court of Appeals held that if the judgment
below rested on federal law, it could be entered against petitioner state officials under the doctrine established in Edelman and Young even though the prospective financial burden
was substantial and ongoing. 13 See 673 F. 2d, at 656. The
court assumed, and respondents assert, that this reasoning
applies as well when the official acts in violation of state law.
This argument misconstrues the pasis of the doctrine established in Young and Edelman.
As discussed above, the injunction in Young was justified,
notwithstanding the obvious impact on the State itself, on the
view that sovereign immunity does not apply because an official who acts unconstitutionally is "stripped of his official or
representative character," Young, 209 U. S., at 160. This
rationale, of course, created the "well-recognized irony" that
an official's unconstitutional conduct constitutes state action
13
We do not decide whether the District Court would have jurisdiction
under this reasoning to grant prospective relief on the basis of federal law,
but we note that the scope of any such relief would be constrained by principles of comity and federalism. "Where, as here, the exercise of authority by state officials is attacked , federal courts must be constantly mindful
of the 'special delicacy of the adjustment to be preserved between federal
equitable power and State administration of its own law."' R izzo v.
Goode, 423 U. S. 362, 378 (1976) (quoting Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U. S.
117, 120 (1951)).
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under the Fourteenth Amendment but not the Eleventh
Amendment. Florida Department of State v. Treasure
Salvors, Inc., - - U. S. - - , - - (1982) (opinion of STEVENS, J.). Nonetheless, the Young doctrine has been accepted as necessary to permit the federal courts to vindicate
federal rights and hold state officials responsible to "the supreme authority of the United States." Young, 209 U. S.,
at 160. As JUSTICE BRENNAN has observed, "Ex parte
Young was the culmination of efforts by this Court to harmonize the principles of the Eleventh Amendment with the effective supremacy of rights and powers secured elsewhere in
the Constitution." Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U. S. 82, 106
(1971) (BRENNAN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Our decisions repeatedly have emphasized that the
Young doctrine rests on the need to promote the vindication
of federal rights. See, e. g., Quern v. Jordan, 440 U. S.
332, 337 (1979); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232, 237 (1974);
Georgia R. & Banking Co. v. Redwine, 342 U. S. 299, 304
(1952).
The Court also has recognized, however, that the need to
promote the supremacy of federal law must be accommodated
to the constitutional immunity of the States. This is the significance of Edelman v. Jordan, supra. We recognized that
the prospective relief authorized by Young "has permitted
the Civil War Amendments to the Constitution to serve as a
sword, rather than merely a shield, for those whom they
were designed to protect." 415 U. S., at 664. But we declined to extend_Afoung to encompass retroactive relief, for to
do so would effectively eliminate the constitutional immunity
of the States. Accordingly, we concluded that although the
difference between permissible and impermissible relief "will
not in many instances be that between day and night," id., at
667, an award of retroactive relief necessarily" 'fall[s] afoul of
the Eleventh Amendment if that basic constitutional provision is to be conceived of as having any present force.'" I d.,
at 665 (quoting Rothstein v. Wyman, 467 F. 2d 226, 237 (CA2
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1972) (McGowan, J., sitting by designation), cert. denied, 411
U. S. 921 (1973)). In sum Edelman's distinction between
prospective and retroactive relief fulfills the underlying
purpose of Ex parte Young while at the same time preserving
to an ~mportant degree the constitutional immunity of the
States.V
This need to reconcile competing interests is wholly absent, however, when a plaintiff alleges that a state official has
violated state law. In such a case the entire basis for the
doctrine of Young and Edelman disappears. A federal
court's grant of relief against state officials on the basis of
state law, whether prospective or retroactive, does not vindicate the supreme authority of federal law. On the contrary,
it is difficult to think of a greater intrusion on state sovereignty than when a federal court instructs state officials on
how to conform their conduct to state law. Such a result
conflicts directly with the principles of federalism that underlie the Eleventh Amendment. We conclude that Young and
Edelman are inapplicable in a suit against state officials on
the basis of state law.
B
The reasoning of our decisions on sovereign immunity thus
leads to the conclusion that a federal suit against state officials on the basis of state law contravenes the Eleventh
Amendment. In reaching a contrary conclusion, the Court
of Appeals relied principally on a separate line of cases dealing with pendent jurisdiction. The crucial point for the
Court of Appeals was that this Court has granted relief
against state officials on the basis of a pendent state-law
claim. See 673 F. 2d, at 657-658. We therefore must consider the relationship between pendent jurisdiction and the
Eleventh Amendment.
This Court long has held generally that when a federal
court obtains jurisdiction over a federal claim, it may adjudicate other related claims over which the court otherwise
would not have jurisdiction. See, e. g., Mine Workers v.

~

~~<-----------------~

Jo

RIDER P. 15

14 To say, as the dissent does, post, at 19, n. 28, that injunctive relief against State officials acting in their official
capacity does not run against the State is to rest on the purest
fiction.

Unlike the English sovereign perhaps, an American State

can act only through its officials.
to command the State.

To command the official is

It is true that the Court in Edelman rec-

ognized that retroactive relief often, or at least sometimes, has
a greater impact on the State treasury than does injunctive relief, see 415

u.s.,

at 666, n. 11, but there was no suggestion

that damages alone were thought to run against the State while
injunctive relief did not.
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Gibbs, 383 U. S. 715, 726 (1966); Osborn v. Bank of the
United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 819-823 (1824). The Court also
has held that a federal court may resolve a case solely on the
basis of a pendent state-law claim, see Siler, supra, at
192-193, and that in fact the court usually should do so in
order to avoid federal constitutional questions, see id., at
193; Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis,
J., concurring) ("[l]f a case can be decided on either of two
grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a
question of statutory construction or general law, the Court
will decide only the latter"). But pendent jurisdiction is a
judge-made doctrine inferred from the general language of
Art. III. The question presented is whether this doctrine
may be viewed as displacing the explicit limitation on federal
jurisdiction contained in the Eleventh Amendment.
As the Court of Appeals noted, in Siler and subsequent
cases concerning pendent jurisdictionA..relief was granted
against state officials on the basis of state-law claims that
were pendent to federal constitutional claims. In none of
these cases, however, did the Court so much as mention the
Eleventh Amendment in connection with the state-law claim.
Rather, the Court appears to have assumed that once jurisdiction was established over the federal-law claim, the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction would establish power to hear
the state-law claims as well. The Court has not addressed
whether that doctrine has a different scope when applied to
suits against the State. This is illustrated by Greene v. Louisville & Interurban R. Co., 244 U. S. 499 (1917), in which
the plaintiff railroads sued state officials, alleging that certain tax assessments were excessive under the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Court first rejected the officials' argument that the Eleventh Amendment barred the federal constitutional claim. It held that Ex parte Young applied to all
allegations challenging the constitutionality of official action,
regardless of whether the state statute under which the officials purported to act was constitutional or unconstitutional.

G /
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See id., at 507. Having determined that the Eleventh
Amendment did not deprive the federal court of jurisdiction
over the Fourteenth Amendment question, the Court declared that the court's jurisdiction extended "to the determination of all questions involved in the case, including questions of state law, irrespective of the disposition that may be
made of the federal question, or whether it be found necessary to decide it at all." I d., at 508. The case then was
decided solely on state-law grounds. Accord, Louisville &
Nashville R. Co. v. Greene, 244 U. S. 522 (1917). V
These cases thus did not directly confront the question before us. "[W]hen questions of jurisdiction have been passed
on in prior decisions sub silentio, this Court has never considered itself bound when a subsequent case finally brings the
jurisdictional issue before us." Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U. S.
528, 533, n. 5 (1974). 14 We therefore view the question as an
open one.
As noted, the implicit view of these cases seems to have
been that once jurisdiction is established on the basis of a federal question, no further Eleventh Amendment inquiry is
necessary with respect to other claims raised in the case.
This is an erroneous view and contrary to the principles established in our Eleventh Amendment decisions. "The
Eleventh Amendment is an explicit limitation on the judicial
power of the United States." Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U. S.,
at 25. It deprives a federal court of power to decide certain
claims against States that otherwise would be within the
scope of Art. III's grant of jurisdiction. For example, if a
lawsuit against state officials under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 alleges
a constitutional claim, the federal court is barred from awarding damages against the state treasury even though the claim
~

~

11.

...k See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 671 (1974) ("Having now had
an opportunity to more fully consider the Eleventh Amendment issue after
briefing and argument, we disapprove the Eleventh Amendment holdings
of [certain prior] cases to the extent that they are inconsistent with our
holding today").

,!;,-

V

o.
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15 The dissent claims that the Court in Greene expressly rejected the explicit argument that pendent state-law claims were
t

not barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Post, at 12, n. 14. The
. I ! I ~~"; (.
•
I ,f.
'
I
•
~]- eventh Amendment T~_:: gument o-fl... the opinion and of the briefs,
#

h

~

~ Yt

&~wev er) , ..i s confined to the federal constitutional claims.

In

only one of their briefs did the railroads make any extensive
argument concerning jurisdiction, and that brief clearly separated Eleventh Amendment considerations with respect to the federal
questions

involved

from

jurisdiction

over

state-law

matters.

Compare Brief for Louisville & N.R. Co., Louisville & N.R. Co. v.
Greene 15-38 with id., at 38-39.

The section dealing with "Ju-

risdiction Over Questions of Local Law" relied solely on pendent
jurisdicty£on.

Id.,

at 38-39.

The State's answering brief at-

tempted to distinguish Young and other cases cited in the Eleventh Amendment section of the railroads' brief primarily on the
ground that Young only applied when a state statute, rather than
official action under a statute, was alleged to be unconsti tutional.

See Brief

N.R. Co. v. Greene

for

State Board and Officers,

75-99~

Louisville

&

see also id., at 99-101 (arguing that

state action is identical for purposes of of Fourteenth and Eleventh Amendments)

~

Brief

for

Appellants Greene v.

Louisville

I.R. 32-45 (arguing that state was real party in interest).

&

The

State's brief in fact closes with a concession that the federal
courts had jurisdiction.

,.

See Brief for State Board and Officers,

I •

Louisville & N.R.
N.R. Co.

Co.

v. Greene 2

v.

Greene 139: Reply Brief, Louisville &

(pointing out concession).

The plain fact

is that the State never contested that if there were jurisdiction
over the federal questions in the case, there would be jurisdiction over the local-law claims.
All of the other pendent-jurisdiction cases cited by the dissent,

post,

at 38, n.

50, likewise do not discuss the Eleventh

Amendment in connection with the state-law claims.
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arises under the Constitution. See Quern v. Jordan, 440
U. S. 332 (1979). Similarly, if a§ 1983 action alleging a constitutional claim is brought directly against a State, the Eleventh Amendment bars a federal court from granting any relief on that claim. See Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U. S. 781
(1978) (per curiam). The Amendment thus is a specific constitutional bar against hearing evenfederal claims that otherwise would be within the jurisdiction of the federal courts.~
This constitutional bar applies to pendent claims as well.
As noted above, pendent jurisdiction is a judge-made doctrine of expediency and efficiency derived from the general
Art. III language conferring power to hear all "cases" arising
under federal law or between diverse parties. See Mine
Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U. S. 715, 725 (1966). See also Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U. S. 528, 545 (1974) (terming pendent
jurisdiction "a doctrine of discretion"). The Eleventh
Amendment should not be construed to apply with less force
to this implied form of jurisdiction than it does to the explicitly granted power to hear federal claims. The history of the
adoption and development of the Amendment, see supra, at
6-9, confirms that it is an independent limitation on all exercises of Art. III power: "the entire judicial power granted by
the Constitution does not embrace authority to entertain suit
brought by private parties against a State without consent
given," Ex parte State of New York No.1, 256 U.S. 490,497
(1921). If we were to hold otherwise, a federal court could
award damages against a State on the basis of a pendent
claim. Our decision in Edelman v. Jordan, supra, makes
clear that pendent jurisdiction does not permit such an evasion of the immunity guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment. We there held that "the District Court was correct in

lr

WSee, e. g., Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U. S. 313, 322 (1934) ("[A]lthough a case may arise under the Constitution and laws of the United
States, the judicial power does not extend to it if the suit is sought to be
prosecuted against a State, without her consent, by one of her own citizens"); Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U. S. 18, 25-26 (1933).

,.,

v
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exercising pendent jurisdiction over [plaintiffs'] statutory
claim," 415 U. S., at 653, n. 1, but then concluded that the
Eleventh Amendment barred an award of retroactive relief
on the basis of that pendent claim. I d., at 678.
In sum, contrary to the view implicit in decisions such as
Greene, supra, neither pendent jurisdiction nor any other
basis of jurisdiction may override the Eleventh Amendment. w A federal court must examine each claim in a case to
see if the court's jurisdiction over that claim is barred by the
Eleventh Amendment. We concluded above that a claim
that state officials violated state law in carrying out their official responsibilities is a claim against the State that is protected by the Eleventh Amendment. See supra, at 16. We
now hold that this principle applies as well to state-law claims
brought into federal court under pendent jurisdiction.

c
Respondents urge that application of the Eleventh Amendment to pendent state-law claims will have a disruptive effect
on litigation against state officials. They argue that the
"considerations of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to litigants" that underlie pendent jurisdiction, see
Gibbs, supra, at 726, counsel against a result that may cause
litigants to split causes of action between state and federal
courts. They also contend that the policy of avoiding unnecessary constitutional decisions will be contravened if plaintiffs choose to forgo their state-law claims and sue only in federal court or, alternatively, that the policy of Ex parte Young
will be hindered if plaintiffs choose to forgo their right to a
federal forum and bring all of their claims in state court.
It may be that applying the Eleventh Amendment to pendent claims results in federal claims being brought in state
court, or in bifurcation of claims. That is not uncommon in
this area. Under Edelman v. Jordan, supra, a suit against
J5See Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U. S., at 27 ("This is not less a suit against
the State because the bill is ancillary and supplemental.").
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state officials for retroactive monetary relief, whether based
on federal or state law, must be brought in state court.
Challenges to the validity of state tax systems under 42
U. S. C. § 1983 also must be brought in state court. Fair
Assessment in Real Estate Assn. v. McNary, 454 U. S. 100
(1981). Under the abstention doctrine, unclear issues of
state law commonly are split off and referred to the state
courts.~

In any case, the answer to respondents' assertions is that
such considerations of policy cannot override the constitutional limitation on the authority of the federal judiciary to
adjudicate suits against a State. See Missouri v. Fiske, 290
U. S., at 25-26 ("Considerations of convenience open no avenue of escape from the [Amendment's] restriction").16'" That a
-i'f""Moreover, allowing claims against state officials based on state law to
be brought in the federal courts does not necessarily foster the policies of
"judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants," Mine Workers v.
Gibbs, 383 U. S. 715, 726 (1966), that underlie pendent jurisdiction. For
example, when a federal decision on state law is obtained, the federal
court's construction often is uncertain and ephemeral. In cases of ongoing
oversight of a state program that may extend over years, as in this case,
the federal intrusion is likely to be extensive. Duplication of effort, inconvenience, and uncertainty may well result. See, e. g., Burford v. Sun Oil
Co., 319 U. S. 315, 327 (1943) ("Delay, misunderstanding of local law, and
needless conflict with the state policy, are the inevitable r uct of this
double [i. e., federal-state] system of review"). 1 ~ste and delay may also
result from abstention, which often is called for when state law is unclear,
see Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U. S. 360, 37~79 (1964) ("abstention operates
to require piecemeal adjudication in many courts, thereby delaying ultimate adjudication on the merits for an undue length of time") (citations
omitted), or from dismissals on the basis of comity, which has special force
when relief is sought on state-law grounds, see Gibbs, supra, at 726;
Hawks v. Hamill, 288 U. S. 52, 61 (1933).
~r cf. Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U. S. 1, 14-15 (1976) (Although "considerations of judicial economy" would be served by permitting pendent-party
jurisdiction, "the addition of a completely new party would run counter to
the well-established principle that federal courts, as opposed to state trial
courts of general jurisdiction, are courts of limited jurisdiction marked out
by Congress").

o.

RIDER P. 20

19 [formerly 17 1 • • • • [Insert after cite to Burford]
This case may be an example.

Here, the federal courts effective-

ly have been running a major state institution based on the emanations drawn from dicta in a state court opinion not decided
until four years after the suit was begun.

The state court has

had no opportunity to review the federal courts' construction of
its opinion, or their choice of remedies.

The only escape from

an erroneous interpretation of state law is presumably the rather
cumbersome route of legislation.
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litigant's choice of forum is reduced "has long been understood to be a part of the tension inherent in our system of federalism." Employees v. Missouri Public Health & Welfare
Dept., 411 U. S. 279, 298 (1973) (MARSHALL, J., concurring
in result).

IV

Respondents contend that, regardless of the applicability
of the Eleventh Amendment to their state claims against petitioner state officials, the judgment may still be upheld
against petitioner county officials. We are not persuaded.
Even assuming that these officials are not immune from suit
challenging their actions under the MH/MR Act,~~ it is clear
that without the injunction against the state institutions and
officials in this case, an order entered on state-law grounds
diWe have held that the Eleventh Amendment does not apply to "counties and similar municipal corporations." Mt. Healthy City School District
v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274, 280 (1977); see Lincoln County v. Luning, 133
U. S. 529, 530 (1890). At the same time, we have applied the Amendment
to bar relief against county officials "in order to protect the state treasury
from liability that would have had essentially the same practical consequences as a judgment against the State itself." Lake Country Estates,
Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U. S. 391, 401 (1979). See,
e. g., Edelman v. Jordan, supra (Eleventh Amendment bars suit against
state and county officials for retroactive award of welfare benefits). The
Courts of Appeals are in general agreement that a suit against officials of a
county or other governmental entity is barred if the relief obt~ined runs
against the State. See, e. g., Moore v. Tangipahoa Parish School Board,
594 F. 2d 489, 493 (CA5 1979); Carey v. Quern, 588 F. 2d 230, 233-234
(CA71978); Incarcerated Men of Allen County Jail v. Fair, 507 F. 2d 281,
287-288 (CA6 1974); Harris v. Tooele County School District, 471 F. 2d
218, 220 (CAlO 1973). Given that the actions of the county commissioners
and mental-health administrators are dependent on funding from the State,
it may be that relief granted against these county officials, when exercising
their functions under the MH/MR Act, effectively runs against the State.
Cf. Farr v. Chesney, 441 F. Supp. 127, 130-132 (MD Pa. 1977) (holding
that Pennsylvania county commissioners, acting as members of the board
of the county office of mental health and retardation, may not be sued for
back pay under the Eleventh Amendment). We need not decide this issue
in light of our disposition above.
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necessarily would be limited. The relief substantially concerns Pennhurst, an arm of the State that is operated by
state officials. Moreover, funding for the county mental retardation programs comes almost entirely from the State, see
Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 50, §§4507-4509 (Purdon 1969 and Supp.
1982), and the costs of the masters have been borne by the
State, see 446 F. Supp., at 1327. Finally, the MH/MR Act
contemplates that the state and county officials will cooperate in operating mental retardation programs. See In re
Schmidt, 494 Pa. 86, 9&-96, 429 A. 2d 631, 63&-636 (1981).
In short, the present judgment could not be sustained on the
basis of the state-law obligations of petitioner county officials. Indeed, any relief granted against the county officials
on the basis of the state statute would be partial and incomplete at best. Such an ineffective enforcement of state law
would not appear to serve the purposes of efficiency, convenience, and fairness that must inform the exercise of pendent
jurisdiction.

v

The Court of Appeals upheld the judgment of the District
Court solely on the basis of Pennsylvania's MH/MR Act.
We hold that these federal courts lacked jurisdiction to enjoin
petitioner state institutions and state officials on the basis of
this state law. The District Court also rested its decision on
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. See supra, at 2. On remand the
Court of Appeals may consider to what extent, if any, the
judgment may be sustained on these bases ..20- The court also
may consider whether relief may be granted to respondents
under the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of
Rights Act, 42 U. S. C. §§ 6011, 6063. The judgment of the
...20-Qn the Fourteenth Amendment issue, the court should consider
Youngberg v. Romeo, U. S . - (1982), a decision that was not available when the District Court issued its decision.

. L..,.'L/
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Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.

To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor
From:. Justice

Powell
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether a federal court
may award injunctive relief against state officials on the basis
of state law.
I
This litigation, here for the second time, concerns the conditions of care at petitioner Pennhurst State School and Hospital, a Pennsylvania institution for the care of the mentally
retarded. See Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1 (1981). Although the litigation's history is set forth in detail in our prior opinion, see id., at 5-10,
it is necessary for purposes of this decision to review that
history.
This suit originally was brought in 1974 by respondent
Terri Lee Halderman, a resident of Pennhurst, in the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Ultimately, plaintiffs included a class consisting of all persons
who were or might become residents of Pennhurst; the Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Citizens (P ARC); and the
United States. Defendants were Pennhurst and various
Pennhurst officials; the Pennsylvania Department of Public
Welfare and several of its officials; and various county commissioners, county mental retardation administrators, and
other officials of five Pennsylvania counties surrounding
Pennhurst. Respondents' amended complaint charged that
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conditions at Pennhurst violated the class members' rights
under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 87 Stat. 394, as amended, 29
U. S. C. § 794 (1976 ed. and Supp. V); the Developmentally
Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U. S. C.
§§ 6001-6081 (1976 ed. and Supp. V); and the Pennsylvania
Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966 (the
"MH/MR Act"), Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 50, §§ 4101--4704 (Purdon 1969 and Supp. 1982). Both damages and injunctive relief were sought.
In 1977, following a lengthy trial, the District Court rendered its decision. 446 F. Supp. 1295 (1977). As noted in
our prior opinion, the court's findings were undisputed: "Conditions at Pennhurst are not only dangerous, with the residents often physically abused or drugged by staff members,
but also inadequate for the 'habilitation' of the retarded. Indeed, the court found that the physicial, intellectual, and
emotional skills of some residents have deteriorated at
Pennhurst." 451 U. S., at 7 (footnote omitted). The District Court held that these conditions violated each resident's
right to "minimally adequate habilitation" under the Due
Process Clause and the MH/MR Act, see 446 F. Supp., at
1314-1318, 1322--1323; "freedom from harm" under the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, see id., at 1320-1321;
and "nondiscriminatory habilitation" under the Equal Protection Clause and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, see id., at
1321-1324. Furthermore, the court found that "due process
demands that if a state undertakes the habilitation of a retarded person, it must do so in the least restrictive setting
consistent with that individual's habilitative needs." Id., at
1319 (emphasis added). After concluding that the large size
of Pennhurst prevented it from providing the necessary
habilitation in the least restrictive environment, the court ordered "that immediate steps be taken to remove the retarded
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residents from Pennhurst." I d., at 1325. Petitioners were
ordered "to provide suitable community living arrangements" for the class members, id., at 1326, and the court appointed a Special Master "with the power and duty to plan,
organize, direct, supervise and monitor the implementation
of this and any further Orders of the Court." Ibid. 1
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed most
of the District Court's judgment. 612 F. 2d 84 (1979) (en
bane). It agreed that respondents had a right to habilitation
in the least restrictive environment, but it grounded this
right solely on the "bill of rights" provision in the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42
U.S. C. §6010. See 612 F. 2d, at 95-100, 104-107. The
court did not consider the constitutional issues or § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act, and while it affirmed the District Court's
holding that the MH/MR Act provides a right to adequate
habilitation, see id., at 100-103, the court did not decide
whether that state right encompassed a right to treatment in
the least restrictive setting.
On the question of remedy, the Court of Appeals affirmed
except as to the District Court's order that Pennhurst be
closed. The court observed that some patients would be
unable to adjust to life outside an institution, and it determined that none of the legal provisions relied on by plaintiffs
precluded institutionalization. I d., at 114-115. It therefore
remanded for "individual determinations by the [District
Court], or by the Special Master, as to the appropriateness of
an improved Pennhurst for each such patient," guided by "a
presumption in favor of placing individuals in [community living arrangements]." Ibid. 2
The District Court determined that the individual defendants had
acted in good faith and therefore were immune from the damage claims.
446 F. Supp., at 1324.
2
In a companion case, the Court of Appeals affirmed the District
Court's denial of the Pennhurst Parents-Staff Association's motion to intervene for purposes of appeal, finding the denial harmless error. See 612
1
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On remand the District Court established detailed procedures for determining the proper residential placement for
each patient. A team consisting of the patient, his parents
or guardian, and his case manager must establish an individual habilitation plan providing for habilitation of the patient
in a designated community living arrangement. The plan is
subject to review by the Special Master. A second master,
called the Hearing Master, is available to conduct hearings,
upon request by the resident, his parents or his advocate, on
the question whether the services of Pennhurst would be
more beneficial to the resident than the community living arrangement provided in the resident's plan. The Hearing
Master then determines where the patient should reside,
subject to possible review by the District Court. See App.
123a-134a (Order of April 24, 1980). 3
This Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals,
finding that 42 U. S. C. § 6010 did not create any substantive
rights. 451 U. S. 1 (1981). We remanded the case to the
Court of Appeals to determine if the remedial order could be
supported on the basis of state law, the Constitution, or § 504
of the Rehabilitation Act. See id., at 31.' We also remanded for consideration of whether any relief was available
F. 2d 131 (1979) (en bane). The Association subsequently was granted
leave to intervene and is a petitioner in this Court.
8
On July 1, 1981, Pennsylvania enacted an appropriations bill providing
that only $35,000 would be paid for the Masters' expenses for the fiscal
year July 1981 to June 1982. The District Court held the Pennsylvania
Department of Public Welfare and its Secretary in contempt, and imposed
a fine of $10,000 per day. Pennsylvania paid the fines, and the contempt
was purged on January 8, 1982. On appeal the Court of Appeals affirmed
the contempt order. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hospital,
673 F. 2d 628 (1982), cert. pending, No. 81-2363.
'Three Justices dissented from the Court's construction of the Act, but
concluded that the District Court should not have adopted the "far-reaching remedy" of appointing "a Special Master to decide which of the Pennhurst inmates should remain and which should be moved to communitybased facilities . . . . [T]he court should not have assumed the task of managing Pennhurst .... " 451 U. S., at 54 (WHITE J. , dissenting in part).
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under other provisions of the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act. See id., at 27--30 (discussing
42 U. S. C. §§ 6011(a), 6063(b)(5)).
On remand the Court of Appeals affirmed its prior judgment in its entirety. 673 F. 2d 647 (1982) (en bane). It determined that in a recent decision the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania had "spoken definitively" in holding that the
MH/MR Act required the State to adopt the "least restrictive
environment" approach for the care of the mentally retarded.
Id., at 651 (citing In re Schmidt, 494 Pa. 86, 429 A. 2d 631
(1981)). The Court of Appeals concluded that this state statute fully supported its prior judgment, and therefore did not
reach the remaining issues of federal law. It also rejected
petitioners' argument that the Eleventh Amendment barred
a federal court from considering this pendent state-law claim.
The court noted that the Amendment did not bar a federal
court from granting prospective injunctive relief against
state officials on the basis of federal claims, see 673 F. 2d, at
656 (citing Ex Parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908)), and concluded that the same result obtained with respect to a
pendent state-law claim. It reasoned that because Siler v.
Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 213 U. S. 175 (1909), an important case in the development of the doctrine of pendent
jurisdiction, also involved state officials, "there cannot be ...
an Eleventh Amendment exception to that rule." 673 F. 2d,
at 658. 5 Finally, the court rejected petitioners' argument
that it should have abstained from deciding the state-law
claim under principles of comity, see id., at 659-660, and
refused to consider petitioners' objections to the District
Court's use of a special master, see id., at 651 and n. 10.
The Court of Appeals also noted that "the United States is an intervening plaintiff ... against which even the state itself cannot successfully
plead the Eleventh Amendment as a bar to jurisdiction," and that "the
counties, even as juridical entities, do not fall within the coverage of the
Eleventh Amendment. Against those defendants even money damages
may be awarded." 673 F. 2d, at 656 (citation omitted).
5
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Three judges dissented in part, arguing that under principles
of federalism and comity the establishment of a special master to supervise compliance was an abuse of discretion. See
id., at 662 (Seitz, C. J., joined by Hunter, J., dissenting in
part); ibid. (Garth, J., concurring in part and dissenting as to
relief). See also id., at 661 (Aldisert, J., concurring) (seriously questioning the propriety of the order appointing the
Special Master, but concluding that a retroactive reversal of
that order would be meaningless). 6
We granted certiorari, 457 U. S. 1131 (1982), and now reverse and remand.
II
Petitioners raise three challenges to the judgment of the
Court of Appeals: (i) the Eleventh Amendment prohibited
the District Court from ordering state officials to conform
their conduct to state law; (ii) the doctrine of comity prohibited the District Court from issuing its injunctive relief; and
(iii) the District Court abused its discretion in appointing two
masters to supervise the decisions of state officials in implementing state law. We need not reach the latter two issues,
for we find the Eleventh Amendment challenge dispositive.
A

Article III, § 2 of the Constitution provides that the federal
judicial power extends, inter alia, to controversies "between
a State and Citizens of another State." Relying on this language, this Court in 1793 assumed original jurisdiction over a
suit brought by a citizen of South Carolina against the State
of Georgia. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419 (1793). The
decision "created such a shock of surprise that the Eleventh
Amendment was at once proposed and adopted." Monaco v.
Mississippi, 292 U. S. 313, 325 (1934). The Amendment
provides:
6

The Office of the Special Master was abolished in December 1982.
See App. 220a (Order of August 12, 1982). The Hearing Master remains
in operation.
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"The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States
by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects
of any Foreign State."

:·-?

The Amendment's language overruled the particular result
in Chisholm, but this Court has recognized that its greater
significance lies in its affirmation that the fundamental principle of sovereign immunity limits the grant of judicial authority in Art. III. Thus, in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1
(1890), the Court held that, despite the limited terms of the
Eleventh Amendment, a federal court could not entertain a
suit brought by a citizen against his own State. Mter reviewing the constitutional debates concerning the scope of
Art. III, the Court determined that federal jurisdiction over
suits against unconsenting States "was not contemplated by
the Constitution when establishing the judicial power of the
United States." !d., at 15. See Monaco v. Mississippi,
supra, at 322-323 (1934). 7 In short, the principle of sovereign immunity is a constitutional limitation on the federal judicial power established in Art. III:
"That a State may not be sued without its consent is a
fundamental rule of jurisprudence having so important a
bearing upon the construction of the Constitution of the
United States that it has become established by repeated
decisions of this court that the entire judicial power
granted by the Constitution does not embrace authority
to entertain a suit brought by private parties against a
State without consent given: not one brought by citizens
' See Employees v. Missouri Public Health Dep't, 411 U. S. 279,
291-292 (1973) (MARSHALL, J., concurring in judgment) (The Eleventh
Amendment "clarif[ied] the intent of the Framers concerning the reach of
-federal judicial power" and "restore[d] the original understanding" that
States could not be made unwilling defendants in federal court). See also
Nevada v. Hall, 440 U. S. 410, 430-431 (1979) (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting);
id., at 437 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting).

r
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of another State, or by citizens or subjects of a foreign
State, because of the Eleventh Amendment; and not
even one brought by its own citizens, because of the fundamental rule of which the Amendment is but an exemplification." Ex parte State of New York No. 1, 256
U. S. 490, 497 (1921) (emphasis added). 8
A sovereign's immunity may be waived, and the Court consistently has held that a State may consent to suit against it
in federal court. See, e. g., Clark v. Barnard, 108 U. S.
436, 447 (1883). We have insisted, however, that the State's
consent be unequivocally expressed. See, e. g., Edelman v.
Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 673 (1974). Similarly, although Congress has power with respect to the rights protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment immunity, see Fitzpatrick v. Bitker, 427 U. S. 445
(1976), we have required an unequivocal expression of congressional intent to "overturn the constitutionally guaranteed immunity of the several States." Quern v. Jordan, 440
U. S. 332, 342 (1979) (holding that 42 U. S. C. § 1983 does not
override States' Eleventh Amendment immunity). Our reluctance to infer that a State's immunity from suit in the federal courts has been negated stems from recognition of the
vital role of the doctrine of sovereign immunity in our federal
system. A State's constitutional interest in immunity encompasses not merely whether it may be sued, but where it
may be sued. 9 As JUSTICE MARSHALL well has noted, "[b]e8

The limitation deprives federal courts of any jurisdiction to entertain
such claims, and thus may be raised at any point in a proceeding. "The
Eleventh Amendment declares a policy and sets forth an explicit limitation
on federal judicial power of such compelling force that this Court will consider the issue arising under this Amendment ... even though urged for
the first time in this Court." Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury,
323
9

u. s. 459, 467 (1945).

For this reason, the Court consistently has held that a State's waiver
of sovereign immunity in its own courts is not a waiver of the Eleventh
Amendment immunity in the federal courts. See, e. g., Florida Department of Health v. Florida Nursing Home Assn., 450 U. S. 147, 150 (1981)
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cause of the problems of federalism inherent in making one
sovereign appear against its will in the courts of the other, a
restriction upon the exercise of the federal judicial power has
long been considered to be appropriate in a case such as this."
Employees v. Missouri Public Health & Welfare Dep't, 411
U. S. 279, 294 (1973) (MARSHALL, J., concurring in result). 10
Accordingly, in deciding this case we must be guided by
"[t]he principles of federalism that inform Eleventh Amendment doctrine." Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678, 691 (1978).
B

This Court's decisions thus establish that "an unconsenting
State is immune from suits brought in federal courts by her
own citizens as well as by citizens of another state." Employees, supra, at 280. There may be a question, however,
whether a particular suit in fact is a suit against a State. It
is clear, of course, that in the absence of consent a suit in
which the State or one of its agencies or departments is
named as the defendant is proscribed by the Eleventh
Amendment. See, e. g., Florida Department of Health v.
Florida Nursing Home Assn., 450 U. S. 147 (1981) (per
curiam); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U. S. 781 (1978) (per
. curiam). This jurisdictional bar applies regardless of the
(per curiam). "[l]t is not consonant with our dual system for the federal
courts . . . to read the consent to embrace federal as well as state
courts .... [A] clear declaration of the state's intention to submit its fiscal
problems to other courts than those of its own creation must be found."
Great Northern Life Insurance Co. v. Read, 322 U. S. 47, 54 (1944).
10
See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S., at 418-419 (States were "vitally interested" in whether they would be subject to suit in the federal courts, and
the debates about state immunity focused on the question of federal judicial
power). Cf. id., at 430-431 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting) (sovereign immunity is "a guarantee that is implied as an essential component of federalism"
and is "sufficiently fundamental to our federal structure to have implicit
constitutional dimension"); id., at 437 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting) ("[T]he
States that ratified the Eleventh Amendment thought that they were putting an end to the possibility of individual States as unconsenting defendants in foreign jurisdictions").

.-

,.
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nature of the relief sought. See, e. g., Missouri v. Fiske,
290 U. S. 18, 27 (1933) ("Expressly applying to suits in equity
as well as at law, the Amendment necessarily embraces demands for the enforcement of equitable rights and the prosecution of equitable remedies when these are asserted and
prosecuted by an individual against a State").
When the suit is brought only against state officials, a
question arises as to whether that suit is a suit against the
State itself. Although prior decisions of this Court have not
been entirely consistent on this issue, certain principles are
well established. The Eleventh Amendment bars a suit
against state officials when "the state is the real, substantial
party in interest." Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U. S. 459, 464 (1945). See, e. g., In re Ayers, 123
U. S. 443, 487-492 (1887); Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U. S.
711, 720-723, 727-728 (1882). Thus, "[t]he general rule is
that relief sought nominally against an officer is in fact
against the sovereign if the decree would operate against the
latter." Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U. S. 57, 58 (1963) (per
curiam). n And, as when the State itself is named as the de11
"The general rule is that a suit is against the sovereign if 'the judgment
sought would expend itself on the public treasury or domain, or interfere
with the public administration,' or if the effect of the judgment would be 'to
restrain the Government from acting, or to compel it to act."' Dugan v.
Rank, 372 U. S. 609, 620 (1963) (citations omitted).
Respondents do not dispute that the relief sought and awarded below operated against the state in each of the foregoing respects. They suggest,
however, that the suit here should not be considered to be against the state
for the purposes of the Eleventh Amendment because, they say, petitioners were acting ultra vires their authority. Respondents rely largely on
Florida Dep't of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc ., 458 U. S. 670 (1982),
which in turn was founded upon Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce
Corp., 337 U. S. 682 (1949). These cases provide no support for this argument. These and other modern cases make clear that a state officer may
be said to act ultra vires only when he acts "without any authority whatever." Treasure Salvors, supra, at 697 (opinion of STEVENS, J.); accord
id., at 716 (WHITE, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in
part) (test is whether there was no "colorable basis for the exercise of au-
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fendant, a suit against state officials that is in fact a suit
against a State is barred regardless of whether it seeks damages or injunctive relief. See Cory v. White, 457 U. S. 85,
91 (1982).
The Court has recognized an important exception to this
general rule: a suit challenging the constitutionality of a state
official's action is not one against the State. This was the
holding in Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908), in which a
federal court enjoined the Attorney General of the State of
Minnesota from bringing suit to enforce a state statute that
allegedly violated the Fourteenth Amendment. This Court
held that the Eleventh Amendment did not prohibit issuance
of this injunction. The theory of the case was that an unconstitutional enactment is "void" and therefore does not "impart to [the officer] any immunity from responsibility to the
supreme authority of the United States." I d., at 160. Since
the State could not authorize the action, the officer was
"stripped of his official or representative character and [was]
subjected to the consequences of his official conduct." Ibid.
While the rule permitting suits alleging conduct contrary
to "the supreme authority of the United States" has survived, the theory of Young has not been provided an expansive interpretation. Thus, in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S.
651 (1974), the Court emphasized that the Eleventh Amendment bars some forms of injunctive relief against state officials for violation of federal law. Id., at 666-667. In parthority by state officials"). As the Court in Larson explained, an ultra
vires claim rests on "the officer's lack of delegated power. A claim of error
in the exercise of that power is therefore not sufficient." Larson, supra,
at 690. Petitioners' actions in operating this mental health institution
plainly were not beyond their delegated authority in this sense. The
MH/MR Act gave them broad discretion to provide "adequate" mental
health services. Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 50, § 4201(1) (Purdon 1969). The
essence of respondents' claim is that petitioners have not provided such
services adequately.
The dissent advances a far broader-and unprecedented-version of the
ultra vires doctrine, that we discuss infra, at 1~25.
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ticular, Edelman held that when a plaintiff sues a state
official alleging a violation of federal law, the federal court
may award an injunction that governs the official's future
conduct, but not one that awards retroactive monetary relief.
Under the theory of Young, such a suit would not be one
against the State since the federal-law allegation would strip
the state officer of his official authority. Nevertheless, retroactive relief was barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

III
With these principles in mind, we now turn to the question
whether the claim that petitioners violated state law in carrying out their official duties at Pennhurst is one against the
State and therefore barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
Respondents advance two principal arguments in support of
the judgment below. 12 First, they contend that under the
12
We reject respondents' additional contention that Pennsylvania has
waived its immunity from suit in federal court. At the time the suit was
filed, suits against Pennsylvania were permitted only where expressly authorized by the legislature, see, e. g., Freach v. Commonwealth, 471 Pa.
558, 370 A. 2d 1163 (1977), and respondents have not referred us to any
provision expressly waiving Pennsylvania's Eleventh Amendment immunity. The State now has a statute governing sovereign immunity, including an express preservation of its immunity from suit in federal court:
"Federal courts.-N othing contained in this subchapter shall be construed
to waive the immunity of the Commonwealth from suit in Federal courts
guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States." 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8521(b) (1980).
We also do not agree with respondents that the presence of the United
States as a plaintiff in this case removes the Eleventh Amendment from
consideration. Although the Eleventh Amendment does not bar the
United States from suing a State in federal court, see, e. g., Monaco v.
Mississippi , 292 U. S. 313, 329 (1934), the United States' presence in the
case for any purpose does not eliminate the State's immunity for all purposes. For example, the fact that the federal court could award injunctive
relief to the United States on federal constitutional claims would not mean
that the court could order the State to pay damages to other plaintiffs. In
any case, we think it clear that the United States does not have standing to
assert the state-law claims of third-parties. For these reasons, the ap-
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doctrine of Edelman v. Jordan, supra, the suit is not against
the State because the courts below ordered only prospective
injunctive relief. Second, they assert that the state-law
claim properly was decided under the doctrine of pendent
jurisdiction. Respondents rely on decisions of this Court
awarding relief against state officials on the basis of a pendent state-law claim. See, e. g., Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 213 U. S. 175, 193 (1909).
A

We first address the contention that respondents' state-law
claim is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment because it
seeks only prospective relief as defined in Edelman v. Jordan, supra. The Court of Appeals held that if the judgment
below rested on federal law, it could be entered against petitioner state officials under the doctrine established in Edelman and Young even though the prospective financial burden
was substantial and ongoing. 13 See 673 F. 2d, at 656. The
court assumed, and respondents assert, that this reasoning
applies as well when the official acts in violation of state law.
This argument misconstrues the basis of the doctrine established in Young and Edelman.
As discussed above, the injunction in Young was justified,
notwithstanding the obvious impact on the State itself, on the
view that sovereign immunity does not apply because an official who acts unconstitutionally is "stripped of his official or
plicability of the Eleventh Amendment to respondents' state-law claim is
unaffected by the United States' participation in the case.
13
We do not decide whether the District Court would have jurisdiction
under this reasoning to grant prospective relief on the basis of federal law,
but we note that the scope of any such relief would be constrained by principles of comity and federalism. "Where, as here, the exercise of authority by state officials is attacked, federal courts must be constantly mindful
of the 'special delicacy of the adjustment to be preserved between federal
equitable power and State administration of its own law.'" Rizzo v.
Goode, 423 U. S. 362, 378 (1976) (quoting Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U. S.
117, 120 (1951)).

.- ,.

81-2101-0PINION
14

PENNHURST STATE SCHOOL

&

HOSP. v. HALDERMAN

representative character," Young, 209 U. S., at 160. This
rationale, of course, created the "well-recognized irony'' that
an official's unconstitutional conduct constitutes state action under the Fourteenth Amendment but not the Eleventh
Amendment. Florida Department of State v. Treasure
Salvors, Inc., 458 U. S. 670, 685 (1982) (opinion of STEVENS,
J.). Nonetheless, the Young doctrine has been accepted as
necessary to permit the federal courts to vindicate federal
rights and hold state officials responsible to "the supreme authority of the United States." Young, 209 U. S., at 160.
As JUSTICE BRENNAN has observed, "Ex parte Young was
the culmination of efforts by this Court to harmonize the
principles of the Eleventh Amendment with the effective supremacy of rights and powers secured elsewhere in the Constitution." Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U. S. 82, 106 (1971)
(BRENNAN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Our decisions repeatedly have emphasized that the Young
doctrine rests on the need to promote the vindication of federal rights. See, e. g., Quern v. Jordan, 440 U. S. 332, 337
(1979); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232, 237 (1974); Georgia
R. & Banking Co. v. Redwine, 342 U. S. 299, 304 (1952).
The Court also has recognized, however, that the need to
promote the supremacy of federal law must be accommodated
to the constitutional immunity of the States. This is the significance of Edelman v. Jordan, supra. We recognized that
the prospective relief authorized by Young "has permitted
the Civil War Amendments to the Constitution to serve as a
sword, rather than merely a shield, for those whom they
were designed to protect." 415 U. S., at 664. But we declined to extend the fiction of Young to encompass retroactive relief, for to do so would effectively eliminate the
constitutional immunity of the States. Accordingly, we concluded that although the difference between permissible and
impermissible relief "will not in many instances be that between day and night," id., at 667, an award of retroactive relief necessarily "'fall[s] afoul of the Eleventh Amendment if
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that basic constitutional provision is to be conceived of as
having any present force."' !d., at 665 (quoting Rothstein v.
Wyman, 467 F. 2d 226, 237 (CA21972) (McGowan, J., sitting
by designation), cert. denied, 411 U. S. 921 (1973)). In sum
Edelman's distinction between prospective and retroactive
relief fulfills the underlying purpose of Ex parte Young while
at the same time preserving to an important degree the constitutional immunity of the States.
This need to reconcile competing interests is wholly absent, however, when a plaintiff alleges that a state official has
violated state law. In such a case the entire basis for the
doctrine of Young and Edelman disappears. A federal
court's grant of relief against state officials on the basis of
state law, whether prospective or retroactive, does not vindi- ·
cate the supreme authority of federal law. On the contrary,
it is difficult to think of a greater intrusion on state sovereignty than when a federal court instructs state officials on
how to conform their conduct to state law. Such a result
conflicts directly with the principles of federalism that underlie the Eleventh Amendment. We conclude that Young and
Edelman are inapplicable in a suit against state officials on
the basis of state law.
B

The contrary view of the dissent rests on fiction, is wrong
on the law, and, most important, would emasculate the Eleventh Amendment. 14 Under its view, an allegation that official conduct is contrary to a state statute would suffice to
override the State's protection under that Amendment. The
theory is that such conduct is contrary to the official's "instructions," and thus ultra vires his authority. Accordingly,
official action based on a reasonable interpretation of any
We are prompted to respond at some length to JUSTICE STEVENS' 38page dissent in part by his broad charge that "the Court blithely overrules
at least 29 cases," post, at 1. The decisions the dissent relies upon simply
do not support this sweeping characterization. See nn. 18, 19, and 20,
infra.
14
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statute might, if the interpretation turned out to be erroneous, 15 provide the basis for injunctive relief against the actors
in their official capacities. In this case, where officials of a
major state department, clearly acting within the scope of
their authority, were found not to have improved conditions
in a state institution adequately under state law, the dissent's
result would be that the State itself has forfeited its constitutionally provided immunity.
The theory is out of touch with reality. The dissent does
not dispute that the general criterion for determining when a
suit is in fact against the sovereign is the effect of the relief
sought. See supra, at 10; post, at 19, n. 28. According to
the dissent, the relief sought and ordered here-which in effect was that a major state institution be closed and smaller
state institutions be created and expansively funded-did not
operate against the State. This view would make the law a
pretense. No other court or judge in the ten-year history of
this litigation has advanced this theory. And the dissent's
underlying view that the named defendants here were acting
beyond and contrary to their authority cannot be reconciled
with reality-or with the record. The District Court in this
case held that the individual defendants "acted in the utmost
good faith . . . within the sphere of their official responsibilities," and therefore were entitled to immunity from damages. 446 F. Supp., at 1324 (emphasis added). The named
defendants had nothing to gain personally from their conduct;
they were not found to have acted wilfully or even negligently. See ibid. The court expressly noted that the individual defendants "apparently took every means available to
them to reduce the incidents of abuse and injury, but were
constantly faced with staff shortages." Ibid. It also found
"that the individual defendants are dedicated professionals in
" In this case, for example, the court below rested its finding that state
law required habilitation in the least restrictive environment on dicta in In
re Schmidt, 494 Pa. 86, 429 A. 2d 631 (1981). That decision was not issued
until seven years after this suit was filed, and four years after trial ended.
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the field of retardation who were given very little with which
to accomplish the habilitation of the retarded at Pennhurst."
Ibid. 16 As a result, all the relief ordered by the courts below
was institutional and official in character. To the extent
there was a violation of state law in this case, it is a case of
the State itself not fulfilling its legislative promises.
The dissent bases its view on numerous cases from the turn
of the century and earlier. These cases do not provide the
support the dissent claims to find. Many are simply
16
This part of the court's findings and judgment was not appealed. See
612 F. 2d, at 90, n. 4. See also 446 F. Supp., at 1303 ("On the whole, the
staff at Pennhurst appears to be dedicated and trying hard to cope with the
inadequacies of the institution").
The parties defendant in this suit were not all individuals. They included as well the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare, a major department of the State itself; and the Pennhurst State School and Hospital,
a state institution. The dissent apparently is arguing that the defendants
as a group-including both the state institutions, and state and county officials-were acting ultra vires. Since the institutions were only said to
have violated the law through the individual defendants, the District
Court's findings, never since questioned by any court, plainly exonerate all
the defendants from the dissent's claim that they acted beyond the scope of
their authority.
A truth of which the dissent's theoretical argument seems unaware is the
plight of many if not most of the mental institutions in our country. As the
District Court in this case found, "History is replete with misunderstanding and mistreatment of the retarded." 446 F. Supp., at 1299. It is common knowledge that "insane asylums," as they were known until the middle of this century, usually were underfunded and understaffed. It is not
easy to persuade competent people to work in these institutions, particularly well trained professionals. Physical facilities, due to consistent
underfunding by state legislatures, have been grossly inadequate-especially in light of advanced knowledge and techniques for the treatment of
the mentally ill. See generally President's Comm. on Mental Retardation,
Changing Patterns in Residential Services for the Mentally Retarded 1-i58
(R. Kugel & W. Wolfensberger ed. 1969); R. C. Scheerenberger, A History of Mental Retardation 240-243 (1983). Only recently have States
commenced to move to correct widespread deplorable conditions. The
responsibility, as the District Court recognized after a protracted trial, has
rested on the State itself.

.-
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miscited. For example, with perhaps one exception, 17 none
of its Eleventh Amendment cases can be said to hold that injunctive relief could be ordered against State officials for failing to carry out their duties under State statutes. 18 And the
federal sovereign immunity cases the dissent relies on as
analogy, while far from uniform, make clear that suit may not
be predicated on violations of state statutes that command
17

See Rolston v. Missouri Fund Commissioners, 120 U. S. 390 (1887).
In Rolston, however, the state officials were ordered to comply with "a
plain ministerial duty," see Great Northern Life Insurance Co. v. Read,
322 U. S. 47, 51 (1944), a far cry from this case, seen. 19, infra.
18
The cases are collected in footnote 48 of the dissent, post, at 37. Several of the cases do not rest on an Eleventh Amendment holding at all.
For example, federal jurisdiction in fact was held to be lacking in Martin
v. Lankford, 245 U. S. 547 (1915), because of lack of diversity. A fair
reading of South Carolina v. Wesley, 155 U. S. 542 (1895), and the cases it
cites, makes clear that the ruling there was on the purely procedural point
that the party raising the jurisdictional objection was not a party to the
proceeding. In two other cases the allegation was that a state officer or
agency had acted unconstitutionally, rather than merely contrary to state
law. Atchison, T. & S. F. R . Co. v. O'Connor, 223 U. S. 280 (1897); Hopkins v. Clemson Agricultural College, 221 U. S. 636 (1911). In Johnson
v. Lankford, 245 U. S. 541 (1918), the relief sought was not injunctive relief but money damages against the individual officer. See infra n. 20.
None of these cases can be said to be overruled by our holding today. As
noted infra, at 2&--27, the Greene cases do not discuss the Eleventh
Amendment in connection with the state-law claim.
Tindal v. Wesley, 167 U. S. 204 (1897), and Scully v. Bird, 209 U. S. 481
(1908), are more closely analogous cases. In both of these old cases, however, the allegation was that the defendants had committed common law
torts, not, as here, that they had failed to carry out affirmative duties assigned to them by statute. See Tindal, supra, at 221 (distinguishing suits
brought "to enforce the discharge by the defendants of any specific duty
enjoined by the State"); Transcript of Record, Tindal v. Wesley 3 (complaint alleged that defendants had "wrongfully entered into said premises
and ousted the plaintiff ... to the damage of the plaintiff ten thousand dollars"); Scully, supra, at 483 (allegation was that defendant had "injuriously
affect[ed] the reputation and sale of [plaintiff's] products"). Tort cases
such as these were explicitly overruled in Larson v. Domestic & Foreign
Commerce Corp., 337 U. S. 682 (1949). See infra, at 20-22.
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purely discretionary duties. 19 Since it cannot be doubted
that the statutes at issue here gave petitioners broad discretion in operating Pennhurst, seen. 11, supra; see also 446 F.
Supp., at 1324, the conduct alleged in this case would not be
ultra vires even under the standards of the dissent's cases. 20
19
See, e. g., Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U. S. 605, 620 (1912) ("The
complainant did not ask the court to interfere with the official discretion of
the Secretary of War, but challenged his authority to do the things of
which complaint was made."); Santa Fe P . R . Co. v. Fall, 259 U. S. 197,
19~199 (1922) (same); Noble v. Union River Logging R., 147 U. S. 165
171-172 (1893) (same); see also Kendall v. Stokes, 3 How. 87, 98 (1845)
("[A] public officer is not liable to an action if he falls into error in a case
where the act to be done is not merely a ministerial one, but is one in relation to which it is his duty to exercise judgment and discretion; even although an individual may suffer by his mistake."); Belknap v. Schild, 161
U. S. 10, 18 (1896) (under Eleventh Amendment, injunctive relief is permitted where officer commits a tort that is "contrary to a plain official duty
requiring no exercise of discretion"); Wells v. Roper, 246 U. S. 335, 338
(1918); Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U. S. 682, 695
(1949) (suit challenging "incorrect decision as to law or fact" is barred "if
the officer making the decision was emplowered to do so"); id., at 715
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (noting that cases involve orders to comply
with nondiscretionary duties). The opinions make clear that the question of
discretion went to sovereign immunity, and not to the court's mandamus
powers generally. See, e. g., Philadelphia Co., supra, at 61~20. The
rationale appears to be that discretionary duties have a greater impact on
the sovereign because they "brin[g] the operation of governmental machinery into play." Larson, supra, at 715 (Frankfurter, J ., dissenting).
20
In any event, as with the Eleventh Amendment cases, see n. 18, supra,
the dissent also is wrong to say that the federal sovereign immunity cases
it cites post, at 37, n. 48, are today overruled. Many of them were actions
for damages in tort against the individual officer. Little v. Barreme, 2
Cranch 170 (1804); Wise v. Withers, 3 Cranch 331 (1806); Mitchell v. Harmony, 13 How. 115 (1851); Bates v. Clark, 95 U. S. 204 (1877); Belknap v.
Schild, 161 U. S. 10 (1896). In Belknap the Court drew a careful distinction between such actions and suits in which the relief would run more directly against the State. !d., at 18. The Court disallowed injunctive relief against the officers on this basis. I d., at 23-25. Nothing in our
opinion touches these cases. Cf. Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U. S. 682, 687-688, and nn. 7, 8 (1949) (whether damages
might be awarded against individual government officers was not at issue).
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Thus, while there is language in the early cases that advances the authority-stripping theory advocated by the dissent, this theory had never been pressed as far as the dissent
would do in this case. And when the expansive approach of
the dissent was advanced, this Court plainly and explicitly
rejected it. In Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce
Corp., 337 U. S. 682 (1949), the Court was faced with the argument that an allegation that a government official committed a tort sufficed to distinguish the official from the sovereign. Therefore, the argument went, a suit for an injunction
to remedy the injury would not be against the sovereign.
The Court rejected the argument, noting that it would make
the doctrine of sovereign immunity superfluous. A plaintiff
would need only to "claim an invasion of his legal rights" in
order to override sovereign immunity. Id., at 693. In the
Court's view, the argument "confuse[d) the doctrine of sovereign immunity with the requirement that a plaintiff state a
cause of action." I d., at 692--693. The dissent's theory suffers a like confusion. 21 Under the dissent's view, a plaintiff
There is language in other cases that suggests they were actions alleging
torts, not statutory violations. See Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223
U. S. 605, 623 (1912); Sloan Shipyards v. U. S. Fleet Corp., 258 U. S. 549,
568 (1922); Land v. Dollar, 330 U. S. 731, 736 (1947). The remainder
clearly distinguish cases (like the present one) involving statutes that command discretionary duties. See n. 19, supra. In any case, the Court in
Larson explicitly limited the precedential value of all of these cases. See
Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U. S. 643, 646, and n. 6 (1962).
21
In fact , as the dissent itself states, the argument in Larson that an allegation of tortious activity overrides sovereign immunity is essentially the
same as the dissent's argument that an allegation of conduct contrary to
statute overrides sovereign immunity. See post, at 30. The result in
each case-as the Court in Larson recognizes-turns on whether the defendant state official was empowered to do what he did, i. e., whether,
even if he acted erroneously, it was action within the scope of his authority.
See Larson, 337 U. S., at 685 (controversy on merits concerned whether
officer had interpreted government contract correctly); id., at 695; id ., at
716-717 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (in cases alleging a tort, the "official
seeks to screen himself behind the sovereign"); id., at 721-722. What the
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would need only to claim a denial of rights protected or provided by statute in order to override sovereign immunity.
Except in rare cases it would make the constitutional doctrine of sovereign immunity a nullity.
The crucial element of the dissent's theory was also the
plaintiff's central contention in Larson. It is that "[a] sovereign, like any other principal, cannot authorize its agent to
violate the law," so that when the agent does so he cannot be
acting for the sovereign. Post, at 25--26; see also post, at 15,
21, 30; cf. Larson, supra, at 693-694 ("It is argued ... that
the commission of a tort cannot be authorized by the sovereign.... It is on this contention that the respondent's position fundamentally rests .... "). It is a view of agency law
that the Court in Larson explicitly rejected. 22 Larson thus
made clear that, at least insofar as injunctive relief is sought,
an error of law by state officers acting in their official capacities will not suffice to override the sovereign immunity of the
State where the relief effectively is against it. Id., at 690,
695. 23 Any resulting disadvantage to the plaintiff was "outdissent fails to note is that the Court in Larson explicitly rejected the view
that the dissent here also advances, which is "that an officer given the
power to make decisions is only given the power to make correct decisions." I d., at 695. The Court in Larson made crystal clear that an officer might make errors and still be acting within the scope of his authority.
(There can be no question that the defendants here were "given the power
to make decisions" about the operation of Pennhurst. Seen. 11, supra.)
22
"It has been said, in a very special sense, that, as a matter of agency
law, a principal may never lawfully authorize the commission of a tort by
his agent. But that statement, in its usual context, is only a way of saying
that an agent's liability for torts committed by him cannot be avoided by
pleading the direction or authorization of his principal. The agent is himself liable whether or not he has been authorized or even directed to commit the tort. This, of course, does not mean that the principal is not liable
nor that the tortious action may not be regarded as the action of the principal." I d., at 694 (footnote omitted).
23
The Larson Court noted that a similar argument "was at one time advanced in connection with corporate agents, in an effort to avoid corporate
liability for torts, but was decisively rejected." 337 U. S., at 694. See 10
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weigh[ed]" by "the necessity of permitting the Government
to carry out its functions unhampered by direct judicial intervention." !d., at 704. If anything, this public need is even
greater when questions of federalism are involved. See
supra, at 8-9. 24
Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations § 4877, at 350
(1978 ed.) (a corporation is liable for torts committed by its agent within
the scope of is authority even though the "act was contrary to or in violation of the instructions or orders given by it to the offending agent"); id.,
§ 4959 (same as to crimes).
The dissent's strained interpretation of Larson, post, at 25-27, simply
ignores the language that the dissent itself quotes: "It is important to note
that in [ultra vires] cases the relief can be granted, without impleading the
sovereign, only because of the officer's lack of delegated power. A claim
of error in the exercise of that power is therefore not sufficient." 337
U. S., at 689-690.
24
As we have discussed supra, at 11-12, Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S.
651 (1974), also shows that the broad ultra vires theory enunciated in
Young and in some of the cases quoted by the dissent has been discarded.
In Edelman, although the State officers were alleged to be acting contrary
to law, and therefore should have been "stripped of their authority'' under
the theory of the dissent, we held the action to be barred by the Eleventh
Amendment. The dissent attempts to distinguish Edelman on the ground
that the retroactive relief there, unlike injunctive relief, does not run only
against the agent. Post, at 19, n. 28. To say that injunctive relief against
State officials acting in their official capacity does not run against the State
is to resort to the fictions that characterize the dissent's theories. Unlike
the English sovereign perhaps, an American State can act only through its
officials. It is true that the Court in Edelman recognized that retroactive
relief often, or at least sometimes, has a greater impact on the State treasury than does injunctive relief, see 415 U. S., at 666, n. 11, but there was
no suggestion that damages alone were thought to run against the State
while injunctive relief did not.
We have noted that the authority-stripping theory of Young is a fiction
that has been narrowly construed. In this light, it may well be wondered
what principled basis there is to the ultra vires doctrine as it was set forth
in Larson and Treasure Salvors. That doctrine excepts from the Eleventh Amendment bar suits against officers acting in their official capacities
but without any statutory authority, even though the relief would operate
against the State. At bottom, the doctrine is based on the fiction of the
Young opinion. The dissent's method is merely to take this fiction to its
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The dissent in Larson made many of the arguments advanced by the dissent today, and asserted that many of the
same cases were being overruled or ignored. See 337 U. S.,
at 723-728 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Those arguments
were rejected, and the cases supporting them are moribund. Since Larson was decided in 1949, 25 no opinion by any
Member of this Court has cited the cases on which the dissent
primarily relies for a proposition as broad as the language the
dissent quotes. Many if not most of these cases have not
been relied upon in an Eleventh Amendment context at all.
Those that have been so cited have been relied upon only for
propositions with which no one today quarrels. 26 The plain
extreme. While the dissent's result may be logical, in the sense that it is
difficult to draw principled lines short of that end, its view would virtually
eliminate the constitutional doctrine of sovereign immunity. It is a result
from which the Court in Larson wisely recoiled. We do so again today.
For present purposes, however, we do no more than question the continued vitality of the ultra vires doctrine in the Eleventh Amendment context. We hold only that to the extent the doctrine is consistent with the
analysis of this opinion, it is a very narrow exception that will allow suit
only under the standards set forth in n. 11 supra.
211
The dissent appears to believe that Larson is consistent with all prior
law. See post, at 25. This view ignores the fact that the Larson Court
itself understood that it was required to "resolve [a] conflict in doctrine."
337 U. S., at 701. The Court since has recognized that Larson represented a watershed in the law of sovereign immunity. In Malone v.
Bowdoin, 369 U. S. 643, Justice Stewart's opinion for the Court observed
that "to reconcile completely all the decisions of the Court in this field prior
to 1949 would be a Procrustean task." I d., at 646. His opinion continued:
"The Court's 1949 Larson decision makes it unnecessary, however, to
undertake that task here. For in Larson the Court, aware that it was
called upon to 'resolve the conflict in doctrine' ... , thoroughly reviewed
the many prior decisions, and made an informed and carefully considered
choice between the seemingly conflicting precedents." Ibid.
The Court included many of the cases upon which the dissent relies in its
list of cases that were rejected by Larson. See id., n. 6.
26
E. g., Rolston v. Missouri Fund Commissioners, 120 U. S. 390 (1887)
(never cited); Scully v. Bird, 209 U. S. 481 (1908) (never cited); Hopkins v.
Clemson Agricultural College, 221 U. S. 636 (1911) (never cited); Johnson
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fact is that the dissent's broad theory, if it ever was accepted
to the full extent to which it is now pressed, has not been the
law for at least a generation.
The reason is obvious. Under the dissent's view of the
ultra vires doctrine, the Eleventh Amendment would have
force only in the rare case in which a plaintiff foolishly attempts to sue the State in its own name, or where he cannot
produce some state statute that has been violated to his asserted injury. Thus, the ultra vires doctrine, a narrow and
questionable exception, would swallow the general rule that a
suit is against the State if the relief will run against it. That
result gives the dissent no pause presumably because of its
view that the Eleventh Amendment and sovereign immunity
"'undoubtedly ru[n] counter to modern democratic notions of
the moral responsibility of the State."' Post, at 36, n. 46
(quoting Great Northern Life Insurance Co. v. Read, 322
U. S. 47, 59 (1944) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). This argument has not been adopted by this Court. See Great Northern Life Insurance Co. v. Read, 322 U. S. 47, 51 (1944) ("Efforts to force, through suits against officials, performance of
promises by a state collide directly with the necessity that a
v. Lankford, 245 U. S. 541 (1918) (never cited); Land v. Dollar, 330 U. S.
731 (1947) (cited only for proposition that judgment that would expend itself on public treasury or interfere with public administration is a suit
against the United States); Cunningham v. Macon & B. R. Co., 109 U. S.
446 (1883) (cited only for proposition that a suit alleging unconstitutional
conduct is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment, and that State cannot
be sued without its consent); Poindexter v. Greenhaw, 114 U. S. 270 (1885)
(unconstitutional-conduct suit is not suit against State); Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust, 154 U. S. 362 (1894) (same). Prior to Florida Dept. of
State v. Treasure Salvors , Inc. , 458 U. S. 670 (1982), Tindal v. Wesley,
167 U. S. 204 (1897), had been cited only for the proposition that a suit alleging unconstitutional conduct is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
The plurality opinion in Treasure Salvors discussed Tindal at some length,
458 U. S., at 685-688, but noted that the rule of Tindal "was clarified in
Larson." Id. , at 688; see also id., at 715, n. 13 (WHITE, J. , dissenting).
As noted , n. 25, supra, some of these cases were also cited-and rejected-in Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U. S. 643, 646, n. 6 (1962).
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sovereign must be free from judicial compulsion in the carrying out of its policies within the limits of the Constitution.");
Larson, supra, at 704 ("The Government, as representative
of the community as a whole, cannot be stopped in its
tracks .... "). Moreover, the argument substantially misses
the point with respect to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. As JUSTICE MARSHALL has observed, the Eleventh
Amendment's restriction on the federal judicial power is
based in large part on "the problems of federalism inherent in
making one sovereign appear against its will in the courts of
the other." Employees v. Missouri Public Health Dept.,
411 U. S. 279, 294 (1973) (MARSHALL, J., concurring in the
result). The dissent totally rejects the Eleventh Amendment's basis in federalism.

c

The reasoning of our recent decisions on sovereign immunity thus leads to the conclusion that a federal suit against
state officials on the basis of state law contravenes the Eleventh Amendment when-as here-the relief sought and ordered has an impact directly on the State itself. In reaching
a contrary conclusion, the Court of Appeals relied principally
on a separate line of cases dealing with pendent jurisdiction.
The crucial point for the Court of Appeals was that this Court
has granted relief against state officials on the basis of a pendent state-law claim. See 673 F. 2d, at 657-658. We therefore must consider the relationship between pendent jurisdiction and the Eleventh Amendment.
This Court long has held generally that when a federal
court obtains jurisdiction over a federal claim, it may adjudicate other related claims over which the court otherwise
would not have jurisdiction. See, e. g., Mine Workers v.
Gibbs, 383 U. S. 715, 726 (1966); Osborn v. Bank of the
United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 819--823 (1824). The Court also
has held that a federal court may resolve a case solely on the
basis of a pendent state-law claim, see Siler, supra, at
192-193, and that in fact the court usually should do so in

.- "

81-2101-0PINION
26

PENNHURST STATE SCHOOL & HOSP. v. HALDERMAN

order to avoid federal constitutional questions, see id., at
193; Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis,
J., concurring) ("[l]f a case can be decided on either of two
grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a
question of statutory construction or general law, the Court
will decide only the latter"). But pendent jurisdiction is a
judge-made doctrine inferred from the general language of
Art. III. The question presented is whether this doctrine
may be viewed as displacing the explicit limitation on federal
jurisdiction contained in the Eleventh Amendment.
As the Court of Appeals noted, in Siler and subsequent
cases concerning pendent jurisdiction, relief was granted
against state officials on the basis of state-law claims that
were pendent to federal constitutional claims. In none of
these cases, however, did the Court so much as mention the
Eleventh Amendment in connection with the state-law claim.
Rather, the Court appears to have assumed that once jurisdiction was established over the federal-law claim, the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction would establish power to hear
the state-law claims as well. The Court has not addressed
whether that doctrine has a different scope when applied to
suits against the State. This is illustrated by Greene v. Louisville & Interurban R. Co., 244 U. S. 499 (1917), in which
the plaintiff railroads sued state. officials, alleging that certain tax assessments were excessive under the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Court first rejected the officials' argument that the Eleventh Amendment barred the federal constitutional claim. It held that Ex parte Young applied to all
allegations challenging the constitutionality of official action,
regardless of whether the state statute under which the officials purported to act was constitutional or unconstitutional.
See id., at 507. Having determined that the Eleventh
Amendment did not deprive the federal court of jurisdiction
over the Fourteenth Amendment question, the Court declared that the court's jurisdiction extended "to the determination of all questions involved in the case, including ques-
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tions of state law, irrespective of the disposition that may be
made of the federal question, or whether it be found necessary to decide it at all." I d., at 508. The case then was
decided solely on state-law grounds. Accord, Louisville &
Nashville R. Co. v. Greene, 244 U. S. 522 (1917). 27
These cases thus did not directly confront the question before us. "[W]hen questions of jurisdiction have been passed
on in prior decisions sub silentio, this Court has never considered itself bound when a subsequent case finally brings the
jurisdictional issue before us." Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U. S.
27
The dissent claims that the Court in Greene expressly rejected the explicit argument that pendent state-law claims were not barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Post, at 12, n. 14. The discussion of the Eleventh
Amendment in the opinion and in the briefs, however, is confined to the
federal constitutional claims. Compare Brief for Louisville & N. R. Co.,
Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Greene 15-38 (jurisdiction over federal claims)
with id., at 38-39 (pendent jurisdiction over state claims); see Brief for
State Board and Officers, Louisville & N . R. Co. v. Greene 75-99 (arguing
that Young only applied when state statute, rather than state action under
statute, is unconstitutional); id., at ~101 (arguing that definition of state
action is identical for purposes of Fourteenth and Eleventh Amendments);
Brief for Appellants Greene v. Louisville & I. R . 32-45 (arguing that state
was real party in interest). Indeed, the State's brief somewhat curiously
closes with a concession that the federal courts had jurisdiction. Brief for
State Board and Officers, Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Greene 139; see Reply
Brief, Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Greene 2 (pointing out concession). Thus,
~ while the State's position on the Court's jurisdiction over the federal claims
is somewhat unclear, the plain fact is that the State never contested that if
there were jurisdiction over the federal questions in the case, there would
be jurisdiction over the local-law claims.
Nor do any of the other pendent-jurisdiction cases cited by the dissent,
post, at 38, n. 50, discuss the Eleventh Amendment in connection with the
state-law claims. Moreover, since Larson was decided in 1949, making
clear that mere violations of state law would not override the Eleventh
Amendment, these cases have been cited only for the proposition that, as a
general matter, a federal court should decide a case on state-law grounds
where possible to avoid a federal constitutional question. Nothing in our
decision is meant to cast doubt on the desirability of applying the Siler
principle in cases where the federal court has jurisdiction to decide the
state-law issues.
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528, 533, n. 5 (1974). 28 We therefore view the question as an
open one.
As noted, the implicit view of these cases seems to have
been that once jurisdiction is established on the basis of a federal question, no further Eleventh Amendment inquiry is
necessary with respect to other claims raised in the case.
This is an erroneous view and contrary to the principles established in our Eleventh Amendment decisions. "The
Eleventh Amendment is an explicit limitation on the judicial
power of the United States." Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U. S.,
at 25. It deprives a federal court of power to decide certain
claims against States that otherwise would be within the
scope of Art. III's grant of jurisdiction. For example, if a
lawsuit against state officials under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 alleges
a constitutional claim, the federal court is barred from awarding damages against the state treasury even though the claim
arises under the Constitution. See Quern v. Jordan, 440
U. S. 332 (1979). Similarly, if a § 1983 action alleging a constitutional claim is brought directly against a State, the Eleventh Amendment bars a federal court from granting any relief on that claim. See Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U. S. 781
(1978) (per curiam). The Amendment thus is a specific constitutional bar against hearing even federal claims that otherwise would be within the jurisdiction of the federal courts. 29
This constitutional bar applies to pendent claims as well.
As noted above, pendent jurisdiction is a judge-made doctrine of expediency and efficiency derived from the general
118
See Edelman v. Jordan , 415 U.S. 651, 671 (1974) ("Having now had
an opportunity to more fully consider the Eleventh Amendment issue after
briefing and argument, we disapprove the Eleventh Amendment holdings
of [certain prior] cases to the extent that they are inconsistent with our
holding today").
29
See, e. g. , Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U. S. 313, 322 (1934) ("[A]lthough a case may arise under the Constitution and laws of the United
States, the judicial power does not extend to it if the suit is sought to be
prosecuted against a State, without her consent, by one of her own citizens"); Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U. S. 18, 25-26 (1933).
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Art. III language conferring power to hear all "cases" arising
under federal law or between diverse parties. See Mine
Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U. S. 715, 725 (1966). See also Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U. S. 528, 545 (1974) (terming pendent
jurisdiction "a doctrine of discretion"). The Eleventh
Amendment should not be construed to apply with less force
to this implied form of jurisdiction than it does to the explicitly granted power to hear federal claims. The history of the
adoption and development of the Amendment, see supra, at
6-9, confirms that it is an independent limitation on all exercises of Art. III power: "the entire judicial power granted by
the Constitution does not embrace authority to entertain suit
brought by private parties against a State without consent
given," Ex parte State of New York No.1, 256 U.S. 490,497
(1921). If we were to hold otherwise, a federal court could
award damages against a State on the basis of a pendent
claim. Our decision in Edelman v. Jordan, supra, makes
clear that pendent jurisdiction does not permit such an evasion of the immunity guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment. We there held that "the District Court was correct in
exercising pendent jurisdiction over [plaintiffs'] statutory
claim," 415 U. S., at 653, n. 1, but then concluded that the
Eleventh Amendment barred an award of retroactive relief
on the basis of that pendent claim. I d., at 678.
In sum, contrary to the view implicit in decisions such as
Greene, supra, neither pendent jurisdiction nor any other
basis of jurisdiction may override the Eleventh Amendment. 30 A federal court must examine each claim in a case to
see if the court's jurisdiction over that claim is barred by the
Eleventh Amendment. We concluded above that a claim
that state officials violated state law in carrying out their official responsibilities is a claim against the State that is protected by the Eleventh Amendment. See supra, at 15. We
See Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U. S., at 27 ("This is not less a suit against
the State because the bill is ancillary and supplemental.").
30
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now hold that this principle applies as well to state-law claims
brought into federal court under pendent jurisdiction.

D
Respondents urge that application of the Eleventh Amendment to pendent state-law claims will have a disruptive effect
on litigation against state officials. They argue that the
"considerations of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to litigants" that underlie pendent jurisdiction, see
Gibbs, supra, at 726, counsel against a result that may cause
litigants to split causes of action between state and federal
courts. They also contend that the policy of avoiding unnecessary constitutional decisions will be contravened if plaintiffs choose to forgo their state-law claims and sue only in federal court or, alternatively, that the policy of Ex parte Young
will be hindered if plaintiffs choose to forgo their right to a
federal forum and bring all of their claims in state court.
It may be that applying the Eleventh Amendment to pendent claims results in federal claims being brought in state
court, or in bifurcation of claims. That is not uncommon in
this area. Under Edelman v. Jordan, supra, a suit against
state officials for retroactive monetary relief, whether based
on federal or state law, must be brought in state court.
Challenges to the validity of state tax systems under 42
U. S. C. § 1983 also must be brought in state court. Fair
Assessment in Real Estate Assn. v. McNary, 454 U. S. 100
(1981). Under the abstention doctrine, unclear issues of
state law commonly are split off and referred to the state
courts. 3'
31
Moreover, allowing claims against state officials based on state law to
be brought in the federal courts does not necessarily foster the policies of
"judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants," Mine Workers v.
Gibbs, 383 U. S. 715, 726 (1966), on which pendent jurisdiction is founded.
For example, when a federal decision on state law is obtained, the federal
court's construction often is uncertain and ephemeral. In cases of ongoing
oversight of a state program that may extend over years, as in this case,
the federal intrusion is likely to be extensive. Duplication of effort, incon-
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In any case, the answer to respondents' assertions is that
such considerations of policy cannot override the constitutional limitation on the authority of the federal judiciary to
adjudicate suits against a State. See Missouri v. Fiske, 290
U. S., at 25--26 ("Considerations of convenience open no avenue of escape from the [Amendment's] restriction"). 32 That a
litigant's choice of forum is reduced "has long been understood to be a part of the tension inherent in our system of federalism." Employees v. Missouri Public Health & Welfare
Dept., 411 U. S. 279, 298 (1973) (MARSHALL, J., concurring
in result).
IV
Respondents contend that, regardless of the applicability
of the Eleventh Amendment to their state claims against petitioner state officials, the judgment may still be upheld
venience, and uncertainty may well result. See, e. g., Burford v. Sun Oil
Co., 319 U. S. 315, 327 (1943) ("Delay, misunderstanding oflocallaw, and
needless conflict with the state policy, are the inevitable product of this
double [i. e., federal-state] system of review''). This case is an example.
Here, the federal courts effectively have been undertaking to operate a
major state institution based on inferences drawn from dicta in a state
court opinion not decided until four years after the suit was begun. The
state court has had no opportunity to review the federal courts' construction of its opinion, or their choice of remedies. The only sure escape from
an erroneous interpretation of state law is presumably the rather cumbersome route of legislation.
Waste and delay may also result from abstention, which often is called
for when state law is unclear, see Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U. S. 360, 378--379
(1964) ("abstention operates to require piecemeal adjudication in many
courts, thereby delaying ultimate adjudication on the merits for an undue
length of time") (citations omitted), or from dismissals on the basis of comity, which has special force when relief is sought on state-law grounds, see
Gibbs, supra, at 726; Hawks v. Hamill, 288 U. S. 52, 61 (1933).
32
Cf. Aldinger v. Howard , 427 U. S. 1, 14-15 (1976) (Although "considerations of judicial economy" would be served by permitting pendent-party
jurisdiction, "the addition of a completely new party would run counter to
the well-established principle that federal courts, as opposed to state trial
courts of general jurisdiction, are courts of limited jurisdiction marked out
by Congress").
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against petitioner county officials. We are not persuaded.
Even assuming that these officials are not immune from suit
challenging their actions under the MH/MR Act, 33 it is clear
that without the injunction against the state institutions and
officials in this case, an order entered on state-law grounds
necessarily would be limited. The relief substantially concerns Pennhurst, an arm of the State that is operated by
state officials. Moreover, funding for the county mental retardation programs comes almost entirely from the State, see
Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 50, §§4507-4509 (Purdon 1969 and Supp.
1982), and the costs of the masters have been borne by the
State, see 446 F. Supp., at 1327. Finally, the MH/MR Act
contemplates that the state and county officials will cooperate in operating mental retardation programs. See In re
Schmidt, 494 Pa. 86, 95-96, 429 A. 2d 631, 635-636 (1981).
We have held that the Eleventh Amendment does not apply to "counties and similar municipal corporations." Mt. Healthy City School District
v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274, 280 (1977); see Lincoln County v. Luning, 133
U. S. 529, 530 (1890). At the same time, we have applied the Amendment
to bar relief against county officials "in order to protect the state treasury
from liability that would have had essentially the same practical consequences as a judgment against the State itself." Lake Country Estates,
Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U. S. 391, 401 (1979). See,
e. g., Edelman v. Jordan, supra (Eleventh Amendment bars suit against
state and county officials for retroactive award of welfare benefits). The
Courts of Appeals are in general agreement that a suit against officials of a
county or other governmental entity is barred if the relief obtained runs
against the State. See, e. g., Moore v. Tangipahoa Parish School Board,
594 F. 2d 489, 493 (CA5 1979); Carey v. Quern, 588 F. 2d 230, 233-234
(CA71978); Incarcerated Men of Allen County Jail v. Fair, 507 F. 2d 281,
287-288 (CA6 1974); Harris v. Tooele County School District, 471 F. 2d
218, 220 (CAlO 1973). Given that the actions of the county commissioners
and mental-health administrators are dependent on funding from the State,
it may be that relief granted against these county officials, when exercising
their functions under the MH/MR Act, effectively runs against the State.
Cf. Farr v. Chesney, 441 F. Supp. 127, 130-132 (MD Pa. 1977) (holding
that Pennsylvania county commissioners, acting as members of the board
of the county office of mental health and retardation, may not be sued for
33
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In short, the present judgment could not be sustained on the
basis of the state-law obligations of petitioner county officials. Indeed, any relief granted against the county officials
on the basis of the state statute would be partial and incomplete at best. Such an ineffective enforcement of state law
would not appear to serve the purposes of efficiency, convenience, and fairness that must inform the exercise of pendent
jurisdiction.

v

The Court of Appeals upheld the judgment of the District
Court solely on the basis of Pennsylvania's MH/MR Act.
We hold that these federal courts lacked jurisdiction to enjoin
petitioner state institutions and state officials on the basis of
this state law. The District Court also rested its decision on
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. See supra, at 2. On remand the
Court of Appeals may consider to what extent, if any, the
judgment may be sustained on these bases. 34 The court also
may consider whether relief may be granted to respondents
under the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of
Rights Act, 42 U. S. C. §§ 6011, 6063. The judgment of the
Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.

.-

back pay under the Eleventh Amendment). We need not decide this issue
in light of our disposition above.
34
On the Fourteenth Amendment issue, the court should consider
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U. S. 307 (1982), a decision that was not available when the District Court issued its decision.
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
Thi.s case presents the question whether a federal court
may award injunctive relief against state officials on the basis
of state law.
I
This litigation, here for the second time, concerns the conditions of care at petitioner Pennhurst State School and Hospital, a Pennsylvania institution for the care of the mentally
retarded. See Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1 (1981). Although the litigation's history is set forth in detail in our prior opinion, see id., at 5-10,
it is necessary for purposes of this decision to review that
history.
This suit originally was brought in 1974 by respondent
Terri Lee Halderman, a resident of Pennhurst, in the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Ultimately, plaintiffs included a class consisting of all persons
who were or might become residents of Pennhurst; the Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Citizens (P ARC); and the
United States. Defendants were Pennhurst and various
Pennhurst officials; the Pennsylvania Department of Public
Welfare and several of its officials; and various county commissioners, county mental retardation administrators, and
other officials of five Pennsylvania counties surrounding
Pennhurst. Respondents' amended complaint charged that
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conditions at Pennhurst violated the class members' rights
under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 87 Stat. 394, as amended, 29
U. S. C. § 794 (1976 ed. and Supp. V); the Developmentally
Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U. S. C.
§§ 6001-6081 (1976 ed. and Supp. V); and the Pennsylvania
Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966 (the
"MH/MR Act"), Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 50, §§ 4101-4704 (Purdon 1969 and Supp. 1982). Both damages and injunctive relief were sought.
In 1977, following a lengthy trial, the District Court rendered its decision. 446 F. Supp. 1295 (1977). As noted in
our prior opinion, the court's findings were undisputed: "Conditions at Pennhurst are not only dangerous, with the residents often physically abused or drugged by staff members,
but also inadequate for the 'habilitation' of the retarded. Indeed, the court found that the physicial, intellectual, and
emotional skills of some residents have deteriorated at
Pennhurst." 451 U. S., at 7 (footnote omitted). The District Court held that these conditions violated each resident's
right to "minimally adequate habilitation" under the Due
Process Clause and the MH/MR Act, see 446 F. Supp., at
1314-1318, 1322-1323; "freedom from harm" under the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, see id., at 1320-1321;
and "nondiscriminatory habilitation" under the Equal Protection Clause and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, see id., at
1321-1324. Furthermore, the court found that "due process
demands that if a state undertakes the habilitation of a retarded person, it must do so in the least restrictive setting
consistent with that individual's habilitative needs." ld., at
1319 (emphasis added). After concluding that the large size
of Pennhurst prevented it from providing the necessary
habilitation in the least restrictive environment, the court ordered "that immediate steps be taken to remove the retarded
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residents from Pennhurst." I d., at 1325. Petitioners were
ordered "to provide suitable community living arrangements" for the class members, id., at 1326, and the court appointed a Special Master "with the power and duty to plan,
organize, direct, supervise and monitor the implementation
of this and any further Orders of the Court." Ibid. 1
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed most
of the District Court's judgment. 612 F. 2d 84 (1979) (en
bane). It agreed that respondents had a right to habilitation
in the least restrictive environment, but it grounded this
right solely on the "bill of rights" provision in the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42
U. S. C. § 6010. See 612 F. 2d, at 95-100, 104-107. The
court did not consider the constitutional issues or § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act, and while it affirmed the District Court's
holding that the MH/MR Act provides a right to adequate
habilitation, see id., at 100-103, the court did not decide
whether that state right encompassed a right to treatment in
the least restrictive setting.
On the question of remedy, the Court of Appeals affirmed
except as to the District Court's order that Pennhurst be
closed. The court observed that some patients would be
unable to adjust to life outside an institution, and it determined that none of the legal provisions relied on by plaintiffs
precluded institutionalization. I d., at 114-115. It therefore
remanded for "individual determinations by the [District
Court], or by the Special Master, as to the appropriateness of
an improved Pennhurst for each such patient," guided by "a
presumption in favor of placing individuals in [community living arrangements]." lbid. 2
The District Court determined that the individual defendants had
acted in good faith and therefore were immune from the damage claims.
446 F . Supp., at 1324.
2
In a companion case, the Court of Appeals affirmed the District
Court's denial of the Pennhurst Parents-Staff Association's motion to intervene for purposes of appeal, finding the denial harmless error. See 612
1
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On remand the District Court established detailed procedures for determining the proper residential placement for
each patient. A team consisting of the patient, his parents
or guardian, and his case manager must establish an individual habilitation plan providing for habilitation of the patient
in a designated community living arrangement. The plan is
subject to review by the Special Master. A second master,
called the Hearing Master, is available to conduct hearings,
upon request by the resident, his parents or his advocate, on
the question whether the services of Pennhurst would be
more beneficial to the resident than the community living arrangement provided in the resident's plan. The Hearing
Master then determines where the patient should reside,
subject to possible review by the District Court. See App.
123a-134a (Order of April 24, 1980). 3
This Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals,
finding that 42 U. S. C. § 6010 did not create any substantive
rights. 451 U. S. 1 (1981). We remanded the case to the
Court of Appeals to determine if the remedial order could be
supported on the basis of state law, the Constitution, or§ 504
of the Rehabilitation Act. See id., at 31. 4 We also remanded for consideration of whether any relief was available
F. 2d 131 (1979) (en bane). The Association subsequently was granted
leave to intervene and is a petitioner in this Court.
3
On July 1, 1981, Pennsylvania enacted an appropriations bill providing
that only $35,000 would be paid for the Masters' expenses for the fiscal
year July 1981 to June 1982. The District Court held the Pennsylvania
Department of Public Welfare and its Secretary in contempt, and imposed
a fine of $10,000 per day. Pennsylvania paid the fines, and the contempt
was purged on January 8, 1982. On appeal the Court of Appeals affinned
the contempt order. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hospital,
673 F. 2d 628 (1982), cert. pending, No. 81-2363.
• Three Justices dissented from the Court's construction of the Act, but
concluded that the District Court should not have adopted the "far-reaching remedy" of appointing "a Special Master to decide which of the Pennhurst inmates should remain and which should be moved to communitybased facilities .... [T]he court should not have assumed the task of managing Pennhurst... ." 451 U. S., at 54 (WHITE J., dissenting in part).
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under other provisions of the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act. See id., at 27-30 (discussing
42 U. S. C. §§ 6011(a), 6063(b)(5)).
On remand the Court of Appeals affirmed its prior judgment in its entirety. 673 F. 2d 647 (1982) (en bane). It determined that in a recent decision the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania had "spoken definitively'' in holding that the
MH/MR Act required the State to adopt the "least restrictive
environment" approach for the care of the mentally retarded.
ld., at 651 (citing In re Schmidt, 494 Pa. 86, 429 A. 2d 631
(1981)). The Court of Appeals concluded that this state statute fully supported its prior judgment, and therefore did not
reach the remaining issues of federal law. It also rejected
petitioners' argument that the Eleventh Amendment barred
a federal court from considering this pendent state-law claim.
The court noted that the Amendment did not bar a federal
court from granting prospective injunctive relief against
state officials on the basis of federal claims, see 673 F. 2d, at
656 (citing Ex Parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908)), and concluded that the same result obtained with respect to a
pendent state-law claim. It reasoned that because Siler v.
Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 213 U. S. 175 (1909), an important case in the development of the doctrine of pendent
jurisdiction, also involved state officials, "there cannot be ...
an Eleventh Amendment exception to that rule." 673 F. 2d,
at 658. 5 Finally, the court rejected petitioners' argument
that it should have abstained from deciding the state-law
claim under principles of comity, see id., at 659-660, and
refused to consider petitioners' objections to the District
Court's use of a special master, see id., at 651 and n. 10.
6
The Court of Appeals also noted that "the United States is an intervening plaintiff ... against which even the state itself cannot successfully
plead the Eleventh Amendment as a bar to jurisdiction," and that "the
counties, even as juridical entities, do not fall within the coverage of the
Eleventh Amendment. Against those defendants even money damages
may be awarded." 673 F. 2d, at 656 (citation omitted). ·
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Three judges dissented in part, arguing that under principles
of federalism and comity the establishment of a special master to supervise compliance was an abuse of discretion. See
id., at 662 (Seitz, C. J., joined by Hunter, J., dissenting in
part); ibid. (Garth, J., concurring in part and dissenting as to
relief). See also id., at 661 (Aldisert, J., concurring) (seriously questioning the propriety of the order appointing the
Special Master, but concluding that a retroactive reversal of
that order would be meaningless). 6
We granted certiorari, 457 U. S. 1131 (1982), and now reverse and remand.
II
Petitioners raise three challenges to the judgment of the
Court of Appeals: (i) the Eleventh Amendment prohibited
the District Court from ordering state officials to conform
their conduct to state law; (ii) the doctrine of comity prohibited the District Court from issuing its injunctive relief; and
(iii) the District Court abused its discretion in appointing two
masters to supervise the decisions of state officials in implementing state law. We need not reach the latter two issues,
for we find the Eleventh Amendment challenge dispositive.
A
Article III, § 2 of the Constitution provides that the federal
judicial power extends, inter alia, to controversies "between
a State and Citizens of another State." Relying on this language, this Court in 1793 assumed original jurisdiction over a
suit brought by a citizen of South Carolina against the State
of Georgia. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419 (1793). The
decision "created such a shock of surprise that the Eleventh
Amendment was at once proposed and adopted." Monaco v.
Mississippi, 292 U. S. 313, 325 (1934). The Amendment
provides:
• The Office of the Special Master was abolished in December 1982.
See App. 220a (Order of August 12, 1982). The Hearing Master remains
in operation.
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"The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States
by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects
of any Foreign State."
The Amendment's language overruled the particular result
in Chisholm, but this Court has recognized that its greater
significance lies in its affirmation that the fundamental principle of sovereign immunity limits the grant of judicial authority in Art. III. Thus, in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1
(1890), the Court held that, despite the limited terms of the
Eleventh Amendment, a federal court could not entertain a
suit brought by a citizen against his own State. After reviewing the constitutional debates concerning the scope of
Art. III, the Court determined that federal jurisdiction over
suits against unconsenting States "was not contemplated by
the Constitution when establishing the judicial power of the
United States." ld., at 15. See Monaco v. Mississippi,
supra, at 322-323 (1934). 7 In short, the principle of sovereign immunity is a constitutional limitation on the federal judicial power established in Art. III:
"That a State may not be sued without its consent is a
fundamental rule of jurisprudence having so important a
bearing upon the construction of the Constitution of the
United States that it has become established by repeated
decisions of this court that the entire judicial power
granted by the Constitution does not embrace authority
to entertain a suit brought by private parties against a
State without consent given: not one brought by citizens
1
See Employees v. Missouri Public Health Dep't, 411 U. S. 279,
291-292 (1973) (MARSHALL, J., concurring in judgment) (The Eleventh
Amendment "clarif[ied] the intent of the Framers concerning the reach of
-federal judicial power" and "restore[d] the original understanding" that
States could not be made unwilling defendants in federal court). See also
Nevada v. Hall, 440 U. S. 410, 430-431 (1979) (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting);
id., at 437 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting).

r ,
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of another State, or by citizens or subjects of a foreign
State, because of the Eleventh Amendment; and not
even one brought by its own citizens, because of the fundamental rule of which the Amendment is but an exemplification." Ex parte State of New York No. 1, 256
U. S. 490, 497 (1921) (emphasis added). 8
A sovereign's immunity may be waived, and the Court consistently has held that a State may consent to suit against it
in federal court. See, e. g., Clark v. Barnard, 108 U. S.
436, 447 (1883). We have insisted, however, that the State's
consent be unequivocally expressed. See, e. g., Edelman v.
Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 673 (1974). Similarly, although Congress has power with respect to the rights protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment immunity, see Fitzpatrick v. Bitker, 427 U. S. 445
(1976), we have required an unequivocal expression of congressional intent to "overturn the constitutionally guaranteed immunity of the several States." Quern v. Jordan, 440
U. S. 332, 342 (1979) (holding that 42 U. S. C. § 1983 does not
override States' Eleventh Amendment immunity). Our reluctance to infer that a State's immunity from suit in the federal courts has been negated stems from recognition of the
vital role of the doctrine of sovereign immunity in our federal
system. A State's constitutional interest in immunity encompasses not merely whether it may be sued, but where it
may be sued. 9 As JUSTICE MARSHALL well has noted, "[b]e8

The limitation deprives federal courts of any jurisdiction to entertain
such claims, and thus may be raised at any point in a proceeding. "The
Eleventh Amendment declares a policy and sets forth an explicit limitation
on federal judicial power of such compelling force that this Court will consider the issue arising under this Amendment ... even though urged for
the first time in this Court." Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury,
323 u. s. 459, 467 (1945).
• For this reason, the Court consistently has held that a State's waiver
of sovereign immunity in its own courts is not a waiver of the Eleventh
Amendment immunity in the federal courts. See, e. g., Florida Department of Health v. Florida Nursing Home Assn., 450 U.S. 147, 150 (1981)

I
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cause of the problems of federalism inherent in making one
sovereign appear against its will in the courts of the other, a
restriction upon the exercise of the federal judicial power has
long been considered to be appropriate in a case such as this."
Employees v. Missouri Public Health & Welfare Dep't, 411
U. S. 279, 294 (1973) (MARSHALL, J., concurring in result). 10
Accordingly, in deciding this case we mu~t be guided by
"[t]he principles of federalism that inform Eleventh Amendment doctrine." Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678, 691 (1978).
B
This Court's decisions thus establish that "an unconsenting
State is immune from suits brought in federal courts by her
own citizens as well as by citizens of another state." Employees, supra, at 280. There may be a question, however,
whether a particular suit in fact is a suit against a State. It
is clear, of course, that in the absence of consent a suit in
which the State or one of its agencies or departments is
named as the defendant is proscribed by the Eleventh
Amendment. See, e. g., Florida Department of Health v.
Florida Nursing Home Assn., 450 U. S. 147 (1981) (per
curiam); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U. S. 781 (1978) (per
curiam). This jurisdictional bar applies regardless of the
"[l]t is ·_not consonant with our dual system for the federal
courts . . . to read . the consent to embrace federal as well as state
courts.... [A] clear declaration of the state's intention to submit its fiscal
problems to other courts than those of its own creation must be found."
Great Northern Life Insurance Co. v. Read, 322 U. S. 47, 54 (1944).
10
See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U. S., at 418-419 (States were "vitally interested" in whether they would be subject to suit in the federal courts, and
the debates about state immunity focused on the question of federal judicial
power). Cf. id., at 430-431 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting) (sovereign immunity is "a guarantee that is implied as an essential component of federalism"
and is "sufficientlY,fundamental to our federal structure to have implicit
constitutional dimension"); id., at 437 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting) ("[T]he
States that ratified the Eleventh Amendment thought that they were putting an end to the possibility of individual States as unconsenting defend-ants in foreign jurisdictions").

(per curiam).
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nature of the relief sought. See, e. g., Missouri v. Fiske,
290 U. S. 18, 27 (1933) ("Expressly applying to suits in equity
as well as at law, the Amendment necessarily embraces demands for the enforcement of equitable rights and the prosecution of equitable remedies when these are asserted and
prosecuted by an individual against a State").
When the suit is brought only against state officials, a
question arises as to whether that suit is a suit against the
State itself. Although prior decisions of this Court have not
been entirely consistent on this issue, certain principles are
well established. The Eleventh Amendment bars a suit
against state officials when "the state is the real, substantial
party in interest." Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U. S. 459, 464 (1945). See, e. g., In re Ayers, 123
U. S. 443, 487-492 (1887); Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U. S.
711, 720-723, 727-728 (1882). Thus, "[t]he general rule is
that relief sought nominally against an officer is in fact
against the sovereign if the decree would operate against the
latter." Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U. S. 57, 58 (1963) (per
curiam). 11 And, as when the State itself is named as the de11
"The general rule is that a suit is against the sovereign if 'the judgment
sought would expend itself on the public treasury or domain, or interfere
with the public administration,' or if the effect of the judgment would be 'to
restrain the Government from acting, or to compel it to act.' " Dugan v.
Rank, 372 U. S. 609, 620 (1963) (citations omitted).
Respondents do not dispute that the relief sought and awarded below operated against the state in each of the foregoing respects. They suggest,
however, that the suit here should not be considered to be against the state
for the purposes of the Eleventh Amendment because, they say, petitioners were acting ultra vires their authority. Respondents rely largely on
Florida Dep't of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U. S. 670 (1982),
which in turn was founded upon Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce
Corp., 337 U. S. 682 (1949). These cases provide no support for this argument. These and other modern cases make clear that a state officer may
be said to act ultra vires only when he acts "without any authority whatever." Treasure Salvors, supra, at 697 (opinion of STEVENS, J.); accord
id., at 716 (WHITE, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in
part) (test is whether there was no "colorable basis for the exercise of au-
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fendant, a suit against state officials that is in fact a suit
against a State is barred regardless of whether it seeks damages or injunctive relief. See Cory v. White, 457 U. S. 85,
91 (1982).
The Court has recognized an important exception to this
general rule: a suit challenging the constitutionality of a state
official's action is not one against the State. This was the
holding in Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908), in which a
federal court enjoined the Attorney General of the State of
Minnesota from bringing suit to enforce a state statute that
allegedly violated the Fourteenth Amendment. This Court
held that the Eleventh Amendment did not prohibit issuance
of this injunction. The theory of the case was that an unconstitutional enactment is "void" and therefore does not "impart to [the officer] any immunity from responsibility to the
supreme authority of the United States." !d., at 160. Since
the State could not authorize the action, the officer was
"stripped of his official or representative character and [was]
subjected to the consequences of his official conduct." Ibid.
While the rule permitting suits alleging conduct contrary
to "the supreme authority of the United States" has survived, the theory of Young has not been provided an expansive interpretation. Thus, in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S.
651 (1974), the Court emphasized that the Eleventh Amendment bars some forms of injunctive relief against state officials for violation of federal law. Id., at 66&-667. In parthority by state officials"). As the Court in Larson explained, an ultra
vires claim rests on "the officer's lack of delegated power. A claim of error
in the exercise of that power is therefore not sufficient." Larson, supra,
at 690. Petitioners' actions in operating this mental health institution
plainly were not beyond their delegated authority in this sense. The
MH/MR Act gave them broad discretion to provid~ "adequate" mental
health services. Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 50, § 4201(1) (Purdon 1969). The
essence of respondents' claim is that petitioners have not provided such
services adequately.
The dissent advances a far broader-and unprecedented-version of the
ultra vires doctrine, that we discuss infra, at 15-25.
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ticular, Edelman held that when a plaintiff sues a state
official alleging a violation of federal law, the federal court
may award an injunction that governs the official's future
conduct, but not one that awards retroactive monetary relief.
Under the theory of Young, such a suit would not be one
against the State since the federal-law allegation would strip
the state officer of his official authority. Nevertheless, retroactive relief was barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

III
With these principles in mind, we now turn to the question
whether the claim that petitioners violated state law in carrying out their official duties at Pennhurst is one against the
State and therefore barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
Respondents advance two principal arguments in support of
the judgment below. 12 First, they contend that under the
12

We reject respondents' additional contention that Pennsylvania has
waived its immunity from suit in federal court. At the time the suit was
filed, suits against Pennsylvania were permitted only where expressly authorized by the legislature, see, e. g., Freach v. Commonwealth, 471 Pa.
558, 370 A. 2d 1163 (1977), and respondents have not referred us to any
provision expressly waiving Pennsylvania's Eleventh Amendment immunity. The State now has a statute governing sovereign immunity, including an express preservation of its immunity from suit in federal court:
"Federal courts.-N othing contained in this subchapter shall be construed
to waive the immunity of the Commonwealth from suit in Federal courts
guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States." 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8521(b) (1980).
We also do not agree with respondents that the presence of the United
States as a plaintiff in this case removes the Eleventh Amendment from
consideration. Although the Eleventh Amendment does not bar the
United States from suing a State in federal court, see, e. g., Monaco v.
Mississippi, 292 U. S. 313, 329 (1934), the United States' presence in the
case for any purpose does not eliminate the State's immunity for all purposes. For example, the fact that the federal court could award injunctive
relief to the United States on federal constitutional claims would not mean
that the court could order the State to pay damages to other plaintiffs. In
any case, we think it clear that the United States does not have standing to
assert the state-law claims of third-parties. For these reasons, the ap-
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doctrine of Edelman v. Jordan, supra, the suit is not against
the State because the courts below ordered only prospective ·
injunctive relief. Second, they assert that the state-law
claim properly was decided under the doctrine of pendent
jurisdiction. Respondents rely on decisions of this Court
awarding relief against state officials on the basis of a pendent state-law claim. See, e. g., Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 213 U. S. 175, 193 (1909).
A
We first address the contention that respondents' state-law
claim is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment because it
seeks only prospective relief as defined in Edelman v. Jordan, supra. The Court of Appeals held that if the judgment
below rested on federal law, it could be entered against petitioner state officials under the doctrine established in E delman and Young even though the prospective financial burden
was substantial and ongoing.l3 See 673 F. 2d, at 656. The
court assumed, and respondents assert, that this reasoning
applies as well when the official acts in violation of state law.
This argument misconstrues the basis of the doctrine established in Young and Edelman.
As discussed above, the injunction in Young was justified,
notwithstanding the obvious impact on the State itself, on the
view that sovereign immunity does not apply because an official who acts unconstitutionally is "stripped of his official or
plicability of the Eleventh Amendment to respondents' state-law claim is
unaffected by the United States' participation in the case.
13
We do not decide whether the District Court would have jurisdiction
under this reasoning to grant prospective relief on the basis of federal law,
but we note that the scope of any such relief would be constrained by principles of comity and federalism. "Where, as here, the exercise of authority by state officials is attacked , federal courts must be constantly mindful
of the 'special delicacy of the adjustment to be preserved between federal
equitable power and State administration of its own law.'" R izzo v.
Goode, 423 U. S. 362, 378 (1976) (quoting Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U. S.
117, 120 (1951)).
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representative character," Young, 209 U. S., at 160. This
rationale, of course, created the "well-recognized irony'' that
an official's unconstitutional conduct constitutes state action under the Fourteenth Amendment but not the Eleventh
Amendment. Florida Department of State v. Treasure
Salvors, Inc., 458 U. S. 670, 685 (1982) (opinion of STEVENS,
J.). Nonetheless, the Young doctrine has been accepted as
necessary to permit the federal courts to vindicate federal
rights and hold state officials responsible to "the supreme authority of the United States." Young, 209 U. S., at 160.
As JUSTICE BRENNAN has observed, "Ex parte Young was
the culmination of efforts by this Court to harmonize the
principles of the Eleventh Amendment with the effective supremacy of rights and powers secured elsewhere in the Constitution." Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U. S. 82, 106 (1971)
(BRENNAN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Our decisions repeatedly have emphasized that the Young
doctrine rests on the need to promote the vindication of federal rights. See, e. g., Quern v. Jordan, 440 U. S. 332, 337
(1979); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232, 237 (1974); Georgia
R. & Banking Co. v. Redwine, 342 U. S. 299, 304 (1952).
The Court also has recognized, however, that the need to
promote the supremacy of federal law must be accommodated
to the constitutional immunity of the States. This is the significance of Edelman v. Jordan, supra. We recognized that
the prospective relief authorized by Young "has permitted
the Civil War Amendments to the Constitution to serve as a
sword, rather than merely a shield, for those whom they
were designed to protect." 415 U. S., at 664. But we declined to extend the fiction of Young to encompass retroactive relief, for to do so would effectively eliminate the
constitutional immunity of the States. Accordingly, we concluded that although the difference between permissible and
impermissible relief "will not in many instances be that between day and night," id., at 667, an award of retroactive relief necessarily "'fall[s] afoul of the Eleventh Amendment if
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that basic constitutional provision is to be conceived of as
having any present force."' !d., at 665 (quoting Rothstein v.
Wyman, 467 F. 2d 226, 237 (CA21972) (McGowan, J., sitting
by designation), cert. denied, 411 U. S. 921 (1973)). In sum
Edelman's distinction between prospective and retroactive
relief fulfills the underlying purpose of Ex parte Young while
at the same time preserving to an important degree the constitutional immunity of the States.
This need to reconcile competing interests is wholly absent, however, when a plaintiff alleges that a state official has
violated state law. In such a case the entire basis for the
doctrine of Young and Edelman disappears. A federal
court's grant of relief against state officials on the basis of
state law, whether prospective or retroactive, does not vindi-.
cate the supreme authority of federal law. On the contrary,
it is difficult to think of a greater intrusion on state sovereignty than when a federal court instructs state officials on
how to conform their conduct to state law. Such a result
conflicts directly with the principles of federalism that underlie the Eleventh Amendment. We conclude that Young and
Edelman are inapplicable in a suit against state officials on
the basis of state law.
B

The contrary view of the dissent rests on fiction, is wrong
on the law, and, most important, would emasculate the Eleventh Amendment. 14 Under its view, an allegation that official conduct is contrary to a state statute would suffice to
override the State's protection under that Amendment. The
theory is that such conduct is contrary to the official's "instructions," and thus ultra vires his authority. Accordingly,
official action based on a reasonable interpretation of any
"We are prompted to respond at some length to JUSTICE STEVENS' 38page dissent in part by his broad charge that "the Court blithely overrules
at least 29 cases," post, at 1. The decisions the dissent relies upon simply
do not support this sweeping characterization. See nn. 18, 19, and 20,
infra.
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statute might, if the interpretation turned out to be erroneous, 15 provide the basis for injunctive relief against the actors
in their official capacities. In this case, where officials of a
major state department, clearly acting within the scope of
their authority, were found not to have improved conditions
in a state institution adequately under state law, the dissent's
result would be that the State itself has forfeited its constitutionally provided immunity.
The theory is out of touch with reality. The dissent does
not dispute that the general criterion for determining when a
suit is in fact against the sovereign is the effect of the relief
sought. See supra, at 10; post, at 19, n. 28. According to
the dissent, the relief sought and ordered here-which in effect was that a major state institution be closed and smaller
state institutions be created and expansively funded-did not ·
operate against the State. This1\would · JNQt:l lti make the law
a pretense. No other court or judge in the ten-year history
of this litigation has advanced this theory. And the dissent's
underlying view that the named defendants here were acting
beyond and contrary to their authority cannot be reconciled
with reality-or with the record. The District Court in this
case held that the individual defendants "acted in the utmost
good faith ... within the sphere of their official responsibilities," and therefore were entitled to immunity from damages. 446 F. Supp., at 1324 (emphasis added). The named
defendants had nothing to gain personally from their conduct;
they were not found to have acted wilfully or even negligently. See ibid. The court expressly noted that the individual defendants "apparently took every means available to
them to reduce the incidents of abuse and injury, but were
constantly faced with staff shortages." Ibid. It also found
"that the individual defendants are dedicated professionals in
In this case, for example, the court below rested its finding that state
law required habilitation in the least restrictive environment on dicta in In
re Schmidt, 494 Pa. 86, 429 A. 2d 631 (1981). That decision was not issued
until seven years after this suit was filed, and four years after trial ended.
15
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the field of retardation who were given very little with which
to accomplish the habilitation of the retarded at Pennhurst."
Ibid. 16 As a result, all the relief ordered by the courts below
was institutional and official in character. To the extent
there was a violation of state law in this case, it is a case of
the State itself not fulfilling its legislative promises.
The dissent bases its view on numerous cases from the turn
of the century and earlier. These cases do not provide the
support the dissent claims to find. Many are simply
This part of the court's findings and judgment was not appealed. See
612 F. 2d, at 90, n. 4. See also 446 F. Supp., at 1303 ("On the whole, the
staff at Pennhurst appears to be dedicated and trying hard to cope with the
inadequacies of the institution").
The parties defendant in this suit were not all individuals. They included as well the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare, a major department of the State itself; and the Pennhurst State School and Hospital,
a state institution. The dissent apparently is arguing that the defendants
as a group-including both the state institutions, and state and county officials-were acting ultra vires. Since the institutions were only said to
have violated the law through the individual defendants, the District
Court's findings, never since questioned by any court, plainly exonerate all
the defendants from the dissent's claim that they acted beyond the scope of
their authority.
A truth of which the dissent's theoretical argument seems unaware is the
plight of many if not most of the mental institutions in our country. As the
District Court in this case found, "History is replete with misunderstanding and mistreatment of the retarded." 446 F. Supp., at 1299. It is common knowledge that "insane asylums," as they were known until the middle of this century, usually were underfunded and understaffed. It is not
easy to persuade competent people to work in these institutions, particularly well trained professionals. Physical facilities, due to consistent
underfunding by state legislatures, have been grossly inadequate-especially in light of advanced knowledge and techniques for the treatment of
the mentally ill. See generally President's Comm. on Mental Retardation,
Changing Patterns in Residential Services for the Mentally Retarded 1-58
(R. Kugel & W. Wolfensberger ed. 1969); R. C. Scheerenberger, A History of Mental Retardation 240-243 (1983). Only recently have States
commenced to ·move to correct widespread deplorable conditions. The
responsibility, as the District Court recognized after a protracted trial, has
rested on the State itself.
16
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miscited. For example, with perhaps one exception, 17 none
of its Eleventh Amendment cases can be said to hold that injunctive relief could be ordered against State officials for failing to carry out their duties under State statutes. 18 And the
federal sovereign immunity cases the dissent relies on as
analogy, while far from uniform, make clear that suit may not
be predicated on violations of state statutes that command
17
See Rolston v. Missouri Fund Commissioners, 120 U. S. 391 (1887).
In Rolston, however, the state officials were ordered to comply with "a
plain ministerial duty," see Great Northern Life Insurance Co. v. Read,
322 U. S. 47, 51 (1944), a far cry from this case, see n. 19, infra.
IB The cases are collected in footnote 48 of the dissent, post, at 37.
Several of the cases do not rest on an Eleventh Amendment holding at all.
For example, federal jurisdiction in fact was held to be lacking in Martin ·
v. Lankford, 245 U. S. 547 (1915), because of lack of diversity. A fair
reading of South Carolina v. Wesley, 155 U. S. 542 (1895), and the cases it
cites, makes clear that the ruling there was on the purely procedural point
that the party raising the jurisdictional objection was not a party to the
proceeding. In two other cases the allegation was that a state officer or
agency had acted unconstitutionally, rather than merely contrary to state
law. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. O'Connor, 223 U. S. 280 (1897); Hopkins v. Clemson Agricultural College, 221 U. S. 636 (1911). In Johnson
v. Lankford, 245 U. S. 541 (1918), the relief sought was not injunctive relief but money damages against the individual officer. See infra n. 20.
None of these cases can be said to be overruled by our holding today. As
noted infra, at 26-27, the Greene cases do not discuss the Eleventh
Amendment in connection with the state-law claim.
Tindal v. Wesley, 167 U. S. 204 (1897), and Scully v. Bird, 209 U. S. 481
(1908), are more closely analogous cases. In both of these old cases, however, the allegation was that the defendants had committed common law
torts, not, as here, that they had failed to carry out affirmative duties assigned to them by statute. See Tindal, supra, at 221 (distinguishing suits
brought ''to enforce the discharge by the defendants of any specific duty
enjoined by the State"); Transcript of Record, Tindal v. Wesley 3 (complaint alleged that defendants had "wrongfully entered into said premises
and ousted the plaintiff ... to the damage of the plaintiff ten thousand dollars"); Scully, supra, at 483 (allegation was that defendant had "injuriously
affect[ed] the reputation and sale of [plaintiff's] products"). Tort cases
such as these were explicitly overruled in Larson v. Domestic & Foreign
Commerce Corp., 337 U. S. 682 (1949). See infra, at 20-22.
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purely discretionary duties. 19 Since it cannot be doubted
that the statutes at issue here gave petitioners broad discretion in operating Pennhurst, see n. 11, supra; see also 446 F.
Supp., at 1324, the conduct alleged in this case would not be
ultra vires even under the standards of the dissent's cases. 20
"See, e. g., Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U. S. 605, 620 (1912) ("The
complainant did not ask the court to interfere with the official discretion of
the Secretary of War, but challenged his authority to do the things of
which complaint was made."); Santa Fe P. R. Co. v. Fall, 259 U. S. 197,
198-199 (1922) (same); Noble v. Union River Logging R., 147 U. S. 165
171-172 (1893) (same); see also Kendall v. Stokes, 3 How. 87, 98 (1845)
("[A] public officer is not liable to an action if he falls into error in a case
where the act to be done is not merely a ministerial one, but is one in relation to which it is his duty to exercise judgment and discretion; even although an individual may suffer by his mistake."); Belknap v. Schild, 161
U. S. 10, 18 (1896) (under Eleventh Amendment, injunctive relief is permitted where officer commits a tort that is "contrary to a plain official duty
requiring no exercise of discretion"); Wells v. Raper, 246 U. S. 335, 338
(1918); Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U. S. 682, 715
(1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissentingr~noting discretionary-ministerial duty
distinction in sovereign immunity cases). The opinions make clear that
the question of discretion went to sovereign immunity, and not to the
court's mandamus powers generally. See, e. g., Stimson, supra, at
618-620. The rationale appears to be that discretionary duties have a
greater impact on the sovereign because they "brin[g] the operation of governmental machinery into play." Larson, supra, at 715 (Frankfurter, J.
dissenting).
• In any event, as with the Eleventh Amendment cases, see n. 18, supra,
the dissent also is wrong to say that the federal sovereign immunity cases
it cites post, at 37, n. 48, are today overruled. Many of them were actions
for damages in tort against the individual officer. Little v. Barreme, 2
Cranch 170 (1804); Wise v. Withers, 3 Cranch 331 (1806); Mitchell v. Harmony, 13 How. 115 (1851); Bates v. Clark, 95.U. S. 204 (1877); Belknap v.
Schild, 161 U. S. 10 (1896). In Belknap the Court drew a careful distinction between such actions and suits in which the relief would run more directly against the State. Id., at 18. The Court disallowed injunctive relief against the officers on this basis. I d., at 23-25. Nothing in our
opinion touches these cases. Cf. Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U. S. 682, 687-688, and nn. 7, 8 (1949) (whether damages
might be awarded against individual government officers was not at issue).
There is language in other cases that suggests they were actions alleging
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Thus, while there is language in the early cases that advances the authority-stripping theory advocated by the dissent, this theory had never been pressed as far as the dissent
would do in this case. And when the expansive approach of
the dissent was advanced, this Court plainly and explicitly
rejected it. In Lars'on v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce
Corp., 337 U. S. 682 (1949), the Court was faced with the argument that an allegation that a government official committed a tort sufficed to distinguish the official from the sovereign. Therefore, the argument went, a suit for an injunction
to remedy the injury would not be against the sovereign.
The Court rejected the argument, noting that it would make
the doctrine of sovereign immunity superfluous. A plaintiff
would need only to "claim an invasion of his legal rights" in
order to override sovereign imm113ity. Id., at 693. In the ·
Court's view, the argument "confu~e[d] the doctrine of sovereign immunity with the requfrement that a plaintiff state a
cause of action." !d., at 692-693. The dissent's theory suffers a like confusion. 21 Under the dissent's view, a plaintiff

..

_, ·
...

.

torts, not statutory violations. See Philiuielphia Co. v. Stimson, 223
U. S. 605, 623 (1912); Sloan Shipyards v. U. S. Fleet Corp., 258 U. S. 549,
568 (1922); Land v. Dollar, 330 U. S. 731, 736 (1947). The remainder
clearly distinguish cases (like the present one) involving statutes that command discretionary duties. Seen. 19, supra. In any case, the Court in
Larson explicitly limited the precedential value of all of these cases. See
Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U. S. 643, 646, and n. 6 (1962).
21
In fact, as the dissent itself states, the argument in Larson that an allegation of tortious activity overrides sovereign immunity is essentially the
same as the dissent's argument that an allegation of conduct contrary to
statute overrides sovereign immunity. See post, at 30. The result in
each case-as the Court in Larson recognizes-turns on whether the defendant state official was empowered to do what he did, i. e., whether,
even if he acted erroneously, it was action within the scope of his authority.
See Larson, 337 U. S., at 685 (controversy on merits concerned whether
officer had interpreted government contract correctly); id., at 695; id., at
716-717 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (in cases alleging a tort, the "official
seeks to screen himself behind the sovereign"); id., at 721-722. What the
dissent fails to note is that the Court in Larson explicitly rejected the view
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would need only to claim a denial of rights protected or provided by statute in order to override sovereign immunity.
Except in rare cases it would make the constitutional doctrine of sovereign immunity a nullity.
The crucial element of the dissent's theory was also the
plaintiff's central contention in Larson. It is that "[a] sovereign, like any other principal, cannot authorize its agent to
violate the law," so that when the agent does so he cannot be
acting for the sovereign. Post, at 2~26; see also post, at 15,
21, 30; cf. Larson, supra, at 693-694 ("It is argued ... that
the commission of a tort cannot be authorized by the sovereign.... It is on this contention that the respondent's position fundamentally rests .... "). It is a view of agency law
that the Court in Larson explicitly rejected. 22 Larson thus
made clear that, at least insofar as injunctive relief is sought, ·
an error of law by state officers acting in their official capacities will not suffice to override the sovereign immunity of the
State where the relief effectively is against it. Id., at 690,
695. 23 Any resulting disadvantage to the plaintiff was "outthat the dissent here also advances, which is ''that an officer given the
power to make decisions is only given the power to make correct decisions." !d., at 695. The Court in Larson made crystal clear that an officer might make errors and still be acting within the scope of his authority.
(There can be no question that the defendants here were "given the power
to make decisions" about the operation of Pennhurst. Seen. 11, supra.)
22
"It has been said, in a very special sense, that, as a matter of agency
law, a principal may never lawfully authorize the commission of a tort by
his agent. But that statement, in its usual context, is only a way of saying
that an agent's liability for torts committed by him cannot be avoided by
pleading the direction or authorization of his principal. The agent is himself liable whether or not he has been authorized or even directed to commit the tort. This, of course, does not mean that the principal is not liable
nor that the tortious action may not be regarded as the action of the principal." Id., at 694 (footnote omitted).
23
The Larson Court noted that a similar argument ''was at one time advanced in connection with corporate agents, in an effort to avoid corporate
liability for torts, but was decisively rejected." 337 U. S., at 694. See 10
Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations § 4877, at 350
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weigh[ed] " by "the necessity of pennitting the Government
to carry out its functions unhampered by direct judicial intervention." I d., at 704. If anything, this public need is even
greater when questions of federalism are involved. See
supra, at 8-:_9. u

--

(1978 ed.) (a corporation is liable for torts committed by its agent within
the scope of is authority even though the "act was contrary to or in violation of the instructions or orders given by it to the offending agent"); id.,
§ 4959 (same as to crimes).
The dissent's~interpretation of Larson, post, at 25-27, simply ignores the
language that the dissent itself quotes: "It is important to note that in
[ultra vires] cases the relief can be granted, without impleading the sovereign, only because of the officer's lack of delegated power. A claim of
error in the exercise of that power is therefore not sufficient." 337 U. S.,
at 690.
24
As we have discussed supra, at 11-12, Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S.
651 (1974), also shows that the broad ultra vires theory enunciated in
Young and in some of the cases quoted by the dissent has been discarded.
In Edelman, although the State officers were alleged to be acting contrary
to law, and therefore should have been "stripped of their authority'' under
the theory of the dissent, we hel(l the action to be barred by the Eleventh
Amendment. The dissent attempts to distinguish Edelman on the ground
that the retroactive relief there, unlike injunctive relief, does not run only
against the agent. Post, at 19, n. 28. To say that injunctive relief against
State officials acting in their official capacity does not run against the State
is to resort to the fictions that characterize the dissent's theories. Unlike
the English sovereign perhaps, an American State can act only through its
officials. It is true that the Court in Edelman recognized that retroactive
relief often, or at least sometimes, has a greater impact on the State treasury than does injunctive relief, see 415 U. S., at 666, n. 11, but there was
no suggestion that damages alone were thought to run against the State
while injunctive relief did not.
We have noted that the authority-stripping theory of Young is a fiction
that has been narrowly construed. In this light, it may well be wondered
what principled basis there is to the ultra vires doctrine as it was set forth
in Larson and Treasure Salvors. That doctrine excepts from the Eleventh Amendment bar suits against officers acting in their official capacities
but without any statutory authority, even though the relief would operate
against the State. At bottom, the doctrine is based on the fiction of the
Young opinion. The dissent's method is merely to take this fiction to its
extreme. While the dissent's result may be logical, in the sense that it is
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The dissent in Larson made many of the arguments advanced by the dissent today, and asserted that many of the
same cases were being overruled or ignored. See 337 U. S.,
at 723-728 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Those arguments
were rejected, and the cases supporting them are moribund. Since Larson was decided in 1949, 25 no opinion by any
Member of this Court has cited the cases on which the dissent
primarily relies for a proposition as broad as the language the
dissent quotes. Many if not most of these cases have not
been relied upon in an Eleventh Amendment context at all.
Those that have been so cited have been relied upon only for
propositions with which no one today quarrels. 26 The plain
difficult to draw principled lines short of that end, its view would virtually
eliminate the constitutional doctrine of sovereign immunity. It is a result
from which the Court in Larson wisely recoiled. We do so again today.
For present purposes, however, we do no more than question the continued vitality of the ultra vires doctrine in the Eleventh Amendment context. We hold only that to the extent the doctrine is consistent with the
analysis of this opinion, it is a very narrow exception that will allow suit
only under the standards set forth in note 11 supra.
21> The dissent appears to believe that Larson is consistent with all prior
law. See post, at 25. This view ignores the fact that the Larson Court
itself understood that it was required to ''resolve [a] conflict in doctrine."
337 U. S., at 701. The Court since has recognized that Larson represented a watershed in the law of sovereign immunity. In Malone v.
Bowdoin, 369 U. S. 643, Justice Stewart's opinion for the Court observed
that "to reconcile completely all the decisions of the Court in this field prior
to 1949 would be a Procrustean task." /d., at 646. His opinion continued:
"The Court's 1949 Larson decision makes it unnecessary, however, to
undertake that task here. For in Larson the Court, aware that it was
called upon to 'resolve the conflict in doctrine' ... , thoroughly reviewed
the many prior decisions, and made an informed and carefully considered
choice between the seemingly conflicting precedents." Ibid.
The Court included many of the cases upon which the dissent relies in its
list of cases that were rejected by Larson. See id., n. 6.
26
E. g., Rolston v. Missouri Fund Commissioners, 120 U. S. 390 (1887)
(never cited); Scully v. Bird, 209 U. S. 481 (1908) (never cited); Hopkins v.
Clemson Agricultural College, 221 U. S. 636 (1911) (never cited); Johnson
v. Lankford, 245 U. S. 541 (1918) (never cited); Land v. Dollar, 330 U. S.
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fact is that the dissent's broad theory, if it ever was accepted
to the full extent to which it is now pressed, has not been the
law for at least a generation.
The reason is obvious. Under the dissent's view of the
ultra vires doctrine, the Eleventh Amendment would have
force only in the rare case in which a plaintiff foolishly attempts to sue the State in its own name, or where he cannot
produce some state statute that has been violated to his asserted injury. Thus, the ultra vires doctrine, a narrow and
questionable exception, would swallow the general rule that a
suit is against the State if the relief will run against it. That
result gives the dissent no pause presumably because of its
view that the Eleventh Amendment and sovereign immunity
"'undoubtedly ru[n] counter to modern democratic notions of .
the moral responsibility of the State."' Post, at 36, n. 46
(quoting Great Northern Life Insurance Co. v. Read, 322
U. S. 47, 59 (1944) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). This argument has not been adopted by this Court. See Great Northern Life Insurance Co. v. Read, 322 U. S. 47, 51 (1944) ("Efforts to force, through suits against officials, performance of
promises by a state collide directly with the necessity that a
sovereign must be free from judicial compulsion in the carry731 (1947) (cited only for proposition that judgment that would expend itself on public treasury or interfere with public administration is a suit
against the United States); Cunningham v. Macon & B. R. Co., 109 U. S.
446 (1883) (cited only for proposition that a suit alleging unconstitutional
conduct is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment, and that State cannot
be sued without its consent); Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U. S. 270 (1885)
(unconstitutional-conduct suit is not suit against State); Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust, 154 U. S. 362 (1894) (same). Prior to Florida Dept. of
State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U. S. 670 (1982), Tindal v. Wesley,
167 U. S. 204 (1897), had been cited only for the proposition that a suit alleging unconstitutional conduct is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
The plurality opinion in Treasure Salvors discussed Tindal at some length,
458 U. S., at 685--688, but noted that the rule of Tindal "was clarified in
Larson." Id., at 688; see also id., at 715, n. 13 (WHITE, J., dissenting).
As noted, n. 25, supra, some of these cases were also cited-and rejected-in Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U. S. 643, 646, n. 6 (1962).
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ing out of its policies within the limits of the Constitution.");
Larson, supra, at 704 ("The Government, as representatives
of the community as a whole, cannot be stopped in its
tracks .... "). Moreover, the argument substantially misses
the point with respect to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. As JUSTICE MARSHALL has observed, the Eleventh
Amendment's restriction on the federal judicial power is
based in large part on "the problems of federalism inherent in
making one sovereign appear against its will in the courts of
the other." Employees v. Missouri Public Health Dept.,
411 U. S. 279, 294 (1973) (MARSHALL, J., concurring in the
result). The dissent totally rejects the Eleventh Amendment's basis in federalism.

c

The reasoning of our,_decisions on sovereign immunity thus
leads to the conclusion that a federal suit against state officials on the basis of state law contravenes the Eleventh
Amendment when-as here-the relief sought and ordered
has an impact directly on the State itself. In reaching a contrary conclusion, the Court of Appeals relied principally on a
separate line of cases dealing with pendent jurisdiction. The
crucial point for the Court of Appeals was that this Court has
granted relief against state officials on the basis of a pendent
state-law claim. See 673 F. 2d, at 657-658. We therefore
must consider the relationship between pendent jurisdiction
and the Eleventh Amendment.
This Court long has held generally that when a federal
court obtains jurisdiction over a federal claim, it may adjudicate other related claims over which the court otherwise
would not have jurisdiction. See, e. g., Mine Workers v.
Gibbs, 383 U. S. 715, 726 (1966); Osborn v. Bank of the
United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 819-823 (1824). The Court also
has held that a federal court may resolve a case solely on the
basis of a pendent state-law claim, see Siler, supra, at
192-193, and that in fact the court usually should do so in
order to avoid federal constitutional questions, see id., at
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193; Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis,
J., concurring) ("[l]f a case can be decided on either of two
grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a
question of statutory construction or general law, the Court
will decide only the latter"). But pendent jurisdiction is a
judge-made doctrine inferred from the general language of
Art. III. The question presented is whether this doctrine
may be viewed as displacing the explicit limitation on federal
jurisdiction contained in the Eleventh Amendment.
As the Court of Appeals noted, in Siler and subsequent
cases concerning pendent jurisdiction, relief was granted
against state officials on the basis of state-law claims that
were pendent to federal constitutional claims. In none of
these cases, however, did the Court so much as mention the
Eleventh Amendment in connection with the state-law claim.
Rather, the Court appear!:! to have assumed that once jurisdiction was established over the federal-law claim, the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction would establish power to hear
the state-law claims as well. The Court has not addressed
whether that doctrine has a different scope when applied to
suits against the State. This is illustrated by Greene v. Louisville & Interurban R . Co., 244 U. S. 499 (1917), in which
the plaintiff railroads sued state officials, alleging that certain tax assessments were excessive under the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Court first rejected the officials' argument that the Eleventh Amendment barred the federal constitutional claim. It held that Ex parte Young applied to all
allegations challenging the constitutionality of official action,
regardless of whether the state statute under which the officials purported to act was constitutional or unconstitutional.
See id., at 507. Having determined that the Eleventh
Amendment did not deprive the federal court of jurisdiction
over the Fourteenth Amendment question, the Court declared that the court's jurisdiction extended "to the determination of all questions involved in the case, including questions of state law, irrespective of the disposition that may be
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made of the federal question, or whether it be found necessary to decide it at all." I d., at 508. The case then was
decided solely on state-law grounds. Accord, Louisville &
Nashville R. Co. v. Greene, 244 U. S. 522 (1917). 27
These cases thus did not directly confront the question before us. "[W]hen questions of jurisdiction have been passed
on in prior decisions sub silentio, this Court has never considered itself bound when a subsequent case finally brings the
jurisdictional issue before us." Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U. S.
27
The dissent claims that the Court in Greene expressly rejected the explicit argument that pendent state-law claims were not barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Post, at 12, n. 14. The discussion of the Eleventh
Amendment in the opinion and in the briefs, however, is confined to the
federal constitutional claims. Compare Brief for Louisville & N. R. Co:,
Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Greene 15-38 (jurisdiction over federal claims)
with id., at 38-39 (pendent jurisdiction over state claims); see Brief for
State Board and Officers, Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Greene 75-99 (arguing
that Young only applied when state statute, rather than state action under
statute, is unconstitutional); id., at 99-101 (arguing that definition of state
action is identical for purposes of Fourteenth and Eleventh Amendments);
Brief for Appellants Greene v. Louisville & I. R. 32-45 (arguing that state
was real party in interest). Indeed, the State's brief somewhat curiously
closes with a concession that the federal courts had jurisdiction. Brief for
State Board and Officers, Louisville & N . R. Co . v. Greene 139; see Reply
Brief, Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Greene 2 (pointing out concession). Thus,
while the State's position on the Court's jurisdiction over the federal claims
is somewhat unclear, the plain fact is that the State never contested that if
there were jurisdiction over the federal questions in the case, there would
be jurisdiction over the local-law claims.
Nor do any of the other pendent-jurisdiction cases cited by the dissent,
post, at 38, n. 50, discuss the Eleventh Amendment in connection with the
state-law claims. Moreover, since Larson was decided in 1949, making
clear that mere violations of state law would not override the Eleventh
Amendment, these cases have been cited only for the proposition that, as a
general matter, a federal court should decide a case on state-law grounds
where possible to avoid a federal constitutional question. ~~~e, e
Sileqo
~bouisvil~'M3 U. S. W-&;-193-t1:9691: Nothing in our decision is meant to cast doubt on the desirability of applying the Siler principle in cases where the federal court has jurisdiction to decide the state-law
issues.

g.,

a-
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528, 533, n. 5 (1974). 28 We therefore view the question as an
open one.
As noted, the implicit view of these cases seems to have
been that once jurisdiction is established on the basis of a federal question, no further Eleventh Amendment inquiry is
necessary with respect to other claims raised in the case.
This is an erroneous view and contrary to the principles established in our Eleventh Amendment decisions. "The
Eleventh Amendment is an explicit limitation on the judicial
power of the United States." Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U. S.,
at 25. It deprives a federal court of power to decide certain
claims against States that otherwise would be within the
scope of Art. III's grant of jurisdiction. For example, if a
lawsuit against state officials under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 alleges.
a constitutional claim, the federal court is barred from awarding damages against the state treasury even though the claim
arises under the Constitution. See Quern v. Jordan, 440
U. S. 332 (1979). Similarly, if a§ 1983 action alleging a constitutional claim is brought directly against a State, the Eleventh Amendment bars a federal court from granting any relief on that claim. See Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U. S. 781
(1978) (per curiam). The Amendment thus is a specific constitutional bar against hearing evenfederal claims that otherwise would be within the jurisdiction of the federal courts. 29
This constitutional bar applies to pendent claims as well.
As noted above, pendent jurisdiction is a judge-made doctrine of expediency and efficiency derived from the general
28
See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 671 (1974) ("Having now had
an opportunity to more fully consider the Eleventh Amendment issue after
briefing and argument, we disapprove the Eleventh Amendment holdings
of [certain prior] cases to the extent that they are inconsistent with our
holding today").
29
See, e. g., Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U. S. 313, 322 (1934) ("[A]lthough a case may arise under the Constitution and laws of the United
States, the judicial power does not extend to it if the suit is sought to be
prosecuted against a State, without her consent, by one of her own citizens"); Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U. S. 18, 25-26 (1933).
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Art. III language conferring power to hear all "cases" arising
under federal law or between diverse parties. See Mine
Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U. S. 715, 725 (1966). See also Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U. S. 528, 545 (1974) (tenning pendent
jurisdiction "a doctrine of discretion"). The Eleventh
Amendment should not be construed to apply with less force
to this implied form of jurisdiction than it does to the explicitly granted power to hear federal claims. The history of the
adoption and development of the Amendment, see supra, at
&-9, confirms that it is an independent limitation on all exercises of Art. III power: ''the entire judicial power granted by
the Constitution does not embrace authority to entertain suit
brought by private parties against a State without consent
given," Ex parte State of New York No.1, 256 U. S. 490, 497
(1921). If we were to hold otherwise, a federal court could
award damages against a State on the basis of a pendent
claim. Our decision in Edelman v. Jordan, supra, makes
clear that pendent jurisdiction does not permit such an evasion of the immunity guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment. We there held that "the District Court was correct in
exercising pendent jurisdiction over [plaintiffs'] statutory
claim," 415 U. S., at 653, n. 1, but then concluded that the
Eleventh Amendment barred an award of retroactive relief
on the basis of that pendent claim. I d., at 678.
In sum, contrary to the view implicit in decisions such as
Greene, supra, neither pendent jurisdiction nor any other
basis of jurisdiction may override the Eleventh Amendment. 30 A federal court must examine each claim in a case to
see if the court's jurisdiction over that claim is barred by the
Eleventh Amendment. We concluded above that a claim
that state officials violated state law in carrying out their official responsibilities is a claim against the State that is protected by the Eleventh Amendment. See supra, at 15. We
30
See Missouri v. Fiske , 290 U. S. , at 27 ("This is not less a suit against
the State because the bill is ancillary and supplemental.").
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now hold that this principle applies as well to state-law claims
brought into federal court under pendent jurisdiction.
D

Respondents urge that application of the Eleventh Amendment to pendent state-law claims will have a disruptive effect
on litigation against state officials. They argue that the
"considerations of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to litigants" that underlie pendent jurisdiction, see
Gibbs, supra, at 726, counsel against a result that may cause
litigants to split causes of action between state and federal
courts. They also contend that the policy of avoiding unnecessary constitutional decisions will be contravened if plaintiffs choose to forgo their state-law claims and sue only in fed.,
eral court or, alternatively, that the policy of Ex parte Young
will be hindered if plaintiffs choose to forgo their right to a
federal forum and bring all of their claims in state court.
It may be that applying the Eleventh Amendment to pendent claims results in federal claims being brought in state
court, or in bifurcation of claims. That is not uncommon in
this area. Under Edelman v. Jordan, supra, a suit against
state officials for retroactive monetary relief, whether based
on federal or state law, must be brought in state court.
Challenges to the validity of state tax systems under 42
U. S. C. § 1983 also must be brought in state court. Fair
Assessment in Real Estate Assn. v. McNary, 454 U. S. 100
(1981). Under the abstention doctrine, unclear issues of
state law commonly are split off and referred to the state
courts. 31
31
Moreover, allowing claims against state officials based on state law to
be brought in the federal courts does not necessarily foster the policies of
"judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants," Mine Workers v.
Gibbs, 383 U. S. 715, 726 (1966), on which pendent jurisdiction is founded.
For example, when a federal decision on state law is obtained, the federal
court's construction often is uncertain and ephemeral. In cases of ongoing
oversight of a state program that may extend over years, as in this case,
the federal intrusion is likely to be extensive. Duplication of effort, incon-
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In any case, the answer to respondents' assertions is that
such considerations of policy cannot override the constitutional limitation on the authority of the federal judiciary to
adjudicate suits against a State. See Missouri v. Fiske, 290
U. S., at 25-26 ("Considerations of convenience open no avenue of escape from the [Amendment's] restriction"). 32 That a
litigant's choice of forum is reduced "has long been understood to be a part of the tension inherent in our system of federalism." Employees v. Missouri Public Health & Welfare
Dept., 411 U. S. 279, 298 (1973) (MARSHALL, J., concurring
in result).
IV
Respondents contend that, regardless of the applicability
of the Eleventh Amendment to their state claims against petitioner state officials, the judgment may still be upheld
venience, and uncertainty may well result. See, e. g., Burford v. Sun Oil
Co., 319 U. S. 315, 327 (1943) ("Delay, misunderstanding of local law, and
needless conflict with the state policy, are the inevitable product of this
double [i. e., federal-state] system of review''). This case is an example.
Here, the federal courts effectively have been undertaking to operate a
major state institution based on inferences drawn from dicta in a state
court opinion not decided until four years after the suit was begun. The
state court has had no opportunity to review the federal courts' construction of its opinion, or their choice of remedies. The only sure escape from
an erroneous interpretation of state law is presumably the rather cumbersome route of legislation.
Waste and delay may also result from abstention, which often is called
for when state law is unclear, see Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U. S. 360, 378-379
(1964) ("abstention operates to require piecemeal adjudication in many
courts, thereby delaying ultimate adjudication on the merits for an undue
length of time") (citations omitted), or from dismissals on the basis of comity, which has special force when relief is sought on state-law grounds, see
Gibbs, supra, at 726; Hawks v. Hamill, 288 U. S. 52, 61 (1933).
82
Cf. Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U. S. 1, 14-15 (1976) (Although "considerations of judicial economy" would be served by permitting pendent-party
jurisdiction, "the addition of a completely new party would run counter to
the well-established principle that federal courts, as opposed to state trial
courts of general jurisdiction, are courts of limited jurisdiction marked out
by Congress").
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against petitioner county officials. We are not persuaded.
Even assuming that these officials are not immune from suit
challenging their actions under the MH/MR Act, 33 it is clear
that without the injunction against the state institutions and
officials in this case, an order entered on state-law grounds
necessarily would be limited. The relief substantially concerns Pennhurst, an arm of the State that is operated by
state officials. Moreover, funding for the county mental retardation programs comes almost entirely from the State, see
Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 50, §§4507-4509 (Purdon 1969 and Supp.
1982), and the costs of the masters have been borne by the
State, see 446 F. Supp., at 1327. Finally, the MH/MR Act
contemplates that the state and county officials will cooper-.
ate in operating mental retardation programs. See In re
Schmidt, 494 Pa. 86, 95-96, 429 A. 2d 631, 635-636 (1981).
at. We have held that the Eleventh Amendment does not apply to "counties and similar municipal corporations." Mt. Healthy City School District
v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274, 280 (1977); see Lincoln County v. Luning, 133
U. S. 529, 530 (1890). At the same time, we have applied the Amendment
to bar relief against county officials "in order to protect the state treasury
from liability that would have had essentially the same practical consequences as a judgment against the State itself." Lake Country Estates,
Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U. S. 391, 401 (1979). See,
e. g., Edelman v. Jordan, supra (Eleventh Amendment bars suit against
state and county officials for retroactive award of welfare benefits). The
Courts of Appeals are in general agreement that a suit against officials of a
county or other governmental entity is barred if the relief obtained runs
against the State. See, e. g., Moore v. Tangipahoa Parish School Board,
594 F . 2d 489, 493 (CA5 1979); Carey v. Quern, 588 F. 2d 230, 233-234
(CA7 1978); Incarcerated Men of Allen County Jail v. Fair, 507 F . 2d 281,
287-288 (CA6 1974); Harris v. Tooele County School District, 471 F . 2d
218, 220 (CAlO 1973). Given that the actions of the county commissioners
and mental-health administrators are dependent on funding from the State,
it may be that relief granted against these county officials, when exercising
their functions under the MH/MR Act, effectively runs against the State.
Cf. Farr v. Chesney, 441 F. Supp. 127, 130-132 (MD Pa. 1977) (holding
that Pennsylvania county commissioners, acting as members of the board
of the county office of mental health and retardation, may not be sued for
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In short, the present judgment could not be sustained on the
basis of the state-law obligations of petitioner county officials. Indeed, any relief granted against the county officials
on the basis of the state statute would be partial and incomplete at best. Such an ineffective enforcement of state law
would not appear to serve the purposes of efficiency, convenience, and fairness that must inform the exercise of pendent
jurisdiction.

v

The Court of Appeals upheld the judgment of the District
Court solely on the basis of Pennsylvania's MH/MR Act.
We hold that these federal courts lacked jurisdiction to enjoin
petitioner state institutions and state officials on the basis of
this state law. The District Court also rested its decision on
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. See supra, at 2. On remand the
Court of Appeals may consider to what extent, if any, the
judgment may be sustained on these bases. 34 The court also
may consider whether relief may be granted to respondents
under the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of
Rights Act, 42 U. S. C. §§ 6011, 6063. The judgment of the
Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

back pay under the Eleventh Amendment). We need not decide this issue
in light of our disposition above.
34
On the Fourteenth Amendment issue, the court should consider
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U. S. 307 (1982), a decision that was not available when the District Court issued its decision.

ckr.-.-r··

( T7f

To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor

~l) L)

o,./1)

From:

Justice Powell

Circulated: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Recirculated: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

2ND CHAMBERS DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No.

81-2101

PENNHURST STATE SCHOOL & HOSPITAL ET AL.,
PETITIONERS v. TERRI LEE HALDERMAN ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
[October - ,

1983]

JUSTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether a federal court
may award injunctive relief against state officials on the basis
of state law.
I
This litigation, here for the second time, concerns the conditions of care at petitioner Pennhurst State School and Hospital, a Pennsylvania institution for the care of the mentally
retarded. See Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1 (1981). Although the litigation's history is set forth in detail in our prior opinion, see id., at 5-10,
it is necessary for purposes of this decision to review that
history.
This suit originally was brought in 1974 by respondent
Terri Lee Halderman, a resident of Pennhurst, in the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Ultimately, plaintiffs included a class consisting of all persons
who were or might become residents of Pennhurst; the Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Citizens (P ARC); and the
United States. Defendants were Pennhurst and various
Pennhurst officials; the Pennsylvania Department of Public
Welfare and several of its officials; and various county commissioners, county mental retardation administrators, and
other officials of five Pennsylvania counties surrounding
Pennhurst. Respondents' amended complaint charged that

;

,.
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conditions at Pennhurst violated the class members' rights
under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 87 Stat. 394, as amended, 29
U. S. C. § 794 (1976 ed. and Supp. V); the Developmentally
Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U. S. C.
§§ 6001-6081 (1976 ed. and Supp. V); and the Pennsylvania
Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966 (the
"MH/MR Act"), Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 50, §§ 4101-4704
(Purdon 1969 and Supp. 1982). Both damages and injunctive
relief were sought.
In 1977, following a lengthy trial, the District Court rendered its decision. 446 F. Supp. 1295 (1977). As noted in
our prior opinion, the court's findings were undisputed: "Conditions at Pennhurst are not only dangerous, with the residents often physically abused or drugged by staff members,
but also inadequate for the 'habilitation' of the retarded. Indeed, the court found that the physicial, intellectual, and
emotional skills of some residents have deteriorated at
Pennhurst." 451 U. S., at 7 (footnote omitted). The District Court held that these conditions violated each resident's
right to "minimally adequate habilitation" under the Due
Process Clause and the MH/MR Act, see 446 F. Supp., at
1314-1318, 1322-1323; "freedom from harm" under the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, see id., at 1320-1321;
and "nondiscriminatory habilitation" under the Equal Protection Clause and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, see id., at
1321-1324. Furthermore, the court found that "due process
demands that if a state undertakes the habilitation of a retarded person, it must do so in the least restrictive setting
consistent with that individual's habilitative needs." Id., at
1319 (emphasis added). After concluding that the large size
of Pennhurst prevented it from providing the necessary
habilitation in the least restrictive environment, the court ordered "that immediate steps be taken to remove the retarded
residents from Pennhurst." I d., at 1325. Petitioners were
ordered "to provide suitable community living arrange-
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ments" for the class members, id., at 1326, and the court appointed a Special Master "with the power and duty to plan,
organize, direct, supervise and monitor the implementation
of this and any further Orders of the Court." Ibid.'
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed most
of the District Court's judgment. 612 F. 2d 84 (1979) (en
bane). It agreed that respondents had a right to habilitation
in the least restrictive environment, but it grounded this
right solely on the "bill of rights" provision in the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42
U. S.C. §6010. See 612 F. 2d, at 95-100, 104-107. The
court did not consider the constitutional issues or § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act, and while it affirmed the District Court's
holding that the MH/MR Act provides a right to adequate
habilitation, see id., at 100-103, the court did not decide
whether that state right encompassed a right to treatment in
the least restrictive setting.
On the question of remedy, the Court of Appeals affirmed
except as to the District Court's order that Pennhurst be
closed. The court observed that some patients would be
unable to adjust to life outside an institution, and it determined that none of the legal provisions relied on by plaintiffs
precluded institutionalization. I d., at 114-115. It therefore
remanded for "individual determinations by the [District
Court], or by the Special Master, as to the appropriateness of
an improved Pennhurst for each such patient," guided by "a
presumption in favor of placing individuals in [community living arrangements]." Ibid. 2
The District Court determined that the individual defendants had acted
in good faith and therefore were immune from the damage claims. 446 F.
Supp., at 1324.
2
In a companion case, the Court of Appeals affirmed the District
Court's denial of the Pennhurst Parents-Staff Association's motion to intervene for purposes of appeal, finding the denial harmless error. See 612
F. 2d 131 (1979) (en bane). The Association subsequently was granted
leave to intervene and is a petitioner in this Court.
1
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On remand the District Court established detailed procedures for determining the proper residential placement for
each patient. A team consisting of the patient, his parents
or guardian, and his case manager must establish an individual habilitation plan providing for habilitation of the patient
in a designated community living arrangement. The plan is
subject to review by the Special Master. A second master,
called the Hearing Master, is available to conduct hearings,
upon request by the resident, his parents or his advocate, on
the question whether the services of Pennhurst would be
more beneficial to the resident than the community living arrangement provided in the resident's plan. The Hearing
Master then determines where the patient should reside,
subject to possible review by the District Court. See App.
123a-134a (Order of April 24, 1980). 3
This Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals,
finding that 42 U. S. C. § 6010 did not create any substantive
rights. 451 U. S. 1 (1981). We remanded the case to the
Court of Appeals to determine if the remedial order could be
supported on the basis of state law, the Constitution, or§ 504
of the Rehabilitation Act. See id., at 31. 4 We also remanded for consideration of whether any relief was available
under other provisions of the Developmentally Disabled As3
On July 1, 1981, Pennsylvania enacted an appropriations bill providing
that only $35,000 would be paid for the Masters' expenses for the fiscal
year July 1981 to June 1982. The District Court held the Pennsylvania
Department of Public Welfare and its Secretary in contempt, and imposed
a fine of $10,000 per day. Pennsylvania paid the fines, and the contempt
was purged on January 8, 1982. On appeal the Court of Appeals affirmed
the contempt order. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hospital,
673 F. 2d 628 (1982), cert. pending, No. 81-2363.
' Three Justices dissented from the Court's construction of the Act, but
concluded that the District Court should not have adopted the "far-reaching remedy" of appointing "a Special Master to decide which of the Pennhurst inmates should remain and which should be moved to communitybased facilities. . . . [T]he court should not have assumed the task of
managing Pennhurst . . . ." 451 U. S., at 54 (WHITE J. , dissenting in
part).
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sistance and Bill of Rights Act. See id., at 27-30 (discussing
42 U. S. C. §§ 6011(a), 6063(b)(5)).
On remand the Court of Appeals affirmed its prior judgment in its entirety. 673 F. 2d 647 (1982) (en bane). It determined that in a recent decision the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania had "spoken definitively" in holding that the
MH/MR Act required the State to adopt the "least restrictive
environment" approach for the care of the mentally retarded.
Id., at 651 (citing In re Schmidt, 494 Pa. 86, 429 A. 2d 631
(1981)). The Court of Appeals concluded that this state statute fully supported itS' prior judgment, and therefore did not
reach the remaining issues of federal law. It also rejected
petitioners' argument that the Eleventh Amendment barred
a federal court from considering this pendent state-law claim.
The court noted that the Amendment did not bar a federal
court from granting prospective injunctive relief against
state officials on the basis of federal claims, see 673 F. 2d, at
656 (citing Ex Parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908)), and concluded that the same result obtained with respect to a
pendent state-law claim. It reasoned that because Siler v.
Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 213 U. S. 175 (1909), an important case in the development of the doctrine of pendent
jurisdiction, also involved state officials, "there cannot be ...
an Eleventh Amendment exception to that rule." 673 F. 2d,
at 658. 5 Finally, the court rejected petitioners' argument
that it should have abstained from deciding the state-law
claim under principles of comity, see id., at 659--660, andrefused to consider petitioners' objections to the District
Court's use of a special master, see id., at 651 and n. 10.
Three judges dissented in part, arguing that under principles
5
The Court of Appeals also noted that "the United States is an intervening plaintiff . . . against which even the state itself cannot successfully
plead the Eleventh Amendment as a bar to jurisdiction," and that "the
counties, even as juridical entities, do not fall within the coverage of the
Eleventh Amendment. Against those defendants even money damages
may be awarded." 673 F. 2d, at 656 (citation omitted).

..
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of federalism and comity the establishment of a special master to supervise compliance was an abuse of discretion. See
id., at 662 (Seitz, C. J., joined by Hunter, J., dissenting in
part); ibid. (Garth, J., concurring in part and dissenting as to
relief). See also id., at 661 (Aldisert, J., concurring) (seriously questioning the propriety of the order appointing the
Special Master, but concluding that a retroactive reversal of
that order would be meaningless). 6
We granted certiorari, 457 U. S. 1131 (1982), and now reverse and remand.
II
Petitioners raise three challenges to the judgment of the
Court of Appeals: (i) the Eleventh Amendment prohibited
the District ·Court from ordering state officials to conform
their conduct to state law;· (ii) the doctrine of comity prohibited the District Court from issuing its injunctive relief; and
(iii) the District Court abused its discretion in appointing two
masters to supervise the decisions of state officials in implementing state law. We need not reach the latter two issues,
for we find the Eleventh Amendment challenge dispositive.
A

Article III, § 2 of the Constitution provides that the federal
judicial power extends, inter alia, to controversies "between
a State and Citizens of another State." Relying on this language, this Court in 1793 assumed original jurisdiction over a
suit brought by a citizen of South Carolina against the State
of Georgia. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419 (1793). The
decision "created such a shock of surprise that the Eleventh
Amendment was at once proposed and adopted." Monaco v.
Mississippi, 292 U. S. 313, 325 (1934). The Amendment
provides:
• The Office of the Special Master was abolished in December 1982.
See App. 220a (Order of August 12, 1982). The Hearing Master remains
in operation.
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"The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States
by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects
of any Foreign State."
The Amendment's language overruled the particular result
in Chisholm, but this Court has recognized that its greater
significance lies.in its affirmation that the fundamental principle of sovereign immunity limits the grant of judicial authority in Art. III. Thus, in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1
(1890), the Court held that, despite the limited terms of the
Eleventh Amendment, a federal court could not entertain a
suit brought by a citizen against his own State. After reviewing the constitutional debates concerning the scope of
Art. III, the Court determined that federal jurisdiction over
suits against unconsenting States "was not contemplated by
the Constitution when establishing the judicial power of the
United States." Id., at 15. See Monaco v. Mississippi,
supra, at 322-323 (1934). 7 In short, the principle of sovereign immunity is a constitutional limitation on the federal judicial power established in Art. III:
"That a State may not be sued without its consent is a
fundamental rule of jurisprudence having so important a
bE: ...ring upon the construction of the Constitution of the
United States that it has become established by repeated
decisions of this court that the entire judicial power
granted by the Constitution does not embrace authority
to entertain a suit brought by private parties against a
State without consent given: not one brought by citizens
7
See E m ployees v. Missour i Pu blic Health Dep't, 411 U. S. 279,
291-292 (1973) (MARSHALL, J., concurring in judgment) (The Eleventh
Amendment "clarif[ied] the intent of the Framers concerning the reach of
federal judicial power" and "restore[d] the original understanding" that
States could not be made unwilling defendants in federal court). See also
N evada v. Hall , 440 U. S. 410, 430-431 (1979) (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting);
id. , at 437 (REHNQUIST, J. , dissenting).
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of another State, or by citizens or subjects of a foreign
State, because of the Eleventh Amendment; and not
even one brought by its own citizens, because of the fundamental rule of which the Amendment is but an exemplification." Ex parte State of New York No. 1, 256
U. S. 490, 497 (1921) (emphasis added). 8
A sovereign's immunity may be waived, and the Court consistently has held that a State may consent to suit against it
in federal court. See, e. g., Clark v. Barnard, 108 U. S.
436, 447 (1883). We have insisted, however, that the State's
consent be unequivocally expressed. See, e. g., Edelman v.
Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 673 (1974). Similarly, although Congress has power with respect to the rights protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment immunity, see Fitzpatrick v. Bitker, 427 U. S. 445
(1976), we have required an unequivocal expression of congressional intent to "overturn the constitutionally guaranteed immunity of the several States." Quern v. Jordan, 440
U. S. 332, 342 (1979) (holding that 42 U. S. C. § 1983 does not
override States' Eleventh Amendment :immunity). Our reluctance to infer that a State's immunity from suit in the federal courts has been negated stems from recognition of the
vital role of the doctrine of sovereign immunity in our federal
system. A State's constitutional interest in immunity encompasses not merely whether it may be sued, but where it
may be sued. 9 As JuSTICE MARSHALL well has noted, "[b]e8
The limitation deprives federal courts of any jurisdiction to entertain
such claims, and thus may be raised at any point in a proceeding. "The
Eleventh Amendment declares a policy and sets forth an explicit limitation
on federal judicial power of such compelling force that this Court will consider the issue arising under this Amendment ... even though urged for
the first time in this Court." Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury,
323 u. s. 459, 467 (1945).
9
For this reason, the Court consistently has held that a State's waiver
of sovereign immunity in its own courts is not a waiver of the Eleventh
Amendment immunity in the federal courts. See, e. g., Florida Department of Health v. Florida Nursing Home Assn., 450 U. S. 147, 150 (1981)

81-2101-0PINION
PENNHURST STATE SCHOOL & HOSP. v. HALDERMAN

9

cause of the problems of federalism inherent in making one
sovereign appear against its will in the courts of the other, a
restriction upon the exercise of the federal judicial power has
long been considered to be appropriate in a case such as this."
Employees v. Missouri Public Health & Welfare Dep't, 411
U. S. 279, 294 (1973) (MARSHALL, J., concurring in result). 10
Accordingly, in deciding this case we must be guided by
"[t]he principles of federalism that inform Eleventh Amendment doctrine." Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678, 691 (1978).
B
This Court's decisions thus establish that "an unconsenting
State is immune from suits brought in federal courts by her
own citizens as well as by citizens of another state." Employees, supra, at 280. There may be a question, however,
whether a particular suit in fact is a suit against a State. It
is clear, of course, that in the absence of consent a suit in
which the State or one of its agencies or departments is
named as the defendant is proscribed by the Eleventh
Amendment. See, e. g., Florida Department of Health v.
Florida Nursing Home Assn., 450 U. S. 147 (1981) (per
curiam); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U. S. 781 (1978) (per
curiam). This jurisdictional bar applies regardless of the
(per curiam). "[l]t is not consonant with our dual system for the federal
courts . . . to read the consent to embrace federal as well as state
courts .... [A] clear declaration of the state's intention to submit its fiscal
problems to other courts than those of its own creation must be found."
Great Northern Life Insurance Co. v. Read, 322 U. S. 47, 54 (1944).
0
' See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S., at 418--419 (States were "vitally interested" in whether they would be subject to suit in the federal courts, and
the debates about state immunity focused on the question of federal judicial
power). Cf. id., at 430-431 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting) (sovereign immunity is "a guarantee that is implied as an essential component of federalism"
and is "sufficiently fundamental to our federal structure to have implicit
constitutional dimension"); id., at 437 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting) ("[T]he
States that ratified the Eleventh Amendment thought that they were putting an end to the possibility of individual States as unconsenting defendants in foreign jurisdictions").
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nature of the relief sought. See, e. g., Missouri v. Fiske,
290 U. S. 18, 27 (1933) ("Expressly applying to suits in equity
as well as at law, the Amendment necessarily embraces demands for the enforcement of equitable rights and the prosecution of equitable remedies when these are asserted and
prosecuted by an individual against a State").
When the suit is brought only against state officials, a
question arises as to whether that suit is a suit against the
State itself. Although prior decisions of this Court have not
been entirely consistent on this issue, certain principles are
well established. The Eleventh Amendment bars a suit
against state officials when "the state is the real, substantial
party in interest." Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U. S. 459, 464 (1945). See, e. g., In re Ayers, 123
U. S. 443, 487-492 (1887); Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U. S.
711, 720-723, 727-728 (1882). Thus, "[t]he general rule is
that relief sought nominally against an officer is in fact
against the sovereign if the decree would operate against the
latter." Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U. S. 57, 58 (1963) (per
curiam). 11 And, as when the State itself is named as the de"The general rule is that a suit is against the sovereign if 'the judgment
sought would expend itself on the public treasury or domain, or interfere
with the public administration,' or if the effect of the judgment would be 'to
restrain the Government from acting, or to compel it to act.'" Dugan v.
Rank, 372 U. S. 609, 620 (1963) (citations omitted).
Respondents do not dispute that the relief sought and awarded below operated against the state in each of the foregoing respects. They suggest,
however, that the suit here should not be considered to be against the state
for the purposes of the Eleventh Amendment because, they say, petitioners were acting ultra vires their authority. Respondents rely largely on
Florida Dep't of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U. S. - - (1982),
which in turn was founded upon Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce
Corp., 337 U. S. 682 (1949). These cases provide no support for this argument. These and other modern cases make clear that a state officer may
be said to act ultra vires only when he acts "without any authority whatever." Treasure Salvors, supra, at-- (opinion of STEVENS, J.); accord
id., at-- (WHITE, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in
part) (test is whether there was no "colorable basis for the exercise of au11
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fendant, a suit against state officials that is in fact a suit
against a State is barred regardless of whether it seeks damages or injunctive relief. See Cory v. White, 457 U. S. 85,
91 (1982).
The Court has recognized an important exception to this
general rule: a suit challenging the constitutionality of a state
official's action is not one against the State. This was the
holding in Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908), in which a
federal court enjoined the Attorney General of the State of
Minnesota from bringing suit to enforce a state statute that
allegedly violated the Fourteenth Amendment. This Court
held that the Eleventh Amendment did not prohibit issuance
of this injunction. The theory of the case was that an unconstitutional enactment is "void" and therefore does not "impart to [the officer] any immunity from responsibility to the
supreme authority of the United States." !d., at 160. Since
the State could not authorize the action, the officer was
"stripped of his official or representative character and [was]
subjected to the consequences of his official conduct." Ibid.
While the rule permitting suits alleging conduct contrary
to ''the supreme authority of the United States" has survived, the theory of Young has not been provided an expansive interpretation. Thus, in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S.
651 (1974), the Court emphasized that the Eleventh Amendment bars some forms of injunctive relief against state officials for violation of federal law. Id., at 666-667. In particular, Edelman held that when a plaintiff sues a state
official alleging a violation of federal law, the federal court
thority by state officials"). As the Court in Larson explained, an ultra
vires claim rests on "the officer's lack of delegated power. A claim of error
in the exercise of that power is therefore not sufficient." Larson, supra,
at 690. Petitioners' actions in operating this mental health institution
plainly were not beyond their delegated authority in this sense. Pennsylvania statutes gave them broad discretion to provide "adequate" mental
health services. Pa. Stat. Ann. , Tit. 50, § 4201(1) (Purdon 1969). The essence of respondents' claim is that petitioners have not provided such services adequately.
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may award an injunction tha~awardvetroactive monetary
relief. Under the theory of Young, such a suit would not be
one against the State since the federal-law allegation would
strip the state officer of his official authority. Nevertheless,
retroactive relief was barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

III
With these principles in mind, we now turn to the question
whether the claim that petitioners violated state law in carrying out their official duties at Pennhurst is one against the
State and therefore barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
Respondents advance two principal arguments in support of
the judgment below. 12 First, they contend that under the
doctrine of Edelman v. Jordan, supra, the suit is not against
12
We reject respondents' additional contention that Pennsylvania has
waived its immunity from suit in federal court. At the time the suit was
filed, suits against Pennsylvania were permitted only where expressly authorized by the legislature, see, e. g., Freach v. Commonwealth, 471 Pa.
558, 370 A. 2d 1163 (1977), and respondents have not referred us to any
provision expressly waiving Pennsylvania's Eleventh Amendment immunity. The State now has a statute governing sovereign immunity, including an express preservation of its immunity from suit in federal court:
"Federal courts.-Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be construed
to waive the immunity of the Commonwealth from suit in Federal courts
guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States." 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8521(b) (1980).
We also do not agree with respondents that the presence of the United
States as a plaintiff in this case removes the Eleventh Amendment from
consideration. Although the Eleventh Amendment does not bar the
United States from suing a State in federal court, see, e. g., Monaco v.
Mississippi, 292 U. S. 313, 329 (1934), the United States' presence in the
case for any purpose does not eliminate the State's immunity for all purposes. For example, the fact that the federal court could award injunctive
relief to the United States on federal constitutional claims would not mean
that the court could order the State to pay damages to other plaintiffs. In
any case, we think it clear that the United States does not have standing to
assert the state-law claims of third-parties. For these reasons, the applicability of the Eleventh Amendment to respondents' state-law claim is
unaffected by the United States' participation in the case.
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the State because the courts below ordered only prospective
injunctive relief. Second, they assert that the state-law
claim properly was decided under the doctrine of pendent
jurisdiction. Respondents rely on decisions of this Court
awarding relief against state officials on the basis of a pendent state-law claim. See, e. g., Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 213 U. S. 175, 193 (1909).
A

We first address the contention that respondents' state-law
claim is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment because it
seeks only prospective relief as defined in Edelman v. Jordan, supra. The Court of Appeals held that if the judgment
below rested on federal law, it could be entered against petitioner state officials under the doctrine established in Edelman and Young even though the prospective financial burden
was substantial and ongoing. 13 See 673 F. 2d, at 656. The
court assumed, and respondents assert, that this reasoning
applies as well when the official acts in violation of state law.
This argument misconstrues the basis of the doctrine established in Young and Edelman.
As discussed above, the injunction in Young was justified,
notwithstanding the obvious impact on the State itself, on the
view that sovereign immunity does not apply because an official who acts unconstitutionally is "stripped of his official or
representative character," Young, 209 U. S., at 160. This
rationale, of course, created the "well-recognized irony" that
an official's unconstitutional conduct constitutes state action
We do not decide whether the District Court would have jurisdiction
under this reasoning to grant prospective relief on the basis of federal law,
but we note that the scope of any such relief would be constrained by principles of comity and federalism. "Where, as here, the exercise of authority by state officials is attacked, federal courts must be constantly mindful
of the 'special delicacy of the adjustment to be preserved between federal
equitable power and State administration of its own law."' R izzo v.
Goode, 423 U. S. 362, 378 (1976) (quoting Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U. S.
117, 120 (1951)).
13
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under the Fourteenth Amendment but not the Eleventh
Amendment. Florida Department of State v. Treasure
Salvors, Inc., - - U. S. - - , - - (1982) (opinion of STEVENS, J.). Nonetheless, the Young doctrine has been accepted as necessary to permit the federal courts to vindicate
federal rights and hold state officials responsible to "the supreme authority of the United States." Young, 209 U. S.,
at 160. As JUSTICE BRENNAN has observed, "Ex parte
Young was the culmination of efforts by this Court to harmonize the principles of the Eleventh Amendment with the effective supremacy of rights and powers secured elsewhere in
the Constitution." Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U. S. 82, 106
(1971) (BRENNAN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Our decisions repeatedly have emphasized that the
Young doctrine rests on the need to promote the vindication
of federal rights. See, e. g., Quern v. Jordan, 440 U. S.
332, 337 (1979); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232, 237 (1974);
Georgia R. & Banking Co. v. Redwine, 342 U. S. 299, 304
(1952).
The Court also has recognized, however, that the need to
promote the supremacy of federal law must be accommodated
to the constitutional immunity of the States. This is the significance of Edelman v. Jordan, supra. We recognized that
the prospective relief authorized by Young "has permitted
the Civil War Amendments to the Constitution to serve as a
sword, rather than merely a shield, for those whom they
were designed to protect." 415 U. S., at 664. But we declined to extend Young to encompass retroactive relief, for to
do so would effectively eliminate the constitutional immunity
of the States. Accordingly, we concluded that although the
difference between permissible and impermissible relief "will
not in many instances be that between day and night," id., at
667, an award of retroactive relief necessarily" 'fall[s] afoul of
the Eleventh Amendment if that basic constitutional provision is to be conceived of as having any present force.'" I d.,
at 665 (quoting Rothstein v. Wyman, 467 F. 2d 226, 237 (CA2

81-2101-0PINION
PENNHURST STATE

-

SCHOOL~

HOSP. v. HALDERMAN

15

1972) (McGowan, J., sitting by designation), cert. denied, 411
U. S. 921 (1973)). In sum Edelman's distinction between
prospective and retroactive relief fulfills the underlying
purpose of Ex parte Young while at the same time preserving
L-----i~o~ important degree the constitutional immunity of the
States.
This need to reconcile competing interests is wholly absent, however, when a plaintiff alleges that a state official has
violated state law. In such a case the entire basis for the
doctrine of Young and Edelman disappears. A federal
court's grant of relief against state officials on the basis of
state law, whether prospective or retroactive, does not vindicate the supreme authority of federal law. On the contrary,
it is difficult to think of a greater intrusion on state sovereignty than when a federal court instructs state officials on
how to conform their conduct to state law. Such a result
conflicts directly with the principles of federalism that underlie the Eleventh Amendment. We conclude that Young and
Edelman are inapplicable in a suit against state officials on
the basis of state law.
B
The reasoning of our decisions on sovereign immunity thus
leads to the conclusion that a federal suit against state officials on the basis of state law contravenes the Eleventh
Amendment. In reaching a contrary conclusion, the Court
of Appeals relied principally on a separate line of cases dealing with pendent jurisdiction. The crucial point for the
Court of Appeals was that this Court has granted relief
against state officials on the basis of a pendent state-law
claim. See 673 F. 2d, at 657-658. We therefore must consider the relationship between pendent jurisdiction and the
Eleventh Amendment.
This Court long has held generally that when a federal
court obtains jurisdiction over a federal claim, it may adjudicate other related claims over which the court otherwise
would not have jurisdiction. See, e. g., Mine Workers v.
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Gibbs, 383 U. S. 715, 726 (1966); Osborn v. Bank of the
United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 819-823 (1824). The Court also
has held that a federal court may resolve a case solely on the
basis of a pendent state-law claim, see Siler, supra, at
192-193, and that in fact the court usually should do so in
order to avoid federal constitutional questions, see id., at
193; Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis,
J., concurring) ("[l]f a case can be decided on either of two
grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a
question of statutory construction or general law, the Court
will decide only the latter"). But pendent jurisdiction is a
judge-made doctrine inferred from the general language of
Art. III. The question presented is whether this doctrine
may be viewed as displacing the explicit limitation on federal
jurisdiction contained in the Eleventh Amendment.
As the Court of Appeals noted, in Siler and subsequent
cases concerning pendent jurisdiction relief was granted
against state officials on the basis of state-law claims that
were pendent to federal constitutional claims. In none of
these cases, however, did the Court so much as mention the
Eleventh Amendment in connection with the state-law claim.
Rather, the Court appears to have assumed that once jurisdiction was established over the federal-law claim, the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction would establish power to hear
the state-law claims as well. The Court has not addressed
whether that doctrine has a different scope when applied to
suits against the State. This is illustrated by Greene v. Louisville & Interurban R. Co., 244 U. S. 499 (1917), in which
the plaintiff railroads sued state officials, alleging that certain tax assessments were excessive under the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Court first rejected the officials' argument that the Eleventh Amendment barred the federal constitutional claim. It held that Ex parte Young applied to all
allegations challenging the constitutionality of official action,
regardless of whether the state statute under which the officials purported to act was constitutional or unconstitutional.
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See id., at 507. Having determined that the Eleventh
Amendment did not deprive the federal court of jurisdiction
over the Fourteenth Amendment question, the Court declared that the court's jurisdiction extended "to the determination of all questions involved in the case, including questions of state law, irrespective of the disposition that may be
made of the federal question, or whether it be found necessary to decide it at all." I d., at 508. The case then was
decided solely on state-law grounds. Accord, Louisville &
Nashville R. Co. v. Greene, 244 U. S. 522 (1917).
These cases thus did not directly confront the question before us. "[W]hen questions of jurisdiction have been passed
on in prior decisions sub silentio, this Court has never considered itself bound when a subsequent case finally brings the
jurisdictional issue before us." Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U. S.
528, 533, n. 5 (1974). 14 We therefore view the question as an
open one.
As noted, the implicit view of these cases seems to have
been that once jurisdiction is established on the basis of a federal question, no further Eleventh Amendment inquiry is
necessary with respect to other claims raised in the case.
This is an erroneous view and contrary to the principles established in our Eleventh Amendment decisions. "The
Eleventh Amendment is an explicit limitation on the judicial
power of the United States." Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U. S.,
at 25. It deprives a federal court of power to decide certain
claims against States that otherwise would be within the
scope of Art. III's grant of jurisdiction. For example, if a
lawsuit against state officials under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 alleges
a constitutional claim, the federal court is barred from awarding damages against the state treasury even though the claim
See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 671 (1974) ("Having now had
an opportunity to more fully consider the Eleventh Amendment issue after
briefing and argument, we disapprove the Eleventh Amendment holdings
of [certain prior] cases to the extent that they are inconsistent with our
holding today").
14
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arises under the Constitution. See Quern v. Jordan, 440
U. S. 332 (1979). Similarly, if a§ 1983 action alleging a constitutional claim is brought directly against a State, the Eleventh Amendment bars a federal court from granting any relief on that claim. See Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U. S. 781
(1978) (per curiam). The Amendment thus is a specific constitutional bar against hearing even federal claims that otherwise would be within the jurisdiction of the federal courts. 15
This constitutional bar applies to pendent claims as well.
As noted above, pendent jurisdiction is a judge-made doctrine of expediency and efficiency derived from the general
Art. III language conferring power to hear all "cases" arising
under federal law or between diverse parties. See Mine
Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U. S. 715, 725 (1966). See also Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U. S. 528, 545 (1974) (terming pendent
jurisdiction "a doctrine of discretion"). The Eleventh
Amendment should not be construed to apply with less force
to this implied form of jurisdiction than it does to the explicitly granted power to hear federal claims. The history of the
adoption and development of the Amendment, see supra, at
6-9, confirms that it is an independent limitation on all exercises of Art. III power: "the entire judicial power granted by
the Constitution does not embrace authority to entertain suit
brought by private parties against a State without consent
given," Ex parte State of New York No.1, 256 U. S. 490, 497
(1921). If we were to hold otherwise, a federal court could
award damages against a State on the basis of a pendent
claim. Our decision in Edelman v. Jordan, supra, makes
clear that pendent jurisdiction does not permit such an evasion of the immunity guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment. We there held that "the District Court was correct in
See, e. g., Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322 (1934) ("[Allthough a case may arise under the Constitution and laws of the United
States, the judicial power does not extend to it if the suit is sought to be
prosecuted against a State, without her consent, by one of her own citizens"); Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U. S. 18, 25-26 (1933).
15
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exercising pendent jurisdiction over [plaintiffs'] statutory
claim," 415 U. S., at 653, n. 1, but then concluded that the
Eleventh Amendment barred an award of retroactive relief
on the basis of that pendent claim. I d., at 678.
In sum, contrary to the view implicit in decisions such as
Greene, supra, neither pendent jurisdiction nor any other
basis of jurisdiction may override the Eleventh Amendment. 16 A federal court must examine each claim in a case to
see if the court's jurisdiction over that claim is barred by the
Eleventh Amendment. We concluded above that a claim
that state officials violated state law in carrying out their official responsibilities is a claim against the State that is protected by the Eleventh Amendment. See supra, at 16. We
now hold that this principle applies as well to state-law claims
brought into federal court under pendent jurisdiction.

c
Respondents urge that application of the Eleventh Amendment to pendent state-law claims will have a disruptive effect
on litigation against state officials. They argue that the
"considerations of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to litigants" that underlie pendent jurisdiction, see
Gibbs, supra, at 726, counsel against a result that may cause
litigants to split causes of action between state and federal
courts. They also contend that the policy of avoiding unnecessary constitutional decisions will be contravened if plaintiffs choose to forgo their state-law claims and sue only in federal court or, alternatively, that the policy of Ex parte Young
will be hindered if plaintiffs choose to forgo their right to a
federal forum and bring all of their claims in state court.
It may be that applying the Eleventh Amendment to pendent claims results in federal claims being brought in state
court, or in bifurcation of claims. That is not uncommon in
this area. Under Edelman v. Jordan, supra, a suit against
16
See Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U. S., at 27 ("This is not less a suit against
the State because the bill is ancillary and supplemental.").
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state officials for retroactive monetary relief, whether based
on federal or state law, must be brought in state court.
Challenges to the validity of state tax systems under 42
U. S. C. § 1983 also must be brought in state court. Fair
Assessment in Real Estate Assn. v. McNary, 454 U. S. 100
(1981). Under the abstention doctrine, unclear issues of
state law commonly are split off and referred to the state
courts. 17
In any case, the answer to respondents' assertions is that
such considerations of policy cannot override the constitutional limitation on the authority of the federal judiciary to
adjudicate suits against a State. See Missouri v. Fiske, 290
U. S., at 25-26 ("Considerations of convenience open no avenue of escape from the [Amendment's] restriction"). 18 That a
17
Moreover, allowing claims against state officials based on state law to
be brought in the federal courts does not necessarily foster the policies of
"judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants," Mine Workers v.
Gibbs, 383 U. S. 715, 726 (1966), that underlie pendent jurisdiction. For
example, when a federal decision on state law is obtained, the federal
court's construction often is uncertain and ephemeral. In cases of ongoing
oversight of a state program that may extend over years, as in this case,
the federal intrusion is likely to be extensive. Duplication of effort, inconvenience, and uncertainty may well result. See, e. g., Burford v. Sun Oil
Co., 319 U. S. 315, 327 (1943) ("Delay, misunderstanding oflocallaw, and
needless conflict with the state policy, are the inevitable product of this
double [i. e., federal-state] system of review"). Waste and delay may also
result from abstention, which often is called for when state law is unclear,
see Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U. S. 360, 378-379 (1964) ("abstention operates
to require piecemeal adjudication in many courts, thereby delaying ultimate adjudication on the merits for an undue length of time") (citations
omitted), or from dismissals on the basis of comity, which has special force
when relief is sought on state-law grounds, see Gibbs, supra, at 726;
Hawks v. Hamill, 288 U. S. 52, 61 (1933).
18
Cf. Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U. S. 1, 14-15 (1976) (Although "considerations of judicial economy" would be served by permitting pendent-party
jurisdiction, "the addition of a completely new party would run counter to
the well-established principle that federal courts, as opposed to state trial
courts of general jurisdiction, are courts of limited jurisdiction marked out
by Congress").
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litigant's choice of forum is reduced "has long been understood to be a part of the tension inherent in our system of federalism." Employees v. Missouri Public Health & Welfare
Dept., 411 U. S. 279, 298 (1973) (MARSHALL, J., concurring
in result).

IV

Respondents contend that, regardless of the applicability
of the Eleventh Amendment to their state claims against petitioner state officials, the judgment may still be upheld
against petitioner county officials. We are not persuaded.
Even assuming that these officials are not immune from suit
challenging their actions under the MH/MR Act, 19 it is clear
that without the injunction against the state institutions and
officials in this case, an order entered on state-law grounds
19
We have held that the Eleventh Amendment does not apply to "counties and similar municipal corporations." Mt. Healthy City School District
v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274, 280 (1977); see Lincoln County v. Luning, 133
U. S. 529, 530 (1890). At the same time, we have applied the Amendment
to bar relief against county officials "in order to protect the state treasury
from liability that would have had essentially the same practical consequences as a judgment against the State itself." Lake Country Estates,
Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U. S. 391, 401 (1979). See,
e. g., Edelman v. Jordan, supra (Eleventh Amendment bars suit against
state and county officials for retroactive award of welfare benefits). The
Courts of Appeals are in general agreement that a suit against officials of a
county or other governmental entity is barred if the relief obtained runs
against the State. See, e. g., Moore v. Tangipahoa Parish School Board,
594 F. 2d 489, 493 (CA5 1979); Carey v. Quern, 588 F. 2d 230, 233-234
(CA71978); Incarcerated Men of Allen County Jail v. Fair, 507 F. 2d 281,
287-288 (CA6 1974); Harris v. Tooele County School District, 471 F. 2d
218, 220 (CAlO 1973). Given that the actions of the county commissioners
and mental-health administrators are dependent on funding from the State,
it may be that relief granted against these county officials, when exercising
their functions under the MH/MR Act, effectively runs against the State.
Cf. Farr v. Chesney, 441 F. Supp. 127, 130-132 (MD Pa. 1977) (holding
that Pennsylvania county commissioners, acting as members of the board
of the county office of mental health and retardation, may not be sued for
back pay under the Eleventh Amendment). We need not decide this issue
in light of our disposition above.
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necessarily would be limited. The relief substantially concerns Pennhurst, an arm of the State that is operated by
state officials. Moreover, funding for the county mental retardation programs comes almost entirely from the State, see
Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 50, §§4507-4509 (Purdon 1969 and Supp.
1982), and the costs of the masters have been borne by the
State, see 446 F. Supp., at 1327. Finally, the MH/MR Act
contemplates that the state and county officials will cooperate in operating mental retardation programs. See In re
Schmidt, 494 Pa. 86, 95-96, 429 A. 2d 631, 635-636 (1981).
In short, the present judgment could not be sustained on the
basis of the state-law obligations of petitioner county officials. Indeed, any relief granted against the county officials
on the basis of the state statute would be partial and incomplete at best. Such an ineffective enforcement of state law
would not appear to serve the purposes of efficiency, convenience, and fairness that must inform the exercise of pendent
jurisdiction.

v

The Court of Appeals upheld the judgment of the District
Court solely on the basis of Pennsylvania's MH/MR Act.
We hold that these federal courts lacked jurisdiction to enjoin
petitioner state institutions and state officials on the basis of
this state law. The District Court also rested its decision on
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. See supra, at 2. On remand the
Court of Appeals may consider to what extent, if any, the
judgment may be sustained on these bases. 2Q The court also
may consider whether relief may be granted to respondents
under the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of
Rights Act, 42 U. S. C. §§ 6011, 6063. The judgment of the
20
On the Fourteenth Amendment issue, the court should consider
Youngberg v. Romeo,- U. S . - (1982), a decision that was not available when the District Court issued its decision.
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Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether a federal court
may award injunctive relief against state officials on the basis
of state law.
I

This litigation, here for the second time, concerns the conditions of care at petitioner Pennhurst State School and Hospital, a Pennsylvania institution for the care of the mentally
retarded. See Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1 (1981). Although the litigation's history is set forth in detail in our prior opinion, see id., at 5-10,
it is necessary for purposes of this decision to review that
history.
This suit originally was brought in 1974 by respondent
Terri Lee Halderman, a resident of Pennhurst, in the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Ultimately, p~aintiffs included a class consisting of all persons
who were or might become residents of Pennhurst; the Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Citizens (P ARC); and the
United States. Defendants were Pennhurst and various
Pennhurst officials; the Pennsylvania Department of Public
Welfare and several of its officials; and various county commissioners, county mental retardation administrators, and
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other officials of five Pennsylvania counties surrounding
Pennhurst. Respondents' amended complaint charged that
conditions at Pennhurst violated the class members' rights
under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 87 Stat. 394, as amended, 29
U. S. C. § 794 (1976 ed. and Supp. V); the Developmentally
Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U. S. C.
§§ 6001-6081 (1976 ed. and Supp. V); and the Pennsylvania
Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966 (the
"MH/MR Act"), Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 50, §§ 4101-4704
(Purdon 1969 and Supp. 1982). Both damages and injunctive
relief were sought.
In 1977, following a lengthy trial, the District Court rendered its decision. 446 F. Supp. 1295 (1977). As noted in
our prior opinion, the court's findings were undisputed: "Conditions at Pennhurst are not only dangerous, with the residents often physically abused or drugged by staff members,
but also inadequate for the 'habilitation' of the retarded. Indeed, the court found that the physicial, intellectual, and
emotional skills of some residents have deteriorated at
Pennhurst." 451 U. S., at 7 (footnote omitted). The District Court held that these conditions violated each resident's
right to "minimally adequate habilitation" under the Due
Process Clause and the MH/MR Act, see 446 F. Supp., at
1314-1318, 1322-1323; "freedom from harm" under the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, see id., at 1320-1321;
and "nondiscriminatory habilitation" under the Equal Protection Clause and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, see id., at
1321-1324. Furthermore, the court found that "due process
demands that if a state undertakes the habilitation of a retarded person, it must do so in the least restrictive setting
consistent with that individual's habilitative needs." ld., at
1319 (emphasis added). After concluding that the large size
of Pennhurst prevented it from providing the necessary
habilitation in the least restrictive environment, the court ordered "that immediate steps be taken to remove the retarded
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residents from Pennhurst." I d., at 1325. Petitioners were
ordered "to provide suitable community living arrangements" for the class members, id., at 1326, and the court appointed a Special Master "with the power and duty to plan,
organize, direct, supervise and monitor the implementation
of this and any further Orders of the Court." Ibid. 1
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed most
of the District Court's judgment. 612 F. 2d 84 (1979) (en
bane). It agreed that respondents had a right to habilitation
in the least restrictive environment, but it grounded this
right solely on the "bill of rights" provision in the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42
U. S. C. § 6010. See 612 F. 2d, at 95-100, 104-107. The
court did not consider the constitutional issues or § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act, and while it affirmed the District Court's
holding that the MH/MR Act provides a right to adequate
habilitation, see id., at 100-103, the court did not decide
whether that state right encompassed a right to treatment in
the least restrictive setting.
On the question of remedy, the Court of Appeals affirmed
except as to the District Court's order that Pennhurst be
closed. The court observed that some patients would be unable to adjust to life outside an institution, and it determined
that none of the legal provisions relied on by plaintiffs precluded institutionalization. I d., at 114-115. It therefore remanded for "individual determinations by the [District
Court], or by the Special Master, as to the appropriateness of
an improved Pennhurst for each such patient," guided by "a
presumption in favor of placing individuals in [community living arrangements]." Ibid. 2
' The District Court determined that the individual defendants had acted
in good faith and therefore were immune from the damage claims. 446 F.
Supp, at 1324.
2
In a companion case, the 8ourt of Appeals affirmed the District
Court's denial of a motion to intervene for purposes of appeal by the
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On remand the District Court established detailed procedures for determining the proper residential placement for
each patient. A team consisting of the patient, his parents
or guardian, and his case manager must establish an individual habilitation plan providing for habilitation of the patient
in a designated community living arrangement. The plan is
subject to review by the Special Master. A second master,
called the Hearing Master, is available to conduct hearings,
upon request by the resident, his parents or his advocate, on
the question whether the services of Pennhurst would be
more beneficial to the resident than the community living arrangement provided in the resident's plan. The Hearing
Master then determines where the patient should reside,
subject to possible review by the District Court. See App.
123a-134a (Order of April 24, 1980). 3
This Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals,
finding that 42 U. S. C. § 6010 did not create any substantive
rights. 451 U. S. 1 (1981). We remanded the case to the
Court of Appeals to determine if the remedial order could be
supported on the basis of state law, the Constitution, or § 504
of the Rehabilitation Act. See id., at 31. 4 We also rePennhurst Parents-Staff Association, finding the denial harmless error.
See 612 F. 2d 131 (1979) (en bane). The Association subsequently was
granted leave to intervene and is a petitioner in this Court.
3
On July 1, 1981, Pennsylvania enacted an appropriations bill providing
that only $35,000 would be paid for the Masters' expenses for the fiscal
year July 1981 to June 1982. The District Court held Pennsylvania and its
Secretary of the Department of Public Welfare in contempt, and imposed a
fine of $10,000 per day. Pennsylvania paid the fines , and the contempt
was purged on January 8, 1982. On appeal the Court of Appeals affirmed
the contempt order. Halderman v. Pennhurst S.tate School & Hospital,
673 F. 2d 628 (1982) , cert. pending, No. 81-2363.
• Three Justices dissented from the Court's construction of the Act, but
concluded that the District Court should not have adopted the "far-reaching remedy" of appointing "a Special Master to decide which of the
Pennhurst inmates should remain and which should be moved to community-based facilities. . . . [T]he court should not have assumed the task of
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manded for consideration of whether any relief was available
under other provisions of the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act. See id., at 27-30 (discussing
42 U. S. C. §§ 6011(a), 6063(b)(5)).
On remand the Court of Appeals affirmed its prior judgment in its entirety. 673 F. 2d 647 (1982) (en bane). It determined that in a recent decision the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania had "spoken definitively" in holding that the
MH/MR Act required the State to adopt the "least restrictive
environment" approach for the care of the mentally retarded.
Id., at 651 (citing In re Schmidt, 494 Pa. 86, 429 A. 2d 631
(1981)). The Court of Appeals concluded that this state statute fully supported its prior judgment, and therefore did not
reach the remaining issues of federal law. It also rejected
petitioners' argument that the Eleventh Amendment barred
a federal court from considering this pendent state-law claim.
The court noted that the Amendment did not bar a federal
court from granting prospective injunctive relief against
state officials on the basis of federal claims, see 673 F. 2d, at
656 (citing Ex Parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908)), and concluded that the same result obtained with respect to a
pendent state-law claim. It reasoned that because Siler v.
Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 213 U. S. 175 (1909), an important case in the development of the doctrine of pendent
jurisdiction, also involved state officials, "there cannot be ...
an Eleventh Amendment exception to that rule." 673 F. 2d,
at 658. 5 Finally, the court rejected petitioners' argument
that it should have abstained from deciding the state-law
managing Pennhurst .... "

451 U. S., at 54

(WHITE

J., dissenting in

part).
5
The Court of Appeals also noted that "the United States is an intervening plaintiff ... against which even the state itself cannot successfully
plead the Eleventh Amendment as a bar to jurisdiction," and that "the
counties, even as juridical entities, do not fall within the coverage of the
Eleventh Amendment. Against those defendants even money damages
may be awarded." 673 F . 2d, at 656 (citation omitted).
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claim under principles of comity, see id., at 659--660, andrefused to consider petitioners' objections to the District
Court's use of a special master, see id., at 651 and n. 10.
Three judges dissented in part, arguing that under principles
of federalism and comity the establishment of a special master to supervise compliance was an abuse of discretion. See
id., at 662 (Seitz, C.J., joined by Hunter, J., dissenting in
part); ibid. (Garth, J., concurring in part and dissenting as to
relief). See also id., at 661 (Aldisert, J., concurring) (seriously questioning the propriety of the order appointing the
Special Master, but concluding that a retroactive reversal of
that order would be meaningless). 6
We granted certiorari,-- U. S. - - (1982), and now reverse and remand.
II
Petitioners raise three challenges to the judgment of the
Court of Appeals: (i) the Eleventh Amendment prohibited
the District Court from ordering state officials to conform
their conduct to state law; (ii) the doctrine of comity prohibited the District Court from issuing its injunctive relief; and
(iii) the District Court abused its discretion in appointing two
·masters to supervise the decisions of state officials in implementing state law. We need not reach the latter two issues,
for we find the Eleventh Amendment challenge dispositive.
A

Article III, § 2 of the Constitution provides that the federal
judicial power extends, inter alia, to controversies "between
a State and Citizens of another State." Relying on this language, this Court in 1793 assumed original jurisdiction over a
suit brought by a citizen of South Carolina against the State
of Georgia. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419 (1793). The
6
The Office of the Special Master was abolished in December 1982.
See App. 220a (Order of August 12, 1982). The Hearing Master remains
in operation.
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decision "created such a shock of surprise that the Eleventh
Amendment was at once proposed and adopted." Monaco v.
Mississippi, 292 U. S. 313, 325 (1934). The Amendment
provides:
"The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States
by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects
of any Foreign State."
The Amendment's language overruled the particular result
in Chisholm, but this Court has recognized that its greater
significance lies in its affirmation that the fundamental principle of sovereign immunity limits the grant of judicial authority in Art. III. Thus, in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1
(1890), the Court held that, despite the limited terms of the
Eleventh Amendment, a federal court could not entertain a
suit brought by a citizen against his own State. After reviewing the constitutional debates concerning the scope of
Art. III, the Court determined that federal jurisdiction over
suits against unconsenting States "was not contemplated by
the Constitution when establishing the judicial power of the
United States." Id., at 15. See Monaco v. Mississippi,
supra, at 322-323 (1934). 7 In short, the principle of saver7

See Employees v. Missouri Public Health Dep't, 411 U. S. 279,
291-292 (1973) (MARSHALL, J. , concurring in judgment) (The Eleventh
Amendment "clarif[ied] the intent of the Framers concerning the reach of
federal judicial power" and "restore[d] the original understanding" that
States could not be made unwilling defendants in federal court). See also
N evada v. Hall, 440 U. S. 410, 430-431 (1979) (BLACKMUN, J. , dissenting);
id., at 437 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting).
In light of the unequivocal holdings in Hans and Monaco as to the constitutional stature of the Eleventh Amendment's principle of sovereign immunity, the dissent's assertion that we have "invented a new principle of
sovereign immunity that is totally unsupported by the text of the Constitution or by any of our prior decisions," post, at 26, n. 3, is plainly unfounded.
Not
cited by the dissent support,{ such an extreme

S
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eign immunity is a constitutional limitation on the federal judicial power established in Art. III:
"That a State may not be sued :without its consent is a
fundamental rule of jurisprudence having so important a
bearing upon the construction of the Constitution of the
United States that it has become established by repeated
decisions of this court that the entire judicial power
granted by the Constitution does not embrace authority
to entertain a suit brought by private parties against a
State without consent given: not one brought by citizens
of another State, or by citizens or subjects of a foreign
State, because of the Eleventh Amendment; and not
even one brought by its own citizens, because of the fundamental rule of which the Amendment is but an exemplification." Ex parte State of New York No. 1, 256
U. S. 490, 497 (1921) (emphasis added). 8
A sovereign's immunity may be waived, and the Court consistently has held that a State may consent to suit against it
in federal court. See, e. g., Clark v. Barnard, 108 U. S.
436, 447 (1883). We have insisted, however, that the State's
consent be unequivocally expressed. See, e. g., Edelman v.
Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 673 (1974). Similarly, although Congress has power with respect to the rights protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment immunity, see Fitzpatrick v. Bitker, 427 U. S. 445
(1976), we have required an unequivocal expression of congressional intent to "overturn the constitutionally guarancharacterization.
8
The limitation deprives federal courts of any jurisdiction to entertain
such claims, and thus may be raised at any point in a proceeding. "The
Eleventh Amendment declares a policy and sets forth an explicit limitation
on federal judicial power of such compelling force that this Court will consider the issue arising under this Amendment .. . even though urged for
the first time in this Court." Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury,
323

u. s. 459, 467 (1945).

'
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teed immunity of the several States." Quern v. Jordan, 440
U. S. 332, 342 (1979) (holding that 42 U. S. C. § 1983 does not
override States' Eleventh Amendment immunity). Our reluctance to infer that a State's immunity from suit in the federal courts has been negated stems from recognition of the
vital role of the doctrine of sovereign immunity in our federal
system. A State's constitutional interest in immunity encompasses not merely whether it may be sued, but where it
may be sued. 9 As JUSTICE MARSHALL has noted well, "[b]ecause of the problems of federalism inherent in making one
sovereign appear against its will in the courts of the other, a
restriction upon the exercise of the federal judicial power has
long been considered to be appropriate in a case such as this."
Employees v. Missouri Public Health & Welfare Dep't, 411
U. S. 279, 294 (1973) (MARSHALL, J., concurring in result). 10
Accordingly, in deciding this case we must be guided by
"[t]he principles of federalism that inform Eleventh Amendment doctrine." Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678, 691 (1978).
9
For this reason, the Court consistently has held that a State's waiver
of sovereign immunity in its own courts is not a waiver of the Eleventh
Amendment immunity in the federal courts. See, e. g., Florida Department of Health v. Florida Nursing Home Assn. 450 U. S. 147, 150 (1981)
(per curiam). "[l]t is not consonant with our dual system for the federal
courts ... to read the consent to embrace federal as well as state courts .
. . . [A] clear declaration of the state's intention to submit its fiscal prob. lems to other courts than those of its own creation must be found." Great
Northern Life Insurance Co. v. Read, 322 U. S. 47, 54 (1944).
10
See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S., at 418-419 (States were "vitally interested" in whether they would be subject to suit in the federal courts, and
the debates about state immunity focused on the question of federal judicial
power). Cf. id., at 430-431 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting) (sovereign immunity is "a guarantee that is implied as an essential component of federalism"
and is "sufficiently fundamental to our federal structure to have implicit
constitutional dimension"); id., at 437 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting) ("[T]he
States that ratified the Eleventh Amendment thought that they were
putting an end to the possibility of individual States as unconsenting defendants in foreign jurisdictions").
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This Court's decisions thus establish that "an unconsenting
State is immune from suits brought in federal courts by her
own citizens as well as by citizens of another state." Employees, supra, at 280. There may be a question, however,
whether a particular suit in fact is a suit against a State. It
is clear, of course, that in the absence of consent a suit in
which the State or one of its agencies or departments is
named as the defendant is proscribed by the Eleventh
Amendment. See, e. g., Florida Department of Health v.
Florida Nursing Home Assn, 450 U. S. 147 (1981) (per
curiam); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U. S. 781 (1978) (per
curiam). This jurisdictional bar applies regardless of the nature of the relief sought. See, e. g., Missouri v. Fiske, 290
U. S. 18, 27 (1933) ("Expressly applying to suits in equity as
well as at law, the Amendment necessarily embraces demands for the enforcement of equitable rights and the prosecution of equitable remedies when these are asserted and
prosecuted by an individual against a State").
When the suit is brought only against state officials, a
question arises as to whether that suit is a suit against the
State itself. Although prior decisions of this Court have not
been entirely consistent on this issue, certain principles are
well established. The Eleventh Amendment bars a suit
against state officials when "the state is the real, substantial
party in interest." Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U. S. 459, 464 (1945). See, e. g., In re Ayers, 123
U. S. 443, 487-492 (1887); Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U. S.
711, 720-723, 727-728 (1882). Thus, "[t]he general rule is
that relief sought nominally against an officer is in fact
against the sovereign if the decree would operate against the
latter." Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U. S. 57, 58 (1963) (per
curiam). 11 And, as when the State itself is named as the deSee also Dugan v. Rank, 372 U. S. 609, 620 (1963) ("The general rule
is that a suit is against the sovereign if 'the judgment sought would expend
11

81-2101-0PINION
PENNHURST STATE SCHOOL & HOSP. v. HALDERMAN

11

fendant, a suit against state officials that is in fact a suit
against a State is barred regardless of whether it seeks damages or injunctive relief. See Cory v. White, 457 U. S. 85, I
91 (1982).
I
The Court has recognized an important exception to this
general rule: a suit challenging the constitutionality of a state
official's action is not one against the State. 12 This was the
holding in Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908), in which a
federal court enjoined the Attorney General of the State of
Minnesota from bringing suit to enforce a state statute that
allegedly violated the Fourteenth Amendment. This Court
held that the Eleventh Amendment did not prohibit issuance
of this injunction:
"The act to be enforced is alleged to be unconstitutional,
itself on the public treasury or domain, or interfere with the public administration,' or if the effect of the judgment would be 'to restrain the Government from acting, or to compel it to act.'") (citations omitted).
12
The Court also has held that sovereign immunity does not apply in a
suit against an official who allegedly acted entirely outside his official authority. See, e. g., Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337
U. S. 682, 702 (1949). This ultra vires exception is quite limited, governing only those situations in which a government official acts without any
official justification. See, e. g., Florida Department of State v. Treasure
Salvors, Inc.,-- U. S. - - , - - (1982) (opinion of STEVENS, J.) (test is
whether the official's conduct was undertaken "without any authority
whatever"); id., at-- (WHITE, J., concurring in judgment in part and
dissenting in part) (test is whether there was no "colorable basis for the
exercise of authority by state officials"). As the Larson Court explained,
"It is important to note that in such cases the relief can be granted, without
impleading the sovereign, only because of the officer's lack of delegated
power. A claim of error in the exercise of that power is therefore not sufficient.'' 337 U. S., at 689-Q90. This exception clearly is inapplicable in
this case. Even if petitioner officials violated state law in carrying out
some of their official duties, they unquestionably acted under colorable
state authority in operating Pennhurst and the State's system of care for
the mentally retarded. In short, these officials were not acting ultra vi·
res, but rather were "exercising the powers delegated to [them] by the
sovereign." Larson, supra, at 693 .

..

I
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and if it be so, the use of the name of the State to enforce
an unconstitutional act to the injury of complainants is a
proceeding without the authority of and one which does
not affect the State in its sovereign or governmental capacity. It is simply an illegal act upon the part of a state
official in attempting by the use of the name of the State
to enforce a legislative enactment which is void because
unconstitutional. If the act which the state Attorney
General seeks to enforce be a violation of the Federal
Constitution, the officer in proceeding under such enactment comes into conflict with the superior authority of
that Constitution, and he is in that case stripped of his
official or representative character and is subjected to
the consequences of his official conduct. The State has
no power to impart to him any immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States."
209 U.S., at 159--160.
The Court subsequently has made clear that, even where this
exception applies, the rule that a suit against state officials
constitutes a suit against the State continues to have force.
Thus, in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651 (1974), the Court
held that in a suit against state officials "a federal court's remedial power, consistent with the Eleventh Amendment, is
necessarily limited to prospective injunctive relief, and may
not include a retroactive award which requires the payment
of funds from the state treasury." ld., at 677 (citations
omitted).
III
With these principles in mind, we now turn to the question
whether the claim that petitioners violated state law in carrying out their official duties at Pennhurst is one against the
State and therefore barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
Respondents advance two principal arguments in support of
the judgment below. 13 First, they contend that under the
13

We reject respondents' additional contention that Pennsylvania has
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doctrine of Edelman v. Jordan, supra, the suit is not against
the State because the courts below ordered only prospective
injunctive relief. Second, they assert that the state-law
claim properly was decided under the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction. Respondents rely on decisions of this Court
awarding relief against state officials on the basis of a pendent state-law claim. See, e. g., Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 213 U. S. 175, 193 (1909).
A
We first address the contention that respondents' state-law
claim is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment because it
seeks only prospective relief as defined in Edelman v. Jordan, supra. The Court of Appeals held that if the judgment
waived its immunity from suit in federal court. At the time the suit was
filed, suits against Pennsylvania were permitted only where expressly authorized by the legislature, see, e. g., Freach v. Commonwealth, 471 Pa.
558, 370 A. 2d 1163 (1977), and respondents have not referred us to any
provision expressly waiving Pennsylvania's Eleventh Amendment immunity. The State now has a statute governing sovereign immunity, including an express preservation of its immunity from suit in federal court:
"Federal courts.-Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be construed
to waive the immunity of the Commonwealth from suit in Federal courts
guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States." 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8521(b) (1980).
We also do not agree with respondents that the presence of the United
States as a plaintiff in this case removes the Eleventh Amendment from
consideration. Although the Eleventh Amendment does not bar the
United States from suing a State in federal court, see, e. g., Monaco v.
Mississippi, 292 U. S. 313, 329 (1934), the United States' presence in the
case for any purpose does not eliminate the State's immunity for all purposes. For example, the fact that the federal court could award injunctive
relief to the United States on federal constitutional claims would not mean
that the court could order the State to pay damages to other plaintiffs. In
any case, we think it clear that the United States does not have standing to
assert the state-law claims of third-parties. For these reasons, the applicability of the Eleventh Amendment to respondents' state-law claim is
unaffected by the United States' participation in the case.
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below rested on federal law, it could be entered against petitioner state officials under the doctrine established in
Edelman and Young even though the prospective financial
burden was substantial and ongoing. 14 See 673 F. 2d, at 656.
The court assumed, and respondents assert, that this reasoning applies as well when the official acts in violation of state
law. This argument misconstrues the basis of the doctrine
established in Young and Edelman.
As discussed above, the injunction in Young was justified,
notwithstanding the obvious impact on the State itself, on the
view that sovereign immunity does not apply because an official who acts unconstitutionally is "stripped of his official or
representative character," Young, 209 U. S., at 160. This
rationale, of course, created the "well-recognized irony" that
an official's unconstitutional conduct constitutes state action
under the Fourteenth Amendment but not the Eleventh
Amendment. Florida Department of State v. Treasure
Salvors, Inc., - - U. S. - - , - - (1982) (opinion of STEVENS, J.). Nonetheless, the Young doctrine has been accepted as necessary to permit the federal courts to vindicate
federal rights and hold state officials responsible to "the supreme authority of the United States." Young, 209 U. S.,
at 160. As JUSTICE BRENNAN has observed, "Ex parte
Young was the culmination of efforts by this Court to harmonize the principles of the Eleventh Amendment with the
effective supremacy of rights and powers secured elsewhere
in the Constitution." Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U. S. 82, 106
(1971) (BRENNAN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
14
Although the District Court thus has jurisdiction to grant prospective
relief on the basis of federal law, the scope of that relief is constrained by
principles of comity and federalism. "Where, as here, the exercise of authority by state officials is attacked, federal courts must be constantly
mindful of the 'special delicacy of the adjustment to be preserved between
federal equitable power and State administration of its own law.'" Rizzo
v. Goode, 423 U. S. 362, 378 (1976) (quoting Stefanelli v. Minard, 342
u. s. 117, 120 (1951)).
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part). Our decisions repeatedly have emphasized that the
Young doctrine rests on the need to promote the vindication
of federal rights.
See, e. g., Quern v. Jordan, 440 U. S.
332, 337 (1979); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232, 237 (1974);
Georgia R. & Banking Co. v. Redwine, 342 U. S. 299, 304
(1952).
The Court also has recognized, however, that the Young
exception should not be applied where unnecessary to promote the supremacy of federal law. This is the significance
of Edelman v. Jordan, supra. We recognized that the prospective relief authorized by Young "has permitted the Civil
War Amendments to the Constitution to serve as a sword,
rather than merely a shield, for those whom they were designed to protect." 415 U. S., at 664. But we declined to
extend Young to encompass retroactive relief, for to do so
would effectively eliminate the constitutional immunity of the
States. Accordingly, we concluded that although the difference between permissible and impermissible relief "will not
in many instances be that between day and night," id., at
667, an award of retroactive relief necessarily" 'fall[s] afoul of
the Eleventh Amendment if that basic constitutional provision is to be conceived of as having any present force.'" I d.,
at 665 (quoting Rothstein v. Wyman, 467 F. 2d 226, 237 (CA2
1972) (McGowan, J., sitting by designation), cert. denied, 411
U. S. 921 (1973)). In sum, Edelman's distinction between
prospective and retroactive relief fulfills the underlying purpose of Ex parte Young while at the same time preserving to
an important degree the constitutional immunity of the
States.
This need to reconcile competing interests is wholly absent, however, when a plaintiff alleges that a state official has
violated state law. In such a case the entire basis for the
doctrine of Young and Edelman disappears. 15 A federal
6
' Contrary to the dissent's argument, there is no long line of cases
clearly holding that the Eleventh Amendment "does not bar suits against

.·
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court's grant of relief against state officials on the basis of
state law, whether prospective or retroactive, does not vindicate the supreme authority of federal law. On the contrary,
it is difficult to think of a greater intrusion on state sover;q~~
state officials for action ot authorizedby the St~le's own laws." Post, at
21 (STEVENS, J., diss nting). The constant theme of the Eleventh
Amendment cases of the
cited by the dissent was that there is a crucial difference between t e class of cases "where the suit is brought against
the officers of the State, as representing the State's action and liability,
thus making it, though not a party to the record, the real party against
which the judgment will so operate as to compel it to specifically perform
contracts," and the class "where as suit is brought against defendants who,
claiming to be officers of the State, and under the color of an unconstitutional statute, commit acts of wrong and injury to the rights and property
"'f
'-'"'"1(~,.
of the plaintiff acquired under a contract with the State." Pennoyer v.
1
McConnaughy, 140 U.S. 1, 10 (1891). Indeed, the de~c_:;is~io~n~s.Jj·~~...-~.--t-' I
.\
,
1
Sill
r0
the cases cited by the dissent turned on this distinctio . ee, e. g., Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 154 U. S. 362, 39 (1894); Poindexter
I
v. Greenhaw, 114 U.S. 270, 288 (1885); Cunningham v. Macon & Brunsr~i .1 c.~ Ct {I II& 1
wick R . Co., 109 U. S. 446, 452 (1883). The Court rarely was faced with
an Eleventh Amendment issue in a case that did not contain a constitu..,. C• t\a (
C..~ t t 1\
tiona! allegation.
.£L'
More significant than the rather bare support for this alleged "firmly es1
~ "lll Ct r 1
tablished" rule, post, at 18, is the fact that the "line of cases" central to the
dissent's argument since has been repudiated by this Court. The principal
c_e
~
case originally cited for the proposition that a suit alleging a tortious act by
an official is not barred by sovereign immunity is United States v. Lee, 106
U. S. 196 (1882). See Cunningham, supra, at 452; Larson, supra, at 717
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (Lee is the "starting point of this line of
cases"). In Larson, however, the Court construed Lee narrowly as representing only "a specific application of the constitutional exception to the
doctrine of sovereign immunity." 337 U. S., at 696. Larson expressly
rejected the view-urged by JUSTICE STEVENS' dissent here-that sovereign immunity is inapplicable whenever the officer allegedly committed a
tortious action. It held that the suit may go forward only if there is an
allegation of unconstitutional action or action that is ultra vires. I d., at
693; see supra, at n. 12. This construction, and the Larson rule, have
been reaffirmed repeatedly-and at this Term-by this Court. See, e. g.,
Block v. North Dakota,-- U. S. - - , - - (1983); Malone v. Bowdoin,
369 u. s. 643, 647-648 (1962).
The dissent recognizes that Larson is inconsistent with the cases on

lc..J....,, Tt
1ft(_
t f f4.1'J.
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eignty than when a federal court instructs state officials on
how to conform their conduct to state law. Such a result
conflicts directly with the principles of federalism that underlie the Eleventh Amendment. We conclude that Young and
Edelman are inapplicable in a suit against state officials on
the basis of state law.
B
The reasoning of our decisions on sovereign immunity thus
leads to the conclusion that a federal suit against state offiwhich the dissent relies, but asserts that "it is not necessary or appropriate
to read it back retroactively into the Eleventh Amendment." Post , at 20
(STEVENS, J., dissenting). This departure from stare decisis is hardly
consistent with the dissent's invocation of the doctrine elsewhere in the
opinion. This Court consistently has considered Larson to be a relevant
precedent in Eleventh Amendment cases, see, e. g., Georgia R. Co. v.
Redwine, 342 U. S. 299, 304, nn. 12, 15, and indeed just last Term eight
Justices expressly applied the two-part Larson test in resolving an Eleventh Amendment issue, Treasure Salvors , supra, - - U. S., at - (opinion of STEVENS, J.); id., at-- (WHITE, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). The plurality opinion in Treasure
Salvors-written by JUSTICE STEVEN&--found that Larson had "clarified"
the prior law established in both Eleventh Amendment and federal sovereign immunity cases, and noted expressly that Larson had "held that the
fact that an officer wrongfully withholds property belonging to another
does not necessarily establish that he is acting beyond the permissible
scope of his official capacity." !d., at--. The plurality then followed
the Larson test in announcing that "the Eleventh Amendment does not bar
an action against a state official that is based on a theory that the officer
acted beyond the scope of his statutory authority or, if within that authority, that such authority is unconstitutional." !d., at--.
Just as the Court's Eleventh Amendment cases have relied on federal
sovereign immunity principles, the Court's federal sovereign immunity
cases have relied on the principles established in Eleventh Amendment
cases. See, e. g., Philadelphia v. Stimson, 223 U. S. 605, 620 (1912).
This especially was true in Larson itself. See 337 U. S., at 687, n. 6, 691,
n. 11, 694, n. 15, 698, nn. 19-20, 699, n. 22. The dissent thus errs in suggesting that there are different principles for the federal sovereign immunity cases d Eleventh Amendment case~
.
t is clear that Larson-the
ourt's mos definitive statement on the rule sovereign immunity and its
exceptions- hould be followed here.
.
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cials on the basis of state law contravenes the Eleventh
Amendment. In reaching a contrary conclusion, the Court
of Appeals relied principally on a separate line of cases dealing with pendent jurisdiction. The crucial point for the
Court of Appeals was that this Court has granted relief
against state officials on the basis of a pendent state-law
claim. See 673 F. 2d, at 657-658. We therefore must consider the relationship between pendent jurisdiction and the
Eleventh Amendment.
This Court long has held generally that when a federal
court obtains jurisdiction over a federal claim, it may adjudicate other related claims over which the court otherwise
would not have jurisdiction. See, e. g., Mine Workers v.
Gibbs, 383 U. S. 715, 726 (1966); Osborn v. Bank of the
United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 819--823 (1824). The Court also
has held that a federal court may resolve a case solely on the
basis of a pendent state-law claim, see Siler, supra, at
192-193, and that in fact the court usually should do so in
order to avoid federal constitutional questions, see id., at
193; Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis,
J., concurring) ("[l]f a case can be decided on either of two
grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a
question of statutory construction or general law, the Court
will decide only the latter"). Under these principles, it
seems clear that, apart from the possible Eleventh Amendment bar, the Court of Appeals had a proper jurisdictional
basis on which to decide the claim based on Pennsylvania
law. 16 The question therefore is whether the Amendment
applies to this pendent state-law claim.
This does not necessarily mean that pendent jurisdiction properly was
exercised here. "Pendent jurisdiction over state claims [is] a doctrine of
discretion not to be routinely exercised without considering the advantages
of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to the litigants." Hagans
v. Lavine, 415 U. S. 528, 545 (1974). In particular, "[n]eedless decisions
of state law should be avoided both as a matter of comity and to promote
justice between the parties, by procuring for them a surer-footed reading
16

.-

,.
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As the Court of Appeals noted, in Siler and subsequent
cases concerning pendent jurisdiction relief was granted
against state officials on the basis of state-law claims that
were pendent to federal constitutional claims. The Court
never held directly that the rationale of Ex parte Young
should be extended to pendent state-law claims, but rather
appears to have assumed that the Eleventh Amendment simply does not apply to pendent claims. 17 This is illustrated by
Greene v. Louisville & Interurban R. Co., 244 U. S. 499
(1917), in which the plaintiff railroads sued state officials, alleging that certain tax assessments were excessive under the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Court first rejected the officials' argument under the Eleventh Amendment, finding that
Ex parte Young applied to all constitutional claims against
state officials, regardless of whether the state statute under
which the officials acted was constitutional or unconstitutional. See id., at 507. Having determined that the Eleventh Amendment did not deprive the federal court of jurisdiction over this constitutional question, the Court declared
that the court's jurisdiction extended "to the determination of
all questions involved in the case, including questions of state
law, irrespective of the disposition that may be made of the
of applicable law." Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U. S. 715, 726 (1966).
Because of our disposition of the case under the Eleventh Amendment, we
need not decide this important comity issue.
17
The dissent repeatedly refers to the "rule" in Siler as if the Court
there had held that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits on pendent state-law claims. It bears repeating that the Eleventh Amendment
was not raised by the State or addressed by this Court in that decision.
Rather, the rule in Siler is that, as a general matter, a federal court should
decide a case on state-law grounds where possible to avoid a federal cons 1 u 1ona question. Contrary to the dissent's repeated intimations, we
have not "repudiated" or "reject[ed]" this rule, post, at 10, 12, or held that
Siler is "no longer good law," post, at 8. Nothing in our decision is meant
to reject Siler, much less cast doubt on the desirability of applying its principles in cases where the federal court has jurisdiction to decide the statelaw issues.
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federal question, or whether it be found necessary to decide
it at all." I d., at 508. The case then was decided solely on
state-law grounds. Accord, Lousiville & Nashville R.R.
Co. v. Greene, 244 U. S. 522 (1917).
The implicit view thus seems to have been that once jurisdiction is established on the basis of any federal question, no
further Eleventh Amendment inquiry is necessary with respect to other claims raised in the case. We believe this
view is erroneous and contrary to the principles established
in our Eleventh Amendment decisions. "The Eleventh
Amendment is an explicit limitation on the judicial power of
the United States." Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U. S., at 25. It
deprives a federal court of power to decide certain claims
against States that otherwise would be within the scope of
Art. III's grant of jurisdiction. For example, if a lawsuit
against state officials under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 alleges a constitutional claim, the federal court is barred from awarding
damages against the state treasury even though the claim
arises under the Constitution. See Quern v. Jordan, 440
U. S. 332 (1979). Similarly, if a§ 1983 action alleging a constitutional claim is brought directly against a State, the Eleventh Amendment bars a federal court from granting any relief on that claim. See Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U. S. 781
(1978) (per curiam). The Amendment thus is a specific constitutional bar against hearing evenfederal claims that otherwise would be within the jurisdiction of the federal courts. 18
This constitutional bar applies to pendent claims as well.
A federal court's power over a pendent claim necessarily derives from Art. III, see Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U. S. 1, 9
(1976), and the Eleventh Amendment is an independent limitation on all exercises of Art. III power. See supra, at 7-8.
8
' See, e. g., Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322 (1934) ("[A]lthough a case may arise under the Constitution and laws of the United
States, the judicial power does not extend to it if the suit is sought to be
prosecuted against a State, without her cons~nt, by one of her own citizens"); Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U. S. 18, 25-26 (1933).
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If we were to hold otherwise, a federal court could award
damages against a State on the basis of a pendent claim.
Our decision in Edelman v. Jordan, supra, makes clear that
pendent jurisdiction does not permit such an evasion of the
immunity guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment. We
there held that "the District Court was correct in exercising
pendent jurisdiction over [plaintiffs'] statutory claim," 415
U. S., at 653, n. 1, but then concluded that the Eleventh
Amendment barred an award of retroactive relief on the
basis of that pendent claim. I d., at 678.
In sum, contrary to the analysis implicit in decisions such
as Greene, supra, neither pendent jurisdiction nor any other
basis of jurisdiction may override the Eleventh Amendment. 19 A federal court must examine each claim in a case to
see if the court's jurisdiction over that claim is barred by the
Eleventh Amendment. We concluded above that a claim
that state officials violated state law in carrying out their official responsibilities is a claim against the State that is protected by the Eleventh Amendment. See supra, at 16. We
now hold that this principle applies as well to state-law claims
brought into federal court under pendent jurisdiction. This
issue has not previously been confronted directly, and we
therefore are not bound by prior decisions assuming a contrary conclusion. "[W]hen questions of jurisdiction have
been passed on in prior decisions sub silentio, this Court has
never considered itself bound when a subsequent case finally
brings the jurisdictional issue before us." Hagans v.
Lavine, 415 U. S. 528, 533, n. 5 (1974). 20

19

See Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U. S., at 27 ("This is not less a suit against
the State because the bill is ancillary and supplemental.").
20
See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 671 (1974) ("Having now had
an opportunity to more fully consider the Eleventh Amendment issue after
briefing and argument, we disapprove the Eleventh Amendment holdings
of [certain prior] cases to the extent that they are inconsistent with our
holding today").
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c
Respondents urge that application of the Eleventh Amendment to pendent state-law claims will have a disruptive effect
on litigation against state officials. They argue that the
"considerations of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to litigants" that underlie pendent jurisdiction, see
Gibbs, supra, at 726, counsel against a result that may cause
litigants to split causes of action between state and federal
courts. They also contend that the policy of avoiding unnecessary constitutional decisions will be contravened if plaintiffs choose to forgo their state-law claims and sue only in federal court or, alternatively, that the policy of Ex parte Young
will be hindered if plaintiffs choose to forgo their right to a
federal forum and bring all of their claims in state court.
We agree that, depending on the circumstances of the case,
these considerations of policy may be important, 21 but they
may not override the constitutional limitations on the authority of the federal judiciary to adjudicate suits against a State.
See Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U. S., at 25-26 ("Considerations
of convenience open no avenue of escape from the [Amendment's] restriction"). 22 In a suit brought by private litigants
against state officials, these constitutional limitations do not
preclude a federal court from granting prospective relief to
vindicate federal law. But the Eleventh Amendment de21

Petitioners contend that in this case these policy considerations are
outweighed by considerations of comity, arguing that the Court of Appeals
"has authorized a severe intrusion on the right of state officials to run their
own programs, basing that intrusion on nothing more than its view of state
law." Brief for Petitioners 9. In light of our disposition of this case, we
need not balance these competing considerations.
22
Cf. Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U. S. 1, 14-15 (1976) (Although "considerations of judicial economy" would be served by permitting pendent-party
jurisdiction, "the addition of a completely new party would run counter to
the well-established principle that federal courts, as opposed to state trial
courts of general jurisdiction, are courts of limited jurisdiction marked out
by Congress")
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prives federal courts of power to consider other claims raised
against the State or its officials. Any inconvenience in
choice of forum that may be caused to litigants who wish to
raise both federal and state claims is a necessary consequence
of this limitation on federal judicial power. 23 The constitutional principle of sovereign immunity, embodied in the Eleventh Amendment, demands that claims against state officials
on the basis of state law be resolved in state courts. 24
23
This limitation on federal judicial power imposes the same inconvenience on a plaintiff who has certain federal claims that may not be raised
in federal court. Under Edelman v. Jordan, supra, a plaintiff with a
claim for monetary relief against a State on the basis of federal law must
resort to state court. If he wishes to press a related claim for prospective
relief, he must forgo the damages claim, or split his related causes of action
between federal and state courts, or take the entire case to state court.
As JUSTICE MARSHALL has observed, the fact that some federal rights
may have to be enforced in a state forum is "a part of the tension inherent
in our system of federalism." Employees v. Missouri Public Health &
Welfare Dept., 411 U. S. 279, 298 (1973) (MARSHALL, J., concurring in
result).
24
The dissent's distaste for the Eleventh Amendment and its principle of
sovereign immunity is the underlying theme of the dissenting opinion.
See post, at 2&--27; cf. id., at 10-11 (quoting the "illuminating" analysis in
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419, 471 (1793) (opinion of Jay, C. J.)). Indeed, the dissent's negative view of sovereign immunity leads it to an apparent willingness to overrule the decisions of this Court that have emphasized the importance and continuing vitality of the Eleventh Amendment,
id., at 26, in favor of JUSTICE BRENNAN's dissenting view in Employees v.
Missouri Public Health Dept., 411 U. S. 279 (1973). But that view was
expressly rejected both by Justice Douglas' opinion for the Court, see id.,
at 280, n. 1, and JUSTICE MARSHALL's opinion concurring in the judgment,
see id., at 292, n. 8.
Thus, the dissent's argument that sovereign immunity "'undoubtedly
runs counter to modern democratic notions of the moral responsibility of
the State,"' post, at 27 (quoting Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322
U. S. 47, 59 (1944) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)), is a view of the Eleventh
Amendment that has never been accepted by this Court. Moreover, the
argument substantially misses the point with respect to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. As JUSTICE MARSHALL has observed, the

(
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Respondents contend that, regardless of the applicability
of the Eleventh Amendment to their state claims against petitioner state officials, the judgment may still be upheld
against petitioner county officials. We are not persuaded.
Even assuming that these officials are not immune from suit
challenging their actions under the MH/MR Act, 26 it is clear
that without the injunction against the state institutions and
Eleventh Amendment's restriction on the federal judicial power is based in
large part on the "the problems of federalism inherent in making one sovereign appear against its will in the courts of the other." Employees, supra,
at 294 (MARSHALL, J., concurring in the result).
26
We have held that the Eleventh Amendment does not apply to "counties and similar municipal corporations." Mt. Healthy City School District
v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274, 280 (1977); see Lincoln County v. Luning, 133
U. S. 529, 530 (1890). At the same time, we have applied the Amendment
to bar relief against county officials "in order to protect the state treasury
from liability that would have had essentially the same practical consequences as a judgment against the State itself." Lake Country Estates,
Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U. S. 391, 401 (1979). See,
e. g., Edelman v. Jordan, supra (Eleventh Amendment bars suit against
state and county officials for retroactive award of welfare benefits). The
Courts of Appeals are in general agreement that a suit against officials of a
county or other governmental entity is barred if the relief obtained runs
against the State. See, e. g., Moore v. Tangipahoa Parish School Board,
594 F. 2d 489, 493 (CA5 1979); Carey v. Quern, 588 F. 2d 230, 233-234
(CA71978); Incarcerated Men of Allen County Jail v. Fair, 507 F. 2d 281,
287-288 (CA6 1974); Harris v. Tooele County School District, 471 F. 2d
218, 220 (CAlO 1973). Given that the actions of the county commissioners
and mental health adminstrators are dependent on funding from the State,
it may be that relief granted against these county officials, when exercising
their functions under the MH/MR Act, effectively runs against the State.
Cf. Farr v. Chesney, 441 F. Supp. 127, 130-132 (MD Pa. 1977) (holding
that Pennsylvania county commissioners, acting as members of the board
of the county office of mental health and retardation, may not be sued for
back pay under the Eleventh Amendment). We need not decide this issue
in light of our disposition above.
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officials in this case, an order entered on state-law grounds
necessarily would be limited. The relief substantially concerns Pennhurst, an arm of the State that is operated by
state officials. Moreover, funding for the county mental retardation programs comes almost entirely from the State, see
Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 50, §§ 4507-4509 (Purdon 1969 and Supp.
1982), and the costs of the masters have been borne by the
State, see 446 F. Supp., at 1327. Finally, the MH/MR Act
contemplates that the state and county officials will cooperate
in operating mental retardation programs. See In re
Schmidt, 494 Pa. 86, 95-96, 429 A. 2d 631, 635-636 (1981).
In short, the present judgment could not be sustained on the
basis of the state-law obligations of petitioner county officials. Indeed, any relief granted against the county officials
on the basis of the state statute would be partial and incomplete at best. Such an ineffective enforcement of state law
would not appear to serve the purposes of efficiency, convenience, and fairness that must inform the exercise of pendent
jurisdiction.

v

The Court of Appeals upheld the judgment of the District
Court solely on the basis of Pennsylvania's MH/MR Act.
We hold that the courts lacked jurisdiction to enjoin petitioner state institutions and state officials on the basis of this
state law. The District Court also rested its decision on the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. See supra, at 2. On remand the
Court of Appeals may consider to what extent, if any, the
judgment may be sustained on these bases. 26 The court also
may consider whether relief may be granted to respondents
under the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of
On the Fourteenth Amendment issue, the court should consider
Youngberg v. Romeo,- U. S . - (1982), a decision that was not available when the District Court issued its decision.
26
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Rights Act, 42 U. S. C. §§ 6011, 6063. The judgment of the
Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 81-2101

PENNHURST STATE SCHOOL & HOSPITAL, ET AL.,
PETITIONERS v. TERRI LEE HALDERMAN, ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
[June-, 1983]

JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether a federal court
may award injunctive relief against state officials on the basis
of state law.
I
This litigation, here for the second time, concerns the conditions of care at petitioner Pennhurst State School and Hospital, a Pennsylvania institution for the care of the mentally
retarded. See Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1 (1981). Although the litigation's history is set forth in detail in our prior opinion, see id., at 5-10,
it is necessary for purposes of this decision to review that
history.
This suit originally was brought in 1974 by respondent
Terri Lee Halderman, a resident of Pennhurst, in the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Ultimately, plaintiffs included a class consisting of all persons
who were or might become residents of Pennhurst; the Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Citizens (P ARC); and the
United States. Defendants were Pennhurst and various
Pennhurst officials; the Pennsylvania Department of Public
Welfare and several of its officials; and various county commissioners, county mental retardation administrators, and
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other officials of five Pennsylvania counties surrounding
Pennhurst. Respondents' amended complaint charged that
conditions at Pennhurst violated the class members' rights
under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 87 Stat. 394, as amended, 29
U. S. C. § 794 (1976 ed. and Supp. V); the Developmentally
Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U. S. C.
§§ 6001-6081 (1976 ed. and Supp. V); and the Pennsylvania
Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966 (the
"MH/MR Act"), Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 50, §§ 4101-4704
(Purdon 1969 and Supp. 1982). Both damages and injunctive
relief were sought.
In 1977, following a lengthy trial, the District Court rendered its decision. 446 F. Supp. 1295 (1977). As noted in
our prior opinion, the court's findings were undisputed: "Conditions at Pennhurst are not only dangerous, with the residents often physically abused or drugged by staff members,
but also inadequate for the 'habilitation' of the retarded. Indeed, the court found that the physicial, intellectual, and
emotional skills of some residents have deteriorated at
Pennhurst." 451 U. S., at 7 (footnote omitted). The District Court held that these conditions violated each resident's
right to "minimally adequate habilitation" under the Due
Process Clause and the MH/MR Act, see 446 F. Supp., at
1314-1318, 1322-1323; "freedom from harm" under the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, see id., at 1320-1321;
and "nondiscriminatory habilitation" under the Equal Protection Clause and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, see id., at
1321-1324. Furthermore, the court found that "due process
demands that if a state undertakes the habilitation of a retarded person, it must do so in the least restrictive setting
consistent with that individual's habilitative needs." Id., at
1319 (emphasis added). After concluding that the large size
of Pennhurst prevented it from providing the necessary
habilitation in the least restrictive environment, the court ordered "that immediate steps be taken to remove the retarded
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residents from Pennhurst." I d., at 1325. Petitioners were
ordered "to provide suitable community living arrangements" for the class members, id., at 1326, and the court appointed a Special Master "with the power and duty to plan,
organize, direct, supervise and monitor the implementation
of this and any further Orders of the Court." Ibid. 1
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed most
of the District Court's judgment. 612 F. 2d 84 (1979) (en
bane). It agreed that respondents had a right to habilitation
in the least restrictive environment, but it grounded this
right solely on the "bill of rights" provision in the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42
U. S. C. § 6010. See 612 F. 2d, at 95--100, 104-107. The
court did not consider the constitutional issues or § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act, and while it affirmed the District Court's
holding that the MH/MR Act provides a right to adequate
habilitation, see id., at 100-103, the court did not decide
whether that state right encompassed a right to treatment in
the least restrictive setting.
On the question of remedy, the Court of Appeals affirmed
except as to the District Court's order that Pennhurst be
closed. The court observed that some patients would be unable to adjust to life outside an institution, and it determined
that none of the legal provisions relied on by plaintiffs precluded institutionalization. !d., at 114-115. It therefore remanded for "individual determinations by the [District
Court], or by the Special Master, as to the appropriateness of
an improved Pennhurst for each such patient," guided by "a
presumption in favor of placing individuals in [community living arrangements]." Ibid. 2
1
The District Court determined that the individual defendants had acted
in good faith and therefore were immune from the damage claims. 446 F.
Supp, at 1324.
2
In a companion case, the 8ourt of Appeals affirmed the District
Court's denial of a motion to intervene for purposes of appeal . by the
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On remand the District Court established detailed procedures for determining the proper residential placement for
each patient. A team consisting of the patient, his parents
or guardian, and his case manager must establish an individual habilitation plan providing for habilitation of the patient
in a designated community living arrangement. The plan is
subject to review by the Special Master. A second master,
called the Hearing Master, is available to conduct hearings,
upon request by the resident, his parents or his advocate, on
the question whether the services of Pennhurst would be
more beneficial to the resident than the community living arrangement provided in the resident's plan. The Hearing
Master then determines where the patient should reside,
subject to possible review by the District Court. See App.
123a-134a (Order of April 24, 1980). 3
This Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals,
finding that 42 U. S. C. § 6010 did not create any substantive
rights. 451 U. S. 1 (1981). We remanded the case to the
Court of Appeals to determine if the remedial order could be
supported on the basis of state law, the Constitution, or § 504
of the Rehabilitation Act. See id., at 31. 4 We also rePennhurst Parents-Staff Association, finding the denial harmless error.
See 612 F. 2d 131 (1979) (en bane). The Association subsequently was
granted leave to intervene and is a petitioner in this Court.
3
On July 1, 1981, Pennsylvania enacted an appropriations bill providing
that only $35,000 would be paid for the Masters' expenses for the fiscal
year July 1981 to June 1982. The District Court held Pennsylvania and its
Secretary of the Department of Public Welfare in contempt, and imposed a
fine of $10,000 per day. Pennsylvania paid the fines, and the contempt
was purged on January 8, 1982. On appeal the Court of Appeals affirmed
the contempt order. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hospital,
673 F. 2d 628 (1982), cert. pending, No. 81-2363.
'Three Justices dissented from the Court's construction of the Act, but
concluded that the District Court should not have adopted the "far-reaching remedy" of appointing "a Special Master to decide which of the
Pennhurst inmates should remain and which should be moved to community-based facilities. . . . [T]he court should not have assumed the task of
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manded for consideration of whether any relief was available
under other provisions of the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act. See id., at 27-30 (discussing
42 U. S. C. §§ 6011(a), 6063(b)(5)).
On remand the Court of Appeals affirmed its prior judgment in its entirety. 673 F. 2d 647 (1982) (en bane). It determined that in a recent decision the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania had "spoken definitively" in holding that the
MH/MR Act required the State to adopt the "least restrictive
environment" approach for the care of the mentally retarded.
Id., at 651 (citing In re Schmidt, 494 Pa. 86, 429 A. 2d 631
(1981)). The Court of Appeals concluded that this state statute fully supported its prior judgment, and therefore did not
reach the remaining issues of federal law. It also rejected
petitioners' argument that the Eleventh Amendment barred
a federal court from considering this pendent state-law claim.
The court noted that the Amendment did not bar a federal
court from granting prospective injunctive relief against
state officials on the basis of federal claims, see 673 F. 2d, at
656 (citing Ex Parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908)), and concluded that the same result obtained with respect to a
pendent state-law claim. It reasoned that because Siler v.
Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 213 U. S. 175 (1909), an important case in the development of the doctrine of pendent
jurisdiction, also involved state officials, "there cannot be . . .
an Eleventh Amendment exception to that rule." 673 F. 2d,
at 658. 5 Finally, the court rejected petitioners' argument
that it should have abstained from deciding the state-law
managing Pennhurst . ... " 451 U. S., at 54 (WHITE J ., dissenting iri
part).
•The Court of Appeals also noted that "the United States is an intervening plaintiff .. . against which even the state itself cannot successfully
plead the Eleventh Amendment as a bar to jurisdiction," and that "the
counties, even as juridical entities, do not fall within the coverage of the
Eleventh Amendment. Against those defendants even money damages
may be awarded." 673 F. 2d, at 656 (citation omitted).
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claim under principles of comity, see id., at 659-660, andrefused to consider petitioners' objections to the District
Court's use of a special master, see id., at 651 and n. 10.
Three judges dissented in part, arguing that under principles
of federalism and comity the establishment of a special master to supervise compliance was an abuse of discretion. See
id., at 662 (Seitz, C.J., joined by Hunter, J., dissenting in
part); ibid. (Garth, J., concurring in part and dissenting as to
relief). See also id., at 661 (Aldisert, J., concurring) (seriously questioning the propriety of the order appointhg the
Special Master, but concluding that a retroactive reversal of
that order would be meaningless). 6
We granted certiorari,-- U. S. - - (1982), and now reverse and remand.
II
Petitioners raise three challenges to the judgment of the
Court of Appeals: (i) the Eleventh Amendment prohibited
the District Court from ordering state officials to conform
. their conduct to state law; (ii) the doctrine of comity prohibited the District Court from issuing its injunctive relief; and
(iii) the District Court abused its discretion in appointing two
masters to supervise the decisions of state officials in implementing state law. We need not reach the latter two issues,
for we find the Eleventh Amendment challenge dispositive.
A
Article III, § 2 of the Constitution provides that the federal
judicial power extends, inter alia, to controversies "between
a State and Citizens of another State." Relying on this language, this Court in 1793 assumed original jurisdiction over a
suit brought by a citizen of South Carolina against the State
of Georgia. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419 (1793). The
6
The Office of the Special Master was abolished in December 1982.
See App. 220a (Order of August 12, 1982). The Hearing Master remains
in operation.

.-

,.

81-2101-0PINION
PENNHURST STATE SCHOOL & HOSP. v. HALDERMAN

7

decision "created such a shock of surprise that the Eleventh
Amendment was at once proposed and adopted." Monaco v.
Mississippi, 292 U. S. 313, 325 (1934). The Amendment
provides:
"The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States
by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects
of any Foreign State."
The Amendment's language overruled the particular result
in Chisholm, but this Court has recognized that its greater
significance lies in its affirmation that the fundamental principle of sovereign immunity limits the grant of judicial authority in Art. III. Thus, in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1
(1890), the Court held that, despite the limited terms of the
Eleventh Amendment, a federal court could not entertain a
suit brought by a citizen against his own State. After reviewing the constitutional debates concerning the scope of
Art. III, the Court determined that federal jurisdiction over
suits against unconsenting States "was not contemplated by
the Constitution when establishing the judicial power of the
United States." Id., at 15. See Monaco v. Mississippi,
supra, at 322-323 (1934). 7 In short, the principle of sover7

See Employees v. Missouri Public Health Dep't, 411 U. S. 279,
291-292 (1973) (MARSHALL, J. , concurring in judgment) (The Eleventh
Amendment "clariftied] the intent of the Framers concerning the reach of
federal judicial power" and "restore[d] the original understanding" that
States could not be made unwilling defendants in federal court). See also
Nevada v. Hall, 440 U. S. 410, 430-431 (1979) (BLACKMON, J., dissenting);
id., at 437 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting).
In light of the unequivocal holdings in Hans and Monaco as to the constitutional stature of the Eleventh Amendment's principle of sovereign immunity, the dissent's assertion that we have "invented a new principle of
sovereign immunity that is totally unsupported by the text of the Constitution or by any of our prior decisions," post, at 26, n. 3, is plainly unfounded.
Not one case cited by the dissent support!\ such an extreme

.-

.$

,.
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eign immunity is a constitutional limitation on the federal judicial power established in Art. III:
"That a State may not be sued without its consent is a
fundamental rule of jurisprudence having so important a
bearing upon the construction of the Constitution of the
United States that it has become established by repeated
decisions of this court that the entire judicial power
granted by the Constitution does not embrace authority
to entertain a suit brought by private parties against a
State without consent given: not one brought by citizens
of another State, or by citizens or subjects of a foreign
State, because of the Eleventh Amendment; and not
even one brought by its own citizens, because of the fundamental rule of which the Amendment is but an exemplification." Ex parte State of New York No. 1, 256
U. S. 490, 497 (1921) (emphasis added). 8
A sovereign's immunity may be waived, and the Court consistently has held that a State may consent to suit against it
in federal court. See, e. g., Clark v. Barnard, 108 U. S.
436, 447 (1883). We have insisted, however, that the State's
consent be unequivocally expressed. See, e. g., Edelman v.
Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 673 (1974). Similarly, although Congress has power with respect to the rights protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment immunity, see Fitzpatrick v. Bitker, 427 U. S. 445
(1976), we have required an unequivocal expression of congressional intent to "overturn the constitutionally guarancharacterization.
8
The limitation deprives federal courts of any jurisdiction to entertain
such claims, and thus may be raised at any point in a proceeding. "The
Eleventh Amendment declares a policy and sets forth an explicit limitation
on federal judicial power of such compelling force that this Court will consider the issue arising under this Amendment . .. even though urged for
the first time in this Court." Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury,
323

u. s. 459, 467 (1945).
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teed immunity of the several States." Quern v. Jordan, 440
U. S. 332, 342 (1979) (holding that 42 U. S. C. § 1983 does not
override States' Eleventh Amendment immunity). Our reluctance to infer that a State's immunity from suit in the federal courts has been negated stems from recognition of the
vital role of the doctrine of sovereign immunity in our federal
system. A State's constitutional interest in immunity encompasses not merely whether it may be sued, but where it
may be sued. 9 As JUSTICE MARSHALL has noted well, "[b]ecause of the problems of federalism inherent in making one
sovereign appear against its will in the courts of the other, a
restriction upon the exercise of the federal judicial power has
long been considered to be appropriate in a case such as this."
Employees v. Missouri Public Health & Welfare Dep't, 411
U. S. 279, 294 (1973) (MARSHALL, J., concurring in result). 10
Accordingly, in deciding this case we must be guided by
"[t]he principles of federalism that inform Eleventh Amendment doctrine." Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678, 691 (1978).
For this reason, the Court consistently has held that a State's waiver
of sovereign immunity in its own courts is not a waiver of the Eleventh
Amendment immunity in the federal courts. See, e. g., Florida Department of Health v. Florida Nursing Home Assn. 450 U. S. 147, 150 (1981)
(per curiam). "[l]t is not consonant with our dual system for the federal
courts ... to read the consent to embrace federal as well as state courts .
. . . [A] clear declaration of the state's intention to submit its fiscal problems to other courts than those of its own creation must be found." Great
Northern Life Insurance Co. v. Read, 322 U. S. 47, 54 (1944).
10
See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U. S., at 418-419 (States were "vitally interested" in whether they would be subject to suit in the federal courts, and
the debates about state immunity focused on the question of federal judicial
power). Cf. id., at 430-431 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting) (sovereign immunity is "a guarantee that is implied as an essential component of federalism"
and is "sufficiently fundamental to our federal structure to have implicit
constitutional dimension"); id., at 437 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting) ("[T]he
States that ratified the Eleventh Amendment thought that they were
putting an end to the possibility of individual States as unconsenting defendants in foreign jurisdictions") .
9

.•
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B

This Court's decisions thus establish that "an unconsenting
State is immune from suits brought in federal courts by her
own citizens as well as by citizens of another state." Employees, supra, at 280. There may be a question, however,
whether a particular suit in fact is a suit against a State. It
is clear, of course, that in the absence of consent a suit in
which the State or one of its agencies or departments is
named as the defendant is proscribed by the Eleventh
Amendment. See, e. g., Florida Department of Health v.
Florida Nursing Home Assn, 450 U. S. 147 (1981) (per
curiam); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U. S. 781 (1978) (per
curiam). This jurisdictional bar applies regardless of the nature of the relief sought. See, e. g., Missouri v. Fiske, 290
U. S. 18, 27 (1933) ("Expressly applying to suits in equity as
well as at law, the Amendment necessarily embraces demands for the enforcement of equitable rights and the prosecution of equitable remedies when these are asserted and
prosecuted by an individual against a State").
When the suit is brought only against state officials, a
question arises as to whether that suit is a suit against the
State itself. Although prior decisions of this Court have not
been entirely consistent on this issue, certain principles are
well established. The Eleventh Amendment bars a suit
against state officials when "the state is the real, substantial
party in interest." Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U. S. 459, 464 (1945). See, e. g., In re Ayers, 123
U. S. 443, 487-492 (1887); Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U. S.
711, 720-723, 727-728 (1882). Thus, "[t]he general rule is
that relief sought nominally against an officer is in fact
against the sovereign if the decree would operate against the
latter." Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U. S. 57, 58 (1963) (per
curiam). 11 And, as when the State itself is named as the deSee also Dugan v. Rank, 372 U. S. 609, 620 (1963) ("The general rule
is that a suit is against the sovereign if 'the judgment sought would expend
11
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fendant, a suit against state officials that is in fact a suit
against a State is barred regardless of whether it seeks damages or injunctive relief. See Cory v. White, 457 U. S. 85,
91 (1982).
The Court has recognized an important exception to this
general rule: a suit challenging the constitutionality of a state
official's action is not one against the State. 12 This was the
holding in Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908), in which a
federal court enjoined the Attorney General of the State of
Minnesota from bringing suit to enforce a state statute that
allegedly violated the Fourteenth Amendment. This Court
held that the Eleventh Amendment did not prohibit issuance
of this injunction:
"The act to be enforced is alleged to be unconstitutional,
itself on the public treasury or domain, or interfere with the public administration,' or if the effect of the judgment would be 'to restrain the Government from acting, or to compel it to act.'") (citations omitted).
12
The Court also has held that sovereign immunity does not apply in a
suit against an official who allegedly acted entirely outside his official authority. See, e. g., Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337
U. S. 682, 702 (1949). This ultra vires exception is quite limited, governing only those situations in which a government official acts without any
official justification. See, e. g., Florida Department of State v. Treasure
Salvors, Inc.,-- U.S.--,-- (1982) (opinion of STEVENS, J.) (test is
whether the official's conduct was undertaken "without any authority
whatever"); id., at-- (WHITE, J., concurring in judgment in part and
dissenting in part) (test is whether there was no "colorable basis for the
exercise of authority by state officials"). As the Larson Court explained,
"It is important to note that in such cases the relief can be granted, without
impleading the sovereign, only because of the officer's lack of delegated
power. A claim of error in the exercise of that power is therefore not sufficient.'' 337 U. S., at 689-690. This exception clearly is inapplicable in
this case. Even if petitioner officials violated state law in carrying out
some of their official duties, they unquestionably acted under colorable
state authority in operating Pennhurst and the State's system of care for
the mentally retarded. In short, these officials were not acting ultra vires, but rather were "exercising the powers delegated to [them] by the
sovereign.'' Larson, supra, at 693.
·
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and if it be so, the use of the name of the State to enforce
an unconstitutional act to the injury of complainants is a
proceeding without the authority of and one which does
not affect the State in its sovereign or governmental capacity. It is simply an illegal act upon the part of a state
official in attempting by the use of the name of the State
to enforce a legislative enactment which is void because
unconstitutional. If the act which the state Attorney
General seeks to enforce be a violation of the Federal
Constitution, the officer in proceeding under such enactment comes into conflict with the superior authority of
that Constitution, and he is in that case stripped of his
official or representative character and is subjected to
the consequences of his official conduct. The State has
no power to impart to him any immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States."
209 U. S., at 159-160.
The Court subsequently has made clear that, even where this
exception applies, the rule that a suit against state officials
constitutes a suit against the State continues to have force.
Thus, in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651 (1974), the Court
held that in a suit against state officials "a federal court's remedial power, consistent with the Eleventh Amendment, is
necessarily limited to prospective injunctive relief, and may
not include a retroactive award which requires the payment
of funds from the state treasury." Id., at 677 (citations
omitted).
III
With these principles in mind, we now turn to the question
whether the claim that petitioners violated state law in carrying out their official duties at Pennhurst is one against the
State and therefore barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
Respondents advance two principal arguments in support of
the judgment below. 13 First, they contend that under the
13

We reject respondents' additional contention that Pennsylvania has
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doctrine of Edelman v. Jordan, supra, the suit is not against
the State because the courts below ordered only prospective
injunctive relief. Second, they assert that the state-law
claim properly was decided under the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction. Respondents rely on decisions of this Court
awarding relief against state officials on the basis of a pendent state-law claim. See, e. g., Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 213 U. S. 175, 193 (1909).

A
We first address the contention that respondents' state-law
claim is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment because it
seeks only prospective relief as defined in Edelman v. Jordan, supra. The Court of Appeals held that if the judgment
waived its immunity from suit in federal court. At the time the suit was
filed, suits against Pennsylvania were permitted only where expressly authorized by the legislature, see, e. g., Freach v. Commonwealth, 471 Pa.
558, 370 A. 2d 1163 (1977), and respondents have not referred us to any
provision expressly waiving Pennsylvania's Eleventh Amendment immunity. The State now has a statute governing sovereign immunity, including an express preservation of its immunity from suit in federal court:
"Federal courts.-Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be construed
to waive the immunity of the Commonwealth from suit in Federal courts
guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States." 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8521(b) (1980).
We also do not agree with respondents that the presence of the United
States as a plaintiff in this case removes the Eleventh Amendment from
consideration. Although the Eleventh Amendment does not bar the
United States from suing a State in federal court, see, e. g., Monaco v.
Mississippi, 292 U. S. 313, 329 (1934), the United States' presence in the
case for any purpose does not eliminate the State's immunity for all purposes. For example, the fact that the federal court could award injunctive
relief to the United States on federal constitutional claims would not mean
that the court could order the State to pay damages to other plaintiffs. In
any case, we think it clear that the United States does not have standing to
assert the state-law claims of third-parties. For these reasons, the applicability of the Eleventh Amendment to respondents' state-law claim is
unaffected by the United States' participation in the case.
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below rested on federal law, it could be entered against petitioner state officials under the doctrine established in
Edelman and Young even though the prospective financial
burden was substantial and ongoing. 14 See 673 F. 2d, at 656.
The court assumed, and respondents assert, that this reasoning applies as well when the official acts in violation of state
law. This argument misconstrues the basis of the doctrine
established in Young and Edelman.
As discussed above, the injunction in Young was justified,
notwithstanding the obvious impact on the State itself, on the
view that sovereign immunity does not apply because an official who acts unconstitutionally is "stripped of his official or
representative character," Young, 209 U. S., at 160. This
rationale, of course, created the "well-recognized irony" that
an official's unconstitutional conduct constitutes state action
under the Fourteenth Amendment but not the Eleventh
Amendment. Florida Department of State v. Treasure
Salvors, Inc.,-- U. S. - - , - - (1982) (opinion of STEVENS, J.). Nonetheless, the Young doctrine has been accepted as necessary to permit the federal courts to vindicate
federal rights and hold state officials responsible to "the supreme authority of the United States." Young, 209 U. S.,
at 160. As JUSTICE BRENNAN has observed, "Ex parte
Young was the culmination of efforts by this Court to harmonize the principles of the Eleventh Amendment with the
effective supremacy of rights and powers secured elsewhere
in the Constitution." Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U. S. 82, 106
(1971) (BRENNAN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
"Although the District Court thus has jurisdiction to grant prospective
relief on the basis of federal law, the scope of that relief is constrained by
principles of comity and federalism. "Where, as here, the exercise of authority by state officials is attacked, federal courts must be constantly
mindful of the 'special delicacy of the adjustment to be preserved between
federal equitable power and State administration of its own law.'" Rizzo
v. Goode, 423 U. S. 362, 378 (1976) (quoting Stefanelli v. Minard, 342
u. s. 117, 120 (1951)).
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part). Our decisions repeatedly have emphasized that the
Young doctrine rests on the need to promote the vindication
See, e. g., Quern v. Jordan, 440 U. S.
of federal rights.
332, 337 (1979); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232, 237 (1974);
Georgia R. & Banking Co. v. Redwine, 342 U. S. 299, 304
(1952).
The Court also has recognized, however, that the Young
exception should not be applied where unnecessary to promote the supremacy of federal law. This is the significance
of Edelman v. Jordan, supra. We recognized that the prospective relief authorized by Young "has permitted the Civil
War Amendments to the Constitution to serve as a sword,
rather than merely a shield, for those whom they were designed to protect." 415 U. S., at 664. But we declined to
extend Young to encompass retroactive relief, for to do so
would effectively eliminate the constitutional immunity of the
States. Accordingly, we concluded that although the difference between permissible and impermissible relief "will not
in many instances be that between day and night," id., at
667, an award of retroactive relief necessarily" 'fall[s] afoul of
the Eleventh Amendment if that basic constitutional provision is to be conceived of as having any present force.'" I d.,
at 665 (quoting Rothstein v. Wyman, 467 F. 2d 226, 237 (CA2
1972) (McGowan, J., sitting by designation), cert. denied, 411
U. S. 921 (1973)). In sum, Edelman's distinction between
prospective and retroactive relief fulfills the underlying purpose of Ex parte Young while at the same time preserving to
an important degree the constitutional immunity of the
States.
This need to reconcile competing interests is wholly absent, however, when a plaintiff alleges that a state official has
violated state law. In such a case the entire basis for the
doctrine of Young and Edelman disappears. 15 A federal
15
Contrary to the dissent's argument, there is no long line of cases
clearly holding that the Eleventh Amendment "does not bar suits against
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court's grant of relief against state officials on the basis of
state law, whether prospective or retroactive, does not vindicate the supreme authority of federal law. On the contrary,
it is difficult to think of a greater intrusion on state soverstate officials for action not authorized by the State's own laws." Post, at
21 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). The constant theme of the Eleventh
Amendment cases of the period cited by the dissent was that there is a crucial difference between the class of cases "where the suit is brought against
the officers of the State, as representing the State's action and liability,
thus making it, though not a party to the record, the real party against
which the judgment will so operate as to compel it to specifically perform
contracts," and the class "where as suit is brought against defendants who,
claiming to be officers of the State, and under the color of an unconstitutional statute, commit acts of wrong and injury to the rights and property
of the plaintiff acquired under a contract with the State." Pennoyer v.
McConnaughy, 140 U. S. 1, 10 (1891). Indeed, the decisions in most of
the cases cited by the dissent turned on this distinction,("""See, e. g., Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 154 U. S. 362, 390 (1894); Poindexter
v. Greenhaw, 114 U. S. 270, 288 (1885); Cunningham v. Macon & Brunswick R. Co., 109 U. S. 446, 452 (1883). The Court rarely was faced with
an Eleventh Amendment issue in a case that did not contain a constitutional allegation.
More significant than the rather bare support for this alleged "firmly established" rule, post, at 18, is the fact that the "line of cases" central to the
dissent's argument since has been repudiated by this Court. The principal
case originally cited for the proposition that a suit alleging a tortious act by
an official is not barred by sovereign immunity is United States v. Lee, 106
U. S. 196 (1882). See Cunningham, supra, at 452; Larson, supra, at 717
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (Lee is the "starting point of this line of
cases"). In Larson, however, the Court construed Lee narrowly as representing only "a specific application of the constitutional exception to the
doctrine of sovereign immunity." 337 U. S., at 696. Larson expressly
rejected the view-urged by JUSTICE STEVENS' dissent here-that sovereign immunity is inapplicable whenever the officer allegedly committed a
tortious action. It held that the suit may go forward only if there is an
allegation of unconstitutional action or action that is ultra vires. !d., at
693; see supra, at n. 12. This construction, and the Larson rule, have
been reaffirmed repeatedly-and at this Term-by this Court. See, e. g.,
Block v. North Dakota, - - U. S. - - , - - (1983); Malone v. Bowdoin,
369 u. s. 643, 647-648 (1962).
The dissent recognizes that Larson is inconsistent with the cases on
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eignty than when a federal court instructs state officials on
how to conform their conduct to state law. Such a result
conflicts directly with the principles of federalism that underlie the Eleventh Amendment. We conclude that Young and
Edelman are inapplicable in a suit against state officials on
the basis of state law.
B
The reasoning of our decisions on sovereign immunity thus
leads to the conclusion that a federal suit against state offiwhich the dissent relies, but asserts that "it is not necessary or appropriate
to read it back retroactively into the Eleventh Amendment." Post, at 20
(STEVENS, J., dissenting). This departure from stare decisis is hardly
consistent with the dissent's invocation of the doctrine elsewhere in the
opinion. This Court consistently has considered Larson to be a relevant
precedent in Eleventh Amendment cases, see, e. g., Georgia R. Co. v.
Redwine, 342 U. S. 299, 304, nn. 12, 15, and indeed just last Term eight
Justices expressly applied the two-part Larson test in resolving an Eleventh Amendment issue, Treasure Salvors, supra, - - U. S., at - (opinion of STEVENS, J.); id., at-- (WHITE, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). The plurality opinion in Treasure
Salvors-written by JUSTICE STEVENs-found that Larson had "clarified"
the prior law established in both Eleventh Amendment and federal sovereign immunity cases, and noted expressly that Larson had "held that the
fact that an officer wrongfully withholds property belonging to another
does not necessarily establish that he is acting beyond the permissible
scope of his official capacity." I d., at--. The plurality then followed
the Larson test in announcing that "the Eleventh Amendment does not bar
an action against a state official that is based on a theory that the officer
acted beyond the scope of his statutory authority or, if within that authority, that such authority is unconstitutional." ld., at--.
Just as the Court's Eleventh Amendment cases have relied on federal
sovereign immunity principles, the Court's federal sovereign immunity
cases have relied on the principles established in Eleventh Amendment
cases. See, e. g., Philadelphia v. Stimson, 223 U. S. 605, 620 (1912).
This especially was true in Larson itself. See 337 U. S., at 687, n. 6, 691,
n. 11, 694, n. 15, 698, nn. 19-20, 699, n. 22. The dissent thus errs in sugy
gesting that there are different principles for the federal sovereign immu~\
nity cases and Eleventh Amendment cases. It is clear that Larson-the
,.t C
~definitive statement on the rule of sovereign immunity and its
\ ·exceptions~hould be followed here.

L

81-2101-0PINION
PENNHURST STATE SCHOOL & HOSP. v. HALDERMAN

18

cials on the basis of state law contravenes the Eleventh
Amendment. In reaching a contrary conclusion, the Court
of Appeals relied principally on a separate line of cases dealing with pendent jurisdiction. The crucial point for the
Court of Appeals was that this Court has granted relief
against state officials on the basis of a pendent state-law
claim. See 673 F. 2d, at 657-658. We therefore must consider the relationship between pendent jurisdiction and the
Eleventh Amendment.
This Court long has held generally that when a federal
court obtains jurisdiction over a federal claim, it may adjudicate other related claims over which the court otherwise
would not have jurisdiction. See, e. g., Mine Workers v.
Gibbs, 383 U. S. 715, 726 (1966); Osborn v. Bank of the
United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 819-823 (1824). The Court also
has held that a federal court may resolve a case solely on the
basis of a pendent state-law claim, see Siler, supra, at
192-193, and that in fact the court usually should do so in
order to avoid federal constitutional questions, see id., at
193; Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis,
J., concurring) ("[l]f a case can be decided on either of two
grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a
question of statutory construction or general law, the Court
will decide only the latter"). Under these principles, it
seems clear that, apart from the possible Eleventh Amendment bar, the Court of Appeals had a proper jurisdictional
basis on which to decide the claim based on Pennsylvania
law. 16 The question therefore is whether the Amendment
applies to this pendent state-law claim.
6

This does not necessarily mean that pendent jurisdiction properly was
exercised here. "Pendent jurisdiction over state claims [is] a doctrine of
discretion not to be routinely exercised without considering the advantages
of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to the litigants." Hagans
v. Lavine, 415 U. S. 528, 545 (1974). In particular, "[n]eedless decisions
of state law should be avoided both as a matter of comity and to promote
justice between the parties, by procuring for them a surer-footed reading
'
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As the Court of Appeals noted, in Siler and subsequent
cases concerning pendent jurisdiction relief was granted
against state officials on the basis of state-law claims that
were pendent to federal constitutional claims. The Court
never held directly that the rationale of Ex parte Young
should be extended to pendent state-law claims, but rather
appears to have assumed that the Eleventh Amendment simply does not apply to pendent claims. 17 This is illustrated by
Greene v. Louisville & Interurban R. Co., 244 U. S. 499
(1917), in which the plaintiff railroads sued state officials, alleging that certain tax assessments were excessive under the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Court first rejected the officials' argument under the Eleventh Amendment, finding that
Ex parte Young applied to all constitutional claims against
state officials, regardless of whether the state statute under
which the officials acted was constitutional or unconstitutional. See id., at 507. Having determined that the Eleventh Amendment did not deprive the federal court of jurisdiction over this constitutional question, the Court declared
that the court's jurisdiction extended "to the determination of
all questions involved in the case, including questions of state
law, irrespective of the disposition that may be made of the
of applicable law." Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U. S. 715, 726 (1966).
Because of our disposition of the case under the Eleventh Amendment, we
need not decide this important comity issue.
17
The dissent repeatedly refers to the "rule" in Siler as if the Court
there had held that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits on pendent state-law claims. It bears repeating that the Eleventh Amendment
was not raised by the State or addressed by this Court in that decision.
Rather, the rule in Siler is that, as a general matter, a federal court should
decide a case on state-law grounds where possible to avoid a federal constitutional question. J... Contrary to the dissent's repeated intimations, we
have not "repudiated" or "reject[ed]" this rule, post, at 10, 12, or held that
Siler is "no longer good law," post, at 8. Nothing in our decision is meant
to reject Siler, much less cast doubt on the desirability of applying its principles in cases where the federal court has jurisdiction to decide the statelaw issues.
·
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federal question, or whether it be found necessary to decide
it at all." I d., at 508. The case then was decided solely on
state-law grounds. Accord, Lousiville & Nashville R.R.
Co. v. Greene, 244 U. S. 522 (1917).
The implicit view thus seems to have been that once jurisdiction is established on the basis of any federal question, no
further Eleventh Amendment inquiry is necessary with respect to other claims raised in the case. We believe this
view is erroneous and contrary to the principles established
in our Eleventh Amendment decisions. "The Eleventh
Amendment is an explicit limitation on the judicial power of
the United States." Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U. S., at 25. It
deprives a federal court of power to decide certain claims
against States that otherwise would be within the scope of
Art. III's grant of jurisdiction. For example, if a lawsuit
against state officials under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 alleges a constitutional claim, the federal court is barred from awarding
damages against the state treasury even though the claim
arises under the Constitution. See Quern v. Jordan, 440
U. S. 332 (1979). Similarly, if a § 1983 action alleging a constitutional claim is brought directly against a State, the Eleventh Amendment bars a federal court from granting any relief on that claim. See Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U. S. 781
(1978) (per curiam). The Amendment thus is a specific constitutional bar against hearing evenfederal claims that otherwise would be within the jurisdiction of the federal courts. 18
This constitutional bar applies to pendent claims as well.
A federal court's power over a pendent claim necessarily derives from Art. III, see Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U. S. 1, 9
(1976), and the Eleventh Amendment is an independent limitation on all exercises of Art. III power. See supra, at 7-8.
See, e. g., Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322 (1934) ("[Allthough a case may arise under the Constitution and laws of the United
States, the judicial power does not extend to it if the suit is sought to be
prosecuted against a State, without her consent, by one of her own citizens"); Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U. S. 18, 25-26 (1933).
'

8
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If we were to hold otherwise, a federal court could award

damages against a State on the basis of a pendent claim.
Our decision in Edelman v. Jordan, supra, makes clear that
pendent jurisdiction does not permit such an evasion of the
immunity guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment. We
there held that "the District Court was correct in exercising
pendent jurisdiction over [plaintiffs'] statutory claim," 415
U. S., at 653, n. 1, but then concluded that the Eleventh
Amendment barred an award of retroactive relief on the
basis of that pendent claim. I d., at 678.
In sum, contrary to the analysis implicit in decisions such
as Greene, supra, neither pendent jurisdiction nor any other
basis of jurisdiction may override the Eleventh Amendment. 19 A federal court must examine each claim in a case to
see if the court's jurisdiction over that claim is barred by the
Eleventh Amendment. We concluded above that a claim
that state officials violated state law in carrying out their official responsibilities is a claim against the State that is protected by the Eleventh Amendment. See supra, at 16. We
now hold that this principle applies as well to state-law claims
brou.ght into federal court under pendent jurisdiction. This
issue has not previously been confronted directly, and we
therefore are not bound by prior decisions assuming a contrary conclusion. "[W]hen questions of jurisdiction have
been passed on in prior decisions sub silentio, this Court has
never considered itself bound when a subsequent case finally
brings the jurisdictional issue before us." Hagans v.
Lavine, 415 U. S. 528, 533, n. 5 (1974). 20

19
See Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U. S., at 27 ("This is not less a suit against
the State because the bill is ancillary and supplemental.").
20
See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 671 (1974) ("Having now had
an opportunity to more fully consider the Eleventh Amendment issue after
briefing and argument, we disapprove the Eleventh Amendment holdings
of [certain prior] cases to the extent that they are inconsistent with our
holding today").
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c
Respondents urge that application of the Eleventh Amendment to pendent state-law claims will have a disruptive effect
on litigation against state officials. They argue that the
"considerations of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to litigants" that underlie pendent jurisdiction, see
Gibbs, supra, at 726, counsel against a result that may cause
litigants to split causes of action between state and federal
courts. They also contend that the policy of avoiding unnecessary constitutional decisions will be contravened if plaintiffs choose to forgo their state-law claims and sue only in federal court or, alternatively, that the policy of Ex parte Young
will be hindered if plaintiffs choose to forgo their right to a
federal forum and bring all of their claims in state court.
We agree that, depending on the circumstances of the case,
these considerations of policy may be important, 21 but they
may not override the constitutional limitations on the authority of the federal judiciary to adjudicate suits against a State.
See Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U. S., at 25-26 ("Considerations
of convenience open no avenue of escape from the [Amendment's] restriction"). 22 In a suit brought by private litigants
against state officials, these constitutional limitations do not
preclude a federal court from granting prospective relief to
vindicate federal law. But the Eleventh Amendment de21

Petitioners contend that in this case these policy considerations are
outweighed by considerations of comity, arguing that the Court of Appeals
"has authorized a severe intrusion on the right of state officials to run their
own programs, basing that intrusion on nothing more than its view of state
law." Brief for Petitioners 9. In light of our disposition of this case, we
need not balance these competing considerations.
22
Cf. Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U. S. 1, 14-15 (1976) (Although "considerations of judicial economy" would be served by permitting pendent-party
jurisdiction, "the addition of a completely new party would run counter to
the well-established principle that federal courts, as opposed to state trial
courts of general jurisdiction, are courts of limited jurisdiction marked out
by Congress")
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prives federal courts of power to consider other claims raised
against the State or its officials. Any inconvenience in
choice of forum that may be caused to litigants who wish to
raise both federal and state claims is a necessary consequence
of this limitation on federal judicial power. 23 The constitutional principle of sovereign immunity, embodied in the Eleventh Amendment, demands that claims against state officials
on the basis of state law be resolved in state courts. 24
This limitation on federal judicial power imposes the same inconvenience on a plaintiff who has certain federal claims that may not be raised
in federal court. Under Edelman v. Jordan, supra, a plaintiff with a
claim for monetary relief against a State on the basis of federal law must
resort to state court. If he wishes to press a related claim for prospective
relief, he must forgo the damages claim, or split his related causes of action
between federal and state courts, or take the entire case to state court.
As JUSTICE MARSHALL has observed, the fact that some federal rights
may have to be enforced in a state forum is "a part of the tension inherent
in our system of federalism." Employees v. Missouri Public Health &
Welfare Dept., 411 U. S. 279, 298 (1973) (MARSHALL, J ., concurring in
result).
24
The dissent's distaste for the Eleventh Amendment and its principle of
sovereign immunity is the underlying theme of the dissenting opinion.
See post, at 25-27; cf. id., at 10-11 (quoting the "illuminating" analysis in
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419, 471 (1793) (opinion of Jay, C. J.)). Indeed, the dissent's negative view of sovereign immunity leads it to an apparent willingness to overrule the decisions of this Court that have emphasized the importance and continuing vitality of the Eleventh Amendment,
id., at 26, in favor of JUSTICE BRENNAN's dissenting view in Employees v.
Missouri Public Health Dept., 411 U. S. 279 (1973). But that view was
expressly rejected both by Justice Douglas' opinion for the Court, see id.,
at 280, n. 1, and JUSTICE MARSHALL's opinion concurring in the judgment,
see id. , at 292, n. 8.
Thus, the dissent's argument that sovereign immunity "'undoubtedly
runs counter to modem democratic notions of the moral responsibility of
the State,"' post, at 27 (quoting Great Northern Life Ins . Co. v. Read, 322
U. S. 47, 59 (1944) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)), is a view of the Eleventh
Amendment that has never been accepted by this Court. Moreover, the
argument substantially misses the point with respect to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. As JuSTICE MARSHALL has observed, the
23
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IV

Respondents contend that, regardless of the applicability
of the Eleventh Amendment to their state claims against petitioner state officials, the judgment may still be upheld
against petitioner county officials. We are not persuaded.
Even assuming that these officials are not immune from suit
challenging their actions under the MH/MR Act, 25 it is clear
that without the injunction against the state institutions and
Eleventh Amendment's restriction on the federal judicial power is based in
large part on the "the problems of federalism inher.ent in making one sovereign appear against its will in the courts of the other." Employees, supra,
at 294 (MARSHALL, J., concurring in the result).
'11lWe have held that the Eleventh Amendment does not apply to "counties and similar municipal corporations." Mt. Healthy City School District
v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274, 280 (1977); see Lincoln County v. Luning, 133
U. S. 529, 530 (1890). At the same time, we have applied the Amendment
to bar relief against county officials "in order to protect the state treasury
from liability that would have had essentially the same practical consequences as a judgment against the State itself." Lake Country Estates,
Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U. S. 391, 401 (1979). See,
e. g., Edelman v. Jordan, supra (Eleventh Amendment bars suit against
state and county officials for retroactive award of welfare benefits). The
Courts of Appeals are in general agreement that a suit against officials of a
county or other governmental entity is barred if the relief obtained runs
against the State. See, e. g., Moore v. Tangipahoa Parish School Board,
594 F. 2d 489, 493 (CA5 1979); Carey v. Quem, 588 F. 2d 230, 233-234
(CA71978); Incarcerated Men of Allen County Jail v. Fair, 507 F. 2d 281,
287-288 (CA6 1974); Harris v. Tooele County School District, 471 F. 2d
218, 220 (CAlO 1973). Given that the actions of the county commissioners
and mental health adminstrators are dependent on funding from the State,
it may be that relief granted against these county officials, when exercising
their functions under the MH/MR Act, effectively runs against the State.
Cf. Farr v. Chesney, 441 F. Supp. 127, 130-132 (MD Pa. 1977) (holding
that Pennsylvania county commissioners, acting as members of the board
of the county office of mental health and retardation, may not be sued for
back pay under the Eleventh Amendment). We need not decide this issue
in light of our disposition above.
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officials in this case, an order entered on state-law grounds
necessarily would be limited. The relief substantially concerns Pennhurst, an arm of the State that is operated by
state officials. Moreover, funding for the county mental retardation programs comes almost entirely from the State, see
Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 50, §§4507-4509 (Purdon 1969 and Supp.
1982), and the costs of the masters have been borne by the
State, see 446 F. Supp., at 1327. Finally, the MH/MR Act
contemplates that the state and county officials will cooperate
in operating mental retardation programs. See In re
Schmidt, 494 Pa. 86, 95-96, 429 A. 2d 631, 635-636 (1981).
In short, the present judgment could not be sustained on the
basis of the state-law obligations of petitioner county officials. Indeed, any relief granted against the county officials
on the basis of the state statute would be partial and incomplete at best. Such an ineffective enforcement of state law
would not appear to serve the purposes of efficiency, convenience, and fairness that must inform the exercise of pendent
jurisdiction.

v

The Court of Appeals upheld the judgment of the District
Court solely on the basis of Pennsylvania's MH/MR Act.
We hold that the courts lacked jurisdiction to enjoin petitioner state institutions and state officials on the basis of this
state law. The District Court also rested its decision on the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. See supra, at 2. On remand the
Court of Appeals may consider to what extent, if any, the
judgment may be sustained on these bases. 26 The court also
may consider whether relief may be granted to respondents
under the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of
26

On the Fourteenth Amendment issue, the court should consider
Youngberg v. Romeo,- U. S . - (1982), a decision that was not available when the District Court issued its decision.
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Rights Act, 42 U. S. C. §§ 6011, 6063. The judgment of the
Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 81-2101
PENNHURST STATE SCHOOL & HOSPITAL, ET AL.,
PETITIONERS v. TERRI LEE HALDERMAN, ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
[June-, 1983]

JUSTICE PoWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether a federal court
may award injunctive relief against state officials on the basis
of state law.
I
This litigation, here for the second time, concerns the conditions of care at petitioner Pennhurst State School and Hospital, a Pennsylvania institution for the care of the mentally
retarded. See Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1 (1981). Although the litigation's history is set forth in detail in our prior opinion, see id., at 5-10,
it is necessary for purposes of this decision to review that
history.
This suit originally was brought in 1974 by respondent
Terri Lee Halderman, a resident of Pennhurst, in the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Ultimately, plaintiffs included a class consisting of. all persons
who were or might become residents of Pennhurst; the Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Citizens (P ARC); and the
United States. Defendants were Pennhurst and various
Pennhurst officials; the Pennsylvania Department of Public
Welfare and several of its officials; and various county commissioners, county mental retardation administrators , and
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other officials of five Pennsylvania counties surrounding
Pennhurst. Respondents' amended complaint charged that
conditions at Pennhurst violated the class members' rights
under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 87 Stat. 394, as amended, 29
U. S. C. § 794 (1976 ed. and Supp. V); the Developmentally
Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U. S. C.
§§ 6001-6081 (1976 ed. and Supp. V); and the Pennsylvania
Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966 (the
"MH/MR Act"), Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 50, §§ 4101-4704
(Purdon 1969 and Supp. 1982). Both damages and injunctive
relief were sought.
In 1977, following a lengthy trial, the District Court rendered its decision. 446 F. Supp. 1295 (1977). As noted in
our prior opinion, the court's findings were undisputed: "Conditions at Pennhurst are not only dangerous, with the residents often physically abused or drugged by staff members,
but also inadequate for the 'habilitation' of the retarded. Indeed, the court found that the physicial, intellectual, and
emotional skills of some residents have deteriorated at
Pennhurst." 451 U. S., at 7 (footnote omitted). The District Court held that these conditions violated each resident's
right to "minimally adequate habilitation" under the Due
Process Clause and the MH/MR Act, see 446 F. Supp., at
1314-1318, 1322-1323; "freedom from harm" under the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, see id., at 1320-1321;
and "nondiscriminatory habilitation" under the Equal Protection Clause and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, see id., at
1321-1324. Furthermore, the court found that "due process
demands that if a state undertakes the habilitation of a retarded person, it must do so in the least restrictive setting
consistent with that individual's habilitative needs." Id., at
1319 (emphasis added). After concluding that the large size
of Pennhurst prevented it from providing the necessary
habilitation in the least restrictive environment, the court ordered "that immediate steps be taken to remove the retarded
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residents from Pennhurst." I d., at 1325. Petitioners were
ordered "to provide suitable community living arrangements" for the class members, id., at 1326, and the court appointed a Special Master "with the power and duty to plan,
organize, direct, supervise and monitor the implementation
of this .and any further Orders of the Court." Ibid. 1
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed most
of the District Court's judgment. 612 F. 2d 84 (1979) (en
bane). It agreed that respondents had a right to habilitation
in the least restrictive environment, but it grounded this
right solely on the "bill of rights" provision in the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42
U. S. C. § 6010. See 612 F. 2d, at 95-100, 104-107. The
court did not consider the constitutional issues or § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act, and while it affirmed the District Court's
holding that the MH/MR Act provides a right to adequate
habilitation, see id., at 100-103, the court did not decide
whether that state right encompassed a right to treatment in
the least restrictive setting.
On the question of remedy, the Court of Appeals affirmed
except as to the District Court's order that Pennhurst be
closed. The court observed that some patients would be unable to adjust to life outside an institution, and it determined
that none of the legal provisions relied on by plaintiffs precluded institutionalization. I d., at 114-115. It therefore remanded for "individual determinations by the [District
Court], or by the Special Master, as to the appropriateness of
an improved Pennhurst for each such patient," guided by "a
presumption in favor of placing individuals in [community living arrangements]." Ibid. 2
1

The District Court determined that the individual defendants had acted
in good faith and therefore were immune from the damage claims. 446 F.
Supp, at 1324.
2
In a companion case, the E:ourt of Appeals affirmed the District
Court's denial of a motion to intervene for purposes of appeal by the
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On remand the District Court established detailed procedures for determining the proper residential placement for
each patient. A team consisting of the patient, his parents
or guardian, and his case manager must establish an individual habilitation plan providing for habilitation of the patient
in a designated community living arrangement. The plan is
subject to review by the Special Master. A second master,
called the Hearing Master, is available to conduct hearings,
upon request by the resident, his parents or his advocate, on
the question whether the services of Pennhurst would be
more beneficial to the resident than the community living arrangement provided in the resident's plan. The Hearing
Master then determines where the patient should reside,
·subject to possible review by the District Court. See App.
123a-134a (Order of April 24, 1980). 3
This Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals,
finding that 42 U. S. C. § 6010 did not create any substantive
rights. 451 U. S. 1 (1981). We remanded the case to the
Court of Appeals to determine if the remedial order could be
supported on the basis of state law, the Constitution, or§ 504
of the Rehabilitation Act. See id., at 31. 4 We also re-

,. .
;

Pennhurst Parents-Staff Association, finding the denial harmless error.
See 612 F . 2d 131 (1979) (en bane). The Association subsequently was
granted leave to intervene and is a petitioner in this Court.
3
On July 1, 1981, Pennsylvania enacted an appropriations bill providing
that only $35,000 would be paid for the Masters' expenses for the fiscal
year July 1981 to June 1982. The District Court held Pennsylvania and its
Secretary of the Department of Public Welfare in contempt, and imposed a
fine of $10,000 per day. Pennsylvania paid the fines, and the contempt
was purged on January 8, 1982. On appeal the Court of Appeals affirmed
the contempt order. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hospital,
673 F . 2d 628 (1982), cert. pending, No. 81-2363.
'Three Justices dissented from the Court's construction of the Act, but
concluded that the District Court should not have adopted the "far-reaching remedy" of appointing "a Special Master to decide which of the
Pennhurst inmates should remain and which should be moved to community-based facilities. . . . [T]he court should not have assumed the task of

j

!
I
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manded for consideration of whether any relief was available
under other provisions of the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act. See id., at 27-30 (discussing
42 U. S. C. §§ 6011(a), 6063(b)(5)).
On remand the Court of Appeals affirmed its prior judgment in its entirety. 673 F. 2d 647 (1982) (en bane). It determined that in a recent decision the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania had "spoken definitively" in holding that the
MH/MR Act required the State to adopt the "least restrictive
environment" approach for the care of the mentally retarded.
Id., at 651 (citing In re Schmidt, 494 Pa. 86, 429 A. 2d 631
(1981)). The Court of Appeals concluded that this state statute fully supported its prior judgment, and therefore did not
reach the remaining issues of federal law. It also rejected
petitioners' argument that the Eleventh Amendment barred
a federal court from considering this pendent state-law claim.
The court noted that the Amendment did not bar a federal
court from granting prospective injunctive relief against
state officials on the basis of federal claims, see 673 F. 2d, at
656 (citing Ex Parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908)), and concluded that the same result obtained with respect to a
pendent state-law claim. It reasoned that because Siler v.
Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 213 U. S. 175 (1909), an important case in the development of the doctrine of pendent
jurisdiction, also involved state officials, "there cannot be ...
an Eleventh Amendment exception to that rule." 673 F. 2d,
at 658. 5 Finally, the court rejected petitioners' argument
that it should have abstained from deciding the state-law
managing Pennhurst. . . ."

451 U. S., at 54

(WHITE

J., dissenting in

part).
5
The Court of Appeals also noted that "the United States is an intervening plaintiff ... against which even the state itself cannot successfully
plead the Eleventh Amendment as a bar to jurisdiction," and that "the
counties, even as juridical entities, do not fall within the coverage of the
Eleventh Amendment. Against those defendants even money damages
may be awarded. " 673 F. 2d, at 656 (citation omitted).
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claim under principles of comity, see id., at 659--660, andrefused to consider petitioners' objections to the District
Court's use of a special master, see id., at 651 and n. 10.
Three judges dissented in part, arguing that under principles
of federalism and comity the establishment of a special master to supervise compliance was an abuse of discretion. See
id., at 662 (Seitz, C.J., joined by Hunter, J., dissenting in
part); ibid. (Garth, J., concurring in part and dissenting as to
relief). See also id., at 661 (Aldisert, J., concurring) (seriously questioning the propriety of the order appointing the
Special Master, but concluding that a retroactive reversal of
that order would be meaningless). 6
We granted certiorari,-- U. S. - -. (1982), and now reverse and remand.
II
Petitioners raise three challenges to the judgment of the
Court of Appeals: (i) the Eleventh Amendment prohibited
the District Court from ordering state officials to conform
their conduct to state law; (ii) the doctrine of comity prohibited the District Court from issuing its injunctive relief; and
(iii) the District Court abused its discretion in appointing two
masters to supervise the decisions of state officials in implementing state law. We need not reach the latter two issues,
for we find the Eleventh Amendment challenge dispositive.
A

Article III, § 2 of the Constitution provides that the federal
judicial power extends, inter alia, to controversies "between
a State and Citizens of another State." Relying on this language, this Court in 1793 assumed original jurisdiction over a
suit brought by a citizen of South Carolina against the State
of Georgia. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419 (1793). The
The Office of the Special Master was abolished in December 1982.
See App. 220a (Order of August 12, 1982). The Hearing Master remains
in operation.
6
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decision "created such a shock of surprise that the Eleventh
Amendment was at once proposed and adopted." Monaco v.
Mississippi, 292 U. S. 313, 325 (1934). The Amendment
provides:
"The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States
by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects
of any Foreign State."
The Amendment's language overruled the particular result
in Chis holm, but this Court has recognized that its greater
significance lies in its affirmation that the fundamental principle of sovereign immunity limits the grant of judicial authority in Art. III. Thus, in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1
(1890), the Court held that, despite the limited terms of the
Eleventh Amendment, a federal court could not entertain a
suit brought by a citizen against his own State. After reviewing the constitutional debates concerning the scope of
Art. III, the Court determined that federal jurisdiction over
suits against unconsenting States "was not contemplated by
the Constitution when establishing the judicial power of the
United States." Id., at 15. See Monaco v. Mississippi,
supra, at 322-323 (1934). 7 In short, the principle of soverSee Employees v. Missouri Public Health Dep't, 411 U. S. 279,
291-292 (1973) (MARSHALL, J., concurring in judgment) (The Eleventh
Amendment "clariflied] the intent of the Framers concerning the reach of
federal judicial power" and "restore[d] the original understanding" that
States could not be made unwilling defendants in federal court). See also
Nevada v. Hall, 440 U. S. 410, 430-431 (1979) (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting);
id., at 437 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting).
In light of the unequivocal holdings in Hans and Monaco as to the constitutional stature of the Eleventh Amendment's principle of sovereign immunity, the dissent's assertion that we have "invented a new principle of
sovereign immunity that is totally unsupported by the text of the Constitution or by any of our prior decisions," post, at ai ;
is plainly unfounded.
Not one case cited by the dissent supports such an extreme
7

ll
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eign immunity is a constitutional limitation on the federal judicial power established in Art. III:
"That a State may not be sued without its consent is a
fundamental rule of jurisprudence having so important a
bearing upon the construction of the Constitution of the
United States that it has become established by repeated
decisions of this court that the entire judicial power
granted by the Constitution does not embrace authority
to entertain a suit brought by private parties against a
State without consent given: not one brought by citizens
of another State, or by citizens or subjects of a foreign
State, because of the Eleventh Amendment; and not
even one brought by its own citizens, because of the fundamental rule of which the Amendment is but an exemplification." Ex parte State of New York No. 1, 256
U. S. 490, 497 (1921) (emphasis added). 8
A sovereign's immunity may be waived, and the Court consistently has held that a State may consent to suit against it
in federal court. See, e. g., Clark v. Barnard, 108 U. S.
436, 447 (1883). We have insisted, however, that the State's
consent be unequivocally expressed. See, e. g., Edelman v.
Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 673 (1974). Similarly, although Congress has power with respect to the rights protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment immunity, see Fitzpatrick v. Bitker, 427 U. S. 445
(1976), we have required an unequivocal expression of congressional intent to "overturn the constitutionally guarancharacterization.
8
The limitation deprives federal courts of any jurisdiction to entertain
such claims, and thus may be raised at any point in a proceeding. "The
Eleventh Amendment declares a policy and sets forth an explicit limitation
on federal judicial power of such compelling force that this Court will consider the issue arising under this Amendment . .. even though urged for
the first time in this Court." Ford Motor Co . v. Department of Treasury,
323

u. s. 459, 467 (1945).

I
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teed immunity of the several States." Quern v. Jordan, 440
U. S. 332, 342 (1979) (holding that 42 U. S. C. § 1983 does not
override States' Eleventh Amendment immunity). Our reluctance to infer that a State's immunity from suit in the federal courts has been negated stems from recognition of the
vital role of the doctrine of sovereign immunity in our federal
system. A State's constitutional interest in immunity encompasses not merely whether it may be sued, but where it
may be sued. 9 As JUSTICE MARSHALL has noted well, "[b]ecause of the problems of federalism inherent in making one
sovereign appear against its will in the courts of the other, a
restriction upon the exercise of the federal judicial power has
long been considered to be appropriate in a case such as this."
Employees v. Missouri Public Health & Welfare Dep't, 411
U. S. 279, 294 (1973) (MARSHALL, J., concurring in result). 10
Accordingly, in deciding this case we must be guided by
"[t]he principles of federalism that inform Eleventh Amendment doctrine." Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678, 691 (1978).
9
For this reason, the Court consistently has held that a State's waiver
of sovereign immunity in its own courts is not a waiver of the Eleventh
Amendment immunity in the federal courts. See, e. g., Florida Department of Health v. Florida Nursing Home Assn. 450 U. S. 147, 150 (1981)
(per curiam). "[l]t is not consonant with our dual system for the federal
courts ... to read the consent to embrace federal as well as state courts .
. . . [A] clear declaration of the state's intention to submit its fiscal problems to other courts than those of its own creation must be found." Great
Northern Life Insurance Co. v. Read, 322 U. S. 47, 54 (1944).
0
' See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U. S., at 418-419 (States were "vitally interested" in whether they would be subject to suit in the federal courts, and
the debates about state immunity focused on the question of federal judicial
power). Cf. id., at 430-431 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting) (sovereign immunity is "a guarantee that is implied as an essential component of federalism"
and is "sufficiently fundamental to our federal structure to have implicit
constitutional dimension"); id., at 437 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting) ("[T]he
States that ratified the Eleventh Amendment thought that they were
putting an end to the possibility of individual States as ~nconsenting defendants in foreign jurisdictions").
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B

This Court's decisions thus establish that "an unconsenting
State is immune from suits brought in federal courts by her
own citizens as well as by citizens of another state." Employees, supra, at 280. There may be a question, however,
whether a particular suit in fact is a suit against a State. It
is clear, of course, that in the absence of consent a suit in
which the State or one of its agencies or departments is
named as the defendant is proscribed by the Eleventh
Amendment. See, e. g., Florida Department of Health v.
Florida Nursing Home Assn, 450 U. S. 147 (1981) (per
curiam); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U. S. 781 (1978) (per
curiam). This jurisdictional bar applies regardless of the nature of the relief sought. See, e. g., Missouri v. Fiske, 290
U. S. 18, 27 (1933) ("Expressly applying to suits in equity as
well as at law, the Amendment necessarily embraces demands for the enforcement of equitable rights and the prosecution of equitable remedies when these are asserted and
prosecuted by an individual against a State").
When the suit is brought only against state officials, a
question arises as to whether that suit is a suit against the
State itself. Although prior decisions of this Court have not
been entirely consistent on this issue, certain principles are
well established. The Eleventh Amendment bars a suit
against state officials when "the state is the real, substantial
party in interest." Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U. S. 459, 464 (1945). See, e. g., In re Ayers, 123
U. S. 443, 487-492 (1887); Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U. S.
711, 720-723, 727-728 (1882). Thus, "[t]he general rule is
that relief sought nominally against an officer is in fact
against the sovereign if the decree would operate against the
latter." Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U. S. 57, 58 (1963) (per
curiam). 11 And, as when the State itself is named as the deSee also Dugan v. Rank, 372 U. S. 609, 620 (1963) ("The general rule
is that a suit is against the sovereign if 'the judgment sought would expend
11
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fendant, a suit against state officials that is in fact a suit
against a State is barred regardless of whether it seeks damages or injunctive relief. See Cory v. White, 457 U. S. 85,
91 (1982).
The Court has recognized an important exception to this
general rule: a suit challenging the constitutionality of a state
official's action is not one against the State. 12 This was the
holding in Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908), in which a
federal court enjoined the Attorney General of the State of
Minnesota from bringing suit to enforce a state statute that
allegedly violated the Fourteenth Amendment. This Court
held that the Eleventh Amendment did not prohibit issuance
of this injunction:
"The act to be enforced is alleged to be unconstitutional,
itself on the public treasury or domain, or interfere with the public administration,' or if the effect of the judgment would be 'to restrain the Government from acting, or to compel it to act."') (citations omitted).
12
The Court also has held that sovereign immunity does not apply in a
suit against an official who allegedly acted entirely outside his official authority. See, e. g., Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337
U. S. 682, 702 (1949). This ultra vires exception is quite limited, governing only those situations in which a government official acts without any
official justification. See, e. g., Florida Department of State v. Treasure
Salvors , Inc ., - - U. S. - - , - - (1982) (opinion of STEVENS, J.) (test is
whether the official's conduct was undertaken "without any authority
whatever"); id., at-- (WHITE, J ., concurring in judgment in part and
dissenting in part) (test is whether there was no "colorable basis for the
exercise of authority by state officials"). As the Larson Court explained,
"It is important to note that in such cases the relief can be grantedl without
impleading the sovereign, only because of the officer's lack of delegated
power. A claim of error in the exercise of that power is therefore not sufficient." 337 U. S., at 689-690. This exception clearly is inapplicable in
this case. Even if petitioner officials violated state law in carrying out
some of their official duties, they unquestionably acted under colorable
state authority in operating Pennhurst and the State's system of care for
the mentally retarded. In short, these officials were not acting ultra vires, but rather were "exercising the powers delegated to [them] by the
sovereign. " Larson, supra, at 693.
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and if it be so, the use of the name of the State to enforce
an unconstitutional act to the injury of complainants is a
proceeding without the authority of and one which does
not affect the State in its sovereign or governmental capacity. It is simply an illegal act upon the part of a state
official in attempting by the use of the name of the State
to enforce a legislative enactment which is void because
unconstitutional. If the act which the state Attorney
General seeks to enforce be a violation oi the Federal
Constitution, the officer in proceeding under such enactment comes into conflict with the superior authority of
that Constitution, and he is in that case stripped of his
official or representative character and is subjected to
the consequences of his official conduct. The State has
no power to impart to him any immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States."
209 U. S., at 159-160.
The Court subsequently has made clear that, even where this
exception applies, the rule that a suit against state officials
constitutes a suit against the State continues to have force.
Thus, in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651 (1974), the Court
held that in a suit against state officials "a federal court's remedial power, consistent with the Eleventh Amendment, is
necessarily limited to prospective injunctive relief, and may
not include a retroactive award which requires the payment
of funds from the state treasury." Id., at 677 (citations
omitted).
III
With these principles in mind, we now turn to the question
whether the claim that petitioners violated state law in carrying out their official duties at Pennhurst is one against the
State and therefore barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
Respondents advance two principal arguments in support of
the judgment below. 13 First, they contend that under the
'" We reject respondents' additional contention that Pennsylvania has
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doctrine of Edelman v. Jordan, supra, the suit is not against
the State because the courts below ordered only prospective
injunctive relief. Second, they assert that the state-law
claim properly was decided under the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction. Respondents rely on decisions of this Court
awarding relief against state officials on the basis of a pendent state-law claim. See, e. g., Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 213 U. S. 175, 193 (1909).
A
We first address the contention that respondents' state-law
claim is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment because it
seeks only prospective relief as defined in Edelman v. Jordan, supra. The Court of Appeals held that if the judgment
waived its immunity from suit in federal court. At the time the suit was
filed, suits against Pennsylvania were permitted only where expressly authorized by the legislature, see, e. g., Freach v. Commonwealth, 471 Pa.
558, 370 A. 2d 1163 (1977), and respondents have not referred us to any
provision expressly waiving Pennsylvania's Eleventh Amendment immunity. The State now has a statute governing sovereign immunity, including an express preservation of its immunity from suit in federal court:
"Federal courts.-Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be construed
to waive the immunity of the Commonwealth from suit in Federal courts
guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States." 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8521(b) (1980).
We also do not agree with respondents that the presence of the United
States as a plaintiff in this case removes the Eleventh Amendment from
consideration. Although the Eleventh Amendment does not bar the
United States from suing a State in federal court, see, e. g., Monaco v.
Mississippi, 292 U. S. 313, 329 (1934), the United States' presence in the
case for any purpose does not eliminate the State's immunity for all purposes. For example, the fact that the federal court could award injunctive
relief to the United States on federal constitutional claims would not mean
that the court could order the State to pay damages to other plaintiffs. In
any case, we think it clear that the United States does not have standing to
assert the state-law claims of third-parties. For these reasons, the applicability of the Eleventh Amendment to respondents' state-law claim is
unaffected by the United States' participation in the case.
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below rested on federal law, it could be entered against petitioner state officials under the doctrine established in
Edelman and Young even though the prospective financial
burden was substantial and ongoing. 14 See 673 F. 2d, at 656.
The court assumed, and respondents assert, that this reasoning applies as well when the official acts in violation of state
law. This argument misconstrues the basis of the doctrine
established in Young and Edelman.
As discussed above, the injunction in Young was justified,
notwithstanding the obvious impact on the State itself, on the
view that sovereign immunity does not apply because an official who acts unconstitutionally is "stripped of his official or
representative character," Young, 209 U. S., at 160. This
rationale, of course, created the "well-recognized irony" that
an official's unconstitutional conduct constitutes state action
under the Fourteenth Amendment but not the Eleventh
Amendment. Florida Department of State v. Treasure
Salvors, Inc., - - U. S. - - , - - (1982) (opinion of STEVENS, J.). Nonetheless, the Young doctrine has been accepted as necessary to permit the federal courts to vindicate
federal rights and hold state officials responsible to "the supreme authority of the United States." Young, 209 U. S.,
at 160. As JUSTICE BRENNAN has observed, "Ex parte
Young was the culmination of efforts by this Court to harmonize the principles of the Eleventh Amendment with the
effective supremacy of rights and powers secured elsewhere
in the Constitution." Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U. S. 82, 106
(1971) (BRENNAN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
Although the District Court thus has jurisdiction to grant prospective
relief on the basis of federal law, the scope of that relief is constrained by
principles of comity and federalism. "Where, as here, the exercise of authority by state officials is attacked, federal courts must be constantly
mindful of the 'special delicacy of the adjustment to be preserved between
federal equitable power and State administration of its own law.'" Rizzo
v. Goode, 423 U. S. 362, 378 (1976) (quoting Stefanelli v. Minard, 342
u. s. 117, 120 (1951)).
14
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part). Our decisions repeatedly have emphasized that the
Young doctrine rests on the need to promote the vindication
of federal rights.
See, e. g., Quern v. Jordan, 440 U. S.
332, 337 (1979); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232, 237 (1974);
Georgia R. & Banking Co. v. Redwine, 342 U. S. 299, 304
(1952).
The Court also has recognized, however, that the Young
exception should not be applied where unnecessary to promote the supremacy of federal law. This is the significance
of Edelman v. Jordan, supra. We recognized that the prospective relief authorized by Young "has permitted the Civil
War Amendments to the Constitution to serve as a sword,
rather than merely a shield, for those whom they were designed to protect." 415 U. S., at 664. But we declined to
extend Young to encompass retroactive relief, for to do so
would effectively eliminate the constitutional immunity of the
States. Accordingly, we concluded that although the difference between permissible and impermissible relief "will not
in many instances be that between day and night," id., at
667, an award of retroactive relief necessarily '"fall[s] afoul of
the Eleventh Amendment if that basic constitutional provision is to be .conceived of as having any present force."' !d.,
at 665 (quoting Rothstein v. Wyman, 467 F. 2d 226, 237 (CA2
1972) (McGowan, J., sitting by designation), cert. denied, 411
U. S. 921 (1973)). In sum, Edelman's distinction between
prospective and retroactive relief fulfills the underlying purpose of Ex parte Young while at the same time preserving to
an important degree the constitutional immunity of the
States.
This need to reconcile competing interests is wholly absent, however, when a plaintiff alleges that a state official has
violated state law. In such a case the entire basis for the
doctrine of Young and Edelman disappears. 15 A federal
15

Contrary to the dissent's argument, there is no long line of cases
clearly holding that the Eleventh Amendment "does not bar suits against

I

I
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court's grant of relief against state officials on the basis of
state law, whether prospective or retroactive, does not vindicate the supreme authority of federal law. On the contrary,
it is difficult to think of a greater intrusion on state soverstate officials for action not authorized by the State's own laws." Post, at
J., dissenting). The constant theme of the Eleventh
Amendment cases of the period cited by the dissent was that there is a crucial difference between the class of cases "where the suit is brought against
the officers of the State, as representing the State's action and liability,
thus making it, though not a party to the record, the real party against
which the judgment will so operate as to compel it to specifically perform
contracts," and the class "where as suit is brought against defendants who,
claiming to be officers of the State, and under the color of an unconstitutional statute, commit acts of wrong and injury to the rights and property
of the plaintiff acquired under a contract with the State." Pennoyer v.
McConnaughy, 140 U. S. 1, 10 (1891). Indeed, the decisions in most of
the cases cited by the dissent turned on this distinction relating to whether
the suit properly raised a constitutional challenge to the officer's conduct.
See, e. g., Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 154 U. S. 362, 390
(1894); Poindexter v. Greenhaw, 114 U. S. 270, 288 (1885); Cunningham v.
Macon & Brunswick R. Co., 109 U. S. 446, 452 (1883). The Court rarely
was faced with an Eleventh Amendment issue in a case that did not contain
a constitutional allegation.
More significant than the rather bare support for this alleged "firmly esis the fact that the "line of cases" central to the
tablished" rule, post, at
dissent's argument since has been repudiated by this Court. The principal
case originally cited for the proposition that a suit alleging a tortious act by
an official is not barred by sovereign immunity is United States v. Lee, 106
U. S. 196 (1882). See Cunningham, supra, at 452; Larson, supra, at 717
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (Lee is the "starting point of this line of
cases"). In Larson, however, the Court construed Lee narrowly as representing only "a specific application of the constitutional exception to the
doctrine of sovereign immunity." 337 U. S., at 696. Larson expressly
rejected the view-urged by JUSTICE STEVENS' dissent here-that sovereign immunity is inapplicable whenever the officer allegedly committed a
tortious action. It held that the suit may go forward only if there is an
allegation of unconstitutional action or action that is ultra vires. I d., at
693; see supra, at n. 12. This construction, and the Larson rule, have
been reaffirmed repeatedly-and at this Term-by this Court. See, e. g.,

if (STEVENS,

it,

18

81-2101-0PINION
PENNHURST STATE SCHOOL & HOSP. v. HALDERMAN

17

eignty than when a federal court instructs state officials on
how to conform their conduct to state law. Such a result
conflicts directly with the principles of federalism that underlie the Eleventh Amendment. We conclude that Young and
Block v. North Dakota, - - U. S. - - , - - (1983); Malone v. Bowdoin,
369 u. s. 643, 647-648 (1962).
The dissent recognizes that Larson is inconsistent with the cases on
which the dissent relies, but asserts that "it is not necessary or appropriate
to read it back retroactively into the Eleventh Amendment." Post, at *
(STEVENS, J., dissenting). This departure from stare decisis is hardly
consistent with the dissent's invocation of the doctrine elsewhere in the
opinion. This Court consistently has considered Larson to be a relevant
precedent in Eleventh Amendment cases, see, e. g., Georgia R. Co. v.
Redwine, 342 U. S. 299, 304, nn. 12, 15, and indeed just last Term eight
Justices expressly applied the two-part Larson test in resolving an Eleventh Amendment issue, Treasure Salvors, supra, - - U. S., at - (opinion of STEVENS, J.); id., at-- (WHITE, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). The plurality opinion in Treasure
Salvors-written by JUSTICE STEVENs-found that Larson had "clarified"
the prior law established in both Eleventh Amendment and federal sovereign immunity cases, and noted expressly that Larson had "held that the
fact that an officer wrongfully withholds property belonging to another
does not necessarily establish that he is acting beyond the permissible
scope of his official capacity." /d., at--. The plurality then followed
the Larson test in announcing that "the Eleventh Amendment does not bar
an action against a state official that is based on a theory that the officer
acted beyond the scope of his statutory authority or, if within that authority, that such authority is unconstitutional." /d., at--.
Just as the Court's Eleventh Amendment cases have relied on federal
sovereign immunity principles, the Court's federal sovereign immunity
cases have relied on the principles established in Eleventh Amendment
cases. See, e. g., Philadelphia v. Stimson, 223 U. S. 605, 620 (1912).
This especially was true in Larson itself. See 337 U. S., at 687, n. 6, 691,
n. 11, 694, n. 15, 698, nn. 19-20, 699, n. 22. The dissent thus errs in suggesting that there are different principles for the federal sovereign immunity cases and Eleventh Amendment cases. See id., at 708 (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting) ("The sources of the immunity are formally different but
they present the same legal issues"). It is clear that Larson-the Court's
most recent definitive statement on the rule of sovereign immunity and its

'"' "· 11
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Edelman are inapplicable in a suit against state officials on
the basis of state law.
B
The reasoning of our decisions on sovereign immunity thus
leads to the conclusion that a federal suit against state officials on the basis of state law contravenes the Eleventh
Amendment. In reaching a contrary conclusion, the Court
of Appeals relied principally on a separate line of cases dealing with pendent jurisdiction. The crucial point for the
Court of Appeals was that this Court has granted relief
against state officials on the basis of a pendent state-law
claim. See 673 F. 2d, at 657-658. We therefore must consider the relationship between pendent jurisdiction and the
Eleventh Amendment.
This Court long has held generally that when a federal
court obtains jurisdiction over a federal claim, it may adjudicate other related claims over which the court otherwise
would not have jurisdiction. See, e. g., Mine Workers v.
Gibbs, 383 U. S. 715, 726 (1966); Osborn v. Bank of the
United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 819-823 (1824). The Court also
has held that a federal court may resolve a case solely on the
basis of a pendent state-law claim, see Siler, supra, at
192-193, and that in fact the court usually should do so in
order to avoid federal constitutional questions, see id., at
193; Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis,
J., concurring) ("[I]f a case can be decided on either of two
grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a
question of statutory construction or general law, the Court
will decide only the latter"). Under these principles, it
seems clear that, apart from the possible Eleventh Amendment bar, the Court of Appeals had a proper jurisdictional
basis on which to decide the claim based on Pennsylvania
law. 16 The question therefore is whether the Amendment
applies to this pendent state-law claim.
exceptions-should be followed here.
16
This does not necessarily mean that pendent jurisdiction properly was

f
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As the Court of Appeals noted, in Siler and subsequent
cases concerning pendent jurisdiction relief was granted
against state officials on the basis of state-law claims that
were pendent to federal constitutional claims. The Court
never held directly that the rationale of Ex parte Young
should be extended to pendent state-law claims, but rather
appears to have assumed that the Eleventh Amendment simply does not apply to pendent claims. 17 This is illustrated by /
Greene v. Louisville & Interurban R. Co., 244 U. S. 499
(1917), in which the plaintiff railroads sued state officials, alleging that certain tax assessments were excessive under the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Court first rejected the officials' argument under the Eleventh Amendment, finding that
Ex parte Young applied to all constitutional claims against
state officials, regardless of whether the state statute under
which the officials acted was constitutional or unconstitutional. See id., at 507. Having determined that the Eleventh Amendment did not deprive the federal court of jurisexercised here. "Pendent jurisdiction over state claims [is] a doctrine of
· discretion not to be routinely exercised without considering the advantages
of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to the litigants." Hagans
v. Lavine, 415 U. S. 528, 545 (1974). In particular, "[n]eedless decisions
of state law should be avoided both as a matter of comity and to promote
justice between the parties, by procuring for them a surer-footed reading
of applicable law." Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U. S. 715, 726 (1966).
Because of our disposition of the case under the Eleventh Amendment, we
need not decide this important comity issue.
17
The dissent repeatedly refers to the "rule" in Siler as if the Court
there had held that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits on pendent state-law claims. It bears repeating that the Eleventh Amendment
was not raised by the State or addressed by this Court in that decision.
Rather, the rule in Siler is that, as a general matter, a federal court should
decide a case on state-law grounds where possible to avoid a federal constitutional question. 213 U. S., at 193. Contrary to the dissent's repeated intimations, we have not "repudiated" or "reject[ed]" this rule,
post, at I/J, ~'or held that Siler is "no longer good law," post, at t. Nothing in ou~ decision is meant to reject Siler, much less cast do~t on the
desirability of applying its principles in cases where the federal court has
jurisdiction to decide the state-law issues.
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diction over this constitutional question, the Court declared
that the court's jurisdiction extended "to the determination of
all questions involved in the case, including questions of state
law, irrespective of the disposition that may be made of the
federal question, or whether it be found necessary to decide
it at all." I d., at 508. The case then was decided solely on
state-law grounds. Accord, Lousiville & Nashville R.R.
Co. v. Greene, 244 U. S. 522 (1917).
The implicit view thus seems to have been that once jurisdiction is established on the basis of any federal question, no
further Eleventh Amendment inquiry is necessary with respect to other claims raised in the case. We believe this
view is erroneous and contrary to the principles established
in our Eleventh Amendment decisions. "The Eleventh
Amendment is an explicit limitation on the judicial power of
the United States." Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U. S., at 25. It
deprives a federal court of power to decide certain claims
against States that otherwise would be within the scope of
Art. III's grant of jurisdiction. For example, if a lawsuit
against state officials under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 alleges a constitutional claim, the federal court is barred from awarding
damages against the state treasury even though the claim
arises under the Constitution. See Quern v. Jordan, 440
U. S. 332 (1979). Similarly, if a§ 1983 action alleging a constitutional claim is brought directly against a State, the Eleventh Amendment bars a federal court from granting any relief on that claim. See Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U. S. 781
(1978) (per curiam). The Amendment thus is a specific constitutional bar against hearing evenfederal claims that otherwise would be within the jurisdiction of the federal courts. 18
8
' See, e. g., Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U. S. 313, 322 (1934) ("[A]lthough a case may arise under the Constitution and laws of the United
States, the judicial power does not extend to it if the suit is sought to be
prosecuted against a State, without her consent, by one of her own citizens"); Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U. S. 18, 25-26 (1933).
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This constitutional bar applies to pendent claims as well.
A federal court's power over a pendent claim necessarily derives from Art. III, see Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U. S. 1, 9
(1976), and the Eleventh Amendment is an independent limitation on all exercises of Art. III power. See supra, at 7-8.
If we were to hold otherwise, a federal court could award
damages against a State on the basis of a pendent claim.
Our decision in Edelman v. Jordan, supra, makes clear that
pendent jurisdiction does not permit such an evasion of the
immunity guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment. We
there held that "the District Court was correct in exercising
pendent jurisdiction over [plaintiffs'] statutory claim," 415
U. S., at 653, n. 1, but then concluded that the Eleventh
Amendment barred an award of retroactive relief on the
basis of that pendent claim. I d., at 678.
In sum, contrary to the analysis implicit in decisions such
as Greene, supra, neither pendent jurisdiction nor any other
basis of jurisdiction may override the Eleventh Amendment. 19 A federal court must examine each claim in a case to
see if the court's jurisdiction over that claim is barred by the
Eleventh Amendment. We concluded above that a claim
that state officials violated state law in carrying out their official responsibilities is a claim against the State that is protected by the Eleventh Amendment. See supra, at 16. We
now hold that this principle applies as well to state-law claims
brought into federal court under pendent jurisdiction. This
issue has not previously been confronted directly, and we
therefore are not bound by prior decisions assuming a contrary conclusion. "[W]hen questions of jurisdiction have
been passed on in prior decisions sub silentio, this Court has
never considered itself bound when a subsequent case finally
See Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U.S., at 27 ("This is not less a suit against
the State because the bill is ancillary and supplemental.").
'

9
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brings the jurisdictional issue before us."
Lavine, 415 U. S. 528, 533, n. 5 (1974). 20

Hagans v.

c
Respondents urge that application of the Eleventh Amendment to pendent state-law claims will have a disruptive effect
on litigation against state officials. They argue that the
"considerations of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to litigants" that underlie pendent jurisdiction, see
Gibbs, supra, at 726, counsel against a result that may cause
litigants to split causes of action between state and federal
courts. They also contend that the· policy of avoiding unnecessary constitutional decisions will be contravened if plaintiffs choose to forgo their state-law claims and sue only in federal court or, alternatively, that the policy of Ex parte Young
will be hindered if plaintiffs choose to forgo their right to a
federal forum and bring all of their claims in state court.
We agree that, depending on the circumstances of the case,
these considerations of policy may be important, 21 but they
may not override the constitutional limitations on the authority of the federal judiciary to adjudicate suits against a State.
See Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U. S., at 25--26 ("Considerations
of convenience open no avenue of escape from the [Amendment's] restriction"). 22 In a suit brought by private litigants
See Edelman v. Jordan , 415 U. S. 651, 671 (1974) ("Having now had
an opportunity to more fully consider the Eleventh Amendment issue after
briefing and argument, we disapprove the Eleventh Amendment holdings
of [certain prior] cases to the extent that they are inconsistent with our
holding today").
21
Petitioners contend that in this case these policy considerations are
outweighed by considerations of comity, arguing that the Court of Appeals
"has authorized a severe intrusion on the right of state officials to run their
own programs, basing that intrusion on nothing more than its view of state
law." Brief for Petitioners 9. In light of our disposition of this case, we
need not balance these competing considerations.
" Cf. Aldinger v. Howard , 427 U. S. 1, 14-15 (1976) (Although "considerations of judicial economy" would be served by permitting pendent-party
20
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against state officials, these constitutional limitations do not
preclude a federal court from granting prospective relief to
vindicate federal law. But the Eleventh Amendment deprives federal courts of power to consider other claims raised
against the State or its officials. Any inconvenience in
choice of forum that may be caused to litigants who wish to
raise both federal and state claims is a necessary consequence
of this limitation on federal judicial power. 23 The constitutional principle of sovereign immunity, embodied in the Eleventh Amendment, demands that claims against state officials
on the basis of state law be resolved in state courts. 24
jurisdiction, "the addition of a completely new party would run counter to
the well-established principle that federal courts, as opposed to state trial
courts of general jurisdiction, are courts of limited jurisdiction marked out
by Congress")
23
This limitation on federal judicial power imposes the same inconvenience on a plaintiff who has certain federal claims that may not be raised
in federal court. Under Edelman v. Jordan, supra, a plaintiff with a
claim for monetary relief against a State on the basis of federal law must
resort to state court. If he wishes to press a related claim for prospective
relief, he must forgo the damages claim, or split his related causes of action
between federal and state courts, or take the entire case to state court.
As JUSTICE MARSHALL has observed, the fact that some federal rights
may have to be enforced in a state forum is "a part of the tension inherent
in our system of federalism." Employees v. Missouri Public Health &
Welfare Dept., 411 U. S. 279, 298 (1973) (MARSHALL, J., concurring in
result).
24
The dissent's distaste for the Eleventh Amendment and its principle of
sovereign immunity is the underlying theme of the dissenting opinion.
See post, at ~; cf. id., at ~ (quoting the "illuminating" analysis in
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 41~, 471 (1793) (opinion of Jay, C. J .)). Indeed, the dissent's negative view of sovereign immunity leads it to an apparent willingness to overrule the decisions of this Court that have emphasized the importance and continuing vitality of the Eleventh Amendment,
id., at 26, in favor of JUSTICE BRENNAN's dissenting view in Employees v.
Missouri Public Health Dept., 411 U. S. 279 (1973). But that view was
expressly rejected both by Justice Douglas' opinion for the Court, see id.,
at 280, n. 1, and JUSTICE MARSHALL's opinion concurring in the judgment,
see id. , at 292, n. 8.

.-

f

81-2101-0PINION
24

PENNHURST STATE SCHOOL & HOSP. v. HALDERMAN

IV
Respondents contend that, regardless of the applicability
of the Eleventh Amendment to their state claims against petitioner state officials, the judgment may still be upheld
against petitioner county officials. We are not persuaded.
Even assuming that these officials are not immune from suit
challenging their actions under the MH/MR Act, 25 it is clear
Thus, the dissent's argument that sovereign immunity '"undoubtedly
runs counter to modern democratic notions of the moral responsibility of
the State,"' post, at ~ (quoting Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322
U. S. 47, 59 (1944) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)), is a view of the Eleventh
Amendment that has never been accepted by this Court. Moreover, the
argument substantially misses the point with respect to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. As JUSTICE MARSHALL has observed, the
Eleventh Amendment's restriction on the federal judicial power is based in
large part on the "the problems offederalism inherent in making one sovereign appear against its will in the courts of the other." Employees, supra,
at 294 (MABSHALL, J. , concurring in the result).
zs we have held that the Eleventh Amendment does not apply to "counties and similar municipal corporations." Mt. Healthy City School District
v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274, 280 (1977); see Lincoln County v. Luning, 133
U. S. 529, 530 (1890). At the same time, we have applied the Amendment
to bar relief against county officials "in order to protect the state treasury
from liability that would have had essentially the same practical consequences as a judgment against the State itself." Lake Country Estates,
Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U. S. 391, 401 (1979). See,
e. g., Edelman v. Jordan, supra (Eleventh Amendment bars suit against
state and county officials for retroactive award of welfare benefits). The
Courts of Appeals are in general agreement that a suit against officials of a
county or other governmental entity is barred if the relief obtained runs
against the State. See, e. g., Moore v. Tangipahoa Parish School Board,
594 F. 2d 489, 493 (CA5 1979); Carey v. Quern, 588 F. 2d 230, 233-234
(CA71978); Incarcerated Men of Allen County Jail v. Fair, 507 F. 2d 281,
287-288 (CA6 1974); Harris v. Tooele County School District, 471 F. 2d
218, 220 (CAlO 1973). Given that the actions of the county commissioners
and mental health adminstrators are dependent on funding from the State,
it may be that relief granted against these county officials, when exercising
their functions under the MH/MR Act, effectively runs against the State.
Cf. Farr v. Chesney, 441 F . Supp. 127, 130-132 (MD Pa. 1977) (holding

1Z.·l.3
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that without the injunction against the state institutions and
officials in this case, an order entered on state-law grounds
necessarily would be limited. The relief substantially concerns Pennhurst, an arm of the State that is operated by
state officials. Moreover, funding for the county mental retardation programs comes almost entirely from the State, see
Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 50, §§4507-4509 (Purdon 1969 and Supp.
1982), and the costs of the masters have been borne by the
State, see 446 F. Supp., at 1327. Finally, the MH/MR Act
contemplates that the state and county officials will cooperate
in operating mental retardation programs. See In re
Schmidt, 494 Pa. 86, 95-96, 429 A. 2d 631, 635-636 (1981).
In short, the present judgment could not be sustained on the
basis of the state-law obligations of petitioner county officials. Indeed, any relief granted against the county officials
on the basis of the state statute would be partial and incomplete at best. Such an ineffective enforcement of state law
would not appear to serve the purposes of efficiency, convenience, and fairness that must inform the exercise of pendent
jurisdiction.

v

The Court of Appeals upheld the judgment of the District
Court solely on the basis of Pennsylvania's MH/MR Act.
We hold that the courts lacked jurisdiction to enjoin petitioner state institutions and state officials on the basis of this
state law. The District Court also rested its decision on the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. See supra, at 2. On remand the
Court of Appeals may consider to what extent, if any, the
judgment may be sustained on these bases. 26 The court also
that Pennsylvania county commissioners, acting as members of the board
of the county office of mental health and retardation, may not be sued for
back pay under the Eleventh Amendment). We need not decide this issue
in light of our disposition above.
26
On the Fourteenth Amendment issue, the court should consider
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may consider whether relief may be granted to respondents
under the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of
Rights Act, 42 U. S. C. §§ 6011, 6063. The judgment of the
Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.

Youngberg v. Romeo,- U. S . - (1982), a decision that was not available when the District Court issued its decision.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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PENNHURST STATE SCHOOL & HOSPITAL ET AL.,
PETITIONERS v. TERRI LEE HALDERMAN ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
[January-, 1984]

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether a federal court
may award injunctive relief against state officials on the basis
of state law.
I
This litigation, here for the second time, concerns the conditions of care at petitioner Pennhurst State School and Hospital, a Pennsylvania institution for the care of the mentally
retarded. See Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1 (1981). Although the litigation's history is set forth in detail in our prior opinion, see id., at 5--10,
it is necessary for purposes of this decision to review that
history.
This suit originally was brought in 1974 by respondent
Terri Lee Halderman, a resident of Pennhurst, in the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Ultimately, plaintiffs included a class consisting of all persons
who were or might become residents of Pennhurst; the Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Citizens (P ARC); and the
United States. Defendants were Pennhurst and various
Pennhurst officials; the Pennsylvania Department of Public
Welfare and several of its officials; and various county commissioners, county mental retardation administrators, and
other officials of five Pennsylvania counties surrounding
Pennhurst. Respondents' amended complaint charged that
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conditions at Pennhurst violated the class members' rights
under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 87 Stat. 394, as amended, 29
U. S. C. § 794 (1976 ed. and Supp. V); the Developmentally
Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U. S. C.
§§ 6001--6081 (1976 ed. and Supp. V); and the Pennsylvania
Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966 (the
"MH/MR Act"), Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 50, §§ 4101-4704 (Purdon 1969 and Supp. 1982). Both damages and injunctive relief were sought.
In 1977, following a lengthy trial, the District Court rendered its decision. 446 F. Supp. 1295 (1977). As noted in
our prior opinion, the court's findings were undisputed: "Conditions at Pennhurst are not only dangerous, with the residents often physically abused or drugged by staff members,
but also inadequate for the 'habilitation' of the retarded. Indeed, the court found that the physicial, intellectual, and
emotional skills of some residents have deteriorated at
Pennhurst." 451 U. S., at 7 (footnote omitted). The District Court held that these conditions violated each resident's
right to "minimally adequate habilitation" under the Due
Process Clause and the MH/MR Act, see 446 F. Supp., at
1314-1318, 1322-1323; "freedom from harm" under the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, see id., at 1320-1321;
and "nondiscriminatory habilitation" under the Equal Protection Clause and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, see id., at
1321-1324. Furthermore, the court found that "due process
demands that if a state undertakes the habilitation of a retarded person, it must do so in the least restrictive setting
consistent with that individual's habilitative needs." I d., at
1319 (emphasis added). After concluding that the large size
of Pennhurst prevented it from providing the necessary
habilitation in the least restrictive environment, the court ordered "that immediate steps be taken to remove the retarded
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residents from Pennhurst." I d., at 1325. Petitioners were
ordered "to provide suitable community living arrangements" for the class members, id., at 1326, and the court appointed a Special Master "with the power and duty to plan,
organize, direct, supervise and monitor the implementation
of this and any further Orders of the Court." Ibid. 1
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed most
of the District Court's judgment. 612 F. 2d 84 (1979) (en
bane). It agreed that respondents had a right to habilitation
in the least restrictive environment, but it grounded this
right solely on the "bill of rights" provision in the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42
U. S. C. § 6010. See 612 F. 2d, at 95-100, 104-107. The
court did not consider the constitutional issues or § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act, and while it affirmed the District Court's
holding that the MH/MR Act provides a right to adequate
habilitation, see id., at 100-103, the court did not decide
whether that state right encompassed a right to treatment in
the least restrictive setting.
On the question of remedy, the Court of Appeals affirmed
except as to the District Court's order that Pennhurst be
closed. The court observed that some patients would be
unable to adjust to life outside an institution, and it determined that none of the legal provisions relied on by plaintiffs
precluded institutionalization. I d., at 114-115. It therefore
remanded for "individual determinations by the [District
Court], or by the Special Master, as to the appropriateness of
an improved Pennhurst for each such patient," guided by "a
presumption in favor of placing individuals in [community living arrangements]." Ibid. 2
1
The District Court determined that the individual defendants had
acted in good faith and therefore were immune from the damage claims.
446 F . Supp., at 1324.
2
In a companion case, the Court of Appeals affirmed the District
Court's denial of the Pennhurst Parents-Staff Association's motion to intervene for purposes of appeal, finding the denial harmless error. See 612
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On remand the District Court established detailed procedures for determining the proper residential placement for
each patient. A team consisting of the patient, his parents
or guardian, and his case manager must establish an individual habilitation plan providing for habilitation of the patient
in a designated community living arrangement. The plan is
subject to review by the Special Master. A second master,
called the Hearing Master, is available to conduct hearings,
upon request by the resident, his parents or his advocate, on
the question whether the services of Pennhurst would be
more beneficial to the resident than the community living arrangement provided in the resident's plan. The Hearing
Master then determines where the patient should reside,
subject to possible review by the District Court. See App.
123a-134a (Order of April 24, 1980). 3
This Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals,
finding that 42 U. S. C. § 6010 did not create any substantive
rights. 451 U. S. 1 (1981). We remanded the case to the
Court of Appeals to determine if the remedial order could be
supported on the basis of state law, the Constitution, or § 504
of the Rehabilitation Act. See id., at 31. 4 We also remanded for consideration of whether any relief was available
F. 2d 131 (1979) (en bane). The Association subsequently was granted
leave to intervene and is a petitioner in this Court.
3
On July 1, 1981, Pennsylvania enacted an appropriations bill providing
that only $35,000 would be paid for the Masters' expenses for the fiscal
year July 1981 to June 1982. The District Court held the Pennsylvania
Department of Public Welfare and its Secretary in contempt, and imposed
a fine of $10,000 per day. Pennsylvania paid the fines, and the contempt
was purged on January 8, 1982. On appeal the Court of Appeals affirmed
the contempt order. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hospital,
673 F. 2d 628 (1982), cert. pending, No. 81-2363.
4
Three Justices dissented from the Court's construction of the Act, but
concluded that the District Court should not have adopted the "far-reaching remedy" of appointing "a Special Master to decide which of the Pennhurst inmates should remain and which should be moved to communitybased facilities .... [T]he court should not have assumed the task of managing Pennhurst.... " 451 U. S., at 54 (WHITE J., dissenting in part).
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under other provisions of the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act. See id., at 27-30 (discussing
42 U. S. C. §§ 6011(a), 6063(b)(5)).
On remand the Court of Appeals affirmed its prior judgment in its entirety. 673 F. 2d 647 (1982) (en bane). It determined that in a recent decision the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania had "spoken definitively" in holding that the
MH/MR Act required the State to adopt the "least restrictive
environment" approach for the care of the mentally retarded.
!d., at 651 (citing In re Schmidt, 494 Pa. 86, 429 A. 2d 631
(1981)). The Court of Appeals concluded that this state statute fully supported its prior judgment, and therefore did not
reach the remaining issues of federal law. It also rejected
petitioners' argument that the Eleventh Amendment barred
a federal court from considering this pendent state-law claim.
The court noted that the Amendment did not bar a federal
court from granting prospective injunctive relief against
state officials on the basis of federal claims, see 673 F. 2d, at
656 (citing Ex Parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908)), and concluded that the same result obtained with respect to a
pendent state-law claim. It reasoned that because Siler v.
Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 213 U. S. 175 (1909), an important case in the development of the doctrine of pendent
jurisdiction, also involved state officials, "there cannot be ...
an Eleventh Amendment exception to that rule." 673 F. 2d,
at 658. 5 Finally, the court rejected petitioners' argument
that it should have abstained from deciding the state-law
claim under principles of comity, see id., at 659--660, and
refused to consider petitioners' objections to the District
Court's use of a special master, see id., at 651 and n. 10.
The Court of Appeals also noted that "the United States is an intervening plaintiff .. . against which even the state itself cannot successfully
plead the Eleventh Amendment as a bar to jurisdiction," and that "the
counties, even as juridical entities, do not fall within the coverage of the
Eleventh Amendment. Against those defendants even money damages
may be awarded." 673 F . 2d, at 656 (citation omitted).
5
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Three judges dissented in part, arguing that under principles
of federalism and comity the establishment of a special master to supervise compliance was an abuse of discretion. See
id., at 662 (Seitz, C. J., joined by Hunter, J., dissenting in
part); ibid. (Garth, J., concurring in part and dissenting as to
relief). See also id., at 661 (Aldisert, J., concurring) (seriously questioning the propriety of the order appointing the
Special Master, but concluding that a retroactive reversal of
that order would be meaningless). 6
We granted certiorari, 457 U. S. 1131 (1982), and now reverse and remand.
II
Petitioners raise three challenges to the judgment of the
Court of Appeals: (i) the Eleventh Amendment prohibited
the District Court from ordering state officials to conform
their conduct to state law; (ii) the doctrine of comity prohibited the District Court from issuing its injunctive relief; and
(iii) the District Court abused its discretion in appointing two
masters to supervise the decisions of state officials in implementing state law. We need not reach the latter two issues,
for we find the Eleventh Amendment challenge dispositive.
A

Article III, § 2 of the Constitution provides that the federal
judicial power extends, inter alia, to controversies "between
a State and Citizens of another State." Relying on this language, this Court in 1793 assumed original jurisdiction over a
suit brought by a citizen of South Carolina against the State
of Georgia. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419 (1793). The
decision "created such a shock of surprise that the Eleventh
Amendment was at once proposed and adopted." Monaco v.
Mississippi, 292 U. S. 313, 325 (1934). The Amendment
provides:
The Office of the Special Master was abolished in December 1982.
See App. 220a (Order of August 12, 1982). The Hearing Master remains
in operation.
6
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"The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States
by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects
of any Foreign State."
The Amendment's language overruled the particular result
in Chisholm, but this Court has recognized that its greater
significance lies in its affirmation that the fundamental principle of sovereign immunity limits the grant of judicial authority in Art. III. Thus, in H an.s v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1
(1890), the Court held that, despite the limited terms of the
Eleventh Amendment, a federal court could not entertain a
suit brought by a citizen against his own State. After reviewing the constitutional deb~tes concerning the scope of
Art. III, the Court determined that federal jurisdiction over
suits against unconsenting States "was not contemplated by
the Constitution when establishing the judicial power of the
United States." Id., at 15. See Monaco v. Mississippi,
supra, at 322-323 (1934). 7 In short, the principle of sovereign immunity is a constitutional limitation on the federal judicial power established in Art. III:
"That a State may not be sued without its consent is a
fundamental rule of jurisprudence having so important a
bearing upon the construction of the Constitution of the
United States that it has become established by repeated
decisions of this court that the entire judicial power
granted by the Constitution does not embrace authority
to entertain a suit brought by private parties against a
State without consent given: not one brought by citizens
7

See Employees v. Missouri Public Health Dep't, 411 U. S. 279,
291-292 (1973) (MARSHALL, J., concurring in judgment) (The Eleventh
Amendment "clarif[ied] the intent of the Framers concerning the reach of
federal judicial power" and "restore[d] the original understanding" that
States could not be made unwilling defendants in federal court). See also
Nevada v. Hall, 440 U. S. 410, 430-431 (1979) (BLACKMUN, J ., dissenting);
id., at 437 (REHNQUIST, J ., dissenting).
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of another State, or by citizens or subjects of a foreign
State, because of the Eleventh Amendment; and not
even one brought by its own citizens, because of the fundamental rule of which the Amendment is but an exemplification." Ex parte State of New York No. 1, 256
U. S. 490, 497 (1921) (emphasis added). 8
A sovereign's immunity may be waived, and the Court consistently has held that a State may consent to suit against it
in federal court. See, e. g., Clark v. Barnard, 108 U. S.
436, 447 (1883). We have insisted, however, that the State's
consent be unequivocally expressed. See, e. g., Edelman v.
Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 673 (1974). Similarly, although Congress has power with respect to the rights protected by the
Fourt~enth Amendment to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment immunity, see Fitzpatrick v. Bitker, 427 U. S. 445
(1976), we have required an unequivocal expression of congressional intent to "overturn the constitutionally guaranteed immunity of the several States." Quern v. Jordan, 440
U. S. 332, 342 (1979) (holding that 42 U. S. C. § 1983 does not
override States' Eleventh Amendment immunity). Our reluctance to infer that a State's immunity from suit in the federal courts has been negated stems from recognition of the
vital role of the doctrine of sovereign immunity in our federal
system. A State's constitutional interest in immunity encompasses not merely whether it may be sued, but where it
may be sued. 9 As JUSTICE MARSHALL well has noted, "[b]e8
The limitation deprives federal courts of any jurisdiction to entertain
such claims, and thus may be raised at any point in a proceeding. "The
Eleventh Amendment declares a policy and sets forth an explicit limitation
on federal judicial power of such compelling force that this Court will consider the issue arising under this Amendment ... even though urged for
the first time in this Court." Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury,
323 u. s. 459, 467 (1945).
9
For this reason, the Court consistently has held that a State's waiver
of sovereign immunity in its own courts is not a waiver of the Eleventh
Amendment immunity in the federal courts. See, e. g., Florida Department of Health v. Florida Nursing Home Assn., 450 U. S. 147, 150 (1981)
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cause of the problems of federalism inherent in making one
sovereign appear against its will in the courts of the other, a
restriction upon the exercise of the federal judicial power has
long been considered to be appropriate in a case such as this."
Employees v. Missouri Public Health & Welfare Dep't, 411
U.S. 279,294 (1973) (MARSHALL, J., concurring in result). 10
Accordingly, in deciding this case we must be guided by
"[t]he principles of federalism that inform Eleventh Amendment doctrine." Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678, 691 (1978).
B

This Court's decisions thus establish that "an unconsenting
State is immune from suits brought in federal courts by her
own citizens as well as by citizens of another state." Employees, supra, at 280. There may be a question, however,
whether a particular suit in fact is a suit against a State. It
is clear, of course, that in the absence of consent a suit in
which the State or one of its agencies or departments is
named as the defendant is proscribed by the Eleventh
Amendment. See, e. g., Florida Department of Health v.
Florida Nursing Home Assn., 450 U. S. 147 (1981) (per
curiam); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U. S. 781 (1978) (per
curiam). This jurisdictional bar applies regardless of the
(per curiam). "[l]t is not consonant with our dual system for the federal
courts . . . to read the consent to embrace federal as well as state
courts . .. . [A] clear declaration of the state's intention to submit its fiscal
problems to other courts than those of its own creation must be found."
Great Northern Life Insurance Co. v. Read, 322 U. S. 47, 54 (1944).
10
See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U. S., at 418-419 (States were "vitally interested" in whether they would be subject to suit in the federal courts, and
the debates about state immunity focused on the question of federal judicial
power). Cf. id., at 430-431 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting) (sovereign immunity is "a guarantee that is implied as an essential component of federalism"
and is "sufficiently fundamental to our federal structure to have implicit
constitutional dimension"); id., at 437 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting) ("[T]he
States that ratified the Eleventh Amendment thought that they were putting an end to the possibility of individual States as unconsenting defendants in foreign jurisdictions").
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nature of the relief sought.

See, e. g., Missouri v. Fiske,

290 U. S. 18, 27 (1933) ("Expressly applying to suits in equity

as well as at law, the Amendment necessarily embraces demands for the enforcement of equitable rights and the prosecution of equitable remedies when these are asserted and
prosecuted by an individual against a State").
When the suit is brought only against state officials, a
question arises as to whether that suit is a suit against the
State itself. Although prior decisions of this Court have not
been entirely consistent on this issue, certain principles are
well established. The Eleventh Amendment bars a suit
against state officials when "the state is the real, substantial
party in interest." Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U. S. 459, 464 (1945). See, e. g., In re Ayers, 123
U. S. 443, 487-492 (1887); Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U. S.
711, 720-723, 727-728 (1882). Thus, "[t]he general rule is
that relief sought nominally against an officer is in fact
against the sovereign if the decree would operate against the
latter." Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U. S. 57, .58 (1963) (per
curiam). 11 And, as when the State itself is named as the de"The general rule is that a suit is against the sovereign if 'the judgment
sought would expend itself on the public treasury or domain, or interfere
with the public administration,' or if the effect of the judgment would be 'to
restrain the Government from acting, or to compel it to act.'" Dugan v.
Rank, 372 U. S. 609, 620 (1963) (citations omitted).
Respondents do not dispute that the relief sought and awarded below operated against the state in each of the foregoing respects. They suggest,
however, that the suit here should not be considered to be against the state
for the purposes of the Eleventh Amendment because, they say, petitioners were acting ultra vires their authority. Respondents rely largely on
Florida Dep't of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U. S. 670 (1982),
which in turn was founded upon Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce
Corp., 337 U. S. 682 (1949). These cases provide no support for this argument. These and other modern cases make clear that a state officer may
be said to act ultra vires only when he acts "without any authority whatever." Treasure Salvors, supra, at 697 (opinion of STEVENS, J.); accord
id., at 716 (WHITE, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in
part) (test is whether there was no "colorable basis for the exercise of au11
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fendant, a suit against state officials that is in fact a suit
against a State is barred regardless of whether it seeks damages or injunctive relief. See Cory v. White, 457 U. S. 85,
91 (1982).
The Court has recognized an important exception to this
general rule: a suit challenging the constitutionality of a state
official's action is not one against the State. This was the
holding in Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908), in which a
federal court enjoined the Attorney General of the State of
Minnesota from bringing suit to enforce a state statute that
allegedly violated the Fourteenth Amendment. This Court
held that the Eleventh Amendment did not prohibit issuance
of this injunction. The theory of the case was that an unconstitutional enactment is "void" and therefore does not "impart to [the officer] any immunity from responsibility to the
StJpreme authority of the United States." !d., at 160. Since
the State could not authorize the action, the officer was
"stripped of his official or representative character and [was]
subjected to the consequences of his official conduct." Ibid.
While the rule permitting suits alleging conduct contrary
to "the supreme authority of the United States" has survived, the theory of Young has not been provided an expansive interpretation. Thus, in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S.
651 (1974), the Court emphasized that the Eleventh Amendment bars some forms of injunctive relief against state officials for violation of federal law. !d., at 666--667. In parthority by state officials"). As the Court in Larson explained, an ultra
vires claim rests on "the officer's lack of delegated power. A claim of error
in the exercise of that power is therefore not sufficient." Larson, supra,
at 690. Petitioners' actions in operating this mental health institution
plainly were not beyond their delegated authority in this sense. The
MH/MR Act gave them broad discretion to provide "adequate" mental
health services. Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 50, § 4201(1) (Purdon 1969). The
essence of respondents' claim is that petitioners have not provided such
services adequately.
The dissent advances a far broader-and unprecedented-version of the
ultra vires doctrine, which we discuss infra, at 15-26.
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ticular, Edelman held that when a plaintiff sues a state
official alleging a violation of federal law, the federal court
may award an injunction that governs the official's future
conduct, but not one that awards retroactive monetary relief.
Under the theory of Young, such a suit would not be one
against the State since the federal-law allegation would strip
the state officer of his official authority. Nevertheless, retroactive relief was barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

III
With these principles in mind, we now turn to the question
whether the claim that petitioners violated state law in carrying out their official duties at Pennhurst is one against the
State and therefore barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
Respondents advance two principal arguments in support of
the judgment below. 12 First, they contend that under the
12.we reject respondents' additional contention that Pennsylvania has
waived its immunity from suit in federal court. At the time the suit was
filed, suits against Pennsylvania were permitted only where expressly authorized by the legislature, see, e. g., Freach v. Commonwealth, 471 Pa.
558, 370 A. 2d 1163 (1977), and respondents have not referred us to any
provision expressly waiving Pennsylvania's Eleventh Amendment immunity. The State now has a statute governing sovereign immunity, including an express preservation of its immunity from suit in federal court:
"Federal courts.-Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be construed
to waive the immunity of the Commonwealth from suit in Federal courts
guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States." 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8521(b) (1980).
We also do not agree with respondents that the presence of the United
States as a plaintiff in this case removes the Eleventh Amendment from
consideration. Although the Eleventh Amendment does not bar the
United States from suing a State in federal court, see, e. g., Monaco v.
Mississippi, 292 U. S. 313, 329 (1934), the United States' presence in the
case for any purpose does not eliminate the State's immunity for all purposes. For example, the fact that the federal court could award injunctive
relief to the United States on federal constitutional claims would not mean
that the court could order the State to pay damages to other plaintiffs. In
any case, we think it clear that the United States does not have standing to
assert the state-law claims of third-parties. For these reasons, the ap-
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doctrine of Edelman v. Jordan, supra, the suit is not against
the State because the courts below ordered only prospective
injunctive relief. Second, they assert that the state-law
claim properly was decided under the doctrine of pendent
jurisdiction. Respondents rely on decisions of this Court
awarding relief against state officials on the basis of a pendent state-law claim. See, e. g., Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 213 U. S. 175, 193 (1909).
A

We first address the contention that respondents' state-law
claim is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment because it
seeks only prospective relief as defined in Edelman v. Jordan, supra. The Court of Appeals held that if the judgment
below rested on federal law, it could be entered against petitioner state officials under the doctrine established in E delman and Young even though the prospective financial burden
was substantial and ongoing. 13 See 673 F. 2d, at 656. The
court assumed, and respondents assert, that this reasoning
applies as well when the official acts in violation of state law.
This argument misconstrues the basis of the doctrine established in Young and Edelman.
As discussed above, the injunction in Young was justified,
notwithstanding the obvious impact on the State itself, on the
view that sovereign immunity does not apply because an official who acts unconstitutionally is "stripped of his official or
plicability of the Eleventh Amendment to respondents' state-law claim is
unaffected by the United States' participation in the case.
13
We do not decide whether the District Court would have jurisdiction
under this reasoning to grant prospective relief on the basis of federal law,
but we note that the scope of any such relief would be constrained by principles of comity and federalism. "Where, as here, the exercise of authority by state officials is attacked, federal courts must be constantly mindful
of the 'special delicacy of the adjustment to be preserved between federal
equitable power and State administration of its own law."' Rizzo v.
Goode, 423 U. S. 362, 378 (1976) (quoting Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U. S.
117, 120 (1951)).
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representative character," Young, 209 U. S., at 160. This
rationale, of course, created the "well-recognized irony" that
an official's unconstitutional conduct constitutes state action under the Fourteenth Amendment but not the Eleventh
Amendment. Florida Department of State v. Treasure
Salvors, Inc., 458 U. S. 670, 685 (1982) (opinion of STEVENS,
J.). Nonetheless, the Young doctrine has been accepted as
necessary to permit the federal courts to vindicate federal
rights and hold state officials responsible to "the supreme authority of the United States." Young, 209 U. S., at 160.
As JUSTICE BRENNAN has observed, "Ex parte Young was
the culmination of efforts by this Court to harmonize the
principles of the Eleventh Amendment with the effective supremacy of rights and powers secured elsewhere in the Constitution." Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U. S. 82, 106 (1971)
(BRENNAN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Our decisions repeatedly have emphasized that the Young
doctrine rests on the need to promote the vindication of federal rights. See, e. g., Quern v:Jordan, 440 U. S. 332, 337
(1979); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232, 237 (1974); Georgia
R. & Banking Co. v. Redwine, 342 U. S. 299, 304 (1952).
The Court also has recognized, however, that the need to
promote the supremacy of federal law must be accommodated
to the constitutional immunity of the States. This is the significance of Edelman v. Jordan, supra. We recognized that
the prospective relief authorized by Young "has permitted
the Civil War Amendments to the Constitution to serve as a
sword, rather than merely a shield, for those whom they
were designed to protect." 415 U. S., at 664. But we declined to extend the fiction of Young to encompass retroactive relief, for to do so would effectively eliminate the
constitutional immunity of the States. Accordingly, we concluded that although the difference between permissible and
impermissible relief "will not in many instances be that between day and night," id., at 667, an award of retroactive relief necessarily "'fall[s] afoul of the Eleventh Amendment if
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that basic constitutional provision is to be conceived of as
having any present force."' !d., at 665 (quoting Rothstein v.
Wyman, 467 F. 2d 226, 237 (CA21972) (McGowan, J., sitting
by designation), cert. denied, 411 U. S. 921 (1973)). In sum
Edelman's distinction between prospective and retroactive
relief fulfills the underlying purpose of Ex parte Young while
at the same time preserving to an important degree the constitutional immunity of the States.
This need to reconcile competing interests is wholly absent, however, when a plaintiff alleges that a state official has
violated state law. In such a case the entire basis for the
doctrine of Young and Edelman disappears. A federal
court's grant of relief against state officials on the basis of
state law, whether prospective or retroactive, does not vindicate the supreme authority of federal law. On the contrary,
it is difficult to think of a greater intrusion on state sovereignty than when a federal court instructs state officials on
how to conform their conduct to state law. Such a result
conflicts·directly with the principles of federalism that underlie the Eleventh Amendment. We conclude that Young and
Edelman are inapplicable in a suit against state officials on
the basis of state law.
B

The contrary view of the dissent rests on fiction, is wrong
on the law, and, most important, would emasculate the Eleventh Amendment. 14 Under its view, an allegation that official conduct is contrary to a state statute would suffice to
override the State's protection under that Amendment. The
theory is that such conduct is contrary to the official's "instructions," and thus ultra vires his authority. Accordingly,
official action based on a reasonable interpretation of any
statute might, if the interpretation turned out to be errone'•We are prompted to respond at some length to JUSTICE STEVENS' 41page dissent in part by his broad charge that "the Court repudiates at least
28 cases," post, at 21. The decisions the dissent relies upon simply do not
support this sweeping characterization. See nn. 19, 20, and 21, infra.
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ous, 15 provide the basis for injunctive relief against the actors
in their official capacities. In this case, where officials of a
major state department, clearly acting within the scope of
their authority, were found not to have improved conditions
in a state institution adequately under state law, the dissent's
result would be that the State itself has forfeited its constitutionally provided immunity.
The theory is out of touch with reality. The dissent does
not dispute that the general criterion for determining when a
suit is in fact against the sovereign is the effect of the relief
sought. See supra, at 10; post, at 21, n. 29. According to
the dissent, the relief sought and ordered here-which in effect was that a major state institution be closed and smaller
state institutions be created and expansively funded-did not
operate against the State. This view would make the law a
pretense. No other court or judge in the ten-year history of
this litigation has advanced this theory. And the dissent's
underlying view that the named defendants here were acting
beyond and contrary to their authority cannot be reconciled
with reality-or with the record. The District Court in this
case held that the individual defendants "acted in the utmost
good faith . . . within the sphere of their official responsibilities," and therefore were entitled to immunity from damages. 446 F. Supp., at 1324 (emphasis added). The named
defendants had nothing to gain personally from their conduct;
they were not found to have acted wilfully or even negligently. See ibid. The court expressly noted that the individual defendants "apparently took every means available to
them to reduce the incidents of abuse and injury, but were
constantly faced with staff shortages." Ibid. It also found
"that the individual defendants are dedicated professionals in
the field of retardation who were given very little with which
15

In this case, for example, the court below rested its finding that state
law required habilitation in the least restrictive environment on dicta in In
re Schmidt, 494 Pa. 86, 429 A. 2d 631 (1981). That decision was not issued
until seven years after this suit was filed, and four years after trial ended.
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to accomplish the habilitation of the retarded at Pennhurst."
Ibid. 16 As a result, all the relief ordered by the courts below
was institutional and official in character. To the extent
there was a violation of state law in this case, it is a case of
the State itself not fulfilling its legislative promises. 17
This part of the court's findings and judgment was not appealed. See
612 F. 2d, at 90, n. 4. See also 446 F. Supp., at 1303 ("On the whole, the
staff at Pennhurst appears to be dedicated and trying hard to cope with the
inadequacies of the institution").
The parties defendant in this suit were not all individuals. They included as well the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare, a major department of the State itself; and the Pennhurst State School and Hospital,
a state institution. The dissent apparently is arguing that the defendants
as a group-including both the state institutions, and state and county officials-were acting ultra vires. Since the institutions were only said to
have violated the law through the individual defendants, the District
Court's findings, never since questioned by any court, plainly exonerate all
the defendants from the dissent's claim that they acted beyond the scope of
their authority.
A truth of which the dissent's theoretical argument seems unaware is the
plight of many if not most of the mental institutions in our country. As the
District Court in this case found, "History is replete with misunderstanding and mistreatment of the retarded." 446 F. Supp., at 1299. Accord
Message from President Kennedy Relative to Mental Illness and Mental
Retardation, H. R. Doc. No. 58, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1963) ("We as a
Nation have long neglected the mentally ill and the mentally retarded").
It is common knowledge that "insane asylums," as they were known until
the middle of this century, usually were underfunded and understaffed. It
is not easy to persuade competent people to work in these institutions, particularly well trained professionals. Physical facilities, due to consistent
underfunding by state legislatures, have been grossly inadequate--€specially in light of advanced knowledge and techniques for the treatment of
the mentally ill. See generally id., at 2, 4; The President's Comm. on
Mental Retardation, MR 68: The Edge of Change 11-13 (1968); President's
Comm. on Mental Retardation, Changing Patterns in Residential Services
for the Mentally Retarded 1-58 (R. Kugel & W. Wolfensberger ed. 1969);
R. C. Scheerenberger, A History of Mental Retardation 240-243 (1983).
Only recently have States commenced to move to correct widespread deplorable conditions. The responsibility, as the District Court recognized
after a protracted trial, has rested on the State itself.
17
The dissent appears to be confused about our argument here. See
14

I
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The dissent bases its view on numerous cases from the turn
of the century and earlier. These cases do not provide the
support the dissent claims to find. Many are simply
mis!!ited. For example, with perhaps one exception, 18 none
of its Eleventh Amendment cases can be said to hold that injunctive relief could be ordered against State officials for failing to carry out their duties under State statutes. 19 And the
post, at 13-14. It is of course true, as the dissent says, that the finding
below that petitioners acted in good faith and therefore were immune from
damages does not affect whether an injunction might be issued against
them by a court possessed of jurisdiction. The point is that the courts
below did not have jurisdiction because the relief ordered so plainly ran
against the State. No one questions that the petitioners in operating
Pennhurst were acting in their official capacity. Nor can it be questioned
that the judgments under review commanded action that could be taken by
petitioners only in their official capacity-and, of course, only if the State
provided the necessary funding. It is evident that the dissent would vest
in federal courts authority, acting solely under state law, to ignore the sovereignty of the States that the Eleventh Amendment was adopted to protect. Article III confers no jurisdiction on this Court to strip an explicit
Amendment of the Constitution of its substantive meaning.
Contrary to the dissent's view, see post, at 21, n. 27, an injunction based
on federal law stands on very different footing, particularly in light of the
Civil War Amendments. As we have explained, in such cases this Court is
vested with the constitutional duty to vindicate "the supreme authority of
the United States," Young, 209 U. S., at 160. There is no corresponding
mandate to enforce state law.
18
See Rolston v. Missouri Fund Commissioners, 120 U. S. 390 (1887).
In Rolston, however, the state officials were ordered to comply with "a
plain ministerial duty," see Great Northern Life Insurance Co. v. Read,
322 U. S. 47, 51 (1944), a far cry from this case, seen. 20, infra.
19
The cases are collected in n. 50 of the dissent, post, at 40. Several of
the cases do not rest on an Eleventh Amendment holding at all. For example, federal jurisdiction in fact was held to be lacking in Martin v.
Lankford, 245 U. S. 547 (1915), because of lack of diversity. A fair reading of South Carolina v. Wesley, 155 U. S. 542 (1895), and the cases it
cites, makes clear that the ruling there was on the purely procedural point
that the party pressing the appeal was not a party to the proceeding. In
two other cases the allegation was that a state officer or agency had acted
unconstitutionally, rather than merely contrary to state law. Atchison,
T. & S. F. R. Co. v. O'Connor, 223 U. S. 280 (1897); Hopkins v. Clemson
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federal sovereign immunity cases the dissent relies on as
analogy, while far from uniform, make clear that suit may not
be predicated on violations of state statutes that command
purely discretionary duties. 20 Since it cannot be doubted
Agricultural College, 221 U. S. 636 (1911). In Johnson v. Lankford, 245
U. S. 541 (1918), the relief sought was not injunctive relief but money damages against the individual officer. See infra n. 21. None of these cases
can be said to be overruled by our holding today. As noted infra, at
26-27, the Greene cases do not discuss the Eleventh Amendment in connection with the state-law claim.
Tindal v. Wesley, 167 U. S. 204 (1897), and Scully v. Bird, 209 U. S. 481
(1908), are more closely analogous cases. In both of these old cases, however, the allegation was that the defendants had committed common law
torts, not, as here, that they had failed to carry out affirmative duties assigned to them by statute. See Tindal, supra, at 221 (distinguishing suits
brought ''to enforce the discharge by the defendants of any specific duty
enjoined by the State"); Transcript of Record, Tindal v. Wesley 3 (complaint alleged that defendants had "wrongfully entered into said premises
anQ. ousted the plaintiff . . . to the damage of the plaintiff ten thousand dollars"); Scully, supra, at 483 (allegation was that defendant had ''injuriously
affect[ed] the reputation and sale of [plaintiff's] products"). Tort cases
such as these were explicitly overruled in Larson v. Domestic & Foreign
Commerce Corp., 337 U. S. 682 (1949). See infra, at 20-23.
See, e. g., Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U. S. 605, 620 (1912) ("The
complainant did not ask the court to interfere with the official discretion of
the Secretary of War, but challenged his authority to do the things of
which complaint was made"); Santa Fe P.R. Co. v. Fall, 259 U. S. 197,
198-199 (1922) (same); see also Kendall v. Stokes, 3 How. 87, 98 (1845)
("[A] public officer is not liable to an action if he falls into error in a case
where the act to be done is not merely a ministerial one, but is one in relation to which it is his duty to exercise judgment and discretion; even although an individual may suffer by his mistake"); Noble v. Union River
Logging R., 147 U. S. 165171-172 (1893); Belknap v. Schild, 161 U. S. 10,
18 (1896) (under Eleventh Amendment, injunctive relief is permitted
where officer commits a tort that is "contrary to a plain official duty requiring no exercise of discretion"); Wells v. Roper, 246 U. S. 335, 338 (1918);
Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U. S. 682, 695 (1949)
(suit challenging "incorrect decision as to law or fact" is barred "if the officer making the decision was empowered to do so"); id., at 715 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (noting that cases involve orders to comply with
nondiscretionary duties). The opinions make clear that the question of dis!l)
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that the statutes at issue here gave petitioners broad discretion in operating Pennhurst, seen. 11, supra; see also 446 F.
Supp., at 1324, the conduct alleged in this case would not be
ultra vires even under the standards of the dissent's cases. 21
Thus, while there is language in the early cases that advances the authority-stripping theory advocated by the dissent, this theory had never been pressed as far as the dissent
would do in this case. And when the expansive approach of
the dissent was advanced, this Court plainly and explicitly
rejected it. In Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce
Corp., 337 U. S. 682 (1949), the Court was faced with the arcretion went to sovereign immunity, and not to the court's mandamus powers generally. See, e. g., Philadelphia Co., supra, at 618-620. Therationale appears to be that discretionary duties have a greater impact on the
sovereign because they "brin[g] the operation of governmental machinery
into play." Larson, supra, at 715 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
"In any event, as with the Eleventh Amendment cases, seen. 19, supra,
the dissent also is wrong to say that the federal sovereign immunity cases
it cites post, at 40, n. 50, are today overruled. Many of them were actions
for damages in tort against the individual officer. Little v. Barreme, 2
Cranch 170 (1804); Wise v. Withers, 3 Cranch 331 (1806); Mitchell v. Harmony, 13 How. 115 (1851); Bates v. Clark, 95 U. S. 204 (1877); Belknap v.
Schild, 161 U. S. 10 (1896). In Belknap the Court drew a careful distinction between such actions and suits in which the relief would run more directly against the State. !d., at 18. The Court disallowed injunctive relief against the officers on this basis. I d., at 23-25. Contrary to the view
of the dissent, post, at 10, n. 10, nothing in our opinion touches these cases.
The Court in Larson similarly distinguished between cases seeking money
damages against the individual officer in tort, and those seeking injunctive
relief against the officer in his official capacity. It held that the latter
sought relief against the sovereign, while the former might not. 337
U. S., at 687-688, and nn. 7, 8.
There is language in other cases that suggests they were actions alleging
torts, not statutory violations. See Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223
U. S. 605, 623 (1912); Sloan Shipyards v. U. S. Fleet Corp., 258 U. S. 549,
568 (1922); Land v. Dollar, 330 U. S. 731, 736 (1947). The remainder
clearly distinguish cases (like the present one) involving statutes that command discretionary duties. See n. 20, supra. In any case, the Court in
Larson explicitly limited the precedential value of all of these cases. See
Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U. S. 643, 646, and n. 6 (1962).
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gument that an allegation that a government official committed a tort sufficed to distinguish the official from the sovereign. Therefore, the argument went, a suit for an injunction
to remedy the injury would not be against the sovereign.
The Court rejected the argument, noting that it would make
the doctrine of sovereign immunity superfluous. A plaintiff
would need only to "claim an invasion of his legal rights" in
order to override sovereign immunity. Id., at 693. In the
Court's view, the argument "confuse[d) the doctrine of sovereign immunity with the requirement that a plaintiff state a
cause of action." !d., at 692-693. The dissent's theory suffers a like confusion. 22 Under the dissent's view, a plaintiff
would need only to claim a denial of rights protected or provided by statute in order to override sovereign immunity.
Except in rare cases it would make the constitutional doctrine of sovereign immunity a nullity.
The crucial element of the dissent's theory was also the
plaintiff's central contention in Larson. It is that "[a] sover- '
22
In fact, as the dissent itself states, the argument in Larson that an
allegation of tortious activity overrides sovereign immunity is essentially
the same as the dissent's argument that an allegation of conduct contrary
to statute overrides sovereign immunity. See post, at 33. The result in
each case-as the Court in Larson recognizes-turns on whether the defendant state official was empowered to do what he did, i. e., whether,
even if he acted erroneously, it was action within the scope of his authority.
See Larson, 337 U. S., at 685 (controversy on merits concerned whether
officer had interpreted government contract correctly); id., at 695; id., at
71&-717 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (in cases alleging a tort, the "official
seeks to screen himself behind the sovereign"); id., at 721-722. What the
dissent fails to note is that the Court in Larson explicitly rejected the view
that the dissent here also advances, which is "that an officer given the
power to make decisions is only given the power to make correct decisions." !d., at 695. The Court in Larson made crystal clear that an officer might make errors and still be acting within the scope of his authority.
Ibid. (There can be no question that the defendants here were "given the
power to make decisions" about the operation of Pennhurst. See n. 11,
supra.) The dissent's view that state officers "have no discretion to commit a tort," post, at 7, n. 7, cannot be reconciled with the plain holding of
Larson.

/
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eign, like any other principal, cannot authorize its agent to
violate the law," so that when the agent does so he cannot be
acting for the sovereign. Post, at 28; see also post, at 17, 24,
33; cf. Larson, supra, at 693-694 ("It is argued . . . that the
commission of a tort cannot be authorized by the sovereign .
. . . It is on this contention that the respondent's position fundamentally rests .... "). It is a view of agency law that the
Court in Larson explicitly rejected. 23 Larson thus made
clear that, at least insofar as injunctive relief is sought, an
error of law by state officers acting in their official capacities
will not suffice to override the sovereign immunity of the
State where the relief effectively is against it. !d., at 690,
695. 24 Any resulting disadvantage to the plaintiff was "outweigh[ed] " by "the necessity of permitting the Government
to carry out its functions unhampered by direct judicial intervention." !d., at 704. If anything, this public need is even
"It has been said, in a very special sense, that, as a matter of agency
law, a principal may never lawfully authorize the commission of a tort by
his agent. But that statement, in its usual context, is only a way of saying
that an agent's liability for torts committed by him cannot be avoided by
pleading the direction or authorization of his principal. The agent is himself liable whether or not he has been authorized or even directed to commit the tort. This, of course, does not mean that the principal is not liable
nor that the tortious action may not be regarded as the action of the principal." Id., at 694 (footnote omitted).
24
The Larson Court noted that a similar argument "was at one time advanced in connection with corporate agents, in an effort to avoid corporate
liability for torts, but was decisively rejected." 337 U. S., at 694. See 10
Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations § 4877, at 350
(1978 ed.) (a corporation is liable for torts committed by its agent within
the scope of is authority even though the "act was contrary to or in violation of the instructions or orders given by it to the offending agent"); id.,
§ 4959 (same as to crimes).
The dissent's strained interpretation of Larson, post, at 28-30, simply
ignores the language that the dissent itself quotes: "It is important to note
that in [ultra vires] cases the relief can be granted, without impleading the
sovereign, only because of the officer's lack of delegated power. A claim
of error in the exercise of that power is therefore not sufficient." 337
U. S., at 689-690.
23
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greater when questions of federalism are involved. See
supra, at ~9.
The dissent in Larson made many of the arguments advanced by the dissent today, and asserted that many of the
same cases were being overruled or ignored. See 337 U. S.,
at 723-728 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Those arguments
were rejected, and the cases supporting them are mori25

211
As we have discussed supra, at 11-12, Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S.
651 (1974), also shows that the broad ultra vires theory enunciated in
Young and in some of the cases quoted by the dissent has been discarded.
In Edelman, although the State officers were alleged to be acting contrary
to law, and therefore should have been "stripped of their authority'' under
the theory of the dissent, we held the action to be barred by the Eleventh
Amendment. The dissent attempts to distinguish Edelman on the ground
that the retroactive relief there, unlike injunctive relief, does not run only
against the agent. Post, at 21, n. 29. To say that injunctive relief against
State officials acting in their official capacity does not run against the State
is to resort to the fictions that characterize the dissent's theories. Unlike
the English sovereign perhaps, an American State can act only through its
officials. It is true that the Court in Edelman recognized that retroactive
relief often, or at least sometimes, has a greater impact on the State treasury than does injunctive relief, see 415 U. S., at 666, n; 11, but there was
no suggestion that damages alone were thought to run against the State
while injunctive relief did not.
We have noted that the authority-stripping theory of Young is a fiction
that has been narrowly construed. In this light, it may well be wondered
what principled basis there is to the ultra vires doctrine as it was set forth
in Larson and Treasure Salvors. That doctrine excepts from the Eleventh Amendment bar suits against officers acting in their official capacities
but without any statutory authority, even though the relief would operate
against the State. At bottom, the doctrine is based on the fiction of the
Young opinion. The dissent's method is merely to take this fiction to its
extreme. While the dissent's result may be logical, in the sense that it is
difficult to draw principled lines short of that end, its view would virtually
eliminate the constitutional doctrine of sovereign immunity. It is a result
from which the Court in Larson wisely recoiled. We do so again today.
For present purposes, however, we do no more than question the continued vitality of the ultra vires doctrine in the Eleventh Amendment context. We hold only that to the extent the doctrine is consistent with the
analysis of this opinion, it is a very narrow exception that will allow suit
only under the standards set forth in n. 11 supra.
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bund. Since Larson was decided in 1949, 26 no opinion by any
Member of this Court has cited the cases on which the dissent
primarily relies for a proposition as broad as the language the
dissent quotes. Many if not most of these cases have not
been relied upon in an Eleventh Amendment context at all.
Those that have been so cited have been relied upon only for
propositions with which no one today quarrels. -n The plain
211

The dissent appears to believe that Larson is consistent with all prior
law. See post, at 28. This view ignores the fact that the Larson Court
itself understood that it was required to ''resolve [a] conflict in doctrine."
337 U. S., at 701. The Court since has recognized that Larson represented a watershed in the law of sovereign immunity. In Malone v.
Bowdoin, 369 U. S. 643, Justice Stewart's opinion for the Court observed
that "to reconcile completely all the decisions of the Court in this field prior
to 1949 would be a Procrustean task." I d., at 646. His opinion continued:
"The Court's 1949 Larson decision makes it unnecessary, however, to
undertake that task here. For in Larson the Court, aware that it was
called upon to 'resolve the conflict in doctrine' ... , thoroughly reviewed
the many prior decisions, and made an informed and carefully considered
choice between the seemingly conflicting precedents." Ibid.
The Court included many of the cases upon which the dissent relies in its
list of cases that were rejected by Larson. See id., n. 6.
27
E. g., Rolston v. Missouri Fund Commissioners, 120 U. S. 390 (1887)
(never cited); Scully v. Bird, 209 U. S. 481 (1908) (never cited); Hopkins v.
Clemson Agricultural College, 221 U. S. 636 (1911) (never cited); Johnson
v. Lankford, 245 U. S. 541 (1918) (never cited); Land v. Dollar, 330 U. S.
731 (1947) (cited only for proposition that judgment that would expend itself on public treasury or interfere with public administration is a suit
against the United States); Cunningham v. Macon & B. R. Co., 109 U. S.
446 (1883) (cited only for proposition that a suit alleging unconstitutional
conduct is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment, and that State cannot
be sued without its consent); Poindexter v. Greenhaw, 114 U. S. 270 (1885)
(unconstitutional-conduct suit is not suit against State); Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust, 154 U. S. 362 (1894) (same). Prior to Florida Dept. of
State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U. S. 670 (1982), Tindal v. Wesley,
167 U. S. 204 (1897), had been cited only for the proposition that a suit alleging unconstitutional conduct is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
The plurality opinion in Treasure Salvors discussed Tindal at some length,
458 U. S., at 685-688, but noted that the rule of Tindal "was clarified in
Larson." Id., at 688; see also id., at 715, n. 13 (WHITE, J., dissenting).
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fact is that the dissent's broad theory, if it ever was accepted
to the full extent to which it is now pressed, has not been the
law for at least a generation.
The reason is obvious. Under the dissent's view of the
ultra vires doctrine, the Eleventh Amendment would have
force only in the rare case in which a plaintiff foolishly attempts to sue the State in its own name, or where he cannot
produce some state statute that has been violated to his asserted injury. Thus, the ultra vires doctrine, a narrow and
questionable exception, would swallow the general rule that a
suit is against the State if the relief will run against it. That
result gives the dissent no pause presumably because of its
view that the Eleventh Amendment and sovereign immunity
"'undoubtedly ru[n] counter to modern democratic notions of
the moral responsibility of the State."' Post, at 39, n. 48
(quoting Great Northern Life Insurance Co. v. Read, 322
U. S. 47, 59 (1944) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)). This argument has not been adopted by this Court. See Great Northern Life Insurance Co. v. Read, 322 U~ S. 47, 51 (1944) ("Efforts to force, through suits against officials, performance of
promises by a state collide directly with the necessity that a
sovereign must be free from judicial compulsion in the carrying out of its policies within the limits of the Constitution.");
Larson, supra, at 704 ("The Government, as representative
of the community as a whole, cannot be stopped in its
tracks ... "). Moreover, the argument substantially misses
the point with respect to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. As JUSTICE MARSHALL has observed, the Eleventh
Amendment's restriction on the federal judicial power is
based in large part on "the problems of federalism inherent in
making one sovereign appear against its will in the courts of
the other." Employees v. Missouri Public Health Dept.,
411 U. S. 279, 294 (1973) (MARSHALL, J., concurring in the
As noted, n. 26, supra, some of these cases were also cited-and rejected-in Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U. S. 643, 646, n. 6 (1962).
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result). The dissent totally rejects the Eleventh Amendment's basis in federalism.

c

The reasoning of our recent decisions on sovereign immunity thus leads to the conclusion that a federal suit against
state officials on the basis of state law contravenes the Eleventh Amendment when-as here-the relief sought and ordered has an impact directly on the State itself. In reaching
a contrary conclusion, the Court of Appeals relied principally
on a separate line of cases dealing with pendent jurisdiction.
The crucial point for the Court of Appeals was that this Court
has granted relief against state officials on the basis of a pendent state-law claim. See 673 F. 2d, at 657-658. We therefore must consider the relationship between pendent jurisdiction and the Eleventh Amendment.
This Court long has held generally that when a federal
court obtains jurisdiction over a federal claim, it may adjudicate other related claims over which the court otherwise
would not have jurisdiction. See, e. g., Mine Workers v.
Gibbs, 383 U. S. 715, 726 (1966); Osborn v. Bank of the
United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 819-823 (1824). The Court also
has held that a federal court may resolve a case solely on the
basis of a pendent state-law claim, see Siler, supra, at
192-193, and that in fact the court usually should do so in
order to avoid federal constitutional questions, see id., at
193; Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis,
J., concurring) ("[l]f a case can be decided on either of two
grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a
question of statutory construction or general law, the Court
will decide only the latter"). But pendent jurisdiction is a
judge-made doctrine inferred from the general language of
Art. III. The question presented is whether this doctrine
may be viewed as displacing the explicit limitation on federal
jurisdiction contained in the Eleventh Amendment.
As the Court of Appeals noted, in Siler and subsequent
cases concerning pendent jurisdiction, relief was granted
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against state officials on the basis of state-law claims that
were pendent to federal constitutional claims. In none of
these cases, however, did t~e Court so much as mention the
Eleventh Amendment in connection with the state-law claim.
Rather, the Court appears to have assumed that once jurisdiction was established over the federal-law claim, the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction would establish power to hear
the state-law claims as well. The Court has not addressed
whether that doctrine has a different scope when applied to
suits against the State. This is illustrated by Greene v. Louisville & Interurban R. Co., 244 U. S. 499 (1917), in which
the plaintiff railroads sued state officials, alleging that certain tax assessments were excessive under the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Court first rejected the officials' argument that the Eleventh Amendment barred the federal constitutional claim. It held that Ex parte Young applied to all
allegations challenging the constitutionality of official action,
regardless of whether the state statute under which the officials purported to act was constitutional or unconstitutional.
See id., at 507. Having determined that the Eleventh
Amendment did not deprive the federal court of jurisdiction
over the Fourteenth Amendment question, the Court declared that the court's jurisdiction extended "to the determination of all questions involved in the case, including questions of state law, irrespective of the disposition that may be
made of the federal question, or whether it be found necessary to decide it at all." I d., at 508. The case then was
decided solely on state-law grounds. Accord, Louisville &
Nashville R. Co. v. Greene, 244 U. S. 522 (1917). 28
28
The case was argued in the same way. The Eleventh Amendment argument in the briefs is confined to the federal constitutional claims. See,
e. g., Brief for Louisville & N. R. Co., Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Greene
15--38 (jurisdiction over federal claims); id., at 38-39 (pendent jurisdiction
over state claims). Indeed the State's brief somewhat curiously closes
with a concession that the federal courts had jurisdiction. Brief for State
Board and Officers, Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Greene 139; see Reply Brief,
Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Greene 2 (pointing out concession). Thus, while
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These cases thus did not directly confront the question before us. "[W]hen questions of jurisdiction have been passed
on in prior decisions sub silentio, this Court has never consider~d itself bound when a subsequent case finally brings the
jurisdictional issue before us." Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U. S.
528, 533, n. 5 (1974). 29 We therefore view the question as an
open one.
As noted, the implicit view of these cases seems to have
been that once jurisdiction is established on the basis of a federal question, no further Eleventh Amendment inquiry is
necessary with respect to other claims raised in the case.
This is an erroneous view and contrary to the principles established in our Eleventh Amendment decisions. "The
Eleventh Amendment is an explicit limitation on the judicial
power of the United States." Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U. S.,
at 25. It deprives a federal court of power to decide certain
claims against States that otherwise would be within the
scope of Art. III's grant of jurisdiction. For example, if a
lawsuit against state officials under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 alleges
the State's position on the Court's jurisdiction over the federal claims is
somewhat unclear, the State never argued that there might not be jurisdiction over the local-law claims if the Court found jurisdiction over the federal question in the case.
Nor do any of the other pendent-jurisdiction cases cited by the dissent,
post, at 41, n. 52, discuss the Eleventh Amendment in connection with the
state-law claims. Moreover, since Larson was decided in 1949, making
clear that mere violations of state law would not override the Eleventh
Amendment, these cases have been cited only for the proposition that, as a
general matter, a federal court should decide a case on state-law grounds
where possible to avoid a federal constitutional question. Nothing in our
decision is meant to cast doubt on the desirability of applying the Siler
principle in cases where the federal court has jurisdiction to decide the
state-law issues.
29
See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 671 (1974) ("Having now had
an opportunity to more fully consider the Eleventh Amendment issue after
briefing and argument, we disapprove the Eleventh Amendment holdings
of [certain prior] cases to the extent that they are inconsistent with our
holding today").

I
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a constitutional claim, the federal court is barred from awarding damages against the state treasury even though the claim
arises under the Constitution. See Quern v. Jordan, 440
U. S. 332 (1979). Similarly, if a§ 1983 action alleging a constitutional claim is brought directly against a State, the Eleventh Amendment bars a federal court from granting any relief on that claim. See Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U. S. 781
(1978) (per curiam). The Amendment thus is a specific constitutional bar against hearing evenfederal claims that otherwise would be within the jurisdiction of the federal courts. 30
This constitutional bar applies to pendent claims as well.
As noted above, pendent jurisdiction is a judge-made doctrine of expediency and efficiency derived from the general
Art. III language conferring power to hear all "cases" arising
under federal law ·or between diverse parties. See Mine
Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U. S. 715, 725 (1966). See also Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U. S. 528, 545 (1974) (terming pendent
jurisdiction "a doctrine of discretion"). The Eleventh
Amendment should not be construed to apply with less force
to this implied form of jurisdiction than it does to the explicitly granted power to hear federal claims. The history of the
adoption and development of the Amendment, see supra, at
&-9, confirms that it is an independent limitation on all exercises of Art. III power: "the entire judicial power granted by
the Constitution does not embrace authority to entertain suit
brought by private parties against a State without consent
given," Ex parte State of New York No.1, 256 U. S. 490, 497
(1921). If we were to hold otherwise, a federal court could
award damages against a State on the basis of a pendent
claim. Our decision in Edelman v. Jordan, supra, makes
clear that pendent jurisdiction does not permit such an eva80
See, e. g., Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322 (1934) ("[A]lthough a case may arise under the Constitution and laws of the United
States, the judicial power does not extend to it if the suit is sought to be
prosecuted against a State, without her consent, by one of her own citizens"); Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U. S. 18, 25-26 (1933).
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sion of the immunity guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment. We there held that "the District Court was correct in
exercising pendent jurisdiction over [plaintiffs'] statutory
claim," 415 U. S., at 653, n. 1, but then concluded that the
Eleventh Amendment barred an award of retroactive relief
on the basis of that pendent claim. I d., at 678.
In sum, contrary to the view implicit in decisions such as
Greene, supra, neither pendent jurisdiction nor any other
basis of jurisdiction may override the Eleventh Amendment. 31 A federal court must examine each claim in a case to
see if the court's jurisdiction over that claim is barred by the
Eleventh Amendment. We concluded above that a claim
that state officials violated state law in carrying out their official responsibilities is a claim against the State that is protected by the Eleventh Amendment. See supra, at 15. We
now hold that this principle applies as well to state-law claims
brought into federal court under pendent jurisdiction.
D

Respondents urge that application of the Eleventh Amendment to pendent state-law claims will have a disruptive effect
on litigation against state officials. They argue that the
"considerations of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to litigants" that underlie pendent jurisdiction, see
Gibbs, supra, at 726, counsel against a result that may cause
litigants to split causes of action between state and federal
courts. They also contend that the policy of avoiding unnecessary constitutional decisions will be contravened if plaintiffs choose to forgo their state-law claims and sue only in federal court or, alternatively, that the policy of Ex parte Young
will be hindered if plaintiffs choose to forgo their right to a
federal forum and bring all of their claims in state court.
It may be that applying the Eleventh Amendment to pendent claims results in federal claims being brought in state
See Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U. S., at 27 ("This is not less a suit against
the State because the bill is ancillary and supplemental.").
81
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court, or in bifurcation of claims. That is not uncommon in
this area. Under Edelman v. Jordan, supra, a suit against
state officials for retroactive monetary relief, whether based
on federal or state law, must be brought in state court.
Challenges to the validity of state tax systems under 42
U. S. C. § 1983 also must be brought in state court. Fair
Assessment in Real Estate Assn. v. McNary, 454 U. S. 100
(1981). Under the abstention doctrine, unclear issues of
state law commonly are split off and referred to the state
courts. 32
In any case, the answer to respondents' assertions is that
such considerations of policy cannot override the constitutional limitation on the authority of the federal judiciary to
32
Moreover, allowing claims against state officials based on state law to
be brought in the federal courts does not necessarily foster the policies of
"judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants," Mine Workers v.
Gibbs, 383 U. S. 715, 726 (1966), on which pendent jurisdiction is founded.
For example, when a federal decision on state law is obtained, the federal
court's construction often is uncertain and ephemeral. In cases of ongoing
oversight of a state program that may extend over years, as in this case,
the federal intrusion is likely to be extensive. Duplication of effort, inconvenience, and uncertainty may well result. See, e. g., Burford v. Sun Oil
Co., 319 U. S. 315, 327 (1943) ("Delay, misunderstanding of local law, and
needless conflict with the state policy, are the inevitable product of this
double [i. e., federal-state] system of review''). This case is an example.
Here, the federal courts effectively have been undertaking to operate a
major state institution based on inferences drawn from dicta in a state
court opinion not decided until four years after the suit was begun. The
state court has had no opportunity to review the federal courts' construction of its opinion, or their choice of remedies. The only sure escape from
an erroneous interpretation of state law is presumably the rather cumbersome route of legislation.
Waste and delay may also result from abstention, which often is called
for when state law is unclear, see Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U. S. 360, 378-379
(1964) ("abstention operates to require piecemeal adjudication in many
courts, thereby delaying ultimate adjudication on the merits for an undue
length of time") (citations omitted), or from dismissals on the basis of comity, which has special force when relief is sought on state-law grounds, see
Gibbs, supra, at 726; Hawks v. Hamill, 288 U. S. 52, 61 (1933).
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adjudicate suits against a State. See Missouri v. Fiske, 290
U. S., at 25-26 ("Considerations of convenience open no avenue of escape from the [Amendment's] restriction"). 33 That a
litigant's choice of forum is reduced "has long been understood to be a part of the tension inherent in our system of federalism." Employees v. Missouri Public Health & Welfare
Dept., 411 U. S. 279, 298 (1973) (MARSHALL, J., concurring
in result).
IV
Respondents contend that, regardless of the applicability
of the Eleventh Amendment to their state claims against petitioner state officials, the judgment may still be upheld
against petitioner county officials. We are not persuaded.
Even assuming that these officials are not immune from suit
challenging their actions under the MH/MR Act, 34 it is clear
33
Cf. Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U. S. 1, 14-15 (1976) (Although "considerations of judicial economy" would be served by permitting pendent-party
jurisdiction, ''the addition of a completely new party would run counter to
the well-established principle that federal courts, as opposed to state trial
courts of general jurisdiction, are courts of limited jurisdiction marked out
by Congress").
·
114
We have held that the Eleventh Amendment does not apply to "counties and similar municipal corporations." Mt. Healthy City School District
v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274, 280 (1977); see Lincoln County v. Luning, 133
U. S. 529, 530 (1890). At the same time, we have applied the Amendment
to bar relief against county officials "in order to protect the state treasury
from liability that would have had essentially the same practical consequences as a judgment against the State itself." Lake Country Estates,
Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U. S. 391, 401 (1979). See,
e. g., Edelman v. Jordan, supra (Eleventh Amendment bars suit against
state and county officials for retroactive award of welfare benefits). The
Courts of Appeals are in general agreement that a suit against officials of a
county or other governmental entity is barred if the relief obtained runs
against the State. See, e. g., Moore v. Tangipahoa Parish School Board,
594 F. 2d 489, 493 (CA5 1979); Carey v. Quern, 588 F. 2d 230, 233-234
(CA71978); Incarcerated Men of Allen County Jail v. Fair, 507 F. 2d 281,
287-288 (CA6 1974); Harris v. Tooele County School District, 471 F. 2d
218, 220 (CAlO 1973). Given that the actions of the county commissioners
and mental-health administrators are dependent on funding from the State,
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that without the injunction against the state institutions and
officials in this case, an order entered on state-law grounds
necessarily would be limited. The relief substantially concerns Pennhurst, an arm of the State that is operated by
state officials. Moreover, funding for the county mental retardation programs comes almost entirely from the State, see
Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 50, §§4507-4509 (Purdon 1969 and Supp.
1982), and the costs of the masters have been borne by the
State, see 446 F. Supp., at 1327. Finally, the MH/MR Act
contemplates that the state and county officials will cooperate in operating mental retardation programs. See In re
Schmidt, 494 Pa. 86, 95-96, 429 A. 2d 631, 635-636 (1981).
In short, the present judgment could not be sustained on the
basis of the state-law obligations of petitioner county officials. Indeed, any relief granted against the county officials
on the basis of the state statute would be partial and incomplete at best. Such an ineffective enforcement of state law
would not appear to serve the purposes of efficiency, convenience, and fairness that must inform the exercise of pendent
jurisdiction.

v

The Court of Appeals upheld the judgment of the District
Court solely on the basis of Pennsylvania's MH/MR Act.
We hold that these federal courts lacked jurisdiction to enjoin
petitioner state institutions and state officials on the basis of
this state law. The District Court also rested its decision on
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. See supra, at 2. On remand the
Court of Appeals may consider to what extent, if any, the
it may be that relief granted against these county officials, when exercising
their functions under the MH/MR Act, effectively runs against the State.
Cf. Farr v. Chesney, 441 F. Supp. 127, 130-132 (MD Pa. 1977) (holding
that Pennsylvania county commissioners, acting as members of the board
of the county office of mental health and retardation, may not be sued for
back pay under the Eleventh Amendment). We need not decide this issue
in light of our disposition above.
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judgment may be sustained on these bases. 35 The court also
may consider whether relief may be granted to respondents
under the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of
Rights Act, 42 U. S. C. §§ 6011, 6063. The judgment of the
Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

36

On the Fourteenth Amendment issue, the court should consider

Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U. S. 307 (1982), a decision that was not avail-

able when the District Court issued its decision.
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether a federal court
may award injunctive relief against state officials on the basis
of state law.
I

This litigation, here for the second time, concerns the conditions of care at petitioner Pennhurst State School and Hospital, a Pennsylvania institution for the care of the mentally
retarded. See Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1 (1981). Although the litigation's history is set forth in detail in our prior opinion, see id., ·at 5-10,
it is necessary for purposes of this decision to review that
history.
This suit originally was brought in 1974 by respondent
Terri Lee Halderman, a resident of Pennhurst, in the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Ultimately, plaintiffs included a class consisting of all persons
who were or might become residents of Pennhurst; the Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Citizens (P ARC); and the
United States. Defendants were Pennhurst and various
Pennhurst officials; the Pennsylvania Department of Public
Welfare and several of its officials; and various county commissioners, county mental retardation administrators, and
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other officials of five Pennsylvania counties surrounding
Pennhurst. Respondents' amended complaint charged that
conditions at Pennhurst violated the class members' rights
under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 87 Stat. 394, as amended, 29
U. S. C. § 794 (1976 ed. and Supp. V); the Developmentally
Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U. S. C.
§§ 6001-6081 (1976 ed. and Supp. V); and the Pennsylvania
Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966 (the
"MH/MR Act"), Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 50, §§4101-4704
(Purdon 1969 and Supp. 1982). Both damages and injunctive
relief were sought.
In 1977, following a lengthy trial, the District Court rendered its decision. 446 F. Supp. 1295 (1977). As noted in
our prior opinion, the court's findings were undisputed: "Conditions at Pennhurst are not only dangerous, with the residents often physically abused or drugged by staff members,
but also inadequate for the 'habilitation' of the retarded. Indeed, the court found that the physicial, intellectual, and
emotional skills of some residents have deteriorated at
Pennhurst." 451 U. S., at 7 (footnote omitted). The District Court held that these conditions violated each resident's
right to "minimally adequate habilitation" under the Due
Process Clause and the MH/MR Act, see 446 F. Supp., at
1314-1318, 1322-1323; "freedom from harm" under the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, see id., at 1320-1321;
and "nondiscriminatory habilitation" under the Equal Protection Clause and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, see id., at
1321-1324. Furthermore, the court found that "due process
demands that if a state undertakes the habilitation of a retarded person, it must do so in the least restrictive setting
consistent with that individual's habilitative needs." Id., at
1319 (emphasis added). After concluding that the large size
of Pennhurst prevented it from providing the necessary
habilitation in the least restrictive environment, the court ordered "that immediate steps be taken to remove the retarded

.•
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residents from Pennhurst." Id., at 1325. Petitioners were
ordered "to provide suitable community living arrangements" for the class members, id., at 1326, and the court appointed a Special Master "with the power and duty to plan,
organize, direct, supervise and monitor the implementation
of this and any further Orders of the Court." Ibid. 1
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed most
of the District Court's judgment. 612 F. 2d 84 (1979) (en
bane). It agreed that respondents had a right to habilitation
in the least restrictive environment, but it grounded this
right solely on the "bill of rights" provision in the Deveiopmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42
U. S. G. § 6010. See 612 F. 2d, at 95-100, 104-107. The
court did not consider the constitutional issues or § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act, and while it affirmed the District Court's
holding that the MH/MR Act provides a right to adequate
habilitation, see id., at 100-103, the court did not decide
whether that state right encompassed a right to treatment in
the least restrictive setting.
.
On the question of remedy, the Court of Appeals affirmed
except as to the District Court's order that Pennhurst be
closed. The court observed that some patients would be unable to adjust to life outside an institution, and it determined
that none of the legal provisions relied on by plaintiffs precluded institutionalization. I d., at 114-115. It therefore remanded for "individual determinations by the [District
Court], or by the Special Master, as to the appropriateness of
an improved Pennhurst for each such patient," guided by "a
presumption in favor of placing individuals in [community living arrangements]." Ibid. 2
The District Court detennined that the individual defendants had acted
in good faith and therefore were immune from the damage claims. 446 F.
Supp, at 1324.
2
In a companion case, the Court of Appeals affirmed the District
Court's denial of a motion to intervene for purposes of appeal by the
1
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On remand the District Court established detailed procedures for determining the proper residential placement for
each patient. A team consisting of the patient, his parents
or guardian, and his case manager must establish an individual habilitation plan providing for habilitation of the patient
in a designated community living arrangement. The plan is
subject to review by the Special Master. A second master,
called the Hearing Master, is available to conduct hearings,
upon request by the resident, his parents or his advocate, on
the question whether the services of Pennhurst would be
more beneficial to the resident than the community living arrangement provided in the resident's plan. The Hearing
Master then determines where the patient should reside,
subject to possible review by the District Court. See App.
123a-134a (Order of .April 24, 1980). 3
This Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals,
finding that 42 U. S. C. § 6010 did not create any substantive
rights. 451 U. S. 1 (1981). We remanded the case to the
Court of Appeals to determine if the remedial order could be
supported on the basis of state law, the Constitution, or§ 504
of the Rehabilitation Act. See id., at 31. 4 We also re-

•

Pennhurst Parents-Staff Association, finding the denial harmless error.
See 612 F. 2d 131 (1979) (en bane). The Association subsequently was
granted leave to intervene and is a petitioner in this Court.
3
On July 1, 1981, Pennsylvania enacted an appropriations bill providing
that only $35,000 would be paid for the Masters' expenses for the fiscal
year July 1981 to June 1982. The District Court held Pennsylvania and its
Secretary of the Department of Public Welfare in contempt, and imposed a
fine of $10,000 per day. Pennsylvania paid the fines, and the contempt
was purged on January 8, 1982. On appeal the Court of Appeals affirmed
the contempt order. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hospital,
673 F. 2d 628 (1982), cert. pending, No. 81-2363.
'Three Justices dissented from the Court's construction of the Act, but
concluded that the District Court should not have adopted the "far-reaching remedy" of appointing "a Special Master to decide which of the
Pennhurst inmates should remain and which should be moved to community-based facilities. . . . [T]he court should not have assumed the task of

..
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manded for consideration of whether any relief was available
under other provisions of the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act. See id., at 27-30 (discussing
42 U. S. C. §§ 6011(a), 6063(b)(5)).
On remand the Court of Appeals affirmed its prior judgment in its entirety. 673 F. 2d 647 (1982) (en bane). It determined that in a recent decision the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania had "spoken definitively" in holding that the
MH/MR Act required the State to adopt the "least restrictive
environment" approach for the care of the mentally retarded.
!d., at 651 (citing In re Schmidt, 494 Pa. 86, 429 A. 2d 631
(1981)). The Court of Appeals concluded that this state statute fully supported its prior judgment, and therefore did not
reach the remaining issues of federal law. It also rejected
petitioners' argument that the Eleventh Amendment barred
a federal court from considering this pendent state-law claim.
The court noted that the Amendment did not bar a federal
court from granting prospective injunctive relief against
state officials on the basis of federal claims, see 673 F. 2d, at
656 (citing Ex Parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908)), and concluded that the same result obtained with respect to a
pendent state-law claim. It reasoned that because Siler v.
Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 213 U. S. 175 (1909), an important case in the development of the doctrine of pendent
jurisdiction, also involved state officials, "there cannot be ...
an Eleventh Amendment exception to that rule." 673 F. 2d,
at 658. 5 Finally, the court rejected petitioners' argument
that it should have abstained from deciding the state-law
managing Pennhurst.... "

451 U. S., at 54

(WHITE

J., dissenting in

part).
5
The Court of Appeals also noted that "the United States is an intervening plaintiff ... against which even the state itself cannot successfully
plead the Eleventh Amendment as a bar to jurisdiction," and that "the
counties, even as juridical entities, do not fall within the coverage of the
Eleventh Amendment. Against those defendants even money damages
may be awarded." 673 F. 2d, at 656 (citation omitted).
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claim under principles of comity, see id., at 65~60, andrefused to consider petitioners' objections to the District
Court's use of a special master, see id., at 651 and n. 10.
Three judges dissented in part, arguing that under principles
of federalism and comity the establishment of a special master to supervise compliance was an abuse of discretion. See
id., at 662 (Seitz, C.J., joined by Hunter, J., dissenting in
part); i bid. (Garth, J., concurring in part and dissenting as to
relief). See also id., at 661 (Aldisert, J., concurring) (seriously questioning the propriety of the order appointing the
Special Master, but concluding that a retroactive reversal of
that order would be meaningless). 6
We granted certiorari,-- U. S. - - (1982), and now reverse and remand.
II
Petitioners raise three challenges to the judgment of the ~
Court of Appeals: (i) the Eleventh Amendment prohibited /<...:.._
the District Court from ordering state officials to conform
their conduct to state law; (ii) the doctrine of comity prohibited the District Court from issuing its injunctive relief; and
(iii) the District Court abused its discretion in appointing two
masters to supervise the decisions of state officials in implementing state law. We need not reach the latter two issues,
for we find the Eleventh Amendment challenge dispositive.
A
Article III, § 2 of the Constitution provides that the federal
judicial power extends, inter alia, to controversies "between
a State and Citizens of another State." Relying on this language, this Court in 1793 assumed original jurisdiction over a
suit brought by a citizen of South Carolina against the State
of Georgia. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419 (1793). The
6
The Office of the Special Master was abolished in December 1982.
See App. 220a (Order of August 12, 1982). The Hearing Master remains
in operation.

81-2101-0PINION
PENNHURST STATE SCHOOL & HOSP. v. HALDERMAN

7

decision "created such a shock of surprise that the Eleventh
Amendment was at once proposed and adopted." Monaco v.
Mississippi, 292 U. S. 313, 325 (1934). The Amendment
provides:
"The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States
by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects
of any Foreign State~"
,
The Amendment's language overruled the particular result
in Chisholm, but this Court has recognized that its greater
significance lies in its affirmation that the fundamental principle of sovereign immunity limits the grant of judicial authority in Art. III. Tl}us, in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1
(1890), the Court held that, despite the limited terms of the
Eleventh Amendment, a federal court could not entertain a
suit brought by a citizen against his own State. After reviewing the constitutional debates concerning the scope of
Art. III, the Court determined that federal jurisdiction over
suits against unconsenting States "was not contemplated by
the Constitution when establishing the judicial power of the
United States." ld., at 15. See Monaco v. Mississippi,
supra, at 322-323 (1934). 7 In short, the principle of sovereign immunity is a constitutional limitation on the federal judicial power established in Art. III:
"That a State may not be sued without its consent is a
fundamental rule of jurisprudence having so important a
7

See Employees v. Missouri Public Health Dep't, 411 U.S. 279,
291-292 (1973) (MARSHALL, J., concurring in judgment) (The Eleventh
Amendment "clarif[ied] the intent of the Framers concerning the reach of
federal judicial power" and "restore[d] the original understanding" that
States could not be made unwilling defendants in federal court). See also
Nevada v. Hall, 440 U. S. 410, 430-431 (1979) (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting);
id., at 437 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting).
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bearing upon the construction of the Constitution of the
United States that it has become established by repeated
decisions of this court that the entire judicial power
granted by the Constitution does not embrace authority
to entertain a suit brought by private parties against a
State without consent given: not one brought by citizens
of another State, or by citizens or subjects of a foreign
State, because of the Eleventh Amendment; and not
even one brought by its own citizens, because of the fundamental rule of which the Amendment is but an exemplification." Ex parte State of New York No. 1, 256
U. S. 490, 497 (1921) (emphasis added). 8
A sovereign's immunity may be waived, and the Court consistently has held that a State may consent to suit against it
in federal court. See, e. g., Clark v. Barnard, 108 U. S.
436, 447 (1883). We have insisted, however, that the State's
consent be unequivocally expressed. See, e. g., Edelman v.
Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 673 (1974). Similarly, although Congress has power with respect to the rights protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment immunity, see Fitzpatrick v. Bitker, 427 U. S. 445
(1976), we have required an unequivocal expression of congressional intent to "overturn the constitutionally guaranteed immunity of the several States." Quern v. Jordan, 440
U. S. 332, 342 (1979) (holding that 42 U. S. C. § 1983 does not
override States' Eleventh Amendment immunity). Our reluctance to infer that a State's immunity from suit in the federal courts has been negated stems from recognition of the
8
The limitation deprives federal courts of any jurisdiction to entertain
such claims, and thus may be raised at any point in a proceeding. "The
Eleventh Amendment declares a policy and sets forth an explicit limitation
on federal judicial power of such compelling force that this Court will consider the issue arising under this Amendment ... even though urged for
the first time in this Court." Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury,

323

u. s. 459, 467 (1945).
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vital role of the doctrine of sovereign immunity in our federal
system. A State's constitutional interest in immunity encompasses not merely whether it may be sued, but where it
may be sued. 9 As JUSTICE MARSHALL has noted well, "[b]ecause of the problems of federalism inherent in making one
sovereign appear against its will in the courts of the other, a
restriction upon the exercise of the federal judicial power has
long been considered to be appropriate in a case such as this."
Employees v. Missouri Public Health & Welfare Dep't, 411
U.S. 279,294 (1973) (MARSHALL, J., concurring in result). 10
Accordingly, in deciding this case we must be guided by
"[t]he principles of federalism that inform Eleventh Amendment doctrine." Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678, 691 (1978).
B

This Court's decisions thus establish that "an unconsenting
State is immune from suits brought in federal courts by her
own citizens as well as by citizens of another state." Em9

For this reason, the Court consistently has held that a State's waiver
of sovereign immunity in its own courts is not a waiver of the Eleventh
Amendment immunity in the federal courts. See, e. g., Florida Department of Health v. Florida Nursing Home Assn. 450 U. S. 147, 150 (1981)
(per curiam). "[I]t is not consonant with our dual system for the federal
courts ... to read the consent to embrace federal as well as state courts .
. . . [A] clear declaration of the state's intention to submit its fiscal problems to other courts than those of its own creation must be found." Great
Northern Life Insurance Co. v. Read, 322 U. S. 47, 54 (1944).
10
See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U. S., at 418-419 (States were "vitally interested" in whether they would be subject to suit in the federal courts, and
the debates about state immunity focused on the question of federal judicial
power). Cf. id., at 430-431 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting) (sovereign immunity is "a guarantee that is implied as an essential component of federalism"
and is "sufficiently fundamental to our federal structure to have implicit
constitutional dimension"); id., at 437 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting) ("[T]he
States that ratified the Eleventh Amendment thought that they were
putting an end to the possibility of individual States as unconsenting defendants in foreign jurisdictions").
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ployees, supra, at 280. There may be a question, however,
whether a particular suit in fact is a suit against a State. It
is clear, of course, that in the absence of consent a suit in
which the State or one of its agencies or departments is
named as the defendant is proscribed by the Eleventh
Amendment. See, e. g., Florida Department of Health v.
Florida Nursing Home Assn, 450 U. S. 147 (1981) (per
curiam); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U. S. 781 (1978) (per
curiam). This jurisdictional bar applies regardless of the nature of the relief sought. See, e. g., Missouri v. Fiske, 290
U. S. 18, 27 (1933) ("Expressly applying to suits in equity as
well as at law, the Amendment necessarily embraces demands for the enforcement of equitable rights and the prosecution of equitable remedies when these are asserted and
prosecuted by an individual against a State").
When the suit is brought only against state officials, a
question arises as to whether that suit is a suit against the
State itself. Although prior decisions of this Court have not
been entirely consistent on this issue, certain principles are
well established. The Eleventh Amendment bars a suit
against state officials when "the state is the real, substantial
party in interest." Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U. S. 459, 464 (1945). See, e. g., In re Ayers, 123
U. S. 443, 487-492 (1887); Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U. S.
711, 720-723, 727-728 (1882). Thus, "[t]he general rule is
that relief sought nominally against an officer is in fact
against the sovereign if the decree would operate against the
latter." Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U. S. 57, 58 (1963) (per
curiam). 11 And, as when the State itself is named as the defendant, a suit against state officials that is in fact a suit
"See also Dugan v. Rank, 372 U. S. 609, 620 (1963) ("The general rule
is that a suit is against the sovereign if 'the judgment sought would expend
itself on the public treasury or domain, or interfere with the public administration,' or if the effect of the judgment would be 'to restrain the Government from acting, or to compel it to act.'") (citations omitted).
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against a State is barred regardless of whether it seeks damages or injunctive relief. See Cory v. White, 457 U. S. 85,
91 (1982).
The Court has recognized an important exception to this
general rule: a suit challenging the constitutionality of a state
official's action is not one against the State. 12 This was the
holding in Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908), in which a
federal court enjoined the Attorney General of the State of
Minnesota from bringing suit to enforce a state statute that
allegedly violated the Fourteenth Amendment. This Court
held that the Eleventh Amendment did not prohibit issuance
of this injunction:
"The act to be enforced is alleged to be unconstitutional,
and if it be so, the use of the name of the State to enforce
an unconstitutional act to the injury of complainants is a
proceeding without the authority of and one which does
12
The Court also has held that sovereign immunity does not apply in a
suit against an official who allegedly acted entirely outside his official authority. See, e. g,(f:ar~ v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337
U. S. 682, 702 (194~s ultra vires exception is quite limited, governing only those situations in which a government official acts without any
official justification. See, e. g., Florida Department of State v. Treasure
Salvors, Inc.,-- U.S.--,-- (1982) (opinion of STEVENS, J.) (test is
whether the official's conduct was undertaken "without any authority
whatever"); id., at-- (WHITE, J., concurring in j"udgmentin p~nd
"iiiSSeiiting in part) (test is whether there was no "colorable basis for the
exercise of authority by state officials"). As the arson L:ourt explii.ned,
"Itlsimporta nt to note that in such cases the relief can be granted, without
impleading the sovereign, only because of the officer's lack of delegated
power. A claim of error in the exercise of that power is there or ot suffi~' 337 U. S., at 68~ .
IS exception clearly is inapplicable in c Jllle ./
this case. Even if petitioner officials violated state law in carrying out .-A&)< 2iiJ4
~
some of their official duties, they unquestionably acted under colorable
I.A-~r
state authority in operating Pennhurst and the State's system of care for
the mentally retarded. In short, these officials were not acting ultra vi~k..''
res, but rather were "exercising the powers delegated to [them] by the
sovereign." Larson, supra, at 693.

v1
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not affect the State in its sovereign or governmental capacity. It is simply an illegal act upon the part of a state
official in attempting by the use of the name of the State
to enforce a legislative enactment which is void because
unconstitutional. If the act which the state Attorney
General seeks to enforce be a violation of the Federal
Constitution, the officer in proceeding under such enactment comes into conflict with the superior authority of
that Constitution, and he is in that case stripped of his
official or representative character and is subjected to
the consequences of his official conduct. The State has
no power to impart to him any immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States."
209 U. S., at 159-160.
The Court subsequently has made clear that, even where this
exception applies-, the rule that a suit against state officials
constitutes a suit against the State continues to have force.
Thus, in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651 (1974), the Court
held that in a suit against state officials "a federal court's remedial power, consistent with the Eleventh Amendment, is
necessarily limited to prospective injunctive relief, and may
not include a retroactive award which requires the payment
of funds from the state treasury." !d., at 677 (citations
omitted).
III
With these principles in mind, we now turn to the question
whether the claim that petitioners violated state law in carrying out their official duties at Pennhurst is one against the
State and therefore barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
Respondents advance two principal arguments in support of
the judgment below. 13 First, they contend that under the
We reject respondents' additional contention that Pennsylvania has
waived its immunity from suit in federal court. At the time the suit was
filed, suits against Pennsylvania were permitted only where expressly au13
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doctrine of Edelman v. Jordan, supra, the suit is not against
the State because the courts below ordered only prospective
injunctive relief. Second, they assert that the state-law
claim properly was decided under the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction. Respondents rely on .decisions of this Court
awarding relief against state o~ls on the basis of a pendent state-law claim. See, e. g., Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 213 U. S. 175, 193 (1909).
A

We first address the contention that respondents' state-law
claim is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment because it
seeks only prospective relief as defined in Edelman v. Jordan, supra. The Court of Appeals held that if the judgment
below rested on federal law, it could be entered against petitioner state officials under the doctrine established in
thorized by the legislature, see, e. g., Freach v. Commonwealth, 471 Pa.
558, 370 A. 2d 1163 (1977), and respondents have not referred us to any
provision expressly waiving Pennsylvania's Eleventh Amendment immunity. The State now has a statute governing sovereign immunity, including an express preservation of its immunity from suit in federal court:
"Federal courts.-N othing contained in this subchapter shall be construed
to waive the immunity of the Commonwealth from suit in Federal courts
guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States." 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8521(b) (1980).
We also do not agree with respondents that the presence of the United
States as a plaintiff in this case removes the Eleventh Amendment from
consideration. Although the Eleventh Amendment does not bar the
United States from suing a State in federal court, see, e. g., Monaco v.
Mississippi, 292 U. S. 313, 329 (1934), the United States' presence in the
case for any purpose does not eliminate the State's immunity for all purposes. For example, the fact that the federal court could award injunctive
relief to the United States on federal constitutional claims would not mean
that the court could order the State to pay damages to other plaintiffs. In
any case, we think it clear that the United States does not have standing to
assert the state-law claims of third-parties. For these reasons, the applicability of the Eleventh Amendment to respondents' state-law claim is
unaffected by the United States' participation in the case.

.-

,
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Edelman and Young even though the prospective financial
burden was substantial and ongoing. 14 See 673 F. 2d, at 656.
The court assumed, and respondents assert, that this reasoning applies as well when the official acts in violation of state
law. This argument misconstrues the basis of the doctrine
established in Young and Edelman.
As discussed above, the injunction in Young was justified,
notwithstanding the obvious impact on the State itself, on the
view that sovereign immunity does not apply because an official who acts unconstitutionally is "stripped of his official or
representative character," Young, 209 U. S., at 160. This
rationale, of course, created the "well-recognized irony" that
an official's unconstitutional conduct constitutes state action
under the Fourteenth Amendment but not the Eleventh
Amendment. Florida Department of State v. Treasure
Salvors, Inc., - - U. S. - - , - - (1982) (opinion of STEVENS, J.). Nonetheless, the Young doctrine has been accepted as necessary to permit the federal courts to vindicate
federal rights and hold state officials responsible to "the supreme authority of the United States." Young, 209 U. S.,
at 160. As JUSTICE BRENNAN has observed, "Ex parte
Young was the culmination of efforts by this Court to harmonize the principles of the Eleventh Amendment with the
effective supremacy of rights and powers secured elsewhere
in the Constitution." Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U. S. 82, 106
(1971) (BRENNAN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Our decisions repeatedly have emphasized that the
Young doctrine rests on the need to promote the vindication
14
Although the District Court thus has jurisdiction to grant prospective
relief on the basis of federal law, the scope of that relief is constrained by
principles of comity
rea eralism. "Where, as here, the exercise of authority by state officials is attacked, federal courts must be constantly
mindful of the 'special delicacy of the adjustment to be preserved between
federal equitable power and State administration of its own law.'" Rizzo
v. Goode, 423 U. S. 362, 378 (1976) (quoting Stefanelli v. Minard, 342
u. s. 117, 120 (1951)).

ana
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of federal rights.
See, e. g., 'Quern v. Jordan, 440 U. S.
332, 337 (1979); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232, 237 (1974);
Georgia R. & Banking Co. v. Redwine, 342 U. S. 299, 304
(1952).
The Court also has recognized, however, that the Young
exception should not be applied where unnecessary to promote the supremacy of federal law. This is the significance
of Edelman v. Jordan, supra. We recognized that the prospective relief authorized by Young "has permitted the Civil
War Amendments to the Constitution to serve as a sword,
rather than merely a shield, for those whom they were designed to protect." 415 U. S., at 664. But we declined to
extend Young to encompass retroactive relief, for to do so
would effectively eliminate the constitutional immunity of the
States. Accordingly, we concluded that although the difference between perniissible and impermissible relief "will not
in many instances be that between day and night," id., at
667, an award of retroactive relief necessarily" 'fall[s] afoul of
the Eleventh Amendment if that basic constitutional provision is to be conceived of as having any present force.'" I d.,
at 665 (quoting Rothstein v. Wyman, 467 F. 2d 226, 237 (CA2
1972) (McGowan, J., sitting by designation), cert. denied, 411
U. S. 921 (1973)). In sum, Edelman's distinction between
prospective and retroactive relief fulfills the underlying purpose of Ex parte Young while at the same time preserving to
an important degree the constitutional immunity of the
States.
This need to reconcile competing interests is wholly ab- J
sent, however, when a plaintiff alleges that a state official has
violated state law. In such a case the entire basis for the
doctrine of Young and Edelman disappears. 15 A federal
16
Contrary to the dissent's argument, there is no long line of cases
clearly holding that the Eleventh Amendment "does not bar suits against
state officials for action not authorized by the State's own laws." Post, at
21 (STEVENS, J ., dissenting). The constant theme of the Eleventh

.~
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court's grant of relief against state officials on the basis of
state law, whether prospective or retroactive, does not vindicate the supreme authority of federal law. On the contrary,
it is difficult to think of a greater intrusion on state soverAmendment cases of the period cited by the dissent was that there is a crucial difference between the class of cases "where the suit is brought against
the officers of the State, as representing the State's action and liability,
thus making it, though not a party to the record, the real party against
which the judgment will so operate as to compel it to specifically perform
contracts," and the class "where as suit is brought against defendants who,
claiming to be officers of the State, and under the color of an unconstitutional statute, commit acts of wrong and injury to the rights and property
of the plaintiff acquired under a contract with the State." Pennoyer v.
McConnaughy, 140 U. S. 1, 10 (1891). Indeed, the decisions in most of
the cases cited by the dissent turned on this distinction relating to whether
the suit properly raised ·a constitutional challenge to the officer's conduct.
See, e. g., Reagan .v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 154 U. S. 362, 390
(1894); Poindexter v. Greenhaw, 114 U. S. 270, 288 (1885); Cunningham v.
Macon & Brunswick R. Co., 109 U. S. 446, 452 (1883). The Court rarely
was faced with an Eleventh Amendment issue in a case that did not contain
a constitutional allegation.
More significant than the rather bare support for this alleged "firmly established" rule, post, at 18, is the fact that the "line of cases" central to the
dissent's argument since has been repudiated by this Court. The principal
case originally cited for the proposition that a suit alleging a tortious act by
an official is not barred by sovereign immunity is Unij.ed States v. Lee, 106
U. S. 196 (1882). See Cunningham, supra, at 452;'1-arson, supra, at 717
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (Lee is the "starting point of this line of
cases"). In Larson, however, the Court construed Lee narrowly as representing only "a specific application of the constitutional exception to the
doctrine of sovereign immunity." 337 U.S., at 696. Larson expressly ~ L~
rejected the view-urged by JUSTICE STEVENS' dissent here-that sovereign immunity is inapplicable whenever the officer allegedly committed a
tortious action. It held that the suit may go forward only if there is an
allegation of unconstitutional action or action that is ultra vires. /d., at
693; see supra, at n. 12.
This construction, and the Larson rule, have been reaffirmed repeatedly-and at this Term-by this Court. See, e. g., Block v. North Dakota, - - U. S. - - , - - (1983); Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U. S. 643,
647-&18 (1962). The dissent seeks to avoid the significance of Larson by

.•
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eignty than when a federal court instructs state officials on
how to conform their conduct to state law. Such a result
conflicts directly with the principles of federalism that underlie the Eleventh Amendment. We conclude that Young and
asserting that its explicit repudiation of the rule and cases relied on by the
dissent here was not "necessary to decide the case" and "apparently did not
command the full agreement of five members of the [Larson] Court" because of a concurring opinion by Justice Douglas. Post, at 16-17, n. 17.
Precisely the same argument was made by Justice Douglas-in lone dissent-13 years after Larson. See Malone v. Bowdoin, supra, at 649-650.
Justice Stewart's opinion for the Court in Malone observed that "to reconcile completely all the decisions of the Court in this field prior to 1949
would be a Procrustean task." Id., at 646. His opinion continued:
"The Court's 1949 Larson decision makes it unnecessary, however, to
undertake that task here. For in Larson the Court, aware that it was
called upon to 'resolve 'the conflict in doctrine' (337 U. S., at 701), thoroughly reviewed the many prior decisions, and made an informed and carefully considered choice between the seemingly conflicting precedents."
Ibid.
The Court in Malone then expressly reaffirmed the Larson rule that the
only two exceptions to sovereign immunity are where the officer acted ultra vires or in an unconstitutional fashion. See id., at 647. An allegation
that the officer acted tortiously or illegally-an allegation the dissent finds
sufficient to avoid entirely the Eleventh Amendment's sovereign immunity-was found "not adequate to support a conclusion that the relief asked
was not relief against the sovereign." Ibid. It thus is indisputably clear
that this Court already has "thoroughly reviewed" the precedents and
"made an informed and carefully considered choice," id., at 646, to reject
the view urged by JUSTICE STEVENS' dissent that sovereign immunity
does not bar a suit alleging that an offical "had acted within his authority
but in a manner contrary to state law." Post, at 19.
The dissent recognizes that Larson is inconsistent with the cases on
which the dissent relies, but asserts that "it is not necessary or appropriate
to read that rule retroactively into the Eleventh Amendment." Post, at
20 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). This departure from stare decisis is hardly
consistent with the dissent's invocation of the doctrine elsewhere in the
opinion. This Court consistently has considered Larson to be a relevant
precedent in Eleventh Amendment cases, see, e. g., Georgia R. Co. v.
Redwine, 342 U. S. 299, 304, nn. 12, 15, and indeed just last Term eight
Justices expressly applied the two-part Larson test in resolving an Elev-
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Edelman are inapplicable in a suit against state officials on
the basis of state law.
B

The reasoning of our decisions on sovereign immunity thus
leads to the conclusion that a federal suit against state officials on the basis of state law contravenes the Eleventh
Amendment. In reaching a contrary conclusion, the Court
of Appeals relied principally on a separate line of cases deal-

'

enth Amendment issue, Treasure Salvors, supra, - - U. S., at - (opinion of STEVENS, J.); id., at-- (WHITE, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). The plurality opinion in Treasure
Salvors-written by JUSTICE STEVENs-found that Larson had "clarified"
the prior law established in both Eleventh Amendment and federal sovereign immunity cases, and noted expressly that Larson had "held that the
fact that an officer wrongfully withholds property belonging to another
does not necessarily establish that he is acting beyond the permissible
scope of his official capacity." I d., at--. The plurality then followed
the Larson test in announcing that "the Eleventh Amendment does not bar
an action against a state official that is based on a theory that the officer
acted beyond the scope of his statutory authority or, if within that authority, that such authority is unconstitutional." I d., at--. As the dissent
notes, see post, at 17-18, n. 17, the plurality concluded that the suit was
not barred because the state officials had "no colorable claim" for their actions, but rather had acted "without any authority whatever." I d., at--.
But it is clear-and the dissent does not contend otherwise-that both the
plurality and the partial dissent accepted and applied the two-part Larson
test as controlling in the Eleventh Amendment context.
Just as the Court's Eleventh Amendment cases have relied on federal
sovereign immunity principles, the Court's federal sovereign immunity
cases have relied on the principles established in Eleventh Amendment
cases. See, e. g., Philadelphia v. Stimson, 223 U. S. 605, 620 (1912).
This especially was true in Larson itself. See 337 U. S., at 687, n. 6, 691,
n. 11, 694, n. 15, 698, nn. 19-20, 699, n. 22. The dissent thus errs in suggesting that there are different principles for the federal sovereign immunity cases and Eleventh Amendment cases. See id., at 708 (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting) ("The sources of the immunity are formally different but
they present the same legal issues"). It is clear that Larson-the Court's
most recent definitive statement on the rule of sovereign immunity and its
exceptions-should be followed here.
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ing with pendent jurisdiction. The crucial point for the
Court of Appeals was that this Court has granted relief
against state officials on the basis of a pendent state-law
claim. See 673 F. 2d, at 657-658. We therefore must consider the relationship between pendent jurisdiction and the
Eleventh Amendment.
This Court long has held generally that when a federal
court obtains jurisdiction over a federal claim, it may adjudicate other related claims over which the court otherwise
would not have jurisdiction. See, e. g., Mine Workers v.
Gibbs, 383 U. S. 715, 726 (1966); Osborn v. Bank of the
United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 819--823 (1824). The Court also
has held that a federal court may resolve a case solely on the
basis of a pendent state-law claim, see Siler, supra, at
192-193, and that in fact the court usually should do so in
order to avoid federal constitutional questions, see id., at
193; Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis,
J., concurring) ("[I]f a case can be decided on either of two
grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a
question of statutory construction or general law, the Court
will decide only the latter"). Under these principles, it
seems clear that, apart from the possible Eleventh Amendment bar, the Court of Appeals had a proper jurisdictional
basis on which to decide the claim based on Pennsylvania
law. 16 The question therefore is whether the Amendment
applies to this pendent state-law claim.
This does not necessarily mean that pendent jurisdiction properly was
exercised here. "Pendent jurisdiction over state claims [is] a doctrine of
discretion not to be routinely exercised without considering the advantages
of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to the litigants." Hagans
v. Lavine, 415 U. S. 528, 545 (1974). In particular, "[n]eedless decisions
of state law should be avoided both as a matter of comity and to promote
justice between the parties, by procuring for them a surer-footed reading
of applicable law." Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U. S. 715, 726 (1966).
Because of our disposition of the case under the Eleventh Amendment, we
need not decide this important comity issue.
16
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As the Court of Appeals noted, in Siler and subsequent
cases concerning pendent jurisdiction relief was granted
against state officials on the basis of state-law claims that
were pendent to federal constitutional claims. The Court
never held directly that the rationale of Ex parte Young
should be extended to pendent state-law claims, but rather
appears to have assumed that the Eleventh Amendment simply does not apply to pendent claims. 17 This is illustrated by
Greene v. Louisville & Interurban R. Co., 244 U. S. 499
(1917), in which the plaintiff railroads sued state officials, alleging that certain tax assessments were excessive under the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Court first rejected the officials' argument under the Eleventh Amendment, finding that
Ex parte Young applied to all constitutional claims against
state officials, regardless of whether the state statute under
which the officials · acted was constitutional or unconstitutional. See id., at 507. Having determined that the Eleventh Amendment did not deprive the federal court of jurisdiction over this constitutional question, the Court declared
that the court's jurisdiction extended "to the determination of
all questions involved in the case, including questions of state
law' irrespective of the disposition that may be made of the
federal question, or whether it be found necessary to decide
it at all." I d., at 508. The case then was decided solely on
17

The dissent repeatedly refers to the "rule" in Siler as if the Court
there had held that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits on pendent state-law claims. It bears repeating that the Eleventh Amendment
was not raised by the State or addressed by this Court in that decision.
Rather, the rule in Siler is that, as a general matter, a federal court should
decide a case on state-law grounds where possible to avoid a federal constitutional question. 213 U. S., at 193. Contrary to the dissent's repeated intimations, we have not "repudiated" or "reject[ed]" this rule,
post, at 10, 12, or held that Siler is "no longer good law," post, at 8. Nothing in our decision is meant to reject Siler, much less cast doubt on the
desirability of applying its principles in cases where the federal court has
jurisdiction to decide the state-law issues .

.

~
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state-law grounds. Accord, Lousiville & Nashville R.R.
Co. v. Greene, 244 U. S. 522 (1917).
The implicit view thus seems to have been that once jurisdiction is established on the basis of any federal question, no
further Eleventh Amendment inquiry is necessary with respect to other claims raised in the case. We believe this
view is erroneous and contrary to the principles established
in our Eleventh Amendment decisions. "The Eleventh
Amendment is an explicit limitation on the judicial power of
the United States." Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U. S., at 25. It
deprives a federal court of power to decide certain claims
against States that otherwise would be within the scope of
Art. III's grant of jurisdiction. For example, if a lawsuit
against state officials under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 alleges a constitutional claim, the federal court is barred from awarding
damages against the state treasury even though the claim
arises under the Constitution. See Quern v. Jordan, 440
U. S. 332 (1979). Similarly, if a§ 1983 action alleging a constitutional claim is brought directly against a State, the Eleventh Amendment bars a federal court from granting any relief on that claim. See Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U. S. 781
(1978) (per curiam). The Amendment thus is a specific constitutional bar against hearing evenfederal claims that otherwise would be within the jurisdiction of the federal courts. 18
This constitutional bar applies to pendent claims as well.
A federal court's power over a pendent claim necessarily derives from Art. III, see Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U. S. 1, 9
(1976), and the Eleventh Amendment is an independent limitation on all exercises of Art. III power. See supra, at 7-8.
If we were to hold otherwise, a federal court could award
8
' See, e. g., Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U. S. 313, 322 (1934) ("[A]lthough a case may arise under the Constitution and laws of the United
States, the judicial power does not extend to it if the suit is sought to be
prosecuted against a State, without her consent, by one of her own citizens"); Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U. S. 18, 2~26 (1933).
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damages against a State on the basis of a pendent claim.
Our decision in Edelman v. Jordan, supra, makes clear that
pendent jurisdiction does not permit such an evasion of the
immunity guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment. We
there held that "the District Court was correct in exercising
pendent jurisdiction over [plaintiffs'] statutory claim," 415
U. S., at 653, n. 1, but then concluded that the Eleventh
Amendment barred an award of retroactive relief on the
basis of that pendent claim. I d., at 678.
In sum, contrary to the analysis implicit in decisions such
as Greene, supra, neither pendent jurisdiction nor any other
basis of jurisdiction may override the Eleventh Amendment. 19 A federal court must examine each claim in a case to
see if the court's jurisdiction over that claim is barred by the
Eleventh Amendment. We concluded above that a claim
that state officials violated state law in carrying out their official responsibilities is a claim against the State that is protected by the Eleventh Amendment. See supra, at 16. We
now hold that this principle applies as well to state-law claims
brought into federal court under pendent jurisdiction. This
issue has not previously been confronted directly, and we
therefore are not bound by prior decisions assuming a contrary conclusion. "[W]hen questions of jurisdiction have
been passed on in prior decisions sub silentio, this Court has
never considered itself bound when a subsequent case finally
brings the jurisdictional issue before us." Hagans v.
Lavine, 415 U. S. 528, 533, n. 5 (1974). 20

c
See Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U. S., at 27 ("This is not less a suit against
the State because the bill is ancillary and supplemental.").
20
See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 671 (1974) ("Having now had
an opportunity to more fully consider the Eleventh Amendment issue after
briefing and argument, we disapprove the Eleventh Amendment holdings
of [certain prior] cases to the extent that they are inconsistent with our
holding today").
19
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Respondents urge that application of the Eleventh Amendment to pendent state-law claims will have a disruptive effect
on litigation against state officials. They argue that the
"considerations of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to litigants" that underlie pendent jurisdiction, see
Gibbs, supra, at 726, counsel against a result that may cause
litigants to split causes of action between state and federal
courts. They also contend that the policy of avoiding unnecessary constitutional decisions will be contravened if plaintiffs choose to forgo their state-law claims and sue only in federal court or, alternatively, that the policy of Ex parte Young
will be hindered if plaintiffs choose to forgo their right to a
federal forum and bring all of their claims in state court.
We agree that, depending on the circumstances of the case,
these considerations of policy may be important, 21 but they
may not override the constitutional limitations on the authority of the federal judiciary to adjudicate suits against a State.
See Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U. S., at 25-26 ("Considerations
of convenience open no avenue of escape from the [Amendment's] restriction"). 22 In a suit brought by private litigants
against state officials, these constitutional limitations do not
preclude a federal court from granting prospective relief to
vindicate federal law. But the Eleventh Amendment deprives federal courts of power to consider other claims raised
21
Petitioners contend that in this case these policy considerations are
outweighed by considerations of comity, arguing that the Court of Appeals
"has authorized a severe intrusion on the right of state officials to run their
own programs, basing that intrusion on nothing more than its view of state
law." Brief for Petitioners 9. In light of our disposition of this case, we
need not balance these competing considerations.
22
Cf. Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U. S. 1, 14-15 (1976) (Although "considerations of judicial economy'.' would be served by permitting pendent-party
jurisdiction, "the addition of a completely new party would run counter to
the well-established principle that federal courts, as opposed to state trial
courts of general jurisdiction, are courts of limited jurisdiction marked out
by Congress")
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against the State or its officials. Any inconvenience in
choice of forum that may be caused to litigants who wish to
raise both federal and state claims is a necessary consequence
of this limitation on federal judicial power. 23 The constitutional principle of sovereign immunity, embodied in the Eleventh Amendment, demands that claims against state officials
on the basis of state law be resolved in state courts. 24
23

This limitation on federal judicial power imposes the same inconvenience on a plaintiff who has certain federal claims that may not be raised
in federal court. Under Edelman v. Jordan, supra, a plaintiff with a
claim for monetary relief against a State on the basis of federal law must
resort to state court. If he wishes to press a related claim for prospective
relief, he must forgo the damages claim, or split his related causes of action
between federal and state courts, or take the entire case to state court.
As JUSTICE MARSHAL+ has observed, the fact that some federal rights
may have to be enforced in a state forum is "a part of the tension inherent
in our system of federalism." Employees v. Missouri Public Health &
Welfare Dept., 411 U. S. 279, 298 (1973) (MARSHALL, J., concurring in
result).
24
The dissent's distaste for the Eleventh Amendment and its principle of
sovereign immunity is the underlying theme of the dissenting opinion.
See post, at 25--27; cf. id., at 10-11 (quoting the "illuminating" analysis in
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419, 471 (1793) (opinion of Jay, C. J.)). Indeed, the dissent's negative view of sovereign immunity leads it to an apparent willingness to overrule the decisions of this Court that have emphasized the importance and continuing vitality of the Eleventh Amendment,
id., at 26, in favor of JUSTICE BRENNAN's dissenting view in Employees v.
Missouri Public Health Dept., 411 U. S. 279 (1973). But that view was
expressly rejected both by Justice Douglas' opinion for the Court, see id.,
at 280, n. 1, and JUSTICE MARSHALL's opinion concurring in the judgment,
see id., at 292, n. 8.
Thus, the dissent's argument that sovereign immunity "'undoubtedly
runs counter to modern democratic notions of the moral responsibility of
the State,"' post, at 27 (quoting Great Northern Life Ins . Co. v. Read, 322
U. S. 47, 59 (1944) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)), is a view of the Eleventh
Amendment that has never been accepted by this Court. Moreover, the
argument substantially misses the point with respect to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. As JUSTICE MARSHALL has observed, the
Eleventh Amendment's restriction on the federal judicial power is based in
large part on the "the problems of federalism inherent in making one sover-

'
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IV
Respondents contend that, regardless of the applicability
of the Eleventh Amendment to their state claims against petitioner state officials, the judgment may still be upheld
against petitioner county officials. We are not persuaded.
Even assuming that these officials are not immune from suit
challenging their actions under the MH/MR Act, 25 it is clear
that without the injunction against the state institutions and
officials in this case, an order entered on state-law grounds
necessarily would be limited. The relief substantially concerns Pennhurst, an arm of the State that is operated by
eign appear against its will in the courts of the other." Employees, supra,
at 294 (MARSHALL, J., concurring in the result).
25
We have held that the Eleventh Amendment does not apply to "counties and similar municipal corporations." Mt. Healthy City School District
v. Doyle, 429 U. S: 274, 280 (1977); see Lincoln County v. Luning, 133
U. S. 529, 530 (1890). At the same time, we have applied the Amendment
to bar relief against county officials "in order to protect the state treasury
from liability that would have had essentially the same practical consequences as a judgment against the State itself." Lake Country Estates,
Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U. S. 391, 401 (1979). See,
e. g., Edelman v. Jordan, supra (Eleventh Amendment bars suit against
state and county officials for retroactive award of welfare benefits). The
Courts of Appeals are in general agreement that a suit against officials of a
county or other governmental entity is barred if the relief obtained runs
against the State. See, e. g., Moore v. Tangipahoa Parish School Board,
594 F. 2d 489, 493 (CA5 1979); Carey v. Quern, 588 F. 2d 230, 233-234
(CA7 1978); Incarcerated Men of Allen County Jail v. Fair, 507 F. 2d 281,
287-288 (CA6 1974); Harris v. Tooele County School District, 471 F. 2d
218, 220 (CAlO 1973). Given that the actions of the county commissioners
and mental health adminstrators are dependent on funding from the State,
it may be that relief granted against these county officials, when exercising
their functions under the MH/MR Act, effectively runs against the State.
Cf. Farr v. Chesney, 441 F. Supp. 127, 130-132 (MD Pa. 1977) (holding
that Pennsylvania county commissioners, acting as members of the board
of the county office of mental health and retardation, may not be sued for
back pay under the Eleventh Amendment). We need not decide this issue
in light of our disposition above.

.-
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state officials. Moreover, funding for the county mental retardation programs comes almost entirely from the State, see
Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 50, §§4507-4509 (Purdon 1969 and Supp.
1982), and the costs of the masters have been borne by the
State, see 446 F. Supp., at 1327. Finally, the MH/MR Act
contemplates that the state and county officials will cooperate
in operating mental retardation programs. See In re
Schmidt, 494 Pa. 86, 95-96, 429 A. 2d 631, 635-636 (1981).
In short, the present judgment could not be sustained on the
basis of the state-law obligations of petitioner county officials. Indeed, any relief granted against the county officials
on the basis of the state statute would be partial and incomplete at best. Such an ineffective enforcement of state law
would not appear to serve the purposes of efficiency, convenience, and fairness that must inform the exercise of pendent
jurisdiction.

v

The Court of Appeals upheld the judgment of the District
Court solely on the basis of Pennsylvania's MH/MR Act.
We hold that the courts lacked jurisdiction to enjoin petitioner state institutions and state officials on the basis of this
state law. The District Court also rested its decision on the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. See supra, at 2. On remand the
Court of Appeals may consider to what extent, if any, the
judgment may be sustained on these bases. 26 The court also
may consider whether relief may be granted to respondents
under the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of
Rights Act, 42 U. S. C. §§ 6011, 6063. The judgment of the
Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.
On the Fourteenth Amendment issue, the court should consider
Youngberg v. Romeo,- U. S . - (1982), a decision that was not available when the District Court issued its decision.
26

/

Justice
Justice
Justice
Justice
Justice
Justice
Justice

Brennan
White
Marshall
Blackmun
Rehnquist
Stevens
O'Connor

From:

Justice Powell

Circulated: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Recirculated: _ _ _ _ __ _ __

~~
'-4th DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 81-2101

PENNHURST STATE SCHOOL & HOSPITAL, ET AL.,
PETITIONERS v. TERRI LEE HALDERMAN, ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR·THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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I

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether a federal court
may award injunctive relief against state officials on the basis
\
of state law.
I
This litigation, here for the second time, concerns the conditions of care at petitioner Pennhurst State School and Hospital, a Pennsylvania institution for the care of the mentally
retarded. See Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1 (1981). Although the litigation's history is set forth in detail in our prior opinion, see id., at 5-10,
it is necessary for purposes of this decision to review that
history.
This suit originally was brought in 1974 by respondent
Terri Lee Halderman, a resident of Pennhurst, in the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Ultimately, plaintiffs included a class consisting of all persons
who were or might become residents of Pennhurst; the Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Citizens (P ARC); and the
United States. Defendants were Pennhurst and various
Pennhurst officials; the Pennsylvania Department of Public
Welfare and several of its officials; and various county commissioners, county mental retardation administrators, and

.·
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other officials of five Pennsylvania counties surrounding
Pennhurst. Respondents' amended complaint charged that
conditions at Pennhurst violated the class members' rights
under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 87 Stat. 394, as amended, 29
U. S. C. § 794 (1976 ed. and Supp. V); the Developmentally
Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U. S. C.
§§ 6001---B081 (1976 ed. and Supp. V); and the Pennsylvania
Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966 (the
"MH/MR Act"), Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 50, §§ 4101-4704
(Purdon 1969 and Supp. 1982). Both damages and injunctive
relief were sought.
In 1977, following a lengthy trial, the District Court rendered its decision. 446 F. Supp. 1295 (1977). As noted in
our prior opinion, the court's findings were undisputed: "Conditions at Pennhurst ·are not only dangerous, with the residents often physically abused or drugged by staff members,
but also inadequate for the 'habilitation' of the retarded. Indeed, the court found that the physicial, intellectual, and
emotional skills of some residents have deteriorated at
Pennhurst." 451 U. S., at 7 (footnote omitted). The District Court held that these conditions violated each resident's
right to "minimally adequate habilitation" under the Due
Process Clause and the MH/MR Act, see 446 F. Supp., at
1314-1318, 1322-1323; "freedom from harm" under the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, see id., at 1320-1321;
and "nondiscriminatory habilitation" under the Equal Protection Clause and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, see id., at
1321-1324. Furthermore, the court found that "due process
demands that if a state undertakes the habilitation of a retarded person, it must do so in the least restrictive setting
consistent with that individual's habilitative needs." I d., at
1319 (emphasis added). After concluding that the large size
of Pennhurst prevented it from providing the necessary
habilitation in the least restrictive environment, the court ordered "that immediate steps be taken to remove the retarded
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residents from Pennhurst." Id., at 1325. Petitioners were
ordered "to provide suitable community living arrangements" for the class members, id., at 1326, and the court appointed a Special Master "with the power and duty to plan,
organize, direct, supervise and monitor the implementation
of this and any further Orders of the Court." Ibid.'
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed most
of the District Court's judgment. 612 F. 2d 84 (1979) (en
bane). It agreed that respondents had a right to habilitation
in the least restrictive environment, but it grounded this
right solely on the "bill of rights" provision in the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42
U. S. C. § 6010. See 612 F. 2d, at 95-100, 104-107. The
court did not consider the constitutional issues or § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act, and while it affirmed the District Court's
holding that the MH/MR Act provides a right to adequate
habilitation, see id., at 100-103, the court did not decide
whether that state right encompassed a right to treatment in
the least restrictive setting.
On the question of remedy, the Court of Appeals affirmed
except as to the District Court's order that Pennhurst be
closed. The court observed that some patients would be unable to adjust to life outside an institution, and it determined
that none of the legal provisions relied on by plaintiffs precluded institutionalization. !d., at 114-115. It therefore remanded for "individual determinations by the [District
Court], or by the Special Master, as to the appropriateness of
an improved Pennhurst for each such patient," guided by "a
presumption in favor of placing individuals in [community living arrangements]." Ibid. 2
The District Court detennined that the individual defendants had acted
446 F.
Supp, at 1324.
2
In a companion case, the Court of Appeals affirmed the District
Court's denial of ~o intervene for purposes of appeaj~t~
1

in good faith and therefore were immune from the damage claims.

t~e.. f~, . . ~\It'" J-t
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On remand the District Court established detailed procedures for determining the proper residential placement for
each patient. A team consisting of the patient, his parents
or guardian, and his case manager must establish an individual habilitation plan providing for habilitation of the patient
in a designated community living arrangement. The plan is
subject to review by the Special Master. A second master,
called the Hearing Master, is available to conduct hearings,
upon request by the resident, his parents or his advocate, on
the question whether the services of Pennhurst would be
more beneficial to the resident than the community living arrangement provided in the resident's plan. The Hearing
Master then determines where the patient should reside,
subject to possible review by the District Court. See App.
123a-134a (Order of.April 24, 1980). 3
This Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals,
finding that 42 U~ S. C. § 6010 did not create any substantive
rights. 451 U. S. 1 (1981). We remanded the case to the
Court of Appeals to determine if the remedial order could be
supported on the basis of state law, the Constitution, or§ 504
of the Rehabilitation Act. See id., at 31. 4 We also re-

Pennhurst-Parents-Staff-Associatio~finding
the denial harmless error.
See 612 F. 2d 131 (1979) (en bane). The Association subsequently was
granted leave to intervene and is a petitioner in this Court.
• On July 1, 1981, Pennsylvania enacted an appropriations bill providing
that only $35,000 would be paid for the Masters' expenses for the fiscal
year July 1981 to June 1982. The District Court held Pennsylvania and its
Secretary of the Department of Public Welfare in contempt, and imposed a
fine of $10,000 per day. Pennsylvania paid the fines, and the contempt
was purged on January 8, 1982. On appeal the Court of Appeals affirmed
the contempt order. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hospital,
673 F. 2d 628 (1982), cert. pending, No. 81-2363.
• Three Justices dissented from the Court's construction of the Act, but
concluded that the District Court should not have adopted the "far-reaching remedy'' of appointing "a Special Master to decide which of the
Pennhurst inmates should remain and which should be moved to community-based facilities. . . . [T]he court should not have assumed the task of
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manded for consideration of whether any relief was available
under other provisions of the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act. See id., at 27-30 (discussing
42 U. S. C. §§ 6011(a), 6063(b)(5)).
On remand the Court of Appeals affirmed its prior judgment in its entirety. 673 F. 2d 647 (1982) (en bane). It determined that in a recent decision the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania had "spoken definitively'' in holding that the
MH/MR Act required the State to adopt the "least restrictive
environment" approach for the care of the mentally retarded.
Id., at 651 (citing In re Schmidt, 494 Pa. 86, 429 A. 2d 631
(1981)). The Court of Appeals concluded that this state statute fully supported its prior judginent, and therefore did not
reach the remaining issues of federal law. It also rejected
petitioners' argument that the Eleventh Amen ment barred
a federal court from considering this pendent state-law claim.
The court noted that the Amendment did not bar a federal
court from granting prospective injunctive relief against
state officials on the basis of federal claims, see 673 F. 2d, at
656 (citing Ex Parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908)), and concluded that the same result obtained with respect to a
pendent state-law claim. It reasoned that because Siler v.
Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 213 U. S. 175 (1909), an important case in the development of the doctrine of pendent
jurisdiction, also involved state officials, "there cannot be ...
an Eleventh Amendment exception to that rule." 673 F. 2d,
at 658. 5 Finally, the court rejected petitioners' argument
that it should have abstained from deciding the state-law
managing Pennhurst.... "

451 U. S., at 54 (WHITE J., dissenting in

part).

The Court of Appeals also noted that "the United States is an intervening plaintiff ... against which even the state itself cannot successfully
plead the Eleventh Amendment as a bar to jurisdiction," and that "the
counties, even as juridical entities, do not fall within the coverage of the
Eleventh Amendment. Against those defendants even money damages
may be awarded." 673 F. 2d, at 656 (citation omitted).
6

81-2101---0PINION
6

PENNHURST STATE SCHOOL & HOSP. v. HALDERMAN

claim under principles of comity, see id., at 659-660, andrefused to consider petitioners' objections to the District
Court's use of a special master, see id., at 651 and n. 10.
Three judges dissented in part, arguing that under principles
of federalism and comity the establishment of a special master to supervise compliance was an abuse of discretion. See
id., at 662 (Seitz, C.J., joined by Hunter, J., dissenting in
part); ibid. (Garth, J., concurring in part and dissenting as to
relief). See also id., at 661 (Aldisert, J., concurring) (seriously questioning the propriety of the order appointing the
Special Master, but conch~ding that a retroactive reversal of
that order would be meanikless). 6
We granted certiorari,
U. S.
(1982), and now reverse and remand.
..
II
Petitioners raise three challenges to the judgment of the
Court of Appeals: (i) the Eleventh Amendment prohibited
the District Court from ordering state officials to conform
their conduct to state law; (ii) the doctrine of comity prohibited the District Court from issuing its injunctive relief; and
(iii) the District Court abused its discretion in appointing two
masters to supervise the decisions of state officials in implementing state law. We need not reach the latter two issues,
for we find the Eleventh Amendment challenge dispositive.

-k-

A
Article III, § 2 of the Constitution provides that the federal
judicial power extends, inter alia, to controversies "between
a State and Citizens of another State." Relying on this language, this Court in 1793 assumed original jurisdiction over a
suit brought by a citizen of South Carolina against the State
of Georgia. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419 (1793). The
6
The Office of the Special Master was abolished in December 1982.
See App. 220a (Order of August 12, 1982). The Hearing Master remains
in operation .

.·
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decision "created such a shock of surprise that the Eleventh
Amendment was at once proposed and adopted." Monaco v.
Mississippi, 292 U. S. 313, 325 (1934). The Amendment
provides:
"The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States
by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects
of any Foreign State."
The Amendment's language overruled the particular result
in Chisholm, but this Court has recognized that its greater
significance lies in its affirmation that the fundamental principle of sovereign immunity limits the grant of judicial authority in Art. III. Tlfus, in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1
(1890), the Court held that, despite the limited terms of the
Eleventh Amendment, a federal court could not entertain a
suit brought by a citizen against his own State. After reviewing the constitutional debates concerning the scope of
Art. III, the Court determined that federal jurisdiction over
suits against unconsenting States "was not contemplated by
the Constitution when establishing the judicial power of the
United States." !d., at 15. See Monaco v. Mississippi,
supra, at 322--323 (1934). 7 In short, the principle of sovereign immunity is a constitutional limitation on the federal judicial power established in Art. III:
"That a State may not be sued without its consent is a
fundamental rule of jurisprudence having so important a
7
See Employees v. Missouri Public Health Dep't, 411 U. S. 279,
291-292 (1973) (MARSHALL, J., concurring in judgment) (The Eleventh
Amendment "clarif[ied] the intent of the Framers concerning the reach of
federal judicial power" and "restore[d] the original understanding" that
States could not be made unwilling defendants in federal court). See also
Nevada v. Hall, 440 U. S. 410, 430-431 (1979) (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting);
id., at 437 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting) .

.

~
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bearing upon the construction of the Constitution of the
United States that it has become established by repeated
decisions of this court that the entire judicial power
granted by the Constitution does not embrace authority
to entertain a suit brought by private parties against a
State without consent given: not one brought by citizens
of another State, or by citizens or subjects of a foreign
State, because of the Eleventh Amendment; and not
even one brought by its own citizens, because of the fundamental rule of which the Amendment is but an exemplification." Ex parte State of New York No. 1, 256
U. S. 490, 497 (1921) (emphasis added). 8
A sovereign's immunity may be waived, and the Court consistently has held th;:tt a State may consent to suit against it
in federal court. See, e. g., Clark v. Barnard, 108 U. S.
436, 447 (1883). We have insisted, however, that the State's
consent be unequivocally expressed. See, e. g., Edelman v.
Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 673 (1974). Similarly, although Congress has power with respect to the rights protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment immunity, see Fitzpatrick v. Bitker, 427 U. S. 445
(1976), we have required an unequivocal expression of congressional intent to "overturn the constitutionally guaranteed immunity of the several States." Quern v. Jordan, 440
U. S. 332, 342 (1979) (holding that 42 U. S. C. § 1983 does not
override States' Eleventh Amendment immunity). Our reluctance to infer that a State's immunity from suit in the federal courts has been negated stems from recognition of the
8
The limitation deprives federal courts of any jurisdiction to entertain
such claims, and thus may be raised at any point in a proceeding. "The
Eleventh Amendment declares a policy and sets forth an explicit limitation
on federal judicial power of such compelling force that this Court will consider the issue arising under this Amendment ... even though urged for
the first time in this Court." Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury,

323

u. s. 459, 467 (1945).
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vital role of the doctrine of sovereign immunity in our federal
system. A State's constitutional interest in immunity encompasses not merely whether it may be sued, but where it
may be sued. 9 As JUSTICE MARSHALL has noted well, "[b]ecause of the problems of federalism inherent in making one
sovereign appear against its will in the courts of the other, a
restriction upon the exercise of the federal judicial power has
long been considered to be appropriate in a case such as this."
Employees v. Missouri Public Health & Welfare Dep't, 411
U. S. 279, 294 (1973) (MARSHALL, J., concurring in result). 10
Accordingly, in deciding this case we must be guided by
"[t]he principles of federalism that inform Eleventh Amendment doctrine." Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678, 691 (1978).

'

B

This Court's decisions thus establish that "an unconsenting
State is immune from suits brought in federal courts by her
own citize!ls as well as by citizens of another state." Em9
For this reason, the Court consistently has held that a State's waiver
of sovereign immunity in its own courts is not a waiver of the Eleventh
Amendment immunity in the federal courts. See, e. g., Florida Department of Health v. Florida Nursing Home Assn.~50 U. S. 147, 150 (1981)
(per curiam). "[I]t is not consonant with our dual system for the federal
courts ... to read the consent to embrace federal as well as state courts .
. . . [A] clear declaration of the state's intention to submit its fiscal problems to other courts than those of its own creation must be found." Great
Northern Life Insurance Co. v. Read, 322 U. S. 47, 54 (1944).
10
See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U. S., at 418-419 (States were "vitally interested" in whether they would be subject to suit in the federal courts, and
the debates about state immunity focused on the question of federal judicial
power). Cf. id., at 430-431 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting) (sovereign immunity is "a guarantee that is implied as an essential component of federalism"
and is "sufficiently fundamental to our federal structure to have implicit
constitutional dimension"); id., at 437 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting) ("[T]he
States that ratified the Eleventh Amendment thought that they were
putting an end to the possibility of individual States as unconsenting defendants in foreign jurisdictions").

-

.
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ployees, supra, at 280. There may be a question, however,
whether a particular suit in fact is a suit against a State. It
is clear, of course, that in the absence of consent a suit in
which the State or one of its agencies or departments is
named as the defendant is proscribed by the Eleventh
Amendment. See, e. g., Florida Department of Health v.
Florida Nursing Home Assn£ 450 U. S. 147 (1981) (per
curiam); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U. S. 781 (1978) (per
curiam). This jurisdictional bar applies regardless of the nature of the relief sought. See, e. g., Missouri v. Fiske, 290
U. S. 18, 27 (1933) ("Expressly applying to suits in equity as
well as at law, the Amendment necessarily embraces demands for the enforcement of equitable rights and the prosecution of equitable remedies when these are asserted and
prosecuted by an individual against a State").
When the suit is brought only against state officials, a
question arises · as to whether that suit is a suit against the
State itself. Although prior decisions of this Court have not
been entirely consistent on this issue, certain principles are
well established. The Eleventh Amendment bars a suit
against state officials when "the state is the real, substantial
party in interest." Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U. S. 459, 464 (1945). See, e. g., In re Ayers, 123
U. S. 443, 487-492 (1887); Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U. S.
711, 720-723, 727-728 (1882). Thus, "[t]he general rule is
that relief sought nominally against an officer is in fact
against the sovereign if the decree would operate against the
latter." Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U. S. 57, 58 (1963) (per
curiam). 11 And, as when the State itself is named as the defendant, a suit against state officials that is in fact a suit
See also Dugan v. Rank, 372 U. S. 609, 620 (1963) ("The general rule
is that a suit is against the sovereign if 'the judgment sought would expend
itself on the public treasury or domain, or interfere with the public administration,' or if the effect of the judgment would be 'to restrain the Government from acting, or to compel it to act.'") (citations omitted) .
11

.·
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against a State is barred regardless of whether it seeks damages or injunctive relief. See Cory v. White, 457 U. S. 85,
91 (1982).
The Court has recognized an important exception to this
general rule: a suit challenging the constitutionality of a state
official's action is not one against the State. '2 This was the
holding in Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908), in which a
federal court enjoined the Attorney General of the State of
Minnesota from bringing suit to enforce a state statute that
allegedly violated the Fourteenth Amendment. This Court
held that the Eleventh Amendment did not prohibit issuance
of this injunction:
"The act to be enforced is alleged to be unconstitutional,
and if it be so, the use of the name of the State to enforce
an unconstitutipnal act to the injury of complainants is a
proceeding .without the authority of and one which does
12
The Court also has held that sovereign immunity does not apply in a
swt against an offic~ who allegedly acted entirely outside his official authority. See, e. g., Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337
U. S. 682, 702 (1949). This ultra vires E)Xception is qwte limited, governing only those situations in which a government official ads without any
official justification. See, e. g., Florida Department of State v. Treasure
Salvors, Inc.,-- U. S. - - , - - (1982) (opinion of STEVENS, J.) (test is
whether the official's conduct was undertaken "without any authority
whatever"); id., at\.__ (WHITE, J., concurring in judgment in part and
dissenting in part) (test is whether there was no "colorable basis for the
exercise of authority by state officials"). As the Larson Court explained,
"It is important to note that in such cases the relief can be granted, without
impleading the sovereign, only because of the officer's lack of delegated
power. A claim of error in the exercise of that power is therefore not sufficient." 337 U. S., at 689-{)90. This exception clearly is inapplicable in
this case. Even if petitioner officials violated state law in carrying out
some of their official duties, they unquestionably acted under colorable
state authority in operating Pennhurst and the State's system of care for
the mentally retarded. In short, these officials were not acting ultra vires, but rather were "exercising the powers delegated to [them] by the
sovereign." Larson, supra, at 693.

'l"h.b~
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not affect the State in its sovereign or governmental capacity. It is simply an illegal act upon the part of a state
official in attempting by the use of the name of the State
to enforce a legislative enactment which is void because
unconstitutional. If the act which the state Attorney
General seeks to enforce be a violation of the Federal
Constitution, the officer in proceeding under such enactment comes into conflict with the superior authority of
that Constitution, and he is in that case stripped of his
official or representative character and is subjected to
the consequences of his official conduct. The State has
no power to impart to him any immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States."
209 U. S., at 159-160.
The Court subsequently has made clear that, even where this
exception applies, the rule that a suit against state officials
.\.constitutes a suit against the State continues to have force.
Thus, in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651 (1974), the Court
held that in a suit against state officials "a federal court's remedial power, consistent with the Eleventh Amendment, is
necessarily limited to prospective injunctive relief, and may
not include a retroactive award which requires the payment
of funds from the state treasury." Id., at 677 (citations
omitted).
III
With these principles in mind, we now turn to the question
whether the claim that petitioners violated state law in carrying out their official duties at Pennhurst is one against the
State and therefore barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
Respondents advance two principal arguments in support of
the judgment below.'3 First, they contend that under the
We reject respondents' additional contention that Pennsylvania has
waived its immunity from suit in federal court. At the time the suit was
filed, suits against Pennsylvania were permitted only where expressly au13
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doctrine of Edelman v. Jordan, supra, the suit is not against
the State because the courts below ordered only prospective
injunctive relief. Second, they assert that the state-law
claim properly was decided under the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction. Respondents rely on decisions of this Court
awarding relief against state officials on the basis of a pendent state-law claim. See, e. g., Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 213 U. S. 175, 193 (1909).
A

We first address the contention that respondents' state-law
claim is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment because it
seeks only prospective relief as defined in Edelman v. Jordan, supra. The Court of Appeals held that if the judgment
below rested on federal law, it could be entered against petitioner state officials under the doctrine established in
thorized by the legislature, see, e. g., Freach v. Commonwealth, 471 Pa.
558, 370 A. 2d 1163 (1977), and respondents have not referred us to any
provision expressly waiving Pennsylvania's Eleventh Amendment immunity. The State now has a statute governing sovereign immunity, including an express preservation of its immunity from suit in federal court:
"Federal courts.-Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be construed
to waive the immunity of the Commonwealth from suit in Federal courts
guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States." 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8521(b) (1980).
We also do not agree with respondents that the presence of the United
States as a plaintiff in this case removes the Eleventh Amendment from
consideration. Although the Eleventh Amendment does not bar the
United States from suing a State in federal court, see, e. g., Monaco v.
Mississippi, 292 U. S. 313, 329 (1934), the United States' presence in the
case for any purpose does not eliminate the State's immunity for all purposes. For example, the fact that the federal court could award injunctive
relief to the United States on federal constitutional claims would not mean
that the court could order the State to pay damages to other plaintiffs. In
any case, we think it clear that the United States does not have standing to
assert the state-law claims of third-parties. For these reasons, the applicability of the Eleventh Amendment to respondents' state-law claim is
unaffected by the United States' participation in the case.
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Edelman and Young even though the prospective financial
burden was substantial and ongoing. ~ See 673 F. 2d, at 656.
The court assumed, and respondents assert, that this reasoning applies as well when the official acts in violation of state
law. This argument misconstrues the basis of the doctrine
established in Young and Edelman.
As discussed above, the injunction in Young was justified,
notwithstanding the obvious impact on the State itself, on the
view that sovereign immunity does not apply because an official who acts unconstitutionally is "stripped of his official or
representative character," Young, 209 U. S., at 160. This
rationale, of course, created the "well-recognized irony'' that
an official's unconstitutional conduct constitutes state action
under the Fourteenth Amendment but not the Eleventh
Amendment. Florida · Department of State v. Treasure
Salvors, Inc.,-- U. S. - - , - - (1982) (opinion of STEVENS, J.). Nonetheless, the Young doctrine has been accepted as necessary to permit the federal courts to vindicate
federal rights and hold state officials responsible to "the supreme authority of the United States." Young, 209 U. S.,
at 160. As JUSTICE BRENNAN has observed, "Ex parte
Young was the culmination of efforts by this Court to harmonize the principles of the Eleventh Amendment with the
effective supremacy of rights and powers secured elsewhere
in the Constitution." Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U. S. 82, 106
(1971) (BRENNAN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Our decisions repeatedly have emphasized that the
Young doctrine rests on the need to promote the vindication
1

"Although the District Court thus has jurisdiction to grant prospective
relief on the basis of federal law, the scope of that relief is constrained by
principles of comity and federalism. ''Where, as here, the exercise of authority by state officials is attacked, federal courts must be constantly
mindful of the 'special delicacy of the adjustment to be preserved between
federal equitable power and State administration of its own law.'" Rizzo
v. Goode, 423 U. S. 362, 378 (1976) (quoting Stefanelli v. Minard, 342
U. S. 117, 120 (1951)).
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of federal rights.
See, e. g., Quern v. Jordan, 440 U. S.
332, 337 (1979); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232, 237 (1974);
Georgia R. & Banking Co. v. Redwine, 342 U. S. 299, 304
(1952).
The Court also has recognized, however, that the Young
exception should not be applied where unnecessary to promote the supremacy of federal law. This is the significance
of Edelman v. Jordan, supra. We recognized that the prospective relief authorized by Young "has permitted the Civil
War Amendments to the Constitution to serve as a sword,
rather than merely a shield, for those whom they were designed to protect." 415 U. S., at 664. But we declined to
extend Young to encompass retroactive relief, for to do so
would effectively eliminate the constitutional immunity of the
States. Accordingly, we concluded that although the difference between pernlissible and impermissible relief "will not
in many instances be that between day and night," id., at
667, an award of retroactive relief necessarily '"fall[s] afoul of
the Eleventh Amendment if that basic constitutional provision is to be conceived of as having any present force."' !d.,
at 665 (quoting Rothstein v. Wyman, 467 F. 2d 226, 237 (CA2
1972) (McGowan, J., sitting by designation), cert. denied, 411
U. S. 921 (1973)). In sum, Edelman's distinction between
prospective and retroactive relief fulfills the underlying purpose of Ex parte Young while at the same time preserving to
an important degree the constitutional immunity of the
States.
This need to reconcile competing interests is wholly absent, however, when a plaintiff alleges that a state official has
violated state law. In such a case the entire basis for the
doctrine of Young and Edelman disappears. 15 A federal
'"Contrary to the dissent's argument, there is no long line of cases
clearly holding that the Eleventh Amendment "does not bar suits against
state officials for action not authorized by the State's own laws." Post, at
21 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). The constant theme of the Eleventh

81-2101-0PINION
16

PENNHURST STATE SCHOOL & HOSP. v. HALDERMAN

court's grant of relief against state officials on the basis of
state law, whether prospective or retroactive, does not vindicate the supreme authority of federal law. On the contrary,
it is difficult to think of a greater intrusion on state soverAmendment cases of the period cited by the dissent was that there is a crucial difference between the class of cases "where the suit is brought against
the officers of the State, as representing the State's action and liability,
thus making it, though not a party to the record, the real party against
which the judgment will so operate as to compel i to specificallYJperform
contracts," and the class "where afsuit is brought against defendants who,
claiming to be officers of the State, and under the color of an unconstitu- tiona! statute, commit acts of wrong and injury to the rights and property
of the plaintiff acquired under a contract with the State." - Pennoyer v.
McConnaughy, 140 U. S. 1, 10 (1891). Indeed, the decisions in most of
the cases cited by the dissent turned on this distinction relating to whether
the suit properly raised. constitutional challenge to the officer's conduct.
See, e. g., Reagan .v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 154 U. S. 362, 390
(1894); Poindexter v. Greenhaw, 114 U. S. 270, 288 (1885); Cunningham v.
Macon & Brunswick R. Co., 109 U. S. 446, 452 (1883). The Court rarely
was faced with an Eleventh Amendment issue in a case that did not contain
a constitutional allegation.
More significant than the rather bare support for this alleged "firmly established" rule, post, at 18, is the fact that the "line of cases" central to the
dissent's argument since has been repudiated by this Court. The principal
case originally cited for the proposition that a suit alleging a tortious act by
an official is not barred by sovereign immunity is United States v. Lee, 106
U. S. 196 (1882). See Cunningham, supra, at 452; Larson, supra, at 717
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (Lee is the "starting point of thls line of
cases"). In Larson, however, the Court construed Lee narrowly as representing only "a specific application of the constitutional exception to the
doctrine of sovereign immunity." 337 U. S., at 696. Larson expressly
rejected the view-urged by JUSTICE STEVENS' dissent here---Uiat sovereign 1rnmunity is inapplicable whenever the officer allegedly committed a
tortious action. It held that the suit may go forward only if there is an
allegation of unconstitutional action or action that is ultra vires. I d., at
693; see supra, at n. 12.
Thls construction, and the Larson rule, have been reaffirmed repeatedly-and at thls Term-by thls Court. See, e. g., Block v. North Dakota, --U.S. - - , - - (1983); Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U. S. 643,
647-648 (1962). The dissent seeks to avoid the significance of Larson by

v

a

J

U5. v ~

r~-~

( H--a..~;~~ it+

L

.~

p-,i/;"""T;;-.-. ....'j.(...~ti..

-

'5'371A..5

?z¥

81-2101-0PINION
PENNHURST STATE SCHOOL & HOSP. v. HALDERMAN

17

eignty than when a federal court instructs state officials on
how to conform their conduct to state law. · Such a result
conflicts directly with the principles of federalism that underlie the Eleventh Amendment. We conclude that Young and
asserting that its explicit repudiation of the rule and cases relied on by the
dissent here was not "necessary to decide the case" and "apparently did not
command the full agreement of five members of the [Larson] Court" because of a concurring opinion by Justice Douglas. Post, at 16-17, n. 17.
Precisely the same argument was made by Justice Douglas-in lone dissent-1lyears after Larson. See Malone v. Bowdoin, supra, at 649--{)50.
Justice {Stewart's opirllon for the Court in Malone observed that,7'"to reconcile completely all the decisions of the Court in this field prior to 1949
would be a Procrustean task." !d., at 646. His opirllon continued:
"The Court's 1949 Larson decision makes it unnecessary, however, to
undertake that task here. . For in Larson the Court, aware that it was
called upon to 'resolve "the conflict in doctrine' (337 U. S., at 701), thoroughly reviewed the many prior decisions, and made an informed and carefully considered choice between the seemingly conflicting precedents."
Ibid.
The Court in Malone then ~xEressl~ re~ed the Larson rule that the
only two exceptions to sovereign immunio/ are where the officer acted ultra vires or in an unconstitutional fashion. See id., at 647. An allegation
that the officer acted tortiously or illegally-an allegation the dissent finds
sufficient to avoid entirely the Eleventh Amendment's sovereign immunity-was found "not adequate to support a conclusion that the relief asked
was not relief against the sovereign." Ibid. It thus is indisputably clear
that this Court already has "thoroughly reviewed" the precedents and
"made an informed and carefully considered choice," id., at 646, to reject
the view urged by JUSTICE STEVENS' dissent that sovereign immunity
does not bar a suit alleging that an offi~ ''had acted within his authority
but in a manner contrary to state law." Post, at 19.
The dissent recognizes that Larson is inconsistent with the cases on
which the dissent relies, but asserts that "it is not necessary or appropriate
to read that rule :t=etroactively"into the Eleventh Amendment." Post, at
20 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). This departure from stare decisis is hardly
consistent with the dissent's invocation of the doctrine elsewhere in the
opinion. This Court consistently has considered Larson to be a relevant
precedent in Eleventh Amendment cases, see, e. g., Georgia R. Co. v.
Redwine, 342 U. S. 299, 304, nn. 12, 15, and indeed just last Term eight
Justices expressly applied the two-part Larson test in resolving an Elev-
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Edelman are inapplicable in a suit against state officials on
the basis of state law.
B

The reasoning of our decisions on sovereign immunity thus
leads to the conclusion that a federal suit against state officials on the basis of state law contravenes the Eleventh
Amendment. In reaching a contrary conclusion, the Court
of Appeals relied principally on a separate line of cases dealenth Amendment issue, Treasure Salvors, supra, - - U.S., at - (opinion of STEVENS, J.); id., at-- (WHITE, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). The plurality opinion in Treasure
Salvors-written by JUSTICE STEVENs-found that Larson had "clarified"
the prior law established in both Eleventh Amendment and federal sovereign immunity cases, and noted expressly that Larson had "held that the
fact that an officer wrongfully withholds property belonging to another
does not necessarily establish that he is acting beyond the permissible
scope of his official capacity." I d., at--. The plurality then followed
the Larson test in announcing that "the Eleventh Amendment does not bar
an action against a state official that is based on a theory that the officer
acted beyond the scope of his statutory authority or, if within that authority, that such authority is unconstitutional." I d., at--. As the dissent
notes, see post, at 17-18, n. 17, the plurality concluded that the suit was
not barred because the state officials had "no colorable claim" for their actions, but rather had acted "without any authority whatever."*' at--.
But it is clear-and the dissent does not contend otherwise-that both the
plurality and the partial dissent accepted and applied the two-part Larson
test as controlling in the Eleventh Amendment context.
Just as the Court's Eleventh Amendment cases have relied on federal
sovereign immunity principles, the Court's federal sovereign immunity
cases have relied on the principles established in Eleventh Amendment
cases. See, e. g., Philadelphia v. Stimson, 223 U. S. 605, 620 (1912).
This especially was true in Larson itself. See 337 U. S., at 687, n. 6, 691,
n. 11, 694, n. 15, 698, nn. 19-20, 699, n. 22. The dissent thus errs in suggesting that there are different principles for the federal sovereign immunity cases and Eleventh Amendment cases. See id., at 708 (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting) ("The sources of the immunity are formally different but
they present the same legal issues"). It is clear that Larson-the Court's
most recent definitive statement on the rule of sovereign immunity and its
exceptions-should be followed here.

?
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ing with pendent jurisdiction. The crucial point for the
Court of Appeals was that this Court has granted relief
against state officials on the basis of a pendent state-law
claim. See 673 F. 2d, at 657-658. We therefore must consider the relationship between pendent jurisdiction and the
Eleventh Amendment.
This Court long has held generally that when a federal
court obtains jurisdiction over a federal claim, it may adjudicate other related claims over which the court otherwise
would not have jurisdiction. See, e. g., Mine Workers v.
Gipbs, 383 U. S. 715, 726 (1966); Osborn v. Bank of the
United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 819-823 (1824). The Court also
has held that a federal court may resolve a case solely on the
basis of a pendent state-law claim, see Siler, supra, at
192-193, and that. -in fact the court usually should do so in
order to avoid _federal constitutional questions, see id., at
193; Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis,
J., concurring) ("[I]f a case can be decided on either of two
grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a
question of statutory construction or general law, the Court
will decide only the latter"). Under these principles, it
seems clear that, apart from the possible Eleventh Amendment bar, the Court of Appeals had a proper jurisdictional
basis on which to decide the claim based on Pennsylvania
law.'6 The question therefore is whether the Amendment
applies to this pendent state-law claim.
This does not necessarily mean that pendent jurisdiction properly was
exercised here. "Pendent jurisdiction over state claims [is] a doctrine of
discretion not to be routinely exercised without considering the advantages
of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to the litigants." Hagans
v. Lavine, 415 U. S. 528, 545 (1974). In particular, "[n]eedless decisions
of state law should be avoided both as a matter of comity and to promote
justice between the parties, by procuring for them a surer-footed reading
of applicable law." Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U. S. 715, 726 (1966).
Because of our disposition of the case under the Eleventh Amendment, we
need not decide this important comity issue.
16
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As the Court of Appeals noted, in Siler and subsequent
cases concerning pendent jurisdiction relief was granted
against state officials on the basis of state-law claims that
were pendent to federal constitutional claims. The Court
never held directly that the rationale of Ex parte Young
should be extended to pendent state-law claims, but rather
appears to have assumed that the Eleventh Amendment simply does not apply to pendent claims. 17 This is illustrated by
Greene v. Louisville & Interurban R. Co., 244 U. S. 499
(1917), in which the plaintiff railroads sued state officials, alleging that certain tax assessments were excessive under the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Court first rejected the officials' argument under the Eleventh Amendment, finding that
Ex parte Young applied to all constitutional claims against
state officials, regardless of whether the state statute under
which the officials · acted was constitutional or unconstitutional. See id. ·, at 507. Having determined that the Eleventh Amendment did not deprive the federal court of jurisdiction over this constitutional question, the Court declared
that the court's jurisdiction extended "to the determination of
all questions involved in the case, including questions of state
law, irrespective of the disposition that may be made of the
federal question, or whether it be found necessary to decide
it at all." I d., at 508. The case then was decided solely on
The dissent repeatedly refers to the "rule" in Siler as if the Court
there had held that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar slits on pendent state-law claims. It bears repeating that the Eleventh Amendment
was not raised by the State or addressed by this Court in that decision.
Rather, the rule in Siler is that, as a general matter, a federal court should
decide a case on state-law grounds where possible to avoid a federal constitutional question. 213 U. S., at 193. Contrary to the dissent's repeated intimations, we have not "repudiated" or "reject[ed]" this rule,
post, at 10, 12, or held that Siler is ''no longer good law," post, at 8. Nothing in our decision is meant to reject Siler, much less cast doubt on the
desirability of applying its principles in cases where the federal court has
jurisdiction to decide the state-law issues.

'
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state-law grounds. Accord, LoJ'0:ille & Nashville R.R.
Co. v. Greene, 244 U. S. 522 (1917).....
The implicit view thus seems to have been that once jurisdiction is established on the basis of any federal question, no
further Eleventh Amendment inquiry is necessary with respect to other claims raised in the case. We believe this
view is erroneous and contrary to the principles established
in our Eleventh Amendment decisions. "The Eleventh
Amendment is an explicit limitation on the judicial power of
the United States." Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U. S., at 25. It
deprives a federal court of power to decide certain claims
against States that otherwise would be within the scope of
Art. III's grant of jurisdiction. For example, if a lawsuit
against state officials under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 alleges a constitutional claim, the. federal court is barred from awarding
damages against 'the state treasury even though the claim
arises under the Constitution. See Quern v. Jordan, 440
U. S. 332 (1979). Similarly, if a § 1983 action alleging a constitutional claim is brought directly against a State, the Eleventh Amendment bars a federal court from granting any relief on that claim. See Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U. S. 781
(1978) (per curiam). The Amendment thus is a specific constitutional bar against hearing evenfederal claims that otherwise would be within the jurisdiction of the federal courts. 18
This constitutional bar applies to pendent claims as well.
A federal court's power over a pendent claim necessarily derives from Art. III, see Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U. S. 1, 9
(1976), and the Eleventh Amendment is an independent limitation on all exercises of Art. III power. See supra, at 7-8.
If we were to hold otherwise, a federal court could award
8

See, e. g., Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322 (1934) ("[A]lthough a case may arise under the Constitution and laws of the United
States, the judicial power does not extend to it if the suit is sought to be
prosecuted against a State, without her consent, by one of her own citizens"); Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U. S. 18, 25-26 (1933).
'
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damages against a State on the basis of a pendent claim.
Our decision in Edelman v. Jordan, supra, makes clear that
pendent jurisdiction does not permit such an evasion of the
immunity guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment. We
there held that "the District Court was correct in exercising
pendent jurisdiction over [plaintiffs'] statutory claim," 415
U. S., at 653, n. 1, but then concluded that the Eleventh
Amendment barred an award of retroactive relief on the
basis of that pendent claim. I d., at 678.
In sum, contrary to the analysis implicit in decisions such
as Greene, supra, neither pendent jurisdiction nor any other
basis of jurisdiction may override the Eleventh Amendment. 19 A federal court must examine each claim in a case to
see if the court's jurisdiction over that claim is barred by the
Eleventh Amendment. We concluded above that a claim
that state officials,violated state law in carrying out their official responsibilities is a claim against the State that is protected by the Eleventh Amendment. See supra, at 16. We
now hold that this principle applies as well to state-law claims
brought into federal court under pendent jurisdiction. This
issue has not previously been confronted directly, and we
therefore are not bound by prior decisions assuming a contrary conclusion. "[W]hen questions of jurisdiction have
been passed on in prior decisions sub silentio, this Court has
never considered itself bound when a subsequent case finally
brings the jurisdictional issue before us." Hagans v.
Lavine, 415 U. S. 528, 533, n. 5 (1974). 20

c
'"See Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U.S., at 27 ("This is not less a suit against
the State because the bill is ancillary and supplemental.").
20
See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 671 (1974) ("Having now had
an opportunity to more fully consider the Eleventh Amendment issue after
briefing and argument, we disapprove the Eleventh Amendment holdings
of [certain prior] cases to the extent that they are inconsistent with our
holding today'').
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Respondents urge that application of the Eleventh Amendment to pendent state-law claims will have a disruptive effect
on litigation against state officials. They argue that the
"considerations of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to litigants" that underlie pendent jurisdiction, see
Gibbs, supra, at 726, counsel against a result that may cause
litigants to split causes of action between state and federal
courts. They also contend that the policy of avoiding unnecessary constitutional decisions will be contravened if plaintiffs choose to forgo their state-law claims and sue only in federal court or, alternatively, that the policy of Ex parte Young
will be hindered if plaintiffs choose to forgo their right to a
federal forum and bring all of their claims in state court.
We agree that, depending on the circumstances of the case,
these considerations of policy may be important, 21 but they
may not override the constitutional limitations on the authority of the fedenil judiciary to adjudicate suits against a State.
See Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U. S., at 25-26 ("Considerations
of convenience open no avenue of escape from the [Amendment's] restriction"). 22 In a suit brought by private litigants
against state officials, these constitutional limitations do not
preclude a federal court from granting prospective relief to
vindicate federal law. But the Eleventh Amendment deprives federal courts of power to consider other claims raised
21
Petitioners contend that in this case these policy considerations are
outweighed by considerations of comity, arguing that the Court of Appeals
"has authorized a severe intrusion on the right of state officials to run their
own programs, basing that intrusion on nothing more than its view of state
law." Brief for Petitioners 9. In light of our disposition of this case, we
need not balance these competing considerations.
22
Cf. Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U. S. 1, 14-15 (1976) (Although "considerations of judicial economy" would be served by permitting pendent-party
jurisdiction, "the addition of a completely new party would run counter to
the well-established principle that federal courts, as opposed to state trial
courts of general jurisdiction, are courts of limited jurisdiction marked out
by Congres%<6
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against the State or its officials. Any inconvenience in
choice of forum that may be caused to litigants who wish to
raise both federal and state claims is a necessary consequence
of this limitation on federal judicial power. 23 The constitutional principle of sovereign immunity, embodied in the Eleventh Amendment, demands that claims against state officials
on the basis of state law be resolved in state courts. 24
23
This limitation on federal judicial power imposes the same inconvenience on a plaintiff who has certain federal claims that may not be raised
in federal court. Under Edelman v. Jordan, supra, a plaintiff with a
claim for monetary relief against a State on the basis of federal law must
resort to state court. If he wishes to press a related claim for prospective
relief, he must forgo the damages claim, or split his related causes of action
between federal and state courts, or take the entire case to state court.
As JUSTICE MARSHAL~. has observed, the fact that some federal rights
may have to be enforced ·in a state forum is "a part of the tension inherent
in our system of federalism." Employees v. Missouri Public Health &
Welfare Dept., 411 U. S. 279, 298 (1973) (MARSHALL, J., concurring in
result).
24
The dissent's distaste for the Eleventh Amendment and its principle of
sovereign immunity is the underlying theme of the dissenting opinion.
See post, at 25--27; cf. id., at 10-11 (quoting the "illuminating" analysis in
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419, 471 (1793) (opinion of Jay, C. J.)). Indeed, the dissent's negative view of sovereign immunity leads it to an apparent willingness to overrule the decisions of this Court that have emphasized the importance and continuing vitality of the Eleventh Amendment,
id., at 26, in favor of JUSTICE BRENNAN's dissenting view in Employees v.
Missouri Public Health Dept., 411 U. S. 279 (1973). But that view was
expressly rejected both by Justice Douglas' opinion for the Court, see id.,

I

y ·

at 280, n. 1, and JUSTICE MARSHALL's opinion concurring in the judgment,

see id., at 292, n. 8.
(
:::tt>. (. J..
Thus, the dissent's argument that sovereign immunity ".{undoubtedly ' ' V
runs counter to modern democratic notions of the moral responsibility of
~·post, at 27 (quoting Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322
U.S. 47,'59 (1944) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)), is a view of the Eleventh
Amendment that has never been accepted by this Court. Moreover, the
argument substantially misses the point with respect to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. As JusTICE MARSHALL has observed, the
Eleventh Amendment's restriction on the federal judicial power is based in
large part on the "the problems of federalism inherent in making one sover-

~
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IV
Respondents contend that, regardless of the applicability
of the Eleventh Amendment to their state claims against peti~ioner state officials, the judgment may still be upheld
against petitioner county officials. We are not persuaded.
Even assuming that these officials are not immune from suit
challenging their actions under the MH/MR Act, 25 it is clear
that without the injunction against the state institutions and
officials in this case, an order entered on state-law grounds
necessarily would be limited. The relief substantially concerns Pennhurst, an arm of the State that is operated by
eign appear against its will in the courts of the other." Employees, supra,
at 294 (MARSHALL, J., concurring in the result). ·
u.we have held that the Eleventh Amendment does not apply to "counties and similar muruc1piu corporations." Mt. Healthy City School District
v. Doyle, 429 U. s: 274, 280 (1977); see Lincoln County v. Luning, 133
U. S. 529, 530 (1890). At the same time, we have applied the Amendment
to bar relief against county officials "in order to protect the state treasury
from liability that would have had essentially the same practical consequences as a judgment against the State itself." Lake Country Estates,
Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U. S. 391, 401 (1979). See,
e. g., Edelman v. Jordan, supra (Eleventh Amendment bars suit against
state and county officials for retroactive award of welfare benefits). The
Courts of Appeals are in general agreement that a suit against officials of a
county or other governmental entity is barred if the relief obtained runs
against the State. See, e. g., Moore v. Tangipahoa Parish School Board,
594 F. 2d 489, 493 (CA5 1979); Carey v. Quem, 588 F. 2d 230, 233-234
(CA7 1978); Incarcerated Men of Allen County Jail v. Fair, 507 F. 2d 281,
287-288 (CA6 1974); Harris v. Tooele County School District, 471 F. 2d
218 220 (CAlO 1973). Given that the actions of the county commissioners
health admizitrators are dependent on funding from the State, ;_
t ay be t at relief granted against these county officials, when exercising
their functions under the MH/MR Act, effectively runs against the State.
Cf. Farr v. Chesney, 441 F. Supp. 127, 130-132 (MD Pa. 1977) (holding
that Pennsylvarua county commissioners, acting as members of the board
of the county office of mental health and retardation, may not be sued for
back pay under the Eleventh Amendment). We need not decide this issue
in light of our disposition above .

-
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state officials. Moreover, funding for the county mental retardation programs comes almost entirely from the State, see
Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 50, §§4507--4509 (Purdon 1969 and Supp.
1982), and the costs of the masters have been borne by the
State, see 446 F. Supp., at 1327. Finally, the MH/MR Act
contemplates that the state and county officials will cooperate
in operating mental retardation programs. See In re
Schmidt, 494 Pa. 86, 95-96, 429 A. 2d 631, 635-636 (1981).
In short, the present judgment could not be sustained on the
basis of the state-law obligations of petitioner county officials. Indeed, any relief granted against the county officials
on the basis of the state statute would be partial and incomplete at best. Such an ineffective enforcement of state law
would not appear to serve the purposes of efficiency, convenience, and fairness that must inform the exercise of pendent
jurisdiction.
--· · ·-

v

The Court of Appeals upheld the judgment of the District
Court solely on the basis of Pennsylvania's MH/MR Act.
We hold that the courts lacked jurisdiction to enjoin petitioner state institutions and state officials on the basis of this
state law. The District Court also rested its decision on the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. See supra, at 2. On remand the
Court of Appeals may consider to what extent, if any, the
judgment may be sustained on these bases. 26 The court also
may consider whether relief may be granted to respondents
under the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of
Rights Act, 42 U. S. C. §§ 6011, 6063. The judgment of the
Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.
On the Fourteenth Amendment issue, the court should consider
Youngberg v. Romeo,- U. S . - (1982), a decision that was not available when the District Court issued its decision .
26
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PENNHURST STATE SCHOOL & HOSPITAL, ET AL.,
PETITIONERS v. TERRI LEE HALDERMAN, ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR_' THE•THIRD CIRCUIT
. [June-, 1983]

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether a federal court
may award injunctive relief against state officials on the basis
of state law.
I ,,,.
This litigation, here for the second time, concerns the conditions of care at petitioner Pennhurst State School and Hospital, a Pennsylvania institution for the care of the mentally
retarded. See Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1 (1981). Although the litigation's history is set forth in detail in our prior opinion, see id., at 5-10,
it is necessary for purposes of this decision to review that
history.
This suit originally was brought in 1974 by respondent
Terri Lee Halderman, a resident of Pennhurst, in the District Court for the Eastern District' of Pennsylvania. Ultimately, plaintiffs included a class consisting of all persons
who were or might become residents of Pennhurst; the Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Citizens (P ARC); and the
United States. Defendants were Pennhurst and various
Pennhurst officials; the Pennsylvania Department of Public
Welfare and several of its officials; and various county commissioners, county mental retardation administrators, and

.-
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other officials of five Pennsylvania counties surrounding
Pennhurst. Respondents' amended complaint charged that
conditions at Pennhurst violated the class members' rights
under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 87 Stat. 394, as amended, 29
U. S. C. § 794 (1976 ed. and Supp. V); the Developmentally
Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U. S. C.
§§ 6001--{)081 (1976 ed. and Supp. V); and the Pennsylvania
Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966 (the
"MH/MR Act"), Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 50, §§ 4101-4704
(Purdon 1969 and Supp. 1982). Both damages and injunctive
relief were sought.
In 1977, following a lengthy trial, the District Court rendered its decision. 446 F. Supp. 1295 (1977). As noted in
our prior opinion, the cour(;.'s_findings were undisputed: "Conditions at Pennhurst ·are not only dangerous, with the residents often physically abused or drugged by staff members,
but also inadequate for the 'habilitation' of the retarded. Indeed, the court found that the physicial, intellectual, and
emotional skills of some residents have deteriorated at
Pennhurst." 451 U. S., at 7 (footnote omitted). The District Court held that these conditions violated each resident's
right to "minimally adequate habilitation" under the Due
Process Clause and the MH/MR Act, see 446 F. Supp., at
1314-1318, 1322-1323; "freedom from harm" under the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, see id., at 1320-1321;
and "nondiscriminatory habilitation" under the Equal Protection Clause and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, see id., at
1321-1324. Furthermore, the court found that "due process
demands that if a state undertakes the habilitation of a retarded person, it must do so in the least restrictive setting
consistent with that individual's habilitative needs." I d., at
1319 (emphasis added). After concluding that the large size
of Pennhurst prevented it from providing the necessary
habilitation in the least restrictive environment, the court ordered "that immediate steps be taken to remove the retarded

.~
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residents from Pennhurst." !d., at 1325. Petitioners were
ordered "to provide suitable community living arrangements" for the class members, id., at 1326, and the court appointed a Special Master "with the power and duty to plan,
organize, direct, supervise and monitor the implementation
of this and any further Orders of the Court." Ibid. 1
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed most
of the District Court's judgment . .. .612 F. 2d 84 (1979) (en
bane). It agreed that respondents had a right to habilitation
in the least restrictive environment, but it grounded this
right solely on the "bill of rights" provision in the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42
U. S. C. § 6010. See 612 F. 2d, at 95-100, 104-107. The
court did not consider the constitutional issues or § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act, and ·while it affirmed the District Court's
holding that the MH/MR Act provides a right to adequate
habilitation, see id., at 100-103, the court did not decide
whether that state right encompassed a right to treatment in
the least restrictive setting.
On the question of remedy, the Court of Appeals affirmed
except as to the District Court's order that Pennhurst be
closed. The court observed that some patients would be unable to adjust to life outside"an institution, and it determined
that none of the legal provisions relied on by plaintiffs precluded institutionalization. I d., at 114-115. It therefore remanded for "individual determinations by the [District
Court], or by the Special Master, as to the appropriateness of
an improved Pennhurst for each such patient," guided by "a
presumption in favor of placing individuals in [community living arrangements]." I bid. 2
~

\..

'The District Court detennined that the individual defendants had acted
in good faith and therefore were immune from the damage claims. 446 F.
Supp, at 1324.
2
In a companion case, the Court of Appeals affirmed the District
Court's denial of motion to intervene for purposes of appeaj~~

.~
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On remand the District Court established detailed procedures for determining the proper residential placement for
each patient. A team consisting of the patient, his parents
or guardian, and his case manager must establish an individual habilitation plan providing for habilitation of the patient
in a designated community living arrangement. The plan is
subject to review by the Special Master. A second master,
called the Hearing Master, is available to conduct hearings,
upon request by the resident, his p'arertts or his advocate, on
the question whether the services of Pennhurst would be
more beneficial to the resident than the community living arrangement provided in the resident's plan. The Hearing
Master then determines where the patient should reside,
subject to possible review by the District Court. See App.
123a-134a (Order of.April 24, 1980). 3
This Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals,
finding that 42 U~ S. C. § 6010 did not create any substantive
rights. 451 U. S. 1 (1981). We remanded the case to the
Court of Appeals to determine if the remedial order could be
supported on the basis of state law, the Constitution, or§ 504
of the Rehabilitation Act. See id., at 31. 4 We also re-

'

Parents-Staff....Associ~tio~finding

Fennhurst
the denial harmless error.
See 612 F. 2d 131 (1979) (en bane). The Association subsequently was
granted leave to intervene and is a petitioner in this Court.
8
On July 1, 1981, Pennsylvania enacted an appropriations bill providing
that only $35,000 would be paid for the Masters' expenses for the fiscal
year July 1981 to June 1982. The District Court held Pennsylvania and its
Secretary of the Department of Public Welfare in contempt, and imposed a
fine of $10,000 per day. Pennsylvania paid the fines, and the contempt
was purged on January 8, 1982. On appeal the Court of Appeals affirmed
the contempt order. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hospital,
673 F. 2d 628 (1982), cert. pending, No. 81-2363.
• Three Justices dissented from the Court's construction of the Act, but
concluded that the District Court should not have adopted the "far-reaching remedy" of appointing "a Special Master to decide which of the
Pennhurst inmates should remain and which should be moved to community-based facilities. . . . [T]he court should not have assumed the task of

..
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manded for consideration of whether any relief was available
under other provisions of the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act. See id., at 27-30 (discussing
42 U. S. C. §§ 6011(a), 6063(b)(5)). "
On remand the Court of Appeals affirmed its prior judgment in its entirety. 673 F. 2d 647 (1982) (en bane). It determined that in a recent decision the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania had "spoken definitively" ,in holding that the
MHIMR Act required the State to adopt. .the "least restrictive
environment" approach for the care of the mentally retarded.
Id., at 651 (citing In re Schmidt, 494 Pa. 86, 429 A. 2d 631
(1981)). The Court of Appeals concluded that this state statute fully supported its prior judginent, and therefore did not
reach the remaining issues of federal law. It also rejected
petitioners' argument that the Eleventh Amendment barred
a federal court from considering this pendent state-law claim.
The court noted that the Amendment did not bar a federal
court from granting prospective injunctive relief against
state officials on the basis of federal claims, see 673 F. 2d, at
656 (citing Ex Parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908)), and concluded that the same result obtained with respect to a
pendent state-law claim. ·u reasoned that because Siler v.
Louisville & Nashville R.R:':co., 213 U. S. 175 (1909), an important case in the development of the doctrine of pendent
jurisdiction, also involved state officials, "there cannot be ...
an Eleventh Amendment exception to that rule." 673 F. 2d,
at 658. 5 Finally, the court rejected petitioners' argument
that it should have abstained from deciding the state-law
managing Pennhurst.... "

451 U. S., at 54

(WHITE

J., dissenting in

part).

'The Court of Appeals also noted that "the United States is an intervening plaintiff ... against which even the state itself cannot successfully
plead the Eleventh Amendment as a bar to jurisdiction," and that "the
counties, even as juridical entities, do not fall within the coverage of the
Eleventh Amendment. Against those defendants even money damages
may be awarded." 673 F. 2d, at 656 (citation omitted) .

.
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claim under principles of comity, see id., at 659-660, andrefused to consider petitioners' objections to the District
Court's use of a special master, see .id., at 651 and n. 10.
Three judges dissented in part, arguing that under principles
of federalism and comity the establishment of a special master to supervise compliance was an abuse of discretion. See
id., at 662 (Seitz, C.J., joined by Hunter, J., dissenting in
part); ibid. (Garth, J., concurring in: p~lt and dissenting as to
relief). See also id., at 661 (Aldisert, J., concurring) (seriously questioning the propriety of the order appointing the
Special Master, but concluding that a retroactive reversal of
that order would be meanikless). 6
We granted certiorari,
U. S.
(1982), and now reverse and remand.
. . . ,, - II

--k-

Petitioners raise three challenges to the judgment of the
Court of Appeals: (i) the Eleventh Amendment prohibited
the District Court from ordering state officials to conform
their conduct to state law; (ii) the doctrine of comity prohibited the District Court from issuing its injunctive relief; and
(iii) the District Court abused its discretion in appointing two
masters to supervise the de~isions of state officials in implementing state law. We need ·not reach the latter two issues,
for we find the Eleventh Amendment challenge dispositive.
A
Article III, § 2 of the Constitution provides that the federal
judicial power extends, inter alia, to controversies "between
a State and Citizens of another State." Relying on this language, this Court in 1793 assumed original jurisdiction over a
suit brought by a citizen of South Carolina against the State
of Georgia. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419 (1793). The
The Office of the Special Master was abolished in December 1982.
See App. 220a (Order of August 12, 1982). The Hearing Master remains
in operation .
6

.·
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decision "created such a shock of surprise that the Eleventh
Amendment was at once proposed and adopted." Monaco v.
Mississippi, 292 U. S. 313, 325 (1934). The Amendment
provides:
·
"The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States
by Citizens of another State, or. by Citizens or Subjects
of any Foreign State."
The Amendment's langu.age overruled the particular result
in Chisholm, but this Court has recognized that its greater
significance lies in its affirmation that the fundamental principle of sovereign immunity limits the grant of judicial authority in Art. III. Tl)us, jp .Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1
(1890), the Court held that, despite the limited terms of the
Eleventh Amendment, a federal court could not entertain a
suit brought by a citizen against his own State. Mter reviewing the constitutional debates concerning the scope of
Art. III, the Court determined that federal jurisdiction over
suits against unconsenting States "was not contemplated by
the Constitution when establishing the judicial power of the
United States." Id., at 15 ..· See Monaco v. Mississippi,
supra, at 322-323 (1934). 7 In short, the principle of sovereign immunity is a constitutional limitation on the federal judicial power established in Art. III:
"That a State may not be sued without its consent is a
fundamental rule of jurisprudence having so important a
See Employees v. Missouri Public Health Dep't, 411 U.S. 279,
291-292 (1973) (MARSHALL, J., concurring in judgment) (The Eleventh
Amendment "clarif[ied] the intent of the Framers concerning the reach of
federal judicial power" and "restore[d] the original understanding" that
States could not be made unwilling d.efendants in federal court). See also
Nevada v. Hall, 440 U. S. 410, 430-431 (1979) (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting);
id., at 437 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting) .
7

.•
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bearing upon the construction of the Constitution of the
United States that it has become established by repeated
decisions of this court that the. entire judicial power
granted by the Constitution does not embrace authority
to entertain a suit brought by private parties against a
State without consent given: not one brought by citizens
of another State, or by citizens
subjects of a foreign
State, because of the Eleventh .Amendment; and not
even one brought by its own citizens, because of the fundamental rule of which the Amendment is but an exemplification." Ex parte State of New York No. 1, 256
U. S. 490, 497 (1921) (emphasis added). 8

or

A sovereign's immunity may be waived, and the Court consistently has held that a State may consent to suit against it
in federal court. See,··~: g., Clark v. Barnard, 108 U. S.
436, 447 (1883). We have insisted, however, that the State's
consent be unequivocally expressed. See, e. g., Edelman v.
Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 673 (1974). Similarly, although Congress has power with respect to the rights protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment immunity, see Fitzpatrick v. Bitker, 427 U. S. 445
(1976), we have required an unequivocal expression of congressional intent to "overturn the constitutionally guaranteed immunity of the several States." Quem v. Jordan, 440
U. S. 332, 342 (1979) (holding that 42 U. S. C. § 1983 does not
override States' Eleventh Amendment immunity). Our reluctance to infer that a State's immunity from suit in the federal courts has been negated stems from recognition of the
8
The limitation deprives federal courts of any jurisdiction to entertain
such claims, and thus may be raised at any point in a proceeding. "The
Eleventh Amendment declares a policy and sets forth an explicit limitation
on federal judicial power of such compelling force that this Court will consider the issue arising under this Amendment ... even though urged for
the first time in this Court." Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury,

323

.•

u. s. 459, 467 (1945) .

81-2101-0PINION
PENNHURST STATE SCHOOL & HOSP. v. HALDERMAN

9

vital role of the doctrine of sovereign immunity in our federal
system. A State's constitutional interest in immunity encompasses not merely whether it may be sued, but where it
may be sued. 9 As JUSTICE MARSHALLiha.s noted Q "[b]ecause of the problems of federalism inherent in making one
sovereign appear against its will in the courts of the other, a
restriction upon the exercise of the federal judicial power has
long been considered to be appropria;t~ !n a case such as this."
Employees v. Missouri Public Health & Welfare Dep't, 411
U. S. 279, 294 (1973) (MARSHALL, J., concurring in result). 10
Accordingly, in deciding this case we must be guided by
"[t]he principles of federalism that inform Eleventh Amendment doctrine." Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678, 691 (1978).
.- l t

-

\

B

This Court's decisions thus establish that "an unconsenting
State is immune from suits brought in federal courts by her
own citize~s as well as by citizens of another state." Em9
For this reason, the Court consistently has held that a State's waiver
of sovereign immunity in its own courts is not a waiver of the Eleventh
Amendment immunity in the federal courts. See, e. g., Florida Department of Health v. Florida Nursin,g Home Assn.~50 U. S. 147, 150 (1981)
(per curiam). "(l]t is not consonant with our dual system for the federal
courts ... to read the consent to embrace federal as well as state courts .
. . . [A] clear declaration of the state's intention to submit its fiscal problems to other courts than those of its own creation must be found." Great
Northern Life Insurance Co. v. Read, 322 U. S. 47, 54 (1944).
10
See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U. S., at 418-419 (States were "vitally interested" in whether they would be subject to suit in the federal courts, and
the debates about state immunity focused on the question of federal judicial
power). Cf. id., at 430-431 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting) (sovereign immunity is "a guarantee that is implied as an essential component of federalism"
and is "sufficiently fundamental to our federal structure to have implicit
constitutional dimension"); id., at 437 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting) ("(T]he
States that ratified the Eleventh Amendment thought that they were
putting an end to the possibility of individual States as unconsenting defendants in foreign jurisdictions").

_A

l) \
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ployees, supra, at 280. There may be a question, however,
whether a particular suit in fact is a suit against a State. It
is clear, of course, that in the absence of consent a suit in
which the State or qne of its agencies or departments is
named as the defendant is proscribed by the Eleventh
Amendment. See, e. g., Florida Department of Health v.
Florida Nursing Home Assnj 450 U. S. 147 (1981) (per
curiam); Alabama v. Pugh, 43$ .lJ. S. 781 (1978) (per
curiam). This jurisdictional bar applies regardless of the nature of the relief sought. See, e. g., Missouri v. Fiske, 290
U. S. 18, 27 (1933) ("Expressly applying to suits in equity as
well as at law, the Amendment necessarily embraces demands for the enforcement of equitable rights and the prosecution of equitable remedies when these are asserted and
prosecuted by an individual against a State").
When the suit is brought only against state officials, a
question arises · as to whether that suit is a suit against the
State itself. Although prior decisions of this Court have not
been entirely consistent on this issue, certain principles are
well established. The Eleventh Amendment bars a suit
against state officials when "the state is the real, substantial
party in interest." Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U. S. 459, 464 (1'945). See, e. g., In re Ayers, 123
U. S. 443, 487-492 (1887); Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U. S.
711, 720-723, 727-728 (1882). Thus, "[t]he general rule is
that relief sought nominally against an officer is in fact
against the sovereign if the decree would operate against the
latter." Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U. S. 57, 58 (1963) (per
curiam). 11 And, as when the State itself is named as the defendant, a suit against state officials that is in fact a suit
See also Dugan v. Rank, 372 U. S. 609, 620 (1963) ("The general rule
is that a suit is against the sovereign if 'the judgment sought would expend
itself on the public treasury or domain, or interfere with the public administration,' or if the effect of the judgment would be 'to restrain the Govern~•nt from acting, " to oomp•l it to act.'") (citatione omitt•d).
11

0
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11
Respondents do not dispute that the relief sought and
awarded below operated against the state.
They suggest,
however, that the suit here should not be considered to be
against the state for the purposes of the Eleventh
Amendment because, they say, petitioners were acting ultra
vires
their authority.
Respondents
rely largely on
Florida Dep't of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 u.
s.
(1982), which in turn was founded upon Larson v.
Domestic & Forei n Commerce Cor ., 337 u. S. 682 (1949).
These cases eo not he~p respondents, however
These and
other modern cases make clear that a state officer may be
said to act ultra vires only when he acts "without any
· authority whatever."
Treasure Salvors, supra, at
(opinion of STEVENS, J.); accord id., at
(WHITE, J.,
concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part)
(test is whether there was no "colorable basis for tthe
exercise of authority by state officials"). As the Court
in Larson explained, an ultra vires claim rests on "the
officer's lack of delegated power.
A claim of error in
the exercise of that power is therefore not sufficient."
Larson, supra, at 690.
Petitioners' actions in ~nn-icng
this mental health institution plainly were not beyond \ )
their delegated authority in this sense.
Pennsylvania
statutes gave them broad discretion to provide "adequate"
mental health services. Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 50, §4201(1)
(Purdon 19
).
The essence of respondents' claim is that
petitioners ~ ~~Fp!\.eted the term "adequate." ,...

C/Ju''

~~/,_

~~:£-.<LA- ~-~ .

('.
t>jUN.-fi4

·
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of this injunction:
"The act
e enforced is alleged to be u nstitutional,
and · · be so, the use of the name of the State enforce
unconstitutional,oact to the injury of complainan s a
proceeding .without the authority of and one which doe
12

The Court also has held that sovereign immunity does not apply in
s · against an official who allegedly acted entirely outside his official
See, e. g., Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Co ., 337
thori
U. S. 68 , 02 (1949). This ultra vires E:Xception is quite limit , governing only thos situations in which a government official a
without any
official justificatl . See, e. g.j'.Florida Department o ·tate v. Treasure
Salvors, Inc.,-- . S. - - , - ·- (1982) (opinion
TEVENS, J.) (test is
whether the official's c duct was undertake 'without any authority
TE, J., cone
ng in judgment in part and
whatever"); id., at~
dissenting in part) (test is whe er the was no "colorable basis for the
exercise of authority by state offici
. As the Larson Court explained,
"It is important to note that in s~ cas the relief can be granted, without
e officer's lack of delegated
impleading the sovereign, oply because o
power. A claim of error 'rfthe exercise of tha ower is therefore not suf689-690. This exception
arly is inapplicable in
ficient." 337 U. S.,
this case. Eve · petitioner officials violated state w in carrying out
der colorable
some of the' fficial duties, they unquestionably acte
state aut 1ty in operating Pennhurst and the State's syste of care for
ally retarded. In short, these officials were not acting ltra vire , ut rather were "exercising the powers delegated to [them] 15 the
overeign." Larson, supra, at 693.
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not affect the State in its sovereign or governmental c
pacity. It is simply an illegal act upon the part of as te
1 in attempting by the use qf the name of th tate
to
orce a legislative enactment which is voi ecause
unco titutional. If the act which the sta Attorney
Genera eeks to enforce be a violation
the Federal
Constitutio the officer in proceeding Cler such enactment comes to conflict with th~ . ~u erior authority of
that Constitutio and he is in~hcase stripped of his
official or represe ative chara er and is subjected to
the consequences of ·s offici conduct. The State has
no power to impart to
any immunity from responority of the United States."
sibility to the supreme
209 U. S., at 159-160
The Court subsequent h~s made cle that, even where this
exception applies, t e rule that a suit ainst state officials
constitutes a sui gainst the State conti es to have force.
74), the Court
Thus, in Edel n v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651
held that in suit against state officials "a fede 1 court's remedial po er, consistent with the Eleventh Am dment, is
necess 1ly limited to prospective injunctive relief, d may
not · elude a retroactive award which requires the pa ent
of
ds from the state treasury." Id., at 677 (citat
mitted.
III
With these principles in mind, we now turn to the question
whether the claim that petitioners violated state law in carrying out their official duties at Pennhurst is one against the
State and therefore barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
Respondents advance,..ttwo principal arguments in support of
the judgment below:il'i.tFirst, they contend that under the

t:Z."'Wereject respondents' .addition~! contention that Pennsylvania has
waived its immunity from suit in federal court. At the time the suit was
filed, suits against Pennsylvania were permitted only where expressly au-

.•

81-2101-0PINION
PENNHURST STATE SCHOOL & HOSP. v. HALDERMAN

13

doctrine of Edelman v. Jordan, supra, the suit is not against
the State because the courts below ordered only prospective
injunctive relief. Second, they assert that the state-law
claim properly was decided under the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction. Respondents rely on decisions of this Court
awarding relief against state officials on the basis of a pendent state-law claim. See, e. g., Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 213 U. S. 175, 193 (1909).
.

.. .

~

. '-

A
We first address the contention that respondents' state-law
claim is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment because it
seeks only prospective relief as defined in Edelman v. Jordan, supra. The Court of Appeals held that if the judgment
below rested on federal _law, it could be entered against petitioner state officia1s · \}rider the doctrine established in
thorized by the legislature, see, e. g., Freach v. Commonwealth, 471 Pa.
558, 370 A. 2d 1163 (1977), and respondents have not referred us to any
provision expressly waiving Pennsylvania's Eleventh Amendment immunity. The State now has a statute governing sovereign immunity, including an express preservation of its immunity from suit in federal court:
"Federal courts.-N othing ccritained in this subchapter shall be construed
to waive the immunity of the Commonwealth from suit in Federal courts
guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States." 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8521(b) (1980).
We also do not agree with respondents that the presence of the United
States as a plaintiff in this case removes the Eleventh Amendment from
consideration. Although the Eleventh Amendment does not bar the
United States from suing a State in federal court, see, e. g., Monaco v.
Mississippi, 292 U. S. 313, 329 (1934), the United States' presence in the
case for any purpose does not eliminate the State's immunity for all purposes. For example, the fact that the federal court could award injunctive
relief to the United States on federal constitutional claims would not mean
that the court could order the State to pay damages to other plaintiffs. In
any case, we think it clear that the United States does not have standing to
assert the state-law claims of third-parties. For these reasons, the applicability of the Eleventh Amendment to respondents' state-law claim is
unaffected by the United States' participation in the case.

81-2101-0PINION
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Edelman and Young even though the prospective financial
burden was substantial and ongoing:~<t.1 See 673 F. 2d, at 656.
The court assumed, and respondents assert, that this reasoning applies as well when the official acts in violation of state
law. This argument misconstrues the basis of the doctrine
established in Young and Edelman.
As discussed above, the injunction in Young was justified,
notwithstanding the obvious impact 9?. ~~_e State itself, on the
view that sovereign immunity does not apply because an official who acts unconstitutionally is "stripped of his official or
representative character," Young, 209 U. S., at 160. This
rationale, of course, created the "well-recognized irony'' that
an official's unconstitutional conduct constitutes state action
under the Fourteenth Amendment but not the Eleventh
Amendment. Florida Department of State v. Treasure
Salvors, Inc.,-- U. S. - - , - - (1982) (opinion of STEVENS, J.). Nonetheless, the Young doctrine has been accepted as necessary to permit the federal courts to vindicate
federal rights and hold state officials responsible to "the supreme authority of the United States." Young, 209 U. S.,
at 160. As JUSTICE BRENNAN has observed, "Ex parte
Young was the culmination of efforts by this Court to harmonize the principles of the Eleventh Amendment with the
effective supremacy of rights and powers secured elsewhere
in the Constitution." Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U. S. 82, 106
(1971) (BRENNAN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Our decisions repeatedly have emphasized that the
Young doctrine rests on the need to promote the vindication
.'

13 4.K,A:lthoogfl the District Cow t tlms
~li~f Q:A th e h asisAf f'!ldeFal ~aw-;-the

f

n!tS jMiseietiBFl 1;Q g::paFlt f:lFBB~eetive
seof'e of th~ti reJ,is£ is

esFist;raii~~d ~"

principles of comity and federalism. ''Where, as here, the exercise of authority by state officials is attacked, federal courts must be constantly
mindful of the 'special delicacy of the adjustment to be preserved between
federal equitable power and State administration of its own law.'" Rizzo
v. Goode, 423 U. S. 362, 378 (1976) (quoting Stefanelli v. Minard, 342
u. s. 117, 120 (1951)).
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of federal rights.
See, e. g., Quern v. Jordan, 440 U. S.
332, 337 (1979); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232, 237 (1974);
Georgia R. & Banking Co. v. Redwine, 342 U. S. 299, 304
(1952).
The Court also has recognized, however, that the Young
exception should not be applied where unnecessary to promote the supremacy of federal law. This is the significance
of Edelman v. Jordan, supra . . W~ _r~cognized that the prospective relief authorized by Young "has permitted the Civil
War Amendments to the Constitution to serve as a sword,
rather than merely a shield, for those whom they were designed to protect." 415 U. S., at 664. But we decline~if'
en
oung o encompass re roac 1ve relief, for to M so
wou
ffectively eliminate the constitutional imm~y of the
States.
ccordingly, we -concluded that altho n the difference betwee ernlissible and impermissib relief "will not
in many instance e that between da and night," id., at
667, an award ofretr tive reliefn ssarily "'fall[s] afoul of
the Eleventh Amendmen · th
asic constitutional provi· g any present force.'" I d.,
sion is to be conceived of as
at 665 (quoting Rothstei . Wym
467 F. 2d 226, 237 (CA2
tmg by designa · n), cert. denied, 411
U. S. 921 (1973 . In sum, Edelman's . inction between
prospective a retroactive relief fulfills the u erlying purpose of
parte Young while at the same time pre rving to
the
an · portant degree the constitutional immunity
tes.
This need to reconcile competmg m eres s 1s w o y a sent, however, when a plaintiff alleges that a state official has
violated state law. In such a case the entire basis for the
doctrine of Young and Edelman disappears ....-A federal

'

.-

•

p

No. 81-2101 Pennhurst v. Halderman

4.

RIDER P. 15

But we declined to extend the fiction of Young to permit
retroactive

relief,

for

to

do

so

would

effectively

eliminate the constitutional immunity of the States.
at

665

(retroactive

relief

would

"'fall

afoul

Id.,

of

the

Eleventh Amendment if that basic constitutional provision
is

to

be

conceived

of

as

having

any

present

force'")

(quoting Rothstein v. Wyman, 467 F. 2d 226, 237 (CA2 1972)
(McGowan,

u. s.
the

J.,

sitting by designation), cert. denied,

921 (1973)).

411

The opinion in Edelman recognized that

difference between

injunctions and money damages

is

not "that between day and night," because the former may
often have a greater
latter.

impact on state treasuries than the

Id., at 667.

Implicit in the holding of Edelman

-

was the view that retroactive relief is of less importance"
in

ensuring

injunctions.

the

vindication

Thus,

of

federal

law

than

are

Edelman was an accommodation between

the interest defined in Young in ensuring the enforcement
of the Civil War Amendments and the interest articulated
in the Eleventh Amendment in maintaining the immunity of
the States.
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court's grant of relief against state officials on the basis of
state law, whether prospective or retroactive, does not vindicate the supreme authority of federal law. On the contrary,
it is difficult to think of a greater intrusion on state soverendment cases of the period cited by the dissent was that there is a crldifference between the class of cases "where the suit is brought ag7-fu~t
the
ce:s o~ the State, as representing, t~~..~tate's action and~·15ility,
thus
king It, though not a party to the record, the real part).) against
which tH judgment will so operate as to compel it to specificall perform
contracts,' nd the class "where ajfsuit is brought against defendants who,
claiming to
officers of the State, and under the color of_~tn unconstitutional statute, ommit acts of wrong and injury to the rig)1i s and property
of the plaintiff a uired under a contract with the St?te." Pennoyer v.
McConnaughy, 14 U. S. 1, 10 (1891). Indeed, th7 -decisions in most of
the cases cited by the issent
turned
on this distinction
relating to whether
• .
•. l t
I.
the suit properly raise a constitutional challeng;::to the officer's conduct.
ers' Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362, 390
See, e. g., Reagan .v.
(1894); Poindexter v. Green ow, 114 U. S. 27 , 288 (1885); Cunningham v.
Macon & Brunswick R. Co., 09 U. S. 446 1:152 (1883). The Court rarely
was faced with an Eleventh Am ndment issue in a case that did not contain
~
a constitutional allegation.
More significant than the rather
e support for this alleged "firmly established" rule, post, at 18, is the f t hat the "line of cases" central to the
dissent's argument since has bee . epu '§iedby this Court. The principal
case originally cited for the pro osition th a suit alleging a tortious act by
an official is not barred by so ereign immu · y is United States v. Lee, 106
U. S. 196 (1882). See Cu ingham, supra, 452; Larson, supra, at 717
(Frankfurter, J., disse
g) (Lee is the "st ing point of this line of
cases"). In Larson, h ever, the Court construe Lee narrowly as representing only "a spe · c application of the constitu · nal exception to the
doctrine of sovere· immunity." 337 U. S., at 696. Larson expressly
rejected the vie -urged by JUSTICE STEVENS' dissen ere-that sovereign immunit).) s inapplicable whenever the officer allege ly committed a
tortious act' n. It held that the suit may go forward onl if there is an
allegation f unconstitutional action or action that is ultra m s. !d., at
693; see upra, at n. 12.
Thi construction, and the Larson rule, have been reaffirme
edlJ,~ and at this Term-by this Court.
See, e. g., Block v. No
k , --U.S. - - , - - (1983); Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U.S.
7--648 (1962). The dissent seeks to avoid the significance of Larson

ci

.·
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eignty than when a federal court instructs state officials on
how to conform their conduct to state law. Such a result
conflicts directly with the principles of federalism that underlie the Eleventh Amendment. We conclude that Young and
serting that its explicit repudiation of the rule and cases relied on by t e
di ent here was not "necessary to decide the case" and "apparently di ot
com and the full agreement of five members of the [Larson] Co
' because
a concurring opinion by Justic~ ' bouglas. Post, at 16-1 , n. 17.
Precise! the same argument was made by Justice Douglas-· lone dissent-1l ars after Larson. See Malone v. Bowdoin, supra at 649--B50.
Justice {Ste art's opinion for the Court in Malone observe
at?'"to recprior to 1949
oncile complet
all the decisions of the Court in this fi
would be a Proc stean task." I d., at 646. His opini continued:
"The Court's 19 Larson decision makes it unnec ssary, however, to
undertake that task ere. . For in Larson the Co , aware that it was
called upon to 'resolve 'the conflict in doctrine' ( 7 u. s.' at 701), thorde an informed and careoughly reviewed the inan prior decisions, and
fully considered choice be ween the seemin
Ibid.
The Court in Malone then e ressly re
ed the Larson rule that the
only two exceptions to sovereign · mu · y are where the officer acted ultra vires or in an unconstitutional f h' n. See id., at 647. An allegation
that the officer acted tortiously or il ally-an allegation the dissent finds
sufficient to- avoid entirely the E ven Amendment's sovereign immunity-was found "not adequate { 'support conclusion that the relief asked
It thus is indisputably clear
was not relief against the sov eign." Ib ·
that this Court already ha "thoroughly re ·ewed" the precedents and
"made an informed and c efully considered en ·ce," id., at 646, to reject
the view urged by Ju~ ICE STEVENS' dissent at sovereign immunity
does not bar a suit aylging that an offi<jfl "had act within his authority .J.
but in a manner contrary to state law." Post, at 19.
The dissent repognizes that Larson is inconsistent 'th the cases on
or appropriate
~
which the dissent relies, but asserts that "it is not necess
to read that nile ~=etroactivelyinto the Eleventh Amendm t." Post, at
/
20 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). This departure from stare dec · is is hardly
consistent with the dissent's invocation of the doctrine elsew re in the
opinion. This Court consistently has considered Larson to be a elevant
precedent in Eleventh Amendment cases, see, e. g., Georgia R. o. v.
Re<}Wine, 342 U. S. 299, 304, nn. 12, 15, and indeed just last Term · ht
/ 6tices expressly applied the two-part Larson test in resolving an El -

;(t
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Edelman are inapplicable in a suit against state officials on

the basis of state law.
B
The reasoning of our decisions on sovereign immunity thus
leads to the conclusion that a federal suit against state officials on the basis of state law contravenes the Eleventh
Amendment. In reaching a contrary conclus1on, the Court
of Appeals relied principally on a separate line of cases deal-

~th Amendment issue, Treasure Salvors,

a~

supra, - - U.S.,
(opinion of STEVENS, J.); id., at-- (WHITE, J., concurring in the · dgment; in part and dissenting in part). The plurality opinion in Tr, asure
Salvors--written by JusTICE STEVENs-found that Larson had " arified"
the prior 4lw established in both Eleventh Amendment and federal sovereign immuili~y cases, and not.~d .expressly that Larson had)'held that the
fact that an (}~er wrongfully withholds property belol)ging to another
does not necess ily establish that he is acting beyond the permissible
scope of his offici capacity." !d., at--. The p ili-ality then followed
the Larson test in an q_uncing that "the Eleventh Amendment does not bar
an action against a stat~ official that is based on/ a theory that the officer
acted beyond the scope of'~s statutory authori(y or, if within that authority, that such authority is u~nstitutional." / !d., at--. As the dissent
notes, see post, at 17-18, n. 1~the plurality concluded that the suit was
not barred because the state offi~i~ls had "no colorable claim" for their actions, but rather had acted "without-any authority whatever." l-A~. at--.
But it is clear-and the dissent doe~ n t contend otherwise--that both the
plurality and the partial dissent accepte and applied the two-part Larson
test as controlling in the Eleventh Amend ent context.
Just as the Court's Eleve'nth Amendment ases have relied on federal
sovereign immunity principles, the Court's fe eral sovereign immunity
cases have relied on t-he principles established 1 Eleventh Amendment
S. 605, 620 (1912).
cases. See, e. g., Philadelphia v. Stimson, 223
This especially was true in Larson itself. See 337 U. , at 687, n. 6, 691,
n. 11, 694, n. ul, 698, nn. 1g.....2o, 699, n. 22. The dissent: hus errs in suggesting t~athe~e are different principles for the federal so ereign immunity cases nd Eleventh Amendment cases. See id., at 708 ( ankfurter,
J., diss ting) ("The sources of the immunity are formally di rent but
they esent the same legal issues"). It is clear that Larson-the ourt's
mo recent definitive statement on the rule of sovereign immunity a <t_its
ceptions-should be followed here.
'\.

?
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ing with pendent jurisdiction. The crucial point for the
Court of Appeals was that this Court has granted relief
against state officials on the basis of a pendent state-law
claim. See 673 F. 2d, at 657-658. · We therefore must consider the relationship between pendent jurisdiction and the
Eleventh Amendment.
This Court long has held generally that when a federal
court obtains jurisdiction over a federal claim, it may adjudicate other related claims over
the court otherwise
would not have jurisdiction. See, e. g., Mine Workers v.
Gibbs, 383 U. S. 715, 726 (1966); Osborn v. Bank_ of the
United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 819-823 (1824). The Court also
has held that a federal court may resolve a case solely on the
basis of a pendent state-law claim, see Siler, supra, at
192-193, and that in fact _the court usually should do so in
order to avoid federal constitutional questions, see id., at
193; Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis,
J., concurring) ("[I]f a case can be decided on either of two
grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a
question of statutory construction .or enerallaw the Court
will decide onl the latter"). Under these pri ·
, it
se
r that, apart from the possibl
enth Amendment bar, the
f Appeal
a proper jurisdictional
basis,f n which to de ·
· based on Pennsylvania
wn therefore is whe
mendment
. law. • The
o this pendent state-law claim . .

which

)

I

r
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But pendent jurisdiction is a judge-made doctrine inferred
from

the

presented

general
is

language

whether

this

of

Art.

doctrine

III.
may

The
be

question
viewed

as

displacing the explicit limitation on federal jurisdiction
contained in the Eleventh Amendment.
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~e

dissent repeatedly refers to the "rule" in Siler as if th<> ~
Eleventh Amendment does not baryui6o"n~;;;~
dent state-law claims. It bears repeating that the Eleventh Amendment
was not raised by the State or addressed by this_..Court in that decision.
Rather, the rule in Siler is that, as a general matter, a federal court should
decide a case on state-law grounds wh~e· possible to avoid a federal constitutional question. 213 U. S., at 193. Contrary to the dissent's repeated intimations, we have not "repudiated" or "reject[ed]" this rule,
post, at 10, 12, or held that Siler is "no longer good law," post, at 8. Nothis meant to reject Siler, much less cast doubt on the
ing in our decision
/
desirability of a:pplying its principles in cases where the deyal court has
jurisdiction to decide the state-law issues.

ther~d .!J.eld that the

/

.-
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In none of these cases, however, did the Court so much . as
mention

the

state-law

Eleventh

Rather,

claim.

federal-law

in

the

connection

Court

with

appears

the

to

have

jurisdiction was established over

that once

assumed

Amendment

claim,

the

doctrine

of

pendent

jurisdiction A
CJ~

wrl/

would establish power to hear the state-law claims.

The

;1

Court

has

not

addressed

whether

that

the

~

doctrine

has

a

different scope when applied to suits against the State.

RIDER "B" P.20

uI'

The Court first rejected the officials' argument that the
Eleventh
claim.

Amendment
It

held

barred

that

Ex

the

federal

parte

Young

constitutional
applied

to

all

allegations challenging the constitutionality of official
action,

regardless

of

whether

the

state

statute

under

which the officials purported to act was constitutional or
unconstitutional.
that
court

See

id.,

at

507.

Having

determined

the Eleventh Amendment did not deprive the federal
of

jurisdiction

over

question, the Court declared

the

Fourteenth

Amendment

·.
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mendmen
"The Eleventh
Amendment is an explicit limitation on the judicial power of
the United States." Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U. S., at 25. It
deprives a federal court of power to decide certain claims
against States that otherwise would be within the scope of
Art. III's grant of jurisdiction. For example, if a lawsuit
against state officials under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 alleges a constitutional claim, the federal court is barred from awarding
damages against 'the state treasury even though the claim
arises under the Constitution. See Quern v. Jordan, 440
U. S. 332 (1979). Similarly, if a§ 1983 action alleging a constitutional claim is brought directly against a State, the Eleventh Amendment bars a federal court from granting any relief on that claim. See Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U. S. 781
(1978) (per curiam). Tht~ Amendment thus is a specific constitutional bar against hearing evenfederal claims that otherwise would be within the jurisdiction of the federal courts. •~I'*
This constitutional bar applies to pendent claims as well.
e r-al court's power over a pendent clmm ~~
rives from Art. II, see-ALd~Il~427 U. S. 1, 9
(1976), and the El ~dment is-au. independent limit.ation-ornt1 exercises of Art. III ower. S~.
If we were to hold othermse, a federal court could award'
il:'f'see, e. g., Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U. S. 313, 322 (1934) ("[A]lthough a case may arise under the Constitution and laws of the United
States, the judicial power does not extend to it if the suit is sought to be
prosecuted against a State, without her consent, by one of her own citizens"); Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U. S. 18, 25-26 (1933).
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These
question

cases

thus

before

did

not

"(W]hen

us.

directly

questions

confront

of

the

jurisdiction

have been passed on in prior decisions sub silentio, this
Court has never considered itself bound when a subsequent
case finally brings the jurisdictional issue before us."
Hagans v .

Lavine ,

415 U .

S.

5 28 ,

533 ,

n.

5

( 19 7 4 )

.'~ We

therefore view the question as an open one.
As noted,
have

been

the

that

implicit view of

once

jurisdiction

these cases seems to
is

established

on

the

basis of a federal question, no further Eleventh Amendment
inquiry is necessary with respect to other claims raised
in the case.
the

principles

This

is an erroneous view and contrary to

established

in

our

Eleventh

Amendment

decisions.

/9(Footnote
20.]

14

is

the

same

as

the

former

footnote
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As

noted

doctrine

above,
of

general Art.
"cases"
parties.
(1966).
(1974)

f·1l.
pendent

expediency
III

arising

jurisdiction

and

efficiency

language
under

conferring

federal

See Mine Workers v.
See also Hagans
(terming

discretion").

v.

pendent

is

law

a

derived
power

or

Gibbs,
Lavine,

judge-made

to

between

from

the

hear

all

diverse

383 u. S.

715,

725

s.

528,

545

doctrine

of

415 U.

jurisdiction

"a

Under ordinary rules of construction, this

general language must give way to the far more specific
command

of

the

Eleventh

Amendment,

which

explicitly

excludes from the judicial power suits prosecuted against
States.

The history of

the adoption and development of

the Amendment, see supra, at 6-9, confirms that it is an
independent limitation on all exercises of Art. III power:
"the

entire

does

not

judicial

power

embrace authority

granted

by

the

Consti tut:i:on

to entertain suit brought by

private parties against a State without consent given," Ex
parte State of New York No. 1, 256

u. s.

490, 497 (1921).
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damages against a State on the basis of a pendent claim.
Our decision in Edelman v. Jordan, supra, makes clear that
pendent jurisdiction does not permit such an evasion of the
immunity guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment. We
there held that 11the District Court was correct in exercising
pendent jurisdiction over [plaintiffs'] statutory claim," 415
U. S., at 653, n. 1, but then concluded that the Eleventh
Amendment barred an award of. r~troactive relief on the
basis of that pendent claim. Jd.,··a.r6'78.
In sum, contrary to the aofttrly · implicit in decisions such
as Greene, supra, neith~r pendent jurisdiction nor any other
basis ..!J...f jurisdiction may override the Eleventh Amendment. • 16 A federal court must examine each claim in a case to
see if the court's jurisdiction over that claim is barred by the
Eleventh Amendment .. " We concluded above that a claim
that state officials' violated state law in carrying out their official responsibilities is a claim against the State that is protected by the Eleventh Amendment. See supra, at 16. We
now hold that this principle applies as well to state-law claims
brought into federal court under pendent ·urisdiction. T .
'ifu3ae.....has not previously been confronted direct , nd we
therefore are not bound by prior decisio
ssuming a contrary conclusio'iL- 11 [V{)!len: que · s of jurisdiction have
ons sub silentio, this Court has
been passed on in prior
never considere ·
bound when a u equent case finally
brings
JUrisdictional issue before us."---li.Q:fla:~~
ne, 415 U. S. 528, 53~ n. 5 (1_9_
74--'-). 20·----~--..;;:::,....

c
16

"!See Mis souri v. Fiske, 290 U. S., at 27 ("This is not less a suit against
the State because the bill is ancillary and supplemental.").
t1 ..M"".- See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 671 (1974) ("Having now had
an opportunity to more fully consider the Eleventh Amendment issue after
briefing and argument, we disapprove the Eleventh Amendment holdings
of [certain prior] cases to the extent that they are inconsistent with our
holding today").

'•
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Respondents urge that application of the Eleventh Amendment to pendent state-law claims will have a disruptive effect
on litigation against state officials ..,, They argue that the
"considerations of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to litigants" that underlie pendent jurisdiction, see
Gibbs, supra, at 726, counsel against a result that may cause
litigants to split causes of action be~ween state and federal
courts. They also contend that the policy of avoiding unnecessary constitutional decisions will be contravened if plaintiffs choose to forgo their state-law claims and sue only in federal court or, alternatively, that the policy of Ex parte Young
will be hindered if plaintiffs choose to forgo their right to a
federal forum and bring all of their claims in state court.
e agree that, depenaing on -fhe c ircumstances 0
'
these considerations of 'POlicy may be important, 21
they
may not override the constitutional limitations
he author- "'(~
ity of the fedenil judiciary to adjudicate~ s against a State.
NE-w .
See Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U. S., %~5-26 ("Considerations
1O~R
of convenience open no aven , of escape from the [Amenda suit brought by private litigants
ment's] restriction"). 22
against state offici 1 , these constitutional limitations do not
p:ec~ude a ~.d-eral court fr.pJ? granting prospective relief to
~di~e-federal law.
But the Eleventh Amendment de~ s _fe~ eral courts of power to consider other claims rai~

R

Petitioners contend that in this c-;;:se thes; rolicy con~
outweighed by considerations of comity, arguing th~_b.e.C
of Appeals
"has authorized a severe intrusion on the r.ight;::on-tafe officials to run their
own programs, basing that intrusi6l'f'On nothing more than its view of state
law." Brief for..,.Petitimiers 9. In light of our disposition of this case, we
~<;bnot"'balance these competing considerations.
~
li ,.....Cf. Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1976) (Alt~
erations of judicial economy" would be served by permitting pendent-party
jurisdiction, "the addition of a completely new party would run counter to
the well-established principle that federal courts, as opposed to state trial
courts of general jurisdiction, are courts of limited jurisdiction marked out
by Congress")cb
-

21

'\
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It

may

be

that

applying

the

Eleventh

Amendment

to

pendent claims results in federal claims being brought in
state court,

or

in bifurcation of claims.

uncommon in this area.
suit

for

That

is

not

Under Edelman v. Jordan, supra, a

money damages against

state officials,

whether

based on federal or state law, must be brought in state
court.
under 42

Challenges

u.s.c.

to the validity of state tax systems

§1983 also must be brought in state court.

Fair Assessment in Real Estate Assn. v. McNary, 454
100 (1981).

u.

S.

Under the abstention doctrine, unclear issues

of state law commonly are split off and referred to the
state courts. 19

11Moreover, allowing claims against state officials
based on state law to be brought in the federal courts
does not necessarily foster the policies of "judicial
economy, convenience and fairness to litigants," Mine
Workers v. Gibbs, 383 u. S. 715, 726 (1966), that underlie
pendent
jurisdiction.
For
example,
when
a
federal
decision on state law is obtained, the federal court's
construction often is uncertain and ephemeral.
In cases
of ongoing oversight of a state program that may extend
over years, as in this case, the federal intrusion is
likely
to
be
extensive.
Duplication
of
effort,
inconvenience, and uncertainty may well result.
See,
e . g . , Burford v . Sun 0 i 1 Co . , 319 U • S . 315 , 3 2 7 ( 19 4 3)
Footnote continued on next page.
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In any case, the answer to respondents' assertions is
that

such

considerations

of

policy

cannot

override

the

constitutional limitation on the authority of the federal
judiciary

to

adjudicate

Missouri v. Fiske,
convenience

open

290

suits

u.

no

against

a

State.

See

S, at 25-26 ("Considerations of
avenue

[Amendment's] restriction") .'!

of

escape

from

the

That a litigant's choice of

forum is reduced "has long been understood to be a part of
the

tension

inherent

in

our

system

Employees v. Missouri Public Health &

u.

s.

279,

298

(1973)

(MARSHALL,

of

federalism."

elfare Dept.,

J.,

concurring

411
in

result).

{"Delay, misunderstanding of local law, and needless
conflict with the state policy, are the inevitable producE
of this double [i.e., federal-state] system of review").
Waste and delay may also result from abstention, which
often is called for when state law is unclear, see Baggett
v. Bullitt, 377 u. S. 360, 378-379 {1964) {"abstention
operates to require piecemeal adjudication in many courts,
thereby delaying ultimate adjudication on the merits for
an undue length of time") {citations omitted), or from
dismissals on the basis of comity, which has special force
when relief is sought on state-law grounds, see Gibbs,
supra, at 726; Hawks v. Hamill, 288 u. s. 52, 61 {1933).

~[Footnote 18 is the same as former footnote 22.]
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-against the State or its officials. Any inconvenien
choice f-fQrum that may be caused to litigant
o wish to
raise both federal--all(l state claims isyee ssary consequence
of this limitation on federal · <iiciaT power. 23 The constitutional principle of ~e·gn immu ·t embodied in the Eleventh Amendment, demands that claims agai
tate officials
~he-basis of state law be resolve~ in state courts.
This limitation on federal judicial I:;6we~ \mposes the same incon ece on a plaintiff who has certain federal claims that may not be r sed
~ral court.
Under Edelman v. Jordan, supra, a plaintiff 'th a
claim_._~ monetary relief against a State on the basis of federal w must
resort to ~tate court. If he wishes to press a related claim for ospective
relief, he must forgo the damages claim, or split his related ca es of action
between federal and state courts, or take the entire case o state court.
As JUSTICE MAASHAL~. has .observed, the fact that so e federal rights
may have to be e~rced ill ·~'state forum is "a part oft e tension inherent
in our system of federalism." Employees v. Miss ri Public Health &
Welfare Dept., 411 U~S.
279, 298 (1973) (MARS
L, J., concurring in
result).
24
The dissent's distaste
the Eleventh Amy dment and its principle of
sovereign immunity is the underlying th~e of the dissenting opinion.
See post, at 25-27; cf. id., at 10" 11 (quoti the "illuminating" analysis in
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419, {71 (1J 3) (opinion of Jay, C. J.)). Indeed, the dissent's negative viE\~ o~oy'ereign immunity leads it to an apparent willingness to overrule the deoi~ons of this Court that have emphasized the importance and continuil)t'vita~ty of the Eleventh Amendment,
id., at 26, in favor of JusTICE BRENNAN's issenting view in Employees v.
Missouri Public Health Dept.,-411 U. S. 2 9,(1973). But that view was
expressly rejected both by Justice Douglas' op'itljon for the Court, see id.,
at 280, n. 1, and JUSTICE ~~RSHALL's opinion con urring in the judgment,
(
'*--.L.).
see id., at 292, n. 8.
Thus, the dissent's argument that sovereign imm~nity "/.undoubtedly -rr V
runs counter to modern democratic notions of the mora responsibility of
post, at 27 (quoting Great Northern Life Ins. o. v. Read, 322
U. S. 47, '59 (1944) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)), is a view o he Eleventh
Amendment that has never been accepted by this Court. M eover, the
argument substantially misses the point with respect to Elevent Amendment sovereign immunity. As JUSTICE MARSHALL has observ , the
Elevent!(Amendment's restriction on the federal judicial power is bas din
large
on the "the problems of federalism inherent in making one sov .

·-UieStiteJ'

F

.·
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IV
Respondents contend that, regardless of the applicability
of the Eleventh Amendment to their state claims against petitioner state officials, the judgment may still be upheld
against petitioner county officials. We are not persuaded.
Even assuming that these officials are not immu~ from suit
challenging their actions under the lY,l:H/MR Act,• '1t is clear
that without the injunction against the state institutions and
officials in this case, an order entered on state-law grounds
necessarily would be limited. The relief substantially concerns Pennhurst, an arm of the State that is operated by
ign appear against its will in the courts of the other." Employees., sup:ro.,- - J., ooneU:Ff'ing in tfie Pes~:tlt).
q
~
"
We
have
held
that
the Eleventh Amendment does not apply to "coun1
ties and similar municipal corporations." Mt. Healthy City School District
v. Doyle, 429 U. S: 274, 280 (1977); see Lincoln County v. Luning, 133
U. S. 529, 530 (1890). At the same time, we have applied the Amendment
to bar relief against county officials "in order to protect the state treasury
from liability that would have had essentially the same practical consequences as a judgment against the State itself." Lake Country Estates,
Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U. S. 391, 401 (1979). See,
e. g., Edelman v. Jordan, supra (Eleventh Amendment bars suit against
state and county officials for retroactive award of welfare benefits). The
Courts of Appeals are in general agreement that a suit against officials of a
county or other governmental entity is barred if the relief obtained runs
against the State. See, e. g., Moore v. Tangipahoa Parish School Board,
594 F. 2d 489, 493 (CA5 1979); Carey v. Quern, 588 F. 2d 230, 233-234
(CA7 1978); Incarcerated Men of Allen County Jail v. Fair, 507 F. 2d 281,
287-288 (CA6 1974); Harris v. Tooele County School District, 471 F. 2d
218 220 (CAlO 1973). Given that the actions of the county commissioners
health adrn4trators are dependent on funding from the State, fit may be at relief granted against these county officials, when exercising
their functions under the MH/MR Act, effectively runs against the State.
Cf. Farr v. Chesney, 441 F. Supp. 127, 130-132 (MD Pa. 1977) (holding
that Pennsylvania county commissioners, acting as members of the board
of the county office of mental health and retardation, may not be sued for
back pay under the Eleventh Amendment). We need not decide this issue
in light of our disposition above.
-a-t-294-(MARSHALL,
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,

state officials. Moreover, funding for the county mental retardation programs comes almost entirely from the State, see
Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 50, §§4507-4509 (Purdon 1969 and Supp.
1982), and the costs of the masters-have been borne by the
State, see 446 F. Supp., at 1327. Finally, the MH/MR Act
contemplates that the state and county officials will cooperate
in operating mental retardation programs._ See In re
Schmidt, 494 Pa. 86, 95--96, 429 A . .2d 631, 635--636 (1981).
In short, the present judgment could not be sustained on the
basis of the state-law obligations of petitioner county officials. Indeed, any relief granted against the county officials
on the basis of the state statute would be partial and incomplete at best. Such an ineffective enforcement of state law
would not appear to serve the purposes of efficiency, convenience, and fairness that must inform the exercise of pendent
jurisdiction.

· . . ··~c

-

v
The Court' ~f Appeals upheld the judgment of the District
Court solely on the basis of Pennsylvania's MH/MR Act.
We hold that -ti:le)._courts lacked jurisdiction to enjoin petitioner state institutions and state officials on the basis of this
state law. The District Court also rested its decision on the
Eighth and Fourteenth .Amendments and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. See supra, at 2. On remand the
Court of Appeals may consider to what extent, if any, the
judgment may be sustained on these bases:-&stThe court also
may consider whether relief may be granted to respondents
under the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of
Rights Act, 42 U. S. C. §§ 6011, 6063. The judgment of the
Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.
i'f

" • on the Fourteenth Amendment issue, the court should consider
Youngberg v. Romeo,- U. S . - (1982), a decision that was not available when the District Court issued its decision.

~ M~

; "

To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor
From:

Justice Powell

Circulated: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Recirculated: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

CHAMBERS DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

ltJ

No. 81-2101

I 3 ___/./(

PENNHURST STATE SCHOOL & HOSPITAL, ET AL.,
PETITIONER v. TERRI LEE HALDERMAN, ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
[April - , 1983]

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether a federal court
may award injunctive relief against state officials on the basis
of state law.
I
This litigation, here for the second time, concerns the conditions of care at petitioner Pennhurst State School and Hospital, a Pennsylvania institution for the care of the mentally
retarded. See Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1 (1981). Although the history of the litigation is set forth in detail in our prior opinion, see 451 U. S.,
at 5-10, it is necessary for purposes of this decision to review
that history.
This suit originally was brought in 1974 by respondent
Terri Lee Halderman, a resident of Pennhurst, in the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Ultimately, the plaintiffs included a class consisting of all persons
who were or might become residents of Pennhurst; the Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Citizens (P ARC); and the
United States. The defendants were Pennhurst and various
Pennhurst officials; the Pennsylvania Department of Public
Welfare and several of its officials; and various county commissioners, mental retardation administrators, and other of-

I 'f

/I,
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~/)

?./

1

---..__
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ficials of five Pennsylvania counties surrounding Pennhurst.
Respondents' amended complaint charged that conditions at
Pennhurst violated the class members' rights under the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 87 Stat. 355, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 701
et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. V); the Developmentally Disabled
Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U. S. C. §§ 6001 et seq.
(1976 ed. and Supp. V); and the Pennsylvania Mental Health
and Mental Retardation Act of 1966 (the "MH/MR Act"), Pa.
Stat. Ann., Tit. 50, §§ 4101-4704 (Purdon 1969). Both damages and injunctive relief were sought.
In 1977, following a lengthy trial, the District Court rendered its decision. 446 F. Supp. 1295 (1977). As noted in
our prior opinion, the court's findings were undisputed: "Conditions at Pennhurst are not only dangerous, with the residents often physically abused or drugged by staff members,
but also inadequate for the 'habilitation' of the retarded. Indeed, the court found that the physicial, intellectual, and
emotional skills of some residents have deteriorated at
Pennhurst." 451 U. S., at 7 (footnote omitted). The District Court held that these conditions violated the class members' rights to "minimally adequate habilitation" in the "least
restrictive environment" under the Due Process Clause,
§ 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and § 201 of the Pennsylvania
MH/MR Act. 446 F. Supp., at 1314-1320, 1322--1324.
Moreover, the court found that Pennhurst, as a large institution, could not provi.de the necessary habilitation, and it ordered "that immediate steps be taken to remove the retarded
residents from Pennhurst." I d., at 1325. Petitioners were
ordered "to provide suitable community living arrangements" for the class members, id., at 1326, and the court appointed a Special Master "with the power and duty to plan,
organize, direct, supervise and monitor the implementation
of this and any further Orders of the Court." Ibid. 1
'The District Court determined that the individual defendants had acted

81-2101-0PINION
PENNHURST STATE SCHOOL & HOSP. v. HALDERMAN

3

The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed most
of the District Court's judgment. 612 F. 2d 84 (1979) (en
bane). It agreed that respondents had a right to habilitation
in the least restrictive environment, but it grounded this
right solely on the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and
Bill of Rights Act. See 612 F. 2d, at 95--100, 104-107. The
court did not consider the constitutional issues or § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act, and while it affirmed the District Court's
holding that the MH/MR Act provides a right to adequate
"habilitation," the court declined to decide whether that state
right encompassed a right to treatment in the least restrictive setting. See id., at 100-103.
On the question of remedy, the Court of Appeals affirmed
except as to the District Court's order that Pennhurst be
closed. The court observed that some patients would be unable to adjust to life outside an institution, and it determined
that the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of
Rights Act did not preclude institutionalization. Id., at 114.
It therefore remanded for "individual determinations by the
[District Court], or by the Special Master, as to the appropriateness of an improved Pennhurst for each such patient,"
guided by a "presumption in favor of placing individuals in
[community living arrangements]." Id., at 114-115. 2
On remand the District Court established detailed procedures for determining the proper residential placement for
each patient. A team consisting of the patient, his parents
or guardian, and his case manager must establish an individual habilitation plan providing for habilitation of the patient
in a designated community living arrangement. The plan is
in good faith and therefore were immune from the damage claims. 446 F .
Supp, at 1324.
2
In a companion case, the Court of Appeals affirmed the District
Court's denial of a motion to intervene for purposes of appeal by the
Pennhurst Parents-Staff Association. See 612 F. 2d 131 (1979). The Association subsequently was granted leave to intervene and is a petitioner in
this Court.
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subject to review by the Special Master. A second master,
called the Hearing Master, is available to conduct hearings,
upon request by the resident, his parents or his advocate, on
the question whether the services of Pennhurst would be
more beneficial to the resident than the community living arrangement provided in the resident's plan. The Hearing
Master then determines where the patient should reside,
subject to possible review by the District Court. See Order
of April24, 1980, Joint Appendix 123a-134a. 3
This Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals,
finding th.at the Developmentally Disabled Assistance..,.and
Bill of Rights Act did not create any substantive rights. 451
U. S. 1 (1981). We remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to determine if the remedial order could be supported
on the basis of state law, the Constitution, or § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. See id., at 31. 4
On remand the Court of Appeals affirmed the prior judgment in its entirety. 673 F. 2d 647 (1982) (en bane). It determined that in a recent decision the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania had "spoken definitively" in holding that the
MH/MR Act required the State to adopt the "least restrictive
environment" approach for the care of the mentally retarded.
673 F. 2d, at 651 (citing In re Joseph Schmidt, 494 Pa. 86, 429
3
On July 1, 1981, Pennsylvania enacted an appropriations bill stating
that only $35,000 would be paid for the Masters' expenses for the fiscal
year July 1981 to June 1982. The District Court held Pennsylvania and its
Secretary of the Department of Public Welfare in contempt, and imposed a
fine of $10,000 per day. Pennsylvania paid the fines , and the contempt
was purged on January 8, 1982. On appeal the Court of Appeals affirmed
the contempt order. Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman,
673 F. 2d 628 (1982), cert. pending, No. 81-2363.
•Three Justices dissented from the Court's construction of the Act, but
concluded that the District Court should not have adopted the "far-reaching remedy" of appointing "a Special Master to decide which of the
Pennhurst inmates should remain and which should be moved to community-based facilities. . . . [T]he court should not have assumed the task of
" 451 U. S., at 54 (WHITE J., dissenting in
managing Pennhurst.
part).

.-

"
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A. 2d 631 (1981)). The Court of A peals concluded that this
state s atute fully supported the pnor or er, and ere ore
did not reacli the remamm Issues o fe erallaw. It also rejecte petitioners argument that t e eventh Amendment
barred federal-court consideration of the state-law claim.
The court noted that the Amendment did not bar a federal
court from granting prospective injunctive relief against
state officials on the basis of federal claims, see 673 F. 2d, at
656 (citing Ex Parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908)), and concluded that the same result obtained with respect to a pendant state-law claim. It reasoned that because Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 213 U. S. 175 (1909), an
important case in the development of the doctrine of pendant
jurisdiction, also involved state officials, "there cannot be ...
an Eleventh Amendment exception to that rule." 673 F. 2d,
at 658. 5 Finally, the court rejected petitioners' argument
that it should have abstained from deciding the state-law
claim under principles of comity, see 673 F. 2d, at 659-660,
and refused to consider petitioners' objections to the District
Court's use of a special master. See id., at 651. Three
judges dissented in part, arguing that under principles of federalism and comity the establishment of a special master to
supervise compliance was an abuse of discretion. See id., at
662 (Seitz, C.J., joined by Hunter, J., dissenting in part); id.,
at (Garth, J., concurring in part and dissenting as to relief).
See also id., at 661 (Aldisert, J., concurring) (seriously questioning the propriety of the order appointing the Special Master, but concluding that a retroactive reversal of that order
would be meaningless). 6

-

The Court of Appeals also noted that "the United States is an intervening plaintiff ... against which even the state itself cannot successfully
plead the Eleventh Amendment as a bar to jurisdiction," and that "the
counties, even as juridicial entities, do not fall within the coverage of the
Eleventh Amendment. Against those defendants even money damages
may be awarded." 673 F. 2d, at 656.
6
The Office of the Special Master was abolished in December 1982.
See Order of August 12, 1982, Joint Appendix 220a. The Hearing Master
5
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We granted certiorari,-- U. S. - - (1982), and now reverse and remand.
II
Petitioners raise three challenges to the judgment of the
Court of Appeals: (i) the Eleventh Amendment prohibited
the District Court from enjoining state officials to conform
their conduct to state law; (ii) the doctrine of comity prohibited the District Court from issuing its injunctive relief; and
(iii) the District Court abused its discretion in appointing two
masters to supervise the decisions of state officials in implementing state law. We need not reach the latter two issues,
for we find the Eleventh Amendment challenge dispositive.
A

Article III, § 2 of the Constitution provides that the federal
judicial power extends, inter alia, to controversies "between
a State and citizens of another State." Relying on this language, this Court in 1793 assumed original jurisdiction over a
suit brought by citizens of South Carolina against the State of
Georgia. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419 (1793). The decision "created such a shock of surprise that the Eleventh
Amendment was at once proposed and adopted." Monaco v.
Mississippi, 292 U. S. 313, 325 (1934). The Amendment
provides:
"The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced
or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subject of any
foreign State."
The Amendment's language overruled the particular result
in Chisholm, but this Court has recognized that its greater
significance lies in its affirmation that the fundamental principle of sovereign immunity limits the grant of judicial authorremains in operation.
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ity in Article III. Thus, in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1
(1890), the Court held that, despite the limited terms of the
Eleventh Amendment, a federal court could not entertain a
suit brought by a citizen against his own State. After reviewing the constitutional debates concerning the scope of
Article III, the Court determined that federal jurisdiction
over suits against unconsenting States "was not contemplated by the Constitution when establishing the judicial
power of the United States." 134 U. S., at 15. See Monaco
v. Mississippi, 292 U. S. 313, 322-323 (1934); In re Ayers,
123 U. S. 443, 505 (1887). 7 In short, the principle of sovereign immunity is a constitutional limitation on the federal judicial power established in Article III:
"That a State may not be sued without its consent is a
fundamental rule of jurisprudence having so important a
bearing upon the construction of the Constitution of the
United States that it has become established by repeated
decisions of this court that the entire judicial power
granted by the Constitution does not embrace authority
to entertain a suit brought by private parties against a
State without consent given: not one brought by citizens
of another State, or by citizens or subjects of a foreign
State, because of the Eleventh Amendment; and not
even one brought by its own citizens, because of the fundamental rule of which the Amendment is but an exemplification." Ex parte State of New York No. 1, 256
U. S. 490, 497 (1921) (emphasis added). 8
' See Employees v. Missouri Public Health Dep't, 411 U.S. 279,
291-292 (1973) (MARSHALL, J ., concurring in judgment) (The Eleventh
Amendment "clarif[ied] the intent of the Framers concerning the reach of
federal judicial power" and "restore[d] the original understanding" that
States could not be made unwilling defendants in federal court.). See also
Nevada v. Hall, 440 U. S. 410, 430-431 (1979) (BLACKMUN, J ., dissenting);
id., at 437 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting).
8
The limitation deprives federal courts of any jurisdiction to entertain
such claims, and thus may be raised at any point in a proceeding. "The
Eleventh Amendment declares a policy and sets forth an explicit limitation

.-

"
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A sovereign's immunity may be waived, and the Court consistently has held that a State may consent to suit against it
in federal court. See, e. g., Clark v. Barnard, 108 U. S.
436, 447 (1883). We have insisted, however, that the State's
consent be unequivocally expressed. See, e. g., Edelman v.
Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 673 (1974). Similarly, although Congress has power with respect to the rights protected by
Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment immunity, see Fitzpatrick v. Bitker, 427 U. S. 445
(1976), we have required an unequivocal expression of congressional intent to "overturn the constitutionally guaranteed immunity of the several States." Quern v. Jordan, 440
U. S. 332, 342 (1979) (holding that 42 U. S. C. § 1983 does not
override States' Eleventh Amendment immunity). Our reluctance to infer that a State's immunity from suit in the federal courts has been negated stems from recognition of the
vital role of the doctrine of sovereign immunity in our federal
system. A State's constitutional interest in immunity encompasses not merely whether it may be sued, but where it
may be sued. 9 As JUSTICE MARSHALL has noted well, "[b]ecause of the problems of federalism inherent in making one
sovereign appear against its will in the courts of the other, a
restriction upon the exercise of the federal judicial power has
on federal judicial power of such compelling force that this Court will consider the issue arising under this Amendment ... even though urged for
the first time in this Court." Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury,
323 u. s. 459, 467 (1945).
9
For this reason, the Court consistently has held that a State's waiver
of sovereign immunity in its own courts is not a waiver of the Eleventh
Amendment immunity in the federal courts. See, e. g., Florida Department of Health v. Florida Nursing Home Ass'n, 450 U. S. 147, 150 (1981)
(per curiam) . "[l]t is not consonant with our dual system for the federal
courts ... to read the consent to embrace federal as well as state courts .
. . . [A] clear declaration of the state's intention to submit its fiscal problems to other courts than those of its own creation must be found." Great
Northern Life Insurance Co. v. Read, 322 U. S. 47, 54 (1944).
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long been considered to be appropriate in a case such as this."
Employees v. Missouri Public Health Dep't, 411 U. S. 279,
29~294 (MARSHALL, J., concurring in result). 10
Accordingly, in deciding this case we must be guided by "[t]he principles of federalism that inform Eleventh Amendment doctrine." Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678, 691 (1978).
B

This Court's decisions thus establish that "an unconsenting
State is immune from suits brought in federal courts by her
own citizens as well as citizens of another state." Employees, supra, 411 U. S., at 280. There may be a question,
however, whether a particular suit in fact is a suit against a
State. It is clear, of course, that a suit in which the State or
one of its agencies or departments is named as the defendant
is proscribed by the Eleventh Amendment in the absence of
the State's consent. 11 See, e. g., Florida Department of
Health v. Florida Nursing Home Ass'n, 450 U. S. 147 (1981);
Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U. S. 781 (1978). This jurisdictional
bar applies regardless of the nature of the relief sought.
See, e. g., Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U. S. 18, 27 (1934) ("Expressly applying to suits in equity as well as at law, the
See Nevada v. Hall, supra, 440 U. S., at 418-421 (States were "vitally
interested" in whether they would be subject to suit in the federal courts,
and the debates about state immunity focused on the question of federal
judicial power). Cf. id., at 430-431 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting) (sovereign
immunity is "a guarantee that is implied as an essential component of federalism" and is "sufficiently fundamental to our federal structure to have
implicit constitutional dimension."); id., at 437 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting)
("[T]he States that ratified the Eleventh Amendment thought that they
were putting an end to the possibility of individual States as unconsenting
defendants in foreign jurisdictions.").
11
The Court has not extended the bar of the Eleventh Amendment to
suits against political subdivisions of the State. See, e. g., Mt. Healthy
City Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274, 280 (1977). This issue is
discussed at p. - , infra.
10
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Amendment necessarily embraces demands for enforcement
of equitable rights and the prosecution of equitable remedies
when these are asserted and prosecuted by an individual
against a State.").
A more complex question arises when the suit is brought
only against state officials. This Court's prior cases have not
been entirely consistent as to when such a suit is a suit
against the State itself, but certain principles/\well established. The Eleventh Amendment bars a suit against state
officials "when the state is the real, substantial party in interest." Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U. S.
459, 464 (1945). See, e. g., In re Ayers, 123 U. S. 443,
487-492 (1887); Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U. S. 711, 719-723,
727-728 (1882). Thus, "[t]he general rule is that relief
sought nominally against an officer is in fact against the sovereign if the decree would operate against the latter." Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U. S. 57, 58 (1963) (per curiam). 12 And,
as when the State itself is named as the defendant, a suit
against state officials that is in fact a suit against a State is
barred regardless whether it seeks damages or injunctive relief. See Cory v. White,-- U. S. - , (1982).
There are two recognized exceptions to the immunity of
state officials from suit in federal court. The first is that
sovereign immunity does not apply in a suit against an official
who allegedly has acted entirely outside his official authority.
In Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Corp., 337 U. S. 682
(1949), the Court stated the rule that an action may be
brought "for specific relief against the individual as an officer
... if it is not within the officer's statutory powers." 337
U. S., at 702. This ultra vires exception is a narrow one
See also Dugan v. Rank, 372 U. S. 609, 620 (1963) ("The general rule
is that a suit is against the sovereign if 'the judgment sought would expend
itself on the public treasury or domain, or interfere with the public administration,' or if the effect of the judgment would be 'to restrain the Government from acting, or to compel it to act."') (citations omitted).
12
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governing only those situations in which a government official acts without any official justification. See e. g., Florida
Department of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., - - U. S.
- - , 3321 (1982) (opinion of STEVENS, J.) (test is whether
the official's conduct was undertaken "without any authority
whatever"); id., at 3329 (WHITE, J., concurring in judgment
in part and dissenting in part) (test is whether the official's
conduct was undertaken under "colorable" authority). As
the Court in Larson explained, the mere allegation that an
officer has acted wrongfully "does not establish that the officer, in committing that wrong, is not exercising the powers
delegated to him by the sovereign. If he is exercising such
powers, the action is the sovereign's and a suit to enjoin it
may not be brought unless the sovereign has consented."
!d., at 693.
The second and more substantial exception to the general
rule is that a suit challenging the constitutionality of a state
official's action is not one against the State. This doctrine
was confirmed in Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908), in
which a federal court enjoined the Attorney General of the
State of Minnesota from bringing suit to enforce a state statute that allegedly violated the Fourteenth Amendment.
This Court held that the Eleventh Amendment did not prohibit issuance of this injunction:
"The act to be enforced is alleged to be unconstitutional,
and if it be so, the use of the name of the State to enforce
an unconstitutional act to the injury of complainants is a
proceeding without the authority of and one which does
not affect the State in its sovereign or governmental capacity. It is simply an illegal act upon the part of a state
official in attempting by the use of the name of the State
to enforce a legislative enactment which is void because
unconstitutional. If the act which the state Attorney
General seeks to enforce be a violation of the Federal
Constitution, the officer in proceeding under such enact-
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ment comes into conflict with the superior authority of
that Constitution, and he is in that case stripped of his
official or representative character and is subjected to
the consequences of his official conduct. The State has
no power to impart to him any immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States."
209 U. S., at 159-160.
It hardly need be said that this rationale is not entirely persuasive. As the dissent in Young argued, to enjoin a state
attorney general from bringing a suit on behalf of the State
is, "for all practical purposes, to enjoin the State itself." 203
U. S., at 199 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Moreover, there is
the "well-recognized irony" that the result of Young is that
an offical's unconstitutional conduct constitutes state action
under the Fourteenth Amendment but not the Eleventh
Amendment. Treasure Salvors, supra, at 3315 (opinion of
STEVENS, J.). Nonetheless, the Young doctrine has been
accepted as necessary for the vindication of federal rights in
recognition of "the supreme authority of the United States."
209 U. S., at 160. See, e. g., Quern v. Jordan, 440 U. S.
332, 338 (1979); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232, 237 (1974);
Georgia R. Co. v. Redwine, 342 U. S. 299, 304 (1952).
The Court subsequently has made clear that, even where
these exceptions apply' the rule that suit against state officials constitutes a suit against the State will not be wholly
disregarded. Thus, in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651
(1974), the Court held that in a suit against state officials "a
federal court's remedial power, consistent with the Eleventh
Amendment, is necessarily limited to prospective injunctive
relief, and may not include a retroactive award which requires the payment of funds from the state treasury." 415
U. S., at 677. We recognized that the prospective relief authorized by Young "has permitted the Civil War Amendments to the Constitution to serve as a sword, rather than
merely a shield, for those whom they were designed to pro-
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teet." I d., at 664. But we recognized as well that an award
of retroactive relief "must inevitably come from the general
revenues of the State." I d., at 665. We concluded that although the difference between permissible and impermissible
relief "will not in many instances be that between night and
day," id., at 667, an award of retroactive relief necessarily
"'run[s] afoul of the Eleventh Amendment if that basic constitutional provision is to be conceived of as having any
present force."' Id., at~65 (quoting Rothstein v. Wyman,
467 F. 2d 226, 237 (CA2 1972) (McGowan, J., sitting by designation), cert. denied, 411 U. S. 921 (1973)).

III
With these principles in mind, we now turn to the question
whether the claim that petitioners violated state law in carrying out their official duties at Pennhurst is one against the
State and therefore barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
First, they
espondents +alee -t;v;e ;p:riReipal aq~nmeft~S.
13

"

We reject respondents' additional contention that Pennsylvania has
waived its immunity from suit in federal court. At the time the suit was
filed, suits against Pennsylvania were permitted only where expressly authorized by the legislature, see, e. g., Freach v. Commonwealth, 471 Pa.
558, 379 A. 2d 1163 (1977), and respondents have not referred us to any
provision expressly waiving Pennsylvania's Eleventh Amendment immunity. The State now has a statute governing sovereign immunity, including an express preservation of its immunity from suit in federal court:
"Federal courts.-Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be construed
to waive the immunity of the Commonwealth from suit in Federal courts
guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States. " 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 8521(b) (1982).
We also do not agree that the presence of the United States as a plaintiff
in this case removes the Eleventh Amendment from consideration. Although the Eleventh Amendment does not bar the United States from suing a State in federal court, see, e. g., Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U. S.
313, 328-329 (1934), the United States' presence in the case for any purpose does not eliminate the State's immunity for all purposes. For example, the fact that the federal court could award injunctive relief to the
13

-
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contend that under the doctrine of Edelman v. Jordan,
supra, the suit is not against the State because the courts
below ordered only prospective injunctive relief. Second,
they assert that the state-law claim properly was decided
under the doctrine of pendant jurisdiction. Respondents
rely on decisions of this Court awarding relief against state
officials on the basis of a pendant state-law claim. See, e. g.,
Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 213 U. S. 175, 193
(1909).
~~~
A
(;~1-~~J
We first address respondents' contention) hat their statelaw claim is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment because
it seeks only prospective relief as defined in Edelman v. Jordan, supra. As lhe Court of Appeals h~;ifthe judgment
below rested on federal law, it could be entered against petitioner state officials under the doctrine established in Young
and Edelma'!Jct;even though the prospective financial burden
is substantial and ongoing. 14 See 673 F. 2d, at 656. Such a
result has been permitted, notwithstanding its impact on the
State itself, because of the recognized need to vindicate the
supremacy of federal law. See pp. - - , supra. Respondents err, however, in suggesting that the decisions in Young
United States on federal constitutional claims would not mean that the
court could order the State to pay damages to other plaintiffs. In this
case, the United States intervened only to enforce federal law, and indeed
would not have standing to enforce state-law claims. Therefore, its intervention does not bear upon the applicability of the Eleventh Amendment to
the state-law claim.
14
Although the District Court thus has jurisdiction to grant prospective
relief on the basis of federal law, the scope of that relief may be constrained
by principles of comity and federalism. "Where, as here, the exercise of
authority by state officials is attacked, federal courts must be constantly
mindful of the 'special delicacy of the adjustment to be preserved between
federal equitable power and State administration of its own law.'" Rizzo
v. Goode, 423 U. S. 362, 378 (1976) (quoting Stefanelli v. Minard, 342
u. s. 117, 120 (1951)).

.,
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and Edelman have established a rule that a suit seeking prospective relief against a state official always is exempt from
the Amendment. The general rule remains that a suit
against a state official is a suit against the State unless the
officer's action "is not within the officer's statutory powers
or, if within those powers, only if the powers, or their exercise in a particular case, are constitutionally void." Larson,
supra, 337 U.S., at 702; see Cory v. White,-- U. S. - - ,
2329 (1982); Treasure Salvors, supra, --U. S., at 3317
(opinion of STEVENS, J.); id., at 3330 (WHITE, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
Applying this rule, it is clear that respondents' state-law
claim against petitioner state officials is a suit against the
State. As it is based on state law, the claim does not allege a
federal constitutional violation. And certainly petitioner officials did not act "without any authority whatever" in carrying out their official duties. Treasure Salvors, supra, at
3320 (opinion of STEVENS, J.). Even if these officials violated some provisions of state law, they clearly acted under
colorable state authority in operating Pennhurst and the
State's system of care for the mentally retarded. Indeed, in
refusing to award damages against the officials as individuals, the District Court found that "the evidence shows that
the [individual] defendants acted in the utmost good faith and
that they did not know nor reasonably should have known
that the actions which they took, or failed to take, within the
sphere of their official responsibilities were in any way violative of the rights of the retarded residents at Pennhurst."
446 F. Supp., at 1324. In sum, the officials did not act ultra
vires their authority; rather they were "exercising the powers delegated to [them] by the sovereign." Larson, supra,
337 U. S., at 693. Under established doctrine, the state-law
claim against the state officials must be considered one
against the State.
B
The reasoning of our decisions on sovereign immunity leads

14t-d~
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to the conclusion that a federal suit against state officials on
the basis of state law contravenes the Eleventh Amendment.
In reaching a contrary conclusion, the Court of Appeals relied principally on a separate line of cases dealing with pendant jurisdiction. The crucial point for the Court of Appeals
was that this Court has granted relief against state officials
solely on the basis of a pendant state-law claim. See 673 F.
2d, at 657-658. We therefore must consider the relationship
between pendant jurisdiction and the Eleventh Amendment.
?~ Article III does not give federal courts jurisdiction over all
suits between a citizen and his State. The District Court obtained jurisdiction in this case only because of the existence
of a claim arising under the Constitution or laws of the
United States. This Court has long held generally that
when a federal court obtains jurisdiction over a federal claim,
it may adjudicate other related claims over which the court
otherwise would not have jurisdiction. See, e. g., Osborn v.
Bank of the United States, 9 Wheat. 738 (1824). The rule is
that "if, considered without regard to their federal or state
character, a plaintiff's claims are such that he would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding,
then, assuming substantiality of the federal issues, there is
power in federal courts to hear the whole." Mine Workers v.
Gibbs, 383 U. S. 715, 725 (1966) (emphasis in original). The
Court also has held that a federal court may resolve the case
solely on the basis of the pendant claims, see Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 213 U. S. 175, 192 (1909), and that
in fact the court usually should do so in order to avoid federal
constitutional questions. See id., at 193; Ashwander v.
TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring)
("[I]f a case can be decided on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a question of statutory construction or general law, the Court will decide only
the latter."). Under these principles, it seems clear that,
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apart from the possible bar of the Eleventh Amendment, the
Court of Appeals had a proper jurisdictional basis on which to
decide the claim based on Pennsylvania law. 15 The question
therefore is whether the Amendment applies to this pendant
state-law claim.
As the Court of Appeals noted, in Siler and subsequent
cases concerning pendant jurisdiction relief was granted
against state officials on the basis of state-law claims that
were pendant to federal constitutional claims. The Court
never held directly that the rationale of Ex parte Young
should be extended to pendant state-law claims, but rather
appears to have assumed that the Eleventh Amendment simply does not apply to pendant claims. This is illustrated by
Greene v. Louisville & Interurban R. Co., 244 U. S. 499
(1917), in which the plaintiff railroads sued state officials, alleging that certain tax assessments were excessive under the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Court first rejected the officials' argument under the Eleventh Amendment, finding that
Young applied to all constitutional claims against state officials, regardlessl\w hether the state statute under which the
officials acted was constitutional or unconstitutional. See
244 U. S., at 507. Having determined that the Eleventh
Amendment did not deprive the federal court of jurisdiction
over this constitutional question, the Court declared that the
court's jurisdiction extended "to the determination of all
questions involved in the case, including questions of state
law, irrespective of the disposition that may be made of the
16
This does not necessarily mean that pendant jurisdiction properly was
exercised here. This doctrine is one "of discretion not to be routinely exercised without considering the advantages of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to the litigants." Hagans v. Levine, 415 U. S. 528,
545 (1974). In particular, "[n]eedless decisions of state law should be
avoided both as a matter of comity and to promote justice between the parties, by procuring for them a surer-footed reading of applicable law."
Gibbs, supra, at 726. Because of our disposition of the case under the
Eleventh Amendment, we need not decide this important comity issue.

.I
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federal question, or whether it be found necessary to decide
it at all." I d., at 508. The case then was decided solely on
state-law grounds. Accord, Lousiville & Nashville R.R.
Co. v. Greene, 244 U. S. 522 (1917).
The implicit view thus seems to have been that once jurisdiction is established on the basis of any federal question, no
further Eleventh Amendment inquiry is necessary with respect to other claims raised in the case. We believe this
view is erroneous and contrary to the principles established
in Eleventh Amendment decisions. It is true as a general
matter that the doctrine of pendant jurisdiction permits a
federal court to decide all the issues in a case. In cases
"where nonfederal questions or claims were bound up with
the federal claim upon which the parties were already in federal court, this Court has found nothmg mArt. III's grant of
judicial power which prevented adjudication of the nonfederal portions of the parties' dispute." Aldinger v. H award,
427 U. S. 1, 9 (1976). The Eleventh Amendment, however,
constitutes precisely such a limitation depriving a federal
court of power to decide certain claims, even where an alternative basis for jurisdiction exists. See - - , supra. For
example, if a lawsuit brought pursuant to 42 U. S. C. § 1983
alleges a constitutional claim directly against a State, the federal court is barred by the Eleventh Amendment from deciding that claim even though the claim arises under the Constitution. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U. S. 332 (1979);
Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U. S. 781 (1978). The Amendment
thus is a specific constitutional bar against hearing even federal claims that otherwise would be within the jurisdiction of
the federal courts. 16
16
See, e. g., Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U. S. 313, 322 (1934) ("[A]lthough a case may arise under the Constitution and Laws of the United
States, the judicial power does not extend to it if the suit is sought to be
prosecuted against a State, without her consent, by one of her own citizens."); Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U. S. 18, 25-26 (1934) (same).

.-
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This principle applies as well to claims over which a federal
court exercises pendant jurisdiction, as we made clear in
Edelman v. Jordan, supra. The District Court's jurisdiction over that suit was based on the plaintiffs' equal-protection claim, and we found that claim sufficiently substantial
that "the District Court was correct in exercising pendant jurisdiction over [plaintiffs'] statutory claim." 415 U. S., at
653. The fact that the District Court had jurisdiction over
the pendant claim did not prevent us, however, from concluding that the Eleventh Amendment barred an award of retroactive relief based on that claim. See id., at 678.
In sum, contrary to the analysis implicit in early decisions
such as Greene, supra, neither pendant jurisdiction nor any
other basis of jurisdiction may override the Eleventh Amendment. 17 A federal court must examine each claim in a case to
see if the court's jurisdiction over that claim is barred by the
Eleventh Amendment. We concluded above that a claim
that state officials violated state law in carrying out their official responsibilities is a claim against the State that is protected by the Eleventh Amendment. See p. - - , supra.
We now hold that this principle applies as well to state-law
claims brought into federal court under pendant jurisdiction.
This issue has not previously been confronted directly, and
we therefore are not bound by prior decisions assuming a
contrary conclusion. "[W]hen questions of jurisdiction have
been passed on in prior decisions sub silentio, this Court has
never considered itself bound when a subsequent case finally
brings the jurisdictional issue before us." Hagans v. Levine,
415 U. S. 533 n. 5 (1974). 18
11
See Missouri v. Fiske, supra, 290 U. S., at 28 ("This is not less a suit
against the State because the bill is ancillary and supplemental.").
8
' See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 670-671 (1974) ("Having now
had an opportunity to more fully consider the Eleventh Amendment issue
after briefing and argument, we disapprove the Eleventh Amendment
holdings of [certain prior] cases to the extent that they are inconsistent

.-
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Respondents urge that application of the Eleventh Amendment _to pendant state-law claims will have a disruptive effect
on litigation against state officials. They argue that the considerations of "judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to
litigants" that underlie pendant jurisdiction, see Gibbs,
supra, 383 U. S., at 726, counsel against a result that may
cause litigants to split causes of action between state and federal court. They also contend that the policy of avoiding unnecessary constitutional decisions will be contravened if
plaintiffs choose to forego their state-law claims and sue only
in federal court. Finally, they argue that plaintiffs may be
forced to vindicate their federal rights in state court, contrary to the policy of Ex parte Young.
We agree that, depending on the circumstances of the case,
these considerations of policy may be important, 19 but they
may not override the constitutional limitations on the authority of the federal judiciary to adjudicate suits against a State.
See Missouri v. Fiske, supra, 290 U. S., at 25-26 ("Considerations of convenience open no avenue of escape from the
[Amendment's] restriction."). The purpose of the Eleventh
Amendment is to deny a federal forum to private litigants in
cases against a State. Any inconvenience this may cause to
litigants who must bring state claims in state court is a necessary consequence of this limitation on federal judicial power. 20
;

with our holding today.").
19
Petitioners contend that in this case these policy considerations are
outweighed by considerations of comity, arguing that the Court of Appeals
"has authorized a severe intrusion on the right of state officials to run their
own programs, basing that intrusion on nothing more than its view of state
law. " Brief for Petitioners 9. In light of our disposition of this case, we
need not balance these competing considerations.
2<l Thus, under Edelman v. Jordan, supra, a plaintiff with a claim for
monetary relief on the basis of federal law must resort to state court. If
he wishes to press a related claim for prospective relief, he must forego the
damages claim, or split his related causes of action between state and federal courts, or take the entire case to state court. These limitations on the

,.
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This holds true even if the Eleventh Amendment forces a
plaintiff to vindicate a federal right in a state forum:
"At first blush, it may seem hypertechnical to say that
these petitioners are entitled personally to enforce their
federal rights against the State in a state forum rather
than in a federal forum. If that be so, I think it is a
hypertechnicality that has long been understood to be a
part of the tension inherent in our system of federalism."
Employees v. Missouri Public Health Dept., 411 U. S.
279, 298 (1973) (MARSHALL, J., concurring in result).
We believe that the constitutional principle of sovereign immunity, embodied in the Eleventh Amendment, demands
that claims against state officials on the basis of state law be
resolved in state courts.
IV
The Court of Appeals upheld the judgment of the District
Court solely on the basis of Pennsylvania's MH/MR Act.
We hold that the court was without jurisdiction to enjoin petitioner state institutions and state officials on the basis of
this state law. Respondents contend, however, that the
judgment may still be upheld against petitioner county officials. We disagree. Even assuming that these officials are
not immune from suit challenging their actions under the
MH/MR Act, 21 it is clear that without the injunction against
choice of a forum inevitably result from the limited jurisdiction of the federal courts. Cf. Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U. S. 1, 14-15 (1976) (Although
"considerations of judicial economy" would be served by permitting pendant-party jurisdiction, "the addition of a completely new party would run
counter to the well-established principle that federal courts, as opposed to
state trial courts of general jurisdiction, are courts of limited jurisdiction
marked out by Congress.")
21
We have held that the Eleventh Amendment does not apply to "counties and similar municipal corporations." Mt . Healthy City School District
v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274, 280 (1977); see Lincoln County v. Luning, 133

·'
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the state institutions and officials in this case, the order entered on state-law grounds necessarily would be limited.
The relief substantially concerns Pennhurst, an arm of the
State that is operated by state officials. Moreover, the
MH/MR Act contemplates that the state and county officials
will cooperate in operating mental retardation programs.
See In re Schmidt, 429 A. 2d 631, 635 (1981). Any relief
granted against the county officials on the basis of the state
statute would be partial and incomplete at best, and such a
limited enforcement of state law would not serve the purposes of efficiency, convenience, and fairness that must inform the exercise of pendant jurisdiction.
For these reasons, the judgment below cannot stand.
consider to what extent,
remand the Court of Appeals
U. S. 529, 530 (1890). At the samrj:we have applied the Amendment to
bar relief against county officials "m order to protect the state treasury
from liability that would have had essentially the same practical consequences as a judgment against the State itself." Lake Country Estates,
Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U. S. 391, 401 (1980). See,
e. g., Edelman v. Jordan, supra (Eleventh Amendment bars suit against
state and county officials for retroactive award of welfare benefits). The
Courts of Appeals are in general agreement that a suit against officials of a
county or other governmental entity is barred if the relief obtained runs
against the State. See, e. g., Moore v. Tangipahoa Parish School Board,
594 F. 2d 489, 493 (CA5 1979); Carey v. Quern, 588 F. 2d 230, 234 (CA7
1978); Incarcerated Men of Allen County Jail v. Fair, 507 F. 2d 282, 287
(CA6 1974); George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. State University Construction
Fund, 493 F. 2d 177, 180 (CA11974); Harris v. Tooele County School District, 471 F. 2d 218, 220 (CAlO 1973).
In this case, the actions of the county commissioners and mental health
adminstrators are dependent to a substantial degree on the State. For
example, the funding for community living arrangements is provided entirely by the State. See 50 Pa. Stat. Ann. §§ 4057-4059; In re Sauers, 447
A. 2d 1132 (Pa. Cmwlth 1982). Thus, it may be that these county officials
in fact are acting as state officials, at least for some purposes, when exercising their functions under the MH/MR Act. Cf. Farr v. Chesney, 441
F. Supp. 127, 130-132 (MD Pa. 1977) (holding that county commissioners,
as members of the board of the county office of mental health and retardation, could not be sued for back pay under the Eleventh Amendment).

J.
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if any, the judgment may be sustained, as the District Court

originally held, on the basis of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments 22 or § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the
case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
It is so ordered.

22

On the Fourteenth Amendment issue, the court should consider

Youngberg v. Romeo,- U. S . - (1982), a decision that was not available when the District Court issued its decision.
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether a federal court
may award injunctive relief against state officials on the basis
of state law.
·
I
This litigation, here for the second time, concerns the conditions of care at petitioner Pennhurst State School and Hospital, a Pennsylvania institution for the care of the mentally
retarded. See Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1 (1981). Although the litigation's history is set forth in detail in our prior opinion, see id., at 5-10,
it is necessary for purposes of this decision to review that
history.
This suit originally was brought in 1974 by respondent
Terri Lee Halderman, a resident of Pennhurst, in the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Ultim;:ttely, plaintiffs included a class consisting of all persons
who were or might become residents of Pennhurst; the Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Citizens (P ARC); and the
United States. Defendants were Pennhurst and various
Pennhurst officials; the Pennsylvania Department of Public
Welfare and several of its officials; and various county com- ·
missioners, county mental retardation administrators, and

)

. _,.--
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other officials of five Pennsylvania counties surrqunding
Pennhurst. Respondents' amended complaint charged that
conditions at Pennhurst violated the class members' rights
under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 87 Stat. 394, as amended, 29
U. S. C. § 794 (1976 ed. and Supp. V); the Developmentally
Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U. S. C.
§§ 6001-6081 (1976 ed. and Supp. V); and the Pennsylvania
Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966 (the
"MH/MR Act"), Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 50, §§ 4101-4704
(Purdon 1969 and Supp. 1982). Both damages and injunctive
relief were sought.
In 1977, following a lengthy trial, the District Court rendered its decision. 446 F. Supp. 1295 (1977). As noted in
our prior opinion, the court's findings were undisputed: "Conditions at Pennhurst are not only dangerous, with the residents often physically abused or drugged by staff members,
but also inadequate for the 'habilitation' of the retarded. Indeed, the court found that the physicial, intellectual, and
emotional skills of some residents have deteriorated at
Pennhurst." 451 U. S., at 7 (footnote omitted). The District Court held that these conditions violated each resident's
right to "minimally adequate habilitation" under the Due
Process Clause and the MH/MR Act, see 446 F. Supp., at
1314-1318, 1322-1323; "freedom from harm" under the
Eighth And Fourteenth Amendments, see id., at 1320-1321;
and "nondiscriminatory habilitation" under the Equal Protection Clause and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, see id., at
1321-1324. Furthermore, the court found that "due process
demands that if a state undertakes the habilitation of a retarded person, it must do so in the least restrictive setting
consistent with that individual's habilitative needs." ld., at
1319 (emphasis added). After concluding that the large size
of Pennhurst prevented it from providing the necessary
habilitation in the least restrictive environment, the court ordered "that immediate steps be taken to remove the retarded
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residents from Pennhurst." I d., at 1325. Petitioners were
ordered "to provide suitable community living arrangements" for the class members, id., at 1326, and the court appointed a Special Master "with the power and duty to plan,
organize, direct, supervise and monitor the implementation
of this and any further Orders of the Court." Ibid. 1
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed most
of the District Court's judgment. 612 F. 2d 84 (1979) (en
bane). It agreed that respondents had a right to habilitation
in the least restrictive environment, but it grounded this
right solely on the "bill of rights" provision in the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act 42
U. S. C. § 6010. See 612 F. 2d, at 95-100, 104-107. The~ .
court did not consider the constitutional issues or § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act, and while it affirmed the District Court's
holding that the MH/MR Act provides a right to adequate
habilitation, see id., at 100-103, the court did not decide
whether that state right encompassed a right to treatment in
the least restrictive setting.
On the question of remedy, the Court of Appeals affirmed
except as to the District Court's order that Pennhurst be
closed. The court observed that some patients would be unable to adjust to life outside an institution, and it determined
that none of the legal provisions relied on by plaintiffs precluded institutionalization. I d., at 114-115. It therefore remanded for "individual determinations by the [District
Court], or by the Special Master, as to the appropriateness of
an improved Pennhurst for each such patient," guided by "a
presumption in favor of placing individuals in [community living arrangements]." Ibid. 2
' The District Court determined that the individual defendants had acted
in good faith and therefore were immune from the damage claims. 446 F .
Supp, at 1324.
' In a companion case, the Court of Appeals affirmed the District
Court's denial of a motion to intervene for purposes of appeal by the
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On remand the District Court established detailed procedures for determining the proper residential placement for
each patient. A team consisting of the patient, his parents
or guardian, and his case manager must establish an individual habilitation plan providing for habilitation of the patient
in a designated community living arrangement. The plan is
subject to review by the Special Master. A second master,
called the Hearing Master, is available to conduct hearings,
upon request by the resident, his parents or his advocate, on
the question whether the services of Pennhurst would be
more beneficial to the resident than the community living arrangement provided in the resident's plan. The Hearing
Master then determines where the patient should reside,
subject to possible review by the District Court. See App.
123a-0134a (Order of April 24, 1980). 3
This Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals,
finding that 42 U. S. C. § 6010 did not create any substantive
rights. 451' U. S. 1 (1981). We remanded the case to the
Court of Appeals to determine if the remedial order could be
· supported on the basis of state law, the Constitution, or§ 504
of the Rehabilitation Act. See id., at 31. 4 We also rePennhurst Parents-Staff Association, finding the denial harmless error.
See 612 F. 2d 131 (1979) (en bane). The Association subsequently was
granted leave to intervene and is a petitioner in this Court.
3
On July 1, 1981, Pennsylvania enacted an appropriations bill stating
that only $35,000 would be paid for the Masters' expenses for the fiscal
year July 1981 to June 1982. The District Court held Pennsylvania and its
Secretary of the Department of Public Welfare in contempt, and imposed a
fine of $10,000 per day. Pennsylvania paid the fines, and the contempt
was purged on January 8, 1982. On appeal the Court of Appeals affirmed
the contempt order. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hospital,
673 F. 2d 628 (1982), cert. pending, No. 81-2363.
'Three Justices dissented from the Court's construction of the Act, but
concluded that the District Court should not have adopted the "far-reaching remedy" of appointing "a Special Master to decide which of the
Pennhurst inmates should remain and which should be moved to community-based facilities. . . . [T]he court should not have assumed the task of

.-
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manded the question whether any relief was available under
other provisions of the Developmentally Disabled Assistance
and Bill of Rights Act. See id., at 27-30 (discussing 42
U. S. C. §§ 6011(a), 6063(b)(5)).
On remand the Court of Appeals affirmed the prior judgment in its entirety. 673 F. 2d 647 (1982) (en bane). It determined that in a recent decision the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania had "spoken definitively" in holding that the
MH/MR Act required the State to adopt the "least restrictive
environment" approach for the care of the mentally retarded.
!d., at 651 (citing In re Joseph Schmidt, 494 Pa. 86, 429 A. 2d
631 (1981)). The Court of Appeals concluded that this state
statute fully supported the prior order, and therefore did not
reach the remaining issues of federal law. It also rejected
petitioners' argument that the Eleventh Amendment barred
a federal court from considering this pendent state-law claim.
The court noted that the Amendment did not bar a federal
court from granting prospective injunctive relief against
state officials on the basis of federal claims, see 673 F. 2d, at
656 (citing E x Parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908)), and concluded that the same result obtained with respect to a
pendent state-law claim. It reasoned that because Siler v.
Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 213 U. S. 175 (1909), an important case in the development of the doctrine of pendent
jurisdiction, also involved state officials, "there cannot be ...
an Eleventh Amendment exception to that rule." 673 F. 2d,
at 658. 5 Finally, the court rejected petitioners' argument
that it should have abst'ained from deciding the state-law
managing Pennhurst .. . ."

451 U. S. , at 54

(WHITE

J., dissenting in

part).

The Court of Appeals also noted that "the United States is an intervening plaintiff . . . against which even the state itself cannot successfully
plead the Eleventh Amendment as a bar to jurisdiction," and that "the
counties, even as juridicial entities, do not fall within the coverage of the
Eleventh Amendment. Against those defendants even money damages
may be awarded." 673 F. 2d, at 656 (citation omitted).
6
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claim under principles of comity, see id., at 659--660, andrefused to consider petitioners' objections to the District
Court's use of a special master, see id., at 651 and n. 10.
Three judges dissented in part, arguing that under principles
of federalism and comity the establishment of a special master to supervise compliance was an abuse of discretion. See
id., at 662 (Seitz, C.J., joined by Hunter, J., dissenting in
part); ibid., (Garth, J., concurring in part and dissenting as to
relief). See also id., at 661 (Aldisert, J., concurring) (seriously questioning the propriety of the order appointing the
Special Master, but concluding that a retroactive reversal of
that order would be meaningless). 6
We granted certiorari,-- U. S. - - (1982), and now reverse and remand.
II
Petitioners raise three challenges to the judgment of the
Court of Appeals: (i) the Eleventh Amendment prohibited
the District Court from 9Bj.oini:Ag sta e o c1als o conform
their conduct to state law; (ii) the doctrine of comity prohibited the District Court from issuing its injunctive relief; and
(iii) the District Court abused its discretion in appointing two
masters to supervise the decisions of state officials in implementing state law. We need not reach the latter two issues,
for we find the Eleventh Amendment challenge dispositive.

A
Article III, § 2 of the Constitution provides that the federal
judicial power extends, inter alia, to controversies "between
a State and Citizens of another State." Relying on this language, this Court in 1793 assumed original jurisdiction over a
suit brought by a citizen of South Carolina against the State
of Georgia. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419 (1793). The
6
The Office of the Special Master was abolished in December 1982.
See App. 220a (Order of August 12, 1982). The Hearing Master remains
in operation.

81-2101-0PINION
PENNHURST STATE SCHOOL & HOSP. v. HALDERMAN

7

decision "created such a shock of surprise that the Eleventh
Amendment was at once proposed and adopted." Monaco v.
Mississippi, 292 U. S. 313, 325 (1934). The Amendment
provides:
"The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States
by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects
of any Foreign State."
The Amendment's language overruled the particular result
in Chisholm, but this Court has recognized that its greater
significance lies in its affirmation that the fundamental principle of sovereign immunity limits the grant of judicial authority in Art. III. Thus, in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1
(1890), the Court held that, despite the limited terms of the
Eleventh Amendment, a federal court could not entertain a
suit brought by a citizen against his own State. After reviewing the constitutional debates concerning the scope of
Art. III, the Court determined that federal jurisdiction over
suits against unconsenting States "was not contemplated by
the Constitution when establishing the judicial power of the
United States." Id., at 15. See Monaco supra, at 322-323
(1934). 7 In short, the principle of sovereign immunity is a
constitutional limitation on the federal judicial power established in Art. III:
"That a State may not be sued without its consent is a
fundamental rule of jurisprudence having so important a
7
See Employees v. Missouri Public Health Dep't, 411 U. S. 279,
291-292 (1973) (MARSHALL, J., concurring in judgment) (The Eleventh
Amendment "clarif[ied] the intent of the Framers concerning the reach of
federal judicial power" and "restore[d] the original understanding" that
States could not be made unwilling defendants in federal court). See also
Nevada v. Hall, 440 U. S. 410, 430-431 (1979) (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting);
id., at 437 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting).
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bearing upon the construction of the Constitution of the
United States that it has become established by repeated
decisions of this court that the entire judicial power
granted by the Constitution does not embrace authority
to entertain a suit brought by private parties against a
State without consent given: not one brought by citizens
of another State, or by citizens or subjects of a foreign
State, because of the Eleventh Amendment; and not
even one brought by its own citizens, because of the fundamental rule of which the Amendment is but an exemplification." Ex parte State of New York No. 1, 256
U. S. 490, 497 (1921) (emphasis added). 8
A sovereign's immunity may be waived, and the Court consistently has held that a State may consent to suit against it
in federal court. See, e. g., Clark v. Barnard, 108 U. S.
436, 447 (1883). We have insisted, however, that the State's
consent be unequivocally expressed. See, e. g., Edelman v.
Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 673 (1974). Similarly, although Congress has power with respect to the rights protected by
Fourteenth Amendment to ·abrogate the Eleventh Amendment immunity, see Fitzpatrick v. Bitker, 427 U. S. 445
(1976), we have required an unequivocal e~pression of congressional intent to "overturn the constitutionally guaranteed immunity of the several States." Que'rn v. Jordan, 440
U. S. 332, 342 (1979) (holding that 42 U. S. C. § 1983 does not
override States' Eleventh Amendment immunity). Our reluctance to infer that a State's immunity from suit in the federal courts has been negated stems from recognition of the
The limitation deprives federal courts of any jurisdiction to entertain
such claims, and thus may be raised at any point in a proceeding. "The
Eleventh Amendment declares a policy and sets forth an explicit limitation
on federal judicial power of such compelling force that this Court will con- ·
sider the issue arising under this Amendment . . . even though urged for
the first time in this Court." Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury,
8

323

u. s. 459, 467 (1945).
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vital role of the doctrine of sovereign immunity in our federal
system. A State's constitutional interest in immunity encompasses not merely whether it may be sued, but where it
may be sued. 9 As JusTICE MARSHALL has noted well, "[b]ecause of the problems of federalism inherent in making one
sovereign appear against its will in the courts of the other, a
restriction upon the exercise of the federal judicial power has
long been considered to be appropriate in a case such as this."
Employees v. Missouri Public Health Dep't, 411 U. S. 279,
294 (1973) (MARSHALL, J., concurring in result). 10 Accordingly, in deciding this case we must be guided by "[t]he principles of federalism that inform Eleventh Amendment doctrine." Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678, 691 (1978).
B

This Court's decisions thus establish that "an unconsenting
State is immune from suits brought in federal courts by her
9
For this reason, the Court consistently has held that a State's waiver
of sovereign immunity in its own courts is not a waiver of the Eleventh
Amendment immunity in the federal courts. See, e. g., Florida Department of Health & Rehabilitation Services v. Florida Nursing Home Assn.
450 U. S. 147, 150 (1981) (per curiam). "[l]t is not consonant with our
dual system for the federal courts ... to read the consent to embrace federal as well as state courts .... [A] clear declaration of the state's intention
to submit its fiscal problems to other courts than those of its own creation
must be found." Great Northern Life Insurance Co. v. Read, 322 U. S.
47, 54 (1944).
10
See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U. S., at 418-419 (States were "vitally interested" in whether they would be subject to suit in the federal courts, and
the debates about state immunity focused on the question of federal judicial
power). Cf. id., at 430~31 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting) (sovereign immunity is "a guarantee that is implied as an essential component of federalism"
and is "sufficiently fundamental to our federal structure to have implicit
constitutional dimension"); id., at 437 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting) ("[T]he
States that ratified the Eleventh Amendment thought that they were
p~tting an end to the possibility of individual States as unconsenting defendants in foreign jurisdictions").

.-
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own citizens as well as by citizens of another state." Employees, supra, at 280. There may be a question, however,
whether a particular suit in fact is a suit against a State. It
is clear, of course, that in the absence of consent a suit in
which the State or one of its agencies or departments is
named as the defendant is proscribed by the Eleventh
Amendment. See, e. g., Florida Department of Health v.
Florida Nursing Home Ass'n, 450 U. S. 147 (1981) (per
curiam); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U. S. 781 (1978) (per
curiam). This jurisdictional bar applies regardless ofthe nature of the relief sought. See, e. g., Missouri v. Fiske, 290
U. S. 18, 27 (1933) ("Expressly applying to suits in equity as
well as at law, the Amendment necessarily embraces demands for the enforcement of equitable rights and the prosecution of equitable remedies when these are asserted and
prosecuted by an individual against a State").
A IBM"e ee:m~x question arises when the suit is brought
only against state officials. This Court's prior cases have not
been entirely consistent in determining when a particular suit
against state officials is a suit against the State itself, but certain principles well established. ' The Eleventh Amendment
bars a suit against state officials when "the state is the real,
substantial party in interest." Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U. S. 459, 464 (1945). See, e. g., In
re Ayers, 123 U. S. 443, 487-492 (1887); Louisiana v. Jumel,
107 U. S. 711, 720-723, 727-728 (1882). Thus, "[t]he general
rule is that relief sought nominally against an officer is in fact
against the sovereign if the decree would operate against the
latter." Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U. S. 57, 58 (1963) (per
curiam). 11 And, as when the State itself is named as the deSee also Dugan v. Rank, 372 U. S. 609, 620 (1963) ("The general rule
is that a suit is against the sovereign if 'the judgment sought would expend
itself on the public treasury or domain, or interfere with the public administration,' or if the effect of the judgment would be 'to restrain the Government from acting, or to compel it to act.'") (citations omitted).
11

81-2101-0PINION
PENNHURST STATE SCHOOL & HOSP. v. HALDERMAN

>

11

fendant, a suit against state officials that is in fact a suit
against a State is barred regardless of whether it seeks damages or injunctive relief. See Cory v. White, - - U. S.
-,-(1982).
The Court has recognized an important exception to this
general rule: a suit challenging the constitutionality of a state
official's action is not one against the State. 12 This eloGtrin~
\W?.i Qonfitame6 in Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908), in
which a federal court enjoined the Attorney General of the
State of Minnesota from bringing suit to enforce a state statute that allegedly violated the Fourteenth Amendment.
This Court held that the Eleventh Amendment did not prohibit issuance of this injunction:
"The act to be enforced is alleged to be unconstitutional,
and if it be so, the use of the name of the State to enforce
an unconstitutional act to the injury of complainants is a
proceeding without the authority of and one which does
not affect the State in its sovereign or governmental capacity. It is simply an illegal act upon the part of a state
official in attempting by the use of the name of the State
12
The Court also has held that sovereign immunity does not apply in a
suit against an official who allegedly acted entirely outside his official authority. See, e. g., Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp. , 337
U. S. 682, 702 (1949). This ultra vires exception is quite limited, governing only those situations in which a government official acts without any
official justification. See, e. g., Florida Department of State v. Treasure
Salvors, Inc.,-- U.S.--,-- (1982) (opinion of STEVENS, J.) (test is
whether the official's conduct was undertaken "without any authority
whatever"); id., at-- (WHITE, J., concurring in judgment in part and
dissenting in part) (test is whether there is "[a] colorable basis for the exercise of authority by state officials"). This exception clearly is inapplicable
in this case. Even if petitioner officials violated state law in carrying out
some of their official duties, they unquestionably acted under colorable
state authority in operating Pennhurst and the State's system of care for
the mentally retarded. In short, these officials were not acting ultra vires, but rather were "exercising the powers delegated to [them] by the
sovereign." Larson, supra, at 693.
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to enforce a legislative enactment which is void because
unconstitutional. If the act which the state Attorney
General seeks to enforce be a violation of the Federal
Constitution, the officer in proceeding under such enactment comes into conflict with the superior authority of
that Constitution, and he is in that case stripped of his
official or representative character and is subjected to
the consequences of his official conduct. The State has
no power to impart to him any immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States."
209 U. S., at 159-160.
The Court subsequently has made clear that, even where this
exception applies, the rule that a suit against state officials
constitutes a suit against the State w:iJ.l uot. b~ wholly diilre. 21 ~ Thus, in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651 (1974),
the Court held that in a suit against state officials "a federal
court's remedial power, consistent with the Eleventh
Amendment, is necessarily limited to prospective injunctive
relief, and may not include a retroactive award which requires the payment of funds from the state treasury." !d.,
at 677 (citations omitted).
III
With these principles in mind, we now turn to the question
whether the claim that petitioners violated state law in carrying out their official duties at Pennhurst is one against the
State and therefore barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
Respondents advance two principal arguments/n support of
the judgment belowY First, they contend tliat under the
We reject respondents' additional contention that Pennsylvania has
waived its immunity from suit in federal court. At the time the suit was
filed, suits against Pennsylvania were permitted only where expressly authorized by the legislature, see, e. g., Freach v. Commonwealth, 471 Pa.
558, 379 A. 2d 1163 (1977), and respondents have not referred us to any
13
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doctrine of Edelman v. Jordan, supra, the suit is not against
the State because the courts below ordered only prospective
injunctive relief. Second, they assert that the state-law
claim properly was decided under the doctrine of pendent juprovision expressly waiving Pennsylvania's Eleventh Amendment immunity. The State now has a statute governing sovereign immunity, including an express preservation of its immunity from suit in federal court:
"Federal courts.-Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be construed
to waive the immunity of the Commonwealth from suit in Federal courts
guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States." 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8521(b) (1980).
We also do not agree with respondents that the presence of the United
States as a plaintiff in this case removes the Eleventh Amendment from
consideration. Although the Eleventh Amendment does not bar the
United States from suing a State in federal court, see, e. g., Monaco v.
Mississippi, 292 U. S. 313, 329 (1934), the United States' presence in the
case for any purpose does not eliminate the State's immunity for all purposes. For example, the fact that the federal court could award injunctive
relief to the United States on federal constitutional claims would not mean
that the court could order the State to pay damages to other plaintiffs.
Moreover, in this case there was some question whether the United States
had independent authority to bring a lawsuit to enforce even the federallaw claims of Pennhurst's residents. The Court of Appeals declined to decide this question, holding only that, because the lawsuit already was pending, "[i]ntervention presented no danger that the federal executive would
be initiating a lawsuit that Congress somehow never intended." 612
F. 2d, at 92. Cf. United States v. Philadelphia, 644 F. 2d 187 (CA3 1980)
(absent specific statutory authorization, United States may not bring suit
against city and city police officials to vindicate citizens' Fourteenth
Amendment rights); United States v. Solomon, 563 F. 2d 1121 (CA4 1977)
(absent specific statutory authorization, United States may not bring suit
against officials at a state mental hospital to vindicate patients' Eighth,
Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights). As the United States is
only an intervenor in the suit, its presence hardly could eliminate the Eleventh Amendment from consideration. In any case, we think it clear that
the United States does not have standing to assert the state-law claims of
third-parties. Therefore, the applicability of the Eleventh Amendment to
respondents' state-law claim is unaffected by the United States' ability to
sue a State.

.-

,.
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risdiction. Respondents rely on decisions of this Court
awarding relief against state officials on the basis of a pendent state-law claim. See, e. g., Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 213 U. S. 175, 193 (1909).
A
We first address the contention that respondents' state-law
claim is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment because it
seeks only prospective relief as defined in Edelman v. Jordan, supra. The Court of Appeals held that if the judgment
below rested on federal law, it could be entered against petitioner state officials under the doctrine established in
Edelman and Young even though the prospective financial
burden was substantial and ongoing. 14 See 673 F. 2d, at 656.
As discussed above, this result has been justified, notwithstanding the obvious impact on the State itself, on the view
that sovereign immunity does not apply because an official
who acts unconstitutionally is "stripped of his official or representative character," Young, 209 U. S., at 160. The Court
of Appeals assumed, and respondents assert, that this reasoning applies as well when the official acts in violation of
state law. This argument misconstrues the basis of the doctrine established in Young and Edelman.
It hardly need be said that the express rationale of Ex
parte Young is not sspeGialJ¥ persuasive. As the dissent in
Young argued, to ~join a state attorney general from bringing a suit on behalf of the State is, "for every practical or
legal purpose, to enjoin the State itself." ld., at 199 (HarAlthough the District Court thus has jurisdiction to grant prospective
relief on the basis of federal law, the scope of that relief may be constrained
by principles of comity and federalism. "Where, as here, the exercise of
authority by state officials is attacked, federal courts must be constantly
mindful of the 'special delicacy of the adjustment to be preserved between
federal equitable power and State administration of its own law.'" Rizzo
v. Goode, 423 U. S. 362, 378 (1976) (quoting Stefanelli v. Minard, 342
u. s. 117, 120 (1951)).
14
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lan, J., dissenting). Moreover, there is the "well-recognized
irony" that the result of Young is that an offical's unconstitutional conduct constitutes state action under the Fourteenth
Amendment but not the Eleventh Amendment. Florida Department of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc.,-- U.S.--,
- - (1982) (opinion of STEVENS, J.). Nonetheless, the
Young doctrine has been accepted as necessary to permit the
federal courts to vindicate federal rights and hold state officials responsible to "the supreme authority of the United
States." Young, 209 U. S., at 160. As JUSTICE BRENNAN
has observed, "Ex parte Young was the culmination of efforts
by this Court to harmonize the principles of the Eleventh
Amendment with the effective supremacy of rights and powers secured elsewhere in the Constitution." Perez v.
Ledesma, 401 U. S. 82, 106 (1971) (BRENNAN, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part). Our decisions repeatedly
have emphasized that the Young doctrine rests on the need
to promote the vindication of federal rights.
See, e. g.,
Quern v. Jordan, 440 U. S. 332, 337 (1979); Scheuer v.
Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232, 237 (1974); GeorgiaR. & Banking Co.
v. Redwine, 342 U. S. 299, 304 (1952).
The Court also has recognized, however, that the Young
exception should not be applied where unnecessary to promote the supremacy of federal law. This is the significance
of Edelman v. Jordan, supra. We recognized that the prospective relief authorized by Young "has permitted the Civil
War Amendments to the Constitution to serve as a sword,
rather than merely a shield, for those whom they were designed to protect." 415 U. S., at 664. But we declined to
extend Young to encompass retroactive relief, for to do so
would effectively eliminate the constitutional immunity of the
States. Accordingly, we concluded that although the difference between permissible and impermissible relief "will not
in many instances be that between day and night," id., at
667, an award of retroactive relief necessarily" 'fall[s] afoul of
the Eleventh Amendment if that basic constitutional provi-
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sion is to be conceived of as having any present force."' !d.,
at 665 (quoting Rothstein v. Wyman, 467 F. 2d 226, 237 (CA2
1972) (McGowan, J., sitting by designation), cert. denied, 411
U. S. 921 (1973)). In sum, Edelman's distinction between
prospective and retroactive relief fulfills the underlying purpose of Ex parte Young while at the same time preserving to
an important degree the constitutional immunity of the
States.
This need to reconcile competing interests is wholly absent, however, when a plaintiff alleges that a state official has
violated state law. In such a case the entire basis for the
doctrine of Young and Edelman disappears. A federal
court's grant of relief against state officials on the basis of
state law, whether prospective or retroactive, does not vindicate the supreme authority of federal law. On the contrary,
it is difficult to think of a greater intrusion on state sovereignty than when a federal court instructs state officials on
how to conform their conduct to state law. Such a result
conflicts directly with the priniciples of federalism that underlie the Eleventh Amendment. We conclude that Young
and Edelman are inapplicable in a suit against state officials
on the basis of state law ~nd that such a suit is barred by the
Eleventh Amendment as a suit against the Sta_il
B
The reasoning of our decisions on sovereign immunity thus k
leads to the conclusion that a federal suit against state officials on the basis of state law contravenes the Eleventh
Amendment. In reaching a contrary conclusion, the Court
of Appeals relied principally on a separate line of cases dealing with pendent jurisdiction. The crucial point for the
Court of Appeals was that this Court has granted relief
against state officials on the basis of a pendent state-law .
claim. See 673 F. 2d, at 657-658. We therefore must consider the relationship between pendent jurisdiction and the
Eleventh Amendment.

7
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This Court {Ea~ long)leld generally that when a federal
court obtains jurisdiction over a federal claim, it may adjudicate other related claims over which the court otherwise
would not have jurisdiction. See, e. g., Mine Workers v.
Gibbs, 383 U. S. 715, 726 (1966); Osborn v. Bank of the
United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 819-823 (1824). The Court also
has held that a federal court may resolve a case solely on the
basis of pendent state-law claim, see Siler, supra, at 192-193,
and that in fact the court usually should do so in order to
avoid federal constitutional questions. See id., at 193;
Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring) ("[l]f a case can be decided on either of two
grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a
question of statutory construction or general law, the Court
will decide only the latter"). Under these principles, it
seems clear that, apart from the possible Eleventh Amendment bar, the Court of Appeals had a proper jurisdictional
basis on which to decide the claim based on Pennsylvania
law. 15 The question therefore is whether the Amendment
applies to this pendant-state-law claim.
As the Court of Appeals noted, in Siler and subsequent
cases concerning pendant jurisdiction relief was granted
against state officials on the basis of state-law claims that
were pendent to federal constitutional claims. The Court
never held directly that the rationale of Ex parte Young
should be extended to pendent state-law claims, but rather
16

This does not necessarily mean that pendent jurisdiction properly was
exercised here. "Pendent jurisdiction over state claims [is] a doctrine of
discretion not to be routinely exercised without considering the advantages
of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to the litigants." Hagans
v. Lavine, 415 U. S. 528, 545 (1974). In particular, "[n]eedless decisions
of state law should be avoided both as a matter of comity and to promote
justice between the parties, by procuring for them a surer-footed reading
of applicable law." Mine Workers v. Gibbs , 383 U. S. 715, 726 (1966).
Because of our disposition of the case under the Eleventh Amendment, we
need not decide this important comity issue.
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appears to have assumed that the Eleventh Amendment simply does not apply to pendent claims. This is illustrated by
Greene v. Louisville & Interurban R. Co., 244 U. S. 499
(1917), in which the plaintiff railroads sued state officials, alleging that certain tax assessments were excessive under the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Court first rejected the officials' argument under the Eleventh Amendment, finding that
Ex parte Young applied to all constitutional claims against
state officials, regardless whether the state statute under
which the officials acted was constitutional or unconstitutional. See id., at 507. Having determined that the Eleventh Amendment did not deprive the federal court of jurisdiction over this constitutional question, the Court declared
that the court's jurisdiction extended "to the determination of
all questions involved in the case, including questions of state
law, irrespective of the disposition that may be made of the
federal question, or whether it be found necessary to decide
it at all." I d., at 508. The case then was decided solely on
state-law grounds. Accord, Lousiville & Nashville R.R.
Co. v. Greene, 244 U. S. 522 (1917).
The implicit view thus seems to have been that once jurisdiction is established on the basis of any federal question, no
further Eleventh Amendment inquiry is necessary with respect to other claims raised in the case. We believe this
view is erroneous and contrary to the principles established
in our Eleventh Amendment decisions. "The Eleventh
Amendment is an explicit limitation on the judicial power of
the United States." Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U. S., at 25. It
deprives a federal court of power to decide certain claims
against States that otherwise would be within the scope of
Art. III's grant of jurisdiction. For example, if a lawsuit
against state officials under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 alleges a constitutional claim, the federal court is barred from awarding
damages against the state treasury even though the claim
arises under the Constitution. See Quern v. Jordan, 440
U. S. 332 (1979). Similarly, if a§ 1983 action alleging a con-
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stitutional claim is brought directly against a State, the Eleventh Amendment bars a federal court from granting any relief on that claim. See Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U. S. 781
(1978) (per curiam). The Amendment thus is a specific constitutional bar against hearing evenfederal claims that otherwise would be within the jurisdiction of the federal courts. 16
This constitutional bar applies to pendent claims as well.
A federal court's power over a pendant claim necessarily derives from Art. III, see Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U. S. 1, 9
(1976), and the Eleventh Amendment is an independent limitation on all exercises of Art. III power t\ If we were to hold
otherwise, a federal court could award· damages against a
State on the basis of a pendent claim. Our decision in
Edelman v. Jordan, supra, makes clear that pendent jurisdiction does not permit such an evasion of the immunity guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment. We there held that
"the District Court was correct in exercising pendent jurisdiction over [plaintiffs'] statutory claim," 415 U. S., at 653,
but then concluded that the Eleventh Amendment barred an
award of retroactive relief on the basis of that pendent claim.
ld., at 678.
In suni, contrary to the analysis implicit in decisions such
as Greene, supra, neither pendent jurisdiction nor any other
basis of jurisdiction may override the Eleventh Amendment. 17 A federal court must examine each claim in a case to
see if the court's jurisdiction over that claim is barred by the
Eleventh Amendment. We concluded above that a claim
that state officials violated state law in carrying out their official responsibilities is a claim against the State that is proSee, e. g., Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U. S. 313, 322 (1934) ("[A]lthough a case may arise under the Constitution and laws of the United
States, the judicial power does not extend to it if the suit is sought to be
prosecuted against a State, without her consent, by one of her own citizens"); Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U. S. 18, 25-26 (1933) (same).
17
See Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U. S., at 27 ("This is not less a suit against
the State because the bill is ancillary and supplemental.").
16
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tected by the Eleventh Amendment. See supra, at - - .
We now hold that this principle applies as well to state-law
claims brought into federal court under pendent jurisdiction.
This issue has not previously been confronted directly, and
we therefore are not bound by prior decisions assuming a
contrary conclusion. "[W]hen questions of jurisdiction have
been passed on in prior decisions sub silentio, this Court has
never considered itself bound when a subsequent case finally
brings the jurisdictional issue before us." Hagans v.
Lavine, 415 U. 8. 533, n. 5 (1974). 18

c
Respondents urge that application of the Eleventh Amendment to pendent state-law claims will have a disruptive effect
on litigation against state officials. They argue that the
"considerations of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to litigants" that underlie pendent jurisdiction, see
Gibbs, supra, at 726, counsel against a result that may cause
litigants to split causes of action between state and federal
courts. They also contend that the policy of avoiding unnecessary constitutional decisions will be contravened if plaintiffs choose to forgo their state-law claims and sue only in federal court. Finally, they argue that plaintiffs may be forced
to vindicate their federal rights in state court, contrary to the
policy of Ex parte Young.
-we agree that, depending on the circumstances of the case,
these considerations of policy may be important, 19 but they

l

See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 671 (1974) ("Having now had
an opportunity to more fully consider the Eleventh Amendment issue after
briefing and argument, we disapprove the Eleventh Amendment holdings
of [certain prior] cases to the extent that they are inconsistent with our
holding today").
19
Petitioners contend that in this case these policy considerations are
outweighed by considerations of comity, arguing that the Court of Appeals
"has authorized a severe intrusion on the right of state officials to run their

'
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may not override the constitutional limitations on the authority of the federal judiciary to adjudicate suits against a State.
See Missouri v. Fiske, supra, 290 U. S., at 25-26 ("Considerations of convenience open no avenue of escape from the
[Amendment's] restriction"). The purpose of the Eleventh
Amendment is to deny a federal forum to private litigants in
cases against a State. Any inconvenience this may cause to
litigants who must bring state claims in state court is a necessary consequence of this limitation on federal judicial power. 20
This holds true even if the Eleventh Amendment forces a
plaintiff to vindicate a federal right in a state forum:
"At first blush, it may seem hypertechnical to say that
these petitioners are entitled personally to enforce their
federal rights against the State in a state forum rather
than in a federal forum. If that be so, I think it is a
hypertechnicality that has long been understood to be a
part of the tension inherent in our system of federalism."
Employees v. Missouri Public Health & Welfare Dept.,
411 U. S. 279, 298 (1973) (MARSHALL, J., concurring in
result).
~-

\ We believe that the constitutional principle of sovereign imown programs, basing that intrusion on nothing more than its view of state
law." Brief for Petitioners 9. In light of our disposition of this case, we
need not balance these competing considerations.
20
Thus, under Edelman v. Jordan, supra, a plaintiff with a claim for
monetary relief on the basis of federal law must resort to state court. If
he wishes to press a related cfaim for prospective relief, he must forgo the
damages claim, or split his related causes of action between state and federal courts, or take the entire case to state court. Cf. Aldinger v.
Howard, 427 U. S. 1, 14-15 (1976) (Although "considerations of judicial
economy" would be served by permitting pendant-party jurisdiction, "the
addition of a completely new party would run counter to the well-established principle that federal courts, as opposed to state trial courts of general jurisdiction, are courts of limited jurisdiction marked out by
Congress")

.-
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munity, embodied in the Eleventh Amendment, demands
that claims against state officials on the basis of state law be
resolved in state courts.
IV
The Court of Appeals upheld the judgment of the District
Court solely on the basis of Pennsylvania's MH/MR Act.
We hold that the court was without jurisdiction to enjoin petitioner state officials on the basis of this state law. 21 Re~
spondents contend, however, that the judgment may still be
upheld against petitioner county officials. We aisagreQ. ,.(" ~
Even assuming that these officials are not immune from suit
~
challenging their actions under the MH/MR Act, 22 it is clear
21
It also clear that the court lacked jurisdiction to grant relief on any
basis against Pennhurst and the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare, both of which are state institutions. See Alabama v. Pugh, 438
U. S. 781 (1978) (per curiam). These parties should be dismissed from
the action.
22
We have held that the Eleventh Amendment does not apply to "counties and similar municipal corporations." Mt. Healthy City School District
v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274, 280 (1977); see Lincoln County v. Luning, 133
U. S. 529, 530 (1890). At the same time, we have applied the Amendment
to bar relief against county officials "in order to protect the state treasury
from liability that would have had essentially the same practical consequences as a judgment against the State itself." Lake Country Estates,
Inc . v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U. S. 391, 401 (1979). See,
e. g., Edelman v. Jordan, supra (Eleventh Amendment bars suit against
state and county officials for retroactive award of welfare benefits). The
Courts of Appeals are in general agreement that a suit against officials of a
county or other governmental entity is barred if the relief obtained runs
against the State. See, e. g., Moore v. Tangipahoa Parish School Board,
594 F. 2d 489, 493 (CA5 1979); Carey, v. Quern, 588 F. 2d 230, 23~234
(CA7 1978); Incarcerated Men of Allen County Jail v. Fair, 507 F. 2d 281,
287-288 (CA6 1974); Harris v. Tooele County School District, 471 F. 2d
218, 220 (CAlO 1973).
In this case, the actions of the county commissioners and mental health
adminstrators are dependent to a substantial degree on the State. For
example, the funding for community living arrangements is provided entirely by the State. See In re Sauers, 447 A. 2d 1132, 1134-1136 (Pa.
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that without the injunction against the state institutions and
officials in this case, the order entered on state-law grounds
necessarily would be limited. The relief substantially concerns Pennhurst, an arm of the State that is operated by
state officials. Moreover, funding for the county mental retardation programs comes almost entirely from the State, see
Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 50, §§4507-4509 (Purdon 1969 & Supp.
1982), and the costs of the masters have been borne entirely
by the State, see 446 F. Supp., at 1327. Finally, the
MH/MR Act contemplates that the state and county officials
will cooperate in operating mental retardation programs.
See In re Schmidt, 494 Pa. 86, - , 429 A. 2d 631, 635-636
(1981). In short, the present judgment could not be sustained on the basis of the state-law obligations of petitioner
county officials. Indeed, any relief granted against the
county officials on the basis of the state statute would be partial and incomplete at best, aaa such a limited enforcement of
state law would not appear ser?"e the purposes of efficiency,
convenience, and fairness that must inform the exercise of
pendent jurisdiction.
FSI! these reasons, the jvdgment below cannot stpn remand the Court of Appeals may consider to what extent, if
urt
·
·
,
· ·
any,
original!¥ h8ld.,. on the basis of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments 23 or § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
The court also may consider whether relief is available under
Cmwlth 1982). Thus, it may be that relief granted against these county
officials, when exercising their functions under the MH/MR Act, effectively runs against the State. Cf. Farr v. Chesney , 441 F. Supp. 127,
130-132 (MD Pa. 1977) (holding that Pennsylvania county commissioners,
acting as members of the board of the county office of mental health and
retardation, may not be sued for back pay under the Eleventh Amendment). We need not decide this issue in light of our disposition above.
23
On the Fourteenth Amendment issue, the court should consider
Youngberg v. Romeo,- U. S . - (1982), a decision that was not available when the District Court issued its decision.
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the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights
Act, 42 U. S. C. §§ 6011, 6063. The judgment of the Court
of Appeals is reversed, and the case remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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PENNHURST STATE SCHOOL & HOSPITAL ET AL.,
PETITIONERS v. TERRI LEE HALDERMAN ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
[January-, 1984]

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether a federal court
may award injunctive relief against state officials on the basis
of state law.
I
This litigation, here for the second time, concerns the conditions of care at petitioner Pennhurst State School and Hospital, a Pennsylvania institution for the care of the mentally
retarded. See Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1 (1981). Although the litigation's history is set forth in detail in our prior opinion, see id., at 5-10,
it is necessary for purposes of this decision to review that
history.
This suit originally was brought in 1974 by respondent
Terri Lee Halderman, a resident of Pennhurst, in the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Ultimately, plaintiffs included a class consisting of all persons
who were or might become residents of Pennhurst; the Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Citizens (P ARC); and the
United States. Defendants were Pennhurst and various
Pennhurst officials; the Pennsylvania Department of Public
Welfare and several of its officials; and various county commissioners, county mental retardation administrators, and
other officials of five Pennsylvania counties surrounding
Pennhurst. Respondents' amended complaint charged that
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conditions at Pennhurst violated the class members' rights
under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 87 Stat. 394, as amended, 29
U. S. C. § 794 (1976 ed. and Supp. V); the Developmentally
Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U. S. C.
§§ 6001-6081 (1976 ed. and Supp. V); and the Pennsylvania
Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966 (the
"MH/MR Act"), Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 50, §§ 4101-4704
(Purdon 1969 and Supp. 1982). Both damages and injunctive
relief were sought.
In 1977, following a lengthy trial, the District Court rendered its decision. 446 F. Supp. 1295 (1977). As noted in
our prior opinion, the court's findings were undisputed: "Conditions at Pennhurst are not only dangerous, with the residents often physically abused or drugged by staff members,
but also inadequate for the 'habilitation' of the retarded. Indeed, the court found that the physicial, intellectual, and
emotional skills of some residents have deteriorated at
Pennhurst." 451 U. S., at 7 (footnote omitted). The District Court held that these conditions violated each resident's
right to "minimally adequate habilitation" under the Due
Process Clause and the MH/MR Act, see 446 F. Supp., at
1314-1318, 1322-1323; "freedom from harm" under the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, see id., at 1320-1321;
and "nondiscriminatory habilitation" under the Equal Protection Clause and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, see id., at
1321-1324. Furthermore, the court found that "due process
demands that if a state undertakes the habilitation of a retarded person, it must do so in the least restrictive setting
consistent with that individual's habilitative needs." Id., at
1319 (emphasis added). After concluding that the large size
of Pennhurst prevented it from providing the necessary
habilitation in the least restrictive environment, the court ordered "that immediate steps be taken to remove the retarded
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residents from Pennhurst." I d., at 1325. Petitioners were
ordered "to provide suitable community living arrangements" for the class members, id., at 1326, and the court appointed a Special Master "with the power and duty to plan,
organize, direct, supervise and monitor the implementation
of this and any further Orders of the Court." Ibid. 1
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed most
of the District Court's judgment. 612 F. 2d 84 (1979) (en
bane). It agreed that respondents had a right to habilitation
in the least restrictive environment, but it grounded this
right solely on the "bill of rights" provision in the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42
U. S. C. § 6010. See 612 F. 2d, at 95-100, 104-107. The
court did not consider the constitutional issues or § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act, and while it affirmed the District Court's
holding that the MH/MR Act provides a right to adequate
habilitation, see id., at 100-103, the court did not decide
whether that state right encompassed a right to treatment in
the least restrictive setting.
On the question of remedy, the Court of Appeals affirmed
except as to the District Court's order that Pennhurst be
closed. The court observed that some patients would be
unable to adjust to life outside an institution, and it determined that none of the legal provisions relied on by plaintiffs
precluded institutionalization. I d., at 114-115. It therefore
remanded for "individual determinations by the [District
Court], or by the Special Master, as to the appropriateness of
an improved Pennhurst for each such patient," guided by "a
presumption in favor of placing individuals in [community living arrangements]." Ibid. 2
1
The District Court determined that the individual defendants had acted
in good faith and therefore were immune from the damage claims. 446 F.
Supp., at 1324.
2
In a companion case, the Court of Appeals affirmed the District
Court's denial of the Pennhurst Parents-Staff Association's motion to intervene for purposes of appeal, finding the denial harmless error. See 612
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On remand the District Court established detailed procedures for determining the proper residential placement for
each patient. A team consisting of the patient, his parents
or guardian, and his case manager must establish an individual habilitation plan providing for habilitation of the patient
in a designated community living arrangement. The plan is
subject to review by the Special Master. A second master,
called the Hearing Master, is available to conduct hearings,
upon request by the resident, his parents or his advocate, on
the question whether the services of Pennhurst would be
more beneficial to the resident than the community living arrangement provided in the resident's plan. The Hearing
Master then determines where the patient should reside,
subject to possible review by the District Court. See App.
123a-134a (Order of April 24, 1980). 3
This Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals,
finding that 42 U. S. C. § 6010 did not create any substantive
rights. 451 U. S. 1 (1981). We remanded the case to the
Court of Appeals to determine if the remedial order could be
supported on the basis of state law, the Constitution, or§ 504
of the Rehabilitation Act. See id., at 31. 4 We also reF. 2d 131 (1979) (en bane). The Association subsequently was granted
leave to intervene and is a petitioner in this Court.
3
On July 1, 1981, Pennsylvania enacted an appropriations bill providing
that only $35,000 would be paid for the Masters' expenses for the fiscal
year July 1981 to June 1982. The District Court held the Pennsylvania
Department of Public Welfare and its Secretary in contempt, and imposed
a fine of $10,000 per day. Pennsylvania paid the fines, and the contempt
was purged on January 8, 1982. On appeal the Court of Appeals affirmed
the contempt order. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hospital,
673 F . 2d 628 (1982), cert. pending, No. 81-2363.
' Three Justices dissented from the Court's construction of the Act, but
concluded that the District Court should not have adopted the "far-reaching remedy'' of appointing "a Special Master to decide which of the Pennhurst inmates should remain and which should be moved to communitybased facilities. . . . [T]he court should not have assumed the task of
managing Pennhurst.... " 451 U. S., at 54 (WHITE J., dissenting in
part).
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manded for consideration of whether any relief was available
under other provisions of the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act. See id., at 27-30 (discussing
42 U. S. C. §§ 6011(a), 6063(b)(5)).
On remand the Court of Appeals affirmed its prior judgment in its entirety. 673 F. 2d 647 (1982) (en bane). It determined that in a recent decision the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania had "spoken definitively" in holding that the
MH/MR Act required the State to adopt the "least restrictive
environment" approach for the care of the mentally retarded.
Id., at 651 (citing In re Schmidt, 494 Pa. 86, 429 A. 2d 631
(1981)). The Court of Appeals concluded that this state statute fully supported its prior judgment, and therefore did not
reach the remaining issues of federal law. It also rejected
petitioners' argument that the Eleventh Amendment barred
a federal court from considering this pendent state-law claim.
The court noted that the Amendment did not bar a federal
court from granting prospective injunctive relief against
state officials on the basis of federal claims, see 673 F. 2d, at
656 (citing Ex Parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908)), and concluded that the same result obtained with respect to a
'pendent state-law claim. It reasoned that because Siler v.
Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 213 U. S. 175 (1909), an important case in the development of the doctrine of pendent
jurisdiction, also involved state officials, "there cannot be ...
an Eleventh Amendment exception to that rule." 673 F. 2d,
at 658. 5 Finally, the court rejected petitioners' argument
that it should have abstained from deciding the state-law
claim under principles of comity, see id., at 659-660, andrefused to consider petitioners' objections to the District
' The Court of Appeals also noted that "the United States is an intervening plaintiff . .. against which even the state itself cannot successfully
plead the Eleventh Amendment as a bar to jurisdiction," and that "the
counties, even as juridical entities, do not fall within the coverage of the
Eleventh Amendment. Against those defendants even money damages
may be awarded." 673 F. 2d, at 656 (citation omitted).
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Court's use of a special master, see id., at 651 and n. 10.
Three judges dissented in part, arguing that under principles
of federalism and comity the establishment of a special master to supervise compliance was an abuse of discretion. See
id., at 662 (Seitz, C. J., joined by Hunter, J., dissenting in
part); ibid. (Garth, J., concurring in part and dissenting as to
relief). See also id., at 661 (Aldisert, J., concurring) (seriously questioning the propriety of the order appointing the
Special Master, but concluding that a retroactive reversal of
that order would be meaningless). 6
We granted certiorari, 457 U. S. 1131 (1982), and now reverse and remand.
II
Petitioners raise three challenges to the judgment of the
Court of Appeals: (i) the Eleventh Amendment prohibited
the District Court from ordering state officials to conform
their conduct to state law; (ii) the doctrine of comity prohibited the District Court from issuing its injunctive relief; and
(iii) the District Court abused its discretion in appointing two
masters to supervise the decisions of state officials in implementing state law. We need not reach the latter two issues,
for we find the Eleventh Amendment challenge dispositive.
A

Article III, § 2 of the Constitution provides that the federal
judicial power extends, inter alia, to controversies."between
a State and Citizens of another State." Relying on this language, this Court in 1793 assumed original jurisdiction over a
suit brought by a citizen of South Carolina against the State
of Georgia. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419 (1793). The
decision "created such a shock of surprise that the Eleventh
Amendment was at once proposed and adopted." Monaco v.
• The Office of the Special Master was abolished in December 1982.
See App. 220a (Order of August 12, 1982). The Hearing Master remains
in operation.

81-2101-0PINION
PENNHURST STATE SCHOOL & HOSP. v. HALDERMAN

7

Mississippi, 292 U. S. 313, 325 (1934). The Amendment
provides:
"The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States
by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects
of any Foreign State."
The Amendment's language overruled the particular result
in Chisholm, but this Court has recognized that its greater
significance lies in its affirmation that the fundamental principle of sovereign immunity limits the grant of judicial authority in Art. III. Thus, in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1
(1890), the Court held that, despite the limited terms of the
Eleventh Amendment, a federal court could not entertain a
suit brought by a citizen against his own State. After reviewing the constitutional debates concerning the scope of
Art. III, the Court determined that federal jurisdiction over
suits against unconsenting States "was not contemplated by
the Constitution when establishing the judicial power of the
United States." ld., at 15. See Monaco v. Mississippi,
supra, at 322-323 (1934). 7 In short, the principle of sovereign immunity is a constitutional limitation on the federal judicial power established in Art. III:
"That a State may not be sued without its consent is a
fundamental rule of jurisprudence having so important a
bearing upon the construction of the Constitution of the
United States that it has become established by repeated
decisions of this court that the entire judicial power
granted by the Constitution does not embrace authority
7
See Employees v. Missouri Public Health Dep't, 411 U.S. 279,
291-292 (1973) (MARSHALL, J., concurring in judgment) (The Eleventh
Amendment "clarif[ied] the intent of the Framers concerning the reach of
federal judicial power" and "restore[d] the original understanding" that
States could not be made unwilling defendants in federal court). See also
Nevada v. Hall, 440 U. S. 410, 430-431 (1979) (BLACKMUN, J ., dissenting);
id., at 437 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting).
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to entertain a suit brought by private parties against a
State without consent given: not one brought by citizens
of another State, or by citizens or subjects of a foreign
State, because of the Eleventh Amendment; and not
even one brought by its own citizens, because of the fundamental rule of which the Amendment is but an exemplification." Ex parte State of New York No. 1, 256
U. S. 490, 497 (1921) (emphasis added). 8
A sovereign's immunity may be waived, and the Court consistently has held that a State may consent to suit against it
in federal court. See, e. g., Clark v. Barnard, 108 U. S.
436, 447 (1883). We have insisted, however, that the State's
consent be unequivocally expressed. See, e. g., Edelman v.
Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 673 (1974). Similarly, although Congress has power with respect to the rights protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment immunity, see Fitzpatrick v. Bitker, 427 U. S. 445
(1976), we have required an unequivocal expression of congressional intent to "overturn the constitutionally guaranteed immunity of the several States." Quern v. Jordan, 440
U. S. 332, 342 (1979) (holding that 42 U. S. C. § 1983 does not
override States' Eleventh Amendment immunity). Our reluctance to infer that a State's immunity from suit in the federal courts has been negated stems from recognition of the
vital role of the doctrine of sovereign immunity in our federal
system. A State's constitutional interest in immunity encompasses not merely whether it may be sued, but where it
The limitation deprives federal courts of any jurisdiction to entertain
such claims, and thus may be raised at any point in a proceeding. "The
Eleventh Amendment declares a policy and sets forth an explicit limitation
on federal judicial power of such compelling force that this Court will consider the issue arising under this Amendment ... even though urged for
the first time in this Court." Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury,
8

323

u. s. 459, 467 (1945).
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may be sued. 9 As JUSTICE MARSHALL well has noted, "[b]ecause of the problems of federalism inherent in making one
sovereign appear against its will in the courts of the other, a
restriction upon the exercise of the federal judicial power has
long been considered to be appropriate in a case such as this."
Employees v. Missouri Public Health & Welfare Dep't, 411
U. S. 279, 294 (1973) (MARSHALL, J., concurring in result). 10
Accordingly, in deciding this case we must be guided by
"[t]he principles of federalism that inform Eleventh Amendment doctrine." Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678, 691 (1978).
B
This Court's decisions thus establish that "an unconsenting
State is immune from suits brought in federal courts by her
own citizens as well as by citizens of another state." Employees, supra, at 280. There may be a question, however,
whether a particular suit in fact is a suit against a State. It
is clear, of course, that in the absence of consent a suit in
which the State or one of its agencies or departments is
named as the defendant is proscribed by the Eleventh
9
For this reason, the Court consistently has held that a State's waiver
of sovereign immunity in its own courts is not a waiver of the Eleventh
Amendment immunity in the federal courts. See, e. g., Florida Department of HeaJth v. Florida Nursing Home Assn., 450 U. S. 147, 150 (1981)
(per curiam). "[l]t is not consonant with our dual system for the federal
courts . . . to read the consent to embrace federal as well as state
courts. . .. [A] clear declaration of the state's intention to submit its fiscal
problems to other courts than those of its own creation must be found."
Great Northern Life Insurance Co. v. Read, 322 U. S. 47, 54 (1944). •
10
See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U. S., at 418-419 (States were "vitally interested" in whether they would be subject to suit in the federal courts, and
the debates about state immunity focused on the question of federal judicial
power). Cf. id., at 430-431 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting) (sovereign immunity is "a guarantee that is implied as an essential component of federalism"
and is "sufficiently fundamental to our federal structure to have implicit
constitutional dimension"); id., at 437 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting) ("[T]he
States that ratified the Eleventh Amendment thought that they were putting an end to the possibility of individual States as unconsenting defendants in foreign jurisdictions").
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Amendment. See, e. g., Florida Department of Health v.
Florida Nursing Home Assn., 450 U. S. 147 (1981) (per
curiam); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U. S. 781 (1978) (per
curiam). This jurisdictional bar applies regardless of the
nature of the relief sought. See, e. g., Missouri v. Fiske,
290 U. S. 18, 27 (1933) ("Expressly applying to suits in equity
as well as at law, the Amendment necessarily embraces demands for the enforcement of equitable rights and the prosecution of equitable remedies when these are asserted and
prosecuted by an individual against a State").
When the suit is brought only against state officials, a
question arises as to whether that suit is a suit against the
State itself. Although prior decisions of this Court have not
been entirely consistent on this issue, certain principles are
well established. The Eleventh Amendment bars a suit
against state officials when "the state is the real, substantial
party in interest." Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U. S. 459, 464 (1945). See, e. g., In re Ayers, 123
U. S. 443, 487-492 (1887); Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U. S.
711, 720-723, 727-728 (1882). Thus, "[t]he general rule is
that relief sought nominally against an officer is in fact
against the sovereign if the decree would operate against the
latter." Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U. S. 57, 58 (1963) (per
curiam). 11 And, as when the State itself is named as the de11
"The general rule is that a suit is against the sovereign if 'the judgment
sought would expend itself on the public treasury or domain, or interfere
with the public administration,' or if the effect of the judgment would be 'to
restrain the Government from acting, or to compel it to act.'" Dugan v.
Rank , 372 U. S. 609, 620 (1963) (citations omitted).
Respondents do not dispute that the relief sought and awarded below operated against the state in each of the foregoing respects. They suggest,
however, that the suit here should not be considered to be against the state
for the purposes of the Eleventh Amendment because, they say, petitioners were acting ultra vires their authority. Respondents rely largely on
Florida Dep't of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc ., 458 U. S.
(1982),
which in turn was founded upon Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce
Corp., 337 U. S. 682 (1949). These cases provide no support for this argu-

+
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fendant, a suit against state officials that is in fact a suit
against a State is barred regardless of whether it seeks damages or injunctive relief. See Cory v. White, 457 U. S. 85,
91 (1982).
The Court has recognized an important exception to this
general rule: a suit challenging the constitutionality of a state
official's action is not one against the State. This was the
holding in Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908), in which a
federal court enjoined the Attorney General of the State of
Minnesota from bringing suit to enforce a state statute that
allegedly violated the Fourteenth Amendment. This Court
held that the Eleventh Amendment did not prohibit issuance
of this injunction. The theory of the case was that an unconstitutional enactment is "void" and therefore does not "impart to [the officer] any immunity from responsibility to the
supreme authority of the United States." !d., at 160. Since
the State could not authorize the action, the officer was
"stripped of his official or representative character and [was]
subjected to the consequences of his official conduct." Ibid.
While the rule permitting suits alleging conduct contrary
to "the supreme authority of the United States" has survived, the theory of Young has not been provided an expansive interpretation. Thus, in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S.
ment. These and other modern cases make clear that a state officer may
be said to act ultra vires only when he acts "without any authority what61?ever." Treasure Salvors, supra, at 7- (opinion of STEVENS, J.); accord
id., at~ (WHITE, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in
~{ 6
part) (test is whether there was no "colorable basis for the exercise of authority by state officials"). As the Court in Larson explained, an ultra
vires claim rests on "the officer's lack of delegated power. A claim of error
in the exercise of that power is therefore not sufficient." Larson, supra,
at 690. Petitioners' actions in operating this mental health institution
plainly were not beyond their delegated authority in this sense. ~ ]
Mtf!MR.. ~~~ gave them broad discretion to provide "adequate" mental
"'feaib'i'"semces. Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 50, § 4201(1) (Purdon 1969). The essence of respondents' claim is that petitioners have not provided such serv- _A
ices adequately.
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651 (1974), the Court emphasized that the Eleventh Amendment bars some forms of injunctive relief against state officials for violation of federal law. Id., at 666-667. In particular, Edelman held that when a plaintiff sues a state
official alleging a violation of federal law, the federal court
may award an injunction that governs the official's future
conduct, but not one that awards retroactive monetary relief.
Under the theory of Young, such a suit would not be one
against the State since the federal-law allegation would strip
the state officer of his official authority. Nevertheless, retroactive relief was barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

III
With these principles in mind, we now turn to the question
whether the claim that petitioners violated state law in carrying out their official duties at Pennhurst is one against the
State and therefore barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
Respondents advance two principal arguments in support of
the judgment below. 12 First, they contend that under the
We reject respondents' additional contention that Pennsylvania has
waived its immunity from suit in federal court. At the time the suit was
filed, suits against Pennsylvania were permitted only where expressly authorized by the legislature, see, e. g., Freach v. Commonwealth, 471 Pa.
558, 370 A. 2d 1163 (1977), and respondents have not referred us to any
provision expressly waiving Pennsylvania's Eleventh Amendment immunity. The State now has a statute governing sovereign immunity, including an express preservation of its immunity from suit in federal court:
"Federal courts.-Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be construed
to waive the immunity of the Commonwealth from suit in Federal courts
guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States." 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8521(b) (1980).
We also do not agree with respondents that the presence of the United
States as a plaintiff in this case removes the Eleventh Amendment from
consideration. Although the Eleventh Amendment does not bar the
United States from suing a State in federal court, see, e. g., Monaco v.
Mississippi, 292 U. S. 313, 329 (1934), the United States' presence in the
case for any purpose does not eliminate the State's immunity for all purposes. For example, the fact that the federal court could award injunctive
relief to the United States on federal constitutional claims would not mean
12
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doctrine of Edelman v. Jordan, supra, the suit is not against
the State because the courts below ordered only prospective
injunctive relief. Second, they assert that the state-law
claim properly was decided under the doctrine of pendent
jurisdiction. Respondents rely on decisions of this Court
awarding relief against state officials on the basis of a pendent state-law claim. See, e. g., Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 213 U. S. 175, 193 (1909).
A
We first address the contention that respondents' state-law
claim is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment because it
seeks only prospective relief as defined in Edelman v. Jordan, supra. The Court of Appeals held that if the judgment
below rested on federal law, it could be entered against petitioner state officials under the doctrine established in Edelman and Young even though the prospective financial burden
was substantial and ongoing. 13 See 673 F. 2d, at 656. The
court assumed, and respondents assert, that this reasoning
applies as well when the official acts in violation of state law.
This argument misconstrues the basis of the doctrine established in Young and Edelman.
As discussed above, the injunction in Young was justified,
notwithstanding the obvious impact on the State itself, on the
that the court could order the State to pay damages to other plaintiffs. In
any case, we think it clear that the United States does not have standing to
assert the state-law claims of third-parties. For these reasons, the applicability of the Eleventh Amendment to respondents' state-law claim is
unaffected by the United States' participation in the case.
13
We do not decide whether the District Court would have jurisdiction
under this reasoning to grant prospective relief on the basis of federal law,
but we note that the scope of any such relief would be constrained by principles of comity and federalism. "Where, as here, the exercise of authority by state officials is attacked, federal courts must be constantly mindful
of the 'special delicacy of the adjustment to be preserved between federal
equitable power and State administration of its own law."' Rizzo v.
Goode, 423 U. S. 362, 378 (1976) (quoting Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U. S.
117, 120 (1951)).
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view that sovereign immunity does not apply because an official who acts unconstitutionally is "stripped of his official or
representative character," Young, 209 U. S., at 160. This
rationale, of course, created the "well-recognized irony" that
an official's unconstitutional conduct constitutes state action
under the Fourteenth Amendment but not the Eleventh
Amendment. Florida Department of State v. Treasure
Salvors, Inc., -rr- U. S. -r--, --/+ (1982) (opinion of STEVENS, J.). Nonetheless, the Young doctrine has been accepted as necessary to permit the federal courts to vindicate
federal rights and hold state officials responsible to "the supreme authority of the United States." Young, 209 U. S.,
at 160. As JUSTICE BRENNAN has observed, "Ex parte
Young was the culmination of efforts by this Court to harmonize the principles of the Eleventh Amendment with the effective supremacy of rights and powers secured elsewhere in
the Constitution." Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U. S. 82, 106
(1971) (BRENNAN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Our decisions repeatedly have emphasized that the
Young doctrine rests on the need to promote the vindication
of federal rights. See, e. g., Quern v. Jordan, 440 U. S.
332, 337 (1979); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232, 237 (1974);
Georgia R. & Banking Co. v. Redwine, 342 U. S. 299, 304
(1952).
The Court also has recognized, however, that the need to
promote the supremacy of federal law must be accommodated
to the constitutional immunity of the States. This is the significance of Edelman v. Jordan, supra. We recognized that
the prospective relief authorized by Young "has permitted
the Civil War Amendments to the Constitution to serve as a
sword, rather than merely a shield, for those whom they
were designed to protect." 415 U. S., at 664. But we declined to extend ~ev~i9J1 s>! Young to encompass retroactive relief, for to do so would effectively eliminate the constitutional immunity of the States.
Accordingly, we
concluded that although the difference between permissible

r
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and impermissible relief "will not in many instances be that
between day and night," id., at 667, an award of retroactive
relief necessarily" 'fall[s] afoul of the Eleventh Amendment if
that basic constitutional provision is to be conceived of as
having any present force."' !d., at 665 (quoting Rothstein v.
Wyman, 467 F. 2d 226, 237 (CA21972) (McGowan, J., sitting
by designation), cert. denied, 411 U. S. 921 (1973)). In sum
Edelman's distinction between prospective and retroactive
relief fulfills the underlying purpose of Ex parte Young while
at the same time preserving to an important degree the constitutional immunity of the States.
This need to reconcile competing interests is wholly absent, however, when a plaintiff alleges that a state official has
violated state law. In such a case the entire basis for the
doctrine of Young and Edelman disappears. A federal
court's grant of relief against state officials on the basis of
state law, whether prospective or retroactive, does not vindicate the supreme authority of federal law. On the contrary,
it is difficult to think of a greater intrusion on state sovereignty than when a federal court instructs state officials on
how to conform their conduct to state law. Such a result
conflicts directly with the principles of federalism that underlie the Eleventh Amendment. We conclude that Young and
Edelman are inapplicable in a suit against state officials on
the basis of state law. 1\
~
The contrary view of the dissent rests on fiction, is wrong
-: ,.
on the law, and, most important, would emasculate the Eleventh Amendment. 14 Under its view, an allegation that official conduct is contrary to a state statute would suffice to
override the State's protection under that Amendment. The
theory is that such conduct is contrary to the official's "in- I
structions," and thus ultra vires his authority. [Under this ..A
A c. q' ,...J_; .. ~ 1/ J
~

1\

•• We are prompted to respond at some length to JUSTICE STEVENS' 38page dissent in part by his broad c~e that "the Court blithely overrules
at least 29 cases," post, at 1. Th~decisions the dissent @ij.es simply do
not support this sweeping characterization.
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J

theory official action based on a reasonable interpretation of
any statute might, if the interpretation turned out to be erroneous, 15 provide the basis for injunctive relief against the actors in their official capacities. In this case, where officials
of a major state department, clearly acting within the scope
of their authority, were found not to have improved conditions in a state institution adequately, the dissent's result
would be that the State itself has forfe:filid its constitutionally
provided immunity.
The theory is out of touch with reality. The dissent does
not dispute that the general criterion for determining when a
suit is in fact against the sovereign is the effect of the relief
sought. See supra, at 10; post, at 19, n. 28. {"T? suggest, as
he dissent does, that the relief sought and ordered herewhich in effect was that a major state institution be closed
and smaller state institutions be created and expansively
funded-did not operate against the Stat~would make the
law a pretense. I No other court or judge in the ten-year history of this liTigation has advanced this theory. And the dissent's ~YJ view that the named defendants here were
acting bey'6'nd and contrary to their authority cannot be reconcl e
"th the record. The District Court in this case held
that the individual defendants "acted in the utmost good faith
... within the sphere of their official responsibilities," and
therefore were entitled to immunity from damages. 446 F.
Supp., at 1324 (emphasis added). The named defendants
had nothing to gain personally from their conduct; they were
not found to have acted wilfully or even negligently. See
ibid. The court expressly noted that the individual defendants "apparently took every means available to them to reduce the incidents of abuse and injury, but were constantly
faced with staff shortages." Ibid. It also found "that the
In this case, for example, the court below rested its finding that state
law required habilitation in the least restrictive environment on dicta in In
re Schmidt, 494 Pa. 86, 429 A. 2d 631 (1981). That decision was not issued
until seven years after this suit was filed, and four years after trial ended.
15
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individual defendants are dedicated professionals in the field
of retardation who were given very little with which to accom lish the habilitation of the retarded at Pennhurst."
Ibid. 16 To the extent there was a violation of state law in this
case, it is a case of the State itself not fulfillin its le ·slative
· s. As a result, all the relief ordered by the cou s
_ .~
elow was institutional and official in character. 1
e disse~~"on numerou~ cases from fie turn of the :_.~.. . . . _ ;; ~ + ,:r Y"t r~ J.,.
century and earlier.' These cas~s7do not provide the support
-,.... ~
the dissent claims to find. Many are simply miscited. For
~- ~
example, with perhaps one exception, 17 none of its Eleventh
......._...(

his part of the court's judgment w not a ealed. See 612 F. 2d, at
·---~ See also
. upp., at 1303 ("On the whole, e s a
enn urst appears to be dedicated and trJing hard to cope with the inadeuacies of the institution").
e parties defendant m this suit were not all individuals. They included as well the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare, a major department of the State itself; and the Pennhurst State School and Hospital,
a state institution. The dissent apparently is arguing that the defendants
as a group-including both the state institutions, and state and county officials-were acting ultra vires. Since the institutions were only said to
have violated the law through the individual defendants, the District
Court's findings, never since questioned by any court, plainly exonerate all
the defendants from the dissent's claim that they acted beyond the scope of
their authority.
A truth of which the dissent's theoretical argument seems unaware is the
plight of many if not most of the mental institutions in our country. As the
District Court in this case found, "History is replete with misunderstanding and mistreatment of the retarded." 446 F. Supp., at 1299. It is common knowledge that "insane asylums," as they were known until the middle of this century, usually were underfunded and understaffed. It is not
easy to persuade competent people to work in these institutions, particularly well trained professionals. Physical facilities , due to consistent
underfunding by state legislatures, have been grossly inadequate-€specially in li ht of advanced knowledge and techniques for the treatment of
e mentally ill. 1\ Only recently have States commenced to move to correct
widespread deplorable conditions. The responsibility, as the District
Court recognized after a protracted trial, has rested on the State itself.
17
See Rolston v. Missouri Fund Commissioners, 120 U. S. 391 (1887) .
.j'n:It 11ee n. 19, irtji(J;. J.,. R(Jisfl!"' 1 ho\.N'E.n~ the.. .sm+-«..
16

~~c.

r(I.Ytt II~

P...-e s;;Je.VI t's Gw- M~ o ..
MLVI~ I a.Q. tf1.V tiu. t1,..) C~o.."'~·· ""4 Po.:t\~.va-..1

i ....

Rt.-{IJ-.4~ tiAI St..vvi c. ~A~ ~~ f1~._.-n,Ll1

~t-tf..V'J.tJ

0-f'~t(.ic..ll

(c

rio.~"'

1- ) 9
~-< .,~,_t & W.

w, I (._.,.J
R5'--

bt..-'1l-Y

1

<Jf) .

ork.,._,J_

V\t\; ... ;s+-<-,..;~1

\"-.Sutf(.vV\CL

Sc. ~u. ..-~ l:>£v~~j

A 1-l-".(~"J
I( e.. f'O.. ....J.. rA-ticM
(I,

~.-t. 1''1'7)i

vv~vL.

t1 e,. .... +-AI

( l'flf 'f) /

I.~(). 2'1]

I\'\~.

G. .

II.

+-&

Jv+'cr , ··
((~fA~<..V"''d-

~ft~

.r.ee..

J

~ ~f

wif-'~

Gve..4-+

,,Cl.

NQ"Y+t-.._ ......

u.s.
C()..S£.,

5.e.e.

Yl ,

I Of,

81-2101-0PINION
PENNHURST STATE SCHOOL & HOSP. v. HALDERMAN

18

Amendment cases can be said to hold that injunctive relief
J.
could be ordered against State officials for failing to carry out_y
their duties under State statutes. 18 More~v~ the a:aalegGYi~ AM
federal sovereign immunity cases the dissent relies Olk while
far from uniform, make clear that suit may not be prea';";Ic~aT.£e~a:r------on violations of state statutes that command purely discretionary duties. 19 Since it cannot be doubted that the stat18

The cases are~ in footnote 48 of the dissent, post, at 37. Several of
the cases do not rest on an Eleventh Amendment holding at all. For example, federal jurisdiction in fact was held to be lacking in Martin v.
Lankford, 245 U. S. 547 (1915), because of lack of diversity. A fair reading of South Carolina v. Wesley, 155 U. S. 542 (1895), and the cases it
cites, makes clear that the ruling there was on the purely procedural point
that the party raising the jurisdictional objection was not a party to the
proceeding. In two other cases the allegation was that a state officer or
agency had acted unconstitutionally, rather than merely contrary to state
law. Atchison, T. & S .F .R . Co. v. O'Connor, 223 U. S. 280 (1897); Hopkins v. Clemson Agricultural College, 221 U. S. 636 (1911). In Johnson
v. Lankford, 245 U. S. 541 (1918), the relief sought was not injunctive relief but money damages against the individual officer. See infra n. 20.
None of these cases can be said to be overruled by our holding today. As
noted infra, at A6-~7, the Greene cases do not discuss the Eleventh
Amendment in connection with the state-law claim.
Tindal v. Wesley, 167 U. S. 204 (1897), and Scully v. Bird, 209 U. S. 481
(1908), are more closely analogous cases. In both of these old cases, however, the allegation was that the defendants had committed common law
torts, not, as here, that they had failed to carry out affirmative duties assigned to them by statute. See Tindal, supra, at 221 (distinguishing suits
brought "to enforce the discharge by the defendants of any specific duty
enjoined by the State"); Transcript of Record, Tindal v. Wesley 3 (complaint alleged that defendants had "wrongfully entered into said premises
and ousted the plaintiff ... to the damage of the plaintiff ten thousand dollars"); Scully, supra, at 483 (allegation was that defendant had "injuriously
affect[ed] the reputation and sale of [plaintiff's] products"). Tort cases
such as these were explicitly overruled in Larson v. Domestic & Foreign
Commerce Corp., 337 U. S. 682 (1949). See infra, at ~ - t r·
19
See, e. g., Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U. S. 605, 620 (1912) ("The
complainant did not ask the court to interfere with the official discretion of
the Secretary of War, but challenged his authority to do the things of
which complaint was made."); Santa Fe P.R. Co . v. Fall, 259 U. S. 197,
198-199 (1922) (same); Noble v. Union River Logging R ., 147 U. S. 165

C .. flee
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utes at issue here gave petitioners broad discretion in operating Pennhurst, see n. 11, supra; see also 446 F. Supp., at
1324, the conduct alleged in this case would not be ultra vires
even under the standards of the dissent's cases. 20
171-172 (1893) (same); see also Kendall v. Stokes, 3 How. 87, 98 (1845)
("[A] public officer is not liable to an action if he falls into error in a case
where the act to be done is not merely a ministerial one, but is one in relation to which it is his duty to exercise judgment and discretion; even although an individual may suffer by his mistake."); Belknap v. Schild, 161
U. S. 10, 18 (1896) (under Eleventh Amendment, injunctive relief is permitted where officer commits a tort that is "contrary to a plain official duty
requiring no exercise of discretion"); Wells v. Rope:r, 246 U. S. 335, 338
(1918); Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U. S. 682, 715
(1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (noting discretionary-ministerial duty
distinction in sovereign immunity cases). The opinions make clear that
the question of discretion went to sovereign immunity, and not to the
court's mandamus powers generally. See, e. g., Stimson, supra, at
618--620. The rationale appears to be that discretionary duties have a
greater impact on the sovereign because they "brin[g] the operation of governmental machinery into play." Larson, supra, at 715 (Frankfurter, J.
dissenting).
R son, the on
whicn ·
ght e
cials n t
asis of
pi n mi · terr
. s. ' 51 (1944).
20
In any event, as with the Eleventh Amendment cases, see n. 18, supra,
the dissent also is wrong to say that the federal sovereign immunity cases
it cites post, at 37, n. 48, are today overruled. At le8B~'Ie of them were
actions for damages in tort against the individual officer. Little v.
Barreme, 2 Cranch 170 (1804); Wise v. Withe:rs, 3 Cranch 331 (1806); Mitchell v. Harmony, 13 How. 115 (1851); Bates v. Clark, 95 U. S. 204 (1877);
Belknap v. Schild, 161 U. S. 10 (1896). In Belknap the Court drew a
careful distinction between such actions and suits in which the relief would
run more directly against the State. I d., at 18. The Court disallowed
injunctive relief against the officers on this basis. Id., at 23-25. Nothing
in our opinion touches these cases. Cf. Larson v. Domestic & Foreign
Commerce Corp., 337 U. S. 682, 687-4>88, and nn. 7, 8 (1949) (whether
damages might be awarded against individual government officers was not
at issue).
4'he othet five ease! rue difficult to elassify, CGRl.p~re id, lit 61H , fl. 12,

M

4--
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Thus, while there is language in the early cases that advances the authority-stripping theory advocated by the dissent, this theory ha)\ never been pressed as far as the dissent
would do in this case.
when the expansive approach
e
1ssen
advanced,
t 1s ourt plainly an ex.---'---plicit y
rejecte 1t. n arson v. ames tc
ore'L{Jn
Commerce Corp., 337 U. S. 682 (1949), the Court was faced
with the argument that an allegation that a government official committed a tort sufficed to distinguish the official from
the sovereign. Therefore, the argument went, a suit for an
injunction to remedy the injury would not be against the sovereign. The Court rejected the argument, noting that it
would make the doctrine of sovereign immunity superfluous.
A plaintiff would need only to "claim an invasion of his legal
rights" in order to override sovereign immunity. I d., at 693.
In the Court's view, the argument "confuse[d] the doctrine of
sovereign immunity with the requirement that a plaintiff
state a cause of action." !d., at 692-693. The dissent's the21
ory
Under the dissent's view,
~

69S, n. ~1, 599=766, '1'6~, 11. 25 (classtfy'!ng th:sna~e~ ~s ~:~allellg:illg actieRs
. taiEeR iR exee:5:5 of statutmy authority), with id:, at 731 '1'32 (Flankfurier,
~
J. , eli~~enting) (classifying these as taPii ease~). There is language i~
~
m
,..,..a~
st_ __
~ that suggests they were actions alleging torts, not statutory Vfolations. See Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U. S. 605, 623 (1912); Sloan
Shipyards v. U.S. Fleet Corp., 258 U.S. 549, 568 (1922); Land v. Dollar,
330 U. S. 731, 736 (1947). The remainder clearly distinguish cases (like
the present one) involving statutes that command discretionary duties.
See n. 19, supra. In any case, the Court in Larson explicitly limited the
precedential value of all of these cases. See Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U. S.
643, 646, and n. 6 (1962).
21
In fact, as the dissent
, the argument in Larson that an allegation o o wus activity ov rrides sovereign immunity is essentially the
same as the dissent's argument that an allegation of conduct contrary to
statute overrides sovereign immunity. See post, at 30. ~~Q :u1weP ift
~-1~fi=ej~;=;e=bt;;;;;;;e:61ffli·~H~fiit~he defendant state official was
empowered to do what he did, i. e., ¥even if he acted erroneously; it was
action within the scope of his authority. See Larson, 337 U. S., at 685
(controversy on merits concerned whether officer had interpreted govern-

~
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a plaintiff would need only to claim a denial of rights protected or provided by statute in order to override sovereign
immunity. ~cases it would make the constitutional
doctrine of sovereign immunity a nullity.
ba1-s6n identified the the61"!J eH 'Nhieh the d:i~~ent's aPgu ..-R~eHt ii baiQQ, q;'he them y is that "[a] sovereign,
e any
Tt. e.. c.~vc.,"a. f
other principal, cannot authorize its agent to violate the law,"
de. YJte"'t u1 rl..tso that when the agent does so he cannot be acting for the
dt'JitVtf'r ~l.e. o v1
sovereign. Post, at 25-26; see also post, at 15, 21, 30; cf.
(..ti(Lt
(i../ Jo +-/,..L
Larson, supra, at 693-694 ("It is argued ... that the commission of a tort cannot be authorized by the sovereign. . . .
f !t... ;#1 .,.,·.f+'s ct.,.~y~{
It is on this contention that the respondent's position funda~ re-k ntM
,·I-t
mentally rests .... "). It is a view of agency law that the
22
Court in Larson explicitly rejected.
Larson thus made
Lo..'fS(M
1+- i J' .
clear that, at least insofar as injunctive relief is sought, an
error of law by state officers acting in their official capacities
will not suffice to override the sovereign immunity of the
State where the relief effectively is against it. I d., at 690,
695. 23 Any resulting disadvantage to the plaintiff was "out-

~---------

ment contract correctly) ~id., at 71&-717 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (in
cases alleging a tort, the "official seeks to screen himself behind the soverei "); id., at 721-722. ~at the dissent fails to note is that the Court in
Larsonls ejected the vie" ''that an officer given the power to make decisiOnS" IS only g~ven the power to make correct decisions." !d., at 695.
'f!otat ii!l esl!lentiall, t!ote M g'lifBeH~ af the dissent in this cal!! e.•
_here can
be no question that the defendants here were "given the powerto make
decisions" about the operation of Pennhurst. Seen. 11, supra }
22
"It has been said, in a very special sense, that, as a matter of agency
law, a principal may never lawfully authorize the commission of a tort by
his agent. But that statement, in its usual context, is only a way of saying
that an agent's liability for torts committed by him cannot be avoided by
pleading the direction or authorization of his principal. The agent is himself liable whether or not he has been authorized or even directed to commit the tort. This, of course, does not mean that the principal is not liable
nor that the tortious action may not be regarded as the action of the principal." Id., at 694 (footnote omitted).
23
The Larson Court noted that a similar argument "was at one time advanced in connection with corporate agents, in an effort to avoid corporate
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weigh[ed] by "the necessity of permitting the Government to
carry out its functions unhampered by direct judicial intervention." !d., at 704. If anything, this public need is even
greater when questions of federalism are involved. See
supra, at 8--9. 24
liability for torts, but was decisively rejected." 337 U. S., at 694. See 10
Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations § 4877, at 350
(1978 ed.) (a corporation is liable for torts committed by its agent within
the scope of is authority even though the "act was contrary to or in violation of the instructions or orders given by it to the offending agent"); id.,
§ 4959 (same as to crimes).
The dissent's interpretation of Larson, post, at 25-27, simply ignores the
language that the dissent itself quotes: "It is important to note that in
[ultra vires] cases the relief can be granted, without impleading the sovereign, only because of the officer's lack of delegated power. A claim of
error in the exercise of that power is therefore not sufficient." 337 U. S.,
at 690.
24
As we have discussed supra, at 11-12, Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S.
651 (1974), also shows that the broad ultra vires theory enunciated in
Young and in some of the cases quoted by the dissent has been discarded.
In Edelman, although the State officers were alleged to be acting contrary
to law, and therefore should have been "stripped of their authority" under
the theory of the dissent, we held the action to be barred by the Eleventh
Amendment. The dissent attempts to distinguish Edelman on the ground
that the retroactive relief there, unlike injunctive relief, does not run only
against the agent. Post, at 19, n. 28. To say that injunctive relief against
State officials acting in their official capacity does not run agains~ the State
is to resort to the fictions that characterize the dissent's theories. Unlike
the English sovereign perhaps, an American State can act only through its
officials. It is true that the Court in Edelman recognized that retroactive
relief often, or at least sometimes, has a greater impact on the State treasury than does injunctive relief, see 415 U. S., at 666, n. 11, but there was
no suggestion that damages alone were thought to run against the State
while injunctive relief did not.
We have noted that the authority-stripping theory of Young is a fiction
that has been narrowly construed. In this light, it may well be wondered
what principled basis there is to the ultra vires doctrine as it was set forth
in Larson and Treasure Salvors. That doctrine excepts from the Eleventh Amendment bar suits against officers acting in their official capacities
but without any statutory authority, even though the relief would operate
against the State. At bottom, the doctrine is based on the fiction of the

)

81-2101-0PINION
PENNHURST STATE SCHOOL & HOSP. v. HALDERMAN

23

The dissent in Larson made many of the arguments advanced by the dissent today, and asserted that many of the
same cases were being overruled or ignored. See 337 U. S.,
at 723-728 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Those arguments
were rejected, and the cases supporting them are moribund. Since Larson was decided in 1949, 25 no opinion by any
Member of this Court has cited the cases on which the dissent
primarily relies for a proposition as broad as the language the
dissent quotes. Many if not most of these cases have not
been relied upon in an Eleventh Amendment context at all.
Those that have been so cited have been relied upon only for
propositions with which no one today quarrels. 26 The plain
Young opinion. The dissent's method is merely to take this fiction to its
extreme. While the dissent's result may be logical, in the sense that it is
difficult to draw principled lines short of that end, its view would virtually
eliminate the constitutional doctrine of sovereign immunity. It is a result
from which the Court in Larson wisely recoiled. We do so again today.
For present purposes, however, we do no more than question the continued vitality of the ultra vires doctrine in the Eleventh Amendment context. We hold only that to the extent the doctrine is consistent with the
analysis of this opinion, it is a very narrow exception that will allow suit
only under the standards set forth in note 11 supra.
25
The dissent appears to believe that Larson is consistent with all prior
law. See post, at 25. This view ignores the fact that the Larson Court
itself understood that it was required to "resolve [a] conflict in doctrine."
337 U. S., at 701. The Court since has recognized that Larson represented a watershed in the law of sovereign imqmnity. In Malone v.
Bowdoin, 369 U. S. 643, Justice Stewart's opinion for the Court observed
that "to reconcile completely all the decisions of the Court in this field prior
to 1949 would be a Procrustean task." !d., at 646. His opinion continued:
"The Court's 1949 Larson decision makes it unnecessary, however, to
undertake that task here. For in Larson the Court, aware that it was
called upon to 'resolve the conflict in doctrine' .. . , thorougJy reviewed the
many prior decisions, and made an informed and carefully considered
choice between the seemingly conflicting precedents."
Ibid. The Court included many of the cases upon which the dissent relies
in its list of cases that were rejected by Larson. See id., n. 6.
26
E. g., Rolston v. Missouri Fund Commissioners, 120 U. S. 390 (1887)
(never cited); Scully v. Bird, 209 U. S. 481 (1908) (never cited); Hopkins v.
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fact is that the dissent's,.theory, if it ever was accepted to the
full extent to which it is now pressed, has not been the law
for at least a generation.
The reason is obvious. Under the dissent's view of the
ultra vires doctrine, the Eleventh Amendment would have
force only in the rare case in which a plaintiff foolishly attempts to sue the State in its own name, or where he cannot
produce some state statute that has been violated to his asserted injury. Thus, the ultra vires doctrine, a narrow and
questionable exception, would swallow the general rule that a
suit is against the State if the relief will run against it. That
result gives the dissent no pause presumably because of its
view that the Eleventh Amendment and sovereign immunity
"'undoubtedly ru[n] counter to modern democratic notions of
the moral responsibility of the State."' Post, at 36, n. 46
(quoting Great Northern Life Insurance Co. v. Read, 322
U. S. 47, 59 (1944) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). This argument has not been adopted by this Court. See Great Northern Life Insurance Co. v. Read, 322 U. S. 47, 51 (1944) ("Efforts to force, through suits against officials, performance of
Clemson Agricultural College, 221 U. S. 636 (1911) (never cited); Johnson
v. Lankford, 245 U. S. 541 (1918) (never cited); Land v. Dollar, 330 U. S.
731 (1947) (cited only for proposition that judgment that would expend itself on public treasury or interfere with public administration is a suit
against the United States); Cunningham v. Macon & B.R . Co., 109 U. S.
446 (1883) (cited only for proposition that a suit alleging unconstitutional
conduct is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment, and that ~ate cannot
be sued without its consent); Poindexter v. Greenhaw, 114 U. S. 270 (1885)
(unconstitutional-conduct suit is not suit against ~tate); Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust, 154 U. S. 362 (1894) (same). Prior to Florida Dept. of
State v. Treasure Salvors , Inc., 458 U.S. 670 (1982), Tindal v. Wesley,
167 U. S. 204 (1897), had been cited only for the proposition that a suit alleging unconstitutional conduct is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
The plurality opinion in Treasure Salvors discussed Tindal at some length,
458 U. S., at 68/H388, but noted that the rule of Tindal "was clarified in
Larson." Id., at 688; see also id., at 715, n. 13 (WHITE, J., dissenting).
As noted, n. 25, supra, some of these cases were also cited-and rejected-in Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U. S. 643, 646, n. 6 (1962).
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promises by a state collide directly with the necessity that a
sovereign must be free from judicial compulsion in the carrying out of its policies within the limits of the Constitution.");
Larson, supra, at 704 ("The Government, as representatives
of the community as a whole, cannot be stopped in its tracks .
. . . "). Moreover, the argument substantially misses the
point with respect to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. As JUSTICE MARSHALL has observed, the Eleventh
Amendment's restriction on the federal judicial power is
based in large part on "the problems of federalism inherent in
making one sovereign appear against its will in the courts of
the other." Employees v. Missouri Public Health Dept.,
411 U. S. 279, 294 (1973) (MARSHALL, J., concurring in the
result). The dissent totally rejects the Eleventh Amendment's basis in federalism.

c

The reasoning of our decisions on sovereign immunity thus
leads to the conclusion that a federal suit against state officials on the basis of state law contravenes the Eleventh
Amendment when-as here-the relief sought and ordered
has an impact directly on the State itself. In reaching a contrary conclusion, the Court of Appeals relied principally on a
separate line of cases dealing with pendent jurisdiction. The
crucial point for the Court of Appeals was that this Court has
granted relief against state officials on the basis of a pendent
state-law claim. See 673 F. 2d, at 657-658. We therefore
must consider the relationship between pendent jurisdiction
and the Eleventh Amendment.
This Court long has held generally that when a federal
court obtains jurisdiction over a federal claim, it may adjudicate other related claims over which the court otherwise
would not have jurisdiction. See, e. g., Mine Workers v.
Gibbs, 383 U. S. 715, 726 (1966); Osborn v. Bank of the
United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 819-823 (1824). The Court also
has held that a federal court may resolve a case solely on the
basis of a pendent state-law claim, see Siler, supra, at

_j
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192--193, and that in fact the court usually should do so in
order to avoid federal constitutional questions, see id., at
193; Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis,
J., concurring) ("[I]f a case can be decided on either of two
grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a
question of statutory construction or general law, the Court
will decide only the latter"). But pendent jurisdiction is a
judge-made doctrine inferred from the general language of
Art. III. The question presented is whether this doctrine
may be viewed as displacing the explicit limitation on federal
jurisdiction contained in the Eleventh Amendment.
As the Court of Appeals noted, in Siler and subsequent
cases concerning pendent jurisdiction/\ relief was granted
against state officials on the basis of state-law claims that
were pendent to federal constitutional claims. In none of
these cases, however, did the Court so much as mention the
Eleventh Amendment in connection with the state-law claim.
Rather, the Court appears to have assumed that once jurisdiction was established over the federal-law claim, the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction would establish power to hear
the state-law claims as well. The Court has not addressed
whether that doctrine has a different scope when applied to
suits against the State. This is illustrated by Greene v. Louisville & Interurban R. Co., 244 U. S. 499 (1917), in which
the plaintiff railroads sued state officials, alleging that certain tax assessments were excessive under the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Court first rejected the officials' argument that the Eleventh Amendment barred the federal constitutional claim. It held that Ex parte Young applied to all
allegations challenging the constitutionality of official action,
regardless of whether the state statute under which the officials purported to act was constitutional or unconstitutional.
See id., at 507. Having determined that the Eleventh
Amendment did not deprive the federal court of jurisdiction
over the Fourteenth Amendment question, the Court declared that the court's jurisdiction extended "to the deter-
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mination of all questions involved in the case, including questions of state law, irrespective of the disposition that may be
made of the federal question, or whether it be found necessary to decide it at all." I d., at 508. The case then was
decided solely on state-law grounds. Accord, Louisville &
Nashville R. Co. v. Greene, 244 U. S. 522 (1917). 27
These cases thus did not directly confront the question before us. "[W]hen questions of jurisdiction have been passed
on in prior decisions sub silentio, this Court has never considered itself bound when a subsequent case finally brings the
27
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The dissent claims that the Court in Greene expressly rejected the explicit argument that pendent state-law claims were not barred by the Elevnth Amendment. Post, at 12, n. 14. (!he Eleventh Amendment ~
.ai'eM of the opinion and of the briefs, however, is confined to the federal
o~stitutional claims] Compare Brief for Louisville & N.R. Co., Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Greene 15-38 (jurisdiction over federal claims) with id.,
at 38-39 (pendent jurisdiction over state claims); see Brief for State Board
and Officers, Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Greene 75-99 (arguing that Young
only applied when state statute, rather than state action under statute, is
unconstitutional); id., at 99-101 (arguing that definition of state action is
identical for purposes of Fourteenth and Eleventh Amendments); Brief for
Appellants Greene v. Louisville & l.R. 32-45 (ar in that state was real
art in ·
The p am fact is that the State never contested that if
there were jurisdiction over the federal questions in the case, there would
be jurisdiction over the local-law claims. The State's brief closes with a
concession that the federal courts had jurisdiction. See Brief for State
Board and Officers, Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Greene 139; Reply Brief, Louv. Greene 2 (pointing out concession).
isville N .
or do any of the other pen ent-Jurisdiction cases cited by t e dissent,
post, at 38, n. 50, discuss the Eleventh Amendment in connection with the
state-law claims. Moreover, since Larson was decide11 in 1949, making
-':(11.I
clear that mere violations of state law would not override the Eleventh
Airiendment ,'~9Re ef these cases ~een cited in aHy sttit ag:aiRet state 9
offieials fet ,.;olatiofts ef state law. T:Re rnle gf tbese eases iii meFely hat,
as a general matter, a federal court should decide a case on state-law
grounds where possible to avoid a federal constitutional question. See,
e. g., Siler v. Louisville & N .R. Co., 213 U.S. 175, 193 (1909). Nothing
in our decision is meant to cast doubt on the desirability of applying the
Siler principle in cases where the federal court has jurisdiction to decide
the state-law issues.
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jurisdictional issue before us." Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U. S.
528, 533, n. 5 (1974). 28 We therefore view the question as an
open one.
As noted, the implicit view of these cases seems to have
been that once jurisdiction is established on the basis of a federal question, no further Eleventh Amendment inquiry is
necessary with respect to other claims raised in the case.
This is an erroneous view and contrary to the principles established in our Eleventh Amendment decisions. "The
Eleventh Amendment is an explicit limitation on the judicial
power of the United States." Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U. S.,
at 25. It deprives a federal court of power to decide certain
claims against States that otherwise would be within the
scope of Art. III's grant of jurisdiction. For example, if a
lawsuit against state officials under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 alleges
a constitutional claim, the federal court is barred from awarding damages against the state treasury even though the claim
arises under the Constitution. See Quern v. Jordan, 440
U. S. 332 (1979). Similarly, if a§ 1983 action alleging a constitutional claim is brought directly against a State, the Eleventh Amendment bars a federal court from granting any relief on that claim. See Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U. S. 781
(1978) (per curiam). The Amendment thus is a specific constitutional bar against hearing evenfederal claims that otherwise would be within the jurisdiction of the federal courts. 29
This constitutional bar applies to pendent claims as well.
As noted above, pendent jurisdiction is a judge-made doc28
See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 671 (1974) ("Having now had
an opportunity to more fully consider the Eleventh Amendment issue after
briefing and argument, we disapprove the Eleventh Amendment holdings
of [certain prior] cases to the extent that they are inconsistent with our
holding today").
29
See, e. g., Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322 (1934) ("[A]lthough a case may arise under the Constitution and laws of the United
States, the judicial power does not extend to it if the suit is sought to be
prosecuted against a State, without her consent, by one of her own citizens"); Missouri v. Fiske , 290 U. S. 18, 25-26 (1933).
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trine of expediency and efficiency derived from the general
Art. III language conferring power to hear all "cases" arising
under federal law or between diverse parties. See Mine
Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U. S. 715, 725 (1966). See also Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U. S. 528, 545 (1974) (terming pendent
jurisdiction "a doctrine of discretion"). The Eleventh
Amendment should not be construed to apply with less force
to this implied form of jurisdiction than it does to the explicitly granted power to hear federal claims. The history of the
adoption and development of the Amendment, see supra, at
6-9, confirms that it is an independent limitation on all exercises of Art. III power: "the entire judicial power granted by
the Constitution does not embrace authority to entertain suit
brought by private parties against a State without consent
given," Ex parte State of New York No.1, 256 U.S. 490,497
(1921). If we were to hold otherwise, a federal court could
award damages against a State on the basis of a pendent
claim. Our decision in Edelman v. Jordan, supra, makes
clear that pendent jurisdiction does not permit such an evasion of the immunity guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment. We there held that "the District Court was correct in
exercising pendent jurisdiction over [plaintiffs'] statutory
claim," 415 U. S., at 653, n. 1, but then concluded that the
Eleventh Amendment barred an award of retroactive relief
on the basis of that pendent claim. I d., at 678.
In sum, contrary to the view implicit in decisions such as
Greene, supra, neither pendent jurisdiction nor any other
basis of jurisdiction may override the Eleventh Amendment. 30 A federal court must examine each claim in a case to
see if the court's jurisdiction over that claim is barred by the
Eleventh Amendment. We concluded above that a claim
that state officials violated state law in carrying out their official responsibilities is a claim against the State that is protected by the Eleventh Amendment. See supra, at )A( We
See Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U. S. , at 27 ("This is not less a suit against
the State because the bill is ancillary and supplemental. ").
30
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now hold that this prifleii>le applies as well to state-law claims
brought into federal court under pendent jurisdiction.

_c,- .:J)
Respondents urge that application of the Eleventh Amendment to pendent state-law claims will have a disruptive effect
on litigation against state officials. They argue that the
"considerations of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to litigants" that underlie pendent jurisdiction, see
Gibbs, supra, at 726, counsel against a result that may cause
litigants to split causes of action between state and federal
courts. They also contend that the policy of avoiding unnecessary constitutional decisions will be contravened if plaintiffs choose to forgo their state-law claims and sue only in federal court or, alternatively, that the policy of Ex parte Young
will be hindered if plaintiffs choose to forgo their right to a
federal forum and bring all of their claims in state court.
It may be that applying the Eleventh Amendment to pendent claims results in federal claims being brought in state
court, or in bifurcation of claims. That is not uncommon in
this area. Under Edelman v. Jordan, supra, a suit against
state officials for retroactive monetary relief, whether based
on federal or state law, must be brought in state j:!Ourt.
Challenges to the validity of state tax systems under 42
U. S. C. § 1983 also must be brought in state court. Fair
Assessment in Real Estate Assn. v. McNary, 454 U. S. 100
(1981). Under the abstention doctrine, unclear issues of
state law commonly are split off and referred to the state
courts. 31
31

Moreover, allowing claims against state officials based on state law to
be brought in the federal courts does not necessarily foster the policies of
"judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants," Mine Workers v.
Gibbs, 383 U. S. 715, 726 (1966), tl:l.at l!ndetH~pendent jurisdictio~. For
example, when a federal decision on state law is obtained, the federal
court's construction often is uncertain and ephemeral. In cases of ongoing
oversight of a state program that may extend over years, as in this case,
the federal intrusion is likely to be extensive. Duplication of effort, incon-

""

whh~ 1-i, ~..iJ
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In any case, the answer to respondents' assertions is that
such considerations of policy cannot override the constitutional limitation on the authority of the federal judiciary to
adjudicate suits against a State. See Missouri v. Fiske, 290
U. S., at 25-26 ("Considerations of convenience open no avenue of escape from the [Amendment's] restriction"). 32 That a
litigant's choice of forum is reduced "has long been understood to be a part of the tension inherent in our system of federalism." Employees v. Missouri Public Health & Welfare
Dept., 411 U. S. 279, 298 (1973) (MARSHALL, J., concurring
in result).
IV
Respondents contend that, regardless of the applicability
of the Eleventh Amendment to their state claims against petitioner state officials, the judgment may still be upheld
venience, and uncertainty may well result. See, e. g., Burford v. Sun Oil
Co., 319 U.S. 315,327 (1943) ("Delay, misunderstanding of local law, and
needless conflict with the state -policy, are the inevitable product of this
double [i. e., federal-state] system of review"). This case
an example. Here, the federal courts effectively have been undertaking to operate a major state institution based on inferences drawn from dicta in a
state court opinion not decided until four years after the suit was begun.
The state court has had no opportunity to review the federal .:.c~ourt
:::.::::.
s'...,;c:.::o:.::
n_
- - 1 - - --<.
struction of its opinion, or their choice of remedies. The onlY, escape om
an erroneous interpretation of state law is presumably the rat er cumbersome route of legislation.
Waste and delay may also result from abstention, which often is called
for when state law is unclear, see Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U. S. 360, 37~79
(1964) ("abstention operates to require piecemeal adjudication in many
courts, thereby delaying ultimate adjudication on the merits for an undue
length of time") (citations omitted), or from dismissals on the basis of comity, which has special force when relief is sought on state-law grounds, see
Gibbs, supra, at 726; Hawks v. Hamill, 288 U. S. 52, 61 (1933).
32
Cf. Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1976) (Although "considerations of judicial economy" would be served by permitting pendent-party
jurisdiction, "the addition of a completely new party would run counter to
the well-established principle that federal courts, as opposed to state trial
courts of general jurisdiction, are courts of limited jurisdiction marked out
by Congress").

_5C/v -€..
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against petitioner county officials. We are not persuaded.
Even assuming that these officials are not immune from suit
challenging their actions under the MH/MR Act, 33 it is clear
that without the injunction against the state institutions and
officials in this case, an order entered on state-law grounds
necessarily would be limited. The relief substantially concerns Pennhurst, an arm of the State that is operated by
state officials. Moreover, funding for the county mental retardation programs comes almost entirely from the State, see
Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 50, §§ 4507-4509 (Purdon 1969 and Supp.
1982), and the costs of the masters have been borne by the
State, see 446 F. Supp., at 1327. Finally, the MH/MR Act
contemplates that the state and county officials will cooperate in operating mental retardation programs. See In re
Schmidt, 494 Pa. 86, 95--96, 429 A. 2d 631, 635--636 (1981).
33
We have held that the Eleventh Amendment does not apply to "counties and similar municipal corporations." Mt. Healthy City School District
v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274, 280 (1977); see Lincoln County v. Luning, 133
U. S. 529, 530 (1890). At the same time, we have applied the Amendment
to bar relief against county officials "in order to protect the state treasury
from liability that would have had essentially the same practical consequences as a judgment against the State itself." Lake Country Estates,
Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U. S. 391, 401 (1979). See,
e. g., Edelman v. Jordan, supra (Eleventh Amendment bars suit against
state and county officials for retroactive award of welfare benefits). The
Courts of Appeals are in general agreement that a suit against officials of a
county or other governmental entity is barred if the relief obtained runs
against the State. See, e. g., Moore v. Tangipahoa Parish School Board,
594 F . 2d 489, 493 (CA5 1979); Carey v. Quern, 588 F. 2d 230, 233-234
(CA71978); Incarcerated Men of Allen County Jail v. Fair, 507 F. 2d 281,
287-288 (CA6 1974); Harris v. Tooele County School District, 471 F. 2d
218, 220 (CAlO 1973). Given that the actions of the county commissioners
and mental-health administrators are dependent on funding from the State,
it may be that relief granted against these county officials, when exercising
their functions under the MH/MR Act, effectively runs against the State.
Cf. Farr v. Chesney, 441 F . Supp. 127, 130-132 (MD Pa. 1977) (holding
that Pennsylvania county commissioners, acting as members of the board
of the county office of mental health and retardation, may not be sued for
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In short, the present judgment could not be sustained on the
basis of the state-law obligations of petitioner county officials. Indeed, any relief granted against the county officials
on the basis of the state statute would be partial and incomplete at best. Such an ineffective enforcement of state law
would not appear to serve the purposes of efficiency, convenience, and fairness that must inform the exercise of pendent
jurisdiction.

v

The Court of Appeals upheld the judgment of the District
Court solely on the basis of Pennsylvania's MH/MR Act.
We hold that these federal courts lacked jurisdiction to enjoin
petitioner state institutions and state officials on the basis of
this state law. The District Court also rested its decision on
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. See supra, at 2. On remand the
Court of Appeals may consider to what extent, if any, the
judgment may be sustained on these bases. 34 The court also
may consider whether relief may be granted to respondents
under the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of
Rights Act, 42 U. S. C. §§ 6011, 6063. The judgment of the
Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.

back pay under the Eleventh Amendment). We need not decide this issue
in light of our disposition above.
34
On the Fourteenth Amendment issue, the court should consider
Youngberg v. Romeo, ! ' \ U. S.
(1982), a decision that was not available when the District Court issued its decision.
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PENNHURST STATE SCHOOL & HOSPITAL, ET AL.,
PETITIONERS v. TERRI LEE HALDERMAN~
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FO~: THE • • If'HIRD CIRCUIT
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
Tills case presents the question whether a federal court
may award injunctive relief against state officials on the basis
of state law.
I '•,..
Tills litigation, here for the second time, concerns the conditions of care at petitioner Pennhurst State School and Hospital, a Pennsylvania institution for the care of the mentally
retarded. See Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1 (1981). Although the litigation's history is set forth in detail in our prior opinion, see id., at 5-10,
it is necessary for purposes of tills decision to review that
illstory.
This suit originally was brought in 1974 by respondent
Terri Lee Halderman, a resident of. Pennhurst, in the District Court for the Eastern Districf -of Pennsylvania. Ultimately, plaintiffs included a class consisting of all persons
who were or might become residents of Pennhurst; the Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Citizens (P ARC); and the
United States. Defendants were Pennhurst and various
Pennhurst officials; the Pennsylvania Department of Public
Welfare and several of its officials; and various county commissioners, county mental retardation admirustrators, and

.-

r
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other officials of five Pennsylvania counties surrounding
Pennhurst. Respondents' amended complaint charged that
conditions at Pennhurst violated the class members' rights
under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 87 Stat. 394, as amended, 29
U. S. C. § 794 (1976 ed. and Supp. V); the Developmentally
Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U. S. C.
§§ 6001-6081 (1976 ed. and Supp. V); and the Pennsylvania
Mental Health and Mental Retard·a non Act of 1966 (the
"MH/MR Act"), Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 50, §§ 4101-4704
(Purdon 1969 and Supp. 1982). Both damages and ~njunctive
relief were sought.
In 1977, following a lengthy trial, the District Court rendered its decision. 446 F. Supp. 1295 (1977). As noted in
our prior opinion, the col.ni:,~_:f_indings were undisputed: "Conditions at Pennhurst ·are not only dangerous, with the residents often physiCally abused or drugged by staff members,
but also inadequate for the 'habilitation' of the retarded. Indeed, the court found that the physicial, intellectual, and
emotional skills of some residents have deteriorated at
Pennhurst." 451 U. S., at 7 (footnote omitted). The District Court held that these conditions violated each resident's
right to "minimally adequate habilitation" under the Due
Process Clause and the MH/MR Act, see 446 F. Supp., at
1314-1318, 1322-1323; "freedom from harm" under the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, see id., at 1320-1321;
and "nondiscriminatory habilitation" under the Equal Protection Clause and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, see id., at
1321-1324. Furthermore, the court found that "due process
demands that if a state undertakes the habilitation of a retarded person, it must do so in the least restrictive setting
consistent with that individual's habilitative needs." I d., at
1319 (emphasis added). After concluding that the large size
of Pennhurst prevented it from providing the necessary
habilitation in the least restrictive environment, the court ordered "that immediate steps be taken to remove the retarded

--
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residents from Pennhurst." Id., at 1325. Petitioners were
ordered "to provide suitable community living arrangements" for the class members, id., at 1326, and the court appointed a Special Master "with the power and duty to plan,
organize, direct, supervise and monitor the implementation
of this and any further Orders of the Court." Ibid. 1
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed most
of the District .Court's judgment. .:. ~~~.F. 2d 84 (1979) (en
bane). It agreed that respondents had a right to habilitation
in the least restrictive environment, but it grounded this
right solely on the "bill of rights" provision in the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42
U. S. C. § 6010. See 612 F. 2d, at 95-100, 104-107. The
court did not consider the constitutional issues or § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act, and while it affirmed the District Court's
holding that the MH/MR Act provides a right · to adequate
habilitation, see 'id., at 100-103, the court did not decide
whether that state right encompassed a right to treatment in
the least restrictive setting.
On the question of remedy, the Court of Appeals affirmed
except as to the District Com-t's order that Pennhurst be
closed. The court observed that some patients would be unable to adjust to life outside"~n institution, and it determined
that none of the legal provisions relied on by plaintiffs precluded institutionalization. /d., at 114-115. It therefore remanded for "individual determinations by the [District
Court], or by the Special Master, as to the appropriateness of
an improved Pennhurst for each such patient," guided by "a
presumption in favor of placing individuals in [community living arrangements]." Ibid. 2
'The District Court determined that the individual defendants had acted
446 F.
Supp, at 1324.
2
In a companion case, the Court of Appeals affirmed the District
Court's denial of motion to intervene for purposes of appeaj

in good faith and therefore were immune from the damage claims.

by--{;!;<
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On remand the District Court established detailed procedures for determining the proper residential" placement for
each patient. A team consisting of the patient, his parents
or guardian, and his case manager mnst establish an individual habilitation plan providing for habilitation of the patient
in a designated community living arrangement. The plan is
subject to review by the Special Master. A second master,
called the Hearing Master, is available to conduct hearings,
upon request by the resident, hisp'a tertts or his advocate, on
the question whether the services of Pennhurst would be
more beneficial to the resident than the community living arrangement provided in the resident's plan. The Hearing
Master then determines where the patient should reside,
subject to possible review by the District Court. See App.
123a-134a (Order o_fApr_U. ~4, 1980). 3
This Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals,
finding that 42 U~ S. C. § 6010 did not create any substantive
rights. 451 U. S. 1 (1981). We remanded the case to the
Court of Appeals to determine if the remedial order could be
supported on the basis of state law, the Constitution, or § 504
of the Rehabilitation Act. See id., at 31.4 We also re-

o;o;oci~tl~:],-

..f!ooFulJ;nwst P:o.rQj:jt& St:off 4
finding the denial hannless error.
See 612 F. 2d 131 (1979) (en bane). The Association subsequently was
granted leave to intervene and is a petitioner in this Court.
sOn July 1, 1981, Pennsylvania enacted an appropriations bill providing
that only $35,000 would be paid for the Masters' ex-penses for the fiscal
year July 1981 to June 1982. The District Court held Pennsylvania and its
Secretary of the Department of Public Welfare in contempt, and imposed a
fine of $10,000 per day. Pennsylvania paid the fines, and the contempt
was purged on January 8, 1982. On appeal the Court of Appeals affirmed
the contempt order. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hospital,
673 F. 2d 628 (1982), cert. pending, No. 81-2363.
'Three Justices dissented from the Court's construction of the Act, but
concluded that the District Court should not have adopted the "far-reaching remedy" of appointing "a Special Master to decide which of the
Pennhurst inmates should remain and which should be moved to community-based facilities. . . . [T]he court should not have assumed the task of
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manded for consideration of whether any relief was available
under other provisions of the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act. See i~., at 27-30 (discussing
42 U. S. C. §§ 6011(a), 6063(b)(5)). ·'
On remand the Court of Appeals affirmed its prior judgment in its entirety. 673 F. 2d 647 (1982) (en bane). It detennined that in a recent decision the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvarua had "spoken definitivelf'jn holding that the
MH/MR Act required the State to adopt\he "least restrictive
environment" approach for the care of the mentally retarded.
Id., at 651 (citing In re Schmidt, 494 Pa. 86, 429 A. 2d 631
(1981)). The Court of Appeals concluded that this state statute fully supported its prior judginent, and therefore did not
reach the remaining issues of federal law. It also rejected
petitioners' argument that•the Eleventh Amendment barred
a federal court from considering this pendent state-law claim.
The court noted that the Amendment did not bar a federal
court from granting prospective injunctive relief against
state officials on the basis of federal claims, see 673 F. 2d, at
656 (citing Ex Parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908)), and concluded that the same result obtained with respect to a
pendent state-law claim. 'It reasoned that because Siler v.
Louisville & Nashville R.R:"'co., 213 U. S. 175 (1909), an important case in the development of the doctrine of pendent
jurisdiction, also involved state officials, "there cannot be ...
an Eleventh Amendment exception to that rule." 673 F. 2d,
at 658. 5 Finally, the court rejected petitioners' argument
that it should have abstained from deciding the state-law
managing Pennhurst. . . . " 451 U. S., at 54 (WHITE J., dissenting in
part).
•The Court of Appeals also noted that "the United States is an intervening plaintiff ... against which evep the state itself cannot successfully
plead the Eleventh Amendment as a bar to jurisdiction," and that "the
counties, even as juridical entities, do not fall within the coverage of the
Eleventh Amendment. Against those defendants even money damages
may be awarded." 673 F. 2d, at 656 (citation omitted).

t.'
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claim under principles of comity, see id., at 659-660, andrefused to consider petitioners' objections to the District
Court's use of a special master, seejd., at 651 and n. 10.
Three judges dissented in part, arguing that under principles
of federalism and comity the establishment of a special master to supervise compliance was an abuse of discretion. See
id., at 662 (Seitz, C.J., joined by Hunter, J., dissenting in
part); ibid. (Garth, J., concurring in P.~rt and dissenting as to
relief). See also id., at 661 (Aldisert, J., concurring) (seriously questioning the propriety of the order appointing the
Special Master, but concluding that a retroactive reversal of
that order would be meanintess). 6
We granted certiorari, ,.._ U. S.
(1982), and now reverse and remand.
.. ·,,,,_ -II

--k-

Petitioners raise three chalJenges to the judgment of the
Court of Appeals: (i) the Eleventh Amendment prohibited
the District Court from ordering state officials to conform
their conduct to state law; (ii) the doctrine of comity prohibited the District Court from issuing its injunctive relief; and
(iii) the District Court abused its discretion in appointing two
masters to supervise the de~isions of state officials in implementing state law. We need ·not reach the latter two issues,
for we find the Eleventh Amendment challenge dispositive.
A
Article III, § 2 of the Constitution provides that the federal
judicial power extends, inter alia, to controversies "between
a State and Citizens of another State." Relying on this language, this Court in 1793 assumed original jurisdiction over a
suit brought by a citizen of South Carolina against the State
of Georgia. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419 (1793). The
'The Office of the Special Master was abolished in December 1982.
See App. 220a (Order of August 12, 1982). The Hearing Master remains
in operation.

81-2101-0PINION
PENNHURST STATE SCHOOL & HOSP. v. HALDERMAN

7

decision "created such a shock of surprise that the Eleventh
Amendment was at once proposed and adopted." Monaco v.
Mississippi, 292 U. S. 313, 325 (1934). The Amendment
provides:
···
"The Judicial power of the Uruted States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the Druted States
by Citizens of another State, or. .by. Citizens or Subjects
of any Foreign State."
The Amendment's langu_age overruled the particular result
in Chisholm, but this Court has recognized that its greater
sigruficance lies in its affirmation that the fundamental principle of sovereign immunity limits the grant of judicial authority in Art. III. Tl)us, .. i.n_Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1
(1890), the Court held that, despite the limited terms of the
Eleventh Amendment, a federal court could not entertain a
suit brought by a citizen against his own State. After reviewing the constitutional debates concerning the scope of
Art. III, the Court determined that federal jurisdiction over
suits against unconsenting States "was not contemplated by
the Constitution when establishing the judicial power of the
Uruted States." Id., at 15._- See Monaco v. Mississippi,
supra, at 322-323 (1934). 7 In short, the principle of sovereign immuruty is a constitutional limitation on the federal judicial power established in Art. III:
"That a State may not be sued without its consent is a
fundamental rule of jurisprudence having so important a
'See Employees v. Missouri Public Health Dep't, 411 U. S. 279,
291-292 (1973) (MARSHALL, J., concurring in judgment) (The Eleventh
Amendment "clarif[ied] the intent of the Framers concerning the reach of
federal judicial power" and "restore[d] the original understanding" that
States could not be made unwilling d.efendants in federal court). See also
Nevada v. Hall, 440 U. S. 410, 430-431 (1979) (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting);
id., at 437 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting) .

.·
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bearing upon the construction of the Constitution of the
United States that it has become established by repeated
decisions of this court that the. entire judicial power
granted by the Constitution does not embrace authority
to entertain a suit brought by private parties against a
State without consent given: not one brought by citizens
of another State, or by citizens
subjects of a foreign
State, because of the Eleventh .Amendment; and not
even one brought by its own citizens, because of the fundamental rule of which the Amendment is but an exemplification." Ex parte State of New York No. 1, 256
U. S. 490, 497 (1921) (emphasis added). 8

or

A sovereign's immunity may be waived, and the Court consistently has held that a State may consent to suit against it
in federal court. ·See, ··~: g., Clark v. Ba?-nard, 108 U. S.
436, 447 (1883). We have insisted, however, that the State's
consent be unequivocally expressed. See, e. g., Edelman v.
Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 673 (1974). Similarly, although Congress has power with respect to the rights protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment immunity, see Fitzpatrick v. Bitker, 427 U. S. 445
(1976), we have required an· unequivocal expression of congressional intent to "overturn the constitutionally guaranteed immunity of the several States." Quem v. Jordan, 440
U. S. 332, 342 (1979) (holding that 42 U. S. C. § 1983 does not
override States' Eleventh Amendment immunity). Our reluctance to infer that a State's immunity from suit in the federal courts has been negated stems from recognition orthe
The limitation deprives federal courts of any jurisdiction to entertain
such claims, and thus may be raised at any point in a proceeding. "The
Eleventh Amendment declares a policy and sets forth an explicit limitation
on federal judicial power of such compelling force that this Court will consider the issue arising under this Amendment ... even though urged for
the first time in this Court." Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury,
323 U. S. 459, 467 (1945) .
8

.-

...
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vital role of the doctrine of sovereign ir,nmunity in our federal
system. A State's constitutional interest in immunity ensued, ~here it
compasses not merely whether it may
may be sued. 9 As JUSTICE MARSHALI.:A as noted el , "[b]ecause of the problems of federalism inherent in making one
sovereign appear against its will in the courts of the other, a
restriction upon the exercise of the federal judicial power has
long been considered to be appropri~t~. in a case such as this."
Employees v. Missouri Public Health & Welfare Dep't, 411
U. S. 279, 294 (1973) (MARSHALL, J., concurring in result). 10
Accordingly, in deciding this case we must be guided by
"[t]he principles of federalism that inform Eleventh Amendment doctrine.'' Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678, 691 (1978) .

4e

\

. .." . B
. . ll

-

This Court's decis.ions thus establish that "an unconsenting
State is immune from suits brought in federal courts by her
own citize~s as well as by citizens of another state." Em9
For this reason, the Court consistently has held that a State's waiver
of sovereign immunity in its own courts is not a waiver of the Eleventh
Amendment immunity in the federal courts. See, e. g., Florida Department of Health v. Florida Nursi'rig Home Assn.L450 U. S. 147, 150 (1981)
(per curiam). "(I]t is not consonant with our dual system for the federal
courts ... to read the consent to embrace federal as well as state courts .
. . . [A] clear declaration of the state's intention to submit its fiscal problems to other courts than those of its own creation must be found." Great
Northern Life Insurance Co. v. Read, 322 U. S. 47, 54 (1944).
10
See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U. S., at 418-419 (States were '\rjtally interested" in whether they would be subject to suit in the federal courts, and
the debates about state immunity focused on the question of federal judicial
power). Cf. id., at 430-431 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting) (sovereign immunity is "a guarantee that is implied as an essential component of federalism"
and is "sufficiently fundamental to ow federal structure to have implicit
constitutional dimension"); id., at 437 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting) ("[T]he
States that ratified the Eleventh Amendment thought that they were
putting an end to the possibility of individual States as unconsenting defendants in foreign jurisdictions").

_A

l) '\
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ployees, supra, at 280. There may be a question, however,
whether a particular suit in fact is a suit against a State. It
is clear, of course, that in the abs~~ce of consent a suit in
which the State or qne of its agencies or departments is
named as the defendant is proscribed by the Eleventh
Amendment. See, e. g., Florida Department of Health v.
Florida Nursing Home Assnj 450 . U. S. 147 (1981) (per
curiam); Alabama v. Pugh,. 43.$.).}.. S. 781 (1978) (per
curiam). This jurisdictional bar applies regardless of the nature of the relief sought. See, e. g., Missouri v. Fiske, 290
U. S. 18, 27 (1933) ("Expressly applying to suits in equity as
well as at law, the Amendment necessarily embraces demands for the enforcement of equitable rights and the prosecution of equitable remedies when these are asserted and
prosecuted by an individtlal against a State").
When the suit is brought only against state officials, a
question arises · as to whether that suit is a suit against the
State itself. Although prior decisions of this Court have not
been entirely consistent on this issue, certain principles are
well established. The Eleventh Amendment bars a suit
against state officials when "the state is the real, substantial
party in interest." Ford lv[.otor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U. S. 459, 464 (f945). See, e. g., In re Ayers, 123
U. S. 443, 487-492 (1887); Lo'u.isiana v. Jumel, 107 U. S.
711, 720-723, 727-728 (1882). Thus, "[t]he general rule is
that relief sought nominally against an officer is in fact
against the sovereign if the decree would operate against the
latter." Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U. S. 57, 58 (1963) (per
curiam). 11 And, as when the State itself is named as the defendant, a suit against state officials that is in fact a suit

.·

0
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[Footnote fl]

ll
Respondents do not dispute that the relief sought and
awarded below operated against the state in each of the
foregoing respects.
They suggest, however, that the suit
here should not be considered to be against the state for
the purposes of the Eleventh Amendment because, they say,
petitioners were acting ultra vires their authority.
Respondents rely largely on Florida Dep't of State v.
Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 u.s.
(1982), which in turn
was founded upon Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce
Corp., 337 u.s.
682
(1949).
These cases provide no
support for this argument.
These and other modern cases
make clear that a state officer may be said to act ultra
vires only when he acts "without any authority whatever."
Treasure Salvors, supra, at __ (opinion of STEVENS, J.) ~
accord id., at
(WHITE, J., concurring in judgment in
part and dissenting in part) (test is whether there was n<t:> "
"colorable basis for the exercise of authority by state
officials").
As the Court in Larson explained, an ultra
vires claim rests on "the officer's lack of delegated
power.
A claim of error in the exercise of that power is
therefore
not
sufficient."
Larson,
supra,
at
6 90.
Petitioners' actions in operating this mental health
institution plainly were not beyond their delegated
authority in this sense.
Pennsylvania statutes gave them
broad discretion to provide "adequate" mental health
services.
Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 50, §4201(1)
(Purdon
1969).
The
essence
of
respondents'
claim
is
that
petitioners have not provided such services adequately.
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against a State is barred regardless of whether it seeks damages or injunctive relief. See Cory v. White, 457 U. S. 85,
91 (1982).
The Court has recognized an important exception to this
general rule: a suit challenging the constitutionalit of a state
official's action is not one against the State.
This was the
holding in Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908), in which a
federal court enjoined the Attor,n~Y . ,General of the State of
Minnesota from bringing suit to enforce a state statute that
allegedly violated the Fourteenth Amendment. This Court
held that the Eleventh Amendment did not prohibit issuance
of this mJunction <9 ~-------------------t
o be enforced is alleged to be unco
onal,
and if it be so,
the na
e tate to enforce
an unconstitutio
e1
complainants is a
.Without the authority of and one
pro
e Court also has held that sovereign immunity does not appl n a
suit a 'nst an official who allegedly acted entirely outside his o cia] authority.
ee, e. g., Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerc orp., 337
U. S. 682,
(1949). This ultra vires E:Xception is quite · 'ted, governing only those · uations in which a government offici acts without any
official justification. See, e. g:, Florida Departme of State v. Treasure
Salvors, Inc.,-- U. - - , - - (1982) (opini of STEVENS, J.) (test is
whether the official's co uct was undert n "without any authority
whatever"); id., at"-E, J., con
ing in judgment in part and
dissenting in part) (test is whe r th e was no "colorable basis for the
exercise of authority by state offici '). As the Larson Court explained,
"It is important to note that in s
cas the relief can be granted, without
impleading the sovereign, o
because o the officer's lack of delegated
ower is therefore not sufpower. A claim of error · the exercise of th
89--B90. This exceptio ]early is inapplicable in
ficient." 337 U. S.,
this case. Even i etitioner officials violated sta law in carrying out
cia] duties, they unquestionably act under colorable
some of their
state author· in operating Pennhurst and the State's sy m of care for
the men y retarded. In short, these officials were not act
res,
rather were "exercising the powers delegated to [the
so reign." Larson, supra, at 693.

---~
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The

theory

of

the

case

was

that

an

unconstitutional

enactment is "void" and therefore does not "impart to [the
officer]

any

immunity from responsibility to the supreme

authority of the United States."
State

could

not

authorize

Id., at 160.

the

action,

the

Since the

officer

was

"stripped of his official or representative character and
[was]

subjected

conduct."
While

to

the

consequences

of

his

official

Ibid.
the

rule

permitting

suits

alleging

conduct

contrary to "the supreme authority of the United States"
has survived, the theory of Young has not been provided an
expansive interpretation.
U.S.

651

Thus, in Edelman v. Jordan, 415

(1974), the Court held that a plaintiff suing a

state official

and

alleging

a

violation of

federal

laM "

could recover only prospective injunctive relief and not
the award of damages.

Under the theory of Young, such a

suit would not be one against the State since the federallaw

allegation

would

official authority.

strip

the

state

officer

of

his

Nevertheless, retroactive relief was

barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
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not affect the State in its sovereign or governmental c
pacity. It is simply an illegal act upon the part of as te
cial in attempting by the use qf the name of th tate
orce a legislative enactment which is voi
ecause
unco titutional. If the act which the sta Attorney
Genera eeks to enforce be a violation
the Federal
Constituti
the officer in proceeding aer such enactment comes to conflict with ,tl)~. tm erior authority of
that Constitutio and he is in th case stripped of his
official or represe ative chara er and is subjected to
the consequences of ·s offici conduct. The State has
no power to impart to
any immunity from responority of the United States."
sibility to the supreme
209 U. S., at 159-160
Li

•

The Court subseque'nt · h~s made cle that, even where this
exception applies, t e rule that a suit ainst state officials
constitutes a sui gainst the State conti es to have force.
Thus, in Edel n v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651
74), the Court
held that in suit against state officials "a fede 1 court's remedial po er, consistent with the Eleventh Am dment, is
necess 1ly limited to prosp~ctive injunctive relief,
d may
not · elude a retroactive award which requires the pa ent
of nds from the state treasury." !d., at 677 (citat
mitted.

III
With these principles in mind, we now turn to the question
whether the claim that petitioners violated state law in carrying out their official duties at Pennhurst is one against the
State and therefore barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
Respondents advance.~wo principal arguments in support of
the judgment below.
First, they contend that under the
-We reject respondents' additional contention that Pennsylvania has
waived its immunity from sillt in federal court. At the time the suit was
filed, suits against Pennsylvania were permitted only where expressly au-
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doctrine of Edelman v. Jordan, supra, the suit is not against
the State because the courts below ordered only prospective
injunctive relief. Second, they assert that the state-law
claim properly was decided under the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction. Respondents rely on decisions of this Court
awarding relief against state officials on the basis of a pendent state-law claim. See, e. g., Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 213 U.S. 175, 193 (1909) .
. . .. .
A
•

: ' ':; ' -

' r

• c_(

We first address the contention that respondents' state-law
claim is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment because it
seeks only prospective relief as defined in Edelman v. Jordan, supra. The Court of Appeals held that if the judgment
below rested on federall~w, it could be entered against petitioner state officials ·· ·~nder the doctrine established in
thorized by the legislature, see, e. g., Freach v. Commonwealth, 471 Pa.
558, 370 A. 2d 1163 (1977), and respondents have not referred us to any
proyjsion expressly waiyjng Pennsylvania's Eleventh Amendment immunity. The State now has a statute governing sovereign immunity, including an express preservation of its immunity from suit in federal court:
"Federal courts.-Nothing ccr\tained in this subchapter shall be construed
to waive the immunity of the CO"mmonwealth from suit in Federal courts
guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States." 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8521(b) (1980).
We also do not agree with respondents that the presence of the United
States as a plaintiff in this case removes the Eleventh Amendment from
consideration. Although the Eleventh Amendment does not bar the
United States from suing a State in federal court, see, e. g., Monaco v.
Mississippi, 292 U. S. 313, 329 (1934), the United States' presence in the
case for any purpose does not eliminate the State's immunity for all purposes. For example, the fact that the federal court could award injunctive
relief to the United States on federal constitutional claims would not mean
that the court could order the State to pay damages to other plaintiffs. In
any case, we think it clear that the United States does not have standing to
assert the state-law claims of third-parties. For these reasons, the applicability of the Eleventh Amendment to respondents' state-law claim is
unaffected by the United States' participation in the case.
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Edelman and Young even though the prospective financial
burden was substantial and ongoing-:-' See 673 F. 2d, at 656.
The court assumed, and respondents assert, that this reasoning applies as well when the official acts in violation of state
law. This argument misconstrues the basis of the doctrine
established in Young and Edelnwn.
As discussed above, the injunction in Young was justified,
notwithstanding the obvious impact <;>_n t~e State itself, on the
view that sovereign immunity does not ·apply because an official who acts unconstitutionally is "stripped of his official or
representative character," Young, 209 U. S., at 160. This
rationale, of comse, created the "well-recognized irony'' that
an official's unconstitutional conduct constitutes state action
under the Fourteenth Amendment but not the Eleventh
Amendment. Florida . Department of State v. Treasure
Salvors, Inc., - - U. S. - - , - - (1982) (opinion of STEVENS, J.). Nonetheless, the Young doctrine has been accepted as necessary to permit the federal courts to vindicate
federal rights and hold state officials responsible to "the supreme authority of the United States." Young, 209 U. S.,
at 160. As JUSTICE BRENNAN has observed, "Ex parte
Young was the culmination bf efforts by this Court to harmonize the principles of the Eleventh Amendment with the
effective supremacy of rights and powers seemed elsewhere
in the Constitution." Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U. S. 82, 106
(1971) (BRENNAN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Om decisions repeatedly have emphasized that the
Young doctrine rests on the need to promote the vindication
ill

lrlthoagh the DisCI let Com t Lha!! has jl:l:l"iseietieH tG gpaHt }3F8Bl:leeti oe
OJ:l the basis of fe9eraJ l!<w, tl!e seope of thl!t ! el:ief i£ eenEtraiJ;llid loy
principles of comity and federalism. ''Wbere, as here, the exercise of authority by state officials is attacked, federal courts must be constantly
mindful of the 'special delicacy of the adJustment to be preserved between
federal equitable power and State administration of its own law.'" Rizzo
v. Goode, 423 U. S. 362, 378 (1976) (quoting Stefanelli v. Minard, 342
)'I'

~li~i£

u. s. 117' 120 (1951)).
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But we declined to extend the fiction of Young to permit
retroactive

relief,

for

to

do

so

would

effectively

eliminate the constitutional immunity of the States.
at

665

(retroactive

relief

would

"'fall

afoul

Id.,

of

the

Eleventh Amendment if that basic constitutional provision
is

to

be

conceived

of

as

having

any

present

force'")

(quoting Rothstein v. Wyman, 467 F.2d 226, 237 (CA2 1972)
(McGowan,
U.S.
the

921

J.,

sitting by designation), cert. denied,

(1973)).

411

The opinion in Edelman recognized that

difference between

injunctions and money damages

is

not "that between day and night," because the former may
often have a greater impact on state treasuries than the
latter.

Id., at 667.

Implicit in the holding of Edelman

was the view that retroactive relief is of less importance
in

ensuring

injunctions.

the

vindication

Thus,

of

federal

law

than

are

Edelman was an accommodation between

the interest defined in Young in ensuring the enforcement
of the Civil War Amendments and the interest articulated
in the Eleventh Amendment in maintaining the immunity of
the States.

,.
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of federal rights.
See, e. g., Quern v. Jordan, 440 U~ S.
332, 337 (1979); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232, 237 (1974);
Georgia R. & Banking Co. v. R edv.jne, 342 U. S. 299, 304
(1952).
The Court also has r ecognized, however, tlfat the Young
'exception should ·not be applied where unnecessary to promote the supremacy of federal law. This is the significance
of E delrnan V. Jordan, supra . .. w~ l~~cognized that the prospective r elief authorized by Young "has permitted the Civil
War Amendments to the Constitution to serve as a sword,
rather than merely a shleld, for those whom they were designed o protect." 415 U. S., at 664. But we ecline~
· en
oung to encompass re roac lVe relief, for t~ so
wou
ffectively eliminate the constitutional imm~y of the
States.
ccordingly, we -concluded that altho gii the differerni.issible and imperrnissib relief "will not
ence betwee
in many instance be that between da and night," id., at
667, an award of retr tive relief n ssarily '"fall[s] afoul of
the Eleventh Amendmen · th
asic constitutional provi· g any present force."' I d.,
sion is to be conceived of as
at 665 (quoting Rothstei .. . Wym
467 F. 2d 226, 237 (CA2
1972) (McGowan, J.
tmg.by de signa · n), cert. denied, 411
U. s. 921 (1973 . I In sum;· Edelman's . inction between
prospective d retroactive relief fulfills the u erlying purpose of
parte Young whlle at the same time pre rving to
an i portant degree the constitutional immunity
the
tes.
Thls need to reconcile competrng mteres s IS w o y a sent, however, when a plaintiff alleges that a state official has
is~
fo~r~h~----~violated state law. In such a case the entire~b-:;.a:;:.:s~
doctrine of Young and Edelman disappears.
A federal

'

.-
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court's grant of relief against state officials on the basis of
state law, whether prospective or retroactive, does not vindicate the supreme authority of federal law. On the contrary,
it is difficult to think of a greater intrusion on state soverendment cases of the period cited by the dissent was that there is a c ci difference between the class of cases "where the suit is brought ag nst
the
cers of the State, as representing .the: State's action and li ility,
thus
king it, though not a party to · th~ ~ecord, the real part)) against
which tl1 judgment will so operate as to compel it to specificall· perfonn
contracts,' nd the class "where aj! suit is brought against deijn'dants who,
claiming to
officers of the State, and under the color of)l.n unconstitutional statute, ommit acts of wrong and injury to the rights and property
of the plaintiff a uired under a contract with the Stale." · Pennoyer v.
McConnaughy, 14 U. S. 1, 10 (1891). Indeed, thE7-d'ecisions in most of
the cases cited by the issent turned on this distincf6n relating to whether
the suit properly raise
con~tifutional challeng to the officer's conduct.
See, e. g., R.eagan .v. F ners' Loan & Trus Co., 154 U.S. 362, 390
(1894); Poindexter v. vreen ow, 114 U. S. 27 , 288 (1885); Cunningham v.
Macon & Brunswick R. Co., 09 U. S. 446 l\52 (1883). The Court rarely
was faced with an Eleventh Am ndment i sue in a case that did not contain
a constitutional allegation.
More significant than the rather
e support for this alleged "firmly established" rule, post, at 18, is the f t hat the "line of cases" central to the
dissent's argument since has bee . epu · ted by this Court. The principal
case originally cited for the pro osition th a suit alleging a tortious act by
an official is not barred by so ereign immu · y is United States v. Lee, 106
U. S. 196 (1882). See Cu tingham, supra,
452; Larson, supra, at 717
(Frankfurter, J., disse ng) (Lee is the "st ing point of this line of
cases"). In Larson, h ever, the Court construe Lee narrowly as representing only "a spe · c application of the constitu · nal exception to the
doctrine of sovere· immunity." 337 U. S., at 69 . Larson expressly
rejected the vie -urged by JUSTICE STEVENS' dissen ere-that sovereign immunitJ.: s inapplicable whenever the officer allege ly committed a
tortious acf n. It held that the suit may go forward on! if there is an
allegation f unconstitutional action or action that is ultra m s. !d., at
693; see upra, at n. 12.
Thi construction, and the Larson rule, have been reaffirme repeat- '\
edlJ,; and at this Tenn-by this Court. See, e. g., Block v. No
Da- \
k , -U.S. - , (1983); Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U. S. 3, )
7--648 (1962). The dissent seeks to avoid the significance of Larson

·a.

.•
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eignty than when a federal court instructs state officials on
how to confonn their conduct to state law. · Such a result
conflicts directly with the principles of federalism that underlie the Eleventh Amendment. We conclude that Young and

'a serting that its explicit repudiation of the rule and cases relied on by t e
di ent here was not "necessary to decide the case" and "apparently di ot
com and the full agreement of five members Gf the [Larson] Co
' because
a concurring opinion by JusticEi ' bouglas. Post, at 16-1 , n. 17.
Precise! the same argument was made by Justice Douglas-· lone dissent-1l ars after Larson. See Malone v. Bowdoin, supra at 649--{)50.
Justice fS te •art's opinion for the Court in Malone observed hat J'"to reconcile complet
all the decisions of the Court in this fi
prior to 1949
would be a Proc stean task." ld., at 646. His opini continued:
"The Court's 19 Larson decision makes it unnec ssary, however, to
undertake that task ere. . For in Larson the Co , aware that it was
called upon to 'resolve 'the conflict in doctrine' ( 7 u. s., at 701), thoroughly reviewed the man prior decisions, and
de an informed and carefully considered choice be ween the seemin y conflicting precedents."
~~~

q-(' 9-

/ 1j
\
)

-

The Court in Malone then ex ressly re
ed the Larson rule that the
only two exceptions to sovereign · mu · y are where the officer acted ultra vires or in an unconstitutional f h. n. See id., at 647. An allegation
that the officer acted tortiously or il ally-an allegation the dissent finds
sufficient ta avoid entirely the ~· ven Amendment's sovereign immunity-was found "not adequate(' support conclusion that the relief asked
It thus is indisputably clear
was not relief against the sov eign." lb ·
that this Court already h "thoroughly re ·ewed" the precedents and
"made an informed and c efully considered en 'ce," id., at 646, to reject
the view urged by Ju9 ICE STEVENS' dissent at sovereign immunity
does not bar a suit aJte'ging that an offi~ "had act within his authority .,L
but in a manner cont'rary to state law." Post, at 19.
The dissent re96gnizes that Larson is inconsistent 'th the cases on
which the dissent relies, but asserts that "it is not necess
or appropriate
~
to read that r,Ule :retroactivelyl.nto the Eleventh Amendm t." Post, at
/
20 (STEVENs'', J., dissenting). This departure from stare dec· ·is is hardly
consistent \vith the dissent's invocation of the doctrine elsew re in the
opinion./ This Court consistently has considered Larson to be a elevant
preced~nt in Eleventh Amendment cases, see, e. g., Georgia R. o. v.
Reainne, 342 U. S. 299, 304, nn. 12, 15, and indeed just last Term · ht
~ftices expressly applied the two-part Larson test in resolving an El -

.-
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Edelman are inapplicable in a suit against state officials on
the basis of state law.
B
... The reasoning of our decisions on sovereign immunity thus
leads to the conclusion that a federal suit against state officials on the basis of state law contravenes the Eleventh
Amendment. In reaching a contrary conclusion, the Court
of Appeals relied principally on a sepwate line of cases deal~nth Amendment issue, Treasure Salvors, supra, - - U. S., at
(apjnion of STEVENS, J.); id., at-- (WHITE, J., concurring in the · dg-

men in part and dissenting in part). The plurality opinion in Tr; asure
Salvor written by JUSTICE STEVENs-found that Larson had " arified"
the prior w established in both Eleventh Amendment and fe,Qeral sovereign imm · y cases, -and nqt.~?d _expressly that Larson had)'lleld that the
fact that an
cer wrongfully withholds property belonging to another
does not necess ily establish that he is acLing beyonB the permissible
scope of his offici
apacity." Id., at--. The pJttrality then followed
the Larson test in a
uncing that "the Eleventh 26;endment does not bar
an action against a sta oiJicial that is based OJl a theory that the officer
acted beyond the scope o is statutory authority or, if within that authority, that such authority is un onstitutional. /'!d., at--. As the dissent
notes, see post, at 17-18, n. l the plura:llty concluded that the suit was
not barred because the state offi · ls hael "no colorable claim" for their actions, but rather had acted ''withou £y authority whatever." lf{", at--.
But it is clear-and the dissent dg.es n t contend otherwise-that both the
plurality and the partial dis~en -:i'ccepte and applied the two-part Larson
test as controlling in the Ele enth Amend ent context.
Just as the Court's ~le} nth Amendment ases have relied on federal
sovereign immunity prjrciples, the Court's fe eral sovereign immunity
cases have relied ~n e principles established 1 Eleventh Amendment
cases. See, e. g., hiladelphia v. Stimson, 223
S. 605, 620 (1912).
This especially wa true in Larson itself. See 337 U. , at 687, n. 6, 691,
n. 11, 694, n. 11(698, nn. 19-20, 699, n. 22. The dissent hus errs in suggesting t~at ere are different princ.iples for the federal so ereign immunity cases nd Eleventh Amendment cases. See id., at 708 ( ankfurter,
J., diss ting) ("The sources of the. immunity are formally d' rent but
they esent the same legal issues"). It is clear that Larson-the ourt's
mo recent definitive statement on the rule of sovereign immunity a its
ceptions-should be followed here .

'

-

.

?
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ing with pendent jurisdiction. The crucial point for the
Court of Appeals was that this Court has granted relief
against state ofncials on the basis of a pendent state-law
claim. See 673 F. 2d, at 657-658. · We therefore must consider the relationshlp between pendent jurisdiction and the
Eleventh Amendment.
Tills Court long has held generally that when a federal
court obtains jurisdiction over a f~deral claim, it may adjudicate other related claims over
the court otherwise
would not have jurisdiction. See, e. g., Mine Workers v.
Gibbs, 383 U. S. 715, 726 (1966); Osborn v. Bank _of the
United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 819-823 (1824). The Court also
has held that a federal court may resolve a case solely on the
basis of a pendent state-law claim, see Siler, supra, at
192-193, and that -i n fa.ct_ the court usually should do so in
order to avoid federal constitutional questions, see id., at
193; Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis,
J., concurring) ("[I]f a case can be decided on either of two
grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a
question of statutory construction or general law, the Court
will decide onl the latter"). Under t ese r ·
, t
s c ear that, apart from the pas eventh Amendment ba ,
Court of ·''
ad a proper jurisdictional
basi~fn whic
- the claim based on Pennsylvania
law. •
e question there o
N"hether the Amendment
·es to tills pendent state-law claim.

which.

--
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But pendent jurisdiction is a judge-made doctrine inferred
from

the

presented

general
is

language

whether

this

of

Art.

doctrine

III.
may

The
be

question
viewed

as

displacing the explicit limitation on federal jurisdiction
contained in the Eleventh Amendment.
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As the Court of Appeals noted, in Siler and subsequent
cases concerning pendent jurisdiction relief was granted
against state officials on the basis of state-law claims that
wer~_.Q_~ndent to fede~al CC?_nstitutiorial claims.
T e o
r-held__Qirectly that the rationale of Ex
should be extencred-to -pen.dep~-tmv"C mms, but rather
appears to have
umed'tillitth~ _ endment sim~~ ___!!.9j;~ly to pendent claims/7 f This is illustrated by
Greene v. Louisville & Interurban :R. Co., 244 U. S. 499
(1917), in which the plaintiff railroads sued state officials, alleging that certain tax assessments were excessive under the
Fourteenth Amendm-ent. The ou
s reJected t
argumen unaer the Eleventh Amendment
mg that
Ex pa
applied to all constituti
claims against
state officials, rega_
_ of wheth
e state statute under
which the officials -acted -titutional or unconstituHaving deterrf'i.,.,_>£1
tional. See id. enth
ment did not deprive the federal co
uris. 1 n over this constitutional uestion, the Court declar
that the court's jurisdiction extended "to the determination of
all questions involved in the case, including questions of state
law, irrespective of the disposition that may be made of the
federal question, or whether it be found necessary to decide
it at all." Id., at 508.
case then was decided solely on

The

~e dissent repeatedly refers to the ''rule" in Siler as if th

ourt
ther~'a<l,beld that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar · s on pendent state-law-.claims. It bears repeating that the Ele_yertl Amendment
was not raised brthe State or addressed by thlsflOurt in that decision.
Rather, the rule in Siler'is that, as a genera]JPatler, a federal court should
decide a case on state-law ground_s wh~possible to avoid a federal constitutional question. 213 U. S.,_)t<l93. Contrary to the dissent's repeated intimations, we ha~AOt "rep~'aiat~d" or "reject[ed]" this rule,
post, at 10, 12, or held that'Siler is "no longer @(}cl.l_aw," post, at 8. N othing in our decisi~~eant to reject Siler, much Tes cast doubt on the
desirability of -a'j)plying its principles in cases where the
a! court has
jurisdicti<>fito decide the state-law issues.

/

.-

'
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In none of these cases, however, did the Court so much as
mention

the

state-law
assumed

claim.

well.

in

the

connection

Court

with

appears

the

to

have

jurisdiction was established over

claim,

establish

Amendment

Rather,

that once

federal-law
would

Eleventh

the

power

doctrine
to

hear

of

pendent

the

the

jurisdiction

state-law

claims

as

The Court has not addressed whether that doctrine

has a different scope when applied to suits against the
State.

RIDER "B" P.20
The Court first rejected the officials' argument that the
Eleventh
claim.

Amendment
It

held

barred

that

Ex

the

federal

parte

Young

constitutional
applied

to

all
;'

allegations challenging the constitutionality of officiai
action,

regardless

of

whether

the

state

statute

under

which the officials purported to act was constitutional or
unconstitutional.
that
court

See

id.,

at

507.

Having

determined

the Eleventh Amendment did not deprive the federal
of

jurisdiction

over

question, the Court declared

the

Fourteenth

Amendment
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state-law grounds. Accord, Lo1/~ille & Nashville R.R.
Co..:. v. Greene, 244 U. S. 522 (1917).
·

VJ ew
. $1QJ1S.
our Eleventh Amendment
Amendmen 1s an explicit limitation on t e judicial power of
the United States." Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U. S., at 25. It
deprives a federal court of power to decide certain claims
against States that otherwise would be within the scope of
Art. III's grant of jurisdiction. For example, if a lawsuit
against state officials under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 alleges a constitutional claim, the federal court is barred from awarding
damages against·'the state treasury even though the claim
arises under the Constitution. See Quem v. Jordan, 440
U. S. 332 (1979). Similarly, if a § 1983 action alleging a constitutional claim is brought directly against a State, the Eleventh Amendment bars a federal court from granting any relief on that claim. SeeAlabanw v. Pugh, 438 U. S. 781
(1978) (per curiam). The Amendment thus is a specific constitutional bar against hearin·g evenfederal claims that other-~
wise would be v.rithin the jurisdiction of the federal courts. •
Tills constitutional bar applies to pendent claims as well.
~L~ power over a pen ent c mm nece
rives from Art.ln;-see-Aldi__nger
r , 427 U. S. 1, 9
(1976), and theE
endme
independent limit.a.tiQR-tJ
exercises of Art. III pow~r. See sup ,
-8.
If we were to hold otherwise, a federal court could award

\5'

'fsee, e. g., Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U. S. 313, 322 (1934) ("[A]lthough a case may arise und er the Constitution and laws of the United
States, the judicial power does not extend to it if the suit is sought to be
prosecuted against a State, without her consent, by one of her own citizens"); Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U. S. 18, 25-26 (1933).

;it,

''~
V

No.

Pennnursc v .

~1-~101

RIDER "A" P.

These
question

Ha~aerrnan

u.

21

cases
before

thus
us.

did

not

"[W]hen

directly

questions

confront

of

the

jurisdiction

have been passed on in prior decisions sub silentio, this
Court has never considered itself bound when a subsequent
case finally brings the jurisdictional issue before us."
Hagans

v.

Lavine,

415

u.s.

528,

533,

n.

5

(1974}. 'JI'Iwe

therefore view the question as an open one.
As noted,
have

been

the

that

implicit view of these cases seems to

once

jurisdiction

is

established

on

the

basis of a federal question, no further Eleventh Amendment
inquiry is necessary with respect to other claims raised
in the case.
the

principles

This

is an erroneous view and contrary to

established

in

our

Eleventh

Amendment

decisions.

IYt [Footnote
20.]

14

is

the

same

as

the

former

footnote
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As

noted

doctrine
general

above,
of

expediency

Art.

III

"cases"

arising

parties.

See

(1966).
(1974)

See

and

under

conferring

federal

Hagans

v.
v.

pendent

is

efficiency

language

also

discretion").

command

jurisdiction

Mine Workers

(terming

general

pendent

law

a

judge-made

derived
power

or

to

between

from

the

hear

all

diverse

Gibbs,

383

u.s.

715,

725

Lavine,

415

u.s.

528,

545

jurisdiction

"a

doctrine

of

Under ordinary rules of construction, this

language must give way to the far more specific
of

the

Eleventh

Amendment,

which

explicitly

excludes from the judicial power suits prosecuted against
States.

The

history of

the Amendment,

see supra,

the adoption and development of
at 6-9, confirms that it is an

independent limitation on all exercises of Art. III power:
"the

entire

does

not

judicial

embrace

power

authority

granted

by

the

Constitution "

to entertain suit brought by

private parties against a State without consent given," Ex
parte State of New York No. 1, 256

u.s.

490, 497 (1921).

81-2101-0PINION
22

PENNHURST STATE SCHOOL & HOSP. v. HALDERMAN

damages against a State on the basis of a pendent claim.
Our decision in Edelman v. Jordan, supra, makes clear that
pendent jurisdiction does not permit such an evasion of the
immunity guaranteed by the Elevehth Amendment. We
there held that "the District Court was correct in exercising
pendent jurisdiction over [plaintiffs'] statutory claim," 415
U. S., at 653, n. 1, but then concluded that the Eleventh
Amendment barred an award of retroactive relief on the
basis of that pendent claim. Jd.,.:at'6'78.
In sum, c_ontrary to the ~~BiB implicit in decisions such
as G1·eene, supra, neith~r pendent jurisdiction. nor any other
basis..f' jurisdiction may override the Eleventh Amendment.
A federal court must examine each claim in a case to
see if the court's jurisdiction over that claim is barred by the
Eleventh Amendment ....... We concluded above that a claim
that state officials Violated state law in carrying out their official responsibilities is a claim against the State that is protected by the Eleventh Amendment. See supra, at 16. We
now hold that this principle applies as well to state-law claims
brought ~~~f~?er~l_ccn~~~-~nder 12~_ndent "urisdiction. T .
1s
has not previously been confronted direct , nd we
thereforear~~~~~b~ prior ~ecisio . s~u~g a contrary conclus10I_l. ~- que
s of Jurlsdlctlon have
been passed on in prior
sub silentio, this Court has
never considere ·
bound when a
equent case finally
brings
JUrisdictional issue before
ne 415 U. S. 528 533 n. 5 (1974). 20

view

c
,See Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U. S., at 27 ("This is not less a suit against
the State because the bill is ancillary and supplemental.").
ee
man v. or n,
1, 671 (1974) ("Havmg now had
an opportunity to more fully consider the Eleventh Amendment issue after
briefing and argument, we disapprove the Eleventh Amendment holdings
of [certain prior] cases to the extent that they are inconsistent with our
holding today'').

·.
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Respondents urge that application of the Eleventh Amendment to pendent state-law claims will have a disruptive effect
on litigation against state officials. ,;. They argue that the
11
Considerations of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to litigants" that underlie pendent jurisdiction, see
Gibbs, supra, at 726, counsel against a result that may cause
litigants to split causes of action be~ween state and federal
courts. They also contend that the .policy of avoiding unnecessary constitutional decisions will be contravened if plaintiffs choose to forgo their state-law claims and sue only in federal court or, alternatively, that the policy of Ex parte Young
will be hindered if plaintiffs choose to forgo their right to a
federal forum and bring all of their claims in state court.
e agree that, depen mg on t e Circumstances o e c ,
these considerations of 'P'olicy may be important, 21
they
may not o~iQe the constitutional limitations
he author- ~
ity of the federa:l)tldif~ary to adjudicate · s against a State. ~
See Missouri v. Fisk~90 U. S.,
5-26 (~~Considerations
J Ot.R
of convenience open no aven v of escape from the [Amendment's] restriction"). 22 ..J~uit rou~t by private litigants
against state o~al0hyse constitutiorial~mitations do not
preclude a ~.deral court fr.pJ? granting pros.Pec....t,t:e relief to
~di~iederal law.
But the Eleventh AmenClm nt de~_!~eral courts of power to consider other claims r · d

R
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It

may

be

that

applying

the

Eleventh

Amendment

to

pendent claims results in federal claims being brought in
state

court,

or

in bifurcation of claims.

uncommon in this area.
suit

for

That

is not

Under Edelman v. Jordan, supra, a

money damages against

state officials,

whether

based on federal or state law, must be brought in state
court.

Challenges

under 42

u.s.c.

to

the validity of state tax systems

§1983 also must be brought in state court.

Fair Assessment in Real Estate Assn.
100 (1981).

v. McNary, 454

u.s.

Under the abstention doctrine, unclear issues

of state law commonly are split off and referred to the
state courts. ll1

r?jMoreover, allowing claims against state officiais /
based on state law to be brought in the federal courts
does not necessarily foster the policies of "judicial
economy, convenience and fairness to litigants," Mine
Workers v. Gibbs, 383 u.s. 715, 726 (1966), that underlie
pendent
jurisdiction.
For
example,
when
a
federal
decision on state law is obtained, the federal court's
construction often is uncertain and ephemeral.
In cases
of ongoing oversight of a state program that may extend
over years, as in this case, the federal intrusion is
likely
to
be
extensive.
Duplication
of
effort,
inconvenience, and uncertainty may well result.
See,
e.g., Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 u.s. 315, 327 (1943)
Footnote continued on next page.
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In any case, the answer to respondents' assertions is
that

such

considerations

of

policy

cannot

override

the

constitutional limitation on the authority of the federal
judiciary

to

adjudicate

Missouri v. Fiske,
convenience
[ Amen d rnent I s ]

290

open

no

suits

u.s.,

against

a

State.

See

at 25-26 ("Considerations of

avenue

of

escape

from

the

'
'
• ' ' Th at
' '
I s
'
restr1ct1on").
a l1t1gant
c h 01ce
of

forum is reduced "has long been understood to be a part of
the

tension

inherent

in

our

system

of

federalism."

Employees v. Missouri Public Health & Welfare Dept.,

u.s.

279, 298 (1973)

411

(MARSHALL, J., concurring in result).

("Delay, misunderstanding of local law, and needless '
conflict with the state policy, are the inevitable product
of this double [i.e. , federal-state] sys tern of review") .
Waste and delay may also result from abstention, which
often is called for when state law is unclear, see Baggett
v. Bullitt, 377 u.s. 360, 378-379 (1964)
("abstention
operates to require piecemeal adjudication in many courts,
thereby delaying ultimate adjudication on the merits for
an undue length of time") (citations omitted), or from
dismissals on the basis of comity, which has special force
when relief is sought on state-law grounds, see Gibbs,
supra, at 726~ Hawks v. Hamill, 288 u.s. 52, 61 (1933).
' ' ' [Footnote 18 is the same as former footnote 22.]
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This limitation on federal judicial J;6:.Ve'r . .l.mposes the same incon ece on a plaintiff who has certain federal claims that may not be r sed
deral court. Under Edelman v. Jordan, supra, a plaintiff "th a
claim~ monetary relief against a State on the basis of federal w must
resort to ~ate court. If he wishes to press a related claim for ospective
relief, he ~st forgo the damages claim, or split his related ca es of action
between federal and state courts, or take the entire case o state court.
AB JUSTICE M~sHAL~. has, .f.lbserved, the fact that so e federal rights
may have to be e arced ·m·a. 'state forum is "a part oft e tension inherent
in our system of fe eralism." Employees v. Misso ri Public Health &
Welfare Dept., 411 . S. 279, 298 (1973) (MARS
L, J., concurring in
result).
"'The dissent's distaste
dment and its principle of
sovereign immunity is the l;lderlying the
of the dissenting opinion.
See post, at 25-27; cf. id., at 1'0'\:11 (quoti the "illuminating" analysis in
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419">A71 (1 3) (opinion of Jay, C. J.)). Indeed, the dissent's negative view o o ereign immunity leads it to an apparent willingness to overrule the ·d)9 s_ions of this Court that have emphasized the importance and continuil;g vita~y of the Eleventh Amendment,
id., at 26, in favor of JUSTICE BR,ENNAN's dissenting view in Employees v.
Missouri Public Health Dept. 1411 U. S. 27~1973). But that view was
expressly rejected both by ~tice Douglas' op 'on for the Court, see id.,
at ~0, n. 1, and JUSTICE ~SHALL's opinion co ~ing in the judgment,
see td., at 292, n. 8.
/
(
Thus, the dissent's 1 argument that sovereign ·
nity ".!.undoubtedly
runs counter to moqern democratic notions of the mor responsibility of
' theState)' post, ae27 (quoting Great Northern Life Ins. o. v. Read, 322
U. S. 47, '59 (1944) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)), is a view o he Eleventh
Amendment t~a't has never been accepted by this Court. M eover, the
argument sub'stantially misses the point with respect to Elevent Amendment sovereign immunity. As JUSTICE MARSHALL has obse~:- the
Elevenq/Amendment's restriction on the federal judicial power is b-a'kd in
large J)i'rt on the "the problems of federalism inherent in making one so~
.

--++.._c..,..L.

-n V .
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IV
Respondents contend that, regardless of the applicability
of the Eleventh Amendment to their .state claims against peti~ioner state officials, the judgment may still be upheld
against petitioner county officials. We are not persuaded.
Even assuming that these officials are not im~u~ from suit
challenging their actions under the MHIMR Act, it is clear
that without the injunction against the ,state institutions and
officials in this case, an order enter~d on state-law grounds
necessarily would be limited. The relief substantially concerns Pennhurst, an arm of the State that is operated by

~

~~~===·"
g,,,.._., ..~···
~he

--=-we have held that
EleVenth Amendment does not apply to "counties and similar municipal corporations." Mt. Healthy City School District
v. Doyle, 429 U. S: 274, 280 (1977); see Lincoln County v. Luning, 133
U. S. 529, 530 (1890). At the same time, we have applied the Amendment
to bar relief against county officials "in order to protect the state treasury
from liability that would have had essentially the same practical consequences as a judgment against the State itself." Lake Country Estates,
Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U. S. 391, 401 (1979). See,
e. g., Edelman v. Jordan, supra (Eleventh Amendment bars suit against
state and county officials for retroactive award of welfare benefits). The
Courts of Appeals are in general agreement that a suit against officials of a
county or other governmental entity is barred if the relief obtained runs
against the State. See, e. g., Moore v. Tangipalwa Parish School Board,
594 F. 2d 489, 493 (CA5 1979); Carey v. Quem, 588 F. 2d 230, 233-234
(CA7 1978); Incarcerated Men of Allen County Jail v. Fair, 507 F. 2d 281,
287-288 (CA6 1974); Harris v. Tooele County School District, 471 F. 2d
218 220 (CAlO 1973). Given that the actions of the county commissioners
health ad~trators are dependent on funding from the State, ;_
t may bet 'at relief granted against these county officials, when exercising
their functions under the MH/MR Act, effectively runs against the State.
Cf. Farr v. Chesney, 441 F. Supp. 127, 130- 132 (MD Pa. 1977) (holding
that Pennsylvania county commissioners, acting as members of the board
of the county office of mental health and retardation, may not be sued for
back pay under the Eleventh Amendment). We need not decide this issue
in light of our disposition above.
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state officials. Moreover, funding for the county mental retardation programs comes almost entirely from the State, see
Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 50, §§4507--4509 (Purdon 1969 and Supp.
1982), and the costs of the masters have been borne by the
State, see 446 F. Supp., at 1327. Finally, the MH!.MR Act
contemplates that the state and county officials will cooperate
in operating mental retardation programs.. See In re
Schmidt, 494 Pa. 86, 95--96, 429 A. 2d 631, 635--636 (1981).
In short, the present judgment could not be sustained on the
basis of the state-law obligations of petitioner county officials. Indeed, any relief granted against the county officials
on the basis of the state statute would be partial and incomplete at best. Such an ineffective enforcement of state law
would not appear to serve the purposes of efficiency, convenience, and fairness that must inform the exercise of pendent
jurisdiction.
.. . · ··'"'- ·

v
The Court'·~f Appeals upheld the judgment of the District
Court solely on the basis of Pennsylvania's MH/MR Act.
We hold that . . courts lacked jurisdiction to enjoin petitioner state institutions and state officials on the basis of this
state law. The District Court also rested its decision on the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. See supra, at 2. On remand the
Court of Appeals may consider to what extent, if any, the
judgment may be sustained on these bases:'The court also
may consider whether relief may be granted to respondents
under the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of
Rights Act, 42 U. S. C. §§ 6011, 6063. The judgment of the
Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered .
.... 1.0/

V

iiF
"""on the Fourteenth Amendment issue, the court should consider
Youngberg v. Romeo,- U. S . - (1982), a decision that was not available when the District Court issued its decision .
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 81-2101
PENNHURST STATE SCHOOL & HOSPITAL ET AL.,
PETITIONERS v. TERRI LEE HALDERMAN ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
[January 23, 1984]

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether a federal court
may award injunctive relief against state officials on the basis
of state law.
I
This litigation, here for the second time, concerns the conditions of care at petitioner Pennhurst State School and Hospital, a Pennsylvania institution for the care of the mentally
retarded. See Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1 (1981). Although the litigation's history is set forth in detail in our prior opinion, see id., at 5-10,
it is necessary for purposes of this decision to review that
history.
This suit originally was brought in 1974 by respondent
Terri Lee Halderman, a resident of Pennhurst, in the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Ultimately, plaintiffs included a class consisting of all persons
who were or might become residents of Pennhurst; the Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Citizens (P ARC); and the
United States. Defendants were Pennhurst and various
Pennhurst officials; the Pennsylvania Department of Public
Welfare and several of its officials; and various county commissioners, county mental retardation administrators, and
other officials of five Pennsylvania counties surrounding
Pennhurst. Respondents' amended complaint charged that
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conditions at Pennhurst violated the class members' rights
under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 87 Stat. 394, as amended, 29
U. S. C. § 794 (1976 ed. and Supp. V); the Developmentally
Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U. S. C.
§§ 6001-6081 (1976 ed. and Supp. V); and the Pennsylvania
Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966 (the
"MH/MR Act"), Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 50, §§ 4101-4704 (Purdon 1969 and Supp. 1982). Both damages and injunctive relief were sought.
In 1977, following a lengthy trial, the District Court rendered its decision. 446 F. Supp. 1295 (1977). As noted in
our prior opinion, the court's findings were undisputed: "Conditions at Pennhurst are not only dangerous, with the residents often physically abused or drugged by staff members,
but also inadequate for the 'habilitation' of the retarded. Indeed, the court found that the physicial, intellectual, and
emotional skills of some residents have deteriorated at
Pennhurst." 451 U. S., at 7 (footnote omitted). The District Court held that these conditions violated each resident's
right to "minimally adequate habilitation" under the Due
Process Clause and the MH/MR Act, see 446 F. Supp., at
1314-1318, 1322-1323; "freedom from harm" under the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, see id., at 1320-1321;
and "nondiscriminatory habilitation" under the Equal Protection Clause and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, see id., at
1321-1324. Furthermore, the court found that "due process
demands that if a state undertakes the habilitation of a retarded person, it must do so in the least restrictive setting
consistent with that individual's habilitative needs." I d., at
1319 (emphasis added). After concluding that the large size
of Pennhurst prevented it from providing the necessary
habilitation in the least restrictive environment, the court ordered "that immediate steps be taken to remove the retarded
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residents from Pennhurst." Id., at 1325. Petitioners were
ordered "to provide suitable community living arrangements" for the class members, id., at 1326, and the court appointed a Special Master "with the power and duty to plan,
organize, direct, supervise and monitor the implementation
of this and any further Orders of the Court." Ibid. 1
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed most
of the District Court's judgment. 612 F. 2d 84 (1979) (en
bane). It agreed that respondents had a right to habilitation
in the least restrictive environment, but it grounded this
right solely on the "bill of rights" provision in the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42
U. S. C. § 6010. See 612 F. 2d, at 95-100, 104-107. The
court did not consider the constitutional issues or § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act, and while it affirmed the District Court's
holding that the MH/MR Act provides a right to adequate
habilitation, see id., at 100-103, the court did not decide
whether that state right encompassed a right to treatment in
the least restrictive setting.
On the question of remedy, the Court of Appeals affirmed
except as to the District Court's order that Pennhurst be
closed. The court observed that some patients would be
unable to adjust to life outside an institution, and it determined that none of the legal provisions relied on by plaintiffs
precluded institutionalization. !d., at 114-115. It therefore
remanded for "individual determinations by the [District
Court], or by the Special Master, as to the appropriateness of
an improved Pennhurst for each such patient," guided by "a
presumption in favor of placing individuals in [community living arrangements]." Ibid. 2
The District Court determined that the individual defendants had
acted in good faith and therefore were immune from the damage claims.
446 F. Supp., at 1324.
2
In a companion case, the Court of Appeals affirmed the District
Court's denial of the Pennhurst Parents-Staff Association's motion to intervene for purposes of appeal, finding the denial harmless error. See 612
1
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On remand the District Court established detailed procedures for determining the proper residential placement for
each patient. A team consisting of the patient, his parents
or guardian, and his case manager must establish an individual habilitation plan providing for habilitation of the patient
in a designated community living arrangement. The plan is
subject to review by the Special Master. A second master,
called the Hearing Master, is available to conduct hearings,
upon request by the resident, his parents or his advocate, on
the question whether the services of Pennhurst would be
more beneficial to the resident than the community living arrangement provided in the resident's plan. The Hearing
Master then determines where the patient should reside,
subject to possible review by the District Court. See App.
123a-134a (Order of April 24, 1980). 3
This Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals,
finding that 42 U. S. C. § 6010 did not create any substantive
rights. 451 U. S. 1 (1981). We remanded the case to the
Court of Appeals to determine if the remedial order could be
supported on the basis of state law, the Constitution, or§ 504
of the Rehabilitation Act. See id., at 31. 4 We also remanded for consideration of whether any relief was available
F . 2d 131 (1979) (en bane). The Association subsequently was granted
leave to intervene and is a petitioner in this Court.
3
On July 1, 1981, Pennsylvania enacted an appropriations bill providing
that only $35,000 would be paid for the Masters' expenses for the fiscal
year July 1981 to June 1982. The District Court held the Pennsylvania
Department of Public Welfare and its Secretary in contempt, and imposed
a fine of $10,000 per day. Pennsylvania paid the fines, and the contempt
was purged on January 8, 1982. On appeal the Court of Appeals affirmed
the contempt order. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hospital,
673 F. 2d 628 (1982), cert. pending, No. 81-2363.
' Three Justices dissented from the Court's construction of the Act, but
concluded that the District Court should not have adopted the "far-reaching remedy" of appointing "a Special Master to decide which of the Pennhurst inmates should remain and which should be moved to communitybased facilities . ... [T]he court should not have assumed the task of managing Pennhurst . ... " 451 U. S. , at 54 (WHITE J., dissenting in part).
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under other provisions of the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act. See id., at 27-30 (discussing
42 U. S. C. §§ 6011(a), 6063(b)(5)).
On remand the Court of Appeals affirmed its prior judgment in its entirety. 673 F. 2d 647 (1982) (en bane). It determined that in a recent decision the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania had "spoken definitively" in holding that the
MH/MR Act required the State to adopt the "least restrictive
environment" approach for the care of the mentally retarded.
!d., at 651 (citing In re Schmidt, 494 Pa. 86, 429 A. 2d 631
(1981)). The Court of Appeals concluded that this state statute fully supported its prior judgment, and therefore did not
reach the remaining issues of federal law. It also rejected
petitioners' argument that the Eleventh Amendment barred
a federal court from considering this pendent state-law claim.
The court noted that the Amendment did not bar a federal
court from granting prospective injunctive relief against
state officials on the basis of federal claims, see 673 F. 2d, at
656 (citing Ex Parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908)), and concluded that the same result obtained with respect to a
pendent state-law claim. It reasoned that because Siler v.
Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 213 U. S. 175 (1909), an important case in the development of the doctrine of pendent
jurisdiction, also involved state officials, "there cannot be ...
an Eleventh Amendment exception to that rule." 673 F. 2d,
at 658. 5 Finally, the court rejected petitioners' argument
' The Court of Appeals also noted that "the United States is an intervening plaintiff ... against which even the state itself cannot successfully
plead the Eleventh Amendment as a bar to jurisdiction," and that "the
counties, even as juridical entities, do not fall within the coverage of the
Eleventh Amendment. Against those defendants even money damages
may be awarded." 673 F. 2d, at 656 (citation omitted).
As JUSTICE BRENNAN points out in his dissent, post, at 1, Judge Gibbons
has expanded on his views of the Eleventh Amendment in a recent law review article. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign
Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1889 (1983). Judge

1
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that it should have abstained from deciding the state-law
claim under principles of comity, see id., at 659-660, and
refused to consider petitioners' objections to the District
Court's use of a special master, see id., at 651 and n. 10.
Three judges dissented in part, arguing that under principles
of federalism and comity the establishment of a special master to supervise compliance was an abuse of discretion. See
id., at 662 (Seitz, C. J., joined by Hunter, J., dissenting in
part); ibid. (Garth, J., concurring in part and dissenting as to
relief). See also id., at 661 (Aldisert, J., concurring) (seriously questioning the propriety of the order appointing the
Special Master, but concluding that a retroactive reversal of
that order would be meaningless). 6
We granted certiorari, 457 U. S. 1131 (1982), and now reverse and remand.
II
Petitioners raise three challenges to the judgment of the
Court of Appeals: (i) the Eleventh Amendment prohibited
the District Court from ordering state officials to conform
their conduct to state law; (ii) the doctrine of comity prohibited the District Court from issuing its injunctive relief; and
(iii) the District Court abused its discretion in appointing two
masters to supervise the decisions of state officials in implementing state law. We need not reach the latter two issues,
for we find the Eleventh Amendment challenge dispositive.
A
Article III, § 2 of the Constitution provides that the federal
judicial power extends, inter alia, to controversies "between
a State and Citizens of another State." Relying on this language, this Court in 1793 assumed original jurisdiction over a
suit brought by a citizen of South Carolina against the State
Gibbons was the author of both the first and second opinions by the Court
of Appeals in this case.
6
The Office of the Special Master was abolished in December 1982.
See App. 220a (Order of August 12, 1982). The Hearing Master remains
in operation.

l
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of Georgia. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419 (1793). The
decision "created such a shock of surprise that the Eleventh
Amendment was at once proposed and adopted." Monaco v.
Mississippi, 292 U. S. 313, 325 (1934). The Amendment
provides:
"The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States
by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects
of any Foreign State."
The Amendment's language overruled the particular result
in Chisholm, but this Court has recognized that its greater
significance lies in its affirmation that the fundamental principle of sovereign immunity limits the grant of judicial authority in Art. III. Thus, in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1
(1890), the Court held that, despite the limited terms of the
Eleventh Amendment, a federal court could not entertain a
suit brought by a citizen against his own State. After reviewing the constitutional debates concerning the scope of
Art. III, the Court determined that federal jurisdiction over
suits against unconsenting States "was not contemplated by
the Constitution when establishing the judicial power of the
United States." Id., at 15. See Monaco v. Mississippi,
supra, at 322-323 (1934). 7 In short, the principle of sovereign immunity is a constitutional limitation on the federal judicial power established in Art. III:
"That a State may not be sued without its consent is a
fundamental rule of jurisprudence having so important a
bearing upon the construction of the Constitution of the
7
See Employees v. Missouri Pu blic Health Dep't, 411 U. S. 279,
291-292 (1973) (MARSHALL, J. , concurring in judgment) (The Eleventh
Amendment "clarif[ied] the intent of the Framers concerning the reach of
federal judicial power" and "restore[d] the original understanding" that
States could not be made unwilling defendants in federal court). See also
Nevada v. Hall, 440 U. S. 410, 430-431 (1979) (BLACKMUN, J ., dissenting);
id., at 437 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting).
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United States that it has become established by repeated
decisions of this court that the entire judicial power
granted by the Constitution does not embrace authority
to entertain a suit brought by private parties against a
State without consent given: not one brought by citizens
of another State, or by citizens or subjects of a foreign
State, because of the Eleventh Amendment; and not
even one brought by its own citizens, because of the fundamental rule of which the Amendment is but an exemplification." Ex parte State of New York No. 1, 256
U. S. 490, 497 (1921) (emphasis added). 8
A sovereign's immunity may be waived, and the Court consistently has held that a State may consent to suit against it
in federal court. See, e. g., Clark v. Barnard, 108 U. S.
436, 447 (1883). We have insisted, however, that the State's
consent be unequivocally expressed. See, e. g., Edelman v.
Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 673 (1974). Similarly, although Congress has power with respect to the rights protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment immunity, see Fitzpatrick v. Bitker, 427 U. S. 445
(1976), we have required an unequivocal expression of congressional intent to "overturn the constitutionally guaranteed immunity of the several States." Quern v. Jordan, 440
U. S. 332, 342 (1979) (holding that 42 U. S. C. § 1983 does not
override States' Eleventh Amendment immunity). Our reluctance to infer that a State's immunity from suit in the federal courts has been negated stems from recognition of the
vital role of the doctrine of sovereign immunity in our federal
system. A State's constitutional interest in hnmunity en8
The limitation deprives federal courts of any jurisdiction to entertain
such claims, and thus may be raised at any point in a proceeding. "The
Eleventh Amendment declares a policy and sets forth an explicit limitation
on federal judicial power of such compelling force that this Court will consider the issue arising under this Amendment . . . even though urged for
the first time in this Court." Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury,

323

u. s. 459, 467 (1945).
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compasses not merely whether it may be sued, but where it
may be sued. 9 As JuSTICE MARSHALL well has noted, "[b]ecause of the problems of federalism inherent in making one
sovereign appear against its will in the courts of the other, a
restriction upon the exercise of the federal judicial power has
long been considered to be appropriate in a case such as this."
Employees v. Missouri Public Health & Welfare Dep't, 411
U.S. 279, 294 (1973) (MARSHALL, J., concurring in result). 10
Accordingly, in deciding this case we must be guided by
"[t]he principles of federalism that inform Eleventh Amendment doctrine." Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678, 691 (1978).
B
This Court's decisions thus establish that "an unconsenting
State is immune from suits brought in federal courts by her
own citizens as well as by citizens of another state." Employees, supra, at 280. There may be a question, however,
whether a particular suit in fact is a suit against a State. It
is clear, of course, that in the absence of consent a suit in
which the State or one of its agencies or departments is
For this reason, the Court consistently has held that a State's waiver
of sovereign immunity in its own courts is not a waiver of the Eleventh
Amendment immunity in the federal courts. See, e. g., Florida Depart·
ment of Health v. Florida Nursing Home Assn., 450 U. S. 147, 150 (1981)
(per curiam). "[l]t is not consonant with our dual system for the federal
courts . . . to read the consent to embrace federal as well as state
courts .... [A] clear declaration of the state's intention to submit its fiscal
problems to other courts than those of its own creation must be found."
Great Northern Life Insurance Co. v. Read, 322 U. S. 47, 54 (1944).
0
' See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S., at 418-419 (States were "vitally interested" in whether they would be subject to suit in the federal courts, and
the debates about state immunity focused on the question of federal judicial
power). Cf. id., at 430-431 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting) (sovereign immunity is "a guarantee that is implied as an essential component of federalism"
and is "sufficiently fundamental to our federal structure to have implicit
constitutional dimension"); id., at 437 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting) ("[T]he
States that ratified the Eleventh Amendment thought that they were putting an end to the possibility of individual States as unconsenting defendants in foreign jurisdictions").
9
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named as the defendant is proscribed by the Eleventh
Amendment. See, e. g., Florida Department of Health v.
Florida Nursing Home Assn., 450 U. S. 147 (1981) (per
curiam); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U. S. 781 (1978) (per
curiam). This jurisdictional bar applies regardless of the
nature of the relief sought. See, e. g., Missouri v. Fiske,
290 U. S. 18, 27 (1933) ("Expressly applying to suits in equity
as well as at law, the Amendment necessarily embraces demands for the enforcement of equitable rights and the prosecution of equitable remedies when these are asserted and
prosecuted by an individual against a State").
When the suit is brought only against state officials, a
question arises as to whether that suit is a suit against the
State itself. Although prior decisions of this Court have not
been entirely consistent on this issue, certain principles are
well established. The Eleventh Amendment bars a suit
against state officials when "the state is the real, substantial
party in interest." Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U. S. 459, 464 (1945). See, e. g., In re Ayers, 123
U. S. 443, 487-492 (1887); Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U. S.
711, 720-723, 727-728 (1882). Thus, "[t]he general rule is
that relief sought nominally against an officer is in fact
against the sovereign if the decree would operate against the
latter." Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U. S. 57, 58 (1963) (per
curiam)Y And, as when the State itself is named as the de11

"The general rule is that a suit is against the sovereign if 'the judgment
sought would expend itself on the public treasury or domain, or interfere
with the public administration, ' or if the effect of the judgment would be 'to
restrain the Government from acting, or to compel it to act.'" Dugan v.
Rank, 372 U. S. 609, 620 (1963) (citations omitted).
Respondents do not dispute that the relief sought and awarded below operated against the state in each of the foregoing respects. They suggest,
however, that the suit here should not be considered to be against the state
for the purposes of the Eleventh Amendment because, they say, petitioners were acting ultra vires their authority. Respondents rely largely on
Florida Dep't of State v. Treasure Salvors , Inc ., 458 U. S. 670 (1982),
which in turn was founded upon Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce
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fendant, a suit against state officials that is in fact a suit
against a State is barred regardless of whether it seeks damages or injunctive relief. See Cory v. White, 457 U. S. 85,
91 (1982).
The Court has recognized an important exception to this
general rule: a suit challenging the constitutionality of a state
official's action is not one against the State. This was the
holding in Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908), in which a
federal court enjoined the Attorney General of the State of
Minnesota from bringing suit to enforce a state statute that
allegedly violated the Fourteenth Amendment. This Court
held that the Eleventh Amendment did not prohibit issuance
of this injunction. The theory of the case was that an unconstitutional enactment is "void" and therefore does not "impart to [the officer] any immunity from responsibility to the
supreme authority ofthe United States." !d., at 160. Since
the State could not authorize the action, the officer was
"stripped of his official or representative character and [was]
subjected to the consequences of his official conduct." Ibid.
Corp ., 337 U. S. 682 (1949). These cases provide no support for this argument. These and other modern cases make clear that a state officer may
be said to act ultra vires only when he acts "without any authority whatever." Treasure Salvors, supra, at 697 (opinion of STEVENS, J.); accord
id., at 716 (WHITE, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in
part) (test is whether there was no "colorable basis for the exercise of authority by state officials"). As the Court in Larson explained, an ultra
vires claim rests on "the officer's lack of delegated power. A claim of error
in the exercise of that power is therefore not sufficient." Larson, supra,
at 690. Petitioners' actions in operating this mental health institution
plainly were not beyond their delegated authority in this sense. The
MH/MR Act gave them broad discretion to provide "adequate" mental
health services. Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 50, § 4201(1) (Purdon 1969). The
essence of respondents' claim is that petitioners have not provided such
services adequately.
In his dissent, JuSTICE STEVENS advances a far broader-and unprecedented-version of the ultra vires doctrine, which we discuss infra, at
15-26.
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While the rule permitting suits alleging conduct contrary
to "the supreme authority of the United States" has survived, the theory of Young has not been provided an expansive interpretation. Thus, in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S.
651 (1974), the Court emphasized that the Eleventh Amendment bars some forms of injunctive relief against state officials for violation of federal law. !d., at 666-667. In particular, Edelman held that when a plaintiff sues a state
official alleging a violation of federal law, the federal court
may award an injunction that governs the official's future
conduct, but not one that awards retroactive monetary relief.
Under the theory of Young, such a suit would not be one
against the State since the federal-law allegation would strip
the state officer of his official authority. Nevertheless, retroactive relief was barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

III
With these principles in mind, we now turn to the question
whether the claim that petitioners violated state law in carrying out their official duties at Pennhurst is one against the
State and therefore barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
Respondents advance two principal arguments in support of
the judgment below. 12 First, they contend that under the
12
We reject respondents' additional contention that Pennsylvania has
waived its immunity from suit in federal court. At the time the suit was
filed, suits against Pennsylvania were permitted only where expressly authorized by the legislature, see, e. g., Freach v. Commonwealth, 471 Pa.
558, 370 A. 2d 1163 (1977), and respondents have not referred us to any
provision expressly waiving Pennsylvania's Eleventh Amendment immunity. The State now has a statute governing sovereign immunity, including an express preservation of its immunity from suit in federal court:
"Federal courts.-N othing contained in this subchapter shall be construed
to waive the immunity of the Commonwealth from suit in Federal courts
guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States." 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8521(b) (1980).
We also do not agree with respondents that the presence of the United
States as a plaintiff in this case removes the Eleventh Amendment from
consideration. Although the Eleventh Amendment does not bar the
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doctrine of Edelman v. Jordan, supra, the suit is not against
the State because the courts below ordered only prospective
injunctive relief. Second, they assert that the state-law
claim properly was decided under the doctrine of pendent
jurisdiction. Respondents rely on decisions of this Court
awarding relief against state officials on the basis of a pendent state-law claim. See, e. g., Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 213 U. S. 175, 193 (1909).
A
We first address the contention that respondents' state-law
claim is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment because it
seeks only prospective relief as defined in Edelman v. Jordan, supra. The Court of Appeals held that if the judgment
below rested on federal law, it could be entered against petitioner state officials under the doctrine established in Edelman and Young even though the prospective financial burden
was substantial and ongoing. 13 See 673 F. 2d, at 656. The
court assumed, and respondents assert, that this reasoning
applies as well when the official acts in violation of state law.
United States from suing a State in federal court, see, e. g., Monaco v.
Mississippi, 292 U. S. 313, 329 (1934), the United States' presence in the
case for any purpose does not eliminate the State's immunity for all purposes. For example, the fact that the federal court could award injunctive
relief to the United States on federal constitutional claims would not mean
that the court could order the State to pay damages to other plaintiffs. In
any case, we think it clear that the United States does not have standing to
assert the state-law claims of third-parties. For these reasons, the applicability of the Eleventh Amendment to respondents' state-law claim is
unaffected by the United States' participation in the case.
13
We do not decide whether the District Court would have jurisdiction
under this reasoning to grant prospective relief on the basis of federal law,
but we note that the scope of any such relief would be constrain~d by principles of comity and federalism. "Where, as here, the exercise of authority by state officials is attacked, federal courts must be constantly mindful
of the 'special delicacy of the adjustment to be preserved between federal
equitable power and State administration of its own law.'" R izzo v.
Goode, 423 U. S. 362, 378 (1976) (quoting Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U. S.
117, 120 (1951)).
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This argument misconstrues the basis of the doctrine established in Young and Edelman.
As discussed above, the injunction in Young was justified,
notwithstanding the obvious impact on the State itself, on the
view that sovereign immunity does not apply because an official who acts unconstitutionally is "stripped of his official or
representative character," Young, 209 U. S., at 160. This
rationale, of course, created the "well-recognized irony" that
an official's unconstitutional conduct constitutes state action under the Fourteenth Amendment but not the Eleventh
Amendment. Florida Department of State v. Treasure
Salvors, Inc., 458 U. S. 670, 685 (1982) (opinion of STEVENS,
J.). Nonetheless, the Young doctrine has been accepted as
necessary to permit the federal courts to vindicate federal
rights and hold state officials responsible to "the supreme authority of the United States." Young, 209 U. S., at 160.
As JUSTICE BRENNAN has observed, "Ex parte Young was
the culmination of efforts by this Court to harmonize the
principles of the Eleventh Amendment with the effective supremacy of rights and powers secured elsewhere in the Constitution." Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U. S. 82, 106 (1971)
(BRENNAN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Our decisions repeatedly have emphasized that the Young
doctrine rests on the need to promote the vindication of federal rights. See, e. g., Quern v. Jordan, 440 U. S. 332, 337
(1979); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232, 237 (1974); Georgia
R. & Banking Co. v. Redwine, 342 U. S. 299, 304 (1952).
The Court also has recognized, however, that the need to
promote the supremacy of federal law must be accommodated
to the constitutional immunity of the States. This is the significance of Edelman v. Jorrj.,an, supra. We recognized that
the prospective relief authorized by Young "has permitted
the Civil War Amendments to the Constitution to serve as a
sword, rather than merely a shield, for those whom they
were designed to protect." 415 U. S., at 664. But we declined to extend the fiction of Young to encompass retro-
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active relief, for to do so would effectively eliminate the
constitutional immunity of the States. Accordingly, we concluded that although the difference between permissible and
impermissible relief "will not in many instances be that between day and night," id., at 667, an award of retroactive relief necessarily "'fall[s] afoul of the Eleventh Amendment if
that basic constitutional provision is to be conceived of as
having any present force."' !d., at 665 (quoting Rothstein v.
Wyman, 467 F. 2d 226, 237 (CA2 1972) (McGowan, J., sitting
by designation), cert. denied, 411 U. S. 921 (1973)). In sum
Edelman's distinction between prospective and retroactive
relief fulfills the underlying purpose of Ex parte Young while
at the same time preserving to an important degree the constitutional immunity of the States.
This need to reconcile competing interests is wholly absent, however, when a plaintiff alleges that a state official has
violated state law. In such a case the entire basis for the
doctrine of Young and Edelman disappears. A federal
court's grant of relief against state officials on the basis of
state law, whether prospective or retroactive, does not vindicate the supreme authority of federal law. On the contrary,
it is difficult to think of a greater intrusion on state sovereignty than when a federal court instructs state officials on
how to conform their conduct to state law. Such a result
conflicts directly with the principles of federalism that underlie the Eleventh Amendment. We conclude that Young and
Edelman are inapplicable in a suit against state officials on
the basis of state law.
B
The contrary view of JUSTICE STEVENS' dissent rests on
fiction, is wrong on the law, and, most important, would
emasculate the Eleventh Amendment. 14 Under his view, an
We are prompted to respond at some length to JUSTICE STEVENS' 41page dissent in part by his broad charge that "the Court repudiates at least
28 cases," post, at 21. The decisions the dissent relies upon simply do not
support this sweeping characterization. See nn. 19, 20, and 21, infra.
14
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allegation that official conduct is contrary to a state statute
would suffice to override the State's protection under that
Amendment. The theory is that such conduct is contrary to
the official's "instructions," and thus ultra vires his authority.
Accordingly, official action based on a reasonable interpretation of any statute might, if the interpretation turned out to
be erroneous, 15 provide the basis for injunctive relief against
the actors in their official capacities. In this case, where officials of a major state department, clearly acting within the
scope of their authority, were found not to have improved
conditions in a state institution adequately under state law,
the dissent's result would be that the State itself has forfeited
its constitutionally provided immunity.
The theory is out of touch with reality. The dissent does
not dispute that the general criterion for determining when a
suit is in fact against the sovereign is the effect of the relief
sought. See supra, at 10; post, at 21, n. 29. According to
the dissent, the relief sought and ordered here-which in effect was that a major state institution be closed and smaller
state institutions be created and expansively funded-did not
operate against the State. This view would make the law a
pretense. No other court or judge in the ten-year history of
this litigation has advanced this theory. And the dissent's
underlying view that the named defendants here were acting
beyond and contrary to their authority cannot be reconciled
with reality-or with the record. The District Court in this
case held that the individual defendants "acted in the utmost
good faith ... within the sphere of their official responsibilities," and therefore were entitled to immunity from damages. 446 F. Supp., at 1324 (emphasis added). The named
defendants had nothing to gain personally from their conduct;
they were not found to have acted wilfully or even negli•• In this case, for example, the court below rested its finding that state
law required habilitation in the least restrictive environment on dicta in In
re Schmidt, 494 Pa. 86, 429 A. 2d 631 (1981). That decision was not issued
until seven years after this suit was filed, and four years after trial ended.

81-2101-0PINION
PENNHURST STATE SCHOOL & HOSP. v. HALDERMAN

17

gently. See ibid. The court expressly noted that the individual defendants "apparently took every means available to
them to reduce the incidents of abuse and injury, but were
constantly faced with staff shortages." Ibid. It also found
"that the individual defendants are dedicated professionals in
the field of retardation who were given very little with which
to accomplish the habilitation of the retarded at Pennhurst."
Ibid. 16 As a result, all the relief ordered by the courts below
16
This part of the court's findings and judgment was not appealed. See
612 F . 2d, at 90, n. 4. See also 446 F. Supp. , at 1303 ("On the whole, the
staff at Pennhurst appears to be dedicated and trying hard to cope with the
inadequacies of the institution").
The parties defendant in this suit were not all individuals. They included as well the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare, a major department of the State itself; and the Pennhurst State School and Hospital,
a state institution. The dissent apparently is arguing that the defendants
as a group-including both the state institutions, and state and county officials-were acting ultra vires. Since the institutions were only said to
have violated the law through the individual defendants, the District
Court's findings, never since questioned by any court, plainly exonerate all
the defendants from the dissent's claim that they acted beyond the scope of
their authority.
A truth of which the dissent's theoretical argument seems unaware is the
plight of many if not most of the mental institutions in our country. As the
District Court in this case found, "History is replete with misunderstanding and mistreatment of the retarded." 446 F. Supp., at 1299. Accord
Message from President Kennedy Relative to Mental Illness and Mental
Retardation, H. R. Doc. No. 58, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1963) ("We as a
Nation have long neglected the mentally ill and the mentally retarded").
It is common knowledge that "insane asylums ," as they were known until
the middle of this century, usually were underfunded and understaffed. It
is not easy to persuade competent people to work in these institutions, particularly well trained professionals. Physical facilities , due to consistent
underfunding by state legislatures, have been grossly inadequate-especially in light of advanced knowledge and techniques for the treatment of
the mentally ill. See generally id ., at 2, 4; The President's Comm. on
Mental Retardation, MR 68: The Edge of Change 11-13 (1968); President's
Comm. on Mental Retardation, Changing Patterns in Residential Services
for the Mentally Retarded 1- 58 (R. Kugel & W. Wolfensberger ed. 1969);
R. C. Scheerenberger, A History of Mental Retardation 240-243 (1983).
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was institutional and official in character. To the extent
there was a violation of state law in this case, it is a case of
the State itself not fulfilling its legislative promises. 17
The dissent bases its view on numerous cases from the turn
of the century and earlier. These cases do not provide the
support the dissent claims to find. Many are simply
miscited. For example, with perhaps one exception, 18 none
of its Eleventh Amendment cases can be said to hold that injunctive relief could be ordered against State officials for failing to carry out their duties under State statutes. 19 And the
Only recently have States commenced to move to correct widespread deplorable conditions. The responsibility, as the District Court recognized
after a protracted trial, has rested on the State itself.
17
The dissent appears to be confused about our argument here. See
post, at 13-14. It is of course true, as the dissent says, that the finding
below that petitioners acted in good faith and therefore were immune from
damages does not affect whether an injunction might be issued against
them by a court possessed of jurisdiction. The point is that the courts
below did not have jurisdiction because the relief ordered so plainly ran
against the State. No one questions that the petitioners in operating
Pennhurst were acting in their official capacity. Nor can it be questioned
that the judgments under review commanded action that could be taken by
petitioners only in their official capacity-and, of course, only if the State
provided the necessary funding. It is evident that the dissent would vest
in federal courts authority, acting solely under state law, to ignore the sovereignty of the States that the Eleventh Amendment was adopted to protect. Article III confers no jurisdiction on this Court to strip an explicit
Amendment of the Constitution of its substantive meaning.
Contrary to the dissent's view, see post, at 21, n. 27, an injunction based
on federal law stands on very different footing, particularly in light of the
Civil War Amendments. As we have explained, in such cases this Court is
vested with the constitutional duty to vindicate "the supreme authority of
the United States," Young, 209 U. S., at 160. There is no corresponding
mandate to enforce state law.
18
See Rolston v. Missouri Fund Commissioners, 120 U. S. 390 (1887).
In Rolston, however, the state officials were ordered to comply with "a
plain ministerial duty," see Great Northern Life Insurance Co . v. Read,
322 U. S. 47, 51 (1944), a far cry from this case, seen. 20, infra.
19
The cases are collected inn. 50 of the dissent, post, at 40. Several of
the cases do not rest on an Eleventh Amendment holding at all. For ex-
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federal sovereign immunity cases the dissent relies on as
analogy, while far from uniform, make clear that suit may not
be predicated on violations of state statutes that command
purely discretionary duties. 20 Since it cannot be doubted
ample, federal jurisdiction in fact was held to be lacking in Martin v.
Lankford, 245 U. S. 547 (1915), because of lack of diversity. A fair reading of South Carolina v. Wesley, 155 U. S. 542 (1895), and the cases it
cites, makes clear that the ruling there was on the purely procedural point
that the party pressing the appeal was not a party to the proceeding. In
two other cases the allegation was that a state officer or agency had acted
unconstitutionally, rather than merely contrary to state law. Atchison,
T. & S. F . R. Co. v. O'Connor, 223 U. S. 280 (1897); Hopkins v. Clemson
Agricultural College, 221 U. S. 636 (1911). In Johnson v. Lankford, 245
U. S. 541 (1918), the relief sought was not injunctive relief but money damages against the individual officer. See infra n. 21. None of these cases
· can be said to be overruled by our holding today. As noted infra, at
26-27, the Greene cases do not discuss the Eleventh Amendment in connection with the state-law claim.
Tindal v. Wesley, 167 U. S. 204 (1897), and Scully v. Bird, 209 U. S. 481
(1908), are more closely analogous cases. In both of these old cases, however, the allegation was that the defendants had committed common law
torts, not, as here, that they had failed to carry out affirmative duties assigned to them by statute. See Tindal, supra, at 221 (distinguishing suits
brought "to enforce the discharge by the defendants of any specific duty
enjoined by the State"); Transcript of Record, Tindal v. Wesley 3 (complaint alleged that defendants had "wrongfully entered into said premises
and ousted the plaintiff ... to the damage of the plaintiff ten thousand dollars"); Scully, supra, at 483 (allegation was that defendant had "injuriously
affect[ed] the reputation and sale of [plaintiff's] products"). Tort cases
such as these were explicitly overruled in Larson v. Domestic & Foreign
Commerce Corp., 337 U. S. 682 (1949). See infra, at 20-23.
20
See, e. g., Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U.S. 605, 620 (1912) ("The
complainant did not ask the court to interfere with the official discretion of
the Secretary of War, but challenged his authority to do the things of
which complaint was made"); Santa Fe P. R. Co. v. Fall, 259 U. S. 197,
198-199 (1922) (same); see also Kendall v. Stokes, 3 How. 87, 98 (1845)
("[A] public officer is not liable to an action if he falls into error in a case
where the act to be done is not merely a ministerial one, but is one in relation to which it is his duty to exercise judgment and discretion; even although an individual may suffer by his mistake"); Noble v. Union River
Logging R., 147 U. S. 165 171-172 (1893); Belknap v. Schild, 161 U. S. 10,
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that the statutes at issue here gave petitioners broad discretion in operating Pennhurst, seen. 11, supra; see also 446 F.
Supp., at 1324, the conduct alleged in this case would not be
ultra vires even under the standards of the dissent's cases. 21
18 (1896) (under Eleventh Amendment, injunctive relief is permitted
where officer commits a tort that is "contrary to a plain official duty requiring no exercise of discretion"); Wells v. Roper, 246 U. S. 335, 338 (1918);
Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U. S. 682, 695 (1949)
(suit challenging "incorrect decision as to law or fact" is barred "if the officer making the decision was empowered to do so"); id., at 715 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (noting that cases involve orders to comply with
nondiscretionary duties). The opinions make clear that the question of discretion went to sovereign immunity, and not to the court's mandamus powers generally. See, e. g., Philadelphia Co., supra, at 61i>-620. Therationale appears to be that discretionary duties have a greater impact on the
sovereign because they "brin[g] the operation of governmental machinery
into play." Larson, supra, at 715 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
21
In any event, as with the Eleventh Amendment cases, seen. 19, supra,
the dissent also is wrong to say that the federal sovereign immunity cases
it cites post, at 40, n. 50, are today overruled. Many of them were actions
for damages in tort against the individual officer. Little v. Barreme, 2
Cranch 170 (1804); Wise v. Withers, 3 Cranch 331 (1806); Mitchell v. Harmony, 13 How. 115 (1851); Bates v. Clark, 95 U. S. 204 (1877); Belknap v.
Schild, 161 U. S. 10 (1896). In Belknap the Court drew a careful distinction between such actions and suits in which the relief would run more directly against the State. I d., at 18. The Court -disallowed injunctive relief against the officers on this basis. I d., at 23-25. Contrary to the view
of the dissent, post, at 10, n. 10, nothing in our opinion touches these cases.
The Court in Larson similarly distinguished between cases seeking money
damages against the individual officer in tort, and those seeking injunctive
relief against the officer in his official capacity. It held that the latter
sought relief against the sovereign, while the former might not. 337
U. S., at 687-688, and nn. 7, 8.
There is language in other cases that suggests they were actions alleging
torts, not statutory violations. See Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223
U. S. 605, 623 (1912); Sloan Shipyards v. U. S. Fleet Corp., 258 U. S. 549,
568 (1922); Land v. Dollar, 330 U. S. 731, 736 (1947). The remainder
clearly distinguish cases (like the present one) involving statutes that command discretionary duties. See n. 20, supra. In any case, the Court in
Larson explicitly limited the precedential value of all of these cases. See
Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U. S. 643, 646, and n. 6 (1962).
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Thus, while there is language in the early cases that advances the authority-stripping theory advocated by the dissent, this theory had never been pressed as far as JUSTICE
STEVENS would do in this case. And when the expansive approach of the dissent was advanced, this Court plainly and
explicitly rejected it. In Larson v. Domestic & Foreign
Commerce Corp., 337 U. S. 682 (1949), the Court was faced
with the argument that an allegation that a government official committed a tort sufficed to distinguish the official from
the sovereign. Therefore, the argument went, a suit for an
injunction to remedy the injury would not be against the sovereign. The Court rejected the argument, noting that it
would make the doctrine of sovereign immunity superfluous.
A plaintiff would need only to "claim an invasion of his legal
rights" in order to override sovereign immunity. I d., at 693.
In the Court's view, the argument "confus~[d] the doctrine of
sovereign immunity with the requirement that a plaintiff
state a cause of action." !d., at 692-693. The dissent's theory suffers a like confusion. 22 Under the dissent's view, a
In fact, as the dissent itself states, the argument in Larson that an
allegation of tortious activity overrides sovereign immunity is essentially
the same as the dissent's argument that an allegation of conduct contrary
to statute overrides sovereign immunity. See post, at 33. The result in
each case-as the Court in Larson recognizes-turns on whether the defendant state official was empowered to do what he did, i. e., whether,
even if he acted erroneously, it was action within the scope of his authority.
See Larson, 337 U. S., at 685 (controversy on merits concerned whether
officer had interpreted government contract correctly); id. , at 695; id., at
716-717 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (in cases alleging a tort, the "official
seeks to screen himself behind the sovereign"); id., at 721-722. What the
dissent fails to note is that the Court in Larson explicitly rejected the view
that the dissent here also advances, which is "that an officer given the
power to make decisions is only given the power to make correct decisions." I d., at 695. The Court in Larson made crystal clear that an officer might make errors and still be acting within the scope of his authority.
Ibid. (There can be no question that the defendants here were "given the
power to make decisions" about the operation of Pennhurst. See n. 11,
supra.) The dissent's view that state officers "have no discretion to com22
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plaintiff would need only to claim a denial of rights protected
or provided by statute in order to override sovereign immunity. Except in rare cases it would make the constitutional
doctrine of sovereign immunity a nullity.
The crucial element of the dissent's theory was also the
plaintiff's central contention in Larson. It is that "[a] sovereign, like any other principal, cannot authorize its agent to
violate the law," so that when the agent does so he cannot be
acting for the sovereign. Post, at 28; see also post, at 17, 24,
33; cf. Larson, supra, at 693-694 ("It is argued . . . that the
commission of a tort cannot be authorized by the sovereign .
. . . It is on this contention that the respondent's position fundamentally rests .... "). It is a view of agency law that the
Court in Larson explicitly rejected. 23 Larson thus made
clear that, at least insofar as injunctive relief is sought, an
error of law by state officers acting in their official capacities
will not suffice to override the sovereign immunity of the
State where the relief effectively is against it. I d., at 690,
695. 24 Any resulting disadvantage to the plaintiff was "outmit a tort," post, at 7, n. 7, cannot be reconciled with the plain holding of
Larson.
23
"It has been said, in a very special sense, that, as a matter of agency
law, a principal may never lawfully authorize the commission of a tort by
his agent. But that statement, in its usual context, is only a way of saying
that an agent's liability for torts committed by him cannot be avoided by
pleading the direction or authorization of his principal. The agent is himself liable whether or not he has been authorized or even directed to commit the tort. This, of course, does not mean that the principal is not liable
nor that the tortious action may not be regarded as the action of the principal." Id., at 694 (footnote omitted).
24
The Larson Court noted that a similar argument "was at one time advanced in connection with corporate agents, in an effort to avoid corporate
liability for torts, but was decisively rejected." 337 U. S., at 694. See 10
Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations § 4877, at 350
(1978 ed.) (a corporation is liable for torts committed by its agent within
the scope of is authority even though the "act was contrary to or in violation of the instructions or orders given by it to the offending agent"); i d.,
§ 4959 (same as to crimes).
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weigh[ed]" by "the necessity of permitting the Government
to carry out its functions unhampered by direct judicial intervention." I d., at 704. If anything, this public need is even
greater when questions of federalism are involved. See
supra, at 8--9. 25
The dissent's strained interpretation of Larson, post, at 28-30, simply
ignores the language that the dissent itself quotes: "It is important to note
that in [ultra vires] cases the relief can be granted, without impleading the
sovereign, only because of the officer's lack of delegated power. A claim
of error in the exercise of that power is therefore not sufficient." 337
U. S., at 689-690.
20
As we have discussed supra, at 11-12, Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S.
651 (1974), also shows that the broad ultra vires theory enunciated in
Young and in some of the cases quoted by the dissent has been discarded.
In Edelman, although the State officers were alleged to be acting contrary
to law, and therefore should have been "stripped of their authority" under
the theory of the dissent, we held the action to be barred by the Eleventh
Amendment. The dissent attempts to distinguish Edelman on the ground
that the retroactive relief there, unlike injunctive relief, does not run only
against the agent. Post, at 21, n. 29. To say that injunctive relief against
State officials acting in their official capacity does not run against the State
is to resort to the fictions that characterize the dissent's theories. Unlike
the English sovereign perhaps, an American State can act only through its
officials. It is true that the Court in Edelman recognized that retroactive
relief often, or at least sometimes, has a greater impact on the State treasury than does injunctive relief, see 415 U. S., at 666, n. 11, but there was
no suggestion that damages alone were thought to run against the State
while injunctive relief did not.
We have noted that the authority-stripping theory of Young is a fiction
that has been narrowly construed. In this light, it may well be wondered
what principled basis there is to the ultra vires doctrine as it was set forth
in Larson and Treasure Salvors. That doctrine excepts from the Eleventh Amendment bar suits against officers acting in their official capacities
but without any statutory authority, even though the relief would operate
against the State. At bottom, the doctrine is based on the fiction of the
Young opinion. The dissent's method is merely to take this fiction to its
extreme. While the dissent's result may be logical, in the sense that it is
difficult to draw principled lines short of that end, its view would virtually
eliminate the constitutional doctrine of sovereign immunity. It is a result
from which the Court in Larson wisely recoiled. We do so again today.
For present purposes, however, we do no more than question the contin-
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The dissent in Larson made many of the arguments advanced by JUSTICE STEVENS dissent today, and asserted that
many of the same cases were being overruled or ignored.
See 337 U. S., at 723-728 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
Those arguments were rejected, and the cases supporting
them are moribund. Since Larson was decided in 1949,w no
opinion by any Member of this Court has cited the cases on
which the dissent primarily relies for a proposition as broad
as the language the dissent quotes. Many if not most of
these cases have not been relied upon in an Eleventh Amendment context at all. Those that have been so cited have been
relied upon only for propositions with which no one today
quarrels. 27 The plain fact is that the dissent's broad theory,
ued vitality of the ultra vires doctrine in the Eleventh Amendment context. We hold only that to the extent the doctrine is consistent with the
analysis of this opinion, it is a very narrow exception that will allow suit
only under the standards set forth in n. 11 supra.
zs The dissent appears to believe that Larson is consistent with all prior
law. See post, at 28. This view ignores the fact that the Larson Court
itself understood that it was required to "resolve [a] conflict in doctrine."
337 U. S., at 701. The Court since has recognized that Larson represented a watershed in the law of sovereign immunity. In Malone v.
Bowdoin, 369 U. S. 643, Justice Stewart's opinion for the Court observed
that "to reconcile completely all the decisions of the Court in this field prior
to 1949 would be a Procrustean task. " !d., at 646. His opinion continued:
"The Court's 1949 Larson decision makes it unnecessary, however, to
undertake that task here. For in Larson the Court, aware that it was
called upon to 'resolve the conflict in doctrine' . . . , thoroughly reviewed
the many prior decisions, and made an informed and carefully considered
choice between the seemingly conflicting precedents." Ibid.
The Court included many of the cases upon which the dissent relies in its
list of cases that were rejected by Larson. See id., n. 6.
27
E . g., Rolston v. Missouri Fund Commissioners, 120 U. S. 390 (1887)
(never cited); Scully v. Bird, 209 U. S. 481 (1908) (never cited); Hopkins v.
Clemson Agricultural College, 221 U. S. 636 (1911) (never cited); Johnson
v. Lankford, 245 U. S. 541 (1918) (never cited); Land v. Dollar, 330 U. S.
731 (1947) (cited only for proposition that judgment that would expend itself on public treasury or interfere with public administration is a suit
against the United States); Cunningham v. Macon & B . R. Co., 109 U. S.
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if it ever was accepted to the full extent to which it is now

pressed, has not been the law for at least a generation.
The reason is obvious. Under the dissent's view of the
ultra vires doctrine, the Eleventh Amendment would have
force only in the rare case in which a plaintiff foolishly attempts to sue the State in its own name, or where he cannot
produce some state statute that has been violated to his asserted injury. Thus, the ultra vires doctrine, a narrow and
questionable exception, would swallow the general rule that a
suit is against the State if the relief will run against it. That
result gives the dissent no pause presumably because of its
view that the Eleventh Amendment and sovereign immunity
"'undoubtedly ru[n] counter to modern democratic notions of
the moral responsibility of the State."' Post, at 39, n. 48
(quoting Great Northern Life Insurance Co. v. Read, 322
U. S. 47, 59 (1944) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)). This argument has not been adopted by this Court. See Great Northern Life Insurance Co. v. Read, 322 U. S. 47, 51 (1944) ("Efforts to force, through suits against officials, performance of
promises by a state collide directly with the necessity that a
sovereign must be free from judicial compulsion in the carrying out of its policies within the limits of the Constitution.");
Larson, supra, at 704 ("The Government, as representative
of the community as a whole, cannot be stopped in its
446 (1883) (cited only for proposition that a suit alleging unconstitutional
conduct is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment, and that State cannot
be sued without its consent); Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U. S. 270 (1885)
(unconstitutional-conduct suit is not suit against State); Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust, 154 U. S. 362 (1894) (same). Prior to Florida Dept. of
State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670 (1982), Tindal v.. Wesley,
167 U. S. 204 (1897), had been cited only for the proposition that a suit alleging unconstitutional conduct is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
The plurality opinion in Treasure Salvors discussed Tindal at some length,
458 U. S., at 685-688, but noted that the rule of Tindal "was clarified in
Larson." Id., at 688; see also id., at 715, n. 13 (WHITE , J., dissenting).
As noted, n. 26, supra, some of these cases were also cited-and rejected-in Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U. S. 643, 646, n. 6 (1962).
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tracks ... "). Moreover, the argument substantially misses
the point with respect to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. As JUSTICE MARSHALL has observed, the Eleventh
Amendment's restriction on the federal judicial power is
based in large part on "the problems of federalism inherent in
making one sovereign appear against its will in the courts of
the other." Employees v. Missouri Public Health Dept.,
411 U. S. 279, 294 (1973) (MARSHALL, J., concurring in the
result). The dissent totally rejects the Eleventh Amendment's basis in federalism.

c

The reasoning of our recent decisions on sovereign immunity thus leads to the conclusion that a federal suit against
state officials on the basis of state law contravenes the Eleventh Amendment when-as here-the relief sought and ordered has an impact directly on the State itself. In reaching
a contrary conclusion, the c'ourt of Appeals relied principally
on a separate line of cases dealing with pendent jurisdiction.
The crucial point for the Court of Appeals was that this Court
has granted relief against state officials on the basis of a pendent state-law claim. See 673 F. 2d, at 657-658. We therefore must consider the relationship between pendent jurisdiction and the Eleventh Amendment.
This Court long has held generally that when a federal
court obtains jurisdiction over a federal claim, it may adjudicate other related claims over which the court otherwise
would not have jurisdiction. See, e. g., Mine Workers v.
Gibbs, 383 U. S. 715, 726 (1966); Osborn v. Bank of the
United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 819-823 (1824). The Court also
has held that a federal court may resolve a case solely on the
basis of a pendent state-law claim, see Siler, supra, at
192-193, and that in fact the court usually should do so in
order to avoid federal constitutional questions, see id., at
193; Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis,
J., concurring) ("[I]f a case can be decided on either of two
grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a

;

,.

81-2101-0PINION
PENNHURST STATE SCHOOL & HOSP. v. HALDERMAN

27

question of statutory construction or general law, the Court
will decide only the latter"). But pendent jurisdiction is a
judge-made doctrine inferred from the general language of
Art. III. The question presented is whether this doctrine
may be viewed as displacing the explicit limitation on federal
jurisdiction contained in the Eleventh Amendment.
As the Court of Appeals noted, in Siler and subsequent
cases concerning pendent jurisdiction, relief was granted
against state officials on the basis of state-law claims that
were pendent to federal constitutional claims. In none of
these cases, however, did the Court so much as mention the
Eleventh Amendment in connection with the state-law claim.
Rather, the Court appears to have assumed that once jurisdiction was established over the federal-law claim, the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction would establish power to hear
the state-law claims as well. The Court has not addressed
whether that doctrine has a different scope when applied to
suits against the State. This is illustrated by Greene v. Louisville & Interurban R. Co., 244 U. S. 499 (1917), in which
the plaintiff railroads sued state officials, alleging that certain tax assessments were excessive under the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Court first rejected the officials' argument that the Eleventh Amendment barred the federal constitutional claim. It held that Ex parte Young applied to all
allegations challenging the constitutionality of official action,
regardless of whether the state statute under which the officials purported to act was constitutional or unconstitutional.
See id., at 507. Having determined that the Eleventh
Amendment did not deprive the federal court of jurisdiction
over the Fourteenth Amendment question, the Court declared that the court's jurisdiction extended "to the determination of all questions involved in the case, including questions of state law, irrespective of the disposition that may be
made of the federal question, or whether it be found necessary to decide it at all." Id., at 508. The case then was

;

"
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decided solely on state-law grounds. Accord, Louisville &
Nashville R. Co. v. Greene, 244 U. S. 522 (1917). 28
These cases thus did not directly confront the question before us. "[W]hen questions of jurisdiction have been passed
on in prior decisions sub silentio, this Court has never considered itself bound when a subsequent case finally brings the
jurisdictional issue before us." Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U. S.
528, 533, n. 5 (1974). 29 We therefore view the question as an
open one.
As noted, the implicit view of these cases seems to have
been that once jurisdiction is established on the basis of a federal question, no further Eleventh Amendment inquiry is
28
The case was argued in the same way. The Eleventh Amendment argument in the briefs is confined to the federal constitutional claims. See,
e. g., Brief for Louisville & N. R. Co., Louisville & N . R. Co. v. Greene
1~8 (jurisdiction over federal claims); id. , at 38--39 (pendent jurisdiction
over state claims). Indeed the State's brief somewhat curiously closes
with a concession that the federal courts had jurisdiction. Brief for State
Board and Officers, Louisville & N . R . Co . v. Greene 139; see Reply Brief,
Louisville & N. R . Co. v. Greene 2 (pointing out concession). Thus, while
the State's position on the Court's jurisdiction over the federal claims is
somewhat unclear, the State never argued that there might not be jurisdiction over the local-law claims if the Court found jurisdiction over the federal question in the case.
Nor do any of the other pendent-jurisdiction cases cited IN JUSTICE STEVENS' dissent, post, at 41, n. 52, discuss the Eleventh Amendment in connection with the state-law claims. Moreover, since Larson was decided in
1949, making clear that mere violations of state law would not override the
Eleventh Amendment, these cases have been cited only for the proposition
that, as a general matter, a federal court should decide a case on state-law
grounds where possible to avoid a federal constitutional question. Nothing in our decision is meant to cast doubt on the desirability of applying the
Siler principle in cases where the federal court has jurisdiction to decide
the state-law issues.
29
See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 671 (1974) ("Having now had
an opportunity to more fully consider the Eleventh Amendment issue after
briefing and argument, we disapprove the Eleventh Amendment holdings
of [certain prior] cases to the extent that they are inconsistent with our
holding today").

81-2101-0PINION
PENNHURST STATE SCHOOL & HOSP. v. HALDERMAN

29

necessary with respect to other claims raised in the case.
This is an erroneous view and contrary to the principles established in our Eleventh Amendment decisions. "The
Eleventh Amendment is an explicit limitation on the judicial
power of the United States." Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U. S.,
at 25. It deprives a federal court of power to decide certain
claims against States that otherwise would be within the
scope of Art. III's grant of jurisdiction. For example, if a
lawsuit against state officials under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 alleges
a constitutional claim, the federal court is barred from awarding damages against the state treasury even though the claim
arises under the Constitution. See Quern v. Jordan, 440
U. S. 332 (1979). Similarly, if a§ 1983 action alleging a constitutional claim is brought directly against a State, the Eleventh Amendment bars a federal court from granting any relief on that claim. See Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U. S. 781
(1978) (per curiam). The Amendment thus is a specific constitutional bar against hearing evenfederal claims that otherwise would be within the jurisdiction of the federal courts. 30
This constitutional bar applies to pendent claims as well.
As noted above, pendent jurisdiction is a judge-made doctrine of expediency and efficiency derived from the general
Art. III language conferring power to hear all "cases" arising
under federal law or between diverse parties. See Mine
Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U. S. 715, 725 (1966). See also Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U. S. 528, 545 (1974) (terming pendent
jurisdiction "a doctrine of discretion"). The Eleventh
Amendment should not be construed to apply with less force
to this implied form of jurisdiction than it does to the explicitly granted power to hear federal claims. The history of the
adoption and development of the Amendment, see supra, at
"" See, e. g., Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322 (1934) ("[A]lthough a case may arise under the Constitution and laws of the United
States, the judicial power does not extend to it if the suit is sought to be
prosecuted against a State, without her consent, by one of her own citizens"); Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U. S. 18, 25--26 (1933).
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6--9, confirms that it is an independent limitation on all exercises of Art. III power: "the entire judicial power granted by
the Constitution does not embrace authority to entertain suit
brought by private parties against a State without consent
given," Ex parte State of New York No.1, 256 U. S. 490, 497
(1921). If we were to hold otherwise, a federal court could
award damages against a State on the basis of a pendent
claim. Our decision in Edelman v. Jordan, supra, makes
clear that pendent jurisdiction does not permit such an evasion of the immunity guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment. We there held that "the District Court was correct in
exercising pendent jurisdiction over [plaintiffs'] statutory
claim," 415 U. S., at 653, n. 1, but then concluded that the
Eleventh Amendment barred an award of retroactive relief
on the basis of that pendent claim. I d., at 678.
In sum, contrary to the view implicit in decisions such as
Greene, supra, neither pendent jurisdiction nor any other
basis of jurisdiction may override the Eleventh Amendment. 31 A federal court must examine each claim in a case to
see if the court's jurisdiction over that claim is barred by the
Eleventh Amendment. We concluded above that a claim
that state officials violated state law in carrying out their official responsibilities is a claim against the State that is protected by the Eleventh Amendment. See supra, at 15. We
now hold that this principle applies as well to state-law claims
brought into federal court under pendent jurisdiction.

D
Respondents urge that application of the Eleventh Amendment to pendent state-law claims will have a disruptive effect
on litigation against state officials. They argue that the
"considerations of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to litigants" that underlie pendent jurisdiction, see
Gibbs, supra, at 726, counsel against a result that may cause
31
See Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U. S., at 27 ("This is not less a suit against
the State because the bill is ancillary and supplemental.").
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litigants to split causes of action between state and federal
courts. They also contend that the policy of avoiding unnecessary constitutional decisions will be contravened if plaintiffs choose to forgo their state-law claims and sue only in federal court or, alternatively, that the policy of Ex parte Young
will be hindered if plaintiffs choose to forgo their right to a
federal forum and bring all of their claims in state court.
It may be that applying the Eleventh Amendment to pendent claims results in federal claims being brought in state
court, or in bifurcation of claims. That is not uncommon in
this area. Under Edelman v. Jordan, supra, a suit against
state officials for retroactive monetary relief, whether based
on federal or state law, must be brought in state court.
Challenges to the validity of state tax systems under 42
U. S. C. § 1983 also must be brought in state court. Fair
Assessment in Real Estate Assn. v. McNary, 454 U. S. 100
(1981). Under the abstention doctrine, unclear issues of
state law commonly are split off and referred to the state
courts. 32
32
Moreover, allowing claims against state officials based on state law to
be brought in the federal courts does not necessarily foster the policies of
"judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants," Mine Workers v.
Gibbs, 383 U. S. 715, 726 (1966), on which pendent jurisdiction is founded.
For example, when a federal decision on state law is obtained, the federal
court's construction often is uncertain and ephemeral. In cases of ongoing
oversight of a state program that may extend over years, as in this case,
the federal intrusion is likely to be extensive. Duplication of effort, inconvenience, and uncertainty may well result. See, e. g., Burford v. Sun Oil
Co., 319 U. S. 315, 327 (1943) ("Delay, misunderstanding of local law, and
needless conflict with the state policy, are the inevitable product of this
double [i. e., federal-state] system of review"). This case is an example.
Here, the federal courts effectively have been undertaking to operate a
major state institution based on inferences drawn from dicta in a state
court opinion not decided until four years after the suit was begun. The
state court has had no opportunity to review the federal courts' construction of its opinion, or their choice of remedies. The only sure escape from
an erroneous interpretation of state law is presumably the rather cumbersome route of legislation.
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that without the injunction against the state institutions and
officials in this case, an order entered on state-law grounds
necessarily would be limited. The relief substantially concerns Pennhurst, an arm of the State that is operated by
state officials. Moreover, funding for the county mental retardation programs comes almost entirely from the State, see
Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 50, §§ 4507-4509 (Purdon 1969 and Supp.
1982), and the costs of the masters have been borne by the
State, see 446 F. Supp., at 1327. Finally, the MH/MR Act
contemplates that the state and county officials will cooperate in operating mental retardation programs. See In re
Schmidt, 494 Pa. 86, 95-96, 429 A. 2d 631, 635-636 (1981).
In short, the present judgment could not be sustained on the
basis of the state-law obligations of petitioner county officials. Indeed, any relief granted against the county officials
on the basis of the state statute would be partial and incomplete at best. Such an ineffective enforcement of state law
would not appear to serve the purposes of efficiency, convenience, and fairness that must inform the exercise of pendent
jurisdiction.
e. g., Edelman v. Jordan, supra (Eleventh Amendment bars suit against
state and county officials for retroactive award of welfare benefits). The
Courts of Appeals are in general agreement that a suit against officials of a
county or other governmental entity is barred if the relief obtained runs
against the State. See, e. g., Moore v. Tangipahoa Parish School Board,
594 F. 2d 489, 493 (CA5 1979); Carey v. Quern, 588 F. 2d 230, 233--234
(CA71978); Incarcerated Men of Allen County Jail v. Fair, 507 F. 2d 281,
287-288 (CA6 1974); Harris v. Tooele County School District, 471 F. 2d
218, 220 (CAlO 1973). Given that the actions of the county commissioners
and mental-health administrators are dependent on funding from the State,
it may be that relief granted against these county officials, when exercising
their functions under the MH/MR Act, effectively runs against the State.
Cf. Farr v. Chesney, 441 F. Supp. 127, 130-132 (MD Pa. 1977) (holding
that Pennsylvania county commissioners, acting as members of the board
of the county office of mental health and retardation, may not be sued for
back pay under the Eleventh Amendment). We need not decide this issue
in light of our disposition above.
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v
The Court of Appeals upheld the judgment of the District
Court solely on the basis of Pennsylvania's MH/MR Act.
We hold that these federal courts lacked jurisdiction to enjoin
petitioner state institutions and state officials on the basis of
this state law. The District Court also rested its decision on
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. See supra, at 2. On remand the
Court of Appeals may consider to what extent, if any, the
judgment may be sustained on these bases. 35 The court also
may consider whether relief may be granted to respondents
under the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of
Rights Act, 42 U. S. C. §§ 6011, 6063. The judgment of the
Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.

35
On the Fourteenth Amendment issue, the court should consider
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U. S. 307 (1982), a decision that was not available when the District Court issued its decision.
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PENN20 SALLY-POW
Petitioners respond with the argument that the
foregoing policy arguments are outweighted by
considerations of comity.

They argue that the Court of

Appeals has "authorized a severe intrusion on the rights
of state officials to run their own programs, basing that
intrusion on nothing more than its view of state law".
Brief for Petitioner 9.

Although the comity argument has

considerable force, in view of our dispoistion of this
case we need not balance the competing policy
considerations.

Depending on the circumstances of a case

these considerations may be important, 19 but they may not
override the constitutional limitations on the authority
of the federal judiciary to adjudicate claims against a

i ..
2.

state.

See Missouri v. Fisk, supra, 290

u.s.,

at 25-26

{"considerations of convenience open no avenue of escape
from the [Eleventh Amendment's limitations]").

In a suit

brought by priviate litigants against Rtate officials,
these constitutional limitations do not preclude a federal
court from granting prospective relief to vindicate
federal law.

A different case is presented when the

relief sought is based on state law.

In such a case, any

inconvenience that may be caused to litigants is a
necessary consequence of this limitation on federal
judicial power. 20

We believe that the constitutional

principle of sovereign immunity, embodied in the Eleventh
Amendment, demands that claims against state officials on
the basis of state law be resolved in state courts.

page 3.

state's actions by controlling the only way a state can act.

The

real explanation of Edelman is that money damages were not deemed
necessary

to

enforce

the

Ci vi 1

War

Amendments.

We

should

be

aware, however, that JPS's explanation is closer to the language.
of Edelman.)
JPS makes the second part of his argument--that this Court's
cases have interpreted the Eleventh Amendment to allow this kind
of suits--by reciting the now familiar interpretation of Greene,
Hopkins, etc.

The only important change is the addition of a new

case to that line, Rolston v. Missouri Fund Comm'rs, 120
( 1887) •

JPS concludes with a

u.s.

391

recitation of the numerous cases

your opinion assertedly will overrule, including a number of preLarson
against

federal
officers

ultra

vires

cases

acting within

that

their

he

says

allowed

suit

authority but unlawfully.

These cases were cited in Larson and not disapproved, he says.

t7
RIDER 1

In light of the unequivocal holdings in Hans and
Monaco as to the constitutional stature of the Eleventh
Amendment's principle of sovereign immunity, the dissent's
assertion that we have "invented a new principle of
sovereign immunity that is totally unsupported by the text
of the Constitution or by any of our prior decisions,"
/tt:Jf~4f.-2..

post, at 26, n. 3, is plainly unfounded.
\

?t-k..,} '1
.;~ d'L~n;'~

?:t

1-..-

I

The

A

,{ 71
" ' clear that
dissent makes
) I
,r-<
' '·

doctrine of sovereign immur~-i~.

it does not like the
I IL'
I t ·t
'
f
See post, at 25-27.

.
~

'?rt.L
/
'
'
Indeed, the dissent's dissatisfaction
witH sovereign

immunity leads it to evince~ willingness to overrule the
decisions of this Court that •have invested the Eleventh
c) A~endmen~ ~~h \ continuing

tJ1

vitality, id., at 26, in favor

of JUSTICE BRENNAN's dissenting view in Employees v.
Missouri Public Health Dept., 411

u.s.

279 (1973).

But

that view was expressly rejected both by Justice Douglas'
opinion for the Court, see id., at 280, n. 1, and JUSTICE
MARSHALL's opinion concurring in the judgment, see id., at

~
292, n. 8.

And

.iA-' "

ore importaftt, l the argument that

sovereign immunity "'undoubtedly runs counter to modern
democratic notions of the moral responsibility of the
State,'" post, at 27 (quoting Great Northern Life Ins. Co.

(~

2.

v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 59 (1944)
1./J/a....~

(Frankfurter, J.,

.;1./j-1,

/

dissenting)), substantially misses the point with respect
t

to the Eleventh Amendment.

As JUSTICE MARSHALL has

observed, the Eleventh Amendment's restriction on the
federal judicial power is based in large part on the "the
problems of federalism inherent in making one sovereign
appear against its will in the courts of the other."
Employees, supra, at 294 (MARSHALL, J., concurring in the
result).

'I.

~

RIDER

A

Contrary to the dissent's argument, there is no long
line of cases clearly holding that the Eleventh Amendment
"does not bar suits against state officials for action not
authorized by the State's own laws."
{STEVENS, J., dissenting).

Post, at 21

The constant theme of the

Eleventh Amendment cases of the period cited by the
dissent was that there is a crucial difference between the
class of cases "where the suit is brought against

~ S' .f..-L-/-

officers of the State, as representing the State's action
and liability, thus making it, though not a party to the
record, the real party against which the judgment will so
operate as to compel it to specifically perform
contracts," and the class "where as suit is brought

2.

against defendants who, claiming to be officers of the
State, and under the color of an unconstitutional statute,
commit acts of wrong and injury to the rights and property
of the plaintiff acquired under a contract with the
State."

Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, 140 U.S. 1, 10 (1891).
;

Indeed, the decisions in almost all of the cases cited by
the dissent turned on this distinction.

See, e.g., Reagan

v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362, 390 (1894);
Poindexter v. Greenhaw, 114

u.s.

270, 288 (1885);

Cunningham v. Macon & Brunswick R. Co., 109 U.S. 446, 452
(1883).

The Court rarely was faced with an Eleventh

Amendment issue in a case that did not contain a
constitutional allegation.
/

The dissent ultimately relies

?
I

principally on two diversity cases finding that
/I

.t.

~

~

"

/'

'
,

/~

I'

~

,
_,
'

I
J

,.' I;H> ., I

I"

,
l

I,

I

I

~-

)

I

, l

,_.,1-1~·

"'

-

t;

.,

3•

...!

allegations of certain tortious conduct could constitute a

/

suit against the individual.
_....,

See post, at 17-20.

_

'

~
~~~;/ more
~
~

significant than the bare support for this

~~~-

alleged "firmly established" rule, E._ost, at 18, is that
A

the "line of cases"

~e ~

central to the dissent's

argument since has been repudiated by this Court.

The

principal case originally cited for the proposition that a
suit alleging a tortious act by an official is not barred
by sovereign immunity is United States v.
196 (1882).

~,

106 U.S.

See Cunningham, supra, at 452; Larson, supra,

at 717 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
point of this line of cases").

(~

.- ,

is the "starting

In Larson, however, the

Court construed Lee narrowly as representing only "a
specific application of the constitutional exception to
the doctrine of sovereign immunity."

337

u.s.,

at 696.

4.

·g~~s~

Larson expressly rejected the view--urged ~y th~ dissent

1

heFe--that sovereign immunity is inapplicable whenever the

?1-

~

officer allegedly committed a tortious action+ holding
that the suit may go forward only if there is an

allegation of unconstitutional action or action that is
ultra vires.

Id., at 693; see supra, at n. 12.
'

This

construction, and the Larson rule, have been reaffirmed
~~~7
repeatedly by this Court. See, e.g., Block v. North
--A

Dakota,

u.s.

__,

(1983); Malone v. Bowdoin, 369

u.s. 643, 647-648 (1962).
The dissent recognizes that Larson is inconsistent
with the cases on which the dissent relies, but asserts
that "it is not necessary or appropriate to read it back
retroactively into the Eleventh Amendment."
(STEVENS, J., dissenting).

Post, at 20

This departure from stare

5.

decisis is

~t ~~<L~~~t~i;o,

~r~ris

I.

ng given the dissent's invocation of

""
the doctrine elsewhere in the opinion.

,

p-r--e·v+~

~

/;

This Court

Ill,

has considered Larson to be a relevant

precedent in Eleventh Amendment cases, see, e.g., Georgia
R. Co. v. Redwine, 342 U.S. 299, 304, nn. 12, 15, and
indeed just last Term eight Justices expressly applied the
two-part Larson test in resolving an Eleventh Amendment
issue, Treasure Salvors, supra, ___
of STEVENS, J.); id., at

u.s.,

{WHITE, J., concurring in the

judgment in part and dissenting in part).

--

at ___ {opinion

~~-h,

The plurality

9 "t./t~ S!" 'e. ,; ,

opinion in Treasure Salvors found that Larson had
~

"clarified" the prior law established in both Eleventh
Amendment and federal sovereign immunity cases, and noted
expressly that Larson had "held that the fact that an
officer wrongfully withholds property belonging to another

6.

does not necessarily establish that he is acting beyond
the permissible scope of his official capacity."

Id., at

The plurality then followed
the Larson test

:p~~y

in announcing that "the Eleventh

Amendment does not bar an action against a state official
that is based on a theory that the officer acted beyond
the scope of his statutory authority or, if within that
authority, that such authority is unconstitutional."

Id.,

at
Just as the Court's Eleventh Amendment cases have
relied on federal sovereign immunity cases, the Court's
federal sovereign immunity cases have relied on the
principles established in Eleventh Amendment cases.

See,

e.g., Philadelphia v. Stimson, 223 U.S. 605, 620 (1912).
This especially was true in Larson itself.

See 337 U.S.,

7.

at 687, n. 6, 691, n. 11, 694, n. 15, 698, nn. 19-20, 699,
n. 22.

The dissent thus errs in suggesting that there are

different principles for the federal sovereign immunity
cases and Eleventh Amendment cases.

it is clear that

Larson--the Court's most definitive statement on the rule
of sovereign immunity and its exceptions--should be
followed here.

RIDER 7

The dissent seeks to avoid the significance of Larson
by asserting that

~~~

~

repudiation of the

.jq~~~~~
r~ relied on by the dissent her-e was not "necessary to
I'

•

decide the case" and "apparently did not command the full

ll~
"

agreement of five members of the Court" because of a
concurring opinion by Justice Douglas.
17.

~ ~recisely

Post, at 16-17, n.

the same argument was made by

Justice Douglas--in lone dissent--15 years after Larson.
See Malone v. Bowdoin, supra, at 649-650.

Justice

Stewart's opinion for the Court in Malone observed that
"to reconcile completely all the decisions of the Court in
this field prior to 1949 would be a Prosrustean task," but
that Larson "makes it unnecessary ••• to undertake that

2.

task here.

For in Larson the Court, aware that it was

called upon to 'resolve the conflict in doctrine'

(337

U.S., at 701), thoroughly reviewed the many prior
decisions, and made an informed and carefully considered
choice between the seemingly conflicting precedents."

~

Id., at 646. ( 1 The Court in Malone then expressly
reaffirmed the Larson rule that the only two exceptions to
sovereign immunity are where the officer acted ultra vires
or in an unconstitutional fashion.

See id., at 647.

An

allegation that the officer allegedly acted tortiously or

.-

illegally--an allegation the dissent finds sufficient to

~

avoid the Eleventh Amendment's sovereign immunity--was
1\
found "not adequate to support a conclusion that the
relief asked was not relief against the sovereign."

Ibid.

It thus is indisputably clear that this Court has made "an

3.

informed and carefully considered choice," id., at 646, to
reject

v-u.ur

the~

A

urged

~~&~

by~

dissent that sovereign

~

immunity does not bar a suit alleging that an offical "had
acted within his authority but in a manner contrary to
state law."

._,

Post, at 19 .
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But pendent jurisdiction is a judge-made doctrine inferred
from

the

general

presented

is

The question

language of Article III.

whether

this

doctrine

may

be

viewed

as

displacing the explicit limitation on federal jurisdiction
contained in the Eleventh Amendment.

Note to Joe:

The last two sentences on page 19 are weak,

and should be revised.

The foregoing

is one suggest ion.

Feel free to reframe this.
I doubt
useful at this

that note 16

(to be changed to 17)

particular point.

we were trying -

here and

in n.

is

My recollection is that
21 -

to find a place to

dispose of the "comity" issue without making a big deal of
it in view of the Conference votes of the CJ and SOC. ; As
they both are now committed to the Eleventh Amendment, all
we

need

say -

as

we do

later

-

is

that because of our

disposition of this case under the Eleventh Amendment, we
need not consider the comity issue.
Also,
Hagans

v.

doctrine

Joe,

Lavine
of

the

states

discretion

language

quoted

that pendent
not

to

be

in

n.

16

from

jurisdiction is

routinely

"a

exercised".

2.

Although this statement was made in the context of comity
considerations,
that

pendent

Amendment?

A

cannot

we

use

jurisdiction
court

has

it

cannot
no

to

buttress

negate

"discretion"

the

the
to

po.int

Eleventh
confer

jurisdiction contrary to the Eleventh Amendment's explicit
grant of sovereign immunity.

.._,_.....
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PENN20 SALLY-POW
The Court first rejected the officials' argument
under Eleventh Amendment, finding that Ex Parte Young
applied to all allegations challenging the
constitutionality of the officials' action regardless of
whether the state statute under which the officials
purported to act was constitutional or unconstitutional.
See id., at 507.

Having determined that the Eleventh

Amendment did not deprive the federal court of
jurisdiction over the Fourteenth Amendment question, the '
Court declared

Note to Joe:

I simply have tried to clarify the language

of the sentences in question.

lfp/ss 10/19/83

Rider X, for Joe's rider, p. 23

PENN23 SALLY-POW
For example, when a federal decision on state law is
obtained, the federal court's construction often is
uncertain and ephemeral.

In cases of ongoing federal

oversight of a state program that may extend over years,
as in this case, the federal intrusion is likely to be
extensive.

Nor is judicial economy or convenience

necessarily furthered.

Rather, duplication of effort,

inconvenience and uncertainty may well result.
Burford v. Sun Oil

See, e.g.,

jen 12/23/83
No. 81-2101 Pennhurst v. Halderman
RESPONSES TO DISSENT
[Insert at p. 15, just before heading "B"]

The contrary view of the dissent rests on

r

fiction,

is

wrong on the law, and, most important, would emasculate the Eleventh Amendment .•"

Under its view, an allegation that official con-

duct is contrary to a state statute would suffice to override the
State's protection under that Amendment.
conduct

is contrary to

the official's

ultra vires his authority.

7

Under

The theory is that such
"instruct ions," and

this theory,

thus

official act ion

based on a reasonable interpretation of any statute might, if the
LJ
Pruv,·A ,...~,. "-. t'tt-1..1.s r~
interpretation turned out to be erroneous, h s'e rve to strip the
''if"'11lhhZ
6b6J4:,Vv /t
re l,'t:.{- '"Y"'"'H fl~ ttLtw.s. ,.., tl-tw ~tf.H,,Jc. t:'A(ldnhe-.s ,'4' .,...13
ol:fjgia \ of t-h ~:a:::;ign's imm\:lni:ty x : - - - ~ (_

t-z...

The theory :roses
1\

t~h

with

reality.

The dissent does not

dispute that the general criterion for determining when a suit is
in fact against the sovereign is the effe S,! of the relief sought. ;
See supra, at 10: post, at 19, n. 28.
does,
was

that the relief

that a major

~

To suggest, as the dissent

sought and ordered here--which

in ef feet

state

institution be closed and smaller state
~~~
institutions be created andl\ funded--did not operate against the
.f~v

~ Jt. ,.,.. 1JI(/

l'fin this case, "' the court below rested its finding
that
state
law
r·equired habilitation
in
the
least
restrictive environment on dicta in In re Schmidt, 494 Pa.
86, 429 A. 2d 631 ( 1981) •
That dec is ion was not issued
until seven years after this suit was filed, and four
years after trial ended.

)
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T hv>

;., tkuc.tvl.{l. , whllv-..e
Simile ~ ly, where
as in this Ga ?
~

state

departmen ~ clearly

'"v~e .-e./

officials of a major

acting within the scope of their

hoi-

authority, ~ found!\ to have ..faileg agequately t ~ improve d.
ll\

conditions in a state
that the

~tate

,l~ "vvvev~l~

instit~ o~,

the dissent would hold

itself has forfeited its constitutionally

provided immunity.
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Joe:

A footnote along the following lines may be helpful:
I-t

;is to be

r~m~mbered

Lha ~ ~he

parties

defendant in this suit were not all individuals.

~
~vluf&f

tvJ--

<>\

They

e. II

the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare, a

/\

major department of the state itself: Athe Pennhurst State
School and Hospital, a state
~
1'1

~~±als

institutio ~ ane~dividuals

at the two state

iiTSLit~A£-aftd~e

five ,.

.coun-t-ies Su.t:-(:.Qund in.g-Pennliut s ~ The dis sen tr iR ef feet "
apparently is arguing that the defendants as a group ' bctl.

dod<- ... .,,j.

t

t>~·~~ ct~· t;kll,

(A""

I.

including the state institutions - were acting ultra
vires.

The District Court's findings,

never since

questioned by any court, plainly exonerate all of the

,

2.

defendants from the dissent's claim that they acted beyond
the scope of their

sp9ci~l

authority.

A truth that the dissent's theoretical argument

knowledge that "insane asylums", as they were known until
the middle of this century, usually were underfunded and
understaffed.

It is not easy to persuade competent people

to work in these institutions, particularly well trained
professionals.

Physical facilities, due to consistent

underfunding by state legislaures, have been grossly

,

inadequate - especially in light of advanced knowledge and
techniques for the treatment of the mentally ill.

Only

recently have states commenced to move to correct
widespread deplorable conditions.

The responsibility, as

3

0

the District Court recognized after a protracted trial,
has

~~~
ee~ the state itself.
;'\

;;

Joe:

Ask the library to give you a reference to

some commission or other authoritative report on
111./.ll

conditions of

""t

I

1'\5 \')

~risons

\v h61i\\

in the United States.

They must be

1\

a 12-foot stack of literature on this subject.

I don't

want to do into any detail, I would just like to cite it.
This sort of background demonstrates the validity of your
basic argument and that the dissent is as out of touch
with reality.

Rider X (Pennhurst)
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We are prompted to respond at some length

to Justice Stevens' 38 page dissent in which he charges
that "the Court today blithely overrules at least 29
cases", post, at 1.

E~m4~oR

Qf

~

old decisions the

dissent cites simply do not support the Court's sweeping
course, we do
r e l i e d z pby
on
armonious with our reaso i g today.
reconciled eithe

dissent

/3"-1can

~or

with the more recent decisions of t

with the purposes of the Eleventh Amendment.
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PENNX SALLY-POW
13.

We are prompted to respond at some length

to Justice Stevens' 38 page dissent in which he charges
that "the Court today blithely overrules at least 29
cases", post, at 1.

Examination of the old decisions the

dissent cites simply do not support the Court's sweeping
characterization.

Of course, we do not suggest that all

of the old decisions relied upon by the dissent are
harmonious with our reasoning today.

Nor can they be

.

reconciled either with the more recent decisions of this ;
Court or with the purposes of the Eleventh Amendment.

lfp/ss 12/27/83

Rider A, p. 1, Joe's Draft (Pennhurst}

PENNl SALLY-POW
Joe:

What do think of a footnote as follows that would

explain why we make such an extensive reply to the
dissent.

).
We are prompted to respond
\

~t ~ I e.,~+"
~~ll¥
1\

to Justice

Stevens' 38-page dissent as its theory, advocated here to
its extreme limits for the first time, would come close to
reading the Eleventh Amendment out of the Constit~ ion.
It is true, of course, that other decisions of this

Cou~t,

arguably relevant to the dissent'sf heory are not

\
harmonious.

But to say, as the dissent does, that "the

Court today blithely overrules at least 29 cases", post,

\
at 1, is a statement that cannot be supported.

~ ~ ~~~
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that ~the named

~~ftf-tfi:~~~-

st a t e rna e,. th e 1 aw a pre t ense.

{!it-h~y

thority a'fla

defendants here

a ~ t~~
·
e

District Cour

,~
h
wer~~~~~~1rrary

~
t' s .,{ v1ew
·
to ~u-

s·~Hil' l rH ~ t e d'1ssen

cC.dltflil..ttc• ;.;. ~ ~ ~

t;.b&J r iO•rerQ;i!'!'IAe l ifJIHf~ a ~
~~~~~~~~~~~~r~~~~~~~

i RSel!t!l€eieAS ..gjvep

,. .,.,z"\ l ..

2.

1n

-them.......b~

1s case A.no e

at the individ-·

al defendants "apparently took every means available to them to
reduce

the

incidents of abuse and injury, but were constantly
-~~

J.,.

faced with staff shortages." '446 F. Sapp., at 132zt. ~he eeur ~
~
~pN!-8'S;I:y J\found
"that the individual defendants are dedicated
professionals

in

the

field of

retardation who were given very

little with which to accomplish the habilitation of the retarded
at Pennhurst."

Ibid.

t5'- To

the extent there was a violation of

state law in this case, it is a case of the State itself not

~·r~ t.r;o~~~ ~~k
The dissent relies for

~~~e

( A )

rathQr faRt&frtig tbQo~ on numer-

ous cases from the turn of the century and earlier.

These cases

do not provide the support the dissent claims to find.
simply miscited.

liv~

Many are

For example, with perhaps one exception, f6 none

of its Eleventh Amendment cases can be said to hold that injunctive relief could be ordered against State officials for failing
to carry out their duties under State statutes. fi

that

Moreover, the

the

"acted in the
official
r o the court's
at 90, n. 4.
16see

u.s.

Rolston

391 (1887).

Footnote(s)

v. Missouri Fund Commissioners,
But see n. 18, infra.

n will

appear on following pages.
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analogous federal sovereign immunity cases the dissent relies on,
while far from uniform, make clear that suit may not be predicated on violations of
tionary duties.l l

state statutes that command purely discre-

Since it cannot be doubted that the statutes at·

1'1-The cases are cited in footnote 4 8 of the dissent,
post, at 37.
Several of the cases do not rest on an
Eleventh Amendment holding at all.
For example, federal
jurisdiction in fact was held to be lacking in Martin v.
Lankford,
245 u.s.
547
(1915), because of lack of
diversity.
A fair reading of South Carolina v. Wesley,
155 U.S. 542 (1895), and the cases it cites, makes clear
that the ruling there was on the purely procedural point
that the party raising the juri sd ict ional object ion was
not a party to the proceeding.
In two other cases the
allegation was that a state officer or agency had acted
unconstitutionally, rather than merely contrary to state
law.
Atchison, T. & S.F.R. Co. v. O'Connor, 223 u.s. 280
(1897): Hopkins v. Clemson Agricultural College, 221 u.s.
636 (1911).
In Johnson v. Lankford, 245 u.s. 541 (1918),
the relief sought was not injunctive relief but money
damages against the individual officer.
See infra n. 19.
None of these cases can be said to be overruled by our
holding today. As noted infra, at 16-17, the Greene cases
do not discuss the Eleventh Amendment in connection with
the state-law claim.
Tindal v. Wesley, 167 u.s. 204 (1897), and Scully v.
Bird, 209 U.S. 481 ( 1908) , are more closely analogous
cases.
In both o t.thes ~ , however, the allegation was tpat
the defendants had committed common law torts, not, as
here, that they had failed to carry out affirmative duties
assigned to them by statute.
See Tindal, supra, at 221
(distinguishing suits brought "to enforce the discharge by
the defendants of any specific duty enjoined by the
State"):
Transcript
of
Record,
Tindal
v.
Wesley
3
(complaint alleged that defendants had "wrongfully entered
into said premises and ousted the plaintiff . • • to the
damage of the plaintiff ten thousand dollars") : Scully,
supra,
at
483
(allegation
was
that
defendant
had
"injuriously
affect [ed]
the
reputation
and
sale
of
[plaintiff's] products").
Tort cases such as these were
explicitly overruled in Larson v. Domestic & Foreign
Commerce Corp., 337 u.s. 682 (1949).
See infra, at s--'1
(of tf,is V'ilv).
1<6

See, e.g., Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 u.s.
605, 620 (1912) ("The complainant did not ask the court to
Footnote continued on next page.
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81-2101 Pennhurst
MEMO TO FILE:
In

rereading

the

DC's

opinion

(446

F.Supp.

1298), the following points are of some interest - though
perhaps not enough to include in our opinion:
1.
jury over

a

The case was tried by the court without a
period of

32 days.

Testimony was

solely to the issue of liability".
2.

"limited

p. 1298.

Among the court's "findings of fact" are the

following:
(a)

retarded,

"Pennhurst,

was on

trial.

assault upon such

as

institution

for

the

Recent years have witnessed an

institutions.

review article cited

an

therein.)

(See,
At

n.

issue

6 and the law
is whether

the

residents at Pennhurst have been the victims of violations
of

their

statutory

or

constitutional

rights

in

failing to provide them with minimally adequate education,
training and care".
(b)
and

"History

mistreatment of

from a book.

the

p. 1299.

is

replete with misunderstanding

retarded"

-

citing

and

quoting

We should cite these pages of the

2.

DC' s

opinion

to

the

language

I

suggest

adding

on

the

hsitory of mental institutions.
(c)
The

era

"Pennhurst was the product of

being one

community

in which

(in which)

"asylums

viewed

as

a

permanent

deviant.

isolated

from the

instead of providing the individual

with education and training •
be

this era".

• the asylum grew to

residential

facility

for

the

(with a distinction being made between

"retarded"

and

"deviant"

groups}

"carne

increased

insolation and increased size permitting little time for
habilitation.

See generally Wolfensberger.

Pennhurst was

the product of this era."
(d)

Since its founding in 1908, the institution

(Pennhurst) has been overcrowded and understaffed • • • •
• All parties concede that the institution has undergone
tremendous improvement since the 1950s
even

with

these

improvements

it

was

(b-et')
admitted

by

the

defendants that Pennhurst does not presently meet minimum
standards

for

the

habilitation

(e)

"At

best,

of

its

residents".

p.

1302.
Pennhur st

is

typical

of

large

result

from

residential state institutions for the retarded
"many

of

the

problems

at

Pennhurst

3.

overcrowding and understaffing".
19

professionals

replaced".

have

left

"In the last two years

the

staff

without

being

p. 1303.
(f)

agreement

"All

that

parties

in

Pennhurst

inappropriate and

this

as

inadequate.

It

litigation

an

are

institution

in
is

is also admitted that

the inadequacies in programing at Pennhurst are directly
attributable to staff shortages".
3.

The

DC

did,

p. 1304.

however,

make

a

series

of

findings of failures at Pennhurst to do what should have
been

done,

retarded
rights.

had

and

the

been

court's

denied

conclusion

was

that

constitutional

and

statutory

And the DC's injunctive order is directed to the

Commonwealth
capacities.

and

county

defendants

in

their

No individual judgment was rendered.

L.F.P., Jr.

ss

the

official

No. 81-2101 Pennhurst v. Halderman

issue

here

gave

Pennhurst,

see n.

would

be

not

4.

broad
11,

ultra

supra,
vires

discretion

conduct alleged
even

under

the

in

operating

in this case

standards

of

the

dissent's cases.11

interfere with the official discretion of the Secretary of
War, but challenged his authority to do the things of
which complaint was made."); Santa Fe P.R. Co. v. Fall,
259 u.s. 197, 198-199 (1922) (same); Noble v. Union "RTV'er
Logging R., 147 u.s. 165 171-172 (1893) (same); see also
Kendall v. Stokes, 3 How. 87, 98 (1845) ("[A] public
officer is not liable to an action if he falls into error
in a case where the act to be done is not merely a
ministerial one, but is one in relation to which it is his
duty to exercise judgment and discretion; even although an
individual may suffer by his mistake."); Belknap v.
Schild, 161 u.s. 10, 18 (1896) (under Eleventh Amendment,
injunctive relief is permitted where officer commits a
tort that is "contrary to a plain official duty requiring
no exercise of discretion"); Wells v. Roper, 246 u.s. 335,
338 (1918); Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp.,
337 U.S. 682, 715 (1949)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
(noting discretionary-ministerial duty distinction in
sovereign immunity cases).
The opinions make clear that
the question of discretion went to sovereign immunity, and
not to the court's mandamus powers generally. See, ~,
Stimson, supra, at 618-620. The rationale appears to be
that discretionary duties have a greater impact on the
sovereign
because
they
"br in [g)
the
operation , o.t
governmental machinery into play." Larson, supra, at 715
(Frankfurter, J. dissenting).
Rolston, the one Eleventh Amendment case relied upon
by the dissent in which it might be said that injunctive
relief was ordered against state officials on the basis of
state law, see n. 16, supra, was a case involving "a plain
ministerial duty," Great Northern Life Insurance Co. v.
Read, 322 u.s. 47, 51 (1944).

--

~

l'f In any event, as with th ~ leventh Amendment cases,
see n. 17, supra, the dissen t) is wrong to say that the
federal sovereign immunity cases it cites post, at 37, n.
48, are today overruled.
At least five of them were
actions for damages in tort against the individual
officer. Little v. Barreme, 2 Cranch 170 (1804); Wise v.
Withers, 3 Cranch 331 (1806); Mitchell v. Harmony, 13 How.
115 (1851); Bates v. Clark, 95 u.s. 204 (1877); Belknap v.
Schild, 161 u.s. 10 (1896).
In Belknap the Court drew a
Footnote continued on next page.

No. 81-2101 Pennhurst v. Halderman

5.

J~- .1 ~t.f
~

j...,

k

.-.AJ~~

~

is

t\

{,~r l~~ vances
'

"

the

~

language

in

authority-stripping

the early cases that ad~~

theory

has never been pressed
v \>'\ .'f'tf~~~) dissent,t~ dottl'sin theory
his case. Rather, when the

(LV\

SQQKS

lt"'

advanced, this

the dissent has
~
itly rejected it.

!"'OI'O~nded

1

argument

that

an

u.s.

by the

. 11 ·r

L.-~

~-

expansive approach of ·

Court~

plainly and explic-

~~-~- ~

ing so, the Ce~Ft Aas Qast doubt ~upon the

....

viability of the theory its lf · { In Larson v. Domestic
Commerce Corp., 337

682 (1

&

Foreign

9), the Court was faced with the

allegation that a

4

as far as the dissent

rf.

In

r--rr--r •, -- 7

D.LM!li"E.'

/.l)
rtt.e, -J~~

state offic i al committed a

tort sufficed to distinguish

the sovereign and

strip the former of the latter's immunity.
the argument, noting that "[i]t confuses the
eign immunity with the requirement that a plaintiff

of severa cause

careful distinction between such act i ons and suits in
which the relief would run more directly against the
State.
Id., at 18.
The Court disallowed injunctive
relief against the officers on this basis. Id., at 23-25.
Nothing in our opinion touches these cases. Cf. Larson v.
Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 687-6?8~
and nn. 7, 8 (1949) (whether damages might be awarded
against individual government officers was not at issue).
The other five cases are difficult to classify.
Compare id., at 691, n. 12, 699, n. 21, 699-700, 702, n.
26 (classifying these cases as challenging act ions taken
in excess of statutory authority), with id., at 731-732
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (classifyingthese as tort
cases).
There is language in most of them that suggests
they
were
actions
alleging
torts,
not
statutory
violations.
See Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 u.s.
605, 623 (1912); Sloan Shipyards v. u.s. Fleet Corp., 258
u.s. 549, 568 (1922); Land v. Dollar, 330 u.s. 731, 736
(1947). The remainder clearly distinguish cases (like the
present one) involving statutes that command discretionary
duties.
See n. 18, supra.
In any case, the Court in
Larson explicitly limited the precedential value of all of
these cases.
See Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 u.s. 643, 646,
and n. 6 (1962).

)

6.
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\

of action."

Id., at 692-693.

sent's argument,

because

it

The same can be said of the disis simply the reverse of the claim

rejected ' by the Larson Court: when sued in tort in his official
capacity,

a government officer's defense on the law is that he ·

acted pursuant to State statutory authority~ 20 when the officer is
sued for violation of a State statute, the question again will be
whether the officer correctly interpreted his authority. l

~erhaps becaus€J~e

~same 8S;i

~/

dissent's

iie plain;iff ' ."]in Larson,

of agency lawJ

argument

fij

is

essentially

the

is based on the same theory

-'I'hfr• theory is that "[a] sovereign, like any oth-

er principal, cannot authorize its agent to violate the law," so
that when the agent does so he cannot be acting consistently with
his instructions.

Post, at

25-26~

see also post, at 15, 21,

30~

cf. Larson, supra, at 693-694 ("It is argued ••• that the commiss ion of a tort cannot be authorized by the sovereign.
on this contention
rests •••• ").

• • • It is

that the respondent's position fundamentally

It is a theory that the Court in Larson explicitly

rejected:
"It has been said, in a very special sense, that, as a
matter of agency law, a principal may never lawfully
authorize the commission of a tort by his agent~
But
that statement, in its usual context, is only a wa~ of
saying that an agent's liability for torts committea by

20see Land v. Dollar, 330 u.s. 731, 738 (1947)
("[P]ublic officials may become tort-feasors by exceeding
the limits of their authority.")~ Philadelphia Co. v.
Stimson, 223 u.s. 605, 622-623 (1912) ~ cf. Larson, 337
u.s., at 685 (controversy on merits concerned whether
officer had correctly interpreted government contract)~
id., at 716-717, 721-722 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (in
cases alleging a tort, the "official seeks to screen
himself behind the sovereign").

i
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him cannot be avoided by pleading the direction or authorization of his principal.
The agent is himself
liable whether or not he has been authorized or even
directed to commit the tort. This, of course, does not
mean that the principal is not liable nor that the tortious action may not be regarded as the action of the
principal." Id., at 694 (footnote omitted).
Larson thus made clear that, at least insofar as injunctive re~...,.~

lief is sought, ~ mr r iD ~ rror of law will not suffice to override
the sovereign

immunity of state officers for

J

their official capacities.

Id., at 690, 695. ll
...,..._

actions taken in

~i~t~

to the plaintiff fC r.eated by , this res~ ~was "outweigh [ed] by "the
necessity of permitting the Government to

arry out its functions

unhampered by direct judicial intervention."
anything, this public need is even greater when
eralism are involved.

Id., at 704.

If
fed-

:J..;)..

See supra, at 8-9.

11 The Larson Court noted that a similar argument "was
at one time advanced in connection with corporate agents,
in an effort to avoid corporate liability for torts, but
was decisively rejected."
337 u.s., at 694.
See 10
Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations
§4877, at 350 (1978 ed.)
(a corporation is liable for
torts committed by its agent within the scope of is
authority even though the "act was contrary to or in
violation of the instructions or orders given by it to the
offending agent"): id., §4959 (same as to crimes).
The dissent's interpretation of Larson, post, at 2527, simply ignores the language that the dissent itself
quotes:
"It is important to note that in [ultra vires]
cases the relief can be granted, without impleading the
sovereign, only because of the officer's lack of delegated
power. A claim of error in the exercise of that power is
therefore not sufficient." 337 u.s., at 690.
2

~As we have discussed supra, at 11-12, Edelman v.
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) , also shows that the broad
ultra vires theory enunciated in Young and in some of the
cases quoted by the dissent has been discarded.
In
Edelman, although the State officers were alleged to be
Footnote continued on next page •
.ll

I
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The dissent in Larson made many of the arguments advanced by
the dissent today, and asserted that many of the same cases were
being overruled or ignored.
er,

J.,

dissenting).

See 337

u.s.,

at 723-728 (Frankfurt-

Those arguments were

cases supporting them are moribund.

rejected,

and

the -

Since Larson was decided in

acting contrary to law, and therefore should have been
"stripped of their authority" under the theory of the
dissent, we held the action to be barred by the Eleventh
Amendment. The dissent attempts to distinguish Edelman on
the ground that the retroactive relief there, unlike
injunctive relief, does not run only against the agent.
Post, at 19, n. 28. To say that injunctive relief against
State officials acting in their official capacity does not
run against the State is to resort to the fictions that
characterize the dissent's theories.
Unlike the English
sovereign perhaps, an American State can act only through
its officials~
It is true that the Court in Edelman
recognized that retroactive relief often, or at least
sometimes, has a greater impact on the State treasury than
does injunctive relief, see 415 u.s., at 666, n. 11, but
there was no suggestion that damages alone were thought to
run against the State while injunctive relief did not.
We have noted that the authority-stripping theory of
Young is a fiction that has been narrowly construed.
In
this light, it may well be wondered what principled basis
there is to the ultra vires doctrine as it was set forth
in Larson and Treasure Salvors.
That doctrine exce:ets
from the Eleventh Amendment bar suits against officers
acting in their official capacities but without any
statutory authority, even though the relief would operate
against the State.
At bottom, the doctrine is based on
the fiction of the Young opinion. The dissent's method is
merely to take this fiction to its extreme.
While the
dissent's result may be logical, in the sense that it is
difficult to draw principled lines short of that end, its
view would virtually eliminate the constitutional doctrine
of sovereign immunity.
It is a result from which the
Court in Larson wisely recoiled. We do so again today.
For present purposes, however, we do no more than question
the continued vitality of the ultra vires doctrine in the
Eleventh Amendment context.
We hold only that to the
extent the doctrine is consistent with the analysis of
this op1n1on, it is a very narrow exception that will
allow suit only under the standards set forth in note 11
supra.

9.
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1949, .2 3

no opinion

by

any Member of

this Court has

cited

the

a.....
cases~;~ ~

a,.v
j i~e

the dissent primarily relies for

~ ,~;e

r' ~

thc-b£eeti language the dissent quotes.

~

proposition

Many if not most of

these cases have not been relied upon in an Eleventh Amendment
context at all.
upon only for

Those that have been so cited have been relied
2
propositions with which no one today quarrels. o/

13 The dissent appears to believe that Larson is
consistent with all prior law.
See post, at 25.
This
view ignores the fact that the Larson Court itself
understood that it was required to "resolve [a] conflict
in doctrine."
337 u.s., at 701.
The Court since has
recognized that Larson represented a watershed in the law
of sovereign immunity.
In Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 u.s.
643, Justice Stewart's opinion for the Court observed that
"to reconcile completely all the decisions of the Court in
this field prior to 1949 would be a Procrustean task."
Id., at 646. His opinion continued:
"The Court's 1949 Larson decision makes it
unnecessary, however, to undertake that task
here.
For in Larson the Court, aware that it
was called upon to 'resolve the conflict in
doctrine' ..• , thorougly reviewed the many prior
decisions, and made an informed and carefully
considered
choice
between
the
seemingly
conflicting precedents."
Ibid. The Court included many of the cases upon which the
dissent relies in its list of cases that were rejected by
Larson. See id., n. 6.

lY ~'

Rolston v. Missouri Fund Commissioners, 120
390 (1887) (never cited); Scully v. Bird, 209 u.s.
481 (1908) (never cited); Hopkins v. Clemson Agricultural
College, 221 u.s. 636 (1911) (never cited); Johnson v.
Lankford, 245 u.s. 541 (1918)
(never cited); Land v.
Dollar, 330 u.s. 731 (1947) (cited only for proposition
that judgment that would expend itself on public treasury
or interfere with public administration is a suit against
the United States); Cunningham v. Macon & B.R. Co., 109
u.s. 446 (1883) (cited only for proposition that a suit
alleging unconstitutional conduct is not barred by the
Eleventh Amendment, and that state cannot be sued without
its consent); Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 u.s. 270 (1885)
Footnote continued on next page.
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The plain fact is that the dissent's theory,
cepted to the

full extent to which

if it ever was ac-

it is now pressed,

has not

been the law for at least a generation.
The

reason

is obvious.

~~6~ ~laintiff foolishly attempts
-f'·r/(' \·l EU
AI''
~ere he cannot produce some
.• JIA.M~ ili1\ .

C"

Except in the

which a

to sue the
its own name, or
,. ~
state ~tatute that has been violated

o his asserted injury, tbe Eleventh Amendment would have little

force under the diss~nt's view of the ultra vires doctrine.
questionabley and

narrow exception

thus would swallow the

This
rule.

That result gives the dissent no pause presumably because of its
view

that

the

Eleventh

"'undoubtedly ru [n]

Amendment

and

sovereign

counter to modern democratic notions of the

moral responsibility of the State.'"

Post, at 36, n. 46 (quoting

Great Northern Life Insurance Co. v. Read, 322
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
ed by this Court.
322

u.s.

immunity

u.s.

47, 59 (1944)

This argument has not been adopt-

See Great Northern Life Insurance Co. v. Read,

47, 51 (1944)

("Efforts to force, through suits against
;

officials,

performance of promises by a state collide directly

(unconstitutional-conduct suit is not suit against state);
Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust, 154 u.s. 362 (1894)
(same).
Prior to Florida Dept. of State v. Treasure
Salvors, Inc., 458 u.s. 670 (1982), Tindal v. Wesley, 167
u.s. 204 (1897), had been cited only for the proposition
that a suit alleging unconstitutional conduct is not
barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
The plurality opinion
in Treasure Salvors discussed Tindal at some length, 458
u.s., at 685-688, but noted that the rule of Tindal "was
clarified in Larson."
Id., at 688; see also id., at 715,
n. 13 (White, J., dissenting).
--As noted, n. 23, supra, some of these cases were also
cited--and rejected--in Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 u.s. 643,
646, n. 6 (1962).
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with

the necessity that a

11.

sovereign must be free from judicial

compulsion in the carrying out of its policies within the limits
of the Constitution."); Larson, supra,

at 704

("The Government,

as representatives of the community as a whole, cannot be stopped ·
in

its

misses

tracks
the

immunity.
ment 1 s

•••• ").

point

with

Moreover,
respect

the

argument

to Eleventh

substantially

Amendment

sovereign

As JUSTICE MARSHALL has observed, the Eleventh Amend-

restrict ion

on

the

federal

j ud ic ial

power

is

based

in

large part on "the problems of federalism inherent in making one
severe ign appear
Employees
(1973)

v.

against

Missouri

(MARSHALL,

-hrl-:tf:4~h
the

,A .Ut..t:Q ~

... .

J.,

its wi 11 in the courts of the other."

Public

Health

concurring

in

Dept.,
the

411

result).

u.s.
The

279,

294

dissent

Eleventh Amendment 1 s basis in federalism •
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I

[RIDER P. 1~
(

1 j The

-

dissent claims
that
the Court
in Greene
expressly rejected the explicit argument that pendent
state-law
claims
were
not
barred
by
the
Eleventh
Amendment.
Post, at 12, n. 14.
The Eleventh Amendment
argument of the opinion and of the briefs, however, is
confined to the federal constitutional claims.
Compare
Brief for Louisville & N.R. Co., Louisville & N.R. Co. v.
Greene 15-38 ( jur isd ict ion over federal claims) with id. ,
at 38-39 (pendent jurisdiction over state claims); see
Brief for State Board and Officers, Louisville & N.R. Co.
v. Greene 75-99 (arguing that Young only applied when
state statute, rather than state action under statute, is
unconstitutional); id., at 99-101 (arguing that definition
of state action is--rdentical for purposes of Fourteenth
and Eleventh Amendments); Brief for Appellants Greene v.
Louisville & I.R. 32-45 (arguing that state was real party
in interest).
The plain fact is that the State never
contested that if there were jurisdiction over the federal
questions in the case, there would be jurisdiction over
the local-law claims. "'""!'11 f~ct') T he State's brief closes
with
a
concession
that
th l
federal
courts
had
jurisdiction.
See Brief for State Board and Officers,
Louisville & N.R. Co.
v. Greene 139; Reply Brief,
Louisville
&
N.R.
Co.
v.
Greene
2
(pointing
out
-------------i l o
3
ncession) •
~ 4
~
1d:"r of the other pendent-jurisdiction cases cited by
the dissent, post, at 38, n. 50, 1-i-k~.r.ds-e do ROt discuss
--------------- the Eleventh Amendment in connection with the state-law
claims. Moreover, since Larson was decide in 1949, making
clear that mere violations of state law would not override
the Eleventh Amendment, none of these cases has been cited
in any suit against state officials for violations of
state law.
The rule of these cases is merely that, as a
general matter, a federal court should decide a case on
state-law grounds where possible to avoid a federal
constitutional question. See, e.g., Siler v. Louisville &
N.R. Co., 213 u.s. 175, 193 (1909).
Nothing in our
decis1on is meant to cast doubt on the desirability of
applying the Siler principle in cases where the federal
court has jurisdiction to decide the state-law issues.
,
fie d1ssent ::r at~er =9trange:iioy argtt~ at application
the S~ r rule to claims bar~ed by the Eleventh
Amendment "en
ces the deci s ionmak ing autonomy of the
States" because t
States are free to change state law.
See post, at 35. The · ea appears to be that a decision
based on state law will re
less federal intrusion
on state affairs.,; See ibid. ("g1
appropriate deference
to established state policies").
Tn
issent fails to
Footnote continued on next
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1

~

".#'

, ..-1

V'F

~~

p-IV" -~~VI
~ ~r,

J

~~ ;

... ::1-

• /:

·

,

reco ize that if the state legislature changes state iaw
to ove ide a federal court ruling, the consti tuti al
ground f
decision that was avoided by applica · n of
Siler still emains. The plaintiff can return
federal
court to get
ruling based on federal gro
This is
hardly less intr ive than basing the d 1sion on federal
law in the first pl e. Of course, · the plaintiff could
not obtain relief unde federal 1
in the first place, it
is certainly not less 1 rus · e to grant relief against
. state officials on the
of the federal court's
perception of state la •
egree of intrusiveness on
government powers h.a-s nothing t: do with the policy of
t avoiding
decision
of
constr utional
questions.
{Similarly, i~ is simply not true tha basing decision on
., state law "avoid[s] duplicative liti tion," as the
dissent suggests, post, at 34.
See ge
ally n. 29
~l~
·n~S_r_
a_
.)___________________________________________

14.
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[RIDER P. 20-.:::,..y ]

------~1

u-re-~~ 4 ; 1 h- ~
..

~q [formerly
[Insert after cite to
Burford]
This case may be an
Here, the federal courts
effectively have been
a major state institution
based on inferences
rawn from dicta 1n a state court
opinion not decided until four years after the suit was
begun. The state court has had no opportunity to review
the federal courts' construction of its opinion, or their
choice of remedies.
The only escape from an erroneous }
interpretation of state law is presumably the rather
cumbersome route of legislation.
17 1
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jen 12/16/83
MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL
From:
Re:

Joe
Justice Stevens' dissent in 81-2101 Pennhurst

In response to your memorandum of December 15, here are my
thoughts on how to respond to Justice Stevens' dissent.

My ap-

preach herein is first to describe JPS's argument, then to assess
the strengths and weaknesses of that argument,
make specific
1.

recommen~ations

and finally

to

for responding.

Description of the dissent.

slightly differently than you do.

I believe I read
the dissent
_..
On page 4 of your memorandum,

you identify three points that JPS makes:

Young applies to state

law as well as federal law, the defendants here in ef feet are
being sued

individually rather

dants are acting ultra vires.

than officially, and the defenBy contrast, I think these all are

really just one point, i.e., the last.

The reason he says Young

applies to state as well federal law violations is that he sees
Young as a species of ultra vires action.

The reason the suit is ; ,

in effect one against the defendants individually is that when
they are acting ultra vires they are stripped of their state immunity and

stand as

though

acting on their

own.

I

therefore

think his entire Eleventh Amendment argument concerns only the
breadth of the ultra vires doctrine.
It is true that that doctrine is not mentioned by name until
quite late in the opinion, but it is in fact the basis for his
earlier discussion of the cases.

The structure of the Eleventh

Amendment sections of his opinion is as follows:

Part II simply

page 2.

attempts to amass precedent in which the Eleventh Amendment has
been held not to prevent a federal court from issuing injunctive
relief

based

on

state

law.

Part

III seeks

to

show how

these

cases fit into the law of sovereign immunity--this part provides
the theoretical support for the cases.

In his view, these cases

were justified by the ultra vires doctrine.

His discussion here

can be divided

First, he says that

into four major parts

Young was an ultra vires case

(l)

(pp. 16-17).

(2)

Second, he says

the ultra vires doctrine was also the theory underlying the suits
against
Third,

state

officers

he

based
Larson

the ultra vi res doctrine

(pp.

on

state

law

(pp.

19-20).

(3)

is consistent with this view of
2 5-27) •

(4)

And fourth,

he con-

eludes by very briefly applying his view of the ultra vires doctrine to this case (pp. 27-28).
(I have left out the discussion of English case law (pp. 1516), and the discussion of "the basic reason" the Amendment was
added to the Constitution

~~

~

23-24).

portant to the theory of the opinion.

Neither of these is imPart IV discusses

pendent ~;

f jurisdiction, which he treats as merely a makeweight for his main

~,.Y

~

(pp.

argument.

Part V is a conclusion. J

The reason JPS rests so heavily on the ultra vires doctrine
is that his theory of the Eleventh Amendment is that an action is
against the state if the relief would operate against the state,
except

if

the

state did

not or could not authorize

taken by the individual sued.

the action

The "except" clause describes any

ultra vires conduct, and would include Young.
Eleventh Amendment is quite different.

Our theory of the

It is that an action is

page 3.

against the state if the relief would operate against the state,
except when the extension of immunity would be inconsistent with
federal supremacy.

As Justice Rehnquist points out in his letter

of October 18 (attached) , there is really no room or need in our
theory for an ultra vires doctrine at all.
2.

Strengths

&

weaknesses of the dissent.

The . e_ar ly ca§_es

that JPS discusses in Part II of his dissent, and his analysis of
those

cases

strong.

in

sections

(1)

and

(2)

of

Part

III,

are quite

In brief, the language of these cases clearly supports

his theory that whether or not a suit is against the state in
these situations depends on whether the action is properly authorized by the sovereign.

Many of them hold that the suit is

not against the state, even though the relief would plainly operate against it.

You are right that most of these cases rest on

either allegations of unconstitutional or tortious conduct, rather than conduct that is contrary to statute.

The theory of these

cases is that the sovereign could not authorize such conduct, and
therefore,

in contemplation of

law,

he

or

it did

not do

so. ~

There are 1t ewer cases--perhaps three--in which the theory is applied to assert jurisdiction where it is alleged that the sover eign did not authorize the action--i.e., where the action is contrary to state statute.

But this is the next logical step of the

underlying theory, and so it is difficult to attack JPS's line of
reasoning at this admittedly more-weakly-supported point.
I

$

c;r)/i'
1

,.,.r.;f

We can do three things to undermine his reading of the early
cases, however: \ First, we can, as I have outlined in my draft
response ~

distinguish many of these cases on their facts.

~ c-

"

page 4.

ond ~

there is language in some of these cases that suggests that

an error in carrying out a discretionary, rather than a ministerial,

statutory duty will not serve as the basis for suit.

I

have hinted at that in my proposed footnotes, but I probably can
beef that up.

Third, I believe there is language from the cases

of this period that supports other theories, including ours.

I

am not so confident that this answer is all that strong, but I
can check on it.
More basically, we can acknowledge that the language of the
early cases is against us, but say that it does not matter because Larson, Edelman, and, to a lesser extent, Treasure Salvors,
have changed direction.
to

show

that

the

ultra

Larson and Treasure Salvors can be used
vires

doctrine

is

extremely

narrow.

Larson specifically declined to extend it to encompass tortious
actions,

thus overruling a number of early cases like the ones

JPS relies on.

Edelman suggests that the ultra vires doctrine

does not extend to encompass actions for money damages, regardless of

whether

the action is specifically authorized or

not. ~

The Edelman part of this general response is in the opinion already

(i.e., the language on p. II that the theory of Young "has

not been provided an expansive interpretation"; also If.

IY-tf} .

The

Larson and Treasure Salvors part I have put in my earlier suggested response.

These attack the weakest parts of JPS's dis-

sent, which are his reading of Larson (pp. 25-27) and his explanation of Edelman (p. 19, n. 28).

One thing that I have not put

in, but probably should, is the point made in the Memorandum of
Sept. 29 that none of the dissent's cases have been cited in an

'

page 5.

Eleventh Amendment context

since Larson.

This would help show

that JPS's theory has been a dying one for a long time.

(I have

not checked to make sure this is ~til Y true as to all the cases
that he now cites, but I suspect it is.)
The final part of JPS's theoretical exposition is the application of it to the facts of this case.

In his view, very little

needs to be said, because all a plaintiff needs to do is allege a
violation of state law.

The plaintiffs have done so here.

The

application of our theory to the facts of this case is similarly
short;

it is contained

in footnote

11 of the majority opinion.

Technically, there is no need to expand this, since JPS does not
dispute it.

However, I see your point that we can use the facts

) of this case to show that JPS's position involves the baldest of
fictions.

;~

They can thus be used to illustrate that our theory is

better because it does not involve the empty formalisms that his
(

does.
4.

Recommendations.

marize our

answers

I agree that it would be useful to sum-

to JPS's dissent

in one place

in text.

My ; "

attempt to cram them into various footnotes may have underestimated the force the dissent has on first reading.

The best place

probably would be to insert two paragraphs or so on p. /.J,

just

prior to heading "B."
I am inclined to organize the response along the lines of my

a i scussion above.

First,

suggest

that JPS overstates the case

support his view has.

(Put the actual discussion of the cases in

a

acknowledge

footnote.)

Second,

that

there

is

language

that

supports his view, but say that Larson and Edelman show a process

~

page 6.

of departing from that view.

Larson specifically rejected much

of the theory that the dissent now asserts.

The fact that the

cases he relies on have not been cited for a generation, and have
not been cited in any recent Eleventh Amendment opinion of this
Court, emphasizes this departure.

Conclude that it is not clear

that the ultra vires doctrine has any principled basis today, but
hold only that it is no broader than what is stated in footnote
11.

(This last could be in a footnote.)

Third, show how the

facts of this case make it plain that this suit is "against the
State" in the most direct sense, and that JPS's view is a fiction.
Since it probably would be useful to you to see some sample
language, I will proceed with a draft of this approach.

I antic-

ipate that it will involve mostly rewriting my earlier proposed
footnotes, as well as restating certain parts of the opinion.

lfp/ss 12/27/83

Rider A, p. 1, Joe's Draft (Pennhurst}

PENN! SALLY-POW
Joe:

What do think of a footnote as follows that would ·

explain why we make such an extensive reply to the
dissent.

We are prompted to respond fully to Justice
Stevens' 38-page dissent as its theory, advocated here to
its extreme limits for the first time, would come close to
reading the Eleventh Amendment out of the Constittuion.
It is true, of course, that other decisions of this Court
arguably relevant to the dissent'stheory are not
harmonious.

But to say, as the dissent does, that "the

Court today blithely overrules at least 29 cases", post,
at 1, is a statement that cannot be supported.

lfp/ss 12/27/83

Rider B, p. 1, Joe's Draft (Pennhurst)

PENN12 SALLY-POW
Similarily, where - as in this case - officials of a major
state department clearly acting within the scope of their
authority, are found to have failed adequately to improve
conditions in a state instittuion, the dissent would hold
that the state itself has forfeited its constitutionally
provided immunity.

lfp/ss 12/27/83

Rider A, p. 2, Joe's draft (Pennhurst)

PENN2 SALLY-POW
Joe:

A footnote along the following lines may be helpful:
It is to be remembered that the parties

defendant in this suit were not all individuals.

They

invlufrf the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare, a
major department of the state itself, the Pennhurst State
School and Hospital, a state institution; and individuals
were officials of the two state institutions and the five
counties surrounding Pennhurst.

The dissent, in effect,

apparently is arguing that the defendants as a group including the state institutions - were acting ultra
vires.

The District Court's findings,

never since

questioned by any court, plainly exonerate all of the

;

~

defendants from the dissent's claim that they acted beyond
the scope of their special authority.
A truth that the dissent's theoretical argument
seems unaware of is the plight of many if not most of the
mental institutions in our country.

It is common

knowledge that "insane asylums", as they were known until
the middle of this century, usually were underfunded and
understaffed.

It is not easy to persuade competent people

to work in these institutions, particularly well trained
professionals.

Physical facilities, due to consistent

underfunding by state legislaures, have been grossly
inadequate - especially in light of advanced knowledge
techniques for the treatment of the mentally ill.

~np

.

Only

recently have states commenced to move to 'correct
widespread deplorable conditions.

The responsibility, as

',,

the District Court recognized after a protracted trial,
has been the state itself.

Joe:

Ask the library to give you a reference to

some commission or other authoritative report on
conditions of prisons in the United States.

They must be

a 12-foot stack of literature on this subject.

I don't

want to do into any detail, I would just like to cite it.
This sort of background demonstrates the validity of your
basic argument and that the dissent is as out of touch
with reality.

lfp/ss 12/27/83
MEMORANDUM
DATE:

TO:

Joe

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

Dec. 27, 1983

Pennhurst
I spent most of the afternoon of the "day after
Christmas"
dissent.

reviewing
I

agree

your

enlarged

response

that you have followed

to

the

the outline we

discussed, and done so extremely well.
At the outset,

I express admiration for the way

you have dealt with the cases relied upon by the dissent.
As I am not familiar with the great majority of them, and
will not have

the opportunity to read them,

I

rely on -

but am not surprised - by the way you analyzed them.
I

have dictated

three possible

riders,

and

am

open to discussion on all of them.
The only part of your draft that is not clear to
J

me

are

the

three or

four

sentences

that

,.

begin with the

citation of Larson on page 5 and continue to the end of
that paragraph.

I really do not understand the relevance

to this case of the statement in Larson to the effect that
the

plaintiff

statement of

was confusing
a

cause of

sovereign

act ion.

Is

immunity with
there

a problem

the
in

this case of

stating a cause of action?

self evident may

be

at least to me -

compared

with

a

Also it is not

that a tort suit fairly

claim that

state officials have

failed to act in accordance with a statutory command.
would

think

that

these

few

sentences could

I

be omitted,

though I am open to persuasion.
The next paragraph on page 6 would follow your
reasoning
fact

logically.

that

an

expressly

As you make clear

agent

may

delegated

act

improperly

authority

does

absolve the principal from liability.
Larson

states

still

troubled

as

much.

by

the

Wh i 1 e
tort

emphasize that sovereign

I

law

as

against

I

recall,

had

acted

in

good

not

the

beyond

necessarily

Your quotation from

analogy

immunity is at

t hi s ,

unless

I

we

am

also

issue here to a

The plaintiffs in this

originally sought to recover damages

the officials

ultimately awarded.

even

under stand

far greater extent than in Larson.
case,

in note 21,

as

well

as

the

injunctive

But the DC found that the
faith,

were

entitled

relief

- ,.

offici~ls

to

personal

immunity, and no question has remained in the case as to
relief

against

anyone

except

the

individuals

in

official capacity, i.e., against the state itself.

their

One other point, Joe, that confuses me.

Larson

speaks of "stripping of the official" of his immunity (see
p.

5 of

Larson

your
was

personally
remain

draft).

a

tort

case)

liable,

with

But on the
the

tort

officials

and

the

soverign

to

the

state.

respect

law analogy
still

could · be

immunity
Here,

(and

question

there

is

no

question of stripping officials individually as they have
been exonerated of personal liability.
Perhaps I am missing something.

Of course, feel

free to enlighten me.
Bascially, I think your response to the dissent
is devastatingly strong.

* * *
I

suggest

that

you

give

Pennhurst

priority to get it off of our desks.
in

accord,

ask

David

to

take

a

continued

When you and I are

critical

look

promptly.

Then get what in effect will be a Chambers draft for the
three of us to see in print.
I

know

opinion to draft,
the

January

that

have

an

important

antitrust

and we have less than two weeks before

arguments.

order of priority,

you

The

though

Conference a summary -

bench

memos

are

the

lowest

I would 1 ike to have prior to

possibly as brief as two or three

• ·r

~·

.

···--·~
;

'

pages - of your recommendation with a bare outline of your
reasoning.

I will have read the briefs with some care.

L.F.P., Jr.

ss

~ AAA-/Z+4•..0
~~4A../

~·.
men
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Pennhurst State School & Hospital v.

DRAFT NO. 1

Halderman, No. 81-2101
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the

imp~ ~t

question

}!

whether

a federal court may award injunctive relief against state
officials on the basis of state law.
I

~~i1e~~ ~~~
,

This 1\

3·1---

.s

1~ concern~

"

;(

fia!S

~ee

tfri-s

the conditions of confinement at

petitioner Pennhurst State School and Hospital, a
Pennsylvania institution for the care of the mentally
retarded.

See Pennhurst State School & Hospital v.

Halderman, 451

u.s.

1 (1981).

Although the prior history

of the litigation is set forth in detail in our prior

2.

opinion, see 451 U.S., at 5-10, it is necessary for
purposes of this decision to review that

history , oRce ~

~This suit originally was brought in 1974 by
respondent Terri Lee Halderman, a resident of Pennhurst,
in the District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania.

Ultimately, the plaintiffs included a class

consisting of all persons who were or might become
residents of Pennhurst: the Pennsylvania Association for
Retarded Citizens (PARC): and the United States.

The

defendants were Pennhurst and various Pennhurst officials:
the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare and various
Pennsylvania officials: and various officials of five
Pennsylvania counties surrounding Pennhurst.

Respondents'

amended complaint charged that conditions at Pennhurst

3.

violated the class members' rights under the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments; §504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973, 87 Stat. 355, as amended, 29

o.s.c.

§701 et seq.

(1976 ed. and Supp. V); the Developmentally Disabled
Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42
seq.

o.s.c.

§§6001 et

(1976 ed. and Supp. V); and the Pennsylvania Mental

Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966 (the "MH/MR
Act"), Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 50, §§4101-4704 (Purdon 1969).
Both damages and injunctive relief were sought.
In 1977, following a lengthy trial, the District
~

Court rendered its decision.

446 P. Supp. 1295 (1977). '

noted in our prior opinion, the court's findings
were undisputed:

"Conditions at Pennhurst are not only

dangerous, with the residents often physically abused or
drugged by staff members, but also inadequate for the

,.

4.

'habilitation' of the retarded.

Indeed, the court found

that the physicial, intellectual, and emotional skills of
some residents have deteriorated at Pennhurst."
at 7 (footnote omitted).

451

u.s.,

The District Court held that

these conditions violated the class members' rights to
"minimally adequate habilitation" in the "least
restrictive environment" under the Due Process Clause,
§504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and §201 of the
Pennsylvania MH/MR Act.
1324.

446 F. Supp., at 1314-1320, 1322-

Moreover, the court found that Pennhurst, as a

large institution, could not provide the necessary
habilitation, and it t.Qe.:refere ordered "that immediate

/L
steps be taken to remove the retarded residents

Pennhurst."

Id., at 1325.

from

Petitioners were ordered "to

provide suitable community living arrangements" for the

5.

class members.

Id., at 1326.

The court appointed a

Special Master "with the power and duty to plan, organize,
direct, supervise and monitor the implementation of this
and any further Orders of the Court."

Id. 1

The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed
most of the District Court's judgment.
(en bane) .

612 F.2d 84 (1979)

31-

The CoYrt of Appeals agreed that respondents
1\

had a right to habilitation in the least restrictive
environment, but it grounded this right solely on the
Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights
Act.

See 612 F.2d, at 95-100, 104-107.

~

"

The court did not

consider the constitutional issues or §504 of the

1 The District Court determined that the individual
defendants had acted in good faith and therefore were
immune from the damage claims. 446 F. Supp, at 1324.

6.

Rehabilitation Act, and while it affirmed the District
Court's holding that the MH/MR Act provides a right to
adequate "habilitation," the court declined to decide
whether that state right encompassed a right to treatment
in the least restrictive setting.

See id., at 100-103.

On the question of remedy, the Court of Appeals
affirmed except as to the District Court's order that
Pennhurst be closed.

The court observed that some

patients would be unable to adjust to life outside an
institution, and it determined that the Developmentally
Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act did not
preclude institutionalization.

Id., at 114.

It therefore

remanded for "individual determinations by the [District
Court], or by the Special Master, as to the
appropriateness of an improved Pennhurst for each such

7.

patient," guided by a "presumption in favor of placing
individuals in [community living arrangements]."
114-115.

Id., at

2

On remand the District Court established detailed
procedures for determining the proper residential
placement for each patient.

A team consisting of the

patient, his parents or guardian, and his case manager
must establish an individual habilitation plan providing
for habilitation of the patient in a designated community
living arrangement.
Special Master.

The plan is subject to review of the

A second master, called the Hearing

2 rn a companion case, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the District Court's denial of a motion to intervene for
purposes
of
appeal
by
the
Pennhurst
Parents-Staff
Association.
See 612 P.2d 131 (1979).
The Association
subsequently was granted leave to intervene and it is a
petitioner in this Court.

8

0

Master, is available to conduct hearings, upon request by
the resident, his

parents~

or his advocate, on the

~
question of whether the services of Pennhurst would be
more beneficial to the resident than the community living
arrangement provided in the resident's plan.

The Hearing

Master then determines where the patient should reside,
subject to possible review by the District Court.
Order of April 24, 1980, Joint Appendix 123a-134a.

See
3

This Court reversed the judgment of the Court of
Appeals, finding that the Developmentally Disabled

3 on
July
1,
1981,
Pennsylvania
enacted
an
appropriations bill stating that only $35,000 would be
paid for the Masters' expenses for the fiscal year July
1981 to June 1982.
The District Court held Pennsylvania
and its Secretary of the Department of Public Welfare in
contempt,
and
imposed
a
fine
of $10,000
per day.
Pennsylvania paid the fines, and the contempt was purged
on January 8, 1982.
On appeal the Court of Appeals
affirmed the contempt order.
Pennhurst State School &
Hospital v. Halderman, 673 F.2d 628 (1982), cert. pending,
No. 81-2363.

,,

9.

Assistance and Bill of Rights Act did not create any
substantive rights.

451 U.S. 1 (1981).

We remanded the

case to the Court of Appeals to determine if the remedial
order could be supported on the basis of state law, the
Constitution, or §504 of the Rehabilitation Act.
at 31.

See id.,

4

On remand the Court of Appeals affirmed the prior
judgment in its entirety.

673 .F.2d 647 (1982)

(en bane).

It determined that in a recent decision the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania had "spoken definitively" in holding that
the MH/MR Act required the State to adopt the "least

4 Three

Justices
dissentea
from
the
Court's
construction of the Act, but concluded that the District
Court should not have adopted the "far-reaching remedv" of
appointing "a Special Master to decide which of the
Pennhurst inmates should remain and which should be moved
to community-based facilities. . . . (T] he court should not
have assumed the task of managing Pennhurst
"
451
U.S., at 54 (WHITE, J., dissenting in part).

10.

restrictive environment" approach.

673 F.2d, at 651

(citing In re Joseph Schmidt, 494 Pa. 86, 429 A.2d 631
(1981)).

The (o urt

<>~

r

ls concluded that this state

law fully supported the prior order, and therefore did not
reach the remaining issues of federal law.

jf a.t2-aD
}~ 'D~~:i<:n~e-B$.-A.P;:J~~A rejected petitioners' argument
that the Eleventh Amendment barred federal-court
consideration of the state-law claim.

The court noted

that the Amendment did not bar a federal court from
granting prospective injunctive relief against state
~ "
officials on the basis of federal claims, see 673 F.2d, ' at

656 (citing Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)), and it
concluded that the same result obtained with respect to a
pendant state-law claim.

It relied primarily on the fact

that Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 213

~,.

..

u.s.

11.

175 (1909), a seminal case on the doctrine of pendant
jurisdiction, also involved state officials.
reasoned:

The court

"Since the pendant jurisdiction rule originated

in a case involving state officers, there cannot be, as
the Commonwealth suggests, an Eleventh Amendment exception
to that rule."

673 F.2d, at 658.

5

The Court of Appeals also rejected petitioners'
argument that it should have abstained from deciding the
state-law claim under the doctrines of comity established
in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and Railroad
Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941):

"

5 The Court of Appeals also noted that "the United
States is an intervening plaintiff .•. against which even
the state itself cannot successfully plead the Eleventh
Amendment as a bar to jurisdiction," and that "the
counties, even as juridicial entities, do not fall within
the coverage of the Eleventh Amendment.
Against those
defendants even money damages may be awarded." 673 F.2d,
at 656.

12.

See 673 F.2d, at 659-660.

Finally, the court refused to

consider petitioners' objections to the District Court's
use of a special master.

See id., at 651.

Three judges

.
~:...--~,
d1ssented on ~~ta.J<- 9reund, arguing that under
principles of federalism and comity the establishment of a
special master to supervise compliance was an abuse of
discretion.

See id., at 662 (Seitz, C.J., joined by

Hunter, J., dissenting in part): id., at (Garth, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting as to relief).
id., at 661 (Aldisert, J., concurring)

See also

(seriously

questioning the propriety of the order appointing the
Special Master, but concluding that a retroactive reversal
of that order would be meaningless) . 6

6 The Office of the Special Master was abolished in
December 1982.
See Order of August 12, 1982, Joint
Footnote continued on next page.

13.

u.s.

We granted certiorari,

(1982), and now

reverse and remand.
II

Petitioners raise three challenges to the decision of
the Court of Appeals:

(i) the Eleventh Amendment

prohibited the District Court from enjoining state
officials to conform their conduct to state

law~

(ii) the

doctrine of comity prohibited the District Court from
issuing its injunctive

relief~

and (iii) the District

Court abused its discretion in appointing two masters to
J

,

supervise the decisions of state officials in implementing
state law.

We need not reach the latter two issues, for

we find the Eleventh Amendment challenge dispositive.

Appendix 220a.

The Hearing Master remains in operation.

14.

A
Article III, §2 of the Constitution provides that the
federal judicial power extends, inter alia, to
controversies "between a State and citizens of another
State."

Relying on this language, this Court in 1793

assumed original jurisdiction over a suit brought by
citizens of South Carolina against the State of Georgia.
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419 (1793).

The decision

"created such a shock of surprise that the Eleventh
Amendment was at once proposed and adopted."
Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 325 (1934).

Monaco v.

The Amendment,

adopted in 1798, provides:
"The judicial power of the United States shall
not be construed to extend to any suit in law or
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of
the United States by Citizens of another State,
or by Citizens or Subject of any foreign State."

15.

The Amendment's language is limited to overruling the
particular result in Chisholm, but this Court has
recognized that its greater significance lies in its
affirmation that a fundamental principle of sovereign
immunity limits the grant of authority in Article III
itself.

Thus, in Hans v. Louisiana, 134

u.s.

1 (1890),

the Court held that, despite the limited terms of the
Eleventh Amendment, a federal court could not entertain a
suit brought by a citizen against his own State.

After

reviewing the constitutional debates concerning the scope
of Article III, the Court determined that federal
jurisdiction over suits against unconsenting States "was
not contemplated by the Constitution when establishing the
judicial power of the United States."

134

u.s.,

at 15.

See Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322-323 (1934):

16.

In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 505 (1887) . 7

In short, the

principle of sovereign immunity is a constitutional
limitation on the federal judicial power established in
Article III:
"That a State may not be sued without its
consent is a fundamental rule of jurisprudence
having so important a bearing upon the
construction of the Constitution of the United
States that it has become established bv
repeated decisions of this court that the entire
judicial power granted by the Constitution does
not embrace authority to entertain a suit
brought by private parties against a State
without consent given: not one brought by
citizens of another State, or by citizens or
subjects of a foreign State, because of the
Eleventh Amendment; and not even one brought by
its own citizens, because of the fundamental
rule of which the Amendment is but an
exemplification." Ex parte State of New York
No. 1, ~56 u.s. 490, 497 (1921) (emphasis
added) •
7 See

also Employees
v.
Missouri
Public Health
Dep't,
411 U.S.
279,
291-292
(1973)
(MARSHALL, J.,
concurring
in
judgment)
(The
Eleventh
Amendment
"clarif[ied] the intent of the .Framers concerning the
reach of federal judicial power" and "restore[d] the
original understanding" that States could not be made
unwilling defendants in federal court.); Nevada v. Hall,
440 U.S. 410, 430-431 (1979) (BLACKMON, J., dissenting);
id., at 437 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting) •
.Footnote(s) 8 will appear on following pages.

17.

Because the Framers understood that a sovereign's
immunity could be waived, the Court consistently has held
that a State may consent to the exercise of federal-court
jurisdiction.
447 (1883}.

See, e.g., Clark v. Barnard, 108

436,

We have insisted, however, that the State's

consent be unequivocally expressed.
Jordan, 415

u.s.

u.s.

651, 673 (1974}.

See, e.g., Edelman v.
Similarly, although

~ ·W'I.JL ~~ -lc Allie. ~~ j4.vc~ k~ ki)
Congress has power~ ~ r the Fourteenth Amendment to
abrogate t fte

~~~·

4

Eleventh Amendment immunity, see

Fitzpatrick v. Bitker, 427 U.S. 445 (1976}, we have
a,.....,. ~1""'~-e

required a el ear expression of congressional intent to
1\

8 Because

the 1 imitation is jurisdictional, it may
be raised at any point in a proceeding.
"The Eleventh
Amendment declares a policy and sets forth an explicit
limitation on federal judicial power of such compelling
force that this Court will consider the issue arising
under this Amendment ... even though urged for the first
time in this Court."
Ford Motor Co. v. Department of
Treasury, 323 u.s. 459, 467 (1945}.

..

18.

"overturn the constitutionally guaranteed immunity of the
several States."
(1979).

Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 342

Our reluctance

l~ y

to infer that a State's

immunity from suit in the federal courts has been negated
fro~

stems

recognition of the vital importance of the

doctrine of sovereign immunity in our federal system.

A

State's constitutional interest in immunity encompasses
not merely whether it may be sued, but where it may be
sued.

9

As Justice MARSHALL has noted well, "[b]ecause of

the problems of federalism inherent in making one

9 .For this reason, the Court consistently has held
that a State's waiver of sovereign immunity in its own
courts is not a waiver of the Eleventh Amendment immunity
in the federal courts.
See, e.g., .Florida Department of
Health v . .Florida Nursing Home Ass'n, 450 u.s. 147, 150
11
(1981) (per curiam).
[I] t is not consonant with our dual
system for the federal courts ... to read the consent to
embrace federal as well as state courts.
[A] clear
declaration of the state's intention to submit its fiscal
problems to other courts than those of its own creation
must be found."
Great Northern Life Insurance Co. v.
Read, 322 U.S. 47, 54 (l944).

19.

sovereign appear against its will in the courts of the
other, a restriction upon the exercise of the federal
judicial power has long been considered to be appropriate
in a case such as this."

Employees v. Missouri Public

Health Dep't, 411 U.S. 279, 293-294 (MARSHALL, J.,
concurring in result) .

10

Accordingly, we must be guided

by "[t]he principles of federalism that inform Eleventh
Amendment doctrine."

Hutto v. Finney, 437 u.s. 678, 691

(1978).

10 see Nevada v. Hall, supra, 440 U.S., at 418-~2,.1
(States were "vitally interested" in whether they would be
subject to suit in the federal courts, and the debates
about state immunity focused on the question of federal
judicial power).
Cf. id., at 430-431 (BLACKMON, J.,
dissenting) (sovereign immunity is "a guarantee that is
implied as an essential component of federalism" and is
"sufficiently fundamental to our federal structure to have
implicit
constitutional
dimension."):
id.,
at
437
(REHNQUIST, J., dissenting) (" [T]he States~at ratified
the Eleventh Amendment thought that they were putting an
end
to
the
possibility
of
individual
States
as
unconsenting defendants in foreign jurisdictions.").

20.

B

This Court's decisions thus establish that "an
unconsenting State is immune from suits brought in federal
courts by her own citizens as well as citizens of another
state."

tf
.-(_

Employees, supra, 411

u.s.,

at 280.

~x~ ~

)~,~~

question t..Rat ...a.dseso

"

ie-~;h-en

a suit against a State.

{.
Wl

a particular suit in fact is

t,_ ~ ~~ uf ~hi''
~
h
t

e-n QI:h s 'tUQB-t~ a.R

a

SUl

ln W

lC

A

the State or one of its agencies or departments is named
as the defendant is proscribed by the Eleventh Amendment
in the absence of the State's consent.

11

See, e.g.,

Florida Department of Health v. Florida Nursing Home
Ass'n, 450 U.S. 147 (1981)

~

Alabama v. Pugh, 438

u.s.

781

11 The Court has not extended the bar of the Eleventh
Amendment to suits against political subdivisions of the
State.
See, e.g., Mt. Healthy City Board of Education v.
Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977). This issue is discussed
at _ _ , infra.

21.

(1978).

This jurisdictional bar applies regardless of the

nature of the relief sought.

See, e.g., Missouri v.

Fiske, 290 U.S. 18, 27 (1934)

("Expressly applying to

suits in equity as well as at law, the Amendment
necessarily embraces demands for enforcement of equitable
rights and the prosecution of equitable remedies when
these are asserted and prosecuted by an individual against
a State.").
the suit is

A

~

brought against state officials.

"'

~-~-

Jbis Court's prior cases

have been entirely consistent
A

~~~~-EH"l
"(

tfii-s auestio.R
--.r"

b11t

'

Amendment bars a suit against state officials "when the
state is the real, substantial party in interest."

Ford

Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464

)--

22.

(1945).

See, e.g., In re Ayers, 123

u.s.

443, 487-492

(1887); Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U.S. 711, 719-723, 727-728
(1882).

Thus, "[t]he general rule is that relief sought

nominally against an officer is in fact against the
sovereign if the decree would operate against the latter."
Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U.S. 57, 58 (1963)

(per curiam) •

12

And, as when the State itself is named as the defendant, a
suit against state officials is barred regardless of
whether it seeks damages or injunctive relief.
v. White,

See Cory

u. s · - - ' - - (19 8 2) •
;

There are two recognized exceptions to this general

"

12 see also Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 620 (1963)
("The general rule is that a suit is against the sovereign
if 'the judgment sought would expend itself on the public
treasury
or
domain,
or
interfere
with
the
public
administration,' or if the effect of the judgment would be
'to restrain the Government from acting, or to compel it
to act . ' " ) ( c i tat ions om i t ted) •

,•,

23.

rule.

The first is that sovereign immunity does not apply

in a suit against an official who allegedly has acted
entirely outside his official authority.

In Larson v.

Domestic & Foreign Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949), the Court
stated the rule that an action may be brought "for
specific relief against the individual as an officer ...
if it is not within the officer's statutory powers."

u.s.,

at 702.

337

This is a narrow exception, governing those

situations in which a government official acts without any
official

justification . ~a~ever.

The Court in Larson

explained:
"Since the sovereign may not be sued, it must
also appear that the action to be restrained or
directed is not action of the sovereign. The
mere allegation that the officer, acting
officially, wrongfully holds property to which
the plaintiff has title does not meet that
requirement. True, it establishes a wrong to
the plaintiff. But it does not establish that
the officer, in committing that wrong, is not
exercising the powers delegated to him by the
sovereign.
If he is exercising such powers, the
action is the sovereign's and a suit to enjoin

24.

it may not be brought unless the sovereign has
consented." Id., at 693.

The narrow scope of this ultra vires exception is
illustrated by our decision last Term in Florida
Department of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc.,
(1982).

U.S.

There the Court considered whether the Eleventh

Amendment barred a suit alleging that certain state
officials were holding property without state authority.
The plurality of the Court concluded that the Eleventh
Amendment did not bar the suit because "[n]o statutory
provision has been advanced that even arguably would
authorize the state officials to hold the property."

___u.s.,

at 3320 {opinion of STEVENS, J.).

The dissent

argued that the State had a "colorable contractual claim"
to the property, and that this sufficed "to indicate that

~tf(_

3/r

~s~ ~ 2s.

~~~

~..U.i ~ ~'!-'~~

4

8/?JJJ1:~? 1f. 9

~~~)
-~4.1- ~~~-~--~.

possession of the [propertY] b y - the state officia!s was
not ultra vires."

Id., at 3329 (WHITE, J., concurring in

part and dissenting in part) .

Eight members of the Court

thus followed the Larson test and agreed that the issue
was whether the state officials had any colorable state
authority for their actions.
STEVENS, J.)

See id., at 3321 (opinion of

(test is whether the conduct was undertaken

"without any authority whatever" or whether the officials
"have a colorable claim to possession"); id., at 3329
(WHITE, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting
in part) . 13
The second and more substantial exception to the

13 Justice
BRENNAN
filed
a
separate
opinion
reiterating his view that the Eleventh Amendment does not
bar a suit by citizens against their own State.
See ___
U.S., at 3322 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in judgment in part
and dissenting in part) .

7

26.

general rule is that a suit challenging the
constitutionality of a state official's action is not one
against the State.

This doctrine was confirmed

in ~

Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908),
in which a federal court enjoined the Attorney General of
the State of Minnesota from bringing suit to enforce a
state statute that allegedly violated the Fourteenth
Amendment.

This Court held that the Eleventh Amendment

did not prohibit issuance of this injunction:
"The act to be enforced is alleged to be
unconstitutional, and if it be so, the use of
the name of the State to enforce an
unconstitutional act to the injury of
complainants is a proceeding without the
authority of and one which does not affect the
State in its sovereign or governmental capacity.
It is simply an illegal act upon the part of a
state official in attempting by the use of the
name of the State to enforce a legislative
enactment which is void because
unconstitutional. If the act which the state
Attorney General seeks to enforce be a violation
of the Federal Constitution, the officer in
proceeding under such enactment comes into
conflict with the superior authority of that
Constitution, and he is in that case stripped of
his official or representative character and is

; ,

27.

subjected to the consequences of his official
conduct. The State has no power to impart to
him any immunity from responsibility to the
supreme authority of the United States." 20Q
U.S., at 159-160.

I t hardly need/

r

be

not entirely persuasive.

~that

this rationale is

As the dissent in Young argued,

to enjoin a state attorney general from bringing a suit on
behalf of the State is, "for all practical purposes, to
enjoin the State itself."
dissenting).

203

u.s.,

Moreover, there is

at 199 (Harlan, J.,

~

A

"well-recognized irony"

that the result of Young is that an offical's
;

unconstitutional conduct constitutes state action under

"

the Fourteenth Amendment but not the Eleventh Amendment.
Treasure Salvors, supra, at 3315 (opinion of STEVENS, J.).
Nonetheless, the Young doctrine
~ const i~i~ ;tl£~~~aenee

~~~~~

as necessary for the

28.

~~~~
vindication of) "the supreme authority of the !Jni ted

States."

209 U.S., at

s Justice

BRENNAN

has

parte Young was the culmination of efforts
Court to harmonize the principles
mendment with the effective su
Constitution."
401

u.s.

Perez v.

(BRENNAN, J. ,

Our subsequent decision
emphasized that Young rests on the need
ri

See, e.g., Quern v.
~

Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 338 (1979); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416

u.s.

"

232, 237 (1974); Georgia R. Co. v. Redwine, 342 U.S.

299' 304 (1952).
The Court subsequently has made clear that even where
these exceptions apply, the rule that a suit against state

29.

officials constitutes a suit against the State retains
force.

Thus, in Edelman v. Jordan, 415

u.s.

651 (1974),

the Court held that in a suit against state officials "a
federal court's remedial power, consistent with the
Eleventh Amendment, is necessarily limited to prospective
injunctive relief, and may not include a retroactive award
which requires the payment of funds from the state
treasury."

415

u.s.,

at 677.

We recognized that the

prospective relief authorized by Young "has permitted the
Civil War Amendments to the Constitution to serve as a
sword, rather than merely a shield, for those whom they
were designed to protect."

Id., at 664.

But we

recognized as well that an award of retroactive relief
"must inevitably come from the general revenues of the
State."

Id., at 665.

We concluded that although the

30.

difference between permissible and impermissible relief
"will not in many instances be that between night and
UM.--

day," id., at 667, {!_ direc ~ award of retroactive relief

""
necessarily "'run[s] afoul of the Eleventh Amendment if
that basic constitutional provision is to be conceived of
as having any present force. •"

Id., at 665 (quoting

Rothstein v. Wyman, 467 .P.2d 226, 237 (CA2 1972)

(McGowan,

J., sitting by designation), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 921

(1973)).
III
With these principles in mind, we now turn to the
question }( whether the claim that petitioners violated
state law in carrying out their official duties at
Pennhurst is one against the State and therefore barred by
the Eleventh Amendment.

Initially, respondents suggest

31.

three reasons why the issue need not be reached in this
case: Pennsylvania has waived its sovereign

immunity~

any

Eleventh Amendment bar was removed when the United States
intervened as a

plaintiff~

and the judgment below may be

enforced against the petitioner county officials, who have
no Eleventh Amendment immunity.

On the merits,

respondents raise two principal arguments.

First, they

contend that under the doctrine of Edelman v. Jordan,
supra, the suit is not against the State because the
courts below ordered only prospective injunctive relief.
Second, they assert that the state-law claim properly was
decided under the doctrine of pendant jurisdiction.
Respondents rely on decisions of this Court awarding
relief against state officials on the basis of a pendant

'32.

state-law claim.

See, e.g., Siler v. Louisville &

Nashville R. Co., 213

u.s.

175, 193 (1909).
A

At the outset, we reject respondents' contentions
that the Eleventh Amendment issue need not be reached in
this case.

First, Pennsylvania has not waived its

immunity from suit in federal court.

At the time the suit

was filed, the law in Pennsylvania was that suits against
the State were permitted only where expresslv permitted by
the legislature.

See, e.g., Preach v. Commonwealth, 471
;

Pa. 558, 379 A.2d 1163 (1977)

(construing Art. I, §11 of

the Pennsylvania Constitution).

Respondents have not

referred us to any provision expressly waiving
Pennsylvania's Eleventh Amendment immunity.

14

Footnote(s) 14 will appear on following pages.

"

33.

Second, we do not agree that the presence of the
United States as a plaintiff in this case
Eleventh Amendment from consideration.

~
elim±~etes the

Although the

Eleventh Amendment does not bar the United States from
suing a State in federal court, see, e.g., Monaco v.
Mississippi, 292

u.s.

313, 328-329 (1934), the United

States' presence in the case for any purpose does not
eliminate the State's immunity for all purposes.

For

example, the fact that the federal court could award

14 In 1978 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the
prior
construction
and
held
that
the
Pennsylvania
Constitution did not confer immunity on the State, but
merely permitted the legislature to adopt immunity.
See
Mayle v. Pennsylvania Department of Highways, 4 79 A. 2d
384, 388 A.2d 709 (1978).
In response the Pennsylvania
legislature
enacted
a
statute
governing
sovereign
immunity,
including
an
express
preservation of
its
immunity from suit in federal court: "Federal courts.
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be construed to
waive the immunity of the Commonwealth from suit in
Federal courts guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States."
42 Pa. Cons. Stat.
Ann. §8521 (b) (1982).

34.

relief to the United States on federal constitutional
claims would not mean that the court could order the State
to pay damages to other plaintiffs.

In this case, the

United States intervened only to enforce federal law, and
indeed would not have standing to enforce state-law
claims.

Therefore, its intervention

~ v+-~
~#' t 2b-/\the Eleventh Amendmen~ ::= m-a-4r to

the state-law claim.

A final question arises as to the status of the
county defendants.

We have held that the Eleventh

Amendment does not apply to "counties and similar
;

municipal corporations."
v. Doyle, 429
Luning, 133

u.s.

u.s.

Mt. Healthy City School District

274, 280 (1977): see Lincoln County v.

529, 530 (1890).

But the fact that the

federal court may have power to award relief against

~~

petitioner county officials i-R- n~ destroy~ ~

35.

immunity possessed by petitioner state officials.
~~~~~~~~t

the state-law judgment in this case Geuld Z'-

~~

be supported against the county officials alone.
relief substantially concerns Pennhurst,
of the state

wQ4 ~

The

rs an arm

~f
~/
~ is operated by state officials, aftd the

financial burden of
State treasury. 15

th~ almost

""
entirely on the

If the District Court could not enjoin

the state officials in this case, the relief granted on
state-law grounds necessarily would be much different.
Therefore, we must consider whether the Eleventh Amendment

-"

bars this suit insofar as it applies to the State and the
state officials.

15 For example, the $10,000 per day contempt fine
against the State and the Secretary of the Department of
Public Welfare presumably would be barred if the relief
were granted only against the county officials.

~ ,v .JZJ~h>~~
-~~L'I.-~~fr;.-~
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On the merits of the Eleventh Amendment issue, we

~

~

~
respondents' contention that their

first~

"'

claim is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment
seeks only prospective relief as defined in

be entered aga1nst

~ Young

and Edelman.

See 673 .F. 2d, at 656 (" [T] he

Amendment is no bar to the prospective injunct'
relief which was ordered by the district court insofar
that relief is predicated on constitutional or federal
statutory claims."}.

~g

~~

Such a result is permitted,

its cl.e<>< aAcl

~9stantid

impact on the

State itself, because of the recognized need to vindicate

37.

the supremacy of federal law.

See pp. ___, supra.

But

respondents err in suggesting that the decisions in Young
and Edelman have established a rule that a suit seeking
propsective relief against a state official always is
exempt from the Amendment.

This Court rejected that

argument last Term in Cory v. White,
(1982).

u. s ·---'

?

2 3 29

The general rule remains that a suit against a

state official is a suit against the State unless the
officer's action "is not within the officer's statutory
powers or, if within those powers, only if the powers, or
J

,..

their exercise in a particular case, are constitutionaliy
void."

Larson, supra, 337

u.s.,

at 702: see Treasure

Salvors, supra, ___u.s., at 3317 (opinion of STEVENS, J.):
id., at 3330 (WHITE, J. , concurring in part and dissenting
in part).

38.

Applying this rule, it is clear that respondents'
state-law claim against petitioner state officials is a
suit against the State.
~ o£ eo~rse

As it is based on state law, it

does not allege a federal constitutional

violation.

And

t~~bt~fficials
""

did not act "without any authority whatever" in operating
Pennhurst.

Treasure Salvors, supra, at 3320 (opinion of

STEVENS, J.).

However unlawful the particular conditions

at Pennhurst may have been, it was within the officials'
authority to maintain this institution.
660

~

~

(The Pennsylvania MH/MR Act "does not foreclose all

institutionalization."); 612 P.2d, at 614 (Section 102 of

~

~~n

the MI!/AA Act expressly includes "institutions" within the

#~a,tegory
.#

'1

of "facilities" for which the Department of

Public Welfare was responsible).

• •

"':1.

See 673 P.2d, at

Similarly, even if these

' ~~·

39.

officials violated state law in failing to p±aee
~ Mfficien ~

e mpha£is on

find~

alternative living

arrangements for the mentally retarded, they clearly acted
under colorable state authority in making individual
placement decisions.

Indeed, in refusing to award damages

against the officials as individuals, the District Court
found that "the evidence shows that the [individual]
defendants acted in the utmost good faith and that they
did not know nor reasonably should have known that the
actions which they took, or failed to take, within the

-,
sphere of their official responsibilities were in any way

.

violative of the rights of the retarded residents at
Pennhurst."

446 F. Supp., at 1324.

In sum, the state

,,a;, I~
officials did not act ultra vires their

authority~

~

A

~

rather were "exercising the powers delegated to [them] by
~

40.

the sovereign."

Larson, supra, 337

u.s.,

at 693.

Under

established doctrine, the state-law claim against the
state officials must be considered one against the State.

c
We--

th~r;..ofu£~ l:reli~v~

th-a-t

~e

reasoning of our

decisions on sovereign immunity lead~ to the conclusion
that a federal suit against state officials on the basis
of state law contravenes the Eleventh Amendment.

In

reaching a contrary conclusion, the Court of Appeals
relied principally on a separate line of cases dealing
with pendant jurisdiction.

The crucial point for the

Court of Appeals was that this Court has granted relief
against state officials solely on the basis of a pendant
state-law claim.

See 673 F.2d, at 657-658.

We therefore

/.L~

41.

must consider the relationship between pendant
jurisdiction and the Eleventh Amendment.
Article III does not give the federal courts
jurisdiction over all suits between a citizen and his
State.

The District Court obtained jurisdiction in this

case only because of the existence of a claim arising
under the Constitution or laws of the United

Court has long

held~when

States~

This

a federal court

obtains jurisdiction over a federal claim, it may
adjudicate other related claims over which the court
otherwise would not have jurisdiction.

,

See, e.g., Osbotn

v. Bank of the United States, 9 Wheat. 738 (1824).

The

rule is that "if, considered without regard to their
federal or state character, a plaintiff's claims are such
that he would ordinarily be expected to try them all in

42.

one judicial proceeding, then, assuming substantiality of
the federal issues, there is power in federal courts to
hear the whole."
(1966)

Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725

(emphasis in original).

The Court also has held

that a federal court may resolve the case solely on the
basis of the pendant claims, see Siler v. Louisville &
Nashville R. Co., 213 U.S. 175, 192 (1909), and that in
fact the court usually should do so in order to avoid
federal constitutional questions.
Ashwander v. TVA, 297
concurring)

u.s.

See id., at 193;

288, 347 (1936)

(Brandeis, J.,

~ "
("[I]f a case can be decided on either of two

grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the
other a question of statutory construction or general law,
the Court will decide only the latter.").

Under these

principles, it seems clear that, apart from the possible

43.

bar of the Eleventh Amendment, the Court of Appeals had a
proper jurisdictional basis on which to decide the claim
based on Pennsylvania law. 16

The question therefore is

whether the Amendment applies to this pendant state-law
claim.
As the Court of Appeals noted, in Siler and
subsequent cases concerning pendant

jurisd ~ relief

was granted against state officials on the basis of statelaw claims that were pendant to federal constitutional

16 This
does
not
necessarily mean
that
pendant
jurisdiction properly would have been exercised here:
This doctrine is one "of discretion not to be routinely
exercised without considering the advantages of judicial
economy, convenience, and fairness to the litigants."
Hagans
v.
Levine,
415
u.s. 528, 545 (1974}.
In
particular, "[n] eedless decisions of state law should be
avoided both as a matter of comity and to promote justice
between the parties, by procuring for them a surer-footed
reading of applicable law."
Gibbs,
supra,
at 726.
Because of our disposition of the case under the Eleventh
Amendment, we need not decide thi ] comity issue.

{~~f

44.

claims.

1

~

~~~?

~~~
·i~

The Court never held @irectl iJ that the rationale

"'

of Ex parte Young should be extended to pendant state-law
claims, but rather appears to have assumed that the
Eleventh Amendment simply does not apply to pendant
claims.

This is illustrated by Greene v. Louisville &

Interurban R. Co., 244

u.s.

499 (1917), in which the

plaintiff railroads sued state officials, claiming that
~

certain tax assessments
Amendment.

~

"\

excessive under the Fourteenth

The Court first rejected the officials'

argument under the Eleventh Amendment, finding that Young
applied to all constitutional claims against state

-: "

officials, regardless of whether the state statute under
which the officials acted was constitutional or
unconstitutional.

See 244

u.s.,

at 507.

Having

determined that the Eleventh Amendment did not deprive the

45.

federal court of jurisdiction over this constitutional
question, the Court declared that the court's jurisdiction
extended "to the determination of all questions involved
in the case, including questions of state law,
irrespective of the disposition that may be made of the
federal question, or whether it be found necessary to
decide it at all."

Id., at 508.

The case then was .

decided solely on state-law grounds.

Accord, Lousiville &

Nashville R.R. Co. v. Greene, 244 U.S. 522 (1917).
The implicit view thus seems to have been that once
jurisdiction is established on the basis of any federal ~ '
question, no further Eleventh Amendment inquiry is
necessary with respect to other claims raised in the case.
~

We believe this

~s

is erroneous and contrary to the

.1\

principles established in

~

Eleventh Amendment

decisions.

It is true as a general matter that the

doctrine of pendant jurisdiction permits a federal court
to decide all the issues in a case.

In cases "where

nonfederal questions or claims were bound up with the
federal claim upon which the parties were already in
federal court, this Court has found nothing in Art. III's
grant of judicial power which prevented adjudication of
the nonfederal portions of the parties' dispute."
Aldinger v. Howard, 427

u.s.

1,

Eleventh

Amendment)- h ~ constitutes precisely such a

. •limitation depriving a federal court of power to dec1de

~

certain claims, no matter what alternative basis for
jurisdiction might exist.
brought pursuant to 42

For example, if a lawsuit

u.s.c.

§1983 alleges a

constitutional claim directly against a State, the federal

47.

(

court is barred by the Eleventh Amendment from deciding

;
that claim even though the claim arises under the
Constitution.

See Quern v. Jordan, 440 u.s. 332 (1979);

Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978).

The Amendment thus

is a specific jurisdictional bar against hearing even
federal claims that otherwise would be within the
jurisdiction of the federal courts. 17
This principle applies as well to claims over which a
federal court exercises pendant jurisdiction, as we made
clear in Edelman v. Jordan, supra.

The District Court's

jurisdiction over that suit was based on the plaintiffs1 '

17 see,

e.g., Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 u.s. 313,
322
(1934)
("[A] lthough a case may arise under the
Constitution and Laws of the United States, the judicial
power does not extend to it if the suit is sought to be
prosecuted against a State, without her consent, by one of
her own citizens."); Missouri v. Fiske, 290 u.s. 18, 25-26
(1934) (same).

48.

equal-protection claim, and we found that claim
sufficiently substantial that "the District Court was
correct in exercising pendant jurisdiction over
[plaintiffs'] statutory claim."

415 U.S., at 653.

The

fact that the District Court had jurisdiction over the
pendant claim did not prevent us, however, from concluding
that the Eleventh Amendment barred an award of retroactive
relief based on that claim.

See id., at 678.

In sum, contrary to the analysis implicit in early
decisions such as Greene, supra, neither pendant
jurisdiction nor any other basis of jurisdiction may
override the Eleventh Amendment. 18

A federal court must

18 see Missouri v. Fiske, supra, 290 u.s., at 28
("This is not less a suit against the State because the
bill is ancillary and supplemental.").

49.

examine each claim in a case to see if the court's
jurisdiction over that claim is barred by the Eleventh
Amendment.

We concluded above that a claim that state

officials violated state law in carrying out their
official responsibilities is a claim against the State
that is protected by the Eleventh Amendment, see p. ___ ,

supra~ ~ ~

-

now hold that this principle applies as well

to state-law claims brought into federal court under
pendant jurisdiction.

Because this issue has not

previously been confronted directly, we are not bound by
prior decisions assuming a contrary conclusion.

questions of jurisdiction have been passed on in prior
decisions sub silentio, this Court has never considered
itself bound when a subsequent case finally brings the
jurisdictional issue before us."

~

"[W]hel'l

Hagans v. Levine, 415

,.

50.

U.S. 533 n.5 (1974) •

19

Respondents urge that application of the Eleventh
Amendment to pendant state-law claims will have a
disruptive effect on litigation against state officials.
They argue that the considerations of "judicial economy,
convenience, and fairness to litigants" that underlie
pendant jurisdiction, see Gibbs, supra, 383 u.s., at 726,
counsel against a result that may cause litigants to split
causes of action between state and federal court.

They

also contend that the policy of avoiding unnecessary
,.
constitutional decisions will be contravened if plaintiffs

19 see Edelman v. Jordan, 415 u.s. 651, 670-671
(1974)
("Having now had an opportunity to more fully
consider the Eleventh Amendment issue after briefing and
argument, we disapprove the Eleventh Amendment holdings of
[certain prior]
cases to the extent that they are
inconsistent with our holding today.").

51.

choose to forego their state-law claims and sue only in
federal court.

Finally, they argue that plaintiffs may be

forced to vindicate their federal rights in state court,
contrary to the policy of Ex parte Young.

-U-£~-

--~~1-'W._~~

We agree thatA these are important considerations of

*

policy, but they may not override the constitutional
limitations on the authority of the federal judiciary to
adjudicate suits against a State.
supra, 290

u.s.,

See Missouri v. Fiske,

at 25-26 ("Considerations of convenience

open no avenue of escape from the [Amendment's]
restriction.").

The

.

~
~t

_,

of the Eleventh Amendment 1s·to

\

deny a federal forum to private litigants in cases against
a State.

litigants who

must bring state claims in state court

£-.t.-.
~ a

necessary

consequence of this limitation on federal judicial

~~--~~--~~~
~L~~...........,-.~

52.

power. 20

This holds true even if the Eleventh Amendment

forces a plaintiff to vindicate a federal right in a state
forum:
"At first blush, it may seem hypertechnical to
say that these petitioners are entitled
personally to enforce their federal rights
against the State in a state forum rather than
in a federal forum.
If that be so, I think it
is a hypertechnicality that has long been
understood to be a part of the tension inherent
in our system of federalism." Employees v.
Missouri Public Health Dept., 411 U.S. 279, 298
(1973) (MARSHALL, J., concurring in result).

~

~ra,

20 Thus, under Edelman v. Jordan,
a plaintiff
with a claim for monetary relief on the basis of federal
law must resort to state court.
If he w-a:n::t!s to press a
related claim for prospective relief, he must forego the
damages claim, or split his related causes of action
between state and federal courtf or take the entire case
to state court. A~~~~~~~~~~~~~-P~~~~~
wik-R-- Ravi..n..g-t.Q__m. sn~ a choi.ce,
is one tl:lat -z:rinevitably results from the limited jurisdiction of the
federal courts. Cf. Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 14-15
(1976)
(Although "considerations of judicial economy"
would be served by permitting pendant-party jurisdiction,
"the addition of a completely new party would run counter
to the well-established principle that federal courts, as
opposed to state trial courts of general jurisdiction, are
courts of limited jurisdiction marked out by Congress.")

53.

We believe that the constitutional principle of sovereign
immunity, embodied in the Eleventh Amendment, demands that
claims against state officials on the basis of state law
be resolved in state courts.
IV
The judgment of the District Court, as modified, was
upheld by the Court of Appeals solely on the basis of
state law.

We hold that these federal courts were without

"--·
• ef...;petitioner
.
jurisdiction to "enjoin
the
state institutions

and state officials on the basis of Pennsylvania's MH/MR

,
Act.

As this necessarily invalidates a major portion or

the judgment, the case must be remanded to the Court of
Appeals.

The court

~

~

consider to what extent, if

"\
any, the judgment may be sustained on the basis of state
law as applied to the petitioner county officials, who are

54.

not protected by the Eleventh Amendment.

The court also

may consider whether the relief granted may be sustained,
as the District Court originally held, on the basis of the
Fourteenth Amendment or §504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and
the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.

It is so ordered.

·•
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PENNHURST STATE SCHOOL & HOSPITAL, ET AL.,
PETITIONERS v. TERRI LEE HALDERMAN, ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
[June-, 1983]

JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting.
The question whether a federal court may award injunctive
relief against state officials on the basis of state law has been
answered by this Court many times in the past. The affirmative answer to that question is supported by sound reasons of judicial administration, by the doctrines of stare decisis and law of the case, and by a correct understanding of the
doctrine of sovereign immunity. A negative answer will
place additional burdens on the judiciary and on the victims
of unlawful conduct by state officials. It will also require unnecessary determinations of constitutional questions, a result
inimical to sound principles of judicial restraint. I therefore
respectfully dissent.
I

In one of the most respected opinions ever written by a
Member of this Court, Justice Brandeis wrote:
"The Court developed, for its own governance in the
cases confessedly within its jurisdiction, a series of rules
under which it has avoided passing upon a large part of
all the constitutional questions pressed upon it for decision. They are:
"The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question
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although properly presented by the record, if there is
also present some other ground upon which the case may
be disposed of. This rule has found most varied application. Thus, if a case can be decided on either of two
grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the
other a question of statutory construction or general law,
the Court will decide only the latter. Siler v. Louisville
& Nashville R. Co., 213 U. S. 175, 191." Ashwander v.
Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U. S. 288, 346-347
(1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
The Siler case, cited with approval by Justice Brandeis in
Ashwander, was remarkably similar to the case the Court decides today.
A privately owned railroad corporation
brought suit against the members of the railroad commission
of Kentucky to enjoin the enforcement of a rate schedule promulgated by the Commission. The federal circuit court
found that the schedule violated the plaintiff's federal constitutional rights and granted relief. This Court affirmed,
but it refused to decide the constitutional question because
injunctive relief against the state officials was adequately
supported on the basis of state law. The Court explained:
"The Federal questions, as to the invalidity of the
state statute because, as alleged, it was in violation of
the Federal Constitution, gave the Circuit Court jurisdiction, and, having properly obtained it, that court had
the right to decide all the questions in the case, even
though it decided the Federal questions adversely to the
party raising them, or even if it omitted to decide them
at all, but decided the case on local or state questions
only.
"Where a case in this court can be decided without reference to questions arising under the Federal Constitution, that course is usually pursued and is not departed
from without important reasons. In this -case we think
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it much better to decide it with regard to the question of
a local nature, involving the construction of the state
statute and the authority therein given to the commission to make the order in question, rather than to unnecessarily decide the various constitutional questions appearing in the record." Siler v. Louisville & Nashville
R.R. Co., 213 U. S. 175, 191, 193 (1909). 1
The Siler principle has been repeatedly applied in cases involving state as well as local officials. On numerous occasions, when a suit against state officials has presented both
federal constitutional questions and issues of state law, the
Court has upheld injunctive relief on state law grounds.
See, e. g., Greene v. Louisville & Interurban R.R. Co., 244
U. S. 499, 508, 512--514 (1917) (state board of valuation and
assessment; state attorney general); Louisville & Nashville
R.R. Co. v. Greene, 244 U. S. 522, 527 (1917) (same); Davis
In Siler the Court decided the case on state-law grounds, even though
it acknowledged that, "[i]n this case we are without the benefit of a construction of the statute by the highest state court of Kentucky, and we
must proceed in the absence of state adjudication upon the subject." 213
U. S., at 194.
Justice Peckham's opinion in Siler rested on a long line of cases, dating
back to Chief Justice Marshall's decision in Osborn v. Bank of the United
States, 9 Cranch 738, 822 (1824), holding that a federal court has jurisdiction over all the issues-state as well as federal-presented by a case that
properly falls within its jurisdiction. Nor was Siler breaking new ground
in avoiding a federal constitutional question by deciding on state law
grounds. In Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad Co., 118
U. S. 394, 410-411 (1886), the Court noted the importance of the federal
constitutional questions. Even though these had been treated as dispositive by the lower court, and though they were the "main-almost the
only-questions discussed by counsel," id., at 395, the Court stated,
"These questions belong to a class which this court should not decide, unless their determination is essential to the disposal of the case in which
they arise." It then determined that the challenged tax assessments were
not authorized by state law and affirmed the judgment solely on that
ground.
1
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v. Wallace, 257 U. S. 478, 482-485 (1922) (state tax commissioner, state treasurer, state auditor, state attorney general,
and secretary of state); Glenn v. Field Packing Co., 290
U. S. 177, 178 (1933) (state tax commissioners); Lee v.
Bickell, 292 U. S. 415, 425 (1934) (state comptroller). In the
Greene cases, the Court considered and necessarily rejected
the contention that the Eleventh Amendment bars such relief; state officials had argued at length that the actions were
suits against the State and had endeavored to distinguish Ex
parte Young. 2 In addition, the Court has routinely applied
the Siler rule in cases upholding injunctive relief on the basis
of state law against municipal officials, 3 and it has repeatedly
' See Brief for Appellants, Greene v. Louisville and Interurban Railroad Co., 244 U. S. 499, at 27-45; Brief for State Board and Officers, Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Greene, 244 U. S. 522, at 74-101. See
also Reply Brief of Illinois Central Railroad Co. , Illinois Central Railroad
Co. v. Greene, 244 U. S. 555, at 38-39 (companion case). The Court in
Greene noted that the highest court of Kentucky had held that "discrimination such as that complained of" was not in accord with the constitution and
laws of the state. Although there was no redress in state courts, the
Court stated, "This, while admitting the wrong, merely denies judicial relief, and is not binding upon the federal courts." 244 U.S., at 512-513;
see id., at 514.
3
See, e. g., Lincoln Gas & Electric Light Co. v. City of Lincoln, 250
U. S. 256, 268-269 (1919) (modifying judgment to note specifically that the
District Court had relied on state constitutional grounds rather than federal grounds to enjoin enforcement of occupation tax); Bohler v. Callaway,
267 U. S. 479, 489 (1925) (affirming injunction based on state constitutional
grounds, barring county tax receiver from levying execution of assessments); Risty v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Co., 270 U. S.
378 (1926) (in diversity actions, affirming injunction on state law grounds
barring county officials from assessing costs for drainage system, and citing Greeene with approval); Cincinnati v. Vester, 281 U. S. 439, 448-449
(1930) (affirming injunction on state statutory grounds preventing municipality from appropriating certain parcels of real property); Hillsborough v.
Cromwell, 326 U. S. 620, 629 (1946) (affirming injunction, on state statutory grounds, barring assessment of a tax by county tax collector). Such
suits, of course, do not implicate the Eleventh Amendment. Lincoln
County v. Luning, 133 U. S. 529 (1890).
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reaffirmed the general principle in cases in which the plaintiffs were not held to be entitled to the relief they sought. 4
In Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U. S. 528, 546 (1974), JUSTICE
WHITE, writing for the Court, quoted from the Siler opinion
and noted that the "Court has characteristically dealt first
with possibly dispositive state law claims pendent to federal
constitutional claims." He added:
"Numerous decisions of this Court have stated the
general proposition endorsed in Siler-that a federal
court properly vested with jurisdiction may pass on the
state or local law question without deciding the federal
constitutional issues-and have then proceeded to dispose of the case solely on the nonfederal ground. See,
e. g., Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U. S. 620, 629-630
(1946); Waggoner Estate v. Wichita County, 273 U. S.
113, 116-119 (1927); Chicago G.W.R. Co, v. Kendall, 266
U. S. 94 (1924); United Gas Co. v. Railroad Comm'n,
278 U. S. 300, 308 (1929); Risty v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R.
Co., 270 U. S. 378, 387 (1926). These and other cases
illustrate in practice the wisdom of the federal policy of
avoiding constitutional adjudication where not absolutely
'Most recently, in a unanimous per curiam opinion a year ago, we held
that it was an abuse of discretion for the Court of Appeals to decline to
resolve a pendent state-law claim which might have afforded relief against
a school district, thus avoiding a decision on federal constitutional grounds.
Schmidt v. Oakland Unified School Dist.,- U. S. Q"une 21, 1982)
(citing Hagans v. Lavine, discussed in text infra). See also Louisville &
Nashville Railroad Co. v. Garrett, 231 U. S. 298, 303-304 (1913); Ohio Tax
Cases, 232 U. S. 576, 586--587 (1914); Chicago Great Western Railway Co .
v. Kendall, 266 U. S. 94, 97-98 (1924); Waggoner Estate v. Wichita
County, 273 U. S. 113, 116 (1927); United Gas Co. v. Railroad Commission of Kentucky, 278 U. S. 300, 307 (1929); Railroad Comm'n of California v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 302 U. S. 388, 391 (1938).
Numerous other cases have cited Siler as an accurate statement of the
law regarding pendent jurisdiction. See, e. g., Hurn v. Oursler, 289
U. S. 238, 243-245 (1933); Florida Lime Growers v. Jacobsen, 362 U. S.
73, 81, n. 7 (1960); Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U. S. 1, 7 (1976).
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essential to disposition of a case."
n. 12.

415 U. S., at 547

Not only does the Siler rule have an impressive historical
pedigree. It is strongly supported by the interest in avoiding duplicative litigation as well as the interest in avoiding
the unnecessary decision of federal constitutional questions.
Cf. H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U. S. 398, 407 (1981) (citing Justice Brandeis' opinion in Ashwander); Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U. S. 111, 122 (1979) (citing the Court's opinion in
Siler). In addition, it enhances the decisionmaking autonomy of the States. Unlike the majority's position, which requires a decision on federal constitutional grounds that no
State authority can undo, the Siler rule directs the federal
court to turn first to state law, which the State is free to modify or repeal. Indeed, in some of the cases following Siler,
this Court has r~quired that the decree include a provision
expressly authorizing its reopening in the event that a state
court later decided the question of state law differently.
Glenn v. Field Packing Co., 290 U.S. 177, 178-179 (1933);
Wald Transfer & Storage Co. v. Smyth, 290 U. S. 602 (1933);
Lee v. Bickell, 292 U. S. 415, 426 (1934). By leaving the policy determinations underlying injunctive relief in the hands of
the State, the Court of Appeals' approach gives appropriate
deference to established state policies. See 673 F. 2d, at
658.
Ironically, the premise underlying the Siler principle-that
a federal court with jurisdiction over federal questions in a
lawsuit also has jurisdiction over pendent state law issues,
even if the defendant is a state official-was most recently
recognized by this Court in this very case. The District
Court relied on three sources of law to support its holding
that respondents have a right to treatment in the least restrictive environment: a federal statute, a Pennsylvania statute, and the Federal Constitution. See 446 F. Supp. 1295
(ED Pa. 1977). The Court of Appeals, sitting en bane, af-

I

I
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firmed on both state and federal statutory grounds, and
therefore found it unnecessary to review the District Court's
holding that the federal constitutional rights of the Pennhurst
residents had been violated. See 612 F. 2d 84 (CA3 1979).
When we reviewed the case in 1981, we rejected the federal
statutory basis for the Court of Appeals' decision. We did
not accept respondent's contention that the state law grounds
provided an adequate basis for affirmance of the judgment,
because we were concerned that the Court of Appeals' analysis of the state law question might have been influenced by its
erroneous reading of the federal statute. Concluding that it
was "unclear whether state law provides an independent and
adequate ground which can support the court's remedial
order," 451 U. S. 1, 31 (1981), we "remand[ed] the state-law
issue for reconsideration in light of our decision here." Ibid.
We appended a footnote explaining why we declined to consider the effect of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's then recent decision, In re Schmidt, 494 Pa. 86, 429 A. 2d 631 (1981).
In that footnote, we again expressly stated that the· Court of
Appeals could "consider the state law issues in light of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court's recent decision." 451 U. S.,
at 31, n. 24.
The possibility that Siler was no longer good law, or that
the Eleventh Amendment might provide a basis for refusing
to decide the state law issues, apparently did not occur to any
Member of this Court. Thus, Siler was still good law in
1981.
II
The fair and efficient administration of the law is served by
respecting settled rules and by carrying out orders entered in
the course of litigation. Neither the doctrine of stare decisis, nor the doctrine of the law of the case, rigidly forecloses
the re-examination of old rules or outstanding orders. The
doctrines, do, however, establish strong presumptions. A
proponent of change must come forward with strong reasons
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to disregard what has already been decided-reasons that
are strong enough to overcome the interests in certainty and
stability which underlie so much of the framework of our law.
In this case, the parties have litigated for almost a decade on
the assumption that the rule of the Siler case was sound law.
The state law issue was fully briefed by both sides on the
merits when the case first came before the Court. See Brief
for Petitioners 9, 39-43; Brief for Respondents Terri Lee
Halderman, et al. 23-34; Brief for the United States 37-38;
Reply Brief for Petitioners 17. Only afterthe case had been
fully tried, affirmed by the Court of Appeals sitting en bane,
reviewed for the first time in this Court, and remanded to the
Court of Appeals, did petitioners advance the argument that
the Court finds persuasive today. In rejecting this contention, the Court of Appeals quoted at length from this Court's
opinion remanding for reconsideration of the state law issue,
673 F. 2d, at 649-651. It is tolerably clear that the only reason the Eleventh Amendment argument was not advanced at
an earlier stage of the case is that nobody thought of it before. Yet the Court accepts the State's contention at this
late stage, requiring the plaintiffs to start all over again in a
state court if they wish to rely on state law, and requiring the
Court of Appeals to decide a serious federal constitutional
question which could be avoided if plaintiffs obtain relief on
the basis of state law.
Today the Court rejects settled doctrine, repudiates the
powerful interests supporting the Siler rule, and disserves
the interest in bringing protracted litigation to a conclusion-.
an interest that is particularly strong in a case in which the
mistreatment of a relatively helpless segment of the community is graphically described by undisputed findings of fact.
The countervailing reason must presumably be strong indeed. In the view of the majority, that reason is the doctrine of "sovereign immunity." The essence of the Court's
analysis is encapsulated in this statement:
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"The constitutional principle of sovereign immunity, embodied in the Eleventh Amendment, demands that
claims against state officials on the basis of state law be
resolved in state courts." Ante, at 21.
The Court's explanation of the doctrine that issues such a
powerful command is inadequate. I shall therefore comment
on it, giving special attention to its historical and logical relationship with the Siler rule repudiated today by the Court.

III
In Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419 (1793), the Court was
required to decide whether the doctrine of sovereign immunity deprived a federal court of jurisdiction in an action in assumpsit brought against the State of Georgia by a citizen of
South Carolina serving as the executor of the estate of a British creditor. In a decision that was unpopular with state
governments which were either unable or unwilling to pay
their just debts when due, the Court held that Georgia was
amenable to suit. The analysis of the doctrine of sovereign
immunity in the opinion of Chief Justice Jay is ill,).lminating:
"It will be sufficient to observe briefly, that the sovereignties in Europe, and particularly in England, exist on
feudal principles. That system considers the Prince as
the sovereign, and the peopie as his subjects; it regards
his person as the object of allegiance, and excludes the
idea of his being on an equal footing with a subject, either in a Court of Justice or elsewhere. That system
contemplates him as being the fountain of honor and authority; and from his grace and grant derives all franchises, immunities and privileges; it is easy to perceive
that such a sovereign could not be amenable to a Court of
Justice, or subjected to judicial control and actual constraint. It was of necessity, therefore, that suability
became incompatible with such sovereignty. Besides,
the Prince having all the Executive powers, the judg-
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ment of the Courts would, in fact, be only monitory, not
mandatory to him, and a capacity to be advised, is a different thing from a capacity to be sued. The same feudal ideas run through all their jurisprudence, and constantly remind us of the distinction between the Prince
and the subject. No such ideas obtain here; at the
Revolution, the sovereignty devolved on the people .... " ld., at 471 (emphasis in original).
It is familiar history that it took only five years for the sovereign States, many of which were heavily in debt even
though the new central government had relieved them of
most of their revolutionary war obligations, to overrule the \
Chisholm case by ratifying the Eleventh Amendment to the
Constitution. The text of that amendment has two noteworthy features: it encompasses only suits by citizens of other
States and foreign nations, and it refers only to suits against
States. 5 At the outset, this Court applied the amendment
literally. Chief Justice Marshall wrote that the amendment
would not apply to an action commenced by a citizen of Virginia against the Commonwealth of Virginia. Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 412 (1821). He also asserted that its
force was, "of necessity, limited to those suits in which a
State is a party on the record." Osborn v. Bank of the
United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 857 (1824).
Before the end of the 19th century, however, the reach of
the Eleventh Amendment had been expanded along both dimensions. The first of these textual limitations upon the \
scope of the states' sovereign immunity from suit in federal
courts was swept aside in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1
(1890). Hans was a suit against the State of Louisiana,
brought by a citizen of Louisiana seeking to recover interest
•"The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of
the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects
of any Foreign State. " U. S. Const. Arndt. XL
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on the State's bonds. 6 Disagreeing with the majority's analysis in Chisholm, the Court explained that some of the arguments made during the process of ratifying the Constitution
had become a part of the judicial scheme created by the Constitution. 7 Thus, in the Court's view, the Eleventh Amendment merely exemplified the broader and more ancient doctrine of sovereign immunity, 8 and the Constitution bars a
suit in federal court brought by a citizen against his own
State. 9
Second, the Court did not long adhere to Chief Justice
Marshall's test that a State must be a party of record for the
suit to be barred by sovereign immunity. It held in a num6

The Court's opinion expressly distinguished cases in which a State
might have unconstitutionally invaded the enjoyment of other rights:
"Whilst the State cannot be compelled by suit to perform its contracts, any
attempt on its part to violate property or rights acquired under its contracts, may be judicially resisted; and any law impairing the obligation of
contracts under which such property or rights are held is void and powerless to affect their enjoyment." 134 U. S., at 20-21.
7
Hans did not specify the precise constitutional basis for this conclusion. Some years later, in Monaco v. Mississippi, the Court recognized
this problem:
"Manifestly, we cannot rest with a mere literal application of the words of
§ 2 of Article III, or assume that the letter of the Eleventh Amendment
exhausts the restrictions upon suits against non-consenting States. Behind
the words of the constitutional provisions are postulates which limit and
control." 292 U. S. 313, 322-323 (1934).
8
The discussion of the doctrine of sovereign immunity in the Hans opinion made no attempt to explain its virtues. It relied instead on the antiquity of the rule and the notion that a contrary point of view is simply unthinkable. 134 U. S., at 21.
• In support of its conclusion, the Court noted that Congress had merely
given the federal courts jurisdiction that was "concurrent with the courts
of the several States," and suggested that it would be anomalous to permit
a citizen to sue in federal court when the state courts were closed to him.
!d., at 18. Of course, that argument cuts the other way today, since, as
petitioners acknowledge, respondents' claim for relief under state law
could be brought in state court. Brief for Petitioners 32.
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ber of cases that a suit against a state official was in essence a
suit against the State within the Eleventh Amendment's prohibition. Unlike suits against States, suits against state officials in their own names were not dismissed at the threshold,
Poindexter v. Greenhaw, 114 U. S. 270, 288 (1885); Illinois
Central R. Co. v. Adams, 180 U. S. 28, 37-38 (1901), but the
Court considered the nature of the relief sought in order to
determine whether the State was the "real party in interest."
Cunningham v. Macon & Brunswick R.R. Co., 109 U. S.
446, 456-457 (1883); In re Ayers, 123 U. S. 443, 487-492
(1887). If the plaintiff sought relief that required direct payment of money out of the State's treasury to fulfill the State's
financial obligations, or otherwise directly interfered with
the State's finances, then the suit was treated as an action
against the State, barred by sovereign immunity. 10
But the Court preserved a selective approach to extending
the doctrine of sovereign immunity. It was settled doctrine
that the Eleventh Amendment did not protect unconstitutional conduct by state officials acting in their official capacity. Poindexter v. Greenhaw, supra, at 288; Pennoyer v.
McConnaughy, 140 U. S. 1, 10-12 (1891); Smyth v. Ames,
169 U. S. 466, 518-519 (1898). 11 As the Court wrote,
"The other class is where a suit is brought against defendants who, claiming to act as officers of the State, and
10
See, e. g., Governor of Georgia v. Madrazo, 1 Pet. 110, 123-124 (1828);
Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U. S. 711 (1882); Hagood v. Southern, 117 U. S.
52 (1886); Christian v. Atlantic & N. C. R. Co., 133 U. S. 233, 243-246
(1890); North Carolina v. Temple, 134 U. S. 22, 30 (1890); Louisiana v.
Steele, 134 U. S. 230, 232 (1890); McGahey v. Virginia, 135 U. S. 662, 684
(1890); Smith v. Reeves, 178 U. S. 436 (1900).
11
See also Board of Liquidation v. McComb, 92 U. S. 531, 541 (1875);
Allen v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 114 U. S. 311, 315-316 (1885); In re Tyler, 149 U. S. 164, 190-191 (1893); Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.,
154 U. S. 362, 388-391 (1894); Scott v. Donald, 165 U. S. 58, 67-70 (1897);
Prout v. Starr, 188 U. S. 537 (1903); McNeill v. Southern Ry. Co., 202
u. s. 543, 559 (1906).
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under the color of an unconstitutional statute, commit
acts of wrong and injury to the rights and property of the
plaintiff acquired under a contract with the State. Such
suit, whether brought to recover money or property in
the hands of such defendants, unlawfully taken by them
in behalf of the State, or for compensation in damages,
or, in a proper case where the remedy at law, is inadequate, for an injunction to prevent such wrong and injury, ... is not, within the meaning of the Eleventh
Amendment, an action against the State." 140 U. S., at
10.
The Court reasoned that the absence of valid authority left
the official as a private actor, stripped of his representative
capacity. 12 This was not merely an ad hoc accommodation
between federal and state interests, see ante, at 14, 15, but
an application of the Court's established framework of Eleventh Amendment analysis. In short, the decision upholding
injunctive relief in Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908),
which today's majority treats as a limited exception to the
sweeping generality of the Eleventh Amendment, in fact
merely restated a well-settled rule. 13
12
"That, it is true, is a legislative act of the government of Virginia, but
it is not a law of the State of Virginia. The State has passed no such law,
for it cannot; and what it cannot do, it certainly, in contemplation of law,
has not done. The Constitution of the United States, and its own contract,
both irrepealable by any act on its part, are the law of Virginia; and that
law made it the duty of the defendant to receive the coupons tendered in
payment of taxes, and declared every step to enforce the tax, thereafter
taken, to be without warrant of law, and therefore a wrong. He stands,
then, stripped of his official character; and, confessiong a personal violation
of the plaintiff's rights for which he must personally answer, he is without
defence." Poindexter v. Greenhaw, supra, 114 U. S., at 288.
13
As the Court observes, it is familiar learning that there is a tension in
Ex parte Young because the scope of the Eleventh Amendment was held to
be narrower than the scope of the Fourteenth. But the two amendments
differ both in language and purpose with regard to defining action by the
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Another line of cases-highly relevant to today's decision-also shows that barring suits against state officials was
. as much the exception as the rule. State officials and other
agents of the State were not protected by the federal doctrine of sovereign immunity from tort actions under state
law. In a diversity case, federal courts had power to decide
such cases and to award injunctive and monetary relief
against individuals who claimed to have acted as state officials, unless they proved that the challenged conduct had in
fact been authorized by law.
This rule was expressly reaffirmed in a case decided by this
Court in the same Term as Ex parte Young and published in
the same volume of the United States Reports. The appellant in Scully v. Bird, 209 U. S. 481 (1908), brought a diversity suit seeking injunctive relief against the dairy and food
commissioner of the State of Michigan, on the ground that
"under cover of his office" he had maliciously engaged in a
course of conduct designed to ruin plaintiff's business in the
State. The circuit court dismissed the complaint on Eleventh Amendment grounds. On appeal, the plaintiff contended that the Eleventh Amendment "does not apply where
a suit is brought against defendants who, claiming to act as
officers of the State, and under color of a statute which is
valid and constitutional, but wrongfully administered by
them, commit, or threaten to commit, acts of wrong or injury
State. It is clear, at all events, that the limitations on the Eleventh
Amendment in Ex parte Young simply followed the principles established
by the Court in cases that did not involve the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court stated:
"The answer to all this is the same as made in every case where an official claims to be acting under the authority of the State. The act to be
enforced is alleged to be unconstitutional, and if it be so, the use of the
name of the State to enforce an unconstitutional act to the injury of complainants is a proceeding without the authority of and one which does not
affect the State in its sovereign or governmental capacity." 209 U. S., at
159-160.
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to the rights and property of the plaintiff, or make such administration of the statute an illegal burden and exaction
upon the plaintiff." I d., at 481. 14 This court agreed. It
noted that the complaint alleged action "in dereliction of duties enjoined by the statutes of the State," and concluded that
it was "manifest from this summary of the allegations of the
bill that this is not a suit against the State." Id., at 490.
It was firmly established by 1908 that tortious acts by state
officials under color of office were not protected by the Eleventh Amendment. Cunningham v. Macon & Brunswick R.
Co., supra, 109 U. S., at 452; Poindexter v. Greenhaw, 114
U. S., at 287; Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust, 154 U. S.
362, 390-391 (1894). 15 A few years later, the Court explained
the relationship of these tort cases to the doctrine of sovereign immunity in Hopkins v. Clemson Agricultural College,
221 u. s. 636 (1911):
"immunity from suit is a high attribute of sovereignty-a
prerogative of the State itself-which cannot be availed
of by public agents when sued for their own torts. The
"Your orators further represent that all the acts and doings of the said
Arthur C. Bird, as above specified, in relation to the prohibition of the sale
of your orators' said syrups in the State of Michigan are entirely unauthorized by the statutes of the State of Michigan, and the said Arthur C.
Bird, in committing said acts above complained of, was and is acting as a
private citizen of the State of Michigan, but under cover of his said office of
Dairy and Food Commissioner. .. ." Record 11.
16
The Court explained that the individual officer sued in tort
"is not sued as, or because he is, the officer of the government, but as an
individual, and the court is not ousted of jurisdiction because he asserts jurisdiction as such officer. To make out his defense he must show that his
authority was sufficient in law to protect him." Cunningham, 109 U. S.,
at 452; quoted in Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U. S., at 287.
Cf. Rolston v. Missouri Fund Comm'rs, 120 U. S. 390, 411 (1887) (federal
court may enjoin fund commissioners of state from selling property subject
to liens in favor of private party bringing suit; "the suit is to get a state
officer to do what a statute requires of him. The litigation is with the officer, not the state.")
14
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Eleventh Amendment was not intended to afford them
freedom from liability in any case where, under color of
their office, they have injured one of the State's citizens.
To grant them such immunity would be to create a privileged class free from liability for wrongs inflicted or injuries threatened .... Besides, neither a State nor an individual can confer upon an agent authority to commit a
tort so as to excuse the perpetrator. In such cases the
law of agency has no application-the wrongdoer is
treated as a principal and individually liable for the damages inflicted and subject to injunction against the commission of acts causing irreparable injury." 16
This principle was repeatedly applied in federal courts in
cases contemporary with Young and Siler. 17 In Johnson v.
16

The Court also stated:
"Corporate agents or individual officers of the State stand in no better position than officers of the General Government, and as to them it has often
been held that: 'The exemption of the United States from judicial process
does not protect their officers and agents, civil or military, in time of peace,
from being personally liable to an action of tort by a private person, whose
rights of property they have wrongfully invaded or injured, even by authority of the United States.' Belknap v. Schild, 161 U. S. 10, 18." 221
U. S., at 645.
The importance of state law authority for the actions of state officials
also appears, by implication, in cases barring suits against individual officials as suits against the State. In such cases the Court frequently noted,
as one relevant factor, that the relief sought would be unauthorized by
state law and would therefore adversely affect the State itself. E . g.,
Louisiana v. Jumel, supra, 107 U. S., at 721; Hagood v. Southern, supra,
114 U. S., at 68. In contrast, in cases of official actions that were never
authorized by state law, a federal court's remedy would not run contrary to
state policy.
17
Some of this Court's general language in Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U. S. 682, 691-702 (1949), is inconsistent with
the approach taken in the cases cited in text. But Larson is readily distinguishable. Not only was it a suit against the federal War Assets Administrator rather than against a state official. It also involved a claim to a par-
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Lankford, 245 U. S. 541 (1918), the Court reversed the dismissal of an action against the Bank Commissioner of Oklahoma and his surety to recover damages for the loss of the
plaintiff's bank deposit, alleged to have been caused by the
Commissioner's failure to safeguard the business and assets
of the bank in negligent or willful disregard of his duties
under state law. The Court explained that the action was
not one against the State.
"To answer it otherwise would be to assert, we think,
that whatever an officer does, even in contravention of
the laws of the State, is state action, identifies him with
it and makes the redress sought against him a claim
against the State and therefore prohibited by the Eleventh Amendment. Surely an officer of a State may be
delinquent without involving the State in delinquency,
indeed, may injure the State by delinquency as well as
some resident of the State, and be amenable to both."
Id., at 545. 18
ticular, identified object of property, whose retention by the official was
"unlawful" only in the sense that the plaintiff claimed title, id., at 692.
Such a claim is quite different from a suit for injunctive relief against enforcement of a general policy or practice, which the state supreme court
has held to be inconsistent with "the state's responsibility" which the state
"will not be allowed to ignore." In re Schmidt, 429 A. 2d 631, 637 (Pa.
1981). To the extent that Larson suggests that sovereign immunity bars
all suits based on action within the scope of official authority, it is not necessary or appropriate to read it back retroactively into the Eleventh
Amendment, given the clarity of our precedents in the Eleventh Amendment area.
18
In Lankford v. Platte Iron Works Co., 235 U. S. 461, 471, 476 (1915),
the Court assumed that the Eleventh Amendment would not bar a suit "to
compel submission by the officers of the State to the laws of the State,
accomplishing at once the policy of the law and its specific purpose," but
rejected the appellees' interpretation of the state statute. See also Old
Colony Trust Co. v. Seattle , 271 U. S. 426, 431 (1926) (reaffirming general
principle of Clemson in suit against city and county officials); cf. Worcester
County Trust Co. v. Riley, 302 U. S. 292, 297 (1937) ("generally suits to
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It was clear that, notwithstanding the Eleventh Amendment, a plaintiff could bring a suit under state law against a
state official even if he did not allege that the defendant had
acted ultra vires-that is, completely beyond the scope of official authority. A suit alleging that the official had acted
within his authority but in a manner contrary to state law
was not barred for a simple reason. The Eleventh Amendment bars suits against States; it does not bar suits against
state officials for action not authorized by the State's own
laws. If one accepts the holding of Ex parte Young, as the
majority apparently does, this principle follows a fortiori.
Ex parte Young concludes that unconstitutional action by
state officials is not action by the State even if it purports to
be authorized by state law, because the federal Constitution
strikes down the state-law shield. 209 U. S., at 159. In the
tort cases, if the plaintiff proves his case, there is by definition no state-law defense. 19 These precedents make clear beyond peradventure that the Court is historically wrong when
it says that, because "the Young doctrine rests on the need to
promote the vindication of federal rights," injunctive relief
may not be awarded against state officials "where unnecrestrain action of state officials can, consistently with the constitutional
prohibition, be prosecuted only when the action sought to be restrained is
without the authority of state law or contravenes the statutes or Constitution of the United States"; Cory v. White, - - U. S. - - , - - (1982)
(stating that Worcester established that the "Eleventh Amendment bars
suits against state officers unless they are alleged to be acting contrary to
federal law or against the authority of state law").
19
"If conduct of a state officer taken pursuant to an unconstitutional
state statute is deemed to be unauthorized and may be challenged in federal court, conduct undertaken without any authority whatever is also not
entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity." Florida Department of
State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 50 U.S.L.W. 5056, 5063 Q"uly 1, 1982) (plurality opinion). "Larson established that where the officer's actions are
limited by statute, actions beyond those limitations are to be considered
individual and not sovereign actions." ld., at 5068 (WHITE, J.,
dissenting).
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essary to promote the supremacy of federal law." Ante, at
14, 15.
These two lines of cases-upholding actions against state
officials for conduct violating the Federal Constitution, and
actions against state officials for conduct unauthorized by
state law-demonstrate that the Siler rule was fully harmonious with established Eleventh Amendment principles. The
jurisdiction of the federal court in Siler was established by a
federal claim similar to the one asserted in Ex parte Young;
the pendent state-law claim was not barred by the Eleventh
Amendment under the rationale of the tort cases. 20 The federal court therefore had jurisdiction to resolve the case and
grant injunctive relief on either federal or state grounds,
without encountering any barrier imposed by the Eleventh
Amendment. Moreover, decision on state grounds in Siler
served the powerful interest in avoiding unnecessary decision
of federal constitutional questions.
Thus the Court's rejection of Siler not only runs counter to
the salutary principle of judicial restraint in constitutional adjudication; it is also completely unsupported by this Court's
Eleventh Amendment decisions. The majority acknowledges that the defendant state officials are properly joined as
20
As petitioners recognize, the same Eleventh Amendment principles
apply to diversity cases and to pendent state-law claims. Brief for Petitioners 21. This Court's identical treatment of the Eleventh Amendment
issues in a trio of companion cases, only one of them within the federal diversity jurisdiction but each of them presenting pendent state-law claims,
makes this point clear. Greene v. Louisville & Interurban R. Co., 244
U. S. 499, 506-508 (1917); Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Greene, 244
U. S. 522, 528 (1917); Illinois Central R. Co. v. Greene, 244 U. S. 555, 559
(1917). Thus it is highly improbable that the Court's assertion of federal
jurisdiction over pendent state-law claims in Siler and Greene inadvertently ignored Eleventh Amendment problems, as the majority suggests.
Ante, at 17-19. The Court had repeatedly rejected the contention that
state-law claims against state officials were suits against the State itself.
Today's decision necessarily rejects those prior holdings.
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parties to the lawsuit, and that the District Court has ample
power to grant injunctive relief against them, but somewhere
in the recesses of the Eleventh Amendment it finds a limitation on the source of law on which the District Court may
rely. To reach this conclusion it cavalierly overrules anumber of earlier cases and rejects a rule that has been repeatedly approved by this Court. This sort of freehand rewriting of constitutional text is simply too much for me to accept.
In passing the majority also casts doubt on another apparently well-settled line of cases-those which make clear that
counties and other political subdivisions of States are not protected by the Eleventh Amendment. The defendants in this
case include various county commissioners, county mental retardation administrators, and other officials of five Pennsylvania counties surrounding Pennhurst. The Court casually
suggests, "Given that the actions of the county commissioners and mental health administrators are dependent on funding from the State, it may be that relief granted against these
county officials, when exercising their functions under the
MH/MR Act, effectively runs against the State." Ante, at
21-22, n. 22. This dictum is flatly inconsistent with settled
law. Even if injunctive relief against officials of the State
itself would require additional expenditures from the state
treasury, we have consistently held that it does not violate
the Eleventh Amendment. As we wrote in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 667-668 (1974), "the fiscal consequences
to state treasuries in these cases were the necessary result of
compliance with decrees which by their terms were prospective in nature. . . . Such an ancillary effect on the state treasury is a permissible and often an inevitable consequence of
the principle announced in Ex parte Young, supra." See
also Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U. S. 267, 288--290 (1977).
This principle applies a fortiori to suits against county officials, who serve a governmental body that is not itself immune from suit.
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IV
The Court's willingness to cast off the constraints of
precedent and principle seems to stem from two sources: an
unstated concern about the ability of federal judges to dect£fe
issues of state law, and a belief that the doctrine of sovereign
immunity establishes such a strong imperative that-it nwst
be extended into areas where it has not previo).lsly held sway.
I find both of these grounds of decision to be' indefensible)
Ever since the enactment of the Rules of Decision Apt in
1789, Congress has assumed that federal c~rts are fulfy capable of understanding and applying the law of t e States in
which they sit. They apply such law routinely in diversity
cases. The federal bench is served by former members of
the state bar who have achieved eminence in the practice of
their profession before assuming federal office. Indeed, in
this case, the en bane court which decided the state law issues included several such members of the bar of Pennsylvania bar. Federal judges should not have their ability to decide an entire case undermined by an arbitrary rule that
deprives them of power to determine state law questions
when relief is sought against state officials. 21
The arbitrary rule announced today also results from an
exalted notion of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. If one
day this Court were to undertake a complete reexamination
of Eleventh Amendment doctrine, I might well subscribe to a
literal interpretation of the amendment such as the view espoused by Chief Justice Marshall, see pp. - - supra, or by
JUSTICE BRENNAN in his dissenting opinion in Employees v.
Missouri Public Health Department, 411 U. S. 279, 298
21
We have recently rejected any suggestion that state judges are not
fully competent to resolve issues of federal law. See, e. g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 493-494, n. 35 (1976). It is equally true, however, that
federal judges are fully capable of deciding all issues that arise in litigation
over which they have jurisdiction.
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(1973). But, assuming that stare decisis requires adherence
to Hans v. Louisiana and other 19th century cases that
broadened the reach of sovereign immunity, see supra, 22 the
underlying nature of the doctrine counsels strongly against
detaching any new areas of judicial activity from the purview
of federal courts. 23
As Justice Frankfurter wrote in his dissent in Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U. S. 47, 59 (1944):
"Whether this immunity is an absolute survival of the
monarchial privilege, or is a manifestation merely of
power, or rests on abstract logical grounds, see Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U. S. 349, it undoubtedly runs
22
If the sovereign immunity doctrine were confined to collection cases
like Chisholm and Hans, it could be applied in an evenhanded manner that
produces no unanticipated injustice. A rule that makes clear that "the obligations of a State rest upon its honor and good faith, and cannot be made
the subject of judicial cognizance unless the State consents to be sued"
gives lenders and suppliers fair warning of the added risks involved in doing business with a sovereign State.
23
In Nevada v. Hall, 440 U. S. 410 (1979), we squarely rejected the notion that the Constitution contains some unwritten guarantee that protects
a State from being sued without its consent in the courts of another sovereign. Referring to the prevailing opinion in Chisholm v. Georgia, supra,
we wrote:
"Mr. Chief Justice Jay described sovereignty as the 'right to govern';
that kind of right would necessarily encompass the right to determine what
suits may be brought in the sovereign's own courts. Thus, Mr. Justice
Holmes explained sovereign immunity as based 'on the logical and practical
ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes
the law on which the right depends.'
"This explanation adequately supports the conclusion that no sovereign
may be sued in its own courts without its consent, but it affords no support
for a claim of immunity in another sovereign's courts." 440 U. S., at
415-416.
Similar reasoning applies to the Court's decision today to invent a new
principle of sovereign immunity that is totally unsupported by the text of
the Constitution or by any of our prior decisions.
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counter to modern democratic notions of the moral
responsibility of the State. Accordingly, courts reflect
a strong legislative momentum in their tendency to extend the legal responsibility of Government and to confirm Maitland's belief, expressed nearly fifty years ago
that, 'it is a wholesome sight to see "the Crown" sued
and answering for its torts.' 3 Maitland, Collected Papers, 263."
I respectfully dissent.

To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Powell
Justice Rehnquist
Justice O'Connor
From:

Justice Stevens
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JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting.
The question whether a federal court may award injunctive
relief against state officials on the basis of state law has been
answered by this Court many times in the past. The affirmative answer to that question is supported by sound reasons of judicial administration, by the doctrines of stare decisis and law of the case, and by a correct understanding of the
doctrine of sovereign immunity. A negative answer will
place additional burdens on the judiciary and on the victims
of unlawful conduct by state officials. It will also require unnecessary determinations of constitutional questions, a result
inimical to sound principles of judicial restraint. I therefore
respectfully dissent.
I
In one of the most respected opinions ever written by a
Member of this Court, Justice Brandeis wrote:
"The Court developed, for its own governance in the
cases confessedly within its jurisdiction, a series of rules
under which it has avoided passing upon a large part of
all the constitutional questions pressed upon it for decision. They are:
"The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question
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although properly presented by the record, if there is
also present some other ground upon which the case may
be disposed of. This rule has found most varied application. Thus, if a case can be decided on either of two
grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the
other a question of statutory construction or general law,
the Court will decide only the latter. Siler v. Louisville
& Nashville R. Co., 213 U. S. 175, 191." Ashwander v.
Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U. S. 288, 346-347
(1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
The Siler case, cited with approval by Justice Brandeis in
Ashwander, was remarkably similar to the case the Court decides today.
A privately owned railroad corporation
brought suit against the members of the railroad commission
of Kentucky to enjoin the enforcement of a rate schedule promulgated by the Commission. The federal circuit court
found that the schedule violated the plaintiff's federal constitutional rights and granted relief. This Court affirmed,
but it refused to decide the constitutional question because
injunctive relief against the state officials was adequately
supported on the basis of state law. The Court explained:
"The Federal questions, as to the invalidity of the
state statute because, as alleged, it was in violation of
the Federal Constitution, gave the Circuit Court jurisdiction, and, having properly obtained it, that court had
the right to decide all the questions in the case, even
though it decided the Federal questions adversely to the
party raising them, or even if it omitted to decide them
at all, but decided the case on local or state questions
only.
"Where a case in this court can be decided without reference to questions arising under the Federal Constitution, that course is usually pursued and is not departed
from without important reasons. In this case we think
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it much better to decide it with regard to the question of
a local nature, involving the construction of the state
statute and the authority therein given to the commission to make the order in question, rather than to unnecessarily decide the various constitutional questions appearing in the record." Siler v. Louisville & Nashville
R.R. Co., 213 U.S. 175, 191, 193 (1909).'
The Siler principle has been repeatedly applied in cases involving state as well as local officials. On numerous occasions, when a suit against state officials has presented both
federal constitutional questions and issues of state law, the
Court has upheld injunctive relief on state law grounds.
See, e. g., Greene v. Louisville & Interurban R.R. Co., 244
U. S. 499, 508, 512-514 (1917) (state board of valuation and
assessment; state attorney general); Louisville & Nashville
R.R. Co. v. Greene, 244 U. S. 522, 527 (1917) (same); Davis
' In Siler the Court decided the case on state-law grounds, even though
it acknowledged that, "[i]n this case we are without the benefit of a construction of the statute by the highest state court of Kentucky, and we
must proceed in the absence of state adjudication upon the subject." 213
U. S., at 194.
Justice Peckham's opinion in Siler rested on a long line of cases, dating
back to Chief Justice Marshall's decision in Osborn v. Bank of the United
States, 9 Cranch 738, 822 (1824), holding that a federal court has jurisdiction over all the issues-state as well as federal-presented by a case that
properly falls within its jurisdiction. Nor was Siler breaking new ground
in avoiding a federal constitutional question by deciding on state law
grounds. In Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad Co., 118
U. S. 394, 410-411 (1886), the Court noted the importance of the federal
constitutional questions. Even though these had been treated as dispositive by the lower court, and though they were the "main-almost the
only-questions discussed by counsel," id., at 395, the Court stated,
"These questions belong to a class which this court should not decide, unless their determination is essential to the disposal of the case in which
they arise." It then determined that the challenged tax assessments were
not authorized by state law and affirmed the judgment solely on that
ground.
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v. Wallace, 257 U. S. 478, 482-485 (1922) (state tax commissioner, state treasurer, state auditor, state attorney general,
and secretary of state); Glenn v. Field Packing Co., 290
U. S. 177, 178 (1933) (state tax commissioners); Lee v.
Bickell, 292 U. S. 415, 425 (1934) (state comptroller). In the
Greene cases, the Court considered and necessarily rejected
the contention that the Eleventh Amendment bars such relief; state officials had argued at length that the actions were
suits against the State and had endeavored to distinguish Ex
parte Young. 2 In addition, the Court has routinely applied
the Siler rule in cases upholding injunctive relief on the basis
of state law against municipal officials, 3 and it has repeatedly
2
See Brief for Appellants, Greene v. Louisville and Interurban Railroad Co., 244 U. S. 499, at 27-45; Brief for State Board and Officers, Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co . v. Greene, 244 U. S. 522, at 74-101. See
also Reply Brief of Illinois Central Railroad Co., Illinois Central Railroad
Co. v. Greene, 244 U. S. 555, at 38--39 (companion case). The Court in
Greene noted that the highest court of Kentucky had held that "discrimination such as that complained of" was not in accord with the constitution and
laws of the state. Although there was no redress in state courts, the
Court stated, "This, while admitting the wrong, merely denies judicial relief, and is not binding upon the federal courts." 244 U. S., at 512-513;
see id., at 514.
3
See, e. g., Lincoln Gas & Electric Light Co. v. City of Lincoln, 250
U. S. 256, 268-269 (1919) (modifying judgment to note specifically that the
District Court had relied on state constitutional grounds rather than federal grounds to enjoin enforcement of occupation tax); Bohler v. Callaway,
267 U. S. 479, 489 (1925) (affirming injunction based on state constitutional
grounds, barring county tax receiver from levying execution of assessments); R isty v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Co., 270 U. S.
378 (1926) (in diversity actions, affirming injunction on state law grounds
barring county officials from assessing costs for drainage system, and citing Greeene with approval); Cincinnati v. Vester, 281 U. S. 439, 448-449
(1930) (affirming injunction on state statutory grounds preventing municipality from appropriating certain parcels of real property); Hillsborough v.
Cromwell, 326 U. S. 620, 629 (1946) (affirming injunction, on state statutory grounds, barring assessment of a tax by county tax collector). Such
suits, of course, do not implicate the Eleventh Amendment. Lincoln
County v. Luning, 133 U. S. 529 (1890) .
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reaffirmed the general principle in cases in which the plaintiffs were not held to be entitled to the relief they sought. 4
In Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U. S. 528, 546 (1974), JUSTICE
WHITE, writing for the Court, quoted from the Siler opinion
and noted that the "Court has characteristically dealt first
with possibly dispositive state law claims pendent to federal
constitutional claims." He added:
"Numerous decisions of this Court have stated the
general proposition endorsed in Siler-that a federal
court properly vested with jurisdiction may pass on the
state or local law question without deciding the federal
constitutional issues-and have then proceeded to dispose of the case solely on the nonfederal ground. See,
e. g., Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U. S. 620, 629-630
(1946); Waggoner Estate v. Wichita County, 273 U. S.
113, 116-119 (1927); Chicago G.W.R. Co. v. Kendall, 266
U. S. 94 (1924); United Gas Co. v. Railroad Comm'n,
278 U. S. 300, 308 (1929); Risty v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R.
Co., 270 U. S. 378, 387 (1926). These and other cases
illustrate in practice the wisdom of the federal policy of
avoiding constitutional adjudication where not absolutely
• Most recently, in a unanimous per curiam opinion a year ago, we held
that it was an abuse of discretion for the Court of Appeals to decline to
resolve a pendent state-law claim which might have afforded relief against
a school district, thus avoiding a decision on federal constitutional grounds.
Schmidt v. Oakland Unified School Dist., U. S. Q"une 21, 1982)
(citing Hagans v. Lavine, discussed in text infra). See also Louisville &
Nashville Railroad Co. v. Garrett, 231 U. S. 298, 303-304 (1913); Ohio Tax
Cases, 232 U. S. 576, 586-587 (1914); Chicago Great Western Railway Co.
v. Kendall, 266 U. S. 94, 97-98 (1924); Waggoner Estate v. Wichita
County, 273 U. S. 113, 116 (1927); United Gas Co. v. Railroad Commission of Kentucky, 278 U. S. 300, 307 (1929); Railroad Comm'n of California v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 302 U. S. 388, 391 (1938).
Numerous other cases have cited Siler as an accurate statement of the
law regarding pendent jurisdiction. See, e. g., Hurn v. Oursler, 289
U. S. 238, 243-245 (1933); Florida Lime Growers v. Jacobsen, 362 U. S.
73, 81, n. 7 (1960); Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U. S. 1, 7 (1976).
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essential to disposition of a case."
n. 12.

415 U. S., at 547

Not only does the Siler rule have an impressive historical
pedigree. It is strongly supported by the interest in avoiding duplicative litigation as well as the interest in avoiding
the unnecessary decision of federal constitutional questions.
Cf. H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U. S. 398, 407 (1981) (citing Justice Brandeis' opinion in Ashwander); Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U. S. 111, 122 (1979) (citing the Court's opinion in
Siler). In addition, it enhances the decisionmaking autonomy of the States. Unlike the majority's position, which requires a decision on federal constitutional grounds that no
State authority can undo, the Siler rule directs the federal
court to turn first to state law, which the State is free to modify or repeal. Indeed, in some of the cases following Siler,
this Court has required that the decree include a provision
expressly authorizing its reopening in the event that a state
court later decided the question of state law differently.
Glenn v. Field Packing Co., 290 U. S. 177, 178-179 (1933);
Wald Transfer & Storage Co. v. Smyth, 290 U. S. 602 (1933);
Lee v. Bickell, 292 U. S. 415, 426 (1934). By leaving the policy determinations underlying injunctive relief in the hands of
the State, the Court of Appeals' approach gives appropriate
deference to established state policies. See 673 F. 2d, at
658.
Ironically, the premise underlying the Siler principle-that
a federal court with jurisdiction over federal questions in a
lawsuit also has jurisdiction over pendent state ·law issues,
even if the defendant is a state official-was most recently
recognized by this Court in this very case. The District
Court relied on three sources of law to support its holding
that respondents have a right to treatment in the least restrictive environment: a federal statute, a Pennsylvania statute, and the Federal Constitution. See 446 F. Supp. 1295
(ED Pa. 1977). The Court of Appeals, sitting en bane, af-

.-
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firmed on both state and federal statutory grounds, and
therefore found it unnecessary to review the District Court's
holding that the federal constitutional rights of the Pennhurst
residents had been violated. See 612 F. 2d 84 (CA3 1979).
When we reviewed the case in 1981, we rejected the federal
statutory basis for the Court of Appeals' decision. We did
not accept respondent's contention that the state law grounds
provided an adequate basis for affirmance of the judgment,
because we were concerned that the Court of Appeals' analysis of the state law question might have been influenced by its
erroneous reading of the federal statute. Concluding that it
was "unclear whether state law provides an independent and
adequate ground which can support the court's remedial
order," 451 U. S. 1, 31 (1981), we "remand[ed] the state-law
issue for reconsideration in light of our decision here." Ibid.
We appended a footnote explaining why we declined to consider the effect of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's then recent decision, In re Schmidt, 494 Pa. 86, 429 A. 2d 631 (1981).
In that footnote, we again expressly stated that the Court of
Appeals could "consider the state law issues in light of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court's recent decision." 451 U. S.,
at 31, n. 24.
The possibility that Siler was no longer good law, or that
the Eleventh Amendment might provide a basis for refusing
to decide the state law issues, apparently did not occur to any
Member of this Court. Thus, Siler was still good law in
1981.
II
The fair and efficient administration of the law is served by
respecting settled rules and by carrying out orders entered in
the course of litigation. Neither the doctrine of stare decisis, nor the doctrine of the law of the case, rigidly forecloses
the re-examination of old rules or outstanding orders. The
doctrines, do, however, establish strong presumptions. A
proponent of change must come forward with strong reasons

.•
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to disregard what has already been decided-reasons that
are strong enough to overcome the interests in certainty and
stability which underlie so much of the framework of our law.
In this case, the parties have litigated for almost a decade on
the assumption that the rule of the Siler case was sound law.
The state law issue was fully briefed by both sides on the
merits when the case first came before the Court. See Brief
for Petitioners 9, 39-43; Brief for Respondents Terri Lee
Halderman, et al. 23-34; Brief for the United States 37-38;
Reply Brief for Petitioners 17. Only after the case had been
fully tried, affirmed by the Court of Appeals sitting en bane,
reviewed for the first time in this Court, and remanded to the
Court of Appeals, did petitioners advance the argument that
the Court finds persuasive today. In rejecting this contention, the Court of Appeals quoted at length from this Court's
opinion remanding for reconsideration of the state law issue,
673 F. 2d, at 649-651. It is tolerably clear that the only reason the Eleventh Amendment argument was not advanced at
an earlier stage of the case is that nobody thought of it before. Yet the Court accepts the State's contention at this
late stage, requiring the plaintiffs to start all over again in a
state court if they wish to rely on state law, and requiring the
Court of Appeals to decide a serious federal constitutional
question which could be avoided if plaintiffs obtain relief on
the basis of state law.
Today the Court rejects settled doctrine, repudiates the
powerful interests supporting the Siler rule, and disserves
the interest in bringing protracted litigation to a conclusionan interest that is particularly strong in a case in which the
mistreatment of a relatively helpless segment of the community is graphically described by undisputed findings of fact.
The countervailing reason must presumably be strong indeed. In the view of the majority, that reason is the doctrine of "sovereign immunity." The essence of the Court's
analysis is encapsulated in this statement:
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"The constitutional principle of sovereign immunity, embodied in the Eleventh Amendment, demands that
claims against state officials on the basis of state law be
resolved in state courts." Ante, at 21.
The Court's explanation of the doctrine that issues such a
powerful command is inadequate. I shall therefore comment
on it, giving special attention to its historical and logical relationship with the Siler rule repudiated today by the Court.
\

III
In Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419 (1793), the Court was
required to decide whether the doctrine of sovereign immunity deprived a federal court of jurisdiction in an action in assumpsit brought against the State of Georgia by a citizen of
South Carolina serving as the executor of the estate of a British creditor. In a decision that was unpopular with state
governments which were either unable or unwilling to pay
their just debts when due, the Court held that Georgia was
amenable to suit. The analysis of the doctrine of sovereign
immunity in the opinion of Chief Justice Jay is illuminating:
"It will be sufficient to observe briefly, that the sovereignties in Europe, and particularly in England, exist on
feudal principles. That system considers the Prince as
the sovereign, and the people as his subjects; it regards
his person as the object of allegiance, and excludes the
idea of his being on an equal footing with a subject, either in a Court of Justice or elsewhere. That system
contemplates him as being the fountain of honor and authority; and from his grace and grant derives all franchises, immunities and privileges; it is easy to perceive
that such a sovereign could not be amenable to a Court of
Justice, or subjected to judicial control and actual constraint. It was of necessity, therefore, that suability
became incompatible with such sovereignty. Besides,
the Prince having all the Executive powers, the judg-
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ment of the Courts would, in fact, be only monitory, not
mandatory to him, and a capacity to be advised, is a different thing from a capacity to be sued. The same feudal ideas run through all their jurisprudence, and constantly remind us of the distinction between the Prince
and the subject. No such ideas obtain here; at the
Revolution, the sovereignty devolved on the people .... " /d., at 471 (emphasis in original) .

...
It is familiar history that it took only five years for the sovereign States, many of which were heavily in debt even
though the new central government had relieved them of
most of their revolutionary war obligations, to overrule the
Chisholm case by ratifying the Eleventh Amendment to the
Constitution. The text of that amendment has two noteworthy features: it encompasses only suits by citizens of other
States and foreign nations, and it refers only to suits against
States. 5 At the outset, this Court applied the amendment
literally. Chief Justice Marshall wrote that the amendment
would not apply to an action commenced by a citizen of Virginia against the Commonwealth of Virginia. Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 412 (1821). He also asserted that its
force was, "of necessity, limited to those suits in which a
State is a party on the record." Osborn v. Bank of the
United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 857 (1824).
Before the end of the 19th century, however, the reach of
the Eleventh Amendment had been expanded along both dimensions. The first of these textual limitations upon the
scope of the states' sovereign immunity from suit in federal
courts was swept aside in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1
(1890). Hans was a suit against the State of Louisiana,
brought by a citizen of Louisiana seeking to recover interest
• "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of
the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects
of any Foreign State." U. S. Canst. Arndt. XI.
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on the State's bonds. 6 Disagreeing with the majority's analysis in Chisholm, the Court explained that some of the arguments made during the process of ratifying the Constitution
had become a part of the judicial scheme created by the Constitution. 7 Thus, in the Court's view, the Eleventh Amendment merely exemplified the broader and more ancient doctrine of sovereign immunity, 8 and the Constitution bars a
suit in federal court brought by a citizen against his own
State. 9
Second, the Court did not long adhere to Chief Justice
Marshall's test that a State must be a party of record for the
suit to be barred by sovereign immunity. It held in a num6
The Court's opinion. expressly distinguished cases in which a State
might have unconstitutionally invaded the enjoyment of other rights:
''Whilst the State cannot be compelled by suit to perform its contracts, any
attempt on its part to violate property or rights acquired under its contracts, may be judicially resisted; and any law impairing the obligation of
contracts under which such property or rights are held is void and powerless to affect their enjoyment." 134 U. S., at 20-21.
7
Hans did not specify the precise constitutional basis for this conclusion. Some years later, in Monaco v. Mississippi , the Court recognized
this problem:
"Manifestly, we cannot rest with a mere literal application of the words of
§ 2 of Article III, or assume that the letter of the Eleventh Amendment
exhausts the restrictions upon suits against non-consenting States. Behind
the words of the constitutional provisions are postulates which limit and
control." 292 U. S. 313, 322--323 (1934).
8
The discussion of the doctrine of sovereign immunity in the Hans opinion made no attempt to explain its virtues. It relied instead on the antiquity of the rule and the notion that a contrary point of view is simply unthinkable. 134 U. S. , at 21.
9
In support of its conclusion, the Court noted that Congress had merely
given the federal courts jurisdiction that was "concurrent with the courts
of the several States," and suggested that it would be anomalous to permit
a citizen to sue in federal court when the state courts were closed to him.
!d. , at 18. Of course, that argument cuts the other way today, since, as
petitioners acknowledge, respondents' claim for relief under state law
could be brought in state court. Brief for Petitioners 32.
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ber of cases that a suit against a state official was in essence a
suit against the State within the Eleventh Amendment's prohibition. Unlike suits against States, suits against state officials in their own names were not dismissed at the threshold,
Poindexter v. Greenhaw, 114 U. S. 270, 288 (1885); Illinois
Central R. Co. v. Adams, 180 U. S. 28, 37-38 (1901), but the
Court considered the nature of the relief sought in order to
determine whether the State was the "real party in interest."
Cunningham v. Macon & Brunswick R.R. Co., 109 U. S.
446, 456-457 (1883); In re Ayers, 123 U. S. 443, 487-492
(1887). If the plaintiff sought relief that required direct payment of money out of the State's treasury to fulfill the State's
financial obligations, or otherwise directly interfered with
the State's finances, then the suit was treated as an action
against the State, barred by sovereign immunity. 10
But the Court preserved a selective approach to extending
the doctrine of sovereign immunity. It was settled doctrine
that the Eleventh Amendment did not protect unconstitutional conduct by state officials acting in their official capacity. Poindexter v. Greenhaw, supra, at 288; Pennoyer v.
McConnaughy, 140 U. S. 1, 10-12 (1891); Smyth v. Ames,
169 U. S. 466, 51~19 (1898). 11 As the Court wrote,
"The other class is where a suit is brought against defendants who, claiming to act as officers of the State, and
0
' See, e. g., Governor of Georgia v. Madrazo, 1 Pet. 110, 123-124 (1828);
Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U. S. 711 (1882); Hagood v. Southern, 117 U. S.
52 (1886); Christian v. Atlantic & N . C. R . Co., 133 U. S. 233, 243-246
(1890); North Carolina v. Temple, 134 U. S. 22, 30 (1890); Louisiana v.
Steele, 134 U. S. 230, 232 (1890); McGahey v. Virginia, 135 U. S. 662, 684
(1890); Smith v. Reeves, 178 U. S. 436 (1900).
"See also Board of Liquidation v. McComb , 92 U. S. 531, 541 (1875);
Allen v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 114 U. S. 311, 315-316 (1885); In re Tyler, 149 U. S. 164, 190-191 (1893); Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.,
154 U. S. 362, 388-391 (1894); Scott v. Donald, 165 U. S. 58, 67-70 (1897);
Prout v. Starr, 188 U.S. 537 (1903); McNeill v. Southern Ry. Co., 202
u. s. 543, 559 (1906).
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under the color of an unconstitutional statute, commit
acts of wrong and injury to the rights and property of the
plaintiff acquired under a contract with the State. Such
suit, whether brought to recover money or property in
the hands of such defendants, unlawfully taken by them
in behalf of the State, or for compensation in damages,
or, in a proper case where the remedy at law, is inadequate, for an injunction to prevent such wrong and injury, ... is not, within the meaning of the Eleventh
Amendment, an action against the State." 140 U. S., at
10.
The Court reasoned that the absence of valid authority left
the official as a private actor, stripped of his representative
capacity. 12 This was not merely an ad hoc accommodation
between federal and state interests, see ante, at 14, 15, but
an application of the Court's established framework of Eleventh Amendment analysis. In short, the decision upholding
injunctive relief in Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908),
which today's majority treats as a limited exception to the
sweeping generality of the Eleventh Amendment, in fact
merely restated a well-settled rule. 13
"That, it is true, is a legislative act of the government of Virginia, but
it is not a law of the State of Virginia. The State has passed no such law,
for it cannot; and what it cannot do, it certainly, in contemplation of law,
has not done. The Constitution of the United States, and its own contract,
both irrepealable by any act on its part, are the law of Virginia; and that
law made it the duty of the defendant to receive the coupons tendered in
payment of taxes, and declared every step to enforce the tax, thereafter
taken, to be without warrant of law, and therefore a wrong. He stands,
then, stripped of his official character; and, confessiong a personal violation
of the plaintiff's rights for which he must personally answer, he is without
defence." Poindexter v. Greenhaw, supra, 114 U. S., at 288.
13
As the Court observes, it is familiar learning that there is a tension in
Ex parte Young because the scope of the Eleventh Amendment was held to
be narrower than the scope of the Fourteenth. But the two amendments
differ both in language and purpose with regard to defining action by the
12
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Another line of cases-highly relevant to today's decision-also shows that barring suits against state officials was
as much the exception as the rule. State officials and other
agents of the State were not protected by the federal doctrine of sovereign immunity from tort actions under state
law. In a diversity case, federal courts had power to decide
such cases and to award injunctive and monetary relief
against individuals who claimed to have acted as state officials, unless they proved that the challenged conduct had in
fact been authorized by law.
This rule was expressly reaffirmed in a case decided by this
Court in the same Term as Ex parte Young and published in
the same volume of the United States Reports. The appellant in Scully v. Bird, 209 U. S. 481 (1908), brought a diversity suit seeking injunctive relief against the dairy and food
commissioner of the State of Michigan, on the ground that
"under cover of his office" he had maliciously engaged in a
course of conduct designed to ruin plaintiff's business in the
State. The circuit court dismissed the complaint on Eleventh Amendment grounds. On appeal, the plaintiff contended that the Eleventh Amendment "does not apply where
a suit is brought against defendants who, claiming to act as
officers of the State, and under color of a statute which is
valid and constitutional, but wrongfully administered by
them, commit, or threaten to commit, acts of wrong or injury
State. It is clear, at all events, that the limitations on the Eleventh
Amendment in Ex parte Young simply followed the principles established
by the Court in cases that did not involve the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court stated:
"The answer to all this is the same as made in every case where an official claims to be acting under the authority of the State. The act to be
enforced is alleged to be unconstitutional, and if it be so, the use of the
name of the State to enforce an unconstitutional act to the injury of complainants is a proceeding without the authority of and one which does not
affect the State in its sovereign or governmental capacity. " 209 U. S., at
159-160.
.
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to the rights and property of the plaintiff, or make such administration of the statute an illegal burden and exaction
upon the plaintiff." I d., at 481. 14 This court agreed. It
noted that the complaint alleged action "in dereliction of duties enjoined by the statutes of the State," and concluded that
it was "manifest from this summary of the allegations of the
bill that this is not a suit against the State." Id., at 490.
It was firmly established by 1908 that tortious acts by state
officials under color of office were not protected by the Eleventh Amendment. Cunningham v. Macon & Bruns'Wick R.
Co., supra, 109 U. S., at 452; Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114
U. S., at 287; Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust, 154 U. S.
362, 390-391 (1894). 15 A few years later, the Court explained
the relationship of these tort cases to the doctrine of sovereign immunity in Hopkins v. Clemson Agricultural College,
221 u. s. 636 (1911):
"immunity from suit is a high attribute of sovereignty-a
prerogative of the State itself-which cannot be availed
of by public agents when sued for their own torts. The
"Your orators further represent that all the acts and doings of the said
Arthur C. Bird, as above specified, in relation to the prohibition of the sale
of your orators' said syrups in the State of Michigan are entirely unauthorized by the statutes of the State of Michigan, and the said Arthur C.
Bird, in committing said acts above complained of, was and is acting as a
private citizen of the State of Michigan, but under cover of his said office of
Dairy and Food Commissioner.... " Record 11.
16
The Court explained that the individual officer sued in tort
"is not sued as, or because he is, the officer of the government, but as an
individual, and the court is not ousted of jurisdiction because he asserts jurisdiction as such officer. To make out his defense he must show that his
authority was sufficient in law to protect him." Cunningham, 109 U. S.,
at 452; quoted in Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U. S., at 287.
Cf. Rolston v. Missouri Fund Comm'rs, 120 U. S. 390, 411 (1887) (federal
court may enjoin fund commissioners of state from selling property subject
to liens in favor of private party bringing suit; "the suit is to get a state
officer to do what a statute requires of him. The litigation is with the officer, not the state.")
14
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Eleventh Amendment was not intended to afford them
freedom from liability in any case where, under color of
their office, they have injured one of the State's citizens.
To grant them such immunity would be to create a privileged class free from liability for wrongs inflicted or injuries threatened .... Besides, neither a State nor an individual can confer upon an agent authority to commit a
tort so as to excuse the perpetrator. In such cases the
law of agency has no application-the wrongdoer is
treated as a principal and individually liable for the damages inflicted and subject to injunction against the commission of acts causing irreparable injury." 16
This principle was repeatedly applied in federal courts in
cases contemporary with Young and Siler. 17 In Johnson v.
The Court also stated:
"Corporate agents or individual officers of the State stand in no better position than officers of the General Government, and as to them it has often
been held that: 'The exemption of the United States from judicial process
does not protect their officers and agents, civil or military, in time of peace,
from being personally liable to an action of tort by a private person, whose
rights of property they have wrongfully invaded or injured, even by authority of the United States.' Belknap v. Schild, 161 U. S. 10, 18.'' 221
U. S., at 645.
The importance of state law authority for the actions of state officials
also appears, by implication, in cases barring suits against individual officials as suits against the State. In such cases the Court frequently noted,
as one relevant factor, that the relief sought would be unauthorized by
state law and would therefore adversely affect the State itself. E. g.,
Louisiana v. Jumel, supra, 107 U. S., at 721; Hagood v. Southern, supra,
114 U. S., at 68. In contrast, in cases of official actions that were never
authorized by state law, a federal court's remedy would not run contrary to
state policy.
7
1 The majority sweepingly asserts that the "'line of cases' central to the
dissent's argument since has been repudiated by this Court.'' Ante, at 16,
n. 15. In support of this conclusion, the majority relies almost entirely on
broad language in Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337
U. S. 682, 691-702 (1949). Not only did that language go well beyond
16
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Lankford, 245 U. S. 541 (1918), the Court reversed the dismissal of an action against the Bank Commissioner of Oklahoma and his surety to recover damages for the loss of the
plaintiff's bank deposit, alleged to have been caused by the
what was necessary to decide the case, but it also apparently did not command the full agreement of five members of the Court. Larson was a suit
against the federal War Assets Administrator, asserting that, because the
plaintiff had a contract right to certain surplus coal, the Administrator
could not lawfully sell the same coal to others. According to the plaintiff,
title to the coal had passed to it at the time the contract was made; the
Administrator was "illegally" holding specific property to which the plaintiff had title and could be sued as an individual. I d., at 684--685, 692. In
short, Larson was nothing more than a simple contract dispute regarding
the sale of surplus government property. The Court held that the suit
was barred by the sovereign immunity of the federal government. Justice
Douglas, whose vote was necessary to give the Court's opinion a majority,
wrote separately to make clear the narrow basis for his concurrence:
"I think that the principles announced by the Court are the ones which
should govern the selling of government property. Less strict applications of those principles would cause intolerable interference with public
administration. To make the right to sue the officer turn on whether by
the law of sales title had passed to the buyer would clog this governmental
function with intolerable burdens. So I have joined the Court's opinion."
Id., at 705.
Justice Rutledge concurred in the result; Justice Jackson dissented; and
Justice Frankfurter wrote a lengthy dissenting opinion, in which Justice
Burton joined.
Today the majority extends Larson to a situation governed by entirely
different concerns. The Pennhurst suit is not a private party's contractbased claim to possession of identifiable tangible property, whose retention
by the official is allegedly "unlawful" only in the sense that the plaintiff asserts title. Rather, the respondents have sought injunctive relief against
enforcement of general policies and practices in a state institution for mentally retarded children, policies that the state supreme court has held to be
inconsistent with statutory requirements. In re Schmidt, 429 A. 2d 631,
634, 637 (Pa. 1981). To the extent that Larson suggests that sovereign
immunity bars all suits based on actions that state officials claim to be
within the scope of official authority, it is not necessary or appropriate to
read that rule into the Eleventh Amendment. Indeed, the plurality opinion last Term in Florida Department of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc ., 50
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Commissioner's failure to safeguard the business and assets
of the bank in negligent or willful disregard of his duties
under state law. The Court explained that the action was
not one against the State.
"To answer it otherwise would be to assert, we think,
that whatever an officer does, even in contravention of
the laws of the State, is state action, identifies him with
it and makes the redress sought against him a claim
against the State and therefore prohibited by the Eleventh Amendment. Surely an officer of a State may be
delinquent without involving the State in delinquency,
indeed, may injure the State by delinquency as well as
some resident of the State,· and be amenable to both."
I d., at 545. 18
It was clear that; notwithstanding the Eleventh Amend-

ment, a plaintiff could bring a suit under state law against a
state official even if he did not allege that the defendant had
acted ultra vires-that is, completely beyond the scope of ofU. S.L.W. 5056 (July 1, 1982), expressly rejected a claim by defendant '
state officials that, within the meaning of Larson, they had authority to
refuse to surrender possession of the property at issue.
18
In Lankford v. Platte Iron Works Co., 235 U. S. 461, 471, 476 (1915),
the Court assumed that the Eleventh Amendment would not bar a suit "to
compel submission by the officers of the State to the laws of the State,
accomplishing at once the policy of the law and its specific purpose," but
rejected the appellees' interpretation of the state statute. See also Old
Colony Trust Co. v. Seattle, 271 U. S. 426, 431 (1926) (reaffirming general
principle of Clemson in suit against city and county officials); cf. Worcester
County Trust Co. v. Riley, 302 U. S. 292, 297 (1937) ("generally suits to
restrain action of state officials can, consistently with the constitutional
prohibition, be prosecuted only when the action sought to be restrained is
without the authority of state law or contravenes the statutes or Constitution of the United States"; Cory v. White, - - U. S. - - , - - (1982)
(stating that Worcester established that the "Eleventh Amendment bars
suits against state officers unless they are alleged to be acting contrary to
federal law or against the authority of state law") .

.
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ficial authority. A suit alleging that the official had acted
within his authority but in a manner contrary to state law
was not barred for a simple reason. The Eleventh Amendment bars suits against States; it does not bar suits against
state officials for action not authorized by the State's own
laws. If one accepts the holding of Ex parte Young, as the
majority apparently does, this principle follows a fortiori.
Ex parte Young concludes that unconstitutional action by
state officials is not action by the State even if it purports to
be authorized by state law, because the federal Constitution
strikes down the state-law shield. 209 U. S., at 159. In the
tort cases, if the plaintiff proves his case, there is by definition no state-law defense. 19 These precedents make clear beyond peradventure that the Court is historically wrong when
it says that, because "the Young doctrine rests on the need to
promote the vindication of federal rights," injunctive relief
may not be awarded against state officials "where unnecessary to promote the supremacy of federal law." Ante, at
14, 15.
.
These two lines of cases-upholding actions against state
officials for conduct violating the Federal Constitution, and
actions against state officials for conduct unauthorized by
state law-demonstrate that the Siler rule was fully harmonious with established Eleventh Amendment principles. The
jurisdiction of the federal court in Siler was established by a
federal claim similar to the one asserted in Ex parte Young;
the pendent state-law claim was not barred by the Eleventh
"If conduct of a state officer taken pursuant to an unconstitutional
state statute is deemed to be unauthorized and may be challenged in federal court, conduct undertaken without any authority whatever is also not
entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity." Florida Department of
State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc ., 50 U.S.L.W. 5056, 5063 Q"uly 1, 1982) (plurality opinion). "Larson established that where the officer's actions are
limited by statute, actions beyond those limitations are to be considered
individual and not sovereign actions." Id., at 5068 (WHITE, J.,
dissenting) .
19
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Amendment under the rationale of the tort cases. 20 The federal court therefore had jurisdiction to resolve the case and
grant injunctive relief on either federal or state grounds,
without encountering any barrier imposed by the Eleventh
Amendment. Moreover, decision on state grounds in Siler
served the powerful interest in avoiding unnecessary decision
of federal constitutional questions.
Thus the Court's rejection of Siler not only runs counter to
the salutary principle of judicial restraint in constitutional adjudication; it is also completely unsupported by this Court's
Eleventh Amendment decisions. The majority acknowledges that the defendant state officials are properly joined as
parties to the lawsuit, and that the District Court has ample
power to grant injunctive relief against them, but somewhere
in the recesses of the Eleventh Amendment it finds a limitation on the source of law on which the District Court may
rely. To reach this conclusion it cavalierly overrules anumber of earlier cases and rejects a rule that has been repeatedly approved by this Court. This sort of freehand rewriting of constitutional text is simply too much for me to accept.
In passing the majority also casts doubt on another appar- ·
ently well-settled line of cases-those which make clear that
As petitioners recognize, the same Eleventh Amendment principles
apply to diversity cases and to pendent state-law clait'ns. Brief for Petitioners 21, Tr. of Oral Arg. iHi. This Court's identical treatment of the
Eleventh Amendment issues in a trio of companion cases, only one of them
within the federal diversity jurisdiction but each of them presenting pendent state-law claims, makes this point clear. Greene v. Louisville & Interurban R . Co., 244 U. S. 499, 506-508 (1917); Louisville & Nashville R.
Co. v. Greene, 244 U. S. 522, 528 (1917); Illinois Central R. Co. v. Greene,
244 U. S. 555, 559 (1917). Thus it is highly improbable that the Court's
assertion of federal jurisdiction over pendent state-law claims in Siler and
Greene inadvertently ignored Eleventh Amendment problems, as the majority suggests. Ante, at 17-19. The Court had repeatedly rejected the
contention that state-law claims against state officials were suits against
the State itself. Today's decision necessarily rejects those prior holdings .
20
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counties and other political subdivisions of States are not protected by the Eleventh Amendment. The defendants in this
case include various county commissioners, county mental retardation administrators, and other officials of five Pennsylvania counties surrounding Pennhurst. The Court casually
suggests, "Given that the actions of the county commissioners and mental health administrators are dependent on funding from the State, it may be that relief granted against these
county officials, when exercising their functions under the
MH/MR Act, effectively runs against the State." Ante, at
21-22, n. 22. This dictum is flatly inconsistent with settled
law. Even if injunctive relief against officials of the State
itself would require additional expenditures from the state
treasury, we have consistently held that it does not violate
the Eleventh Amendment. As we wrote in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 667-668 (1974), "the fiscal consequences
to state treasuries in these cases were the necessary result of
compliance with decrees which by their terms were prospective in nature .... Such an ancillary effect on the state treasury is a permissible and often an inevitable consequence of
the principle announced in Ex parte Young, supra." See
also Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U. S. 267, 288-290 (1977).
This principle applies a fortiori to suits against county officials, who serve a governmental body that is not itself immune from suit. \
IV
The Court's willingness to cast off the constraints of
precedent and principle seems to stem from two sources: an
unstated concern about the ability of federal judges to decide
issues of state law, and a belief that the doctrine of sovereign
immunity establishes such a strong imperative that it must
be extended into areas where it has not previously held sway.
I find both of these grounds of decision to be indefensible.
Ever since the enactment of the Rules of Decision Act in
1789, Congress has assumed that federal courts are fully ca-
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pable of understanding and applying the law of the States in
which they sit. They apply such law routinely in diversity
cases. The federal bench is served by former members of
the state bar who have achieved eminence in the practice of
their profession before assuming federal office. Indeed, in
this case, the en bane court which decided the state law issues included several such members of the bar of Pennsylvania bar. Federal judges should not have their ability to decide an entire case undermined by an arbitrary rule that
deprives them of power to determine state law questions
when relief is sought against state officials. 21
The arbitrary rule announced today also results from an
exalted notion of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. If one
day this Court were to undertake a complete reexamination
of Eleventh Amendment doctrine, I might well subscribe to a
literal interpretation of the amendment such as the view espoused by Chief Justice Marshall, see pp. - - supra, or by
JUSTICE BRENNAN in his dissenting opinion in Employees v.
Missouri Public Health Department, 411 U. S. 279, 298
(1973). But, assuming that stare decisis requires adherence
to Hans v. Louisiana and other 19th century cases that
broadened the reach of sovereign immunity, see supra, 22 the
underlying nature of the doctrine counsels strongly against
detaching any new areas of judicial activity from the purview
21

We have recently rejected any suggestion that state judges are not
fully competent to resolve issues of federal law. See, e. g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 493--494, n. 35 (1976). It is equally true, however, that
federal judges are fully capable of deciding all issues that arise in litigation
over which they have jurisdiction.
22
If the sovereign immunity doctrine were confined to collection cases
like Chisholm and Hans, it could be applied in an evenhanded manner that
produces no unanticipated injustice. A rule that makes clear that "the obligations of a State rest upon its honor and good faith, and cannot be made
the subject of judicial cognizance unless the State consents to be sued"
gives lenders and suppliers fair warning of the added risks involved in doing business with a sovereign State.
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of federal courts. 23
As Justice Frankfurter wrote in his dissent in Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U. S. 47, 59 (1944):
"Whether this immunity is an absolute survival of the
monarchial privilege, or is a manifestation merely of
power, or rests on abstract logical grounds, see Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U. S. 349, it undoubtedly runs
counter to modern democratic notions of the moral
responsibility of the State. Accordingly, courts reflect
a strong legislative momentum in their tendency to extend the legal responsibility of Government and to confirm Maitland's belief, expressed nearly fifty years ago
that, 'it is a wholesome sight to see "the Crown" sued
and answering for its torts.' 3 Maitland, Collected Papers, 263."
I respectfully dissent.
23
In Nevada v. Hall, 440 U. S. 410 (1979), we squarely rejected the notion that the Constitution contains some unwritten guarantee that protects
a State from being sued without its consent in the courts of another sovereign. Referring to the prevailing opinion in Chisholm v. Georgia, supra,
we wrote:
"Mr. Chief Justice Jay described sovereignty as the 'right to govern';
that kind of right would necessarily encompass the right to determine what
suits may be brought in the sovereign's own courts. Thus, Mr. Justice
Holmes explained sovereign immunity as based 'on the logical and practical
ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes
the law on which the right depends.'
"This explanation adequately supports the conclusion that no sovereign
may be sued in its own courts without its consent, but it affords no support
for a claim of immunity in another sovereign's courts.'' 440 U. S., at
415-416.
Similar reasoning applies to the Court's decision today to invent a new
principle of sovereign immunity, barring injunctive relief against state official's on pendent state-law claims, that is totally unsupported by the text of
the Constitution or by any of our prior decisio~s .
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MEMORANDUM OF JUSTICE STEVENS.
At stake in this litigation is a claim asserted on behalf of a
class of mentally retarded persons that their entitlement to
treatment in an appropriate environment is being denied
them by petitioners, the state and county officials responsible
for the administration of Pennhurst State School and Hospital. Respondents' entitlement is assertedly supported by
both federal and state law. After years of controversy it has
become clear that Pennsylvania law guarantees respondents
the remedy they seek. 1 The principal question presented to
us is whether a federal court may order state officials to comply with state law. Petitioners submit that the Eleventh
Amendment deprives a federal court of jurisdiction to award
injunctive relief against state officials on the basis of state
law. This submission is novel, is foreclosed by repeated de..s
cisions of this Court and represents a most unwise departure
from sound principles of judicial administration. It is sup' In the questions raised in their petition for certiorari, petitioners do not
ask this Court to reexamine the Court of Appeals' conclusion that respondents are clearly entitled to relief under state law. Nor would it be appropriate for this Court to reexamine the unanimous conclusion of the en bane
Court of Appeals on a question of state law. See e. g., Bishop v. Wood,
426

u. s. 341, 345-346 (1976).
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ported by nothing more than an inaccurate understanding of
the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
The District Court found that petitioners have been operating the Pennhurst facility in a way that is forbidden by
state law, by federal statute and by the Federal Constitution.
In its most recent opinion, the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit, sitting en bane, unanimously concluded that state
law provided a clear and adequate basis for upholding the
District Court and that it was not necessary to address the
federal questions decided by that court. That action conformed precisely to the directive issued by this Court when
the case was here before. 2 Petitioners urge this Court to
make an unprecedented about-face, and to hold that the
Eleventh Amendment prohibited the Court of Appeals from
ordering petitioners to desist from conduct that violates state
law.
Petitioners' position is utterly without precedential support. Neither the Eleventh Amendment nor the doctrine of
sovereign immunity 3 has ever been interpreted to deprive a
2
In 1981 we held that the Court of Appeals had incorrectly relied on a
federal statute enacted in 1975 as a basis for affirming the District Court's
injunction. Pennsylvania State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 451
U. S. 1. We remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to consider
whether the Pennsylvania Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of
1966 provided "an independent and adequate ground which can support the
court's remedial order." !d., 31. It was after that remand that petitioners raised the Eleventh Amendment question that is now before us.
Therefore, if petitioners' Eleventh Amendment argument is meritorious,
error was committed not only by the Court of Appeals, but by this Court in
1981 when we ordered the Court of Appeals to consider respondents' state
law claims. For in asserting jurisdiction over the claims, the Court of Appeals was doing no more than complying with the specific mandate of this
Court.
3
At least with respect to cases brought against state officials by citizens
of the same state, which do not fall within the literal terms of the Eleventh
Amendment, the Amendment is merely a codification of the ancient doctrine of sovereign immunity. Monaco v. Mississippi , 292 U. S. 313,
322--323 (1934). See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1, 15-18 (1890); Ex
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court of jurisdiction to grant relief against government officials who are engaged in conduct that is forbidden by their
sovereign. On the contrary, this Court has repeatedly and
consistently exercised the power to enjoin state officials from
violating state law. Before .reviewing those cases, however,
it will be helpful to examine the origins of the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
I

The doctrine of sovereign immunity developed in England,
where it was thought that the king could not be sued. However, common law courts, in applying the doctrine, traditionally distinguished between the king and his agents, on the
theory that the king would never authorize unlawful conduct,
and that therefore the unlawful acts of the king's officers
ought not be treated as acts of the sovereign. See 1 W.
Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England *244 (J.
Andrews ed. 1909). As early as the fifteenth century,
Holdsworth writes, servants of the king were held liable for
their unlawful acts. See Ill W. Holdsworth, A History of
English Law 388 (1903). During the seventeenth century,
as the struggle to establish the supremacy of the constitution
over the monarch was waged, this rule of law was used extensively to curb the king's authority. The king's officers
"could do wrong, and if they committed wrongs, · ·hether
in the course of their employment or not, they could be
made legally liable. The command or instruction of the
king could not protect them. If the king really had
given such commands or instructions, he must have been
deceived." VI id., at 101.
In one famous case, it was held that although process would
not issue against the sovereign himself, it could issue against
his officers. "For the warrant of no man, not even of the
parte New York, 256 U. S. 490, 497 (1921); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U. S.
445, 456 (1976); Quern v. Jordan, 440 U. S. 332, 341 (1979). Petitioners
concede as much. See Brief for Petitioners at 12 n. 10.

.-
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King himself, can excuse the doing of an illegal act." Sands
v. Child, 83 Eng. Rep. 725, 726 (K.B. 1693). By the eighteenth century, this rule of law was unquestioned. See X
W. Holdsworth, supra, at 650~52. And in the 19th Century this view was taken by the court to be so well-settled as
to not require the citation of authority, see Feather v. The
Queen, 122 Eng. Rep. 1191, 1205-1206 (K.B. 1865). 4
It was only natural, then, that this Court, in applying the
principles of sovereign immunity, recognized the distinction
between a suit against a state and one against its officer. 5
For example, while the Court did inquire as to whether a suit
was "in essence" against the sovereign, it soon became settled law that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar suits
against state officials in their official capacities challenging
unconstitutional conduct. See Poindexter v. Greenhaw, 114
U. S. 270, 288 (1885); Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, 140 U. S.
1, 10-12 (1891); Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466, 518-519
(1898). 6 This rule was reconciled with sovereign immunity
'The rationale for this principle was compelling. Courts did not wish to
confront the king's immunity from suit directly, nevertheless they found
the threat to liberty posed by permitting the sovereign's abuses to go unremedied to be intolerable. Since in reality the king could act only
through his officers, the rule which permitted suits against those officers
formally preserved the sovereign's immunity while operating as one of the
means by which courts establisJ..ed the supremacy of the law over the monarch. See X W. Holdsworth, ,upra, at 262-268.
5
Commentators have noted the influence of these English doctrines on
the American conception of sovereign immunity. See Jaffe, Suits Against
Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 19--29
(1963); Note, Express Waiver of Eleventh Amendment Immunity, 17 Ga.
L. Rev. 513, 517-518 (1983); Note, Developments in the Law-Remedies
Against the United States and its Officials, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 827, 831-833
(1957). In fact, in Belknap v. Schild, 161 U. S. 10 (1896), the Court, in
holding that officers of the United States were liable for injuries caused by
their unlawful conduct even if they did so acting pursuant to official duties,
cited the passage from Feather v. The Queen. See 161 U. S., at 18.
6
See also Board of Liquidation v. McComb, 92 U. S. 531, 541 (1875);
Allen v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., 114 U. S. 311, 315--316 (1885); Haygood v.
Southern, 117 U.S. 52, 70 (1886); In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 506--507
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principles by use of the traditional rule that an action against
an agent of the sovereign who had acted unlawfully was not
considered to be against the sovereign.
"[W]here a suit is brought against defendants who,
claiming to act as officers of the State, and under the
color of an unconstitutional statute, commit acts of
wrong and injury to the rights and property of the plaintiff acquired under a contract with the State. Such suit,
whether brought to recover money or property in the
hands of such defendants, unlawfully taken by them in
behalf of the State, or for compensation in damages, or,
in a proper case where the remedy at law, is inadequate,
for an injunction to prevent such wrong and injury, ...
is not, within the meaning of the Eleventh Amendment,
an action against the State."
Pennoyer v.
McConnaughy, 140 U. S., at 10.
The Court was able to distinguish between the sovereign
and its officials by reasoning that when an official acts pursuant to an unconstitutional statute, the absence of valid authority leaves the official ultra vires his authority, and thus a
private actor stripped of his status as a representative of the
sovereign. 7 In Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908), the
Court was merely restating a settled principle when it wrote:
(1887); In re Tyler, 149 U. S. 164, 190-191 (1893); Reagan v. Farmers'
Loan & Trust Co., 154 U. S. 362, 388--391 (1894); Scott v. Donald, 165
U. S. 58, 67-70 (1897); Prout v. Starr, 188 U. S. 537 (1903); Gunter v. Atlantic C.L. R . Co., 200 U. S. 273, 283-284 (1906); McNeill v. Southern R.
Co., 202 U. S. 543, 559 (1906). Cf. United States v. Lee, 106 U. S. 196,
219-222 (1883) (sovereign immunity of the United States not a defense
against suit charging officers of the United States with unconstitutional
conduct).
' "That, it is true, is a legislative act of the government of Virginia, but it
is not a law of the State of Virginia. The State has passed no such law, for
it cannot; and what it cannot do, it certainly, in contemplation of law, has
not done. The Constitution of the United States, and its own contract,
both irrepealable by any act on its part, are the law of Virginia; and that
law made it the duty of the defendant to receive the coupons tendered in
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"The Act to be enforced is alleged to be unconstitutional, and if it be so, the use of the name of the State to
enforce an unconstitutional act to the injury of complainants is a proceeding without the authority of and one
which does not affect the State in its sovereign or governmental capacity. It is simply an illegal act upon the
part of a state official in attempting by the use of the
name of the State to enforce a legislative enactment
which is void because unconstititional. If the act which
the state Attorney General seeks to enforce be a violation of the Federal Constitution, the officer in proceeding under such enactment comes into conflict with the
superior authority of that Constitution, and he is in that
case stripped of his official or representative character
and is subjected in his person to the consequences of his
individual conduct." ld., at 159-160. 8
payment of taxes, and declared every step to enforce the tax, thereafter
taken, to be without warrant of law, and the tax, thereafter taken, to be
without warrant of law, and therefore a wrong. He stands, then, stripped
of his official character; and, confessing a personal violation of the plaintiff's
rights for which he must personally answer, he is without defence."
Poindexter v. Greenhaw, 114 U. S., at 288.
8
See generally Orth, The Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment,
1798-1908: A Case Study of Judicial Power, 1983 U. Ill. L. Rev. 423. The
Court has adhered to this formulation to the present day. See Goltra v.
Weeks, 271 U. S. 536, 544-545 (1926); Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U. S.
378, 393 (1932); Georgia R. Co. v. Redwine, 342 U. S. 299 (1952); Scheuer
v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232, 237 (1974); Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435
U. S. 151, 156 n. 6 (1978); Florida Dept. of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc.,
- - U. S. - - , - - (1982) (opinion of STEVENS, J.); id., at-- (WHITE,
J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). It is familiar learning that there is a tension in Ex parte Young because the scope of
state action for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment was held to be narrower than the scope of state action for purposes of the Fourteenth. See,
e. g., Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 227 U. S. 278 (1913).
But the two amendments differ in both language and purpose with regard
to defining action by the State. The limitations on the Eleventh Amendment in Ex parte Young were compelled by the traditional sovereign immunity principles applied in cases such as Poindexter v. Greenhaw and

.-
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Petitioners argue that the holding of Ex parte Young is
limited to the situation in which relief is provided on the basis
of federal law, and that it rests entirely on the need to protect the supremacy of federal law. That position overlooks
the foundation of the rule of Young as well Pennoyer v.
McConnaughy and Young's other predecessors. Young distinguished between the state and its attorney general because the latter, in violating the Constitution, had engaged in
conduct the sovereign could not authorize. The pivotal consideration was not that the conduct violated federal law,
since nothing in the jurisprudence of the Eleventh Amendment permits a suit against a sovereign merely because federal law is at issue. 9 Rather, the pivotal consideration was
Pennoyer v. McConnaughy which did not concern the Fourteenth
Amendment.
9
As the Solicitor General correctly notes in his amicus curiae brief,
"this Court has no power to create any exception to a constitutional bar to
federal court jurisdiction. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651,
66~69 (1974); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1, 11 (1890).
Ex Parte
Young rests instead on recognition that the Eleventh Amendment simply
does not apply to suits seeking to restrain illegal acts by state officialswhether those acts are illegal because they violate the Constitution, as in
Young, or federal or state law." Brief for the United States at 23.
Indeed, acceptance of petitioners' contention that Young exists simply to
ensure the supremacy of federal law would mean that a number of our prior
cases, which held that the Eleventh Amendment may bar an action for injunctive relief even where the State has violated the federal Constitution,
see, e. g., Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U. S. 781 (1978) (per curiam), were incorrectly decided. Petitioners have no satisfactory explanation for Pugh,
which held that even as to a federal constitutional claim, a suit may not be
brought directly against a state even where it may be brought against its
officials. On petitioners' view, there is no basis for distinguishing between
the state and its officials-as to both there is a need to vindicate the supremacy of federal law through the issuance of injunctive relief, and unless
the officials are acting completely outside of their authority, they must be
treated as is the state. However, Pugh can be explained simply by reference to Young's use of the ultra vires doctrine with respect to unconstitutional conduct by state officers-such conduct is not conduct by the sovereign because it could not be authorized by the sovereign, hence the officers
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that it was not conduct of the sovereign that was at issue. 10
This rule, that unlawful acts of an officer should not be attributed to the sovereign, has deep roots in the history of sovereign immunity, and makes Young reconcilable with the principles of sovereign immunity found in the Eleventh
Amendment, rather than merely an ad hoc accomodation between federal and state interests. This rule plainly applies
to conduct of state officers in violation of state law. Where
state officials violate state law, they have engaged in conduct
the sovereign has not and could not authorize, and hence they
fall squarely within the ultra vires doctrine of Young and its
predecessors. 11
The Young line of cases quite plainly indicates that conduct
is not attributable to the sovereign when it has not or could
are not entitled to the sovereign's immunity. A suit directly against the
state cannot succeed because the ultra vires doctrine is unavailable without
a state officer to which it can be applied. Pugh makes it clear that Young
rests not on a need to vindicate federal law, but on the traditional distinction between the sovereign and its agents.
In fact, petitioners' position that the existence of a need to vindicate federallaw in itself removes the bar of the Eleventh Amendment, without reference to the question whether the suit is in essence against the sovereign,
is substantially the same as the position advocated by JUSTICE BRENNAN
in Employees v. Missouri Public Health Dept., 411 U. S. 279, 315--322
(1973) (dissenting opinion). Whatever the merits of that position as an
original matter, it is not now the law.
10
The distinction between the sovereign and its agents not only explains
why the rationale of Ex Parte Young and its predecessors is consistent
with previously established sovereign immunity doctrine, but also explains
the critical difference between actions for injunctive relief and actions for
damages recognized in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651 (1973). There,
since the damages remedy would have required payment by the state, it
could not be said that the action ran only against the agents of the state.
Therefore, while the agents' unlawful conduct was considered ultra vires
and hence could be enjoined, a remedy which did run against the sovereign
and not merely its agent could not fit within the ultra vires doctrine and
hence was impermissible.
11
See Note, The Sovereign Immunity of the States: The Doctrine and
Some of its Recent Developments, 40 Minn. L. Rev. 234, 244-245 (1956).
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not have been authorized by it. That being the case, the
doctrine of Young applies with equal force to any conduct not
authorized by the sovereign, be it conduct prohibited by state
or federal law. 12 The Court has considered it of little significance whether the state officer has violated federal or state
law. For example, the Court held that a suit challenging an
unconstitutional attempt by the Virginia legislature to disavow a state contract was not barred by the Eleventh
Amendment, reasoning that,
"inasmuch as, by the Constitution of the United States,
which is also the supreme law of Virginia, that contract,
when made, became thereby unchangeable, irrepealable
by the State, the subsequent act of January 26, 1882, and
all other like acts, which deny the obligation of that contract and forbid its performance, are not the acts of the
State of Virginia. The true and real Commonwealth
which contracted the obligation is incapable in law of do12
In fact, the Court rejected the argument that the Eleventh Amendment permits injunctive relief only on the basis of federal law on two occasions only two Terms ago. In Florida Dept. of State v. Treasure Salvors,
Inc.,-- U. S. - - (1982), four justices concluded that a suit for possession of property in hands of state officials was not barred by the Eleventh
Amendment inasmuch as the state did not have even a colorable claim to
the property under state law. See id., at-- (opinion of STEVENS, J.).
Four additional justices accepted the proposition that if the state officers'
conduct had been unauthorized by state law the Ele¥enth Amendment
would not bar the action, and limited their disagreement to the question
whether the conduct had in fact been authorized by state law. See id., at
--(WHITE, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)
("[W]here the officer's actions are limited by statute, actions beyond those
limitations are to be considered individual and not sovereign actions.").
During the same Term, in Cory v. White, 457 U. S. 85 (1982), the Court
was careful to distinguish its prior cases holding actions for injunctive relief
barred by the Eleventh Amendment where the officers have acted within
their authority from cases where the plaintiff "alleg[ed] a violation of either
federal or state law," id., at 91 and concluded that the "Eleventh Amendment bars suits against state officers unless they are alleged to be acting
contrary to federal law or against the authority of state law." (emphasis
supplied) Ibid.
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ing anything in derogation of it. Whatever having that
effect, if operative, has been attempted or done, is the
work of its government acting without authority, in violation of its fundamental law, and must be looked upon,
in all courts of justice, as if it were not and never had
been. . . . The State of Virginia has done none of these
things with which this defence charges her. The defendant in error is not her officer, her agent, or her representative, in the matter complained of, for he has
acted not only without her authority, but contrary to her
express commands." Poindexter v. Greenhaw, 114
U. S. 270, 293 (1885) (emphasis supplied).
It is clear that the Court in Poindexter attached no significance to the fact that Virginia had been accused of violating
federal and not its own law. To the contrary, the Court
treated the Federal Constitution as part of Virginia's law,
and concluded that the challenged action was not that of Virginia precisely because it violated Virginia's law. Petitioners' position turns the Young doctrine on its head-sovereign
immunity did not bar actions challenging unconstitutional
conduct by state officers since the Federal Constitution was
also to be considered part of the state's law-and since the
state could not and would not authorize a violation of its own
law, the officers' conduct was considered individual and not
sovereign. No doubt the Courts that produced Poindexter
and Young would be shocked to discover that conduct authorized by state law but prohibited by federal law is not considered conduct attributable to the State for sovereign immunity purposes, but conduct prohibited by state law is
considered conduct attributable to the very state which prohibited that conduct. Indeed, in Tindal v. Wesley, 167 U. S.
204 (1896), the Court specifically found that it was impossible
to distinguish between a suit challenging unconstitutional
conduct of state officers and a suit challenging any other type
of unlawful behavior-neither is a suit against the State for
purposes of the Eleventh Amendment.

.-
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It follows that the basis for the Young rule is present when
the officer sued has violated the law of the sovereign; in all
such cases the conduct is of a type that would not be permitted by the sovereign and hence is not attributable to the sovereign under traditional sovereign immunity principles. 13
Conduct by an official that is contrary to the sovereign's law
is not conduct of the sovereign. 14 In such a case, the sover8

The earliest cases in which this Court rejected sovereign immunity defenses raised by officers of the sovereign accused of unlawful conduct did
not involve charges of unconstitutional conduct, but rather simple trespass
actions. In rejecting the defense, the Court simply noted that although
the officers were acting pursuant to their duties, they were engaged in unlawful conduct which therefore could not be the conduct of the sovereign.
See Little v. Barreme, 2 Cranch 169 (1804); Wise v. Withers, 3 Cranch 331
(1806); Mitchell v. Harmony, 13 How. 115, 137 (1851); Bates v. Clark, 95
U. S. 204, 209 (1877). In the landmark case of Osborn v. Bank of the
United States, 9 Wheat. 738 (1824), the Court took it as beyond argument
that if a state officer unlawfully seized property in an attempt to collect
taxes he believed to be owed the state, the Eleventh Amendment would
not bar a simple trespass action against the officer. This conclusion followed inevitably from the traditional refusal to apply sovereign immunity
to illegal acts of governmental officials.
"While in England personification of sovereignty in the person of the King
may have been possible, attempts to adopt this reasoning in the United
States resulted in the postulation of the abstract State as sovereign.
Since the ideal State could only act by law, whatever the State did must be
lawful. On this ground a distinction was drawn between the State and its
officers, and since the State could not commit an illegal act, any such act
was imputed to government officers. It logically followed that a suit
against state officers was not necessarily a suit against the State." Note,
The Sovereign Immunity of the States: The Doctrine and Some of its Recent Developments, 40 Minn. L. Rev. 234, 244-245 (1956) (footnotes
omitted).
"Conversely, in cases barring suits against individual officers as suits
against the state, the Court has also acknowledged the importance of state
law authority for the challenged conduct of the officer. In such cases the
Court has frequently noted that the relief sought would be unauthorized by
state law and would therefore adversely affect the state itself. See, e. g.,
Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U. S. 711, 721 (1882); Hagood v. Southern, 117
U. S. 52, 68 (1886). In contrast, in cases of official actions contrary to
'

.-
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eign's interest lies with those who seek to enforce its laws,
rather than those who have violated them.
"[P]ublic officials may become tort-feasors by exceeding
the limits of their authority. And where they unlawfully seize or hold a citizen's realty or chattel, recoverable by appropriate action at law or in equity [the] dominant interest of the sovereign is then on the side of the
victim who may bring his possessory action to reclaim
that which is wrongfully withheld." Land v. Dollar,
330 u.s. 731, 738 (1947). 15
That the doctrine of sovereign immunity does not protect
conduct which has been prohibited by the sovereign is clearly
demonstrated by the case on which petitioners chiefly rely,
Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U. S.
682 (1949). The Larson opinion teaches that the actions of
state officials are not attributable to the state-are ultra vires-in two different types of situations: (1) when the official
is engaged in conduct that the sovereign has not authorized,
and (2) when he has engaged in conduct that the sovereign
has forbidden. A sovereign, like any other principal, cannot
authorize its agent to violate the law. When an agent does
so, his actions are considered ultra vires and he is liable for
his own conduct under the law of agency. Both types of
ultra vires conduct are clearly identified in Larson.
"There may be, of course, suits for specific relief
against officers of the sovereign which are not suits
against the sovereign. If the officers purports to act as
an individual and not as an official, a suit directed against
that action is not a suit against the sovereign. If the
War Assets Administrator had completed a sale of his
state law, a federal court's remedy would not adversely affect any state
policy.
5
' While Land v. Dollar is a case dealing with the sovereign immunity of
the federal government, it is pertinent to the Eleventh Amendment, which
after all for present purposes is no more than an embodiment of sovereiegn
immunity principles.

.
J
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own personal home, he presumably could be enjoined
from later conveying it to a third person. On a similar
theory, where the officer's powers are limited by statute,
his actions beyond those limitations are considered individual and not sovereign actions. The officer is not doing the business which the sovereign has empowered him
to do or he is doing it in a way that the sovereign has
forbidden. His actions are ultra vires his authority and
therefore may be made the object of specific relief. It is
important to note that in such cases the relief can be
granted, without impleading the sovereign, only because
of the officer's lack of delegated power. A claim of error
in the exercise of that power is therefore not sufficient.
And since the jurisdiction of the court to hear the case
may depend, as we have recently recognized, upon the
decision which it ultimately reaches on the merits, it is
necessary that the plaintiff set out in his complaint the
statutory limitation on which he relies." 337 U. S., at
68~690 (emphasis supplied). 16
Following the two-track analysis of Larson, the cases considering the question whether the state official is entitled to
the sovereign's immunity can be grouped into two categories.
In cases like Larson, Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U. S. 643
(1962), and Florida Dept. of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc.,
- - U. S. - - (1982), which usually involve the state functioning in its proprietary capacity, the ultra vires issue can
be resolved solely be reference to the law of agency. Since
there is no specific limitation on the powers of the officers
other than the general limitations on their authority, the only
question that need be asked is whether they have acted completely beyond their authority. But when the state has
placed specific limitations on the manner in which state offi6

Larson thus clearly indicates that the immunity determination depends
of the merits of the plaintiff's claim. The same analysis is employed by
Young-the plaintiff can overcome the official's immunity only by succeeding on the merits of its claim of unconstitutional conduct.
'

-. ,.
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cials may perform their duties, as it often does in regulatory
or other administrative contexts, the ultra vires inquiry also
involves the question whether the officials acted in a way that
state law forbids. If so, then Larson indicates that their
conduct is not protected by sovereign immunity.
In this case, respondents pleaded a specific statutory limitation on the way in which petitioners were entitled to run
Pennhurst. The District Court and the Court of Appeals
have both found that petitioners operated Pennhurst in a way
that the sovereign has forbidden. Specifically, both courts
concluded that petitioners placed residents in Pennhurst
without any consideration at all of the limitations on institutional confinement that are found in state law, and that they
failed to create community living programs that are mandated by state law. Under the second track of the Larson
analysis, petitioners were acting ultra vires because they
were acting in a way that the sovereign, by statute, had
forbidden. 17
17
In Larson, the Administrator of the War Assets Administration was in
possession of coal that the plaintiff claimed the Administrator was contractually obligated to deliver to it. Instead of seeking damages for breach of
contract in the Court of Claims, the plaintiff sought an injunction in the
district court. The Court held that the Administrator had acted properly
in refusing to deliver the coal and instead insisting that the plaintiff seek its
remedy in the Court of Claims.
"There was, it is true, an allegation that the Administrator was acting
"illegally," and that the refusal to deliver was "unauthorized." But these
allegations were not based and did not purport to be based upon any lack of
delegated power. Nor could they be, since the Administrator was empowered by the sovereign to administer a general sales program encompassing
the negotiation of contracts, the shipment of goods and the receipt of payment. A normal concomitant of such powers, as a matter of general
agency law, is the power to refuse delivery when, in the agent's view, delivery is not called for under a contract and the power to sell goods which
the agent believes are still his principal's to sell." 337 U. S., at 691-62
(footnotes omitted).
Thus, the Administrator had acted properly. He was doing what any
agent would do-holding on to property he believed was his principal's and
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Petitioners readily concede, both in their brief and at oral
argument, that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar a suit
against state officers who have acted ultra vires. Yet they
totally ignore the fact that the cases, and most especially
Larson, set out a two-step analysis for ultra vires conduct conduct that is completely beyond the scope of the officer's
authority, or conduct that the sovereign has forbidden. Petitioners' omission of the second step is understandable, since
their conduct in this case clearly falls into the category of conduct the sovereign has specifically forbidden by statute. Accordingly, acceptance of petitioners' position would require a
radical repudiation of Larson and the analysis of the ultra vires doctrine which it contains.
II

This Court has previously had occasion not only to consider
insisting that the claimant sue the principal if it wanted the property. He
was merely exercising the "normal" duties of a sales agent. Congress envisioned that he do exactly that; the remedy it had provided required the
claimant to sue for damages in the Court of Claims rather than obtaining
the property directly from the Administrator, and no one had questioned
the constitutional sufficiency of that alternate remedy. See McCord,
Fault Without Liability: Immunity of Federal Employees, 1966 U. Ill. L.F.
849, 862-867. Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U. S. 643 (1962) can be explained
similarly. These cases hold that Congress had empowered the governmental official to make incorrect as well as correct decisions, at least pending the aggrieved party's remedy for incorrect ones in the Claims Court
under the Tucker Act, 28 U. S. C. §§ 1491-1507 (1976 ed. and Supp. V
1981 and West Supp. 1983). See Byse, Proposed Reforms in Federal
"Nonstatutory" Judicial Review: Sovereign Immunity, Indispensible Parties, Mandamus, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 1479, 1490-1491 (1962); Jaffe , The Right
to Judicial Review I, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 401, 436-437 (1958). Where the
official acts as the sovereign intends, he is entitled to the sovereign's immunity under the principles discussed above. Where that is not the case,
Larson permits injunctive relief. In this case, the holding of the Court of
Appeals on the merits of respondents' state law claims indicates that petitioners were not exercising the "normal" duties that the sovereign had envisioned for them, unlike the Administrator in Larson. Instead, petitioners were running Pennhurst "in a way which the sovereign has forbidden."
337 U. S., at 689.
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the general mode of analysis for petitioners' sovereign immunity claim, but it also has considered and rejected the precise
argument that the Eleventh Amendment bars suits against
state officers alleging violations of state law.
For example, state officials and other agents of the State
have not been protected by the Eleventh Amendment from
tort actions under state law even when they have not acted
completely outside of their authority. By 1908 it was firmly
established that tortious acts by state officials under color of
office were not protected by the Eleventh Amendment. See
Cunningham v. Macon & Brunswick R. Co., 109 U. S. 446,
452 (1883); Poindexter v. Greenhaw, 114 U. S., at 287; Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust, 154 U. S. 362, 390-391
(1894). 18 Cf. Stanley v. Schwalby, 147 U. S. 508, 518--19
(1893) (same rule adopted for sovereign immunity of the
United States); Belknap v. Schild, 161 U. S. 10, 18 (1896)
(same). 19 In Hopkins v. Clemson Agricultural College, 221
18

The Court explained that the state officer sued in tort
"is not sued as, or because he is, the officer of the government, but as an
individual, and the court is not ousted of jurisdiction because he asserts jurisdiction as such officer. To make out his defense he must show that his
authority was sufficient in law to protect him." Cunningham, 109 U. S.,
at 452, quoted in Poindexter, 114 U. S., at 287.
19
See also Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U. S. 605, 619-620 (1912)
(officers of the United States may be enjoined where they wrongfully interfere with property rights); Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S. 478, 489-490
(1978) (officers of the United States were liable for their torts unless the
torts are authorized by federal law). Justice Holmes had occasion to state
that sovereign immunity does not generally extend to the acts of an officer
of the sovereign. "In general the United States cannot be sued for a tort,
but its immunity does not extent to those that acted in its name." Sloan
Shipyards v. U.S. Fleet Corp., 258 U. S. 549, 568 (1922). He characterized petitioner's argument in that case-that sovereign immunity should
extend to the unlawful acts of agents of the United States acting within the
scope of their authority-as "a very dangerous departure from one of the
first principles of our system of law. The sovereign properly so called is
superior to suit for reasons that often have been explained. But the general rule is that any person within the jurisdiction is always amenable to
the law.... An instrumentality of government he might be and for the

.-
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U. S. 636 (1911), the Court explained the relationship of
these cases to the doctrine of sovereign immunity, making it
clear that the rationale employed in Ex parte Young applied
to actions under state tort law.
"[I]mmunity from suit is a high attribute of sovereignty-a prerogative of the State itself-which cannot
be availed of by public agents when sued for their own
torts. The Eleventh Amendment was not intended to
afford them freedom from liability in any case where,
under color of their office, they have injured one of the
State's citizens. To grant them such immunity would be
to create a privileged class free from liability for wrongs
inflicted or injuries threatened . . .. Besides, neither a
State nor an individual can confer upon an agent authority to commit a tort so as to excuse the perpetitionerator. In such cases the law of agency has no application-the wrongdoer is treated as a principal and
individually liable for the damages inflicted and subject
to injunction against the commission of acts causing irreparable injury." I d., at 642-643. 20
The principles contained in these cases were not confined
to actions under state tort law. They were also applied to
greatest ends, but the agent, because he is agent, does not cease to be answerable for his acts." !d., at 566-567. See also Brady v. Roosevelt S.S.
Co., 317 U. S. 575 (1943) (following Sloan).
20
The Court also stated,
"Corporate agents or individual officers of the State stand in no better
position than officers of the General Government, and as to them it has
often been held that: 'The exemption of the United States from judicial
process does not protect their officers and agents, civil or military, in time
of peace, from being personally liable to an action of tort by a private person, whose rights of property they have wrongfully invaded, or injured,
even by authority of the United States.' Belknap v. Shild, 161 U. S. 10,
18.'' 221 U. S., at 645 (emphasis supplied).
See also Old Colony Trust Co. v. Seattle, 271 U. S. 426, 431 (1926) (reaffirming the rationale of Clemson in an action against city and county
officials).

·.
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claims that state officers had violated state statutes. In
Johnson v. Lankford, 245 U. S. 541 (1918), the Court reversed the dismissal of an action against the bank commissioner of Oklahoma and his surety to recover damages for the
loss of plaintiff's bank deposit, allegedly caused by the commissioner's failure to safeguard the business and assets of the
bank in negligent or willful disregard of his duties under applicable state statutes. The Court explained that the action
was not one against the State.
"To answer it otherwise would be to assert, we think,
that whatever an officer does, even in contravention of
the laws of the State, is state action, identifies him with
it and makes the redress sought against him a claim
against the State and therefore prohibited by the Eleventh Amendment. Surely an officer of a State may be
delinquent without involving the State in delinquency,
indeed, may injure the State by delinquency as well as
some resident of the State, and be amenable to both."
Id., at 545.
Similarly, in Rolston v. Missouri Fund Commissioners,
120 U. S. 391 (1887), the Court rejected the argument that a
suit to enjoin a state officer to comply with state law violated
the Eleventh Amendment. The Court wrote, "Here the suit
is to get a state officer to do what a statute 'requires of him.
The litigation is with the officer, not the state." Id., at 411. 21
Significantly, this rule was expressly reaffirmed in a case
decided by this Court in the same Term as Ex parte Young
21
In Atchison &c. Ry. Co. v. O'Connor, 223 U. S. 280 (1912), the Court
held that a suit against state officers seeking recovery of taxes paid under
duress was not against the State since a state statute required the recovery of wrongfully paid taxes. See id., at 287. In Lankford v. Platte Iron
Works Co., 235 U.S. 461, 471, 476 (1915), the Court assumed that the
Eleventh Amendment would not bar a suit "to compel submission by the
officers of the State to the laws of the State, accomplishing at once the policy of the law and its specific purpose," but rejected the appellees' construction of the state statute.
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and published in the same volume of the United States Reports. The appellant in Scully v. Bird, 209 U. S. 481 (1908),
brought a diversity suit seeking injunctive relief against the
dairy and food commissioner of the State of Michigan, on the
ground that "under cover of his office" he had maliciously engaged in a course of conduct designed to ruin plaintiff's business in the State. The circuit court dismissed the complaint
on Eleventh Amendment grounds. On appeal, the plaintiff
contended that the Eleventh Amendment "does not apply
where a suit is brought against defendants who, claiming to
act as officers of the State, and under color of a statute which
is valid and constitutional, but wrongfully administered by
them, commit, or threaten to commit, acts of wrong or injury
to the rights and property of the plaintiff, or make such administration of the statute an illegal burden and exaction
upon the plaintiff." /d., 418. This Court agreed. It noted
that the complaint alleged action "in dereliction of duties enjoined by the statutes of the State," and concluded that it was
"manifest from this summary of the allegations of the bill that
this is not a suit against the State." I d., at 490. 22
Finally, in Greene v. Louisville & Interurban R. Co., 244
U. S. 499 (1917), and its companion cases, Louisville & Nashville R. ·Co. v. Greene, 244 U.S. 522 (1917); Illinois Central
R. Co. v. Greene, 244 U. S. 555 (1917), the plaintiffs challenged the conduct of state officials under both federal and
state law. The Court, citing, inter alia, Young and
Clemson, held that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar injunctive relief on the basis of state law, noting that the plain22

Cases construing the sovereign immunity of the federal government
also hold, consistently with the Larson analysis, that conduct by federal
officers forbidden by statute is not shielded by sovereign immunity even
though the officer is not acting completely beyond his authority. See Noble v. Union River Logging R. Co., 147 U. S. 165 (1893); Waite v. Macy,
246 U. S. 606 (1918); Payne v. Central Pac. Ry. Co., 255 U. S. 228 (1921);
Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co. v. Fall, 259 U. S. 197 (1922); Work v. Louisiana,
269 U. S. 250 (1925); Ickes v. Fox, 300 U. S. 82 (1937); Land v. Dollar, 330
u. s. 731 (1947).
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tiffs' f~deral claim was sufficiently substantial to justify the
exercise of pendent jurisdiction over plaintiffs' state law
claims, 23 and that since violations of federal and state law had
been alleged, it was appropriate for the federal court to issue
injunctive relief on the basis of state law without reaching the
federal claims, despite the strictures of the Eleventh Amendment. In short, the Greene Court approved of precisely the
methodology employed by the Court of Appeals in this case.
The results in these cases-most of which were contemporaries of Young 24-were inevitable, given the foundation of
The Court cited Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 213 U. S. 175
(1917), in support of this proposition. See 244 U. S., at 508. In that case
the Court held that where a case is brought alleging violations of federal
law and pendent state law claims, a federal court should first consider the
state law claims and, if they prove meritorious, should issue relief solely
under state law in order to avoid deciding a federal constitutional question.
The Court of Appeals here did no more than apply the time-honored Siler
principle. Petitioners' position requires us to repudiate that principle as
inconsistent with the Eleventh Amendment.
24
In a rather desperate attempt to explain these cases, amici suggest
that the Court simply did not realize that it was deciding questions of state
law, since in the era before Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 (1938)
and United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U. S. 715 (1966), it was not clear
that diversity cases or pendent claims were governed by state rather than
federal law. That suggestion is refuted by the cases discussed above in
which it was held that relief could issue against state officers who had violated state statutes. Even under the construction of the Rules of Decision
Act, currently 28 U. S. C. § 1652, adopted in Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1
(1842), and repudiated in Erie , federal courts were bound to apply state
statutes. See, e. g., Swift, 16 Pet., at 18-19; Black & White Taxicab &
Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U. S. 518,
529-531 (1928). Thus, in these cases the Court was indisputably issuing
relief under state law. The Court was quite explicit about the state law
basis for the relief it granted in Greene, to use just one example, explicitly
declining to reach the federal questions in the case. It stated that federal
jurisdiction "extends, to the determination of all questions involved in the
case, including questions of state law, irrespective of the disposition that
may be made of the federal question, or whether it be found necessary to
decide it at all." 244 U. S., at 508. It then granted plaintiffs relief under
state law, and concluded by declining to decide any question of federal law.
23
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Young. A suit alleging that the official had acted within his
authority but in a manner contrary to state statutes was not
barred because the Eleventh Amendment prohibits suits
against States; it does not bar suits against state officials for
actions not permitted by the state under its own law. The
sovereign could not and would not authorize its officers to violate its own law; hence an action against a state officer seeking redress for conduct not permitted by state law is a suit
against the officer, not the sovereign. If one accepts Ex
parte Young, this principle follows a fortiori. 25 Young concludes that unconstitutional action by state officials is not action by the State even if it purports to be authorized by state
law, because the federal Constitution strikes down the state
law shield. In the tort cases, if the plaintiff proves his case,
there is by definition no state-law defense to shield the defendant. The cases involving state statutory challenges to
official action rest upon the same principle. The sovereign
has forbidden the conduct at issue, so it hardly can provide a
shield against liability. These precedents make clear that
there is no foundation for the contention that petitioners ad"It is obvious, however, in view of the result reached upon the questions of
state law, just discussed, that the disposition of the cases would not be affected by whatever result we might reach upon the federal question ... .
Therefore, we find it unnecessary to express any opinion upon the question
raised under the Fourteenth Amendment." !d., at 519.
25
"If conduct of a state officer taken pursuant to an unconstitutional state
statute is deemed to be unauthorized and may be challenged in federal
court, conduct undertaken without any authority whatever is also not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity." Florida Dep't of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc.,-- U. S. - - , - - (1982) (opinion of STEVENS, J.).
This point appeared in our cases long before Treasure Salvors. It dates to
at least Tindal v. Wesley, 167 U. S. 204 (1897) , in which the plaintiff alleged that state officials were tortiously holding his property. "If a suit
against officers of a State to enjoin them from enforcing an unconstitutional
statute ... be not one against the State, it is impossible to see how a suit
against the same indivduals to recover the possession of property belonging to the plaintiff and illegally held by the defendants can be deemed a suit
against the State." !d., at 222.
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vance in this case-that Ex parte Young authorizes injunctive relief against state officials only on the basis of federal
law.
These cases demonstrate that the Court's disposition of
this case in 1981-ordering the Court of Appeals to consider
respondents' state law claims-was fully harmonious with established Eleventh Amendment principles. The jurisdiction
of the federal court was established by a federal claim; 26 the
Court of Appeals therefore had jurisdiction to resolve the
case and to grant injunctive relief on either federal or state
grounds, without encountering any barrier imposed by the
Eleventh Amendment.
In this case, state officials were properly joined as defendants. The undisputed findings of the District Court, and the
legal conclusions of the en bane Court of Appeals, together
indicate that petitioners had woefully failed to run Pennhurst
as state law required. They had failed even to een begin to
set up the sort of individualized treatment plans and community living programs mandated by state law. In short, they
had acted in a way that the sovereign had forbidden. The
proper Eleventh Amendment analysis is therefore straightforward-an agent is not entitled to its sovereign's immunity
when he acts in a way that has been statutorily forbidden by
the sovereign. Pennsylvania did not, and indeed under the
law of agency could not, authorize the unlawful conduct of petitioners. Very simply, when an agent violates the soverThere can be no doubt that respondents' federal claims were sufficiently substantial to justify federal jurisdiction in this case. In another
case brought by a resident of Pennhurst, we held that the Due Process
Clause requires, at a minimum, that petitioners provide the residents with
reasonable care and safety. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U. S. 307, 324
(1982). The uncontested findings of the District Court in this case establish that Pennhurst was neither safe nor providing reasonable care to its
residents. Therefore, respondents' federal claims not only were sufficiently substantial to support the exercise of federal jurisdiction in this
case, but would almost certainly have justified the issuance of at least some
injunctive relief had a state law basis for the relief been unavailable.
26
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eign's law, his violation is not properly attributable to the
sovereign; the violation is individual, and not entitled to the
sovereign's immunity. That principle has been consistently
endorsed by our cases, and indeed appears as far back as the
fifteenth century. Since the sovereign could and would
never authorize conduct it has statutorily prohibited, an
agent is not entitled to the sovereign's immunity when called
to account for such conduct. That principle remains as true
today as it was in the earliest case to formulating the sovereign immunity doctrine.
III
It is essential that the Court understand that acceptance of
petitioners' position would require the Court to repudiate virtually all of its precedents in this area of the law. I have already demonstrated that petitioners' position requires rejection of Young and its predecessors-which held that state
officers' unconstitutional actions were ultra vires precisely
because state law incorporated the federal Constitution and
hence stripped the officers of authority to violate the Constitution. But more than the analytical scheme of Young is
at stake-petitioners' position requires the wholesale overruling of cases. In the following cases the Court permitted
relief to issue against state officers on the basis of state law
over an explicit Eleventh Amendment defense: Rolston v.
Missouri Fund Commissioners, 120 U. 8. 391 (1887); South
Carolina v. Wesley, 155 U. 8. 542 (1895); Tindal v. Wesley,
167 U. 8. 204 (1897); Scully v. Bird, 209 U. 8. 481 (1908);
Hopkins v. Clemson College, 221 U. 8. 636 (1911); Atchison
&c. Ry. Co. v. O'Connor, 223 U. 8. 280 (1912); Johnson v.
Lankford, 245 U. 8. 541 (1918); Martin v. Lankford, 245
U. 8. 547 (1918); Greene v. Louisville & Interurban R. Co.,
244 U. 8. 499 (1917); Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v.
Greene, 244 U. 8. 522 (1917); Illinois Central R. Co. v.
Greene, 244 U. 8. 555 (1917). 27
27
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Since petitioners' position applies also to federal sovereign
immunity (indeed the principal case on which they rely,
Larson, is a federal sovereign immunity case), the following
additional cases which refused to apply sovereign immunity
to suits against federal officers acting within the scope of
their authority because the plaintiff had alleged that the officers had engaged in unlawful conduct conduct would also be
overruled: Little v. Barreme, 2 Cranch 169 (1804); Wise v.
Withers, 3 Cranch 331 (1806); Mitchell v. Harmony, 13 How.
115 (1851); Bates v. Clark, 95 U. S. 204 (1877); Noble v.
Union River Logging R. Co., 147 U. S. 165 (1893); Belknap
v. Schild, 161 U. S. 10 (1896); Sloan Shipyards v. U. S. Fleet
Corp., 258 U. S. 549 (1922); Santa Fe Pac. R. Co. v. Fall,
259 U. S. 197 (1922); Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U. S.
605 (1912); Land v. Dollar, 330 U. S. 731, 738 (1947).
Larson itself cites most of these cases with approval, and disapproves of none of them. In fact, petitioners' position results in the repudiation of the two-track analysis of Larson,
since in Larson the Court stated that conduct which has been
specifically prohibited by statute is not protected by sovereign immunity even if it is performed within the scope of the
official's duties.
Petitioners' position also results in the overruling of Siler
v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 213 U. S. 175 (1909), and
its progeny, including Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Garrett, 231 U. S. 298 (1913); Davis v. Wallace, 257 U. S. 478
(1922); Chicago Great Western R. Co. v. Kendall, 266 U. S.
94 (1924); United Gas Co. v. Railroad Commission, 278
U. S. 300 (1919); Glenn v. Field Packing Co., 290 U. S. 177
(1933); Lee v. Bickell, 292 U. S. 415 (1934); Railroad Commission of California v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 302
u. s. 388 (1938).
followed these precedents. See, e. g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. Kelley, 493 F.
2d 784 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U. S. 1022 (1974); New England Patriots Football club, Inc. v. University of Colorado, 592 F. 2d 1196,
1201-1202 (1st Cir. 1979). See Brief for the United States, p. 23.
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Finally, petitioner's position repudiates the law of this very
case. For if accepted, it would determine that this Court
had no power to act as it did in 1981 when it ordered the
Court of Appeals to consider and decide the state law issues
in this case.
It is significant to note that many of the decisions petitioners would have us overrule were written by some of the
greatest advocates of federalism in this Court's history. It
is odd, to say the least, that they somehow overlooked the
"fundamental" principle of Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence that petitioners claim exists. For that matter, it is
odd that this Court could have overlooked such a fundamental principle when it remanded the case for consideration
of the state law issues in 1981. 28
Not only is this wholesale disregard of precedent unprincipled; it will actually distort the processes of orderly adjudication not only in this case, but also in all future cases in which
both state and federal claims are presented to a federal court.
Contrary to the wise and settled practice of addressing state
law statutory issues in order to avoid the unnecessary adjudication of federal constitutional questions-a practice that
would end with the overruling of Siler-the course on which
28
The unanimous rejection of the argument that the Eleventh Amendment bars claims based on state officers' violations of federal statutesin
Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U. S. 151, 156 n. 6 (1978) is entirely
consistent with my analysis of our cases. But under petitioners' view, it
represented a rather dramatic extension of Ex parte Young to encompass
federal statutory claims as well as constitutional claims. Ray demonstrates that cannot be maintained that Young and the other cases of this
Court permit injunctive relief only where the constitutionality of state officers' conduct is at issue. If that were so Ray would be wrongly decidedan argument that a state officer has violated a federal statute does not constitute a challenge to the constitutionality of the officer's conduct. Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 612-615 (1979); Swift
& Co. v. Wickham, 382 U. S. 111 (1965). In my view, the Eleventh
Amendment claim in Ray deserved no more than the cursory footnote it
received, since the state officials had engaged in conduct forbidden by
statute.
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petitioners would have the Court embark will mandate the
decision of constitutional issues in cases of this kind.
In the final analysis, however, petitioners' position simply
overlooks the two-track analysis of Larson. Larson, like so
many cases before it, teaches that conduct is not attributable
to the sovereign when that conduct has been forbidden by
statute. This, Larson instructs, is a form of ultra vires conduct entirely separate from conduct that is completely beyond the agent's authority. From the fifteenth century
English common law to Larson and beyond, courts have
never held that prohibited conduct can be shielded by sovereign immunity. That rule makes good sense-since a principal cannot authorize unlawful conduct, such conduct is of necessity ultra vires. There is no reason to abandon such a
well-settled and sensible rule.

To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Powell
Justice Rehnquist
Justice O'Connor
From:

Justice Stevens
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JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting.
This case has illuminated the character of an institution.
The record demonstrates that the Pennhurst State School
and Hospital has been operated in blatant disregard of state
law. In 1977, after three years of litigation, the District
Court entered detailed findings of fact that abundantly support that conclusion. In 1981, after four more years of litigation, this Court ordered the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit to decide whether the law of Pennsylva- ~
nia provides an independent and adequate ground which can
)
support the District Court's remedial order. The Court of
Appeals, sitting en bane, unanimously concluded that it did.
The Court does not disagree with that conclusion. Rather,
it reverses the Court of Appeals because it did precisely what
this Court ordered it to do; the only error committed by the
Court of Appeals was its faithful obedience to this Court's
command.
This remarkable result is the product of an equally remarkable misapplication of the ancient doctrine of sovereign immunity. In a completely unprecedented holding, today the
Court concludes that Pennsylvania's sovereign immunity prevents a federal court from enjoining the conduct that Pennsylvania itself has prohibited. No rational t iew of the sovereign immunity of the States supports this result. To the
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contrary, the question whether a federal court may award injunctive relief on the basis of state law has been answered affirmatively by this Court many times in the past. Yet the
Court blithely overrules at least 29 cases, spanning well over
a century of this Court's jurisprudence, proclaiming that federal courts have no power to enforce the will of the States by
enjoining conduct because it violates state law. This new
pronouncement will require the federal courts to decide federal constitutional questions despite the availability of statelaw grounds for decision, a result inimical to sound principles
of judicial restraint. Nothing in the Eleventh Amendment,
the conception of state sovereignty it embodies, or the history of this institution, requires or justifies such a perverse
result. I therefore respectfully dissent.
I
It is worth noting exactly what conduct of petitioners the
Court attributes to the State of Pennsylvania in order to find
it protected by the Eleventh Amendment, as well as the procedural posture of this case. As noted in our prior opinion,
451 U. S. 1 (1981), and by the majority today, ante, at 2, the
District Court's findings were undisputed: "Conditions at
Pennhurst are not only dangerous, with the residents often
physically abused or drugged by staff members, but also inadequate for the 'habilitation' of the retarded. The court
found that the physical, intellectual, and emotional skills of
some residents have deteriorated at Pennhurst." 451 U. S.,
at 7 (footnote omitted). The court concluded that Pennhurst
was actually hazardous to its residents. 1 Organized pro'There was often urine and excrement on the walls. Infectious diseases
were common and minimally adequate health care was unavailable. Residents of Pennhurst were inadequately supervised, and as a consequence
were often injured by other residents or as a result of self-abuse. Assaults
on residents by staff members, including sexual assaults, were frequent.
Physical restraints were employed in lieu of adequate staffing, often causing injury to residents , and on one occasion leading to a death. Dangerous
psychotropic drugs were indiscriminately used for purposes of behavior
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grams of training or education were inadequate or entirely
unavailable, and programs of treatment or training were not
developed for residents. When they visited Pennhurst,
shocked parents of residents would find their children
bruised, drugged and unattended. These conditions often
led to a deterioration in the condition of the residents after
being placed in Pennhurst. Terri Lee Halderman, for example, was learning to talk when she entered Pennhurst; after
residing there she lost her verbal skills.
At every stage of
this litigation, petitioners have conceded that Pennhurst fails
to provide even minimally adequate habilitation for its residents. See 612 F. 2d 84, 92-94 (3d Cir. 1979) (en bane); 446
F. Supp. 1295, 1304 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
The District Court held that these conditions violated each
resident's rights under the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 87 Stat. 394, as amended by 92 Stat. 2987,
29 U. S. C. § 794 (1976 ed., Supp. V), and the Pennsylvania
Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966, Pa. Stat.
Ann. tit. 50, §§ 4101-4704 (Purdon 1969 & Supp. 1982)
("MH/MR Act"). The en bane Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit affirmed most of the District Court's judgment,
but it grounded its decision solely on the "bill of rights" provision in the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of
Rights Act, 42 U. S. C. § 6010 (1976 ed. & Supp. V). The
court did not consider the constitutional issues or § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act. While it affirmed the District Court's
holding that the MH/MR Act provides a right to adequate
habilitation, see id., at 100-103, the court did not decide
whether that state right justified all of the relief granted by
the District Court.
control and staff convenience. Staff supervision during meals was minimal, and residents often stole food from each other-leaving some without
enough to eat. The unsafe conditions led to aggressive behavior on the
part of residents which was punished by solitary confinement.
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Petitioners sought review by this Court, asserting that the
Court of Appeals had erred in its construction of both federal
and state statutes. This Court granted certiorari and reversed, 451 U. S. 1 (1981), holding that 42 U. S. C. § 6010
created no substantive rights. We did not accept respondents' state-law contention, because there was a possibility
that the Court of Appeals' analysis of the state statute had
been influenced by its erroneous reading of federal law.
Concluding that it was "unclear whether state law provides
an independent and adequate ground which can support the
court's remedial order," 451 U. S., at 31, we "remand[ed] the
state-law issue for reconsideration in light of our decision
here." Ibid. In a footnote we declined to consider the effect of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's then recent decision, In re Schmidt, 494 Pa. 86, 429 A. 2d 631 (1981), on the
state-law issues in the case, expressly stating that on remand
the Court of Appeals could "consider the state law issues in
light of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's recent decision."
451 U. S., at 31 n. 24.
On remand, 673 F. 2d 647 (3d Cir. 1982) (en bane), the
Court of Appeals, noting that this Court had remanded for
reconsideration of the state-law issue, examined the impact
of Schmidt. 2 According to the Court of Appeals, which was
~~S-.P.oint, the State Supreme Court had "spoken definitively" on the duties of the State under the MH/MR
Act, holding that the State was required to provide care to
the mentally retarded in the "least restrictive environment."
I d., at 651. Since the MH/MR Act fully justified the relief
issued in the Court of Appeals' prior judgment, the court re2
In the questions raised in their petition for certiorari, petitioners do not
ask this Court to reexamine the Court of Appeals' conclusion that respondents are clearly entitled to relief under state law. Nor would it be appropriate for this Court to reexamine the unanimous conclusion of the en bane
Court of Appeals on a question of state Jaw. See, e. g., Bishop v. Wood,

426

u. s. 341, 345-346 (1976).
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instated its prior judgment on the basis of petitioner's violation of state law. 3
Thus, the District Court found that petitioners have been
operating the Pennhurst facility in a way that is forbidden by
state law, by federal statute and by the Federal Constitution.
The en bane Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit unanimously concluded that state law provided a clear and adequate basis for upholding the District Court and that it was
not necessary to address the federal questions decided by
that court. That action conformed precisely to the directive
issued by this Court when the case was here before. Petitioners urge this Court to make an unprecedented about-face,
and to hold that the Eleventh Amendment prohibited the
Court of Appeals from doing what this Court ordered it to do
when we instructed it to decide whether respondents were
entitled to relief under state law. Of course, if petitioners
are correct, then error was committed not by the Court of
Appeals, which after all merely obeyed the instruction of this
Court, but rather by this Court in 1981 when we ordered the
Court of Appeals to consider the state-law issues in the case.
Petitioners' position is utterly without support. The Eleventh Amendment and the doctrine of sovereign immunity it
embodies have never been interpreted to deprive a court of
jurisdiction to grant relief against government officials who
are engaged in conduct that is forbidden by their sovereign.
On the contrary, this Court has repeatedly and consistently
exercised the power to enjoin state officials from violating
state law.
II
The majority proceeds as if this Court has not had previous
occasion to consider Eleventh Amendment argument made
by petitioners, and contends that Ex parte Young, 209 U. S.
123 (1908) has no application to a suit seeking injunctive relief
The court therefore found it unnecessary to decide if respondents were
also entitled to relief under the federal statutory and constitutional provisions which had been raised in the District Court.
3
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on the basis of state law. That is simply not the case. The
Court rejected the argument that the Eleventh Amendment
~eflftitls- injunctive relief on the basis of state law twice only
two Terms ago. In Florida Dept. of State v. Treasure
Salvors, Inc., 458 U. S. 670 (1982), four Justices concluded
that a suit for possession of property in the hands of state officials was not barred by the Eleventh Amendment inasmuch
as the State did not have even a colorable claim to the property under state law. See id., at 69(H397 (opinion of STEVENS, J., joined by BURGER, C. J., MARSHALL, and BLACKMUN, JJ.). Four additional Justices accepted the proposition
that if the state officers' conduct had been in violation of a
state statute, the Eleventh Amendment would not bar the
action. Id., at 714 (WHITE, J., concurring in the judgment
in part and dissenting in part, joined by POWELL, REHNQUIST, and O'CONNOR, JJ.). 4
And in just one short paragraph in Cory v. White, 457 U. S. 85 (1982), the Court thrice
restated the settled rule that the Eleventh Amendment does
not bar suits against state officers when they are "alleged to
be acting against federal or state law." 5 These are only the
two most recent in an extraordinarily long line of cases.
• "Larson established that where the officer's actions are limited by statute, actions beyond those limitations are to be considered individual and
not sovereign actions." Id., at 714.
5
"Neither did Edelman deal with a suit naming a state officer as defendant, but not alleging a violation of either federal or state law. Thus, there
was no occasion in the opinion to cite or discuss the unanimous opinion in
Worcester that the Eleventh Amendment bars suits against state officers
unless they are alleged to be acting contrary to federal law or against the
authority of state law. Edelman did not hold that suits against state officers who are not alleged to be acting against federal or state law are per-

missible under the Eleventh Amendment if only prospective relief is
sought." Id., at. 91 (emphasis supplied).
See also Worcester County Co. v. Riley, 302 U. S. 292, 297 (1937) (citations
omitted) ("[G]enerally suits to restrain action of state officials can, consistently with the constitutional prohibition, be prosecuted only when the action sought to be restrained is without the authority of state law or contravenes the statutes or Constitution of the United States. The Eleventh
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1908, it was firmly established that conduct of
state officials under color of office considered tortious under
state law are not protected by the Eleventh Amendment.
See Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust, 154 U.S. 362,
390--391 (1894); Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U. S. 270, 287
(1885); Cunningham v. Macon & Brunswick R. Co., 109
U. S. 446, 452 (1883). 6 Cf. Belknap v. Schild, 161 U. S. 10,
18 (1896) (same rule adopted for sovereign immunity of the
United States); Stanley v. Schwalby, 147 U. S. 508, 518-19
(1893) (same). 7 In Hopkins v. Clemson Agricultural ColAmendment, which denies to the citizen the right to resort to a federal
court to compel or restrain state action, does not preclude suit against a
wrongdoer merely because he asserts that his acts are within an official authority which the state does not confer."). In Worcester the Court held a
suit barred by the Eleventh Amendment only after stating: "Hence, it cannot be said that the threatened action of respondents involves any breach
of state law or of the laws or Constitution of the United States." Id.j at
299.
6
The Court explained that the state officer sued in tort
"is not sued as, or because he is, the officer of the government, but as an
individual, and the court is not ousted of jurisdiction because he asserts jurisdiction as such officer. To make out his defense he must show that his
authority was sufficient in law to protect him." Cunningham, 109 U. S.,
at 452, quoted in Poindexter, 114 U. S., at 287.
7
See also Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S. 478, 489-490 (1978) (officers of
the United States are liable for their torts unless the torts are authorized
by federal law); Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U. S. 605, 619-Q20 (1912)
(officers of the United States may be enjoined where they wrongfully interfere with property rights). Justice Holmes had occasion to state that sovereign immunity does not generally extend to the acts of an officer of the
sovereign. "In general the United States cannot be sued for a tort, but its
immunity does not extend to those that acted in its name." Sloan Shipyards v. U. S . Fleet Corp., 258 U. S. 549, 568 (1922). He characterized
petitioner's argument in that case-that sovereign immunity should extend
to the unlawful acts of agents of the United States acting within the scope
of their authority-as "a very dangerous departure from one of the first
principles of our system of law. The sovereign properly so called is superior to suit for reasons that often have been explained. But the general
rule is that any person within the jurisdiction is always amenable to the
law. . . . An instrumentality of government he might be and for the

(
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lege, 221 U. S. 636 (1911), the Court explained the relation-

ship of these cases to the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
"[I]mmunity from suit is a high attribute of sovereignty-a prerogative of the State itself-which cannot
be availed of by public agents when sued for their own
torts. The Eleventh Amendment was not intended to
afford them freedom from liability in any case where,
under color of their office, they have injured one of the
State's citizens. To grant them such immunity would be
to create a privileged class free from liability for wrongs
inflicted or injuries threatened . . . . Besides, neither a
State nor an individual can confer upon an agent authority to commit a tort so as to excuse the perpetrator. In
such cases the law of agency has no application-the
wrongdoer is treated as a principal and individually liable for the damages inflicted and subject to injunction
against the commission of acts causing irreparable injury." Id., at 642-643. 8
The principles that were decisive in these cases are not
confined to actions under state tort law. They also apply to
claims that state officers have violated state statutes. In
Johnson v. Lankford, 245 U. S. 541 (1918), the Court regreatest ends, but the agent, because he is agent, does not 'cease to be answerable for his acts." !d., at 566-567. See also Brady v. Roosevelt S.S.
Co., 317 U. S. 575 (1943) (following Sloan).
8
The Court also stated,
"Corporate agents or individual officers of the State stand in no better
position than officers of the General Government, and as to them it has
often been held that: 'The exemption of the United States from judicial
process does not protect their officers and agents, civil or military, in time
of peace, from being personally liable to an action of tort by a private person, whose rights of property they have wrongfully invaded, or injured,
even by authority of the United States.' Belknap v. Shild, 161 U. S. 10,
18.'' 221 U. S. , at 645 (emphasis supplied).
See also Old Colony Trust Co. v. Seattle, 271 U. S. 426, 431 (1926) (reaffirming the rationale of Clemson in an action against city and county
officials).
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versed the dismissal of an action against the bank commissioner of Oklahoma and his surety to recover damages for the
loss of plaintiff's bank deposit, allegedly caused by the commissioner's failure to safeguard the business and assets of the
bank in negligent or willful disregard of his duties under applicable state statutes. The Court explained that. the action
was not one against the State.
"To answer it otherwise would be to assert, we think,
that whatever an officer does, even in contravention of
the laws of the State, is state action, identifies him with
it and makes the redress sought against him a claim
against the State and therefore prohibited by the Eleventh Amendment. Surely an officer of a State may be
delinquent without involving the State in delinquency,
indeed, may injure the State by delinquency as well as
some resident of the State, and be amenable to both."
!d., at 545.
Similarly, in Rolston v. Missouri Fund Commissioners,
120 U. S. 391 (1887), the Court rejected the argument that a
suit to enjoin a state officer to comply with state law violated
the Eleventh Amendment. The Court wrote, "Here the suit
is to get a state officer to do what a statute requires of him.
The litigation is with th,e officer, not the state." !d., at 411. 9
9
In R eagan v. Farme:rs' Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362 (1894), the
Court held that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar a suit alleging that
a state officer has wrongfully administered a state statute. The Court
awarded injunctive relief against state officers on the basis of both state
and federal law. In Atchison &c. Ry. Co. v. O'Connor, 223 U. S. 280
(1912) , the Court held that a suit against state officers seeking recovery of
taxes paid under duress was not against the State since a state statute required the recovery of wrongfully paid taxes. See id., at 287. In
Lankford v. Platte Iron Works Co. , 235 U. S. 461 (1915), the Court assumed that the Eleventh Amendment would not bar a suit "to compel submission by the officers of the State to the laws of the State, accomplishing
at once the policy of the law and its specific purpose," id., at 471, but rejected the appellees' construction of the state statute. See also Parish v.
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Significantly, this rule was expressly reaffirmed in a case
decided by this Court in the same Term as Ex parte Young
and published in the same volume of the United States Reports. The appellant in Scully v. Bird, 209 U. S. 481 (1908),
brought a diversity suit seeking injunctive relief against the
dairy and food commissioner of the State of Michigan, on the
ground that "under cover.of his office" he had maliciously engaged in a course of conduct designed to ruin plaintiff's business in the State. The circuit court dismissed the complaint
on Eleventh Amendment grounds. On appeal, the plaintiff
contended that the Eleventh Amendment "does not apply
where a suit is brought against defendants who, claiming to
act as officers of the State, and under color of a statute which
is valid and constitutional, but wrongfully administered by
them, commit, or threaten to commit, acts of wrong or injury
to the rights and property of the plaintiff, or make such administration of the statute an illegal burden and exaction
upon the plaintiff." Id., 418. This Court agreed. It noted
that the complaint alleged action "in dereliction of duties enjoined by the statutes of the State," and concluded that it was
"manifest from this summary of the allegations of the bill that
this is not a suit against the State." I d., at 490. 10
Finally, in Greene v. Louisville & Interurban R. Co., 244
U. S. 499 (1917), and its companion cases, Louisville & Nash, ville R. Co. v. Greene, 244 U. S. 522 (1917); Illinois Central
R. Co. v. Greene, 244 U. S. 555 (1917), the plaintiffs challenged the conduct of state officials under both federal and
State Banking Board, 235 U. S. 498 (1915); American Water Co. v.
Lankford, 235 U. S. 496 (1915).
1
°Cases construing the sovereign immunity of the federal government
also hold that conduct by federal officers forbidden by statute is not
shielded by sovereign immunity even though the officer is not acting completely beyond his authority. See Land v. Dollar, 330 U. S. 731 (1947);
Ickes v. Fox, 300 U. S. 82 (1937); Work v. Louisiana, 269 U. S. 250 (1925);
Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co. v. Fall, 259 U. S. 197 (1922); Payne v. Central
Pac. Ry. Co., 255 U. S. 228 (1921); Waite v. Macy, 246 U. S. 606 (1918);
Noble v. Union River Logging R. Co., 147 U. S. 165 (1893).

81-2101-DISSENT
PENNHURST STATE SCHOOL & HOSP. v. HALDERMAN

11

state law. The Court, citing, inter alia, Young and
Clemson, held that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar injunctive relief on the basis of state law, noting that the plaintiffs' federal claim was sufficiently substantial to justify the
exercise of pendent jurisdiction over plaintiffs' state law
claims, 11 and that since violations of federal and state law had
been alleged, it was appropriate for the federal court to issue
injunctive relief on the basis of state law without reaching the
federal claims, despite the strictures of the Eleventh Amendment. In short, the Greene Court approved of precisely the
methodology employed by the Court of Appeals in this case. 12
The majority manages to avoid addressing almost all of
these cases, perhaps because it has no explanation for them. 13 ~--The Court cited Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 213 U.S. 175
(1917), which will be discussed in part IV, infra, in support of this
proposition.
12
The unanimous rejection of the argument that the Eleventh Amendment bars claims based on state officers' violations of federal statutes in
Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co. , 435 U. S. 151, 156 n. 6 (1978) is entirely
consistent with my analysis of our cases. But under the majority's view, it
represented a rather dramatic extension of Ex parte Young to encompass
federal statutory claims as well as constitutional claims. Ray demonstrates that it cannot be maintained that Young and the other cases of this
Court permit injunctive relief only when the constitutionality of state officers' conduct is at issue. If that were so Ray would be wrongly decidedan argument that a state officer has violated a federal statute does not constitute a challenge to the constitutionality of the officer's conduct. Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U. S. 600, 612-615 (1979); Swift
& Co. v. Wickham, 382 U. S. 111 (1965). In my view, the Eleventh
Amendment claim in Ray deserved no more than the cursory footnote it
received, since the state officials had engaged in conduct forbidden by statute. If the Court were willing to adhere to settled rules of law today, the
Eleventh Amendment claim could be rejected just as summarily.
13
In a rather desperate attempt to explain these cases, amici suggest
that the Court simply did not realize that it was deciding questions of state
law, since in the era before Erie R . Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 (1938)
and United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U. S. 715 (1966), it was not clear
that diversity cases or pendent claims were governed by state rather than
federal law. That suggestion is refuted by the cases discussed above in
11
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None of these cases contain only "implicit" or sub silentio
holdings; all of them explicitly consider and reject the claim
that the Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from
issuing injunctive relief based on state law. There is therefore no basis for the majority's assertion that the issue presented by this case is an open one, ante, at 17. 14 To the extent it does deal with these precedents, the majority merely
suggests that they assumed that federal courts could hear
state-law claims that are pendant to federal claims, failing to
which it was held that relief could issue against state officers who had violated state statutes. Even under the construction of the Rules of Decision
Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1652, adopted in Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1 (1842), and
repudiated in Erie, federal courts were bound to apply state statutes.
See, e. g., Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow
Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U. S. 518, 529--531 (1928); Swift, 16 Pet., at
18-19. Thus, in these cases the Court was indisputably issuing relief
under state law. The Court was explicit about the state-law basis for the
reliefit granted in Greene, to use just one example. It stated that federal
jurisdiction "extends, to the determination of all questions involved in the
case, including questions of state law, irrespective of the disposition that
may be made of the federal question, or whether it be found necessary to
decide it at all." 244 U. S., at 508. It then granted plaintiffs relief under
state law~ and concluded by declining to decide any question of federal law.
"It is obvious, however, in view of the result reached upon the questions of
state law, just discussed, that the disposition of the cases would not be affected by whatever result we might reach upon the federal question ... .
Therefore, we find it unnecessary to express any opinion upon the question
raised under the Fourteenth Amendment." Id., at 519.
14
The majority incredibly claims that Greene contains only an implicit
holding on the Eleventh Amendment question the Court decides today.
In plain words, the Greene Court held that the Eleventh Amendment did
not bar consideration of the pendant state-law claims advanced in that
case. It must be left to others to explain how the majority can possibly
read this as an implicit or sub silentio holding; I cannot. Not only did the
Court expressly reject the Eleventh Amendment claim, but it did so after
extensive briefing on this precise issue. See Brief for Appellants, Greene
v. Louisville and Interurban Railroad Co. 27-45; Brief for State Board
and Officers, Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Greene 74-101. See
also Reply Brief of Illinois Central Railroad Co., Illinois Central Railroad
Co. v. Greene 38-39.
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recognize that the Eleventh Amendment is a limitation on
the entire judicial power, including the power to here pendant claims. Ante, at 17-19. This is simply incorrect. In
many of the foregoing cases the state-law claims were not
based on pendant jurisdiction; hence, the Court's decisions
could not have been based on any theory about pendant jurisdiction.15 More significantly, today's majority opinion reveals a distressing lack of knowledge about the doctrine of
sovereign immunity and the basis for the rule of Ex parte
Young.
III
On its face, the Eleventh Amendment applies only to suits
against a State brought by citizens of other States and foreign nations. 16 This textual limitation upon the scope of the
states' immunity from suit in federal court was set aside in
Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1 (1890). Hans was a suit
against the State of Louisiana, brought by a citizen of Louisiana seeking to recover interest on the state's bonds. The ·
Court stated that some of the arguments favoring sovereign
immunity for the States made during the process of th;.;;.e-.._ _
Amendment's ratification ~eem
of
the judicial scheme created by the Constitution. As a result,
the Court concluded that the Constitution prohibited a suit
by a citizen against his or her own state. When called upon
to elaborate in Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U. S. 313 (1934),
the Court explained that the Eleventh Amendment did more
than simply prohibit suits brought by citizens of one State
against another State. Rather, it exemplified the broader
and more ancient doctrine of sovereign immunity, which opFor example, in Johnson v. Lankford and Scully v. Bird federal jurisdiction was established over the state-law claims by diversity of citizenship; they were not pendant to federal claims.
16
"The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of
the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects
of any Foreign State." U. S. Const. amend. XL
15
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erates to bar a suit brought by a citizen against his own State
without its consent. 17
The Court has subsequently adhered to this interpretation
of the Eleventh Amendment. For example, in Quern v. Jordan, 440 U. S. 332 (1979), the Court referred to the Eleventh
Amendment as incorporating "the traditional sovereign immunity of the States." !d., at 341. Similarly, in Fitzpatrick
v. Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445 (1976), the Court referred to "the
Eleventh Amendment, and the principle of sovereign immunity it embodies .... " ld., at 456. See also Nevada v.
Hall, 440 U. S. 410, 438-441 (1979) (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting).18 Thus, under our cases it is the doctrine of sovereign
immunity, rather than the text of the Amendment itself,
"Manifestly, we cannot rest with a mere literal application of the words
of § 2 or Article III, or assume that the letter of the Eleventh Amendment
exhausts the restriction upon suits against non-consenting states. Behind
the words of the constitutional provisions are postulates which limit and
control. There is the essential postulate that the controversies, as contemplated, shall be found to be of a justiciable character. There is also the
postulate that States of the Union, still possessing attributes of sovereignty, shall be immune from suits, without their consent, save where
there has been 'a surrender of this immunity in the plan of the convention.'" Monaco v. Mississippi. 292 U. S. 313, 322-323 (1934) (footnote
omitted).
See also Ex Parte New York, 256 U. S. 490, 497 (1921); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1, 15-18 (1890). Most commentators have understood this
Court's Eleventh Amendment cases as taking the position that the Constitution incorporates the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity.
See, e. g., Baker, Federalism and the Eleventh Amendment, 48 U. Col. L.
Rev. 139, 153-158 (1977); Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: Part One, 126 U. Pa. L. Rev. 515, 538--546
(1978); Thornton, The Eleventh Amendment: An Endangered Species, 55
Ind. L. J. 293, 305-310 (1980); Tribe, Intergovernmental Immunities in
Litigation, Taxation, and Regulation: Separation of Powers Issues in Controversies About Federalism, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 682, 684-Q88 (1976); Comment, Private Suits Against States in the Federal Courts, 33 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 331, 334-336 (1966).
18
Petitioners themselves treat the Eleventh Amendment as equivalent to
the doctrine of sovereign immunity. See Brief for Petitioners 12 n. 10.
17
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which is critical to the analysis of any Eleventh Amendment
problem. 19
The doctrine of sovereign immunity developed in England,
where it was thought that the king could not be sued. However, common law courts, in applying the doctrine, traditionally distinguished between the king and his agents, on the
theory that the king would never authorize unlawful conduct,
and that therefore the unlawful acts of the king's officers
ought not be treated as acts of the sovereign. See 1 W.
Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England *244 (J.
Andrews ed. 1909). As early as the fifteenth century,
Holdsworth writes, servants of the king were held liable for
their unlawful acts. See III W. Holdsworth, A History of
English Law 388 (1903). During the seventeenth century,
this rule of law was used extensively to curb the king's authority. The king's officers
"could do wrong, and if they committed wrongs, whether
in the Gourse of their employment or not, they could be
made legally liable. The command or instruction of the
king could not protect them. If the king really had
given such commands or instructions, he must have been
deceived." VI id., at 101.
In one famous case, it was held that although process would
not issue against the sovereign himself, it could issue against
his officers. "For the warrant of no man, not even of the
King himself, can excuse the doing of an illegal act." Sands
v. Child, 83 Eng. Rep. 725, 726 (K.B. 1693). 20 By the eighOf course, if the Court were to apply the text of the Amendment, it
would not bar an action against Pennsylvania by one of its own citizens.
See n. 16, supra.
:oo The rationale for this principle was compelling. Courts did not wish to
confront the king's immunity from suit directly; nevertheless they found
the threat to liberty posed by permitting the sovereign's abuses to go unremedied to be intolerable. Since in reality the king could act only
through his officers, the rule which permitted suits against those officers
formally preserved the sovereign's immunity while operating as one of the
19
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teenth century, this rule of law was unquestioned. See X
W. Holdsworth, supra, at 650-652. And in the 19th Century this view was taken by the court to be so well-settled as
to not require the citation of authority, see Feather v. The
Queen, 122 Eng. Rep. 1191, 120fr-1206 (K.B. 1865). 21
It was only natural, then, that this Court, in applying the
principles of sovereign immunity, recognized the distinction
between a suit against a State and one against its officer. 22
For example, while the Court did inquire as to whether a suit
was "in essence" against the sovereign, it soon became settled law that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar suits
against state officials in their official capacities challenging
unconstitutional conduct. See Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S.
466, 518-519 (1898); Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, 140 U. S. 1,
10-12 (1891); Poindexter v. Greenhaw, 114 U. S. 270, 288
(1885). 23 This rule was reconciled with sovereign immunity
means by which courts curbed the abuses of the monarch. See X W.
Holdsworth, supra, at 262-268.
21
Commentators have noted the influence of these English doctrines on
the American conception of sovereign immunity. See Jaffe, Suits Against
Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 1~29
(1963); Note, Express Waiver of Eleventh Amendment Immunity, 17 Ga.
L. Rev. 513, 517--518 (1983); Note, Developments in the Law-Remedies
Against the United States and its Officials, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 827, 831-833
(1957). In fact, in Blflknap v. Schild, 161 U. S. 10 (1896), the Court, in
holding that officers of the United States were liable for injuries caused by
their unlawful conduct even if they did so acting pursuant to official duties,
cited the passage from Feather v. The Queen. See 161 U. S., at 18.
22
Chief Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, recognized this distinction in the very first case to reach the Court concerning the application of
the Eleventh Amendment to the conduct of a state official, Osborn v. Bank
of the United States, 9 Wheat. 738 (1824).
23
See also McNeill v. Southern R. Co., 202 U. S. 543, 559 (1906); Gunter
v. Atlantic C.L. R. Co., 200 U. S. 273, 283-284 (1906); Prout v. Starr, 188
U. S. 537 (1903); Scott v. Donald, 165 U. S. 58, 67-70 (1897); Reagan v.
Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 154 U. S. 362, 388--391 (1894); In re Tyler, 149
U. S. 164, 190-191 (1893); In re Ayers, 123 U. S. 443, 506--507 (1887);
Haygood v. Southern, 117 U. S. 52, 70 (1886); Allen v. Baltimore & O.R.
Co., 114 U. S. 311, 315-316 (1885); Board of Liquidation v. McComb, 92
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principles by use of the traditional rule that an action against
an agent of the sovereign who had acted unlawfully was not
considered to be against the sovereign. When an official
acts pursuant to an unconstitutional statute, the Court rea() / ~ VI·~ ~lA
soned, the absence of valid authority leaves the official ultra ""'.Ah
~
vires his authority, and thus a private actor stripped of his ~·
status as a representative of the sovereign. 24 In Ex parte /~/ r-L.. J-oc,tY' 'VlL,
Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908), the Court was merely restating
a settled principle when it wrote:

S

"The Act to be enforced is alleged to be unconstitutional, and if it be so, the use of the name of the State to
enforce an unconstitutional act to the injury of complainants is a proceeding without the authority of and one
which does not affect the State in its sovereign or governmental capacity. It is simply an illegal act upon the
part of a state official in attempting by the use of the
name of the State to enforce a legislative enactment
which is void because unconstititional. If the act which
the state Attorney General seeks to enforce be a violation of the Federal Constitution, the officer in proceeding under such enactment comes into conflict with the
superior authority of that Constitution, and he is in that
U. S. 531, 541 (1875). Cf. United States v. Lee, 106 U. S. 196, 219-222
(1883) (sovereign immunity of the United States not a defense against suit
charging officers of the United States with unconstitutional conduct).
24
"That, it is true, is a legislative act of the government of Virginia, but it
is not a law of the State of Virginia. The State has passed no such law, for
it cannot; and what it cannot do, it certainly, in contemplation of law, has
not done. The Constitution of the United States, and its own contract,
both irrepealable by any act on its part, are the law of Virginia; and that
law made it the duty of the defendant to receive the coupons tendered in
payment of taxes, and declared every step to enforce the tax, thereafter
taken, to be without warrant of law, and the tax, thereafter taken, to be
without warrant of law, and therefore a wrong. He stands, then, stripped
of his official character; and, confessing a personal violation of the plaintiff's
rights for which he must personally answer, he is without defence."
Poindexter v. Greenhaw, 114 U. S., at 288.
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case stripped of his official or representative character
and is subjected in his person to the consequences of his
individual conduct." I d., at 159--160. 25
The majority states that the holding of Ex parte Young is
limited to cases in which relief is provided on the basis of federallaw, and that it rests entirely on the need to protect the
supremacy of federal law. That position overlooks the foundation of the rule of Young as well Pennoyer v.
McConnaughy and Young's other predecessors.
The Young Court distinguished between the State and its
attorney general because the latter, in violating the Constitution, had engaged in conduct the sovereign could not authorize. The pivotal consideration was not that the conduct violated federal law, since nothing in the jurisprudence of the
Eleventh Amendment permits a suit against a sovereign
vl r ~ f~ 'J
merely because federal law is at issue. 26 Indeed, at least
since Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1 (1890), the law has been £:;:::' ..,
1,..-,~-«.I fl,t
k~·~
settled that the Eleventh Amendment applies even though
"' " 1 \
~
lfW
the State is accused of violating the Federal Constitution.
;.._ ~!c. u( /'Itt-., ~;- ,J
In Hans the Court held that the Eleventh Amendment apllf'~ .,v""}t d.;fo.. VU7'"'f '.if'11'"' ~vv ~
plies to all cases within the jurisdiction of the federal courts
including those brought to require compliance with federal

A

·u

25
See generally Orth, The Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment,
1798-1908: A Case Study of Judicial Power, 1983 U. Ill. L. Rev. 423. The
Court has adhered to this formulation to the present day. See Florida
Dept. of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U. S. 670, 684-690 (1982)
(opinion of STEVENS, J.); id., at 714-715 (WHITE, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part); Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,
435 U. S. 151, 156 n. 6 (1978); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232, 237 (1,974);
Georgia R. Co. v. Redwine, 342 U. S. 299 (1952); Sterling v. Constantin,
287 u. s. 378, 393 (1932).
26
As the Solicitor General correctly notes in his brief, "this Court has no
power to create any exception to a constitutional bar to federal court jurisdiction. Ex parte Young rests instead on recognition that the Eleventh
Amendment simply does not apply to suits seeking to restrain illegal acts
by state officials-whether those acts are illegal because they violate the
Constitution, as in Young, or federal or state law." Brief for the United
States 23 (citations omitted).
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law, and bars any suit where the State is the proper defendant under sovereign immunity principles. A long line of
cases has endorsed that proposition, holding that irrespective
of the need to vindicate federal law a suit is barred by the
Eleventh Amendment if the State is the proper defendant. 27
It was clear until today that "the State [is not] divested of its
immunity 'on the mere ground that the case is one arising
under the Constitution or laws of the United States."'
Parden v. Terminal R. Co., 377 U. S. 184, 186 (1964) (quoting Hans, 134 U. S., at 10).
The pivotal consideration in Young was that it was not conduct of the sovereign that was at issue. 28 The rule that unlawful acts of an officer should not be attributed to the sovereign has deep roots in the history of sovereign immunity and
makes Young reconcilable with the principles of sovereign
immunity found in the Eleventh Amendment, 29 rather than
27

See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 345 n. 17 (1979); Alabama v.
Pugh, 438 U. S. 781 (1978) (per curiam); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S.
651, 668--669 (1974); Employees v. Missouri Public Health Dept., 411 U. S.
279, 280 n. 1 (1973); Smith v. Reeves, 178 U. S. 436, 444--449 (1900); Fitts v.
McGhee, 172 U. S. 516 (1899); In re Ayers, 123 U. S. 443 (1887); Hagood v.
Southern, 117 U. S. 52 (1886); Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U. S. 711 (1882).
See generally C. Jacobs, The Eleventh Amendment and Sovereign Immunity 88-91, 109-110 (1972).
28
The distinction between the sovereign and its agents not only explains
why the rationale of Ex parte Young and its predecessors is consistent with
established sovereign immunity doctrine, but it also explains the critical
difference between actions for injunctive relief and actions for damages
recognized in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651 (1973). Since the damages remedy sought in that case would have required payment by the
State, it could not be said that the action ran only against the agents of the
State. Therefore, while the agents' unlawful conduct was considered
ultra vires and hence could be enjoined, a remedy which did run against
the sovereign and not merely its agent could not fit within the ultra vires
doctrine and hence was impermissible. If damages are not sought from
the State and the relief will run only against the state official, damages are
a permissible remedy under the Eleventh Amendment. See Scheuer v.
Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232, 237-238 (1974).
29
"While in England personification of sovereignty in the person of the
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merely an unprincipled accommodation between federal and
state interests that ignores the principles contained in the __.-/ h 1/{
Eleventh Amendment.
This rule plainly applies to conduct of state officers in violation of state law. Young states that the significance of the
charge of unconstitutional conduct is that it renders the state
official's conduct "simply an illegal act," and hence the officer
is not entitled to the sovereign's immunity. Since a state officer's conduct in violation of state law is certainly no less illegal than his violation of federal law, in either case the official,
by committing an illegal act, is "stripped of his official or representative character." For example, one of Young's predecessors held that a suit challenging an unconstitutional attempt by the Virginia legislature to disavow a state contract
was not barred by the Eleventh Amendment, reasoning that,
"inasmuch as, by the Constitution of the United States,
which is also the supreme law ofVirginia, that contract,
when made, became thereby unchangeable, irrepealable
' the State, the subsequent act of January 26, 1882, and
by
all other like acts, which deny the obligation of that contract and forbid its performance, are not the acts of the
State of Virginia. The true and real Commonwealth
which contracted the obligation is incapable in law of doing anything in derogation of it. Whatever having that
effect, if operative, has been attempted or done, is the
work of its government acting without authority, in violation of its fundamental law, and must be looked upon,
King may have been possible, attempts to adopt this reasoning in the
United States resulted in the postulation of the abstract State as sovereign. Since the ideal State could only act by law, whatever the State did
must be lawful. On this ground a distinction was drawn between the State
and its officers, and since the State could not commit an illegal act, any
such act was imputed to government officers. It logically followed that a
suit against state officers was not necessarily a suit against the State."
Note, The Sovereign Immunity of the States: The Doctrine and Some of its
Recent Developments, 40 Minn. L. Rev. 234, 244-245 (1956) (footnotes
omitted).
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in all courts of justice, as if it were not and never had
been. . . . The State of Virginia has done none of these
things with which this defence charges her. The defendant in error is not her officer, her agent, or her representative, in the matter complained of, for he has
acted not only without her authority, but contrary to her
express commands." Poindexter v. Greenhaw, 114
U. S. 270, 293 (1885) (emphasis supplied). 30
It is clear that the Court in Poindexter attached no significance to the fact that Virginia had been accused of violating
federal and not its own law. 31 To the contrary, the Court
treated the Federal Constitution as part of Virginia's law, Y/
and concluded that the challenged action was not that of Virginia precisely because it violated Virginia's law. The majority's position turns the Young doctrine on its head-sovereign immunity did not bar actions challenging
unconstitutional conduct by state officers since the Federal
Constitution was also to be considered part of the State's
law-and since the State could not and would not authorize a \
violation of its own law, the officers' conduct was considered )
individual and not sovereign. No doubt the Courts that produced Poindexter and Young would be shocked to discover
See also Barney v. City of New York, 193 U. S. 430, 439-441 (1904).
This approach began long before Poindexter. , The earliest cases in
which this Court rejected sovereign immunity defenses raised by officers
of the sovereign accused of unlawful conduct did not involve charges of unconstitutional conduct, but rather simple trespass actions. In rejecting
the defense, the Court simply noted that although the officers were acting
pursuant to their duties, they were engaged in unlawful conduct which
therefore could not be the conduct of the sovereign. See Bates v. Clark,
95 U. S. 204, 209 (1877); Mitchell v. Harmony, 13 How. 115, 137 (1851);
Wise v. Withers, 3 Cranch 331 (1806); Little v. Barreme, 2 Cranch 169
(1804). In the landmark case of Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 9
Wheat. 738 (1824), the Court took it as beyond argument that if a state
officer unlawfully seized property in an attempt to collect taxes he believed
to be owed the state, the Eleventh Amendment would not bar a simple
trespass action against the officer.
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that conduct authorized by state law but prohibited by federal law is not considered conduct attributable to the State
for sovereign immunity purposes, but conduct prohibited by
state law is considered conduct attributable to the very State
which prohibited that conduct. Indeed, in Tindal v. Wesley,
167 U. S. 204 (1896), the Court specifically found that it was
impossible to distinguish between a suit challenging unconstitutional conduct of state officers and a suit challenging any
other type of unlawful behavior:
"If a suit against officers of a State to enjoin them from
enforcing an unconstitutional statute . . . be not one
against the State, it is impossible to see how a suit
against the individuals to recover the possession of property belonging to the plaintiff and illegally held by the
defendants can be deemed a suit against the State."
Id., at 222. 32
These cases are based on the simple idea that an illegal act
strips the official of his state-law shield, thereby depriving
the official of the sovereign's immunity.
It follows that the basis for the Young rule is present when
the officer sued has violated the law of the sovereign; in all
such cases the conduct is of a type that would not be permitted by the sovereign and hence is not attributable to the sovereign under traditional sovereign immunity principles. In
such a case, the sovereign's interest lies with those who seek
to enforce its laws, rather than those who have violated
them.
"[P]ublic officials may become tort-feasors by exceeding
the limits of their authority. And where they unlawfully seize or hold a citizen's realty or chattel, recover32

See also Florida Dept. of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U. S.
670, 697 (1982) (opinion of STEVENS, J.) ("If conduct of a state officer taken
pursuant to an unconstitutional state statute is deemed to be unauthorized
and may be challenged in federal court, conduct undertaken without any
authority whatever is also not entitled to Eleventh Amendment
immunity.").
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able by appropriate action at law or in equity [the] dominant interest of the sovereign is then on the side of the
victim who may bring his possessory action to reclaim
that 'Chich is wrongfully withheld." Land v. Dollar,
330

u. s. 731, 738 (1947).

33

The majority's position that the Eleventh Amendment does
not permit federal courts to enjoin conduct that the sovereign
State itself seeks to prohibit thus is inconsistent with both
the doctrine of sovereign immunity and the underlying respect for the integrity of State policy which the Eleventh
Amendment protects. The issuance of injunctive relief
which enforces state laws and policies, if anything, enhances
federal courts' respect for the sovereign Jferogatives of the
States. 34 The majority's approach, which requires federal
courts to ignore questions of state law and to rest their decisions on federal bases, will create more rather than less friction between the States and the federal judiciary.
Moreover, the majority's rule has nothing to do with the
basic reason the Eleventh Amendment was added to the Constitution. There is general agreement that the Amendment
was passed because the States were fearful that federal
courts would force them to pay their Revolutionary War
While Land v. Dollar is a case dealing with the sovereign immunity of
the federal government, it is pertinent to the Eleventh Amendment, which
after all for present purposes is no more than an embodiment of sovereiegn
immunity principles.
34
For example, in cases barring suits against individual officers as suits
against the state, the Court has also acknowledged the importance of statelaw authority for the challenged conduct of the officer. In such cases the
Court has frequently noted that the relief sought would be unauthorized by
state law and would therefore adversely affect the state itself. See, e. g.,
Hagood v. Southern, 117 U. S. 52, 68 (1886); Louisiana v. Jumel, 107
U. S. 711, 721 (1882). In contrast, in cases of official actions contrary to
state law, a federal court's remedy would not adversely affect any state
policy.
83
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debts, leading to their financial ruin. 36 Entertaining a suit
for injunctive relief based on state law implicates none of the
concerns of the Framers. Since only injunctive relief is
sought there is no threat to the state treasury of the type
that concerned the Framers, see Milliken v. Bradley, 433
U. S. 267, 288-290 (1977); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S.
651, 667-668 (1974); and if the State wishes to avoid the federal injunction, it can easily do so simply by changing its law.
The possibility of States left helpless in the face of disruptive
federal decrees which led to the passage of the Eleventh
Amendment simply is not presented by this case. Indeed,
the Framers no doubt would have preferred federal courts to
base their decisions on state law, which the State is then free
to reexamine, rather than forcing courts to decide cases on
federal grounds, leaving the litigation beyond state control.
In light of the preceding, it should come as no surprise that
there is absolutely no authority for the majority's position
that the rule of Young is inapplicable to violations of state
law. The only cases the majority cites, ante, at 14-15, for
the proposition that Young is limited to the vindication of federal law do not consider the question of whether Young permits injunctive relief on the basis of state law-in each of the
cases the question was neither presented, briefed, argued
nor decided. 36 It is curious, to say the least, that the majority disapproves of reliance on cases in which the issue we face
See, e. g., Petty v. Tennessee-MissouriBr'idg e Comm'n, 359 U. S. 275,
276 n. 1 (1959); Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U. S. 18, 27 (1933); Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 406-407 (1821).
96
The majority cites Quern v. Jordan, 440 U. S. 332 (1979); Scheuer v.
Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232 (1974); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651 (1974);
Georgia R. & Banking Co. v. Redwine, 342 U. S. 299 (1952). In each of
these cases, the only question presented or decided was whether monetary
relief could be obtained against state officials on the basis of federal law,
except for Redwine, where the Court decided that a suit to enjoin collection
of a state tax on the basis of federal law was not barred by the Eleventh
Amendment. In none of these cases was any question concerning the
availability of injunctive relief under state law considered even in dicta.
36
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today was decided sub silentio, see ante, at 17, yet it is willing to rely on cases in which the issue was not decided at all.
In fact, not only is there no precedent for the majority's position, but, as I have demonstrated in part II, supra, there is
an avalanche of precedent squarely to the contrary. 37
That the doctrine of sovereign immunity does not protect
conduct which has been prohibited by the sovereign is clearly
demonstrated by the case on which petitioners chiefly rely,
Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U. S.
682 (1949). The Larson opinion teaches that the actions of
state officials are not attributable to the state-are ultra vires-in two different types of situations: (1) when the official
is engaged in conduct that the sovereign has not authorized,
and (2) when he has engaged in conduct that the sovereign
has forbidden. A sovereign, like any other principal, cannot
authorize its agent to violate the law. When an agent does
so, his actions are considered ultra vires and he is liable for
-n In addition to overruling the cases discussed in part II, supra, the majority's view that Young exists simply to ensure the supremacy of federal
law requires that a number of our prior cases, which held that the Eleventh
Amendment may bar an action for injunctive relief even where the State
has violated the Federal Constitution, see, e. g., Alabama v. Pugh, 438
U. S. 781 (1978) (per curiam), were incorrectly decided. The Court can
have no satisfactory explanation for Pugh, which held that even as to a federal constitutional claim, a suit may not be brought directly against a state
even where it may be brought against its officials. On the majority's view,
there is no basis for distinguishing between the state and its officials-as to
both there is a need to vindicate the supremacy of federal law through the
issuance of injunctive relief, and unless the officials are acting completely
outside of their authority, they must be treated as is the state. However,
Pugh can be explained simply by reference to Young's use of the ultra vires doctrine with respect to unconstitutional conduct by state officerssuch conduct is not conduct by the sovereign because it could not be authorized by the sovereign, hence the officers are not entitled to the sovereign's immunity. A suit directly against the state cannot succeed because
the ultra vires doctrine is unavailable without a state officer to which it can
be applied. Pugh makes it clear that Young rests not on a need to vindicate federal law, but on the traditional distinction between the sovereign
and its agents.
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his own conduct under the law of agency. Both types of
ultra vires conduct are clearly identified in Larson.
"There may be, of course, suits for specific relief
against officers of the sovereign which are not suits
against the sovereign. If the officers purports to act as
an individual and not as an official, a suit directed against
that action is not a suit against the sovereign. If the
War Assets Administrator had completed a sale of his
own personal home, he presumably could be enjoined
from later conveying it to a third person. On a similar
theory, where the officer's powers are limited by statute,
his actions beyond those limitations are considered individual and not sovereign actions. The officer is not doing the business which the sovereign has empowered him
to do or he is doing it in a way that the sovereign has
forbidden. His actions are ultra vires his authority and
therefore may be made the object of specific relief. It is
important to note that in such cases the relief can be
granted, without impleading the sovereign, only because
of the officer's lack of delegated power. A claim of error
in the exercise of that power is therefore not sufficient.
And, since the jurisdiction of the court to hear the case
may depend, as we have recently recognized, upon the
decision which it ultimately reaches on the merits, it is
necessary that the plaintiff set out in his complaint the
statutory limitation on which he relies." I d., at 689-690
(emphasis supplied).
Larson thus clearly indicates that the immunity determination depends upon the the merits of the plaintiff's claim. The
same approach is employed by Young-the plaintiff can overcome the state official's immunity only by succeeding on the
merits of its claim of unconstitutional conduct.
Following the two-track analysis of Larson, the cases considering the question whether the state official is entitled to
the sovereign's immunity can be grouped into two categories.
In cases like Larson, Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U. S. 643
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(1962), and Florida Dept. of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc.,
458 U. S. 670 (1982), which usually involve the state functioning in its proprietary capacity, the ultra vires issue can be resolved solely by reference to the law of agency. Since there
is no specific limitation on the powers of the officers other
than the general limitations on their authority, the only question that need be asked is whether they have acted completely beyond their authority. But when the State has
placed specific limitations on the manner in which state officials may perform their duties, as it often does in regulatory
or other administrative contexts as were considered in Scully
v. Bird and Johnson v. Lankford, the ultra vires inquiry also
involves the question whether the officials acted in a way that
state law forbids. No sovereign would authorize its officials
to violate its own law, and if the official does so, then Larson
indicates that his conduct is ultra vires and not protected by
sovereign immunity.
Larson confirms that the Court's disposition of this case in
1981-ordering the Court of Appeals to consider respondents' state law claims-was fully harmonious with established
sovereign immunity principles. The jurisdiction of the federal court was established by a federal claim; 38 the Court of
Appeals therefore had jurisdiction to resolve the case and to
grant injunctive relief on either federal or state grounds.
Respondents pleaded a specific statutory limitation on the
,;::-------

-

There can be no doubt that respondents' federal claims were sufficiently substantial to justify federal jurisdiction in this case. In another
case brought by a resident of Pennhurst, we held that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires, at a minimum, that petitioners provide the residents with reasonable care and safety. See
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U. S. 307, 324 (1982). The uncontested findings
of the District Court in this case establish that Pennhurst was neither safe
nor providing reasonable care to its residents. Therefore, respondents'
federal claims not only were sufficiently substantial to support the exercise
of federal jurisdiction in this case, but would almost certainly have justified
the issuance of at least some injunctive relief had a state-law basis for the
relief been unavailable.
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way in which petitioners were entitled to run Pennhurst.
The District Court and the Court of Appeals have both found
that petitioners operated Pennhurst in a way that the sovereign has forbidden. Specifically, both courts concluded that
petitioners placed residents in Pennhurst without any consideration at all of the limitations on institutional confinement
that are found in state law, and that they failed to create
community living programs that are mandated by state law.
In short, there can be no dispute that petitioners ran
Pennhurst in a way that the sovereign had forbidden.
Under the second track of the Larson analysis, petitionero
were acting ultra vires because they were acting in a way
that the sovereign, by statute, had forbidden. 39
39
In Larson, the Administrator of the War Assets Administration was in
possession of coal that the plaintiff claimed the Administrator was contractually obligated to deliver to it. Instead of seeking damages for breach of
contract in the Court of Clai~s, the plaintiff sought an injunction in the
district court. The Court held that the Administrator had acted properly
in refusing to deliver the coal and instead insisting that the plaintiff seek its
remedy in the Court of Claims.
"There was, it is true, an allegation that the Administrator was acting
'illegally,' and that the refusal to deliver was 'unauthorized.' But these
allegations were not based and did not purport to be based upon any lack of
delegated power. Nor could they be, since the Administrator was empowered by the sovereign to administer a general sales program encompassing
the negotiation of contracts, the shipment of goods and the receipt of payment. A normal concomitant of such powers, as a matter of general
agency law, is the power to refuse delivery when, in the agent's view, delivery is not called for under a contract and the power to sell goods which
the agent believes are still his principal's to sell." 337 U. S. at 691-62
(footnotes omitted).
Thus, the Administrator had acted properly. He was doing what any
agent would do-holding on to property he believed was his principal's and
insisting that the claimant sue the principal if it wanted the property. He
was merely exercising the "normal" duties of a sales agent. Congress envisioned that he do exactly that; the remedy it had provided required the
claimant to sue for damages in the Court of Claims rather than obtaining
the property directly from the Administrator, and no one had questioned
the constitutional sufficiency of that alternate remedy. See McCord,
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Petitioners readily concede, both in their brief and at oral
argument, that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar a suit
against state officers who have acted ultra vires. The majority makes a similar concession, ante, at 10 n. 11. Yet both
ignore the fact that the cases, and most especially Larson,
set out a two-step analysis for ultra vires conduct -conduct
that is completely beyond the scope of the officer's authority,
or conduct that the sovereign has forbidden. In fact, the
majority goes so far as to quote the passage from Larson indicating that a state official acts ultra vires when he completely lacks power delegated from the state, ibid. That selective quotation ignores sentences immediately preceding
and following the quoted passage stating in terms that where
an official violates a statutory prohibition, he acts ultra vires
and is not protected by sovereign immunity. This omission

/
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Fault Without Liability: Immunity of Federal Employees, 1966 U. Ill. L.F.
849, 862--867. "Since the plaintiff had not made an affinnative allegation
of any relevant statutory limitation upon the Administrator's powers, and
had made no claim that the Administrator's action amounted to an unconstitutional taking, the Court ruled that the suit must fail as an effort to
enjoin the United States." Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U. S. 643, 647 (1962).
Malone can be explained similarly. These cases hold that Congress had
empowered the governmental official to make necessary decisions about
whether to hold onto property the official believes it the government's, at
least pending the aggrieved party's remedy for incorrect ones in the Claims
Court under the Tucker Act, 28 U. S. C. §§ 1491-1507 (1976 ed. and
Supp. V 1981 and West Supp. 1983). See Byse, Proposed Reforms in Federal "Nonstatutory" Judicial Review: Sovereign Immunity, lndispensible
Parties, Mandamus, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 1479, 1490-1491 (1962); Jaffe, The
Right to Judicial Review I, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 401, 436-437 (1958). Thus,
where the official acts as the sovereign intends, he is entitled to the sovereign's immunity under the principles discussed above. Where that is not
the case, Larson permits injunctive relief. In this case, respondents did
~mitation on petitioners' powers, and the holding of the
plead
Court o .npe:O's on the merits of respondents' state law claims indicates
that petitioners were not exercising the "normal" duties that the sovereign
had envisioned for them, unlike the Administrator in Larson. Instead,
petitioners were running Pennhurst "in a way which the sovereign has forbidden." 337 U. S., at 689.
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is understandable, since petitioners' conduct in this case
clearly falls into the category of conduct the sovereign has
specifically forbidden by statute. Petitioners were told bj
Pennsylvania how to run Pennhurst, and there is no dispute
that they disobeyed their instructions. Yet without explanation, the Court repudiates the two-track analysis of
Larson and holds that sovereign immunity extends to conduct the sovereign has statutorily prohibited. 40
In sum, a century and a half of this Court's Eleventh
Amendment jurisprudence has established the following. A
suit alleging that the official had acted within his authority
but in a manner contrary to state statutes was not barred because the Eleventh Amendment prohibits suits against
States; it does not bar suits against state officials for actions
not permitted by the State under its own law. The sovereign could not and would not authorize its officers to violate
its own law; hence an action against a state officer seeking
redress for conduct not permitted by state law is a suit
against the officer, not the sovereign. Ex parte Young concluded in as explicit a fashion as possible that unconstitutional action by state officials is not action by the State even
if it purports to be authorized by state law, because the federal Constitution strikes down the state law shield. In the
tort cases, ifthe plaintiff proves his case, there is by definition no state-law defense to shield the defendant. Similarly,
when the state officer violates a state statute, the sovereign
has by definition erected no shield against liability. These
precedents make clear that there is no foundation for the contention that the majority embraces-that Ex parte Young authorizes injunctive relief against state officials only on the
basis of federal law. To the contrary, Young is as clear as a
The majority also repudiates JUSTICE WHITE's recent statement in
Treasure Salvors: "where the officer's actions are limited by statute, actions beyond those limitations are to be considered individual and not sovereign actions." 458 U. S., at 714. Four Members of today's majority
subscribed to that statement only two Terms ago.
40
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bell: the Eleventh Amendment does not apply where there is
no state-law shield. That simple principle should control this
case.
IV
The majority's decision in this case is especially bizarre in
that it overrules a long line of cases in order to reach a result
that is utterly at odds with the usual practices of this Court.
In one of the most respected opinions ever written by a Member of this Court, Justice Brandeis wrote:
"The Court [has] developed, for its own governance in
the cases confessedly within its jurisdiction, a series of
rules under which it has avoided passing upon a large
part of all the constitutional questions pressed upon it for
decision. They are:
The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question
although properly presented by the record, if there is
also present some other ground upon which the case may
be disposed of. This rule has found most varied application. Thus, if a case can be decided on either of two
grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the
other a question of statutory construction or general law,
the Court will decide only the latter. Siler v. Louisville
& Nashville R. Co., 213 U. S. 175, 191." Ashwander v.
Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U. S. 288, 346-347
(1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
The Siler case, cited with approval by Justice Brandeis in
Ashwander, employed a remarkably similar approach to that
used by the Court of Appeals in this case. A privately
owned railroad corporation brought suit against the members
of the railroad commission of Kentucky to enjoin the enforcement of a rate schedule promulgated by the commission.
The federal circuit court found that the schedule violated the
plaintiff's federal constitutional rights and granted relief.
This Court affirmed, but it refused to decide the constitutional question because injunctive relief against the state offi-
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cials was adequately supported by state law. The Court
held that the plaintiff's claim that the schedule violated the
Federal Constitution was sufficient to justify the assertion of
federal jurisdiction over the case, but then declined to reach
the federal question, deciding the case on the basis of state
law instead:
"Where a case in this court can be decided without reference to questions arising under the Federal Constitution, that course is usually pursued and is not departed
from without important reasons. In this case we think
it much better to decide it with regard to the question of
a local nature, involving the construction of the state
statute and the authority therein given to the commission to make the order in question, rather than to unnecessarily decide the various constitutional questions appearing in the record." Siler v. Louisville & Nashville
R.R. Co., 213 U. S. 175, 193 (1909). 41
The Siler principle has been applied on numerous occasions; when a suit against state officials has presented both
federal constitutional questions and issues of state law, the
Court has upheld injunctive relief on state law grounds.
See, e. g., Lee v. Bickell, 292 U. S. 415, 425 (1934); Glenn v.
Field Packing Co., 290 U. S. 177, 178 (1933); Davis v. Wallace, 257 U. S. 478, 482-485 (1922); Louisville & Nashville
R.R. Co. v. Greene, 244 U. S. 522, 527 (1917); Greene v. Louisville & Interurban R.R. Co., 244 U. S. 499, 508, 512-514
(1917). 42
"In Siler the Court decided the case on state-law grounds, even though
it acknowledged that "(i]n this case we are without the benefit of a construction of the statute by the highest state court of Kentucky, and we
must proceed in the absence of state adjudication upon the subject." I d.,
at 194.
42
Justice Peckham's opinion in Siler rested on a long line of cases, dating
back to Chief Justice Marshall's decision in Osborn v. Bank of the United
States, 9 Wheat. 738, 822 (1824) , holding that a federal court has jurisdiction over all the issues-state as well as federal-presented by a case that
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In Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U. S. 528 (1974), the Court
quoted from the Siler opinion and noted that the "Court has
characteristically dealt first with possibly dispositive state
law claims pendent to federal constitutional claims." I d., at
546. It added:
"Numerous decisions of this Court have stated the
general proposition endorsed in Siler-that a federal
court properly vested with jurisdiction may pass on the
state or local law question without deciding the federal
constitutional issues-and have then proceeded to disproperly falls within its jurisdiction. Nor was Siler breaking new ground
in avoiding a federal constitutional question by deciding on state law
grounds. In Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad Co., 118
U. S. 394 (1886), the Court noted the importance of the federal constitutional questions. Even though these had been treated as dispositive by
the lower court, and though they were the "main-almost the only-questions discussed by counsel," id., at 395, the Court stated, "These questions
belong to a class which this court should not decide, unless their determination is essential to the disposal of the case in which they arise." I d., at
410. It then determined that the challenged tax assessments were not authorized by state law and affirmed the judgment solely on that ground. In
addition, the Court has routinely applied the Siler rule in cases upholding
injunctive relief on the basis of state law against municipal officials, see,
e. g., Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U. S. 620, 629 (1946); Cincinnati v.
Vester, 281 U. S. 439, 448-449 (1930); Risty v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Co., 270 U. S. 378 (1926); Bohler v. Callaway , 267 U. S. 479,
489 (1925); Lincoln Gas & Electric Light Co. v. City of Lincoln, 250 U. S.
256, 268-269 (1919); and in cases in which the plaintiffs were not held to be
entitled to the relief they sought, see Schmidt v. Oakland Unified School
Dist., 457 U. S. 594 (1982) (per curiam); Railroad Comm'n of California v.
Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 302 U. S. 388, 391 (1938); United Gas Co. v.
Railroad Commission of Kentucky, 278 U. S. 300, 307 (1929); Waggoner
Estate v. Wichita County, 273 U. S. 113, 116 (1927); Chicago Great Western Railway Co. v. Kendall, 266 U. S. 94, 97-98 (1924); Ohio Tax Cases,
232 U. S. 576, 586-587 (1914); Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Garrett, 231 U. S. 298, 303-304 (1913). Numerous other cases decided by this
Court have cited Siler as an accurate statement of the law regarding pendent jurisdiction. See, e. g., Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U. S. 1, 7 (1976);
Florida Lime Growers v. Jacobsen, 362 U. S. 73, 81, n. 7 (1960); Hurn v.
Oursler, 289 U. S. 238, 243--245 (1933).
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pose of the case solely on the nonfederal ground. See,
e. g., Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U. S. 620, 629-630
(1946); Waggoner Estate v. Wichita County, 273 U. S.
113, 116-119 (1927); Chicago G.W.R. Co. v. Kendall, 266
U. S. 94 (1924); United Gas Co. v. Railroad Comm'n,
278 U. S. 300, 308 (1929); Risty v. Chicago, R. I. &
P.R. Co., 270 U. S. 378, 387 (1926). These and other
cases illustrate in practice the wisdom of the federal policy of avoiding constitutional adjudication where not absolutely essential to disposition of a case." 415 U. S., at
547 n. 12.
In fact, in this very case we applied the Siler rule by remanding the case to the Court of Appeals with explicit instructions
to consider whether respondents were entitled to relief under
state law.
Not only does the Siler rule have an impressive historical
pedigree, but it is also strongly supported by the interest in
avoiding duplicative litigation and the unnecessary decision
of federal constitutional questions.
"The policy's ultimate foundations ... lie in all that
goes to make up the unique place and character, in our
scheme, of judicial review of governmental action for
constitutionality. They are found in the delicacy of that
function, particularly in view of possible consequences
for others stemming also from constitutional roots; the
comparative finality of those consequences; the consideration due to the judgment of other repositories of constitutional power concerning the scope of their authority;
the necessity, if government is to function constitutionally, for each to keep within its power, including the
courts; the inherent limitations of the judicial process,
arising especially from its largely negative character and
limited resources of enforcement; withal in the paramount importance of constitutional adjudication in our
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system." Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U. S.
549, 571 (1947). 43

In addition, application of the Siler rule enhances the decisionmaking autonomy of the States. Siler directs the federal
court to turn first to state law, which the State is free to modify or repeal. 44 By leaving the policy determinations underlying injunctive relief in the hands of the State, the Court of
Appeals' approach gives appropriate deference to established
state policies.
In contrast, the rule the majority creates today serves
none of the interests of the State. The majority prevents
federal courts from implementing State policies through equitable enforcement of State law. Instead, federal courts
are required to resolve cases on federal grounds that no State
authority can undo. Leaving violations of state law unredressed and ensuring that the decisions of federal courts may
never be reexamined by the States hardly comports with the
respect for States as sovereign entities commanded by the
Eleventh Amendment.

v

One basic fact underlies this case: far from immunizing petitioners' conduct, the State of Pennsylvania prohibited it.
Respondents do not complain about the conduct of the State
of Pennsylvania-it is Pennsylvania's commands which they
seek to enforce. Respondents seek only to have Pennhurst
run the way Pennsylvania envisioned that it be run. Until
today, the Court understood that the Eleventh Amendment
Cf. H.L . v. Matheson, 450 U. S. 398, 407 (1981) (citing Justice Brandeis' opinion in Ashwander); Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U. S. 111, 122
(1979) (citing the Court's opinion in Siler).
44
In some of the cases following Siler, this Court has required that the
decree include a provision expressly authorizing its reopening in the event
that a state court later decided the question of state law differently. See
Lee v. Bickell, 292 U. S. 415, 426 (1934); Wald Transfer & Storage Co. v.
Smyth, 290 U. S. 602 (1933); Glenn v. Field Packing Co., 290 U. S. 177,
178-179 (1933).
43
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does not shield the conduct of state officers which has been
sanctioned by their sovereign.
Throughout its history this Court has derived strength
from institutional self-discipline. Adherence to settled doctrine is presumptively the correct course. 45 Departures are,
of course, occasionally required by changes in the fabric of
our society. 46 When a court, rather than a legislature, initi.. "I agree with what the Court stated only days ago, that 'the doctrine of
stare decisis, while perhaps never entirely persuasive on a constitutional
question, is a doctrine that demands respect in a society governed by the
rule of law.' City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health,
Inc., - - U. S. - -, - - (1983). While the doctrine of stare decisis does
not absolutely bind the Court to its prior opinions, a decent regard for the
orderly administration of justice requires that directly controlling cases
either be followed or candidly overruled.'' Solem v. Helm, - - U. S.
- - , - - (1983) (BURGER, C. J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
This statement was joined by four members of today's majority. The
fifth was the author of the opinion of the Court in City of Akron.
46
This is an especially odd context in which to repudiate settled law in
that if anything changes in our social fabric favor limitation rather than expansion of sovereign immunity. The concept that the sovereign can do no
wrong and that citizens should be remediless in the face of its abuses is
more a relic of medieval thought than anything else.
"Whether this immunity is an absolute survival of the monarchial privilege,
or is a manifestation merely of power, or rests on abstract logical grounds,
it undoubtedly runs counter to modern democratic notions of the moral
responsibility of the State. Accordingly, courts reflect a strong legislative
momentum in their tendency to extend the legal responsibility of Government and to confirm Maitland's belief, expressed nearly fifty years ago
that, 'it is a wholesome sight to see "the Crown" sued and answering for its
torts.'" Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U. S. 47, 59 (1944)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
In the even older decision of Poindexter v. Greenhaw, 114 U. S. 270
(1884) , the Court, after observing that "the distinction between the government of a State and the State itself is important, and should be observed," id., at 290, wrote:
"This distinction is essential to the idea of constitutional government.
To deny it or blot it out obliterates the line of demarcation that separates
constitutional government from absolutism, free self-government based on
the sovereignty of the people from that despotism, whether of the one or

.-
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ates such a departure, it has a special obligation to explain
and to justify the new course on which it has embarked. Today, however, the Court casts aside, ignores, or misapplies
well settled respected doctrine that plainly commands affirmance of the Court of Appeals-the doctrine of the law of the
case, 47 the doctrine of stare decisis (the Court overrules at
least 29 cases), 48 the doctrine of sovereign immunity, 49 the
the many, which enables the agent of the State to declare and decree that
he is the State; to say 'L'Etat c'est moi.' Of what avail are written constitutions whose bills of right for the security of individual liberty are written, too often, with the blood of martyrs shed upon the battle-field and the
scaffold, if their limitations and restraints upon power may be overpassed
with impunity by the very agencies created and appointed to guard, defend, and enforce them; and that, too, with the sacred authority oflaw, not
only compelling obedience, but entitled to respect? And how else can
these principles of individual liberty and right be maintained, if, when violated, the judicial tribunals are forbidden to visit penalties upon individual
offenders, who are the instruments of wrong, whenver they interpose the
shield of the State? The doctrine is not to be tolerated. The whole frame
and scheme of the political institutions of this country, State and Federal,
protest against it. Their continued existence is not compatible with it. It
is the doctrine of absolutism, pure, simple, and naked ... .'' ld., at 291.
47
The heart of today's holding is that this Court had no power to act as it
did in 1981 when it ordered the Court of Appeals to consider and decide the
state law issues in this very case.
48
In the following cases the Court permitted injunctive relief to issue
against state officers on the basis of state law after explicitly rejecting
their Eleventh Amendment defense: Rolston v. Missouri Fund Commissioners, 120 U. S. 391 (1887); South Carolina v. Wesley, 155 U. S. 542
(1895); Tindal v. Wesley, 167 U. S. 204 (1897); Scully v. Bird, 209 U. S.
481 (1908); Hopkins v. Clemson College, 221 U. S. 636 (1911); Atchison &c.
Ry. Co. v. O'Connor, 223 U. S. 280 (1912); Johnson v. Lankford, 245 U. S.
541 (1918); Martin v. Lankford, 245 U. S. 547 (1918); Greene v. Louisville
& Interurban R. Co., 244 U. S. 499 (1917); Louisville & Nashville R. Co.
v. Greene, 244 U.S. 522 (1917); Illinois Central R. Co. v. Greene, 244
U. S. 555 (1917). All are overruled.
Since petitioners' position applies also to federal sovereign immunity (indeed the principal case on which they rely, Larson, is a federal sovereign
immunity case), the following additional cases which refused to apply sovereign immunity to suits against federal officers acting within the scope of
their authority because the plaintiff had alleged that the officers had en-
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doctrine of pendent jurisdiction, 50 the doctrine of judicial restraint-all without an adequate explanation of the reasons
for its action. No sound reason justifies the further prolongation of this litigation or this Court's voyage into the sea
of undisciplined lawmaking.
As I said at the outset, this case has illuminated the character of an institution.
I respectfully dissent.

gaged in unlawful ,<:f.,nduct conduct would also be overruled: Little v.
Barreme, 2 Crancq.~p804); Wise v. Withers, 3 Cranch 331 (1806); Mitchell v. Harmony, 13 How. 115 (1851);'-Bates v. Clark, 95 U. S. 204 (1877);
Noble v. Union River Logging R. Co., 147 U. S. 165 (1893); Belknap v.
Schild, 161 U. S. 10 (1896); tSloan Shipyards v. U. S. Fleet Corp., 258
U. S. 549 (1922);'Santa Fe Pac. R. Co. v. Fall, 259 U. S. 197 (1922);'-Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U. S. 605 (1912);VLand v. Dollar, 330 U. S.
731, 738 (1947). Larson itself cites most of these cases with approval, and
disapproves of none of them. All are overruled today. In fact, today the
Court repudiates the two-track analysis of Larson, since in Larson the
Court stated that conduct which has been specifically prohibited by statute
is not protected by sovereign immunity even if it is performed within the
scope of the official's duties, yet today the Court holds that even if an officer violates a statute, his conduct is protected by sovereign immunity.
The Court also overrules the cases cited in note 50, infra.
49
From the fifteenth century English common law to Larson and beyond,
courts have never held that prohibited conduct can be shielded by sovereign immunity. That rule makes good sense-since a principal cannot authorize unlawful conduct, such conduct is of necessity ultra vires. There is
no reason to abandon such a well settled and sensible rule.
50
The majority also overrules Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 213
U.S. 175 (1909), and its progeny, including Louisville & Nashville R. Co.
v. Garrett, 231 U. S. 298 (1913); Davis v. Wallace, 257 U. S. 478 (1922);
Chicago Great Western R. Co. v. Kendall, 266 U. S. 94 (1924); United Gas
Co. v. Railroad Commission, 278 U. S. 300 (1919); Glenn v. Field Packing
Co., 290 U. S. 177 (1933); Lee v. Bickell, 292 U. S. 415 (1934); Railroad
Commission of California v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 302 U. S. 388
(1938).
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JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting.
This case has illuminated the character of an institutio:ir. f ~ _,d~ L~ "1 I z_
The record demonstrates that the Pennhurst State School
· - _,. ~ and Hospital has been operated in blatant disregard of state ' '~ . L~ ~ ~ ~ ~ : ~
law. In 1977, after three years of iftigation, the District ~ ,___.._._........,.
Court entered detailed findings of fact that abundantly sup-~ ~ i J ~
44
port that conclusion. In 1981, after four more years oflitiga~V'
tion, this Court ordered the United States Court of Appeals ~4.. ; -'/ ~
for the Third Circuit to decide whether the law of Pennsylvania provides an independent and adequate ground which can
support the District Court's remedial order. The Court of
Appeals, sitting en bane, unanimously concluded that it did.
The Court does not disagree with that conclusion. Rather,
it reverses the Court of Appeals because it did precisely what
this Court ordered it to do; the only error committed by the
Court of Appeals was its faithful obedience to this Court's
command.
This remarkable result is the product of an equally remarkable misapplication of the ancient doctrine of sovereign immunity. In a completely unpre ~e~ed holding, today the
Court concludes that Pennsylvama's sovereign immunity prevents a federal court from enjoining the conduct that Pennsylvania itself has prohibited. No rational view of the sovereign immunity of the States supports this result. To the
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contrary, the question whether a federal court may award injunctive relief on the basis of state law has been answered affirmatively by this Court many times in the past. Yet the
Court blithely overrules at leas~es, spanning well over
a century of this Court's jurisprudence, proclaiming that federal courts have no power to enforce the will of the States by
enjoining conduct because it violates state law. This new
pronouncement will require the federal courts to decide federal constitutional questions despite the availability of statelaw grounds for decision, a result inimical to sound principles
of judicial restraint. Nothing in the Eleventh Amendment,
the conception of state sovereignty it embodies, or the history of this institution, requires or justifies such a perverse
result. I therefore respectfully dissent.
I

. It is worth noting exactly what conduct of petitioners the
Court attributes to the State of Pennsylvania in order to find
it protected by the Eleventh Amendment, as well as the procedural posture of this case. As noted in our prior opinion,
451 U. S. 1 (1981), and by the majority today, ante, at 2, the
District Court's findings were undisputed: "Conditions at
Pennhurst are not only dangerous, with the residents often
physically abused or drugged by staff members, but also inadequate for the 'habilitation' of the retarded. The court
found that the physical, intellectual, and emotional skills of
some residents have deteriorated at Pennhurst." 451 U. S.,
at 7 (footnote omitted). The court concluded that Pennhurst
was actually hazardous to its residents. 1 Organized pro' There was often urine and excrement on the walls. Infectious diseases
were common and minimally adequate health care was unavailable. Residents of Pennhurst were inadequately supervised, and as a consequence
were often injured by other residents or as a result of self-abuse. Assaults
on residents by staff members, including sexual assaults, were frequent.
Physical restraints were employed in lieu of adequate staffing, often causing injury to residents, and on one occasion leading to a death. Dangerous
psychotropic drugs were indiscriminately used for purposes of behavior
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grams of training or education were inadequate or entirely
unavailable, and programs of treatment or training were not
developed for residents. When they visited Pennhurst,
shocked parents of residents would find their children
bruised, drugged and unattended. These conditions often
led to a deterioration in the condition of the residents after
being placed in Pennhurst. Terri Lee Halderman, for example, was learning to talk when she entered Pennhurst; after
residing there she lost her verbal skills.
At every stage of
this litigation, petitioners have conceded that Pennhurst fails
to provide even minimally adequate habilitation for its residents. See 612 F. 2d 84, 92-94 (3d Cir. 1979) (en bane); 446
F. Supp. 1295, 1304 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
The District Court held that these conditions violated each
resident's rights under the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 87 Stat. 394, as amended by 92 Stat. 2987,
29 U. S. C. § 794 (1976 ed., Supp. V), and the Pennsylvania
Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966, Pa. Stat.
Ann. tit. 50, §§ 4101-4704 (Purdon 1969 & Supp. 1982)
("MH/MR Act"). The en bane Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit affirmed most of the District Court's judgment,
but it grounded its decision solely on the "bill of rights" provision in the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of
Rights Act, 42 U. S. C. § 6010 (1976 ed. & Supp. V). The
court did not consider the constitutional issues or § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act. While it affirmed the District Court's
holding that the MH/MR Act provides a right to adequate
habilitation, the court did not decide whether that state right
justified all of the relief granted by the District Court.
Petitioners sought review by this Court, asserting that the
Court of Appeals had erred in its construction of both federal
control and staff convenience. Staff supervision during meals was minimal, and residents often stole food from each other-leaving some without
enough to eat. The unsafe conditions led to aggressive behavior on the
part of residents which was punished by solitary confinement.
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and state statutes. This Court granted certiorari and reversed, 451 U. S. 1 (1981), holding that 42 U. S. C. § 6010
created no substantive rights. We did not accept respondents' state-law contention, because there was a possibility
that the Court of Appeals' analysis of the state statute had
been influenced by its erroneous reading of federal law.
Concluding that it was "unclear whether state law provides
an independent and adequate ground which can support the
court's remedial order," 451 U. S., at 31, we "remand[ed] the
state-law issue for reconsideration in light of our decision
here."~_2bid. In a footnote we declined to consider the effect ~t~= Pennsylvania Supreme Court's then recent decision, In re Schmidt, 494 Pa. 86, 429 A. 2d 631 (1981), on the
state-law issues in the case, expressly stating that on remand
the Court of Appeals could "consider the state law issues in
light of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's recent decision."
451 U. S., at 31 n. 24.
On remand, 673 F. 2d 647 (3d Cir. 1982) (en bane), the
Court of Appeals, noting that this Court had remanded for
reconsideration of the state-law issue, examined the impact
of Schmidt. 2 According to the Court of Appeals, which was
unanimous on this point, the State Supreme Court had "spoken definitively'' on the duties of the State under the MH/MR
Act, holding that the State was required to provide care to
the mentally retarded in the "least restrictive environment."
Id., at 651. Since the MH/MR Act fully justified the relief
issued in the Court of Appeals' prior judgment, the court reinstated its prior judgment on the basis of petitioner's violation of state law. 3
2
In the questions raised in their petition for certiorari, petitioners do not
ask this Court to reexamine the Court of Appeals' conclusion that respondents are clearly entitled to relief under state law. Nor would it be appropriate for this Court to reexamine the unanimous conclusion of the en bane
Court of Appeals on a question of state law. See, e. g., Bishop v. Wood,

426

u. s. 341, 345-346 (1976).

The court therefore found it unnecessary to decide if respondents were
also entitled to relief under the federal statutory and constitutional provisions which had been raised in the District Court.
3

,
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Thus, the District Court found that petitioners have been
operating the Pennhurst facility in a way that is forbidden by
state law, by federal statute and by the Federal Constitution.
The en bane Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit unanimously concluded that state law provided a clear and adequate basis for upholding the District Court and that it was
not necessary to address the federal questions decided by
that court. That action conformed precisely to the directive
issued by this Court when the case was here before. Petitioners urge this Court to make an unprecedented about-face,
and to hold that the Eleventh Amendment prohibited the
Court of Appeals from doing what this Court ordered it to do
when we instructed it to decide whether respondents were
entitled to relief under state law. Of course, if petitioners
are correct, then error was committed not by the Court of
Appeals, which after all merely obeyed the instruction of this
Court, but rather by this Court in 1981 when we ordered the
Court of Appeals to consider the state-law issues in the case.
Petitioners' position is E_tterly without support. The Eleventh Amendment and the doctrine of sovereign immunity it
embodies have never been interpreted to deprive a court of
jurisdiction to grant relief against government officials who
are engaged in conduct that is forbidden by their sovereign.
On the contrary, this Court has repeated! and consistently
exercised the power to enJom state officials om violating
s~ aw.
---.

II

The majority proceeds as if this Court has not had previous
occasion to consider Eleventh Amendment argument made
by petitioners, and contends that Ex parte Young, 209 U. S.
123 (1908) has no application to a suit seeking injunctive relief
on the basis of state law. That is simply not the case. The
Court rejected the argument that the Eleventh Amendment
precludes injunctive relief on the basis of state law twice only
two Terms ago. In Florida Dept. of State v. Treasure
Salvors, Inc., 458 U. S. 670 (1982), four Justices concluded
that a suit for possession of property in the hands of state of-
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ficials was not barred by the Eleventh Amendment inasmuch
as the State did not have even a colorable claim to the property under state law. See id., at 69~97 (opinion of STEVENS, J., joined by BURGER, C. J., MARSHALL, and BLACK- ~
MUN, JJ.). Four additional Justices accepted the proposition
that if the state officers' conduct had been in violation of a
state statute, the Eleventh Amendment would not bar the
action. Id., at 714 (WHITE, J., concurring in the judgment
in part and dissenting in part, joined by POWELL, REHNQUIST, and O'CONNOR, JJ.). 4
And in just one short paragraph in Cory v. White, 457 U. S. 85 (1982), the Court thrice
~restated the
settled rule that the Eleventh Amendment does
not bar suits against state officers when they are "alleged to
be acting against federal or state law." 5 These are only the
two most recent in an extraordinarily long line of cases.
• "Larson established that where the officer's actions are limited by statute, actions beyond those limitations are to be considered individual and
not sovereign actions." Ibid.
5
"Neither did Edelman deal with a suit naming a state officer as defendant, but not alleging a violation of either federal or state law. Thus, there
was no occasion in the opinion to cite or discuss the unanimous opinion in
Worcester that the Eleventh Amendment bars suits against state officers
unless they are alleged to be acting contrary to federal law or against the
authority of state law. Edelman did not hold that suits against state officers who are not alleged to be acting against federal or state law are per-

missible under the Eleventh Amendment if only prospective relief is
sought." 457 U. S., at 91 (emphasis supplied).
See also Worcester County Co. v. Riley, 302 U. S. 292, 297 (1937) (citations
omitted) ("[G]enerally suits to restrain action of state officials can, consistently with the constitutional prohibition, be prosecuted only when the action sought to be restrained is without the authority of state law or contravenes the statutes or Constitution of the United States. The Eleventh
Amendment, which denies to the citizen the right to resort to a federal
court to compel or restrain state action, does not preclude suit against a
wrongdoer merely because he asserts that his acts are within an official authority which the state does not confer."). In Worcester the Court held a
suit barred by the Eleventh Amendment only after stating: "Hence, it cannot be said that the threatened action of respondents involves any breach
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By 1908, it was firmly established t
cials under color of office considered tortious under state law
are not protected by the Eleventh
endment. See Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust, 154 U. S. 362, 390-391
(1894); Poindexter v. Greenhaw, 114 U. S. 270, 287 (1885);
Cunningham v. Macon & Bruns'Wick R. Co., 109 U. S. 446,
452 (1883). 6 Cf. Belknap v. Schild, 161 U. S. 10, 18 (1896)
(same rule adopted for sovereign immunity of the United
States); Stanley v. Schwalby, 147 U. S. 508, 518-19 (1893)
(same). 7 In Hopkins v. Clemson Agricultural College, 221
U. S. 636 (1911), the Court explained the relationship of
these cases to the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
of state law or of the laws or Constitution of the United States." ld., at
299.
6
The Court explained that the state officer sued i tort
"is not sued as, or because he is, the officer of the go
ment, but as an
individual, and the court is not ousted of jurisdiction because he asserts JUrisdiction as such officer. To make out his defense he must show that his
authority was sufficient in law to protect him." Cunningham, 109 U. S.,
at 452, quoted in Poindexter, 114 U. S., at 287.
7
See also Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478-, 489-490 (1978) (officers of
the United States are liable for their torts unless the torts are authorized
by federal law); Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U. S. 605, 61~20 (1912)
(officers of the United States may be enjoined where they wrongfully interfere with property rights). Justice Holmes had occasion to state that sovereign immunity does not generally extend to the acts of an officer of the
sovereign. "In general the United States cannot be sued for a tort, but its
immunity does not extend to those that acted in its name." Sloan Shipyards v. U.S. Fleet Corp., 258 U.S. 549, 568 (1922). He characterized
petitioner's argument in that case-that sovereign immunity should extend
to the unlawful acts of agents of the United States acting within the scope
of their authority-as "a very dangerous departure from one of the first
principles of our system of law. The sovereign properly so called is superior to suit for reasons that often have been explained. But the general
rule is that any person within the jurisdiction is always amenable to the
law. . . . An instrumentality of government he might be and for the
greatest ends, but the agent, because he is3~nt, does not cease to be answerable for his acts." !d., at 560-567. See also Brady v. Roosevelt S.S.
Co., 317 U. S. 575 (1943) (following Sloan).
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"[I]mmunity from suit is a high attribute of sovereignty-a prerogative of the State itself-which cannot
be availed of by public agents when s~d fo; their OWl
torts. The Eleventh Amendment was not mtended to
affOrd them freedom from liability in any case where,
under color of their office, they have injured one of the
State's citizens. To grant them such immunity would be
to create a privileged class free from liability for wrongs
inflicted or injuries threatened . . . . Besides, neither a
State nor an individual can confer upon an agent authority to commit a tort so as to excuse the perpetrator. In
such cases the law of agency has no application-the
wrongdoer is treated as a principal and individua~ble for the damages inflicted and subject to 'i!rJunctwn
" against the commission of acts causing irreparable injury." ld., at 642-643. 8
The principles that were decisive in these cases are not
confined to actions under state tort law. They also apply to
claims that state officers have violated state statutes. In
Johnson v. Lankford, 245 U. S. 541 (1918), the Court reversed the dismissal of an action against the bank commissioner of Oklahoma and his surety to recover damages for the
loss of plaintiff's bank deposit, allegedly caused by the commissioner's failure to safe ard the business and assets of the
bank in neg!igent or willful disregard of his duties under ap8

The Court also stated,
"Corporate agents or individual officers of the State stand in no better
position than officers of the General Government, and as to them it has
often been held that: 'The exemption of the United States from judicial
process does not protect their officers and agents, civil or military, in time
of peace, from being ersonally liable to an action of tort by a private person, whose rights of prope y t ey ave wrongfully in aded, or injured,
even by authority of the United States.' Belknap v. Shild, 161 U. S. 10,
18.'' 221 U. S., at 645 (emphasis supplied).
See also Old Colony Trust Co. v. Seattle, 271 U. S. 426, 431 (1926) (reaffirming the rationale of Clemson in an action against city and county
officials).
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plicable state statutes. The Court explained that the action
was not one against the State.
"To answer it otherwise would be to assert, we think,
that whatever an officer does, even in contravention of
the laws of the State, is state action, identifies him with
it and makes the redress sought against him a claim
against the State and therefore prohibited by the Eleventh Amendment. Surely an officer of a State may be
delinquent without involvingThe State in delmquency,
in ee , may InJure e tate by delinquency as well as
some resident of the State, and be amenable to both."
ld., at 545.
Similarly, in Rolston v. Missouri Fund Commissioners,
120 U. S. 391 (1887), the Court rejected the argument that a
suit to enjoin a state officer to comply with state law violated
the Eleventh Amendment. The Court wrote, "Here the suit
is to get a state officer to do what a statute requires of him.
The litigation is with the officer, not the state." !d. ; at 411. 9
Significantly, this rule was expressly reaffirmed in a case
decided by this Court in the same Term as Ex parte Young
and published in the same volume of the United States Reports. The appellant in Scully v. Bird, 209 U. S. 481 (1908),
9
In Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 154 U. S. 362 (1894), the
Court held that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar a suit alleging that
a state officer has wrongfully administered a state statute. The Court
~warded injunctive relief against state officers on the basis of both state
and federal law. In Atchison &c. Ry. Co. v. O'Connor, 223 U. S. 280
(1912), the Court held that a suit against state officers seeking recovery of
taxes paid under duress was not against the State since a state statute required the recovery of wrongfully paid taxes. See id., at 287. In
Lankford v. Platte Iron Works Co ., 235 U. S. 461 (1915), the Court assumed that the Eleventh Amendment would not bar a suit "to compel submission by the officers of the State to the laws of the State, accomplishing
at once the policy of the law and its specific purpose," id. , at 471, but rejected the appellees' construction of the state statute. See also Parish v.
State Banking Board, 235 U. S. 498 (1915); American Water Co. v.
Lankford, 235 U. S. 496 (1915).
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brought a diversity suit seeking injunctive relief against the
dairy and food commissioner of the State of Michigan, on the
ground that "under cover of his office" he had maliciously engaged in a course of conduct designed to ruin plaintiff's business in the State. The circuit court dismissed the complaint
on Eleventh Amendment grounds. On appeal, the plaintiff
contended that the Eleventh Amendment "does not apply
where a suit is brought against defendants who, claiming to
act as officers of the State, and under color of a statute which
is valid and constitutional, but wrongfully administered by
them, commit, or threaten to commit, acts of wrong or injury
to the rights and property of the plaintiff, or make such administration of the statute an illegal burden and exaction
upon the plaintiff." Id., at 418. This Court agreed. It
noted that the complaint alleged action "in dereliction of duties enjoined by the statutes of the State," and concluded that
it was "manifest from this summary of the allegations of the
bill that this is not a suit against the State." I d., at 490. 10
Finally, in Greene v. Louisville & Interurban R. Co., 244
U. S. 499 (191~d its companion cases, Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Greene, 244 U. S. 522 (1917); Illinois Central
R. Co. v. Greene, 244 U. S. 555 (1917), the plaintiffs challenged the conduct of state officials under both federal and
state law. The Court, citing, inter alia, Young and
Clemson, held that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar injunctive relief on the basis of state law, noting that the plaintiffs' federal claim was sufficiently substantial to justify the
exercise of pendent jurisdiction over plaintiffs' state-law

°Cases construing the sovereign immunity of the Federal Government
also hold that conduct by federal officers forbidden by statute is not
shielded by sovereign immunity even though the officer is not acting completely beyond his authority. See Land v. Dollar, 330 U. S. 731 (1947);
Ickes v. Fox, 300 U. S. 82 (1937); Work v. Louisiana, 269 U. S. 250 (1925);
Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co. v. Fall , 259 U. S. 197 (1922); Payne v. Central
Pac. Ry. Co., 255 U.S. 228 (1921); Waite v. Macy, 246 U.S. 606 (1918);
Noble v. Union River Logging R. Co., 147 U. S. 165 (1893).
1
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claims, 11 and that since violations of federal and state law had
been alleged, it was appropriate for the federal court to issue
injunctive relief on the basis of state law without reaching the
federal claims, despite the strictures of the Eleventh Amendment. In short, the Greene Court approved of precisely the
methodology employed by the Court of Appeals in this case. 12
The majority manages to avoid addressing almost all of J
these cases, perhaps because it has no explanation for them. 13
"The Court cited Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 213 U.S. 175
(1917), which will be discussed in part IV, infra, in support of this
proposition.
12
The unanimous rejection of the argument that the Eleventh Amendment bars claims based on state officers' violations of federal statutes in
Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U. S. 151, 156 n. 6 (1978) is entirely
consistent with my analysis of our cases. But under the majority's view, it
represented a rather dramatic extension of Ex parte Young to encompass
federal statutory claims as well as constitutional claims. Ray demonstrates that it cannot be maintained that Young and the other cases of this
Court permit injunctive relief only when the constitutionality of state officers' conduct is at issue. If that were so Ray would be wrongly decidedan argument that a state officer has violated a federal statute does not constitute a challenge to the constitutionality of the officer's conduct. Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U. S. 600, 612-615 (1979); Swift
& Co. v. Wickham, 382 U. S. 111 (1965). In my view, the Eleventh
Amendment claim in Ray deserved no more than the cursory footnote it
received, since the state officials had engaged in conduct forbidden by statute. If the Court were willing to adhere to settled rules of law today, the
Eleventh Amendment claim could be rejected just as summQ il@
13
In a r her des erate attempt to explain these cases, amici suggest
that the Court simp y 1 not rea 1ze t a 1 was ec1 mg questions of state
law, since in the era before Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 (1938)
and United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U. S. 715 (1966), it was not clear
that diversity cases or pendent claims were governed by state rather than
federal law. That suggestion is refuted by the cases discussed above in
which it was held that re'lief could issue against state officers who had violated state statutes. Even under the construction of the Rules of Decision
Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1652, adopted in Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1 (1842), and
repudiated in Erie, federal courts were bound to apply state statutes.
See, e. g., Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow
Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U. S. 518, 529-531 (1928); Swift, 16 Pet., at
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None of these cases ontain only- "imp~icit" or sub silentio
ho~ them exp 'city consider an reject t e c aim
tnatthe Imeventh Amendment prohibits federal couFEs From
iss'Umg injunctive relief based on state law. There istherefore no basis for the majority's assertion that the issue presented by this case is an open one, ante, at 17. 14 To the extent it does deal with these precedents, the majority merely
suggests that they assumed that federal courts could hear
state-law claims that are pendant to federal claims, failing to
recognize that the Eleventh Amendment is a limitation on
the entire judicial power, including the power to hear pendant claims. Ante, at 17-19. This is simply incorrect. In
many of the foregoing cases the state-law claims were not
based on pendant jurisdiction; hence, the Court's decisions
18-19. Thus, in these cases the Court was indisputably issuing relief
under state law. The Court was explicit about the state-law basis for the
relief it granted in Greene, to use just one example. It stated that federal
jurisdiction "extends, to the determination of all questions involved in the
case, including questions of state law, irrespective of the disposition that
may be made of the federal question, or whether it be found necessary to
decide it at all." 244 U. S., at 508. It then granted plaintiffs relief under
state law, and concluded by declining to decide any question of federal law.
"It is obvious, however, in view of the result reached upon the questions of
state law, just discussed, that the disposition of the cases would not be affected by whatever result we might reach upon the federal question . . . .
Therefore, we find it unnecessary to express any opinion upon the question
raised under the Fourteenth Amendment." Id., at 519.
14
The majority incredibly claims that Green;. contains only an implicit
holding on the Eleventh A'men?finent question the Court decides today.
In plain words, the Greene Court held that the Eleventh Amendment did
not bar consideration of the pendant state-law claims advanced in that
case. It must be left to others to explain how the majority can possibly
read this as an implicit or sub silentio holding; I cannot. Not only did the
Court expressly reject the Eleventh Amendment claim, but it did so after
extensive briefing on this precise issue. See Brief for Appellants, Greene
v. Louisville and Interurban Railroad Co. 27-45; Brief for State Board
and Officers, Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Greene 74-101. See
also Reply Brief of Illinois Central Railroad Co., Illinois Central Railroad
Co. v. Greene 38--39.
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could not have been based on any theory about pendant jurisdiction.15 More significantly, today's majority opinion reveals a distressinffi lack of knowledge about the doctrine of
sovereign immuni y ana t'lie 6asi s for the rule of Ex parte
Young.
III
On its face, the Eleventh Amendment applies only to suits
against a State brought by citizens of other States and foreign nations. 16 This textual limitation upon the scope of the
states' immunity from suit in federal court was set aside in
Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1 (1890). Hans was a suit
against the State of Louisiana, brought by a citizen of Louisiana seeking to recover interest on the state's bonds. The
Court stated that some of the arguments favoring sovereign
immunity for the States made during the process of the .J--"
Amendment's ratification -¥at;ifieati~ had become a part of
the judicial scheme created by the Constitution. As a result,
the Court concluded that the Constitution prohibited a suit
by a citizen against his or her own state. When called upon
to elaborate in Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U. S. 313 (1934),
the Court explained that the Eleventh Amendment did more
than simply prohibit suits brought by citizens of one State
against another State. Rather, it exemplified the broader
and more ancient doctrine of sovereign immunity, which operates to bar a suit brought by a citizen against his own State
without its consent. 17
16
For example, in Johnson v. Lankford and Scully v. Bird federal jurisdiction was established over the state-law claims by diversity of citizenship; they were not pendant to federal claims.
16
"The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of
the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects
of any Foreign State." U. S. Const. amend. XI.
17
"Manifestly, we cannot rest with a mere literal application of the words
of§ 2 or Article III, or assume that the letter of the Eleventh Amendment
exhausts the restriction upon suits against non-consenting states. Behind
the words of the constitutional provisions are postulates which limit and
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The Court has subsequently adhered to this interpretation
of the Eleventh Amendment. For example, in Quern v. Jordan, 440 U. S. 332 (1979), the Court referred to the Eleventh
Amendment as incorporating "the traditional sovereign immunity of the States." I d., at 341. Similarly, in Fitzpatrick
v. Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445 (1976), the Court referred to "the
Eleventh Amendment, and the principle of sovereign immunity it embodies . . . ." I d., at 456. See also Nevada v.
Hall, 440 U. S. 410, 438-441 (1979) (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting). 18 Thus, under our cases it is the doctrine of sovereign
immunity, rather than the_text o:[ the AmendmenC it'self,
wh'icliis critical t o ffiearutlySisOi' any Elevemfi :Amendiiient
problem. 19
The doctrine of sovereign immunity developed in England,
where it was thoug'liftflat the king could not 6e sued. Howcontrol. There is the essential postulate that the controversies, as contemplated, shall be found to be of a justiciable character. There is also the
postulate that States of the Union, still possessing attributes of sovereignty, shall be immune from suits, without their consent, save where
there has been 'a surrender of this immunity in the plan of the convention."' ld., at 322-323 (footnote omitted).
See also Ex Parte New York, 256 U. S. 490, 497 (1921); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1, 1&-18 (1890). Most commentators have understood this
Court's Eleventh Amendment cases as taking the position that the Constitution incorporates the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity.
See, e. g., Baker, Federalism and the Eleventh Amendment, 48 U. Col. L.
Rev. 139, 153-158 (1977); Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: Part One, 126 U. Pa. L. Rev. 515, 53~6
(1978); Thornton, The Eleventh Amendment: An Endangered Species, 55
Ind. L. J. 293, 30&-310 (1980); Tribe, Intergovernmental Immunities in
Litigation, Taxation, and Regulation: Separation of Powers Issues in Controversies About Federalism, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 682, 684-688 (1976); Comment, Private Suits Against States in the Federal Courts, 33 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 331, 334-336 (1966).
18
Petitioners themselves treat the Eleventh Amendment as equivalent to
the doctrine of sovereign immunity. See Brief for Petitioners 12 n. 10.
19
Of course, if the Court were to apply the text of the Amendment, it
would not bar an action against Pennsylvania by one of its own citizens.
See n. 16, supra.
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ever, common law courts, in applying the doctrine, traditionally distinguished between the king and his a ents, on the
theory that t e 'ng would never authoriZe unlawful conduct,
and that therefore the unlawful acts of the king's officers
ought not to be treated as acts of the sovereign. See 1 W.
Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England *244 (J.
Andrews ed. 1909). As early as the fifteenth century,
Holdsworth writes, servants of the king were held liable for
their unlawful acts. See I
o dswo , A is ory of
English Law 388 (1903). During the seventeenth century,
this rule of law was used extensively to curb the king's authority. The king's officers
"could do wrong, and if they committed wrongs, whether
iri tfie cours; of their employment or not, they could be
made legally liable. The command or instruction of the
king could not protect them. If the king really had
given such commands or instructions, he must have been
deceived." VI id., at 101.
In one famous case, it was held that although process would
not issue against the sovereign himself, it could issue against
his officers. "For the warrant of no man, not even of the
King himself, can excuse the doing of an illegal act." Sands
v. Child, 83 Eng. Rep. 725, 726 (K.B. 1693). 20 By the eighteenth century, this rule of law was unquestioned. See X
W. Holdsworth, supra, at 650-652. And in the nineteenthCentury this view was taken by the court to be so well-set20

The rationale for this principle was compelling. Courts did not wish to
confront the king's immunity from suit directly; nevertheless they found
the threat to liberty posed by permitting the sovereign's abuses to go unremedied to be intolerable. Since in reality the king could act only
through his officers, the rule which permitted suits against those officers
formally preserved the sovereign's immunity while operating as one of the
means by which courts curbed the abuses of the monarch. See X W.
Holdsworth, supra, at 262-268.

81-2101-DISSENT
PENNHURST STATE SCHOOL & HOSP. v. HALDERMAN

16

tled as to not require the citation of authority, see Feather v.
The Queen, 122 Eng. Rep. 1191, 120&-1206 (K.B. 1865). 21
It was only natural, then, that this Court, in applying the
principles of sovereign immunity, recognized the distinction
between a suit a ainst a State and one a ainst its officer. 22
For example, while the Court did inquire as to whether a suit
was "in essence" against the sovereign, it soon became settled law that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar suits
against state officials in their official capacities challenging
unconstitutional conduct. See Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S.
466, 518--519 (1898); Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, 140 U. S. 1,
10-12 (1891); Poindexter v. Greenhaw, 114 U. S. 270, 288
(1885). 23 This rule was reconciled with sovereign immunity
principles by use of the traditional rule that an action against
an agent of the sovereign who had acted unlawfully was not
Commentators have noted the influence of these English doctrines on
the American conception of sovereign immunity. See Jaffe, Suits Against
Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 1~29
(1963); Note, Express Waiver of Eleventh Amendment Immunity, 17 Ga.
L. Rev. 513, 517-518 (1983); Note, Developments in the Law-Remedies
Against the United States and its Officials, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 827, 831-833
(1957). In fact, in Belknap v. Schild, 161 U. S. 10 (1896), the Court, in
holding that officers of the United States were liable for injuries caused by
their unlawful conduct even if they did so acting pursuant to official duties,
cited the passage from Feather v. The Queen. See 161 U. S., at 18.
22
Chief Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, recognized this distinction in the very first case to reach the Court concerning the application of
the Eleventh Amendment to the conduct of a state official, Osborn v. Bank
of the United States, 9 Wheat. 738 (1824).
23
See also McNeill v. Southern R. Co., 202 U. S. 543, 559 (1906); Gunter
v. Atlantic C.L. R. Co., 200 U.S. 273, 28~284 (1906); Prout v. Starr, 188
U. S. 537 (1903); Scott v. Donald, 165 U. S. 58, 67-70 (1897); Reagan v.
Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 154 U. S. 362, 388-391 (1894); In re Tyler, 149
U. S. 164, 190-191 (1893); In re Ayers, 123 U. S. 443, 506-507 (1887);
Haygood v. Southern, 117 U. S. 52, 70 (1886); Allen v. Baltimore & O.R.
Co., 114 U. S. 311, 315-316 (1885); Board of Liquidation v. McComb, 92
U. S. 531, 541 (1875). Cf. United States v. Lee, 106 U. S. 196, 21~222
(1883) (sovereign immunity of the United States not a defense against suit
charging officers of the United States with unconstitutional conduct).
21
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considered to be against the sovereign. When an official
acts pursuant to an unconstitutional statute, the Court reasoned, the absence of valid authority leaves the official ultra
vires his authority, and thus a private actor stripped of his
status as a representative of the sovereign. 24 In., Ex parte
Y.QUdf;, 209 U. S. 123 (1908), the Court was merely restatfng
a sett ed principle when it wrote:
"The Act to be enforced is alleged to be unconstitutional, and if it be so, the use of the name of the State to
enforce an unconstitutional act to the injury of complainants is a proceeding without the authority of and one
which does not affect the State in its sovereign or governmental capacity. It is simply an illegal act uport the
part of a state official in attempting by the use of the
name of the State to enforce a legislative enactment
which is void because unconstititional. If the act which
the state Attorney General seeks to enforce be a violation of the Federal Constitution, the officer in proceeding under such enactment comes into conflict with the
" superior authority of that Constitution, and he is in that
case stripped of his official or representative character
and is subjected in his person to the consequences of his
individual conduct." !d., at 159--160. 25
'I
24
"That, it is_ true, is a legislative act of the government of Virginia, but it
is not a law of the State of Virginia. The State has passed no such law, for
it cannot; and what it cannot do, it certainly, in contemplation of law, has
not done . The Constitution of the United States, and its own contract,
both irrepealable by any act on its part, are the law of Virginia; and that
law made jt the duty of the defendant to receive the coupons tendered in
payment of taxes, and declared every step to enforce the tax, thereafter
taken, to be without warrant of law, and the tax, thereafter taken, to be
without warrant oflaw, and therefore a wrong. He stands, then, stripped
of his official character; and , c2nfessinK a personal violation of the prainrnrs
rigHt§ ioF wh1clt lie must personal y answer, fie is without defence."
Poindexter v. Greenhaw, 114 U. S., at 288.
25
See generally Orth, The Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment,
1798-1908: A Case Study of Judicial Power, 1983 U. Ill. L. Rev. 423. The
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The majority states that the holding of Ex parte Young is
limited to cases in which relief is provided on the basis of federallaw, and that it rests entirely on the need to protect the
supremacy of federal law. That position overlooks the foundation of the rule of Young as well Pennoyer v.
McConnaughy and Young's other predecessors.
The Young Court distinguished between the State and its
~~
attorney general because the latter, in violating the Constitution, had engaged in conduct the sovereign could not author- ~~
ize. The pivotal consideration was not that the conduct viou..s-&-=~
lated federal law, since nothing in the jurisprudence of the
Eleventh Amendment permits a suit against a sovereign
merely because federal law is at issue. 26 Indeed, at least
~r
since Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1 (1890), the law has been
settled that the Eleventh Amendment applies even though
the State is accused of violating the Federal Constitution.
In Hans the Court held that the Eleventh Amendment applies to all cases within the jurisdiction of the federal courts
including those brought to require compliance with federal
law, and bars any suit where the State is the proper defendant under sovereign immunity principles. A long line of
cases has endorsed that proposition, holding that irrespective
of the need to vindicate federal law a suit is barred by the

u
-

Court has adhered to this formulation to the present day. See Florida
Dept. of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U. S. 670, 684-690 (1982)
(opinion of STEVENS, J.); id., at 714-715 (WHITE, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part); Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co .,
435 U. S. 151, 156 n. 6 (1978); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232, 237 (1974);
Georgia R. Co. v. Redwine, 342 U. S. 299 (1952); Sterling v. Constantin,
287 u. s. 378, 393 (1932).
26
As the Solicitor General correctly notes in his brief, "this Court has no
power to create any exception to a constitutional bar to federal court jurisdiction. Ex parte Young rests instead on recognition that the Eleventh
Amendment simply does not apply to suits seeking to restrain illegal acts
by state officials-whether those acts are illegal because they violate the
Constitution, as in Young, or federal or state law." Brief for the United
States 23 (citations omitted).

81-2101-DISSENT
PENNHURST STATE SCHOOL & HOSP. v. HALDERMAN

19

Eleventh Amendment if the State is the proper defendant. -n
It was clear until today that "the State [is not] divested of its
immunity 'on the mere ground that the case is one arising
under the Constitution or laws of the United States.'"
Parden v. Terminal R. Co., 377 U. S. 184, 186 (1964) (quoting Hans, 134 U. S., at 10).
The pivotal consideration in Young was that it was not conduct of the sovere1
at was at Issue. 28
e ru e t at unlaw!iilac s o an officer should not be attributed to the sovereign has deep roots in the history of sovereign immunity and
makes Young reconcilable with the principles of sovereign
immunity found in the Eleventh Amendment, 29 rather than
Lf

See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 345 n. 17 (1979); Alabama v.
Pugh, 438 U. S. 781 (1978) (per curiam); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S.
651, 668--Q69 (1974); Employees v. Missouri Public Health Dept., 411 U. S.
279, 280 n. 1 (1973); Smith v. Reeves, 178 U. S. 436, 444--449 (1900); Fitts v.
McGhee, 172 U. S. 516 (1899); In re Ayers, 123 U. S. 443 (1887); Hagood v.
Southern, 117 U. S. 52 (1886); Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U. S. 711 (1882).
See generally C. Jacobs, The Eleventh Amendment and Sovereign Immunity 88-::z.9!J1cJl.JI.iZ:.UU-+1-i:LU.,/..--- - - - - - - - - 28 The distinction between the soverei
and its a ents ot only explains
why the rationale of Ex parte Young and its predecessors IS consistent with
established sovereign immunity doctrine, but it also explains the critical
difference between actions for injunctive relief and actions for damag_es
recognized in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651 (1973). Since the damages remedy sought in that case would have required payment by the
State, it could not be said that the action ran only against the agents of the
State. Therefore, while the agents' unlawful conduct was considered
ultra vires and hence could be enjoined, a remedy which did run against
the sovereign and not merely its agent could not fit within the ultra vires
doctrine and hence was impermissible. If damages are not sought from
the State and the relief will run only against the state official, damages are
a permissible remedy under the Eleventh Amendment. See Scheuer v.
Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232, 237-238 (1974).
29
"While in England personification of sovereignty in the person of the
King may have been possible, attempts to adopt this reasoning in the
United States resulted in the postulation of the abstract State as sovereign. Since the ideal State could only act by law, whatever the State did
must be lawful. On this ground a distinction was drawn between the State
and its officers, and since the State could not commit an illegal act, any
27
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merely an unprincipled accommodation between federal and
state interests that ignores the principles contained in the
Eleventh Amendment.
This rule plainly applies to conduct of state officers in violation of state law. Young states that the significance of the
charge of unconstitutional conduct is that it renders the state
official's conduct "simply an illegal act," and hence the officer
is not entitled to the sovereign's immunity. Since a state officer's conduct in violation of state law is certainly no less illegal than his violation of federal law, in either case the official,
by committing an illegal act, is "stripped of his official or representative character." For example, one of Young's predecessors held that a suit challenging an unconstitutional attempt by the Virginia legislature to disavow a state contract
was not barred by the Eleventh Amendment, reasoning that
"inasmuch as, by the Constitution of the United States,
which is also the supreme law of Virginia, that contract,
when made, became thereby unchangeable, irrepealable
by the State, the subsequent act of January 26, 1882, and
all other like acts, which deny the obligation of that contract and forbid its performance, are not the acts of the
State of Virginia. The true and real Commonwealth
which contracted the obligation is incapable in law of doing anything in derogation of it. Whatever having that
effect, if operative, has been attempted or done, is the
work of its government acting without authority, in violation of its fundamental law, and must be looked upon,
in all courts of justice, as if it were not and never had
been. . . . The State of Virginia has done none of these
things with which this defence charges her. The defendant in error is not her officer, her agent, or her repsuch act was imputed to government officers. It logically followed that a
suit against state officers was not necessarily a suit against the State."
Note, The Sovereign Immunity of the States: The Doctrine and Some of its
Recent Developments, 40 Minn. L. Rev. 234, 244-245 (1956) (footnotes
omitted).
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resentative, in the matter complained of, for he has
acted not only without her authority, but contrary to her
express commands." Poindexter v. Greenhaw, 114
U. S. 270, 293 (1885) (emphasis supplied). 30
It is clear that the Court in Poindexter attached no signifi-

cance to the fact that Virginia had been accused of violating
federal and not its own law. 31 To the contrary, the Court
treated the Federal Constitution as part of Virginia's law,
and concluded that the challenged action was not that of Virginia precisely because it violated Virginia's law. The majority's position turns the Young doctrine on its head-sovereign immunity did not bar actions challenging
unconstitutional conduct by state officers since the Federal
Constitution was also to be considered part of the State's
law-and since the State could not and would not authorize a
violation of its own law, the officers' conduct was considered
individual and not sovereign. No doubt the Courts that produced Poindexter and Young would be shocked to discover
that conduct authorized by state law but prohibited by federal law is not considered conduct attributable to the State
for sovereign immunity purposes, but conduct prohibited by
state law is considered conduct attributable to the very State
See also Barney v. City of New York, 193 U. S. 430, 439--441 (1904).
This approach began long before Poindexter. The earliest cases in
which this Court rejected sovereign immunity defenses raised by officers
of the sovereign accused of unlawful conduct did not involve charges of unconstitutional conduct, but rather simple trespass actions. In rejecting
the defense, the Court simply noted that although the officers were acting
pursuant to their duties, they were engaged in unlawful conduct which
therefore could not be the conduct of the sovereign. See Bates v. Clark,
95 U. S. 204, 209 (1877); Mitchell v. Harmony, 13 How. 115, 137 (1851);
Wise v. Withers, 3 Cranch 331 (1806); Little v. Barreme, 2 Cranch 169
(1804). In the landmark case of Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 9
Wheat. 738 (1824), the Court took it as beyond argument that if a state
officer unlawfully seized property in an attempt to collect taxes he believed
to be owed the state, the Eleventh Amendment would not bar a simple
trespass action against the officer.
30

31
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which prohibited that conduct. Indeed, in Tindal v. Wesley,
167 U. S. 204 (1896), the Court specifically found that it was
impossible to distinguish between a suit challenging unconstitutional conduct of state officers and a suit challenging any
other type of unlawful behavior:
"If a suit against officers of a State to enjoin them from
enforcing an unconstitutional statute . . . be not one
against the State, it is impossible to see how a suit
against the individuals to recover the possession of property belonging to the plaintiff and illegally held by the
defendants can be deemed a suit against the State."
!d., at 222. 32
These cases are based on the simple idea that an illegal act
strips tbe official of his state-law shi~ld, thereby depriving
theonfcial oitlie sovereign's immunity.
It follows that the basis for the Young rule is present when
the officer sued has violated the law of the sovereign; in all
such cases the conduct is of a type that would not be permitted by the sovereign and hence is not attributable to the sovereign under traditional sovereign immunity principles. In
such a case, the sovereign's interest lies with those who seek
to enforce its laws, rather than those who have violated
them.
"[P]ublic officials may become tort-feasors by exceeding
the limits of their authority. And where they unlawfully seize or hold a citizen's realty or chattel, recoverable by appropriate action at law or in equity [the] dominant interest of the sovereign is then on the side of the
victim who may bring his possessory action to reclaim
32
See also Florida Dept. of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc ., 458 U. S.
670, 697 (1982) (opinion of STEVENS, J.) ("If conduct of a state officer taken
pursuant to an unconstitutional state statute is deemed to be unauthorized
and may be challenged in federal court, conduct undertaken without any
authority whatever is also not entitled to Eleventh Amendment
immunity.").
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that which is wrongfully withheld."
330

u. s. 731, 738 (1947).

23

Land v. Dollar,

33

The majority's position that the Eleventh Amendment does
not permit federaRourts to enjoin conduct that the sovereign
State itself seeks to prohibit thus is-inconsistent with both
the doctrine of sovere · immunity and _the undertxing respec or t e inte~it of S
olicy which the Eleventh
Amen ment pro ects. The issuance of injunctive relief
which enforces state laws and policies, if anp hing, enhances
federal courts' respect for the sovereign pe rogatives of the
States. 34 The majority's approach, which requires federal
courts to ignore questions of state law and to rest their decisions on federal bases, will create more rather than less friction between the States and the federal judiciary.
Moreover, the majority's rule has nothing to do with the
basic reason the Eleventh Amendment was added to the Constitution. There is general agreement that the Amendment
was passed because the States were fearful that federal
courts would force them to pay their Revolutionary War
debts, leading to their financial ruin. 35 Entertaining a suit
for injunctive relief based on state law implicates none of the
concerns of the Framers. Since only injunctive relief is
33
While Land v. Dollar is a case dealing with the sovereign immunity of
the Federal Government, it is pertinent to the Eleventh Amendment,
which after all for present purposes is no more than an embodiment of
sovereiegn immunity principles.
34
For example, in cases barring suits against individual officers as suits
against the state, the Court has also acknowledged the importance of statelaw authority for the challenged conduct of the officer. In such cases the
Court has frequently noted that the relief sought would be unauthorized by
state law and would therefore adversely affect the state itself. See, e. g.,
Hagood v. Southern, 117 U. S. 52, 68 (1886); Louisiana v. Jumel, 107
U. S. 711, 721 (1882). In contrast, in cases of official actions contrary to
state law, a federal court's remedy would not adversely affect any state
policy.
36
See, e. g., Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n , 359 U.S. 275,
276 n. 1 (1959); Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U. S. 18, 27 (1933); Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 406-407 (1821).
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sought there is no threat to the state treasury of the type
that concerned the Framers, see Milliken v. Bradley, 433
U. S. 267, 288-290 (1977); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S.
651, 667-668 (1974); and if the State wishes to avoid the federal injunction, it can easily do so simply by changing its law.
The possibility of States left helpless in the face of disruptive
federal decrees which led to the passage of the Eleventh
Amendment simply is not presented by this case. Indeed,
the Framers no doubt would have preferred federal courts to
base their decisions on state law, which the State is then free
to reexamine, rather than forcing courts to decide cases on
federal grounds, leaving the litigation beyond state control.
In light of the preceding, it should come as no surprise that
there is absolutely no authority for the majority's position
that the rule of Young is mapphcable to vfolafions o ..state
law.
e on y cases t e maJori y cites, an e, at 14-15, for
tlleProposition that Young is limited to the vindication of federallaw do not consider the question whether Young permits
injunctive relief on the basis of state law-in each of the cases
the question was neither presented, briefed, argued nor decided. 36 It is curious, to say the least, that the majority disapproves of reliance on cases in which the issue we face today
was decided sub silentio, see ante, at 17, yet it is willing to
rely on cases in which the issue was not decided at all. In
fact, not only is there no precedent for the majority's position, but, as I have demonstrated in part II, supra, there is
an avalanche of precedent squarely to the contrary. 37
The majority cites Quem v. Jordan, 440 U. S. 332 (1979); Scheuer v.
Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232 (1974); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651 (1974);
Georgia R. & Banking Co. v. Redwine, 342 U. S. 299 (1952). In each of
these cases, the only question presented or decided was whether monetary
relief could be obtained against state officials on the basis of f ederal law,
except for Redwine, where the Court decided that a suit to enjoin collection
of a state tax on the basis of federal law was not barred by the Eleventh
Amendment. In none of these cases was any question concerning the
availability of injunctive relief under state law considered even in dicta.
37
In addition to overruling the cases discussed in part II, supra, the majority's view that Yaung exists s1mply to ensure the supremacy of federal
36
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That the doctrine of sovereign immunity does not protect )
conduct which has been prohibited by the sovereign is clearly
demonstrated by the case on which petitioners chiefly rely,
Larso?! v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U. S.
682 (1949). The Larson opinion teaches that the actions of
state officials are not attributable to the state-are ultra vires-in two different types of situations: (1) when the official
is engaged in conduct that the sovereign has not authorized,
and (2) when he has engaged in conduct that the sovereign
has forbidden. A sovereign, like any other principal, cannot
authorize its agent to violate the law. When an agent does
so, his actions are considered ultra vires and he is liable for
his own conduct under the law of agency. Both types of
ultra vires conduct are clearly identified in Larson.
"There may be, of course, suits for specific relief
against officers of the sovereign which are not suits
against the sovereign. If the officers purports to___....
act as
an individual and not as an official, a suit directed against
that action is not a suit against the sovereign. If the
law indicates that a number of our prior cases, which held that the Eleventh Amendment may bar an action for injunctive relief even where the
State has violated the Federal Constitution, see, e. g., Alabama v. Pugh,
438 U. S. 781 (1978) (per curiam), were incorrectly decided. The Court
can have no satisfactory explanation for Pugh, which held that even as to a
federal constitutional claim, a suit may not be brought directly against a
state even where it may be brought against its officials. On the majority's
view, there is no basis for distinguishing between the state and its officials-as to both there is a need to vindicate the supremacy of federal law
through the issuance of injunctive relief, and unless the officials are acting
completely outside of their authority, they must be treated as is the state.
However, Pugh can be explained simply by reference to Young's use of the
ultra vires doctrine with respect to unconstitutional conduct by state officers-such conduct is not conduct by the sovereign because it could not be
authorized by the sovereign, hence the officers are not entitled to the sovereign's immunity. A suit directly against the state cannot succeed because the ultra vires doctrine is unavailable without a state officer to which
it can be applied. Pugh makes it clear that Young rests not on a need to)(
vindicate federal law, but on the traditional distinction between the sovereign and its agents.

J
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War Assets Administrator had completed a sale of his
own personal home, he presumably could be enjoined
from later conveying it to a third person. On a similar
theory, where the officer's powers are limited by statute, )
his actions beyond those limitations are considered individual and not sovereign actions. The officer is not dot:.df-1~ ~
ing the business which the sovereign has empowered him
to do or he is doing it in a way that the sovereign has
....,...;~
forbidden. His actions are ultra vires his authority and
•I~
therefore may be made the object of specific relief. It is
important to note that in such cases the relief can be
granted, without impleading the sovereign, qnly b~e
of the officer's lack of delegated power. A claim of error
in e exercise of that power IS therefore not sufficient.
Ari , smce the Juris iction o e cou to ear e case
may depend, as we have recently recognized, upon the
decision which it ultimately reaches on the merits, it is
necessary that the plaintiff set out in his complaint the
statutory limitation on which he relies." I d., at 689-690
(emphasis supplied).

Larson thus clearly indicates that the immunity determination depends upon the the merits of the plaintiff's claim. The
same approach is employed by Young-the plaintiff can overcome the state official's immunity only by succeeding on the
merits of its claim of unconstitutional conduct.
Following the two-track anal is of Larson, the cases considerin
e ques 10n w ether the state official is entftled to
the sovereign's immunity can be grouped into two categories.
In cases like Larson, Malone v. !5owdotn, 36'9U. S. ~ 643
(1962), and Florida Dept. of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc.,
458 U. S. 670 (1982), which usually involve the state functioning in its proprietary capacity, th
· i sue can be resolved solely by reference to th law of agenc
Since there
is no specifiCiiiiutatwn on the powers of the officers other
than the general limitations on their authority, the only question that need be asked is whether they have acted com-

~
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pletely beyond their authority. But ~hen the State !).as
placed specific limitations on the mann~.r Tn w1iich stat> officialsmaY perform their duties, as it often does in regulatory
or Otner administrative contexts as were considered in Scully
v. Bird and Johnson v. Lankford, the ultra vires inqui!x_ also ~~
involves~ion wh~ther the o~Iars actea m a way that
~~
stateraW forbids. No sovereign would authorize its officials
to violate its own law, and if the official does so, then Larson ~~
indicates that his conduct is ultra vires and not protected by dAD~
~
sovereign immunity.
Larson confirms that the Court's disposition of this case in ~~~
1981-ordering the Court of Appeals to consider respondents' state law claims-was fully harmonious with established
sovereign immunity principles. The jurisdiction of the federal court was established by a federal claim; 38 the Court of
Appeals therefore had jurisdiction to resolve .the case and to
grant injunctive relief on either federal or state grounds.
Respondents pleaded a specific statutory limitation on the
way in which petitioners were entitled to run Pennhurst.
The District Court and the Court of A eals have both found
that pe 1tioners operate ennhurst in a wa that h overeign as orbidden.
pecifically, both courts concluded that
petitioners placed residents in Pennhurst without any consideration at all of the limitations on institutional confinement
that are found in state law, and that they failed to create

--

-

There can be no doubt that respondents' federal claims were suffi- ~ ~
ciently substantial to justify federal jurisdiction in this case. In another ~ ~ . /1
case brought by a resident of Pennhurst, we held that the Due Process L-.~- ~
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires, at a minimum, that peti- /) v , ~
tioners provide the residents with reasonable care and safety. See
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U. S. 307, 324 (1982). The uncontested findings
c::::: ~ j
of the District Court in this case establish that Pennhurst was neither safe
nor providing reasonable care to its residents. Therefore, respondents'
federal claims not only were sufficiently substantial to support the exercise
of federal jurisdiction in this case, but would almost certainly have justified
the issuance of at least some injunctive relief had a state-law basis for the
relief been unavailable.
88
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community living programs that are mandated by state law.
In short, there can be no dispute th~t ftetitioner~ ran
Pennhjlrst in a wav _that'" tbe soyereign ad forbidden.
Uii"der the se~ond t;ack of the Larson analysis, petitioners
were acting ultra vires because they were acting in a way
that the sovereign, by statute, had forbidden. 39
In Larson, the Administrator of the War Assets Administration was in
possession of coal that the plaintiff claimed the Administrator was contractually obligated to deliver to it. Instead of seeking damages for breach of
contract in the Court of Claims, the plaintiff sought an injunction in the
district court. The Court held that the Administrator had acted properly
in refusing to deliver the coal and instead insisting that the plaintiff seek its
remedy in the Court of Claims.
"There was, it is true, an allegation that the Administrator was acting
'illegally,' and that the refusal to deliver was 'unauthorized.' But these
allegations were not based and did not purport to be based upon any lack of
delegated power. Nor could they be, since the Administrator was empowered by the sovereign to administer a general sales program encompassing
the negotiation of contracts, the shipment of goods and the receipt of payment. A normal concomitant of such powers, as a matter of general
agency law, is the power to refuse delivery when, in the agent's view, delivery is not called for under a contract and the power to sell goods which
the agent believes are still his principal's to sell.'' 337 U. S. at 691-62
(footnotes omitted).
Thus, the Administrator had acted properly. He was doing what any
agent would do-holding on to property he believed was his principal's and
insisting that the claimant sue the principal if it wanted the property. He
was merely exercising the "normal" duties of a sales agent. Congress envisioned that he do exactly that; the remedy it had provided required the
claimant to sue for damages in the Court of Claims rather than obtaining
the property directly from the Administrator, and no one had questioned
the constitutional sufficiency of that alternate remedy. See McCord,
Fault Without Liability: Immunity of Federal Employees, 1966 U. Ill. L.F.
849, 862-867. "Since the plaintiff had not made an affirmative allegation
of any relevant statutory limitation upon the Administrator's powers, and
had made no claim that the Administrator's action amounted to an unconstitutional taking, the Court ruled that the suit must fail as an effort to
enjoin the United States.'' Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U. S. 643, 647 (1962).
Malone can be explained similarly. These cases hold that Congress had
empowered the governmental official to make necessary decisions about
whether to hold onto property the official believes it the government's, at
39
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Petitioners readily concede, both in their brief and at oral
argument, that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar a suit
against state officers who have acted ultra vires. The majority makes a similar concession, ante, at 10 n. 11. Yet both
ignore the fact that the cases, and most especially Larson,
set out a two-step analysis for ultra vires conduct -conduct
that is completely beyond the scope of the officer's authority,
or conducftffii'ttfie ; overeign"lias tor bid'aen:= In fact, the
majo 1 y goes so far as to quote the passage from Larson indicating that a state official acts ultra vires when he completely lacks power delegated from the state, ibid. That selective quotation ignores sentences immediately preceding
and following the quoted passage stating in terms that where
an official violates a statutory prohibition, he acts ultra vires
and is not protected by sovereign immunity. This omission
is understandable, since petitioners' conduct in this case
clearly falls into the category of conduct the sovereign has
specifically forbidden by statute. Petitioners were told by
Pennsylvania how to run Pennhurst, and there is no dispute
that they disobeyed their instructions. Yet without explanation, the Court repudiates the two-track analysis of
least pending the aggrieved party's remedy for incorrect ones in the Claims
Court under the Tucker Act, 28 U. S. C. §§ 1491-1507 (1976 ed. and
Supp. V 1981 and West Supp. 1983). See Byse, Proposed Reforms in Federal "Nonstatutory" Judicial Review: Sovereign Immunity, Indispensible
Parties, Mandamus, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 1479, 1490-1491 (1962); Jaffe, The
Right to Judicial Review I, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 401, 436-437 (1958). Thus,
where the official acts as the sovereign intends, he is entitled to the sovereign's immunity under the principles discussed above. Where that is not
the case, Larson permits injunctive relief. In this case, respondents did
plead a specific limitation on petitioners' powers, and the holding of the
Court of Appeals on the merits of respondents' state law claims indicates
that petitioners were not exercising the "normal" duties that the sovereign
had envisioned for them, unlike the Administrator in Larson. Instead,
petitioners were running Pennhurst "in a way which the sovereign has forbidden. " 337 U. S., at 689.
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Larson and holds that sovereign immunity extends to conduct the sovereign has statutorily prohibited. 40
In sum, a century and a half of this Court's Eleventh
the following. A ,
Amendment jurisprudence has establish~d
1
suit alleging that the official had acted within his authority '"
(..

IV
The majority's decision in this case is especially bizarre in
that it overrules a long line of cases in order roreac'rt' a result
~

40
The majority also repudiates JuSTICE WHITE's recent statement in
Treasure Salvors: "where the officer's actions are limited by statute, actions beyond those limitations are to be considered individual and not sovereign actions." 458 U. S., at 714. Four Members of today's majority
subscribed to that statement only two Terms ago.
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that is utterly at odds with the usual practices of this Court.
In one of the most respected opinions ever written by a Member of this Court, Justice Brandeis wrote:
'"' Court [has] developed, for its own governance in
"The
the cases confessedly within its jurisdiction, a series of
rules under which it has avoided passing upon a large
part of all the constitutional questions pressed upon it for
decision. They are:
The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question
although properly presented by the record, if there is
also present some other ground upon which the case may
be disposed of. This rule has found most varied application. Thus, if a case can be decided on either of two
grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the
other a question of statutory construction or general law,
the Court will decide only the latter. Siler v. Louisville
& Nashville R. Co., 213 U. S. 175, 191." Ashwander v.
Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U. S. 288, 346--347
(1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
The Siler case, cited with approval by Justice Brandeis in
Ashwa?iaer;-employed a rem'<lrkably similar approach to that
used by the Court of Appeals in this case. A privately
owned railroad corporation brought suit against the members
of the railroad commission of Kentucky to enjoin the enforcement of a rate schedule promulgated by the commission.
The federal circuit court found that the schedule violated the
plaintiff's federal constitutional rights and granted relief.
This Court affirmed, but it refused to decide the constitutional question because injunctive relief against the state officials was adequately supported by state law. The Court
held that the plaintiff's claim that the schedule violated the
Federal Constitution was sufficient to justify the assertion of
federal jurisdiction over the case, but then declined to reach
the federal question, deciding the case on the basis of state
law instead:
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"Where a case in this court can be decided without reference to questions arising under the Federal Constitution, that course is usually pursued and is not departed
from without important reasons. In this case we think
it much better to decide it with regard to the question of
a local nature, involving the construction of the state
statute and the authority therein given to the commission to make the order in question, rather than to unnecessarily decide the various constitutional questions appearing in the record." Siler v. Louisville & Nashville
R.R. Co., 213 U. S. 175, 193 (1909). 41
The Siler principle has been applied on numerous occasions; when a suit against state officials has presented both
federal constitutional questions and issues of state law, the
Court has upheld injunctive relief on state law grounds.
See, e. g., Lee v. Bickell, 292 U. S. 415, 425 (1934); Glenn v.
Field Packing Co., 290 U. S. 177, 178 (1933); Davis v. Wallace, 257 U. S. 478, 482-485 (1922); Louisville & Nashville
R.R. Co. v. Greene, 244 U. S. 522, 527 (1917); Greene v. Louisville & Interurban R.R. Co., 244 U. S. 499, 508, 512-514
(1917). 42
41
ln Siler the Court decided the case on state-law grounds, even though
it acknowledged that "[i]n this case we are without the benefit of a construction of the statute by the highest state court of Kentucky, and we
must proceed in the absence of state adjudication upon the subject." I d.,
at 194.
42
Justice Peckham's opinion in Siler rested on a long line of cases, dating
back to Chief Justice Marshall's decision in Osborn v. Bank of the United
States, 9 Wheat. 738, 822 (1824), holding that a federal court has jurisdiction over all the issues-state as well as federal-presented by a case that
properly falls within its jurisdiction. Nor was Siler breaking new ground
in avoiding a federal constitutional question by deciding on state law
grounds. In Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad Co., 118
U. S. 394 (1886), the Court noted the importance of the federal constitutional questions. Even though these had been treated as dispositive by
the lower court, and though they were the "main-almost the only-questions discussed by counsel," id., at 395, the Court stated, "These questions
belong to a class which this court should not decide, unless their determina-
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In Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U. S. 528 (1974), the Court
quoted from the Siler opinion and noted that the "Court has
characteristically dealt first with possibly dispositive state
law claims pendent to federal constitutional claims." I d., at
546. · It added:
"Numerous decisions of this Court have stated the
general proposition endorsed in Siler-that a federal
court properly vested with jurisdictioh may pass on the
state or local law question without deciding the federal
constitutional issues-and have then proceeded to dispose of the case solely on the nonfederal ground. See,
e. g., Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U. S. 620, 629-630
(1946); Waggoner Estate v. Wichita County, 273 U. S.
113, 116-119 (1927); Chicago G. W.R. Co. v. Kendall, 266
U. S. 94 (1924); United Gas Co. v. Railroad Comm'n,
278 U. S. 300, 308 (1929); Risty v. Chicago, R. I. &
P.R. Co., 270 U. S. 378, 387 (1926). These and other
tion is essential to the disposal of the case in which they arise." I d., at
410. It then determined that the challenged tax assessments were not authorized by state law and affirmed the judgment solely on that ground. In
addition, the Court has routinely applied the Siler rule in cases upholding
injunctive relief on the basis of state law against municipal officials, see,
e. g., Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U. S. 620, 629 (1946); Cincinnati v.
Vester, 281 U. S. 439, 448-449 (1930); Risty v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Co., 270 U. S. 378 (1926); Bohler v. Callaway, 267 U. S. 479,
489 (1925); Lincoln Gas & Electric Light Co. v. City of Lincoln, 250 U. S.
256, 268-269 (1919); and in cases in which the plaintiffs were not held to be
entitled to the relief they sought, see Schmidt v. Oakland Unified School
Dist., 457 U. S. 594 (1982) (per curiam); Railroad Comm'n of California v.
Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 302 U.S. 388, 391 (1938); United Gas Co. v.
Railroad Commission of Kentucky, 278 U. S. 300, 307 (1929); Waggoner
Estate v. Wichita County, 273 U. S. 113, 116 (1927); Chicago Great Western Railway Co. v. Kendall, 266 U. S. 94, 97-98 (1924); Ohio Tax Cases ,
232 U. S. 576, 586-587 (1914); Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Garrett, 231 U. S. 298, 303-304 (1913). Numerous other cases decided by this
Court have cited Siler as an accurate statement of the law regarding pendent jurisdiction. See, e. g., Aldinger v. Howard , 427 U. S. 1, 7 (1976);
Florida Lime Growers v. Jacobsen, 362 U. S. 73, 81, n. 7 (1960); Hurn v.
Oursler, 289 U. S. 238, 24S-245 (1933).
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cases illustrate in practice the wisdom of the federal policy of avoiding constitutional adjudication where not absolutely essential to disposition of a case." 415 U. S., at
547 n. 12.
In fact, in this very case we applied the Siler rule by remanding the case to the Court of Appeals with explicit instructions
to consider whether respondents were entitled to relief under
state law.
Not only does the Siler rule have an impressive historical
pedigree, but it is also strongly supported by the interest in
avoiding duplicative litigation and the unnecessary decision
of federal constitutional questions.
"The policy's ultimate foundations ... lie in all that
goes to make up the unique place and character, in our
scheme, of judicial review of governmental action for
constitutionality. They are found in the delicacy of that
function, particularly in view of possible consequences
for others stemming also from constitutional roots; the
comparative finality of those consequences; the consideration due to the judgment of other repositories of constitutional power concerning the scope of their authority;
the necessity, if government is to function constitutionally, for each to keep within its power, including the
courts; the inherent limitations of the judicial process,
arising especially from its largely negative character and
limited resources of enforcement; withal in the paramount importance of constitutional adjudication in our
system." Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U. S.
549, 571 (1947). 43
In addition, application of the Siler rule enhances the decisionmaking autonomy of the States. Siler directs the federal
court to turn first to state law, which the State is free to mod43
Cf. H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U. S. 398, 407 (1981) (citing Justice Brandeis' opinion in Ashwander); Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U. S. 111, 122
(1979) (citing the Court's opinion in Siler).
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ify or repeal. 44

By leaving the policy determinations underlying injunctive relief in the hands of the State, the Court of
Appeals' approach gives appropriate deference to established
state policies.
In contrast, the rule the majority creates today serves
none of the interests of the State. The majority prevents
federal courts from implementing State policies through equitable enforcement of State law. Instead, federal courts
are required to resolve cases on federal grounds that no State
authority can undo. Leaving violations of state law unredressed and ensuring that the decisions of federal courts may
never be reexamined by the States hardly comports with the
respect for States as sovereign entities commanded by the
Eleventh Amendment.

v

One basic fact underlies this case: far from immunizing petitioners' conduct, the
e of Pennsylvania prohibited it.
Respondents do not complain about t e conduct of the State
of Pennsylvania-it is Pennsylvania's commands which they
seek to enforce. Respondents seek only to have Pennhurst
run the way Pennsylvania envisioned that it be run. Until
today, the Court understood that the Eleventh Amendment
does not shield the conduct of state officers which has been
sanctioned by their sovereign.
Throughout its history this Court has derived strength
from institutional self-discipline. Adh~rence to settled doctrine is presumptively the correct course. 45 Departures are,
44

In some of the cases following Siler, this Court has required that the
decree include a provision expressly authorizing its reopening in the event
that a state court later decided the question of state law differently. See
Lee v. Bickell, 292 U. S. 415, 426 (1934); Wald Transfer & Storage Co. v.
Smyth, 290 U. S. 602 (1933); Glenn v. Field Packing Co., 290 U. S. 177,
178-179 (1933).
40
"I agree with what the Court stated only days ago, that 'the doctrine of
stare decisis, while perhaps never entirely persuasive on a constitutional
question, is a doctrine that demands respect in a society governed by the
rule of law.' City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health,
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of course, occasionally required by changes in the fabric of
our society. 46 When a court, rather than a legislature, initiates such a departure, it has a special obligation to explain
Inc.,-- U. S. - - , - - (1983). While the doctrine of stare decisis does
not absolutely bind the Court to its prior opinions, a decent regard for the
orderly administration of justice requires that directly controlling cases
either be followed or candidly overruled." Solem v. Helm, - - U. S.
- - , - - (1983) (BURGER, C. J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
This statement was joined by four members of today's majority. The
·
fifth was the author of the opinion of the Court in City of Akron.
46
This is an especially odd context in which to repudiate settled law in
that if anything changes in our social fabric favor limitation rather than expansion of sovereign immunity. The concept that the sovereign can do no
wrong and that citizens should be remediless in the face of its abuses is
more a relic of medieval thought than anything else.
"Whether this immunity is an absolute survival of the monarchial privilege,
or is a manifestation merely of power, or rests on abstract logical grounds,
it undoubtedly runs counter to modern democratic notions of the moral
responsibility of the State. Accordingly, courts reflect a strong legislative
momentum in their tendency to extend the legal responsibility of Government and to confirm Maitland's belief, expressed nearly fifty years ago
that, 'it is a wholesome sight to see "the Crown" sued and answering for its
torts.'" Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 59 (1944)
(Frankfurter, J ., dissenting) (citation omitted).
In the even older decision of Poindexter v. Greenhaw, 114 U. S. 270
(1884), the Court, after observing that "the distinction between the government of a State and the State itself is important, and should be observed," id., at 290, wrote:
"This distinction is essential to the idea of constitutional government.
To deny it or blot it out obliterates the line of demarcation that separates
constitutional government from absolutism, free self-government based on
the sovereignty of the people from that despotism, whether of the one or
the many, which enables the agent of the State to declare and decree that
he is the State; to say 'L'Etat c'est moi.' Of what avail are written constitutions whose bills of right for the security of individual liberty are written, too often, with the blood of martyrs shed upon the battle-field and the
scaffold, if their limitations and restraints upon power may be overpassed
with impunity by the very agencies created and appointed to guard, defend, and enforce them; and that, too, with the sacred authority of law, not
only compelling obedience, but entitled to respect? And how else can
these principles of individual liberty and right be maintained, if, when vio-
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and to justify the new course on which it has embarked. Today, however, the Court casts aside, ignores, or misa
well settled respected doctrme a p am y comman s_a
ance of t~Ctrtnt 51' Appeals the d6<!thne of the law of the
ca~crrme o stare decisis (the Court overrules at
least 29 cases), 48 the doctrine of sovereign immuni~he

-

lated, the judicial tribunals are forbidden to visit penalties upon individual
offenders, who are the instruments of wrong, whenver they interpose the
shield of the State? The doctrine is not to be tolerated. The whole frame
and scheme of the political institutions of this country, State and Federal,
protest against it. Their continued existence is not compatible with it. It
is the doctrine of absolutism, pure, simple, and naked .... " Id., at 291.
47
The heart of today's holding is that this Court had no power to act as it
did in 1981 when it ordered the Court of Appeals to consider and decide the
state law issues in this very case.
48
In the following cases the Court permitted injunctive relief to issue
against state officers on the basis of state law after explicitly rejecting
their Eleventh Amendment defense: Rolston v. Missouri Fund Commissioners, 120 U. S. 391 (1887); South Carolina v. Wesley, 155 U. S. 542
(1895); Tindal v. Wesley, 167 U. S. 204 (1897); Scully v. Bird, 209 U. S.
481 (1908); Hopkins v. Clemson College, 221 U. S. 636 (1911); Atchison &c.
Ry. Co. v. O'Connor, 223 U. S. 280 (1912); Johnson v. Lankford, 245 U. S.
541 (1918); Martin v. Lankford, 245 U. S. 547 (1918); Greene v. Louisville
& Interurban R. Co., 244 U. S. 499 (1917); Louisville & Nashville R. Co.
v. Greene, 244 U. S. 522 (1917); Illinois Central R. Co. v. Greene, 244
U. S. 555 (1917). All are overruled.
Since petitioners' position applies also to federal sovereign immunity (indeed the principal case on which they rely, Larson, is a federal sovereign
immunity case), the following additional cases which refused to apply sovereign immunity to suits against federal officers acting within the scope of
their authority because the plaintiff had alleged that the officers had engaged in unlawful conduct conduct would also be overruled: Little v.
Barreme, 2 Cranch 169 (1804); Wise v. Withers, 3 Cranch 331 (1806); Mitchell v. Harmony, 13 How. 115 (1851); Bates v. Clark, 95 U. S. 204 (1877);
Noble v. Union River Logging R. Co., 147 U. S. 165 (1893); Belknap v.
Schild, 161 U. S. 10 (1896); Sloan Shipyards v. U.S. Fleet Corp., 258
U. S. 549 (1922); Santa Fe Pac. R. Co. v. Fall, 259 U. S. 197 (1922); Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U. S. 605 (1912); Land v. Dollar, 330 U. S.
731, 738 (1947). Larson itself cites most of these cases with approval, and
disapproves of none of them. All are overruled today. In fact, today the
Court repudiates the two-track analysis of Larson, since in Larson the
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doctrine of pendent jurisdiction, 50 the doctrine of judicial restraint-all without an adequate explanation of the reasons
for its action. No sound reason justifies the further prolongation of this litigation or this Court's voyage into the sea
of undisciplined lawmaking.
As t said at the et~ise~ t his case has illuminated the character of an institution.
I respectfully dissent.

Court stated that conduct which has been specifically prohibited by statute
is not protected by sovereign immunity even if it is performed within the
scope of the official's duties, yet today the Court holds that even if an officer violates a statute, his conduct is protected by sovereign immunity.
The Court also overrules the cases cited in note. 50, infra.
49
From the fifteenth century English common law to Larson and beyond,
courts have never held that prohibited conduct can be shielded by sovereign immunity. That rule makes good sense-since a principal cannot authorize unlawful conduct, such conduct is of necessity ultra vires. There is
no reason to abandon such a well settled and sensible rule.
50
The majority also overrules Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 213
U. S. 175 (1909), and its progeny, including Louisville & Nashville R. Co.
v. Garrett, 231 U. S. 298 (1913); Davis v. Wallace, 257 U. S. 478 (1922);
Chicago Great Western R . Co. v. Kendall, 266 U. S. 94 (1924); United Gas
Co. v. Railroad Commission, 278 U. S. 300 (1919); Glenn v. Field Packing
Co., 290 U. S. 177 (1933); Lee v. Bickell, 292 U. S. 415 (1934); Railroad
Commission of California v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 302 U.S. 388
(1938).
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JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN and
JUSTICE MARsHALL join, dissenting.
This case has illuminated the character of an institution.
The record demonstrates that the Pennhurst State School
and Hospital has been operated in violation of state law. In
1977, after three years of litigation, the District Court entered detailed findings of fact that abundantly support that
conclusion. In 1981, after four more years of litigation, this
Court ordered the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit to decide whether the law of Pennsylvania provides an independent and adequate ground which can support
the District Court's remedial order. The Court of Appeals,
sitting en bane, unanimously concluded that it did. This
Court does not disagree with that conclusion. Rather, it reverses the Court of Appeals because it did precisely what this
Court ordered it to do; the only error committed by the Court
of Appeals was its faithful obedience to this Court's
command.
This remarkable result is the product of an equally remarkable misapplication of the ancient doctrine of sovereign immunity. In a completely unprecedented holding, today the
Court concludes that Pennsylvania's sovereign immunity prevents a federal court from enjoining the conduct that Pennsylvania itself has prohibited. No rational view of the sover-
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eign immunity of the States supports this result. To the
contrary, the question whether a federal court may award injunctive relief on the basis of state law has been answered affirmatively by this Court many times in the past. Yet the
Court repudiates at least 28 cases, spanning well over a century of this Court's jurisprudence, proclaiming that federal
courts have no power to enforce the will of the States by enjoining conduct because it violates state law. This new pronouncement will require the federal courts to decide federal
constitutional questions despite the availability of state-law
grounds for decision, a result inimical to sound principles of
judicial restraint. Nothing in the Eleventh Amendment, the
conception of state sovereignty it embodies, or the history of
this institution, requires or justifies such a perverse result.
I

The conduct of petitioners that the Court attributes to the
State of Pennsylvania in order to find it protected by the
Eleventh Amendment is described in detail in the District
Court's findings. As noted in our prior opinion, 451 U. S. 1
(1981), and by the majority today, ante, at 2, those findings
were undisputed: "Conditions at Pennhurst are not only dangerous, with the residents often physically abused or
drugged by staff members, but also inadequate for the
'habilitation' of the retarded. The court found that the physical, intellectual, and emotional skills of some residents have
deteriorated at Pennhurst." 451 U. S., at 7 (footnote omitted). The court concluded that Pennhurst was actually hazardous to its residents. 1 Organized programs of training or
' Infectious diseases were common and minimally adequate health care
was unavailable. Residents of Pennhurst were inadequately supervised,
and as a consequence were often injured by other residents or as a result of
self-abuse. Assaults on residents by staff members, including sexual assaults, were frequent. Physical restraints were employed in lieu of adequate staffing, often causing injury to residents, and on one occasion leading to a death. Dangerous psychotropic drugs were indiscriminately used
for purposes of behavior control and staff convenience. Staff supervision
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education were inadequate or entirely unavailable, and programs of treatment or training were not developed for residents. When they visited Pennhurst, shocked parents of
residents would find their children bruised, drugged and unattended. These conditions often led to a deterioration in
the condition of the residents after being placed in
Pennhurst. Terri Lee Halderman, for example, was learning to talk when she entered Pennhurst; after residing there
she lost her verbal skills. At every stage of this litigation,
petitioners have conceded that Pennhurst fails to provide
even minimally adequate habilitation for its residents. See
612 F. 2d 84, 92-94 (3d Cir. 1979) (en bane); 446 F. Supp.
1295, 1304 (E. D. Pa. 1977).
The District Court held that these conditions violated each
resident's rights under the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 87 Stat. 394, as amended by 92 Stat. 2987,
29 U. S. C. § 794 (1976 ed., Supp. V), and the Pennsylvania
Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966, Pa. Stat.
Ann. tit. 50, §§ 4101-4704 (Purdon 1969 and Supp. 1982)
("MH/MR Act"). The en bane Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit affirmed most of the District Court's judgment,
but it grounded its decision solely on the "bill of rights" provision in the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of
Rights Act, 42 U. S. C. § 6010 (1976 ed. and Supp. V). The
court did not consider the constitutional issues or § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act. While it affirmed the District Court's
holding that the MH/MR Act provides a right to adequate
habilitation, the court did not decide whether that state right
justified all of the relief granted by the District Court.
Petitioners sought review by this Court, asserting that the
Court of Appeals had erred in its construction of both federal
during meals was minimal, and residents often stole food from each otherleaving some without enough to eat. The unsafe conditions led to aggressive behavior on the part of residents which was punished by solitary confinement. There was often urine and excrement on the walls.
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and state statutes. This Court granted certiorari and reversed, 451 U. S. 1 (1981), holding that 42 U. S. C. §6010
created no substantive rights. We did not accept respondents' state-law contention, because there was a possibility
that the Court of Appeals' analysis of the state statute had
been influenced by its erroneous reading of federal law.
Concluding that it was ''unclear whether state law provides
an independent and adequate ground which can support the
court's remedial order," 451 U. S., at 31, we "remand[ed] the
state-law issue for reconsideration in light of our decision
here." Ibid. In a footnote we declined to consider the effect of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's then recent decision, In re Schmidt, 494 Pa. 86, 429 A. 2d 631 (1981), on the
state-law issues in the case, expressly stating that on remand
the Court of Appeals could "consider the state law issues in
light of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's recent decision."
451 U. S., at 31, n. 24.
On remand, 673 F. 2d 647 (3d Cir. 1982) (en bane), the
Court of Appeals, noting that this Court had remanded for
reconsideration of the state-law issue, examined the impact
of Schmidt. 2 According to the Court of Appeals, which was
unanimous on this point, the State Supreme Court had "spoken definitively'' on the duties of the State under the MH/MR
Act, holding that the State was required to provide care to
the mentally retarded in the "least restrictive environment."
I d., at 651. Since the MH/MR Act fully justified the relief
issued in the Court of Appeals' prior judgment, the court reinstated its prior judgment on the basis of petitioner's violation of state law. 3
1
In the questions raised in their petition for certiorari, petitioners do not
ask this Court to reexamine the Court of Appeals' conclusion that respondents are clearly entitled to relief under state law. Nor would it be appropriate for this Court to reexamine the unanimous conclusion of the en bane
Court of Appeals on a question of state law. See, e. g., Bishop v. Wood,

426

u. s. 341, 345-346 (1976).

• The court therefore found it unnecessary to decide if respondents were
also entitled to relief under the federal statutory and constitutional provisions which had been raised in the District Court.
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Thus, the District Court found that petitioners have been
operating the Pennhurst facility in a way that is forbidden by
state law, by federal statute and by the Federal Constitution.
The en bane Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit unanimously concluded that state law provided a clear and adequate basis for upholding the District Court and that it was
not necessary to address the federal questions decided by
that court. That action confonned precisely to the directive
issued by this Court when the case was here before. Petitioners urge this Court to make an unprecedented about-face,
and to hold that the Eleventh Amendment prohibited the
Court of Appeals from doing what this Court ordered it to do
when we instructed it to decide whether respondents were
entitled to relief under state law. Of course, if petitioners
are correct, then error was committed not by the Court of
Appeals, which after all merely obeyed the instruction of this
Court, but rather by this Court in 1981 when we ordered the
Court of Appeals to consider the state-law issues in the case.
Petitioners' position is utterly without support. The Eleventh Amendment and the doctrine of sovereign immunity it
embodies have never been interpreted to deprive a court of
jurisdiction to grant relief against government officials who
are engaged in conduct that is forbidden by their sovereign.
On the contrary, this Court has repeatedly and consistently
exercised the power to enjoin state officials from violating
state law.4
II
The majority proceeds as if this Court has not had previous
occasion to consider Eleventh Amendment argument made
by petitioners, and contends that Ex parte Young, 209 U. S.
123 (1908) has no application to a suit seeking injunctive relief
on the basis of state law. That is simply not the case. The
Court rejected the argument that the Eleventh Amendment

•

Although the Court struggles mightily to distinguish some of the cases
that foreclose its holding today, see ante, at 15-25, this vain effort merely
brings into stark relief the total absence of any affirmative support for its
holding.

I
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precludes injunctive relief on the basis of state law twice only
two Terms ago. In Florida Dept. of State v. Treasure
Salvors, Inc., 458 U. S. 670 (1982), four Justices concluded
that a suit for possession of property in the hands of state officials was not barred by the Eleventh Amendment inasmuch
as the State did not have even a colorable claim to the property under state law. See id., at 696-697 (opinion of STEVENS, J., joined by BURGER, C. J., MARSHALL, and BLACKMUN, JJ.). Four additional Justices accepted the proposition
that if the state officers' conduct had been in violation of a
state statute, the Eleventh Amendment would not bar the
action. ld., at 714 (WHITE, J., concurring in the judgment
in part and dissenting in part, joined by POWELL, REHNQUIST, and O'CONNOR, JJ.). 5
And in just one short paragraph in Cory v. White, 457 U. S. 85 (1982), the Court thrice
restated the settled rule that the Eleventh Amendment does
not bar suits against state officers when they are "alleged to
be acting against federal or state law.'' 6 These are only the
two most recent in an extraordinarily long line of cases.
& "Larson established that where the officer's actions are limited by statute, actions beyond those limitations are to be considered individual and
not sovereign actions." Ibid.
• "Neither did Edelman deal with a suit naming a state officer as defendant, but not alleging a violation of either federal or state law. Thus, there
was no occasion in the opinion to cite or discuss the unanimous opinion in
Worcester that the Eleventh Amendment bars suits against state officers
unless they are alleged to be acting contrary to federal law or against the
authority of state law. Edelman did not hold that suits against state officers who are not alleged to be acting against federal or state law are
permissible under the Eleventh Amendment if only prospective relief is
sought." 457 U. S., at 91 (emphasis supplied).
See also Worcester County Co. v. Riley, 302 U. S. 292, 297 (1937) (citations omitted) ("[G]enerally suits to restrain action of state officials can,
consistently with the constitutional prohibition, be prosecuted only when
the action sought to be restrained is without the authority of state law or
contravenes the statutes or Constitution of the United States. The Eleventh Amendment, which denies to the citizen the right to resort to a federal court to compel or restrain state action, does not preclude suit against

-' "
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By 1908, it was firmly established that conduct of state officials under color of office that is tortious as a matter of state
law"not protected by the Eleventh Amendment. See Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust, 154 U. S. 362, 390-391
(1894); Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U. S. 270, 287 (1885);
Cunningham v. Macon & Brunswick R. Co., 109 U. S. 446,
452 (1883). 7 Cf. Belknap v. Schild, 161 U. S. 10, 18 (1896)
(same rule adopted for sovereign immunity of the United
States); Stanley v. Schwalby, 147 U. S. 508, 518-519 (1893)
(same). 8 In Hopkins v. Clemson Agricultural College, 221
a wrongdoer merely because he asserts that his acts are within an official
authority which the state does not confer."). In Worcester the Court held
a suit barred by the Eleventh Amendment only after stating: "Hence, it
cannot be said that the threatened action of respondents involves any
breach of state law or of the laws or Constitution of the United States."
Id. , at 299.
7
The Court explained that the state officer sued in tort "is not sued as,
or because he is, the officer of the government, but as an individual, and
the court is not ousted of jurisdiction because he asserts jurisdiction as
such officer. To make out his defense he must show that his authority was
sufficient in law to protect him." Cunningham, 109 U. S., at 452, quoted
in Poindexter, 114 U. S., at 287. Today's majority notes that these cases
involve nondiscretionary duties of governmental officers, ante, at 18-19,
but overlooks the reason for this characterizatio!l-{)fficers have no discretion to commit a tort. The same is true of the Court's treatment of the
federal sovereign immunity cases I discuss below.
'See also Butz v. Ecorwmou , 438 U. S. 478, 489--490 (1978) (officers of
the United States are liable for their torts unless the torts are authorized
by federal law); Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U. S. 605, 619-620 (1912)
(officers of the United States may be enjoined where they wrongfully interfere with property rights). Justice Holmes had occasion to state that sovereign immunity does not generally extend to the acts of an officer of the
sovereign. "In general the United States cannot be sued for a tort, but its
immunity does not extend to those that acted in its name." Sloan Shipyards v. U. S. Fleet Corp ., 258 U. S. 549, 568 (1922). He characterized
petitioner's argument in that case-that sovereign immunity should extend
to the unlawful acts of agents of the United States acting within the scope
of their authority-as "a very dangerous departure from one of the first
principles of our system of law. The sovereign properly so called is superior to suit for reasons that often have been explained. But the general

I
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U. S. 636 (1911), the Court explained the relationship of
these cases to the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
"[l]mmunity from suit is a high attribute of sovereignty-a prerogative of the State itself-which cannot
be availed of by public agents when sued for their own
torts. The Eleventh Amendment was not intended to
afford them freedom from liability in any case where,
under color of their office, they have injured one of the
State's citizens. To grant them such immunity would be
to create a privileged class free from liability for wrongs
inflicted or injuries threatened . . . . Besides, neither a
State nor an individual can confer upon an agent authority to commit a tort so as to excuse the perpetrator. In
such cases the law of agency has no application-the
wrongdoer is treated as a principal and individually liable for the damages inflicted and subject to injunction
against the commission of acts causing irreparable injury." Id., at 642-643. 9
rule is that any person within the jurisdiction is always amenable to the
law. . . . An instrumentality of government he might be and for the
greatest ends, but the agent, because he is agent, does not cease to be
answerable for his acts." ld., at 566-567. See also Brady v. Roosevelt
S .S. Co., 317 U.S. 575 (1943) (following Sloan).
• The Court also stated,
"Corporate agents or individual officers of the State stand in no better
position than officers of the General Government, and as to them it has
often been held that: 'The exemption of the United States from judicial
process does not protect their officers and agents, civil or military, in time
of peace, from being personally liable to an action of tort by a private person, whose rights of property they have wrongfully invaded, or injured,
even by authority of the United States.' Belknap v. Shild, 161 U. S. 10,
18.'' 221 U. S., at 645 (emphasis supplied). The language I have quoted
in the text makes it clear that the Court is incorrect to suggest ante, at 18,
n. 18, that Clemson dealt only with unconstitutional conduct and not with
conduct in violation of state tort law. See also Old Colony Trust Co. v.
Seattle, 271 U. S. 426, 431 (1926) (reaffirming the rationale of Clemson in
an action against city and county officials).

I
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The principles that were decisive in these cases are not
confined to actions under state tort law. They also apply to
claims that state officers have violated state statutes. In
Johnson v. Lankford, 245 U.S. 541 (1918), the Court reversed the dismissal of an action against the bank commissioner of Oklahoma and his surety to recover damages for the
loss of plaintiff's bank deposit, allegedly caused by the commissioner's failure to safeguard the business and assets of the
bank in negligent or willful disregard of his duties under applicable state statutes. The Court explained that the action
was not one against the State.
"To answer it otherwise would be to assert, we think,
that whatever an officer does, even in contravention of
the laws of the State, is state action, identifies him with
it and makes the redress sought against him a claim
against the State and therefore prohibited by the Eleventh Amendment. Surely an officer of a State may be
delinquent without involving the State in delinquency,
indeed, may injure the State by delinquency as well as
some resident of the State, and be amenable to both."
ld., at 545.
Similarly, in Rolston v. Missouri Fund Commissioners,
120 U. S. 390 (1887), the Court rejected the argument that a
suit to enjoin a state officer to comply with state law violated
the Eleventh Amendment. The Court wrote, "Here the suit
is to get a state officer to do what a statute requires of him.
The litigation is with the officer, not the state." I d., at 411. 10
In Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362 (1894), the
Court held that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar a suit alleging that
a state officer has wrongfully administered a state statute. The Court
awarded injunctive relief against state officers on the basis of both state
and federal law. In Atchison &c. R. Co. v. O'Connor, 223 U. S. 280
(1912), the Court held that a suit against state officers seeking recovery of
taxes paid under duress was not against the State since a state statute required the recovery of wrongfully paid taxes. See id., at 287. In
Lankford v. Platte Iron Works Co., 235 U. S. 461 (1915), the Court as'

0
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Significantly, this rule was expressly reaffirmed in a case
decided by this Court in the same Term as Ex parte Young
and published in the same volume of the United States Resumed that the Eleventh Amendment would not bar a suit "to compel submission by the officers of the State to the laws of the State, accomplishing
at once the policy of the law and its specific purpose," id., at 471, but rejected the appellees' construction of the state statute. See also Parish
v. State Banking Board, 235 U. S. 498 (1915); American Water Co. v.
Lankford, 235 U. S. 496 (1915). In Martin v. Lankford, 245 U. S. 547
(1918), the Court stated that the case was not barred by the Eleventh
Amendment since the claim ''is based, as we have seen, not in exertion
of the state law but in violation of it. The reasoning of [Johnson v.
Lankfcm[J is therefore applicable and the conclusion must be the same, that
is, the action is not one against the State, and the District Court erred in
dismissing it for want of jurisdiction on that ground." I d., at 551. While
~)A<N- V"'
it is true, as the Court points out ante, at 18, n. 18, that the Martin Court
Mttd'\>- ,.... Lh
went on to hold that there was no federal diversity jurisdiction over the
case, it cannot be denied that the majority today repudiates the reasoning
of Martin. As for the Court's treatment of Johnson v. Lankford and
O'Connor, ante, at 18, n. 18, it is true that Johnson sought only damages,
but the holding of that case, that the action was not barred by the Constitution since it alleged conduct in violation of state law, is utterly at odds with
the Court's decision 'tOday. Surely the Court cannot mean to rely on a distinction between damages and injunctive relief, for it states: "A federal
court's grant of relief against state officers on the basis of state law,
whether prospective or retroactive, does not vindicate the supreme authority of federal law. . . . We conclude that Young and Edelman are inapplicable in a suit gainst state officials on the basis of state law." Ante, at 15.
Awarding damages for a violation of state law by state officers acting
within their authority is inconsistent with the majority's position that only
a need to vindicate federal law justifies the lifting of the Eleventh AmendI" ;
ment bar. If an order to pay damages for wrongful conduct against a state
I
officer is not against the State for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment, )
/
Yc ""
an additional order in the form of an injunction telling the officer not to do / 1 .
~ .}
it again is no more against the State. It cannot be doubted that today's
\,v
••
decision overrules Johnson. Finally, as for O'Connor, while it involved an
i ~ ,rJ:'
allegation of unconstitutional action, that allegation was insufficient to lift
Jl)
the bar of the Eleventh Amendment because the complaint sought retroact.,
tive relief. It was the fact that relief was authorized by state law that
•
defeated the Eleventh Amendment claim in O'Connor. See 223 U. S., at
287.

-
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ports. The appellant in Scully v. Bird, 209 U. S. 481 (1908),
brought a diversity suit seeking injunctive relief against the
dairy and food commissioner of the State of Michigan, on the
ground that ''under cover of his office" he had maliciously engaged in a course of conduct designed to ruin plaintiff's business in the State. The circuit court dismissed the complaint
on Eleventh Amendment grounds. On appeal, the plaintiff
contended that the Eleventh Amendment "does not apply
where a suit is brought against defendants who, claiming to
act as officers of the State, and under color of a statute which
is valid and constitutional, but wrongfully administered by
them, commit, or threaten to commit, acts of wrong or injury
to the rights and property of the plaintiff, or make such administration of the statute an illegal burden and exaction
upon the plaintiff." Id., at 418. This Court agreed. It
noted that the complaint alleged action "in dereliction of duties enjoined by the statutes of the State," and concluded that
it was "manifest from this summary of the allegations of the
bill that this is not a suit against the State." Id., at 490. 11
Finally, in Greene v. Louisville & Interurban R . Co., 244
U. S. 499 (1917), and its companion cases, Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Greene, 244 U. S. 522 (1917); Illinois Central
R. Co. v. Greene, 244 U. S. 555 (1917), the plaintiffs challenged the conduct of state officials under both federal and
state law. The Court, citing, inter alia, Young and Clemson, held that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar injunctive relief on the basis of state law, noting that the plaintiffs'
federal claim was sufficiently substantial to justify the exer11
Cases construing the sovereign immunity of the Federal Government
also hold that conduct by federal officers forbidden by statute is not
shielded by sovereign immunity even though the officer is not acting completely beyond his authority. See Land v. Dollar, 330 U. S. 731 (1947);
Ickes v. Fox, 300 U. S. 82 (1937); Work v. Louisiana, 269 U. S. 250 (1925);
Santa Fe Pac. R . Co. v. Fall , 259 U. S. 197 (1922); Payne v. Central Pac.
R . Co., 255 U. S. 228 (1921); Waite v. Macy, 246 U. S. 606 (1918).
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cise of pendent jurisdiction over plaintiffs' state-law claims, 12
and that since violations of federal and state law had been alleged, it w~ appropriate for the federal court to issue injunctive relief on the basis of state law without reaching the federal claims, despite the strictures of the Eleventh
Amendment. In short, the Greene Court approved of precisely the methodology employed by the Court of Appeals in
this case. 18
None of these cases contain only "implicit" or sub silentio
holdings; all of them explicitly consider and reject the claim
that the Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from
issuing injunctive relief based on state law. There is therefore no basis for the majority's assertion that the issue presented by this case is an open one, ante, at 28. ••

.

aThe Court cited Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 213 U.S. 175
(1917), which will be discussed in Part IV, infra, in support of this
proposition.
11
The unanimous rejection of the argument that the Eleventh Amendment bars claims based on state officers' violations of federal statutes in
Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U. S. 151, 156 n. 6 (1978) is entirely
consistent with my analysis of our cases. But under the majority's view, it
represented a rather dramatic extension of Ex parte Young to encompass
federal statutory claims as well as constitutional claims. Ray demonstrates that it cannot be maintained that Young and the other cases of this
Court permit injunctive relief only when the constitutionality of state officers' conduct is at issue. If that were so Ray would be wrongly decidedan argument that a state officer has violated a federal statute does not constitute a challenge to the constitutionality of the officer's conduct. Chapman v. Houstcn Welfare Rights Org., 441 U. S. 600, 612-615 (1979); Swift
& Co. v. Wickham, 382 U. S. 111 (1965). In my view, the Eleventh
Amendment claim in Ray deserved no more than the cursory footnote it
received, since the state officials had engaged in conduct forbidden by statute. If the Court were willing to adhere to settled rules oflaw today, the
Eleventh Amendment claim could be rejected just as summarily.
•• The majority incredibly claims that Greene contains only an implicit
holding on the Eleventh Amendment question the Court decides today.
In plain words, the Greene Court held that the Eleventh Amendment did
not bar consideration of the pendant state-law claims advanced in that
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The Court tries to explain away these cases by arguing
that the applicable state statutes gave petitioners such
"broad discretion" over Pennhurst that their actions were not
ultra vires, ante, at 19. The Court, however, does not dispute the Court of Appeals' conclusion that these state statutes gave petitioners no discretion whatsoever to disregard
their duties with respect to institutionalization of the retarded as they did. Petitioners acted outside of their lawful
discretion every bit as much as did the government officials
in the cases I have discussed, which hold that when an official
commits an act prohibited by law, he acts beyond his authority and is not protected by sovereign immunity. 15 After all,
it is only common sense to conclude that States do not authorize their officers to violate their legal duties.
The Court also relies heavily on the fact that the District
Court found petitioners immune from damages liability because they "acted in the utmost good faith . . . within the
sphere of their official responsibilities," ante, at 16 (emphasis
case. The Court then considered and sustained those claims on their
merits.
"Contrary to the Court's treatment of them, the cases discussed above
rely on the doctrine embraced in the quotation from Clemson I have set
out-officials have no discretion to violate the law. The same is true of the
federal sovereign immunity cases. See, e. g., Land v. Dollar, 330 U. S.
731, 736 (1947) (''the assertion by officers of the Government of their authority to act did not foreclose judicial inquiry into the lawfulness of their
action [and] a determination of whether their 'authority is rightfully assumed is the exercise of jurisdiction, and must lead to the decision of the
merits of the question. " '); Payne v. Central P. R. Co., 255 U. S. 228, 236
(1928) ("But of course [the Secretary's statutory authority] does not clothe
him with any discretion to eillarge or curtail the rights of the grantee, nor
to substitute his judgment for the will of Congress as manifested in the
granting act"); Waite v. Macy, 246 U. S. 606, 610 (1918) ("The Secretary
and the board must keep within the statute . . . and we see no reason why
the restriction should not be enforced by injunction ... "); Philadelphia
Co. v. Stimson, 223 U. S. 605, 620 (1912) ("And in the case of an injury
threatened by his illegal action, the officer cannot claim immunity from injunction process").
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in original) (quoting 446 F. Supp., at 1324). This confuses
two distinct concepts. An official can act in good faith and
therefore be immune from damages liability despite the fact
that he has done that which the law prohibits, a point recognized as recently as Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800
(1982). Nevertheless, good faith immunity from damage liability is irrelevant to the availability of injunctive relief.
See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U. S. 308, 314-315, n. 6 (1975).
The state officials acted in nothing less than good faith and
within the sphere of their official responsibilities in asserting
Florida's claim to the treasure in Treasure Salvors; the same
can be said for the bank commissioner's actions in safeguarding bank deposits challenged in Johnson v. Lankford, the
fund commissioner's decision to sell property mortgaged to
the State challenged in Rolston, and the state food and dairy
commissioner's decision to prosecute the appellant for violating the state food impurity act challenged in Scully, to give
just a few examples. Yet in each of these cases the state officers' conduct was enjoined. Greene makes this point perfectly clear. There state officers did nothing more than
carry out responsibilities clearly assigned to them by a statute. Their conduct was neverthless enjoined because this
Court held that their conduct violated the state constitution,
despite the fact that their reliance on a statute made it perfectly clear that their conduct was not only in good faith but
reasonable. See Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U. S. 31
(1979). Until today the rule has been simple: conduct that
exceeds the scope of an official's lawful discretion is not conduct the sovereign has authorized and hence is subject to injunction. 16 Whether that conduct also gives rise to damage
liability is an entirely separate question.
11
In a rather desperate attempt to explain these cases, amici suggest
that the Court simply did not realize that it was deciding questions of state
law, since in the era before Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 (1938)
and United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U. S. 715 (1966), it was not clear
that diversity cases or pendent claims were governed by state rather than

.-
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III
On its face, the Eleventh Amendment applies only to suits
against a State brought by citizens of other States and foreign nations. 17 This textual limitation upon the scope of the
states' immunity from suit in federal court was set aside in
Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1 (1890). Hans was a suit
against the State of Louisiana, brought by a citizen of Louisiana seeking to recover interest on the state's bonds. The
Court stated that some of the arguments favoring sovereign
immunity for the States made during the process of the
Amendment's ratification .Mifteation had become a part of
the judicial scheme created by the Constitution. As a result,
the Court concluded that the Constitution prohibited a suit
by a citizen against his or her own state. When called upon
to elaborate in Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U. S. 313 (1934),
federal law. That suggestion is refuted by the cases discussed above in
which it was held that relief could issue against state officers who had violated state statutes. Even under the construction of the Rules. of Decision
Act, 28 U. S.C. § 1652, adopted in Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1 (1842), and
repudiated in Erie, federal courts were bound to apply state statutes.
See, e. g., Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Braum & Yellow
Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U. S. 518, 529--531 (1928); Swift, 16 Pet., at
1~19.
Thus, in these cases the Court was indisputably issuing relief
under state law. The Court was explicit about the state-law basis for the
relief it granted in Greene, to use just one example. It stated that federal
jurisdiction "extends, to the detennination of all questions involved in the
case, including questions of state law, irrespective of the disposition that
may be made of the federal question, or whether it be found necessary to
decide it at all." 244 U. S., at 508. It then granted plaintiffs relief under
state law, and concluded by declining to decide any question of federal law.
"It is obvious, however, in view of the result reached upon the questions of
state law, just discussed, that the disposition of the cases would not be affected by whatever result we might reach upon the federal question . . . .
Therefore, we find it unnecessary to express any opinion upon the question
raised under the Fourteenth Amendment." Id., at 519.
17
"The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of
the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects
of any Foreign State." U. S. Const. amend. XI.

--
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the Court explained that the Eleventh Amendment did more
than simply prohibit suits brought by citizens of one State
against another State. Rather, it exemplified the broader
and more ancient doctrine of sovereign immunity, which operates to bar a suit brought by a citizen against his own State
without its consent. 18
The Court has subsequently adhered to this interpretation
of the Eleventh Amendment. For example, in Quem v. Jordan, 440 U. S. 332 (1979), the Court referred to the Eleventh
Amendment as incorporating "the traditional sovereign immunity of the States." I d., at 341. Similarly, in Fitzpatrick
v. Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445 (1976), the Court referred to "the
Eleventh Amendment, and the principle of sovereign immunity it embodies . . . . " I d., at 456. See also Nevada v.
Hall, 440 U. S. 410, 438-441 (1979) (REHNQUIST, J., dissent11
"Manifestly, we cannot rest with a mere literal application of the words
of § 2 or Article III, or assume that the letter of the Eleventh Amendment
exhausts the restriction upon suits against non-consenting states. Behind
the words of the constitutional provisions are postull~tes which limit and
control. There is the essential postulate that the controversies, as contemplated, shall be found to be of a justiciable character. There is also the
postulate that States of the Union, still possessing attributes of sovereignty, shall be immune from suits, without their consent, save where
there has been 'a surrender of this immunity in the plan of the convention."' Id., at 322-323 (footnote omitted).
See also Ex parte New York, 256 U. S. 490, 497 (1921); Hans v. Louisiana,
134 U. S. 1, 15-18 (1890). Most commentators have understood this
Court's Eleventh Amendment cases as taking the position that the Constitution incorporates the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity.
See, e. g., Baker, Federalism and the Eleventh Amendment, 48 U. Col. L.
Rev. 139, 1~158 (1977); Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: Part One, 126 U. Pa. L. Rev. 515, 538-546
(1978); Thornton, The Eleventh Amendment: An Endangered Species, 55
Ind. L. J. 293, 305-810 (1980); Tribe, Intergovernmental Immunities in
Litigation, Taxation, and Regulation: Separation of Powers Issues in Controversies About Federalism, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 682, 684-688 (1976); Comment, Private Suits Against States in the Federal Courts, 33 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 331, 334--336 (1966).
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ing). 19 Thus, under our cases it is the doctrine of sovereign
immunity, rather than the text of the Amendment itself,
which is critical to the analysis of any Eleventh Amendment
problem. 20
The doctrine of sovereign immunity developed in England,
where it was thought that the king could not be sued. However, common law courts, in applying the doctrine, traditionally distinguished between the king and his agents, on the
theory that the king would never authorize unlawful conduct,
and that therefore the unlawful acts of the king's officers
ought not to be treated as acts of the sovereign. See 1 W.
Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England *244 (J.
Andrews ed. 1909). As early as the fifteenth century,
Holdsworth writes, servants of the king were held liable for
t~eir unlawful acts. See III W. Holdsworth, A History of
English Law 388 (1903). During the seventeenth century,
this rule of law was used extensively to curb the king's authority. The king's officers
"could do wrong, and if they committed wrongs, whether
in the course of their employment or not, they could be
made legally liable. The command or instruction of the
king could not protect them. If the king really had
given such commands or instructions, he must have been
deceived." VI id., at 101.
In one famous case, it was held that although process would
not issue against the sovereign himself, it could issue against
his officers. "For the warrant of no man, not even of the
King himself, can excuse the doing of an illegal act." Sands
1
'

Petitioners themselves treat the Eleventh Amendment as equivalent to
the doctrine of sovereign immunity. See Brief for Petitioners 12 n. 10.
., Of course, if the Court were to apply the text of the Amendment, it
would not bar an action against Pennsylvania by one of its own citizens.
See n. 17, supra.

.-

"

81-2101-DISSENT
PENNHURST STATE SCHOOL & HOSP. v. HALDERMAN

18

v. Child, 83 Eng. Rep. 725, 726 (K.B. 1693). 21 By the eighteenth century, this rule of law was unquestioned. See X
W. Holdsworth, supra, at 650-652. And in the nineteenth
Century this view was taken by the court to be so well-settled as to not require the citation of authority, see Feather v.
The Queen, 122 Eng. Rep. 1191, 1205-1206 (K.B. 1865). 22
It was only natural, then, that this Court, in applying the
principles of sovereign immunity, recognized the distinction
between a suit against a State and one against its officer. 23
For example, while the Court did inquire as to whether a suit
was ''in essence" against the sovereign, it soon became settled law that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar suits
against state officials in their official capacities challenging
unconstitutional conduct. See Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S.
466, 518-519 (1898); Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, 140 U. S. 1,
10-12 (1891); Poindexter v. Greenhaw, 114 U. S. 270, 288
The rationale for this principle was compelling. Courts did not wish to
confront the king's immunity from suit directly; nevertheless they found
the threat to liberty posed by permitting the sovereign's abuses to go- unremedied to be intolerable. Since in reality the king could act only
through his officers, the rule which permitted suits against those officers
fonnally preserved the sovereign's immunity while operating as one of the
means by which courts curbed the abuses of the monarch. See X W.
Holdsworth, supra, at 262-268.
11
Commentators have noted the influence of these English doctrines on
the American conception of sovereign immunity. See Jaffe, Suits Against
Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 19-29
(1963); Note, Express Waiver of Eleventh Amendment Immunity, 17 Ga.
L. Rev. 513, 517-518 (1983); Note, Developments in the Law-Remedies
Against the United States and its Officials, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 827, 831-833
(1957). In fact, in Belknap v. Schild, 161 U. S. 10 (1896), the Court, in
holding that officers of the United States were liable for injuries caused by
their unlawful conduct even if they did so acting pursuant to official duties,
cited the passage from Feather v. The Queen. See 161 U. S., at 18.
11
Chief Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, recognized this distinction in the very first case to reach the Court concerning the application of
the Eleventh Amendment to the conduct of a state official, Osborn v. Bank
of the United States, 9 Wheat. 738 (1824).
11
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(1885). u This rule was reconciled with sovereign immunity
principles by use of the traditional rule that an action against
an agent of the sovereign who had acted unlawfully was not
COnSidered to be against the SOVereign. When an official
acts pursuant to an unconstitutional statute, the Court reasoned, the absence of valid authority leaves the official ultra
vires his authority, and thus a private actor stripped of his
status as a representative of the sovereign. 25 In Ex parte
Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908), the Court was merely restating
a settled principle when it wrote:
"The Act to be enforced is alleged to be unconstitutional, and if it be so, the use of the name of the State to
enforce an unconstitutional act to the injury of complainants is a proceeding without the authority of and one
which does not affect the State in its sovereign or governmental capacity. It is simply an illegal act upon the
part of a state official in attempting by the use of the
"'See also McNeill v. Southern R. Co., 202 U. S. 543, 559 (1906); Gunter
v. Atlantic C. L. R. Co., 200 U. S. 273, ~284 (1906); Prout v. Starr, 188
U. S. 537 (1903); Scott v. Donald, 165 U. S. 58, 67-70 (1897); Reagan v.
Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 154 U. S. 362, 388--391 (1894); In re Tyler, 149
U. S. 164, 190-191 (1893); In re Ayers, 123 U. S. 443, 506-507 (1887);
Haygood v. Southern, 117 U. S. 52, 70 (1886); Allen v. Baltimore & 0. R.
Co., 114 U. S. 311, 315-316 (1885); Board of Liquidation v. McCamb, 92
U. S. 531, 541 (1875). Cf. United States v. Lee, 106 U. S. 196, 219-222
(1883) (sovereign immunity of the United States not a defense against suit
charging officers of the United States with unconstitutional conduct).
• "That, it is true, is a legislative act of the government of Virginia, but it
is not a law of the State of Virginia. The State has passed no such law, for
it cannot; and what it cannot do, it certainly, in contemplation of law, has
not done. The Constitution of the United States, and its own contract,
both irrepealable by any act on its part, are the law of Virginia; and that
law made it the duty of the defendant to receive the coupons tendered in
payment of taxes, and declared every step to enforce the tax, thereafter
taken, to be without warrant of law, and therefore a wrong. He stands,
then, stripped of his official character; and, confessing a personal violation
of the plaintiff's rights for which he must personally answer, he is without
defence." Poindexter v. Greenlww, 114 U. S., at 288.
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name of the State to enforce a legislative enactment
which is void because unconstititional. If the act which
the state Attorney General seeks to enforce be a violation of the Federal Constitution, the officer in proceeding under such enactment comes into conflict with the
superior authority of that Constitution, and he is in that
case stripped of his official or representative character
and is subjected in his person to the consequences of his
individual conduct." Id., at 159-160. 28
The majority states that the holding of Ex parte Young is
limited to cases in which relief is provided on the basis of federallaw, and that it rests entirely on the need to protect the
supremacy of federal law. That position overlooks the foundation of the rule of Young as well Pennoyer v. McConnaughy and Young's other predecessors.
The Young Court distinguished between the State and its
attorney general because the latter, in violating the Constitution, had engaged in conduct the sovereign could not authorize. The pivotal consideration was not that the conduct violated federal law, since nothing in the jurisprudence of the
Eleventh Amendment permits a suit against a sovereign
merely because federal law is at issue. 27 Indeed, at least
• See generally Orth, The Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment,
1798-1908: A Case Study of Judicial Power, 1983 U. Ill. L. Rev. 423. The
Court has adhered to this formulation to the present day. See Florida
Dept. of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U. S. 670, 684-690 (1982)
(opinion of STEVENS, J.); id., at 714-715 (WHITE, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part); Ray v. Atlantic Rich,Mld Co.,
435 U. S. 151, 156 n. 6 (1978); Scheuerv. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232,237 (1974);
Georgia R. Co. v. Redwine, 342 U. S. 299 (1952); Sterling v. Constantin,
287 u. s. 378, 393 (1932).
"'As the Solicitor General correctly notes in his brief, ''this Court has no
power to create any exception to a constitutional bar to federal court jurisdiction. Ex parte Young rests instead on recognition that the Eleventh
Amendment simply does not apply to suits seeking to restrain illegal acts
by state officials-whether those acts are illegal because they violate the
Constitution, as in Young, or federal or state law." Brief for the United
States 23 (citations omitted). The majority criticizes this approach as
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since Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1 (1890), the law has been
settled that the Eleventh Amendment applies even though
the State is accused of violating the Federal Constitution.
In Hans the Court held that the Eleventh Amendment applies to all cases within the jurisdiction of the federal courts
including those brought to require compliance with federal
law, and bars any suit where the State is the proper defendant under sovereign immunity principles. A long line of
cases has endorsed that proposition, holding that irrespective
of the need to vindicate federal law a suit is barred by the
Eleventh Amendment if the State is the proper defendant. 28
It was clear until today that ''the State [is not] divested of its
immunity 'on the mere ground that the case is one arising
under the Constitution or laws of the United States."'
Parden v. Terminal R. Co., 377 U. S. 184, 186 (1964) (quoting Hans, 134 U. S., at 10).
The pivotal consideration in Young was that it was not conduct of the sovereign that was at issue. 29 The rule that unbeing "out of touch with reality'' because it ignores the practical impact of
an injunction on the State though directed at its officers. Ante, at 1~17.
Yet that criticism cannot account for Young, since an injunction has the
same effect on the State whether it is based on federal or state law. Indeed, the majority recognizes that injunctions approved by Young "have
an obvious impact on the State itself," ante, at 13. In the final analysis the
distinction between the State and its officers, realistic or not, is one finnly
embedded in the doctrine of sovereign immunity. It is that doctrine and ]
not any theory of federal supremacy which the Framers placed in the Eleventh Amendment and which this Court therefore has a duty to respect.
•see Quem v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 345 n. 17 (1979); Alabama v.
Pugh, 438 U. S. 781 (1978) (per curiam); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S.
651, 668--669 (1974); Employees v. Missouri Public Health Dept., 411 U. S.
279, 280 n. 1 (1973); Smith v. Reeves, 178 U. S. 436, 444-449 (1900); Fitts v.
McGhee, 172 U. S. 516 (1899); In re Ayers, 123 U. S. 443 (1887); Hagood v.
Southern, 117 U. S. 52 (1886); Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U. S. 711 (1882).
See generally C. Jacobs, The Eleventh Amendment and Sovereign Immunity BS-91, 109-110 (1972).
• The distinction between the sovereign and its agents not only explains
why the rationale of Ex parte Young and its predecessors is consistent with
established sovereign immunity doctrine, but it also explains the critical

~
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lawful acts of an officer should not be attributed to the sovereign has deep roots in the history of sovereign immunity and
makes Young reconcilable with the principles of sovereign
immunity found in the Eleventh Amendment, 30 rather than
merely an unprincipled accommodation between federal and
state interests that ignores the principles contained in the
Eleventh Amendment.
This rule plainly applies t1> conduct of state officers in violation of state law. Young states that the significance of the
charge of unconstitutional conduct is that it renders the state
official's conduct "simply an illegal act," and hence the officer
is not entitled to the sovereign's immunity. Since a state officer's conduct in violation of state law is certainly no less illegal than his violation of federal law, in either case the official,
by committing an illegal act, is "stripped of his official or rep-

I

difference between actions for injunctive relief and actions for damages
recognized in Edelman v. Jardan, 415 U. S. 651 (1973). Since the damages remedy sought in that case would have required payment by the
State, it could not be said that the action ran only against the agents of the
State. Therefore, while the agents' unlawful conduct was considered
ultra vires and hence could be enjoined, a remedy which did run against
the sovereign and not merely its agent could not fit within the ultra vires
doctrine and hence was impermissible. If damages are not sought from
the State and the relief will run only against the state official, damages are
a permissible remedy under the Eleventh Amendment. See Scheuer v.
Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232, 237-238 (1974).
80
"While in England personification of sovereignty in the person of the
King may have been possible, attempts to adopt this reasoning in the
United States resulted in the postulation of the abstract State as sovereign. Since the ideal State could only act by law, whatever the State did
must be lawful. On this ground a distinction was drawn ~tween the State
and its officers, and since the State could not commit an illegal act, any
such act was imputed to government officers. It logically followed that a
suit against state officers was not necessarily a suit against the State."
Note, The Sovereign Immunity of the States: The Doctrine and Some of its
Recent Developments, 40 Minn. L. Rev. 234, 244-245 (1956) (footnotes
omitted). Curiously, the majority appears to acknowledge that it has created a sovereign immunity broader than had ever been enjoyed by the king
of England. Ante, at 22, n. 24.
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resentative character." For example, one of Young's predecessors held that a suit challenging an unconstitutional attempt by the Virginia legislature to disavow a state contract
was not barred by the Eleventh Amendment, reasoning that
''inasmuch as, by the Constitution of the United States,
whick is also the supreme law ofVirginia, that contract,
when made, became thereby unchangeable, irrepealable
by the State, the subsequent act of January 26, 1882, and
all other like acts, which deny the obligation of that contract and forbid its performance, are not the acts of the
State of Virginia. The true and real Commonwealth
which contracted the obligation is incapable in law of doing anything in derogation of it. Whatever having that
effect, if operative, has been attempted or done, is the
work of its government acting without authority, in violation of its fundamental law, and must be looked upon,
in all courts of justice, as if it were not and never had
been. . . . The State of Virginia has done none of these
things with which this defence charges her. The defendant in error is not her officer, her agent, or her representative, in the matter complained of, for he has
acted not only without her authority, but contrary to her
express commands." Poindexter v. Greenkow, 114
U. S. 270, 293 (1885) (emphasis supplied). 31
It is clear that the Court in Poindexter attached no significance to the fact that Virginia had been accused of violating
federal and not its own law. 32 To the contrary, the Court
See also Barney v. City of New York, 193 U. S. 430, 439-441 (1904).
• This approach began long before Poin.dezter. The earliest cases in
which this Court rejected sovereign immunity defenses raised by officers
of the sovereign accused of unlawful conduct did not involve charges of unconstitutional conduct, but rather simple trespass actions. In rejecting
the defense, the Court simply noted that although the officers were acting
pursuant to their duties, they were engaged in unlawful conduct which
therefore could not be the conduct of the sovereign. See Bates v. Clark,
95 U. S. 204, 209 (1877); Mitchell v. Harmony, 13 How. 115, 137 (1851);
11
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treated the Federal Constitution as part of Virginia's law,
and concluded that the challenged action was not that of Virginia precisely because it violated Virginia's law. The majority's position turns the Young doctrine on its head-sovereign immunity did not bar actions challenging unconstitutional conduct by state officers since the Federal Constitution
was also to be considered part of the State's law-and since
the State could not and would not authorize a violation of
its own law, the officers' conduct was considered individual
and not sovereign. No doubt the Courts that produced
Poindexter and Young would be shocked to discover that conduct authorized by state law but prohibited by federal law is
not considered conduct attributable to the State for sovereign
immunity purposes, but conduct prohibited by state law is
considered conduct attributable to the very State which prohibited that conduct. Indeed, in Tindal v. Wesley, 167 U. S.
204 (1896), the Court specifically found that it was impossible
to distinguish between a suit challenging unconstitutional
conduct of state officers and a suit challenging any other type
of unlawful behavior:
"If a suit against officers of a State to enjoin them from

enforcing an unconstitutional statute . . . be not one
against the State, it is impossible to see how a suit
against the individuals to recover the possession of property belonging to the plaintiff and illegally held by the

10

,

Wise v. Withers, 3 Cranch 331 (1806); Little v. Barreme, 2 Cranch 169
(1804). In the landmark case of Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 9
Wheat. 738 (1824), the Court took it as beyond argument that if a state
officer unlawfully seized property in an attempt to collect taxes he believed
to be owed the state, the Eleventh Amendment would not bar a simple
trespass action against the officer. The majority strangely takes comfort
in the fact that the former cases allowed damages actions against federal
officers. Ante, at 19, n. 20. The allowance of a damage remedy is no
more consistent with the Court's approach than the allowance of an injunction, seen.~, supra.
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defendants can be deemed a suit against the State."
ld., at 222. 88
These cases are based on the simple idea that an illegal act
strips the official of his state-law shield, thereby depriving
the official of the sovereign's immunity.
It follows that the basis for the Young rule is present when
the officer sued has violated the law of the sovereign; in all
such cases the conduct is of a type that would not be permitted by the sovereign and hence is not attributable to the sovereign under traditional sovereign immunity principles. In
such a case, the sovereign's interest lies with those who seek
to enforce its laws, rather than those who have violated
them.
"[P]ublic officials may become tort-feasors by exceeding
the limits of their authority. And where they unlawfully seize or hold a citizen's realty or chattel, recoverable by appropriate action at law or in equity [the] dominant interest of the sovereign is then on the side of the
victim who may bring his possessory action to reclaim
that which is wrongfully withheld." Land v. Dollar,
330

u. s. 731, 738 (1947).

34

•To the same effect as Tindal is South Carolina v. Wesley, 155 U. S.
542 (1895). The ~ority argues that the case notes that South Carolina
was not a party to the proceeding and suggests the ruling was "purely procedural," ante, at 18, n. 18, but that misses the whole purpose of the ''procedural" point made in the opinion-Eleventh Amendment immunity may
only be claimed by the State; it does not extend to state officers accused of
violating state law. See also Florida Dept. of State v. Treasure Salvors,
Inc., 458 U. S. 670, 697 (1982) (opinion of STEVENS, J.) ("If conduct of a
state officer taken pursuant to an unconstitutional state statute is deemed
to be unauthorized and may be challenged in federal court, conduct undertaken without any authority whatever is also not entitled to Eleventh
Amendment immunity'').
14
While Land v. Dollar is a case dealing with the sovereign immunity
of the Federal Government, it is pertinent to the Eleventh Amendment,
which after all for present purposes is no more than an embodiment of sovereign immunity principles.
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The majority's position that the Eleventh Amendment does
not pennit federal courts to enjoin conduct that the sovereign
State itself seeks to prohibit thus is inconsistent with both
the doctrine of sovereign immunity and the underlying respect for the integrity of State policy which the Eleventh
Amendment protects. The issuance of injunctive relief
which enforces state laws and policies, if anything, enhances
federal courts' respect for the sovereign prerogatives of the
States. 86 The majority's approach, which requires federal
courts to ignore questions of state law and to rest their decisions on federal bases, will create more rather than less friction between the States and the federal judiciary.
Moreover, the majority's rule has nothing to do with the
basic reason the Eleventh Amendment was added to the Constitution. There is general agreement that the Amendment
was passed because the States ·were fearful that federal
courts would force them to pay their Revolutionary War
debts, leading to their financial ruin. 36 Entertaining a suit
for injunctive relief based on state law implicates none of the
concerns of the Framers. Since only injunctive relief is
sought there is no threat to the state treasury of the type
that concerned the Framers, see Milliken v. Bradley, 433
U. S. 267, 288-290 (1977); Etklman v. Jordan, 415 U. S.
651, 667-668 (1974); and if the State wishes to avoid the federal injunction, it can easily do so simply by changing its law.
• For example, in cases barring suits against individual officers as suits
against the state, the Court has also acknowledged the importance of statelaw authority for the challenged conduct of the officer. In such cases the
Court has frequently noted that the relief sought would be unauthorized by
state law and would therefore adversely affect the state itself. See, e. g.,
Hagood v. Southern, 117 U.S. 52, 68 (1886); Louisiana v. Jumel, 107
U. S. 711, 721 (1882). In contrast, in cases of official actions contrary to
state law, a federal court's remedy would not adversely affect any state
policy.
• See, e. g., Petty v. Tenneuee-Miasouri Bridge Comm'n, 359 U. S. 275,
276 n. 1 (1959); Miasouri v. Fiake, 290 U. S. 18, 27 (1933); Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 406-407 (1821).
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The possibility of States left helpless in the face of disruptive
federal decrees which led to the passage of the Eleventh
Amendment simply is not presented by this case. Indeed,
the Framers no doubt would have preferred federal courts to
base their decisions on state law, which the State is then free
to reexamine, rather than forcing courts to decide cases on
federal grounds, leaving the litigation beyond state control.
In light of the preceding, it should come as no surprise that
there is absolutely no authority for the majority's position
that the rule of Y ourzg is inapplicable to violations of state
law. The only cases the majority cites, ante, at 14-15, for
the proposition that Yourzg is limited to the vindication of federallaw do not consider the question whether Yourzg permits
injunctive relief on the basis of state law-in each of the cases
the question was neither presented, briefed, argued nor decided. 37 · It is curious, to say the least, that the majority dis;
approves of reliance on cases in which the issue we face today
was decided sub silentio, see ante, at 27, yet it is willing to
rely on cases in which the issue was not decided at all. In
fact, not only is there no precedent for the majority's position, but, as I have demonstrated in Part II, supra, there is
an avalanche of precedent squarely to the contrary. 38
The majority cites Quem v. Jordan, 440 U. S. 332 (1979); Scheuer v.
Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232 (1974); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651 (1974);
Georgia R. & Banking Co. v. Redwine, 342 U. S. 299 (1952). In each of
these cases, the only question presented or decided was whether monetary
relief could be obtained against state officials on the basis of federal law,
except for Redwine, where the Court decided that a suit to enjoin collection
of a state tax on the basis of federal law was not barred by the Eleventh
Amendment. In none of these cases was any question concerning the
availability of injunctive relief under state law considered even in dicta.
• In addition to overruling the cases discussed in part II, supra, the majority's view that Young exists simply to ensure the supremacy of federal
law indicates that a number of our prior cases, which held that the Eleventh Amendment may bar an action for injunctive relief even where the
State has violated the Federal Constitution, see, e. g., Alabama v. Pugh,
438 U. S. 781 (1978) (per curiam), were incorrectly decided. The Court
can have no satisfactory explanation for Pugh, which held that even as to a
11
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That the doctrine of sovereign immunity does not protect
conduct which has been prohibited by the sovereign is clearly
demonstrated by the case on which petitioners chiefly rely,
Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S.
682 (1949). The Larson opinion teaches that the actions of
state officials are not attributable to the state-are ultra
vires-in two different types of situations: (1) when the official is engaged in conduct that the sovereign has not authorized, and (2) when he has engaged in conduct that the sovereign has forbidden. A sovereign, like any other principal,
cannot authorize its agent to violate the law. When an agent
does so, his actions are considered ultra vires and he is liable
for his own conduct under the law of agency. Both types of
ultra vires conduct are clearly identified in Larson.
"There may be, of course, suits for specific relief
against officers of the sovereign which are not suits
against the sovereign. If the officer purports to act as
an individual and not as an official, a suit directed against
that action is not a suit against the sovereign. If the
War Assets Administrator had completed a sale of his
own personal home, he presumably could be enjoined
from later conveying it to a third person. On a similar
federal constitutional claim, a suit may not be brought directly against a
state even where it may be brought against its officials. On the majority's
view, there is no basis for distinguishing between the state and its officials-as to both there is a need to vindicate the supremacy of federal law
through the issuance of injunctive relief, and unless the officials are acting
completely outside of their authority, they must be treated as is the state.
However, Pugh can be explained simply by reference to Young's use of the
ultra vires doctrine with respect to unconstitutional conduct by state officers-such conduct is not conduct by the sovereign because it could not be
authorized by the sovereign, hence the officers are not entitled to the sovereign's immunity. A suit directly against the state cannot succeed because the ultra vires doctrine is unavailable without a state officer to which
it can be applied. Pugh makes it clear that Young rests not on a need to
vindicate federal law, but on the traditional distinction between the sovereign and its agents.
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theory, where the officer's powers are limited by statute,
his actions beyond those limitations are considered individual and not sovereign actions. The officer is not doing the business which the sovereign has empowered him
to do or he is doir19 it in a way that the sovereign has
forbidden. His actions are ultra vires his authority and
therefore may be made the object of specific relief. It is
important to note that in such cases the relief can be
granted, without impleading the sovereign, only because
of the officer's lack of delegated power. A claim of error
in the exercise of that power is therefore not sufficient.
And, since the jurisdiction of the court to hear the case
may depend, as we have recently recognized, upon the
decision which it ultimately reaches on the merits, it is
necessary that the plaintiff set out in his complaint the
statutory limitation on which he relies." ld., at 689-690
(emphasis supplied).

Larson thus clearly indicates that the immunity determination depends upon the the merits of the plaintiff's claim. The
same approach is employed by Y our19-the plaintiff can overcome the state official's immunity only by succeeding on the
merits of its claim of unconstitutional conduct.
Following the two-track analysis of Larson, the cases considering the question whether the state official is entitled to
the sovereign's immunity can be grouped into two categories.
In cases like Larson, Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U. S. 643
(1962), and Florida Dept. of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc .,
458 U. S. 670 (1982), which usually involve the state functioning in its proprietary capacity, the ultra vires issue can be resolved solely by reference to the law of agency. Since there
is no specific limitation on the powers of the officers other
than the general limitations on their authority, the only question that need be asked is whether they have acted completely beyond their authority. But when the State has
placed specific limitations on the manner in which state officials may perform their duties, as it often does in regulatory

'
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or other administrative contexts as were considered in Scully
v. Bird and Johnson v. Lankford, the ultra vires inquiry also
involves the question whether the officials acted in a way that
state law forbids. No sovereign would authorize its officials
to violate its own law, and if the official does so, then Larson
indicates that his conduct is ultra vires and not protected by
sovereign immunity.
Larson confirms that the Court's disposition of this case in
1981-ordering the Court of Appeals to consider respondents' state law claims-was fully hannonious with established
sovereign immunity principles. The jurisdiction of the federal court was established by a federal claim; 39 the Court of
Appeals therefore had jurisdiction to resolve the case and to
grant injunctive relief on either federal or state grounds.
Respondents pleaded a specific statutory limitation on the
way in which petitioners were entitled to run Pennhurst.
The District Court and the Court of Appeals have both found
that petitioners operated Pennhurst in a way that the sovereign has forbidden. Specifically, both courts concluded that
petitioners placed residents in Pennhurst without any consideration at all of the limitations on institutional confinement that are found in state law, and that they failed to create community living programs that are mandated by state
law. In short, there can be no dispute that petitioners
• There can be no doubt that respondents' federal claims were sufficiently substantial to justify federal jurisdiction in this case. In another
case brought by a resident of Pennhurst, we held that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires, at a minimum, that petitioners provide the residents with reasonable care and safety. See
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U. S. 307, 324 (1982). The uncontested findings
of the District Court in this case establish that Pennhurst was neither safe
nor providing reasonable care to its residents. Therefore, respondents'
federal claims not only were sufficiently substantial to support the exercise
of federal jurisdiction in this case, but would almost certainly have justified
the issuance of at least some injunctive relief had a state-law basis for the
relief been unavailable.

.-
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ran Pennhurst in a way that the sovereign had forbidden.
Under the second track of the Larson analysis, petitioners
were acting ultra vires because they were acting in a way
that the sovereign, by statute, had forbidden. 40
• In LaTBon, the Administrator of the War Assets Administration was in
possession of coal that the plaintiff claimed the Administrator was contractually obligated to deliver to it. Instead of seeking damages for breach of
contract in the Court of Claims, the plaintiff sought an injunction in the
district court. The Court held that the Administrator had acted properly
in refusing to deliver the coal and instead insisting that the plaintiff seek its
remedy in the Court of Claims.
"There was, it is true, an allegation that the Administrator was acting
'illegally,' and that the refusal to deliver was 'unauthorized.' But these
allegations were not based and did not purport to be based upon any lack of
delegated power. Nor could they be, since the Administrator was empowered by the sovereign to administer a general sales program encompassing
the negotiation of contracts, the shipment of goods and the receipt of payment. A normal concomitant of such powers, as a matter of general
agency law, is the power to refuse delivery when, in the agent's view, delivery is not called for under a contract and the power to sell goods which
the agent believes are still his principal's to sell." 337 U. S. at 691-62
(footnotes omitted).
Thus, the Administrator had acted properly. He was doing what any
agent would d()-holding on to property he believed was his principal's and
insisting that the claimant sue the principal if it wanted the property. He
was merely exercising the "normal" duties of a sales agent. Congress envisioned that he do exactly that; the remedy it had provided required the
claimant to sue for damages in the Court of Claims rather than obtaining
the property directly from the Administrator, and no one had questioned
the constitutional sufficiency of that alternate remedy. See McCord,
Fault Without Liability: Immunity of Federal Employees, 1966 U. Ill.
L. F. 849, 862-867. "Since the plaintiff had not made an affirmative allegation of any relevant statutory limitation upon the Administrator's powers, and had made no claim that the Administrator's action amounted to an
unconstitutional taking, the Court ruled that the suit must fail as an effort
to enjoin the United States.'' Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U. S. 643, 647
(1962). Malone can be explained similarly. These cases hold that Congress had empowered the governmental official to make necessary decisions about whether to hold onto property the official believes is the government's, at least pending the aggrieved party's remedy in the Claims
Court under the Tucker Act, 28 U. S. C. §§ 1491-1507 (1976 ed. and
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Petitioners readily concede, both in their brief and at oral
argument, that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar a suit
against state officers who have acted ultra vires. The majority makes a similar concession, ante, at 10, n. 11. Yet
both ignore the fact that the cases, and most especially
Larson, set out a two-step analysis for ultra vires conduct conduct that is completely beyond the scope of the officer's
authority, or conduct that the sovereign has forbidden. In
fact, the majority goes so far as to quote the passage from
Larson indicating that a state official acts ultra vires when he
completely lacks power delegated from the state, ante, at 11,
n. 11. That quotation ignores sentences immediately preceding and following the quoted passage stating in terms that
where an official violates a statutory prohibition, he acts
ultra vires and is not protected by sovereign immunity.
This omission is understandable, since petitioners' conduct in
this case clearly falls into the category of conduct the sovereign has specifically forbidden by statute. Petitioners were
told by Pennsylvania how to run Pennhurst, and there is no
dispute that they disobeyed their instructions. Yet without
explanation, the Court repudiates the two-track analysis of
Larson and holds that sovereign immunity extends to conduct the sovereign has statutorily prohibited. 41 Thus, con, Supp. V 1981 and West Supp. 1983). See Byse, Proposed Refonns in Federal "Nonstatutory" Judicial Review: Sovereign Immwiity, lndispensible
Parties, Mandamus, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 1479, 1490-1491 (1962); Jaffe, The
Right to Judicial Review I, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 401, 436-437 (1958). Thus,
where the official acts as the sovereign intends, he is entitled to the sovereign's immunity under the principles discussed above. Where that is not
the case, Larson permits injunctive relief. In this case, respondents did
plead a specific limitation on petitioners' powers, and the holding of the
Court of Appeals on the merits of respondents' state law claims indicates
that petitioners were not exercising the ''normal" duties that the sovereign
had envisioned for them, unlike the Administrator in Larson. Instead,
petitioners were running Pennhurst "in a way which the sovereign has forbidden." 337 U. S., at 689.
•• The majority also repudiates JUSTICE WHITE's recent statement in
TreaBUre Salvors: "where the officer's actions are limited by statute, ac-
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trary to the Court's assertion, Larson is in conflict with the
result reached today. 42
In sum, a century and a half of this Court's Eleventh
Amendment jurisprudence has established the following. A
suit alleging that the official had acted within his authority
but in a manner contrary to state statutes was not barred because the Eleventh Amendment prohibits suits against
States; it does not bar suits against state officials for actions
not permitted by the State under its own law. The sovereign could not and would not authorize its officers to violate
its own law; hence an action against a state officer seeking
redress for conduct not permitted by state law is a suit
against the officer, not the sovereign. Ex parte Young concluded in as explicit a fashion as possible that unconstitutional action by state officials is not action by the State even
if it purports to be authorized by state law, because the federal Constitution strikes down the state law shield. In the
tort cases, if the plaintiff proves his case, there is by definition no state-law defense to shield the defendant. Similarly,
when the state officer violates a state statute, the sovereign
has by definition erected no shield against liability. These
precedents make clear that there is no foundation for the contention that the majority embraces-that Ex parte Young authorizes injunctive relief against state officials only on the
tions beyond those limitations are to be considered individual and not sovereign actions." 458 U. S., at 714. Four Members of today's majority
subscribed to that statement only two Terms ago.
41
Indeed, the majority senses as much, by admitting that it cannot reconcile the ultra vires doctrine endorsed by Larson with its approach. See
ante, at 22-23, n. 24. The majority is also incorrect in suggesting that
Larson overruled most if not all of the cases contrary to its position. In
fact, Larson cited most of those cases with approval, including Clemson,
Tindal v. Wesley, Poindexter v. Greenlww and Land v. Dollar; the Larson
opinion stated that it was overruling only a single case, Goltra v. Weeks,
271 U. S. 536 (1926). See 337 U. S., at 698-702. Larson simply did not
wreak the kind of havoc on this Court's precedents that the majority does
today.

J.-
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basis of federal law. To the contrary, Young is as clear as a
bell: the Eleventh Amendment does not apply where there is
no state-law shield. That simple principle should control this
case.
IV
The majority's decision in this case is especially unwise m
that it overrules a long line of cases in order to reach a result
that is at odds with the usual practices of this Court. In one
of the most respected opinions ever written by a Member of
this Court, Justice Brandeis wrote:
"The Court [has] developed, for its own governance in
the cases confessedly within its jurisdiction, a series of
rules under which it has avoided passing upon a large
part of all the constitutional questions pressed upon it for
decision. They are:
The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question
although properly presented by the record, if there is
also present some other ground upon which the case may
be disposed of. This rule has found most varied application. Thus, if a case can be decided on either of two
grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the
other a question of statutory construction or general law,
the Court will decide only the latter. Siler v. Louisville
& Nashville R. Co., 213 U. S. 175, 191." Ashwander v.
Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U. S. 288, 346-347
(1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
The Siler case, cited with approval by Justice Brandeis in
Ashwander, employed a remarkably similar approach to that
used by the Court of Appeals in this case. A privately
owned railroad corporation brought suit against the members
of the railroad commission of Kentucky to enjoin the enforcement of a rate schedule promulgated by the commission.
The federal circuit court found that the schedule violated the
plaintiff's federal constitutional rights and granted relief.
This Court affirmed, but it refused to decide the constitu-
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tional question because injunctive relief against the state officials was adequately supported by state law. The Court
held that the plaintiff's claim that the schedule violated the
Federal Constitution was sufficient to justify the assertion of
federal jurisdiction over the case, but then declined to reach
the federal question, deciding the case on the basis of state
law instead:
"Where a case in this court can be decided without reference to questions arising under the Federal Constitution, that course is usually pursued and is not departed
from without important reasons. In this case we think
it much better to decide it with regard to the question of
a local nature, involving the construction of the state
statute and the authority therein given to the commission to make the order in question, rather than to unnecessarily decide the various constitutional questions appearing in the record." Siler v. Louisville & Nashville
R. Co., 213 U. S. 175, 193 (1909). 43
The Siler principle has been applied on numerous occasions; when a suit against state officials has presented both
federal constitutional questions and issues of state law, the
Court has upheld injunctive relief on state law grounds.
See, e. g., Lee v. Bickell, 292 U. S. 415, 425 (1934); Glenn v.
Field Packing Co., 290 U. S. 177, 178 (1933); Davis v. Wallace, 257 U. S. 478, 482-485 (1922); Louisville & Nashville R.
Co. v. Greene, 244 U. S. 522, 527 (1917); Greene v. Louisville
& Interurban R. Co., 244 U. S. 499, 508, 512-514 (1917)."
• In Siler the Court decided the case on state-law grounds, even though
it acknowledged that "[i]n this case we are without the benefit of a construction of the statute by the highest state court of Kentucky, and we
must proceed in the absence of state adjudication upon the subject." !d.,
at 194.
.. Justice Peckham's opinion in Siler rested on a long line of cases, dating
back to Chief Justice Marshall's decision in Oabcmt v. Bank of the United
States, 9 Wheat. 738, 822 (1824), holding that a federal court has jurisdiction over all the issues-state as well as federal-presented by a case that
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In Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U. S. 528 (1974), the Court
quoted from the Siler opinion and noted that the "Court has
characteristically dealt first with possibly dispositive state
law claims pendent to federal constitutional claims." I d., at
546. It added:
"Numerous decisions of this Court have stated the
general proposition endorsed in Siler-that a federal
court properly vested with jurisdiction may pass on the
state or local law question without deciding the federal
constitutional issues-and have then proceeded to disproperly falls within its jurisdiction. Nor was Siler breaking new ground
in avoiding a federal constitutional question by deciding on state law
grounds. In Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific R. Co., 118 U. S.
394 (1886), the Court noted the importance of the federal constitutional
questions. Even though these had been treated as dispositive by the
lower court, and though they were the "main-almost the only-questions
discussed by counsel," id., at 395, the Court stated, "These questions belong to a class which this court should not decide, unless their determination is essential to the disposal of the case in which they arise." I d., at
410. It then detennined that the challenged tax assessments were not authorized by state law and affirmed the judgment solely on that ground. In
addition, the Court has routinely applied the Siler rule in cases upholding
injunctive relief on the basis of state law against municipal officials, see,
e. g., HillBIKrrou!Jh v. Cromwell, 326 U. S. 620, 629 (1946); Cincinnati v.
Vuter, 281 U. S. 439, 448-449 (1930); Ri8ty v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific R. Co., 270 U. S. 378 (1926); Bohler v. Callaway, 267 U. S. 479, 489
(1925); Lincoln Gas & Electric Light Co. v. City of Lincoln, 250 U. S. 256,
268-269 (1919); and in cases in which the plaintiffs were not held to be entitled to the relief they sought, see Schmidt v. Oakland Unified Sclwol
Di8t., 457 U. S. 594 (1982) (per curiam); Railroad Comm'n of California v.
Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 302 U. S. 388, 391 (1938); United Gas Co. v.
Railroad Commi8sion of Kentucky, 278 U.S. 300, 307 (1929); Waggoner
Estate v. Wichita County, 273 U. S. 113, 116 (1927); Chicago Great Western R . Co. v. Kendall, 266 U. S. 94, 97-98 (1924); Ohio Tax Cases, 232
U. S. 576, 586-587 (1914); Loui8ville & Nashville R. Co. v. Garrett, 231
U. S. 298, 303-304 (1913). Numerous other cases decided by this Court
have cited Siler as an accurate statement of the law regarding pendent jurisdiction. See, e. g., Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 7 (1976); Florida
Lime Growers v. Jacobsen, 362 U. S. 73, 81, n. 7 (1960); Hurn v. Oursler,
289 u. s. 238, 243-245 (1933).
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pose of the case solely on the nonfederal ground. See,
e. g., HillsbCJrO'IA1Jh v. Cromwell, 326 U. S. 620, 629--630
(1946); Waggoner Estate v. Wichita County, 273 U. S.
113, 116-119 (1927); Chicago G. W. R. Co. v. Kendall,
266 U. S. 94 (1924); United Gas Co. v. Railroad
Comm'n, 278 U. S. 300, 308 (1929); Risty v. Chicago,
R.I. & P.R. Co., 270 U. S. 378,387 (1926). These and
other cases illustrate in practice the wisdom of the federal policy of avoiding constitutional adjudication where
not absolutely essential to disposition of a case." 415
U. S., at 547, n. 12.
In fact, in this very case we applied the Siler rule by remanding the case to the Court of Appeals with explicit instructions
to consider whether respondents were entitled to relief under
state law.
Not only does the Siler rule have an impressive historical
pedigree, but it is also strongly supported by the interest in
avoiding duplicative litigation and the unnecessary decision
of federal constitutional questions.
"The policy's ultimate foundations . . . lie in all that
goes to make up the unique place and character, in our
scheme, of judicial review of governmental action for
constitutionality. They are found in the delicacy of that
function, particularly in view of possible consequences
for others stemming also from constitutional roots; the
comparative finality of those consequences; the consideration due to the judgment of other repositories of constitutional power concerning the scope of their authority;
the necessity, if government is to function constitutionally, for each to keep within its power, including the
courts; the inherent limitations of the judicial process,
arising especially from its largely negative character and
limited resources of enforcement; withal in the paramount importance of constitutional adjudication in our
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system." Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U. S.
549, 571 (1947). 46

In addition, application of the Siler rule enhances the decisionmaking autonomy of the States. Siler directs the federal
court to turn first to state law, which the State is free to modify or repeal. 41 By leaving the policy determinations underlying injunctive relief in the hands of the State, the Court of
Appeals' approach gives appropriate deference to established
state policies.
In contrast, the rule the majority creates today serves
none of the interests of the State. The majority prevents
federal courts from implementing State policies through equitable enforcement of State law. Instead, federal courts
are required to resolve cases on federal grourids that no State
authority can undo. Leaving violations of state law unredressed and ensuring that the decisions of federal courts may
never be reexamined by the States hardly comports with the
respect for States as sovereign entities commanded by the
Eleventh Amendment.

v

One basic fact underlies this case: far from immunizing petitioners' conduct, the State of Pennsylvania prohibited it.
Respondents do not complain about the conduct of the State
of Pennsylvania-it is Pennsylvania's commands which they
seek to enforce. Respondents seek only to have Pennhurst
run the way Pennsylvania envisioned that it be run. Until
today, the Court understood that the Eleventh Amendment
41

Cf. H. L. v. Matheson, 450 U. S. 398, 407 (1981) (citing Justice Brandeis' opinion in Ashwander); Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 122
(1979) (citing the Court's opinion in Siler).
41
In some of the cases following Siler, this Court has required that the
decree include a provision expressly authorizing its reopening in the event
that a state court later decided the question of state law differently. See
Lee v. Bickell, 292 U. S. 415, 426 (1934); Wald Transfer & Storage Co. v.
Smyth, 290 U. S. 602 (1933); Glenn v. Field Packing Co., 290 U. S. 177,
17~179 (1933).
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does not shield the conduct of state officers which has been
sanctioned by their sovereign.
Throughout its history this Court has derived strength
from institutional self-discipline. Adherence to settled doctrine is presumptively the correct course. ' 7 Departures are,
of course, occasionally required by changes in the fabric of
our society.ca When a court, rather than a legislature, initi""I agree with what the Court stated only days ago, that 'the doctrine of

stare tUciai8, while perhaps never entirely persuasive on a constitutional
question, is a doctrine that demands respect in a society governed by the
rule of law.' City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health,
Inc., - - U. S. - - , - - (1983). While the doctrine of stare decisiB does
not absolutely bind the Court to its prior opinions, a decent regard for the
orderly administration of justice requires that directly controlling cases
either be followed or candidly overruled.'' Solem v. Helm, - - U. S.
- , - (1983) (BURGER, C. J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
This statement was joined by four members of today's majority. The
fifth was the author of the opinion of the Court in City of Akron.
• This is an especially odd context in which to repudiate settled law in
that if anything changes in our social fabric favor limitation rather than expansion of sovereign immunity. The concept that the sovereign can do no
wrong and that citizens should be remediless in the face of its abuses is
more a relic of medieval thought than anything else.
"Whether this immunity is an absolute survival of the monarchial privilege,
or is a manifestation merely of power, or rests on abstract logical grounds,
it undoubtedly runs counter to modem democratic notions of the moral
responsibility of the State. Accordingly, courts reflect a strong legislative
momentum in their tendency to extend the legal responsibility of Government and to confirm Maitland's belief, expressed nearly fifty years ago
that, 'it is a wholesome sight to see ''the Crown" sued and answering for its
torts.'" Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U. S. 47, 59 (1944)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
In the even older decision of Poinde:neT v. Greenlww, 114 U. S. 270
(1884), the Court, after observing that "the distinction between the government of a State and the State itself is important, and should be observed," id., at 290, wrote:
"This distinction is essential to the idea of constitutional government.
To deny it or blot it out obliterates the line of demarcation that separates
constitutional government from absolutism, free self-government based on
the sovereignty of the people from that despotism, whether of the one or
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ates such a departure, it has a special obligation to explain
and to justify the new course on which it has embarked. Today, however, the Court casts aside 1well settled respected
doctrine that plainly commands affirmance of the Court of
Appeals-the doctrine of the law of the case," the doctrine of
stare decisis (the Court repudiates at least 28 cases), 60 the
the many, which enables the agent of the State to declare and decree that
he is the State; to say 'L'Etat c'est moi.' Of what avail are written constitutions whose bills of right for the security of individual liberty are written, too often, with the blood of martyrs shed upon the battle-field and the
scafl'old, if their limitations and restraints upon power may be overpassed
with impunity by the very agencies created and appointed to guard, defend, and enforce them; and that, too, with the sacred authority oflaw, not
only compelling obedience, but entitled to respect? And how else can
these principles of individual liberty and right be maintained, if, when violated, the judicial tribunals are forbidden to visit penalties upon individual
offenders, who are the instruments of wrong, whenver they interpose the
shield of the State? The doctrine is not to be tolerated. The whole frame
and scheme of the political institutions of this country, State and Federal,
protest against it. Their continued existence is not compatible with it. It
is the doctrine of absolutism, pure, simple, and naked .... " /d., at 291.
See also Chisholm v. Geqrgia, 2 Dall. 419, 469-479 (1793) (opinion of Jay,

c. J.).

•The heart oftoday's holding is that this Court had no power to act as it
did in 1981 when it ordered the Court of Appeals to consider and decide the
state law issues in this very case.
10
In the following cases the Court held injunctive relief may issue against
state officers on the basis of state law after explicitly rejecting their Eleventh Amendment defense: Rolston v. Missouri Fund Commissioners, 120
U. S. 391 (1887); South Carolina v. Wesley, 155 U. S. 542 (1895); Tindal v.
Wesley, 167 U. S. 204 (1897); Scully v. Bird, 209 U. S. 481 (1908); Hopkins
v. Clemson College, 221 U. S. 636 (1911); Atchison &c. R. Co. v. O'Connor, 223 U. S. 280 (1912); Johnson v. Lankford, 245 U. S. 541 (1918); Martin v. Lankford, 245 U. S. 547 (1918); (}rune v. Loui8ville & Interurban
R. Co., 244 U. S. 499 (1917); Loui8ville & Nashville R. Co. v. Greene, 244
U. S. 522 (1917); Illinois Central R. Co. v. Greene, 244 U. S. 555 (1917).
Since petitioners' position applies also to federal sovereign immunity (indeed the principal case on which they rely, Larson, is a federal sovereign
immunity case), the following additional cases which refused to apply sovereign immunity to suits against federal officers acting within the scope of
their authority because the plaintiff had alleged that the officers had en-

r
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doctrine of sovereign immunity, 51 the doctrine of pendant jurisdiction, 62 and the doctrine of judicial restraint. No sound
reason justifies the further prolongation of this litigation or
this Court's voyage into the sea of undisciplined lawmaking.
As I said at the outset, this case has illuminated the character of an institution.
I respectfully dissent.

)

gaged in unlawful conduct are rej~ hittle v. Barreme, 2 Cranch 169
(1804); Wise v. Withera, 3 Cranch 331 (1806); Mitchell v. Harrrwny, 13
How. 115 (1851); Bates v. Clark, 95 U. S. 204 (1877); Belk114p v. Schild,
161 U. S. 10 (1896); Sloan Shipyards v. U.S. Fleet Corp., 258 U. S. 549
(1922); Santa Fe Pac. R. Co. v. Fall, 259 U. S. 197 (1922); Philadelphia
Co. v. Stim~~on, 223 U.S. 605 (1912); Land v. Dollar, 330 U. S. 731, 738
(1947). Larson itself cites most of these cases with approval, and disapproves of none of them. All are overruled today. In fact, today the
Court repudiates the two-track analysis of Larson, since in Larson the
Court stated that conduct which has been specifically prohibited by statute
is not protected by sovereign immunity even if it is performed within the
scope of the official's duties, yet today the Court holds that even if an officer violates a statute, his conduct is protected by sovereign immunity.
The Court also overrules the cases cited in n. 5;@, infra. If some of these
cases have been rarely cited, see ante, at 23-24, n. 26, this is because
until today the law was thought to be well-settled on this point.
1
' From the fifteenth century English common law to Larson and beyond,
courts have never held that prohibited conduct can be shielded by sovereign immunity. That rule makes good sense-since a principal cannot authorize unlawful conduct, such conduct is of necessity ultra vires. There is
no reason to abandon such a well settled and sensible rule.
11
The majority also overrules Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 213
U. S. 175 (1909), and its progeny, including Louisville & Nashville R. Co.
v. Garrett, 231 U. S. 298 (1913); Davis v. Wallace, 257 U. S. 478 (1922);
Chicago Great Western R. Co. v. Kendall, 266 U. S. 94 (1924); United Gas
Co. v. Railroad Commission, 278 U. S. 300 (1919); Glenn v. Field Packing
Co., 290 U. S. 177 (1933); Lee v. Bickell, 292 U. S. 415 (1934); Railroad
Commission of California v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 302 U. S. 388
(1938).
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 81-2101

PENNHURST STATE SCHOOL AND HOSPITAL
ET AL., PETITIONERS v. TERRI LEE
HALDERMAN ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
[January-, 1984]

JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN, JusTICE MARSHALL, and JUSTICE BLACKMUN join, dissenting.
This case has illuminated the character of an institution.
The record demonstrates that the Pennhurst State School
and Hospital has been operated in violation of state law. In
1977, after three years of litigation, the District Court entered detailed findings of fact that abundantly support that
conclusion. In 1981, after four more years of litigation, this
Court ordered the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit to decide whether the law of Pennsylvania provides an independent and adequate ground which can support
the District Court's remedial order. The Court of Appeals,
sitting en bane, unanimously concluded that it did. This
Court does not disagree with that conclusion. Rather, it reverses the Court of Appeals because it did precisely what this
Court ordered it to do; the only error committed by the Court
of Appeals was its faithful obedience to this Court's
command.
This remarkable result is the product of an equally remarkable misapplication of the ancient doctrine of. sovereign immunity. In a completely unprecedented holding, today the
Court concludes that Pennsylvania's sovereign immunity prevents a federal court from enjoining the conduct that Pennsylvania itself has prohibited. No rational view of the sover-
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eign immunity of the States supports this result. To the
contrary, the question whether a federal court may award injunctive relief on the basis of state law has been answered affirmatively by this Court many times in the past. Yet the
Court repudiates at least 28 cases, spanning well over a century of this Court's jurisprudence, proclaiming instead that
federal courts have no power to enforce the will of the States
by enjoining conduct because it violates state law. This new
pronouncement will require the federal courts to decide federal constitutional questions despite the availability of statelaw grounds for decision, a result inimical to sound principles
of judicial restraint. Nothing in the Eleventh Amendment,
the conception of state sovereignty it embodies, or the history of this institution, requires or justifies such a perverse
result.
I

The conduct of petitioners that the Court attributes to the
State of Pennsylvania in order t.o find it protected by the
Eleventh Amendment is described in detail in the District
Court's findings. As noted in our prior opinion, 451 U. S. 1
(1981), and by the majority today, ante, at 2, those findings
were undisputed: "Conditions at Pennhurst are not only dangerous, with the residents often physically abused or
drugged by staff members, but also inadequate for the
'habilitation' of the retarded. The court found that the physical, intellectual, and emotional skills of some residents have
deteriorated at Pennhurst." 451 U. S., at 7 (footnote omitted). The court concluded that Pennhurst was actually hazardous to its residents. 1 Organized programs of training or
1
Infectious diseases were common and minimally adequate health care
was unavailable. Residents of Pennhurst were inadequately supervised,
and as a consequence were often injured by other residents or as a result of
self-abuse. Assaults on residents by staff members, including sexual assaults, were frequent. Physical restraints were employed in lieu of adequate staffing, often causing injury to residents, and on one occasion leading to a death. Dangerous psychotropic drugs were indiscriminately used
for purposes of behavior control and staff convenience. Staff supervision
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education were inadequate or entirely unavailable, and programs of treatment or training were not developed for residents. When they visited Pennhurst, shocked parents of
residents would find their children bruised, drugged and unattended. These conditions often led to a deterioration in
the condition of the residents after being placed in
Pennhurst. Terri Lee Halderman, for example, was learning to talk when she entered Pennhurst; after residing there
she lost her verbal skills. At every stage of this litigation,
petitioners have conceded that Pennhurst fails to provide
even minimally adequate habilitation for its residents. See
612 F. 2d 84, 92-94 (3d Cir. 1979) (en bane); 446 F. Supp.
1295, 1304 (E. D. Pa. 1977).
The District Court held that these conditions violated each
resident's rights under the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 87 Stat. 394, as amended by 92 Stat. 2987,
29 U. S., C. § 794 (1976 ed., Supp. V), and the Pennsylvania
Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966, Pa. Stat.
Ann. tit. 50, §§ 4101-4704 (Purdon 1969 and Supp. 1982)
("MH/MR Act"). The en bane Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit affirmed most of the District Court's judgment,
but it grounded its decision solely on the "bill of rights" provision in the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of
Rights Act, 42 U. S. C. § 6010 (1976 ed. and Supp. V). The
court did not consider the constitutional issues or § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act. While it affirmed the District Court's
holding that the MH/MR Act provides a right to adequate
habilitation, the court did not decide whether that state right
justified all of the relief granted by the District Court.
Petitioners sought review by this Court, asserting that the
Court of Appeals had erred in its construction of both federal
during meals was minimal, and residents often stole food from each otherleaving some without enough to eat. The unsafe conditions led to aggressive behavior on the part of residents which was punished by solitary confinement. There was often urine and excrement on the walls.
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and state statutes. This Court granted certiorari and reversed, 451 U. S. 1 (1981), holding that 42 U. S. C. § 6010
created no substantive rights. We did not accept respondents' state-law contention, because there was a possibility
that the Court of Appeals' analysis of the state statute had
been influenced by its erroneous reading of federal law.
Concluding that it was "unclear whether state law provides
an independent and adequate ground which can support the
court's remedial order," 451 U. S., at 31, we "remand[ed] the
state-law issue for reconsideration in light of our decision
here." Ibid. In a footnote we declined to consider the effect of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's then recent decision, In re Schmidt, 494 Pa. 86, 429 A. 2d 631 (1981), on the
state-law issues in the case, expressly stating that on remand
the Court of Appeals could "consider the state law issues in
light of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's recent decision."
451 U. S., at 31, n. 24.
On remand, 673 F. 2d 647 (3d Cir. 1982) (en bane), the
Court of Appeals, noting that this Court had remanded for
reconsideration of the state-law issue, examined the impact
of Schmidt. 2 According to the Court of Appeals, which was
unanimous on this point, the State Supreme Court had "spoken definitively" on the duties of the State under the MH/MR
Act, holding that the State was required to provide care to
the mentally retarded in the "least restrictive environment."
I d., at 651. Since the MH/MR Act fully justified the relief
issued in the Court of Appeals' prior judgment, the .court reinstated its prior judgment on the basis of petitioner's violation of state law. 3
In the questions raised in their petition for certiorari, petitioners do not
ask this Court to reexamine the Court of Appeals' conclusion that respondents are clearly entitled to relief under state law. Nor would it be appropriate for this Court to reexamine the unanimous conclusion of the en bane
Court of Appeals on a question of state law. See, e. g., Bishop v. Wood,
2

426

u. s. 341, 345-346 (1976).

The court therefore found it unnecessary to decide if respondents were
also entitled to relief under the federal statutory and constitutional provisions which had been raised in the District Court.
8

.-
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Thus, the District Court found that petitioners have been
operating the Pennhurst facility in a way that is forbidden by
state law, by federal statute and by the Federal Constitution.
The en bane Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit unanimously concluded that state law provided a clear and adequate basis for upholding the District Court and that it was
not necessary to address the federal questions decided by
that court. That action conformed precisely to the directive
issued by this Court when the case was here before. Petitioners urge this Court to make an unprecedented about-face,
and to hold that the Eleventh Amendment prohibited the
Court of Appeals from doing what this Court ordered it to do
when we instructed it to decide whether respondents were
entitled to relief under state law. Of course, if petitioners
are correct, then error was committed not by the Court of
Appeals, which after all merely obeyed the instruction of this.
Court, but rather by this Court in 1981 when we ordered the
Court of Appeals to consider the state-law issues in the case.
Petitioners' position is utterly without support. The Eleventh Amendment and the doctrine of sovereign immunity it
embodies have never been interpreted to deprive a court of
jurisdiction to grant relief against government officials who
are engaged in conduct that is forbidden by their sovereign.
On the contrary, this Court has repeatedly and consistently
exercised the power to enjoin state officials from violating
state law. 4
II
The majority proceeds as if this Court has not had previous
occasion to consider Eleventh Amendment argument made
by petitioners, and contends that Ex parte Young, 209 U. S.
123 (1908) has no application to a suit seeking injunctive relief
on the basis of state law. That is simply not the case. The
Court rejected the argument that the Eleventh Amendment
• Although the Court struggles mightily to distinguish some of the cases
that foreclose its holding today, see ante, at 15-25, this vain effort merely
brings into stark relief the total absence of any affirmative support for its
holding.
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precludes injunctive relief on the basis of state law twice only
two Tenns ago. In Florida Dept. of State v. Treasure
Salvors, Inc., 458 U. S. 670 (1982), four Justices concluded
that a suit for possession of property in the hands of state officials was not barred by the Eleventh Amendment inasmuch
as the State did not have even a colorable claim to the property under state law. See id., at 696-697 (opinion of STEVENS, J., joined by BURGER, C. J., MARSHALL, and BLACKMUN, JJ.). Four additional Justices accepted the proposition
that if the state officers' conduct had been in violation of a
state statute, the Eleventh Amendment would not bar the
action. Id., at 714 (WHITE, J., concurring in the judgment
in part and dissenting in part, joined by POWELL, REHNQUIST, and O'CONNOR, JJ.). 5
And in just one short paragraph in Cory v. White, 457 U. S. 85 (1982), the Court thrice
restated the settled rule that the Eleventh Amendment does
not bar suits against state officers when they are "alleged to
be acting against federal or state law." 6 These are only the
two most recent in an extraordinarily long line of cases.
"Larson established that where the officer's actions are limited by statute, actions beyond those limitations are to be considered individual and
not sovereign actions." Ibid.
6
"Neither did Edelman deal with a suit naming a state officer as defendant, but not alleging a violation of either federal or state law. Thus, there
was no occasion in the opinion to cite or discuss the unanimous opinion in
Worcester that the Eleventh Amendment bars suits against state officers
'lfnless they are alleged to be acting contrary to federal law or against the
authority of state law. Edelman did not hold that suits against state officers who are not alleged to be acting against federal or state law are
permissible under the Eleventh Amendment if only prospective relief is
sought." 457 U. S., at 91 (emphasis supplied).
See also Worcester County Co. v. Riley, 302 U. S. 292, 297 (1937) (citations omitted) ("[G]enerally suits to restrain action of state officials can,
consistently with the constitutional prohibition, be prosecuted only when
the action sought to be restrained is without the authority of state law or
contravenes the statutes or Constitution of the United States. The Eleventh Amendment, which denies to the citizen the right to resort to a federal court to compel or restrain state action, does not preclude suit against
5
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By 1908, it was firmly established that conduct of state officials under color of office that is tortious as a matter of state
law is not protected by the Eleventh Amendment. See Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust, 154 U. S. 362, 390-391
(1894); Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U. S. 270, 287 (1885);
Cunningham v. Macon & Brunswick R. Co., 109 U. S. 446,
452 (1883). 7 Cf. Belknap v. Schild, 161 U. S. 10, 18 (1896)
(same rule adopted for sovereign immunity of the United
States); Stanley v. Schwalby, 147 U. S. 508, 518-519 (1893)
(same). 8 In Hopkins v. Clemson Agricultural College, 221
a wrongdoer merely because he asserts that his acts are within an official
authority which the state does not confer."). In Worcester the Court held
a suit barred by the Eleventh Amendment only after stating: "Hence, it
cannot be said that the threatened action of respondents involves any
breach of state law or of the laws or Constitution of the United States."
Id., at 299. •
7
The Court explained that the state officer sued in tort "is not sued as,
or because he is, the officer of the government, but as an individual, and
the court is not ousted of jurisdiction because he asserts jurisdiction as
such officer. To make out his defense he must show that his authority was
sufficient in law to protect him." Cunningham, 109 U. S., at 452, quoted
in Poindexter, 114 U. S., at 287. Today's majority notes that these cases
involve nondiscretionary duties of governmental officers, ante, at 18-19,
but overlooks the reason for this characterization-{)fficers have no discretion to commit a tort. The same is true of the Court's treatment of the
federal sovereign immunity cases I discuss below.
8
See also Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 489-490 (1978) (officers of
the United States are liable for their torts unless the torts are authorized
by federal law); Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U. S. 605, 619-620 (1912)
(officers of the United States may be enjoined where they wrongfully interfere with property rights). Justice Holmes had occasion to state that sovereign immunity does not generally extend to the acts of an officer of the
sovereign. "In general the United States cannot be sued for a tort, but its
immunity does not extend to those that acted in its name." Sloan Shipyards v. U.S. Fleet Corp., 258 U. S. 549, 568 (1922). He characterized
petitioner's argument in that case-that sovereign immunity should extend
to the unlawful acts of agents of the United States acting within the scope
of their authority-as "a very dangerous departure from one of the first
principles of our system of law. The sovereign properly so called is superior to suit for reasons that often have been explained. But the general
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U. S. 636 (1911), the Court explained the relationship of
these cases to the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
"[l]mmunity from suit is a high attribute of sovereignty-a prerogative of the State itself-which cannot
be availed of by public agents when sued for their own
torts. The Eleventh Amendment was not intended to
afford them freedom from liability in any case where,
under color of their office, they have injured one of the
State's citizens. To grant them such immunity would be
to create a privileged class free from liability for wrongs
inflicted or injuries threatened . . . . Besides, neither a
State nor an individual can confer upon an agent authority to commit a tort so as to excuse the perpetrator. In
such cases the law of agency has no application-the
wrongdoer is treated as a principal and individually liable for the damages inflicted and subject to injunction
against the commission of acts causing irreparable injury." !d., at 642-643. 9
rule is that any person within· the jurisdiction is always amenable to the
law. . . . An instrumentality of government he might be and for the
greatest ends, but the agent, because he is agent, does not cease to be
answerable for his acts." Id., at 566-567. See also Brady v. Roosevelt
S.S. Co., 317 U.S. 575 (1943) (following Sloan).
9
The Court also stated,
"Corporate agents or individual officers of the State stand in no better
position than officers of the General Government, and as to them it has
often been held that: 'The exemption of the United States from judicial
process does not protect their officers and agents, civil or military, in time
of peace, from being personally liable to an action of tort by a private person, whose rights of property they have wrongfully invaded, or injured,
even by authority of the United States.' Belknap v. Shild, 161 U. S. 10,
18.'' 221 U. S., at 645 (emphasis supplied). The language I have quoted
in the text makes it clear that the Court is incorrect to suggest ante, at
18-19, n. 19, that Clemson dealt only with unconstitutional conduct and
not with conduct in violation of state tort law. See also Old Colony Trust
Co. v. Seattle, 271 U. S. 426, 431 (1926) (reaffirming the rationale of
Clemson in an action against city and county officials).
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The principles that were decisive in these cases are not
confined to actions under state tort law. They also apply to
claims that state officers have violated state statutes. In
Johnson v. Lankford, 245 U. S. 541 (1918), the Court reversed the dismissal of an action against the bank commissioner of Oklahoma and his surety to recover damages for the
loss of plaintiff's bank deposit, allegedly caused by the commissioner's failure to safeguard the business and assets of the
bank in negligent or willful disregard of his duties under applicable state statutes. The Court explained that the action
was not one against the State.
"To answer it otherwise would be to assert, we think,
that whatever an officer does, even in contravention of
the laws of the State, is state action, identifies him with
it and makes the redress sought against him a claim
against the State and therefore prohibited by the Eleventh Amendment. Surely an officer of a State may be
delinquent without involving the State in delinquency,
indeed, may injure the State by delinquency as well as
some resident of the State, and be amenable to both."
ld., at 545.
Similarly, in Rolston v. Missouri Fund Commissioners,
120 U. S. 390 (1887), the Court rejected the argument that a
suit to enjoin a state officer to comply with state law violated
the Eleventh Amendment. The Court wrote, "Here the suit
is to get a state officer to do what a statute requires of him.
The litigation is with the officer, not the state." I d., at 411. 10
10
In Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 154 U. S. 362 (1894) , the
Court held that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar a suit alleging that
a state officer has wrongfully administered a state statute. The Court
awarded injunctive relief against state officers on the basis of both state
and federal law. In Atchison &c. R . Co. v. O'Connor, 223 U. S. 280
(1912), the Court held that a suit against state officers seeking recovery of
taxes paid under duress was not against the State since a state statute required the recovery of wrongfully paid taxes. See id., at 287. In
Lankford v. Platte Iron Works Co., 235 U. S. 461 (1915), the Court as-
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Significantly, this rule was expressly reaffirmed in a case
decided by this Court in the same Term as Ex parte Young
and published in the same volume of the United States Resumed that the Eleventh Amendment would not bar a suit "to·compel submission by the officers of the State to the laws of the State, accomplishing
at once the policy of the law and its specific purpose," id., at 471, but rejected the appellees' construction of the state statute. See also Parish
v. State Banking Board, 235 U. S. 498 (1915); American Water Co. v.
Lankford, 235 U. S. 496 (1915). In Martin v. Lankford, 245 U. S. 547
(1918), the Court stated that the case was not barred by the Eleventh
Amendment since the claim "is based, as we have seen, not in exertion
of the state law but in violation of it. The reasoning of [Johnson v.
Lankford] is therefore applicable and the conclusion must be the same, that
is, the action is not one against the State, and the District Court erred in
dismissing it for want of jurisdiction on that ground." I d., at 551. While
it is true, as the Court points out ante, at 18, n. 19, that the Martin Court
went on to hold that there was no federal diversity jurisdiction over the
case, it cannot be denied that the majority today repudiates the reasoning
of Martin. As for the Court's treatment of Johnson v. Lankford and
O'Connor, ante, at 18-19, n. 19, it is true that Johnson sought only damages, but the holding of that case, that the action was not barred by the
Constitution since it alleged conduct in violation of state law, is utterly at
odds with the Court's decision today. Surely the Court cannot mean to
rely on a distinction between damages and injunctive relief, for it states:
"A federal court's grant of relief against state officers on the basis of state
law, whether prospective or retroactive, does not vindicate the supreme
authority of federal law. . . . We conclude that Young and Edelman are
inapplicable in a suit gainst state officials on the basis of state law." Ante,
at 15. Awarding damages for a violation of state law by state officers acting within their authority is inconsistent with the majority's position that
only a need to vindicate federal law justifies the lifting of the Eleventh
Amendment bar. If an order to pay damages for wrongful conduct against
a state officer is not against the State for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment, an additional order in the form of an injunction telling the officer not
to do it again is no more against the State. It cannot be doubted that today's decision overrules Johnson. Finally, as for O'Connor, while it involved an allegation of unconstitutional action, that allegation was insufficient to lift the bar of the Eleventh Amendment because the complaint
sought retroactive relief. It was the fact that relief was authorized by
state law that defeated the Eleventh Amendment claim in O'Connor. See
223 U. S., at 287.

.-
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ports. The appellant in Scully v. Bird, 209 U. S. 481 (1908),
brought a diversity suit seeking injunctive relief against the
dairy and food commissioner of the State of Michigan, on the
ground that "under cover of his office" he had maliciously engaged in a course of conduct designed to ruin plaintiff's business in the State. The circuit court dismissed the complaint
on Eleventh Amendment grounds. On appeal, the plaintiff
contended that the Eleventh Amendment "does not apply
where a suit is brought against defendants who, claiming to
act as officers of the State, and under color of a statute which
is valid and constitutional, but wrongfully administered by
them, commit, or threaten to commit, acts of wrong or injury
to the rights and property of the plaintiff, or make such administration of the statute an illegal burden and exaction
upon the plaintiff." Id., at 418. This Court agreed. It
noted that the complaint alleged action "in dereliction of duties enjoined ~y the statutes of the State," and concluded that
it was "manifest from this summary of the allegations of the
bill that this is not a suit against the State." I d., at 490. 11
Finally, in Greene v. Louisville & Interurban R. Co., 244
U. S. 499 (1917), and its companion cases, Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Greene, 244 U. S. 522 (1917); Illinois Central
R. Co. v. Greene, 244 U. S. 555 (1917), the plaintiffs challenged the conduct of state officials under both federal and
state law. The Court, citing, inter alia, Young and Clemson, held that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar injunctive relief on the basis of state law, noting that the plaintiffs'
federal claim was sufficiently substantial to justify the exer11

Cases construing the sovereign immunity of the Federal Government
also hold that conduct by federal officers forbidden by statute is not
shielded by sovereign immunity even though the officer is not acting completely beyond his authority. See Land v. Dollar, 330 U. S. 731 (1947);
Ickes v. Fox, 300 U. S. 82 (1937); Work v. Louisiana, 269 U. S. 250 (1925);
Santa Fe Pac. R. Co. v. Fall, 259 U. S. 197 (1922); Payne v. Central Pac.
R. Co., 255 U.S. 228 (1921); Waite v. Macy, 246 U.S. 606 (1918).
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cise of pendent jurisdiction over plaintiffs' state-law claims, 12
and that since violations of federal and state law had been alleged, it was appropriate for the federal court to issue injunctive relief on the basis of state law without reaching the federal claims, despite the strictures of the Eleventh
Amendment. In short, the Greene Court approved of precisely the methodology employed by the Court of Appeals in
this case. 13
None of these cases contain only "implicit" or sub silentio
holdings; all of them explicitly consider and reject the claim
that the Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from
issuing injunctive relief based on state law. There is therefore no basis for the majority's assertion that the issue presented by this case is an open one, ante, at 28. 14
12
The Court cited Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 213 U. S. 175
(1917), which will be discussed in Part IV, infra, in support of this
proposition.
13
The unanimous rejection of the argument that the Eleventh Amendment bars claims based on state officers' violations of federal statutes in
Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U. S. 151, 156 n. 6 (1978) is entirely
consistent with my analysis of our cases. But under the majority's view, it
represented a rather dramatic extension of Ex parte Young to encompass
federal statutory claims as well as constitutional claims. Ray demonstrates that it cannot be maintained that Young and the other cases of this
Court permit injunctive relief only when the constitutionality of state officers' conduct is at issue. If that were so Ray would be wrongly decidedan argument that a state officer has violated a federal statute does not constitute a challenge to the constitutionality of the officer's conduct. Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U. S. 600, 61~15 (1979); Swift
& Co. v. Wickham, 382 U. S. 111 (1965). In my view, the Eleventh
Amendment claim in Ray deserved no more than the cursory footnote it
received, since the state officials had engaged in conduct forbidden by statute. If the Court were willing to adhere to settled rules of law today, the
Eleventh Amendment claim could be rejected just as summarily.
14
The majority incredibly claims that Greene contains only an implicit
holding on the Eleventh Amendment question the Court decides today.
Ante, at 26-28. In plain words, the Greene Court held that the Eleventh
Amendment did not bar consideration of the pendant state-law claims ad-
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The Court tries to explain away these cases by arguing
that the applicable state statutes gave petitioners such
"broad discretion" over Pennhurst that their actions were not
ultra vires, ante, at 19-20. The Court, however, does not
dispute the Court of Appeals' conclusion that these state statutes gave petitioners no discretion whatsoever to disregard
their duties with respect to institutionalization of the retarded as they did. Petitioners acted outside of their lawful
discretion every bit as much as did the government officials
in the cases I have discussed, which hold that when an official
commits an act prohibited by law, he acts beyond his authority and is not protected by sovereign immunity. 15 After all,
it is only common sense to conclude that States do not authorize their officers to violate their legal duties.
The Court also relies heavily on the fact that the District
Court found petitioners immune from damages liability because they "acted in the utmost good faith . . . within the
sphere of their official responsibilities," ante, at 16 (emphasis
vanced in that case. The Court then considered and sustained those
claims on their merits.
5
' Contrary to the Court's treatment of them, the cases discussed above
rely on the doctrine embraced in the quotation from Clemson I have set
out-officials have no discretion to violate the law. The same is true of the
federal sovereign immunity cases. See, e. g., Land v. Dollar, 330 U. S.
731, 736 (1947) ("the assertion by officers of the Government of their authority to act did not foreclose judicial inquiry into the lawfulness of their
action [and] a determination of whether their 'authority is rightfully assumed is the exercise of jurisdiction, and must lead to the decision of the
merits of the question."'); Payne v. Central P. R . Co., 255 U. S. 228, 236
(1928) ("But of course [the Secretary's statutory authority] does not clothe
him with any discretion to enlarge or curtail the rights of the grantee, nor
to substitute his judgment for the will of Congress as manifested in the
granting act"); Waite v. Macy, 246 U. S. 606, 610 (1918) ("The Secretary
and the board must keep within the statute ... and we see no reason why
the restriction should not be enforced by injunction ... "); Philadelphia
Co. v. Stimson, 223 U. S. 605, 620 (1912) ("And in the case of an injury
threatened by his illegal action, the officer cannot claim immunity from injunction process").
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in original) (quoting 446 F. Supp., at 1324). This confuses
two distinct concepts. An official can act in good faith and
therefore be immune from damages liability despite the fact
that he has done that which the law prohibits, a point recognized as recently as Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800
(1982). Nevertheless, good faith immunity from damage liability is irrelevant to the availability of injunctive relief.
See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U. S. 308, 314-315, n. 6 (1975).
The state officials acted in nothing less than good faith and
within the sphere of their official responsibilities in asserting
Florida's claim to the treasure in Treasure Salvors; the same
can be said for the bank commissioner's actions in safeguarding bank deposits challenged in Johnson v. Lankford, the
fund commissioner's decision to sell property mortgaged to
the State challenged in Rolston, and the state food and dairy
commissioner's decision to prosecute the appellant for violating the state food impurity act challenged in Scully, to give
just a few examples. Yet in each of these cases the state officers' conduct was enjoined. Greene makes this point perfectly clear. There state officers did nothing more than
carry out responsibilities clearly assigned to them by a statute. Their conduct was neverthless enjoined because this
Court held that their conduct violated the state constitution,
despite the fact that their reliance on a statute made it perfectly clear that their conduct was not only in good faith but
reasonable. See Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U. S. 31
(1979). Until today the rule has been simple: conduct that
exceeds the scope of an official's lawful discretion is not conduct the sovereign has authorized and hence is subject to injunction. 16 Whether that conduct also gives rise to damage
liability is an entirely separate question.
In a rather desperate attempt to explain these cases, amici suggest
that the Court simply did not realize that it was deciding questions of state
law, since in the era before Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 (1938)
and United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U. S. 715 (1966), it was not clear
that diversity cases or pendent claims were governed by state rather than
16
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III
On its face, the Eleventh Amendment applies only to suits
against a State brought by citizens of other States and foreign nations. 17 This textual limitation upon the scope of the
states' immunity from suit in federal court was set aside in
Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1 (1890). Hans was a suit
against the State of Louisiana, brought by a citizen of Louisiana seeking to recover interest on the state's bonds. The
Court stated that some of the arguments favoring sovereign
immunity for the States made during the process of the
Amendment's ratification ratification had become a part of
the judicial scheme created by the Constitution. As a result,
the Court concluded that the Constitution prohibited a suit
by a citizen against his or her own state. When called upon
to elaborate in Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U. S. 313 (1934),
federal law. That suggestion is refuted by the cases discussed above in
which it was held that relief could issue against state officers who had violated state statutes. Even under the construction of the Rules of Decision
Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1652, adopted in Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1 (1842), and
repudiated in Erie, federal courts were bound to apply state statutes.
See, e. g., Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co . v. Brown & Yellow
Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U. S. 518, 529-531 (1928); Swift, 16 Pet., at
18-19. Thus, in these cases the Court was indisputably issuing relief
under state law. The Court was explicit about the state-law basis for the
relief it granted in Greene, to use just one example. It stated that federal
jurisdiction "extends, to the determination of all questions involved in the
case, including questions of state law, irrespective of the disposition that
may be made of the federal question, or whether it be found necessary to
decide it at all." 244 U. S., at 508. It then granted plaintiffs relief under
state law, and concluded by declining to decide any question of federal law.
"It is obvious, however, in view of the result reached upon the questions of
state law, just discussed, that the disposition of the cases would not be affected by whatever result we might reach upon the federal question . . . .
Therefore, we find it unnecessary to express any opinion upon the question
raised under the Fourteenth Amendment." Id., at 519.
17
"The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of
the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects
of any Foreign State." U. S. Const. amend. XI.
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the Court explained that the Eleventh Amendment did more
than simply prohibit suits brought by citizens of one State
against another State. Rather, it exemplified the broader
and more ancient doctrine of sovereign immunity, which operates to bar a suit brought by a citizen against his own State
without its consent. 18
The Court has subsequently adhered to this interpretation
of the Eleventh Amendment. For example, in Quern v. J ordan, 440 U. S. 332 (1979), the Court referred to the Eleventh
Amendment as incorporating "the traditional sovereign immunity of the States." I d., at 341. Similarly, in Fitzpatrick
v. Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445 (1976), the Court referred to "the
Eleventh Amendment, and the principle of sovereign immunity it embodies . . . ." I d., at 456. See also Nevada v.
Hall, 440 U. S. 410, 438-441 (1979) (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting). 19 Thus, under our cases it is the doctrine of sovereign
"Manifestly, we cannot rest with a mere literal application of the words
of§ 2 or Article III, or assume that the letter of the Eleventh Amendment
exhausts the restriction upon suits against non-consenting states. Behind
the words of the constitutional provisions are postulates which limit and
control. There is the esS'ential postulate that the controversies, as contemplated, shall be found to be of a justiciable character. There is also the
postulate that States of the Union, still possessing attributes of sovereignty, shall be immune from suits, without their consent, save where
there has been 'a surrender of this immunity in the plan of the convention.'" I d., at 322-323 (footnote omitted). See also Ex parte New York,
256 U. S. 490, 497 (1921); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1, 15-18 (1890).
Most commentators have understood this Court's Eleventh Amendment
cases as taking the position that the Constitution incorporates the common
law doctrine of sovereign immunity. See, e. g., Baker, Federalism and
the Eleventh Amendment, 48 U. Col. L. Rev. 139, 153-158 (1977); Field,
The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: Part
One, 126 U. Pa. L. Rev. 515, 538-546 (1978); Thornton, The Eleventh
Amendment: An Endangered Species, 55 Ind. L. J. 293, 305-310 (1980);
Tribe, Intergovernmental Immunities in Litigation, Taxation, and Regulation: Separation of Powers Issues in Controversies About Federalism, 89
Harv. L. Rev. 682, 684-688 (1976); Comment, Private Suits Against States
in the Federal Courts, 33 U. Chi. L. Rev. 331, 334-336 (1966).
19
Petitioners themselves treat the Eleventh Amendment as equivalent to
18
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immunity, rather than the text of the Amendment itself,
which is critical to the analysis of any Eleventh Amendment
problem. 20
The doctrine of sovereign immunity developed in England,
where it was thought that the king could not be sued. However, common law courts, in applying the doctrine, traditionally distinguished between the king and his agents, on the
theory that the king would never authorize unlawful conduct,
and that therefore the unlawful acts of the king's officers
ought not to be treated as acts of the sovereign. See 1 W.
Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England *244 (J.
Andrews ed. 1909). As early as the fifteenth century,
Holdsworth writes, servants of the king were held liable for
their unlawful acts. See III W. Holdsworth, A History of
English Law 388 (1903). During the seventeenth century,
this rule of law was used extensively to curb the king's authority . . The king's officers
"could do wrong, and if they committed wrongs, whether
in the course of their employment or not, they could be
made legally liable. The command or instruction of the
king could not protect them. If the king really had
given such commands or instructions, he must have been
deceived." VI id., at 101.
In one famous case, it was held that although process would
not issue against the sovereign himself, it could issue against
his officers. "For the warrant of no man, not even of the
King himself, can excuse the doing of an illegal act." Sands
v. Child, 83 Eng. Rep. 725, 726 (K.B. 1693). 21 By the eighthe doctrine of sovereign immunity. See Brief for Petitioners 12 n. 10.
The Court appears to agree. Ante, at 7.
20
Of course, if the Court were to apply the text of the Amendment, it
would not bar an action against Pennsylvania by one of its own citizens.
See n. 17, supra.
21
The rationale for this principle was compelling. Courts did not wish to
confront the king's immunity from suit directly; nevertheless they found
the threat to liberty posed by permitting the sovereign's abuses to go un-

81-2101-DISSENT
18

PENNHURST STATE SCHOOL & HOSP. v. HALDERMAN

teenth century, this rule of law was unquestioned. See X
W. Holdsworth, supra, at 650-652. And in the nineteenth
Century this view was taken by the court to be so well-settled as to not require the citation of authority, see Feather v.
The Queen, 122 Eng. Rep. 1191, 1205-1206 (K.B. 1865). 22
It was only natural, then, that this Court, in applying the
principles of sovereign immunity, recognized the distinction
between a suit against a State and one against its officer. 23
For example, while the Court did inquire as to whether a suit
was "in essence" against the sovereign, it soon became settled law that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar suits
against state officials in their official capacities challenging
unconstitutional conduct. See Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S.
466, 518--519 (1898); Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, 140 U. S. 1,
10-12 (1891); Poindexter v. Greenhaw, 114 U. S. 270, 288
(1885). 24 This rule was reconciled with sovereign immunity
remedied to be intolerable. Since. in reality the king could act only
through his officers, the rule which permitted suits against those officers
formally preserved the sovereign's immunity while operating as one of the
means by which courts curbed the abuses of the monarch. See X W.
Holdsworth, supra, at 262-268.
22
Commentators have noted the influence of these English doctrines on
the American conception of sovereign immunity. See Jaffe, Suits Against
Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 19-29
(1963); Note, Express Waiver of Eleventh Amendment Immunity, 17 Ga.
L. Rev. 513, 517-518 (1983); Note, Developments in the Law-Remedies
Against the United States and its Officials, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 827, 831-833
(1957). In fact, in Belknap v. Schild, 161 U. S. 10 (1896), the Court, in
holding that officers of the United States were liable for injuries caused by
their unlawful conduct even if they did so acting pursuant to official duties,
cited the passage from Feather v. The Queen. See 161 U. S., at 18.
23
Chief Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, recognized this distinction in the very first case to reach the Court concerning the application of
the Eleventh Amendment to the conduct of a state official, Osborn v. Bank
of the United States, 9 Wheat. 738 (1824).
24
See also McNeill v. Southern R. Co., 202 U. S. 543, 559 (1906); Gunter
v. Atlantic C. L. R. Co ., 200 U. S. 273, 283-284 (1906); Prout v. Starr, 188
U. S. 537 (1903); Scott v. Donald, 165 U. S. 58, 67-70 (1897); Reagan v.
Farmers' Loan & Trust Co ., 154 U. S. 362, 388-391 (1894); In re Tyler, 149
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principles by use of the traditional rule that an action against
an agent of the sovereign who had acted unlawfully was not
considered to be against the sovereign. When an official
acts pursuant to an unconstitutional statute, the Court reasoned, the absence of valid authority leaves the official ultra
vires his authority, and thus a private actor stripped of his
status as a representative of the sovereign. 25 In Ex parte
Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908), the Court was merely restating
a settled principle when it wrote:
"The Act to be enforced is alleged to be unconstitutional, and if it be so, the use of the name of the State to
enforce an unconstitutional act to the injury of complainants is a proceeding without the authority of and one
which does not affect the State in its sovereign or governmental capacity. It is simply an illegal act upon the
part of a state official in attempting by the use of the
name of the State to enforce a legislative enactment
which is void because unconstititional. If the act which
the state Attorney General seeks to enforce be a violation of the Federal Constitution, the officer in proceeding under such enactment comes into conflict with the
U. S. 164, 190-191 (1893); In re Ayers, 123 U. S. 443, 506-507 (1887);
Haygood v. Southern, 117 U. S. 52, 70 (1886); Allen v. Baltimore & 0. R.
Co., 114 U. S. 311, 31fh316 (1885); Board of Liquidation v. McComb, 92
U. S. 531, 541 (1875). Cf. United States v. Lee, 106 U. S. 196, 219--222
(1883) (sovereign immunity of the United States not a defense against suit
charging officers of the United States with unconstitutional conduct).
26
"That, it is true, is a legislative act of the government of Virginia, but it
is not a law of the State of Virginia. The State has passed no such law, for
it cannot; and what it cannot do, it certainly, in contemplation of law, has
not done. The Constitution of the United States, and its own contract,
both irrepealable by any act on its part, are the law of Virginia; and that
law made it the duty of the defendant to receive the coupons tendered in
payment of taxes, and declared every step to enforce the tax, thereafter
taken, to be without warrant of law, and therefore a wrong. He stands,
then, stripped of his official character; and, confessing a personal violation
of the plaintiff's rights for which he must personally answer, he is without
defence." Poindexter v. Greenhaw, 114 U. S., at 288.
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superior authority of that Constitution, and he is in that
case stripped of his official or representative character
and is subjected in his person to the consequences of his
individual conduct." !d., at 159-160. 26
The majority states that the holding of Ex parte Young is
limited to cases in which relief is provided on the basis of federal law, and that it rests entirely on the need to protect the
supremacy of federal law. That position overlooks the foundation of the rule of Young as well Pennoyer v. McConnaughy and Young's other predecessors.
The Young Court distinguished between the State and its
attorney general because the latter, in violating the Constitution, had engaged in conduct the sovereign could not authorize. The pivotal consideration was not that the conduct violated federal law, since nothing in the jurisprudence of the
Eleventh Amendment permits a suit against a sovereign
merely because federal law is at issue. -n Indeed, at least
since Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1 (1890), the law has been
settled that the Eleventh Amendment applies even though
the State is accused of violating the Federal Constitution.
26
See generally Orth, The Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment,
1798-1908: A Case Study of Judicial Power, 1983 U. Ill. L. Rev. 423. The
Court has adhered to this formulation to the present day. See Florida
Dept. of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U. S. 670, 684-690 (1982)
(opinion of STEVENS, J.); id., at 714-715 (WHITE, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part); Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,
435 U. S. 151, 156 n. 6 (1978); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232, 237 (1974);
Georgia R . Co. v. Redwine, 342 U. S. 299 (1952); Sterling v. Constantin,
287 U. S. 378, 393 (1932). Of course, the fragment from Young quoted by
the Court, ante, at 18, n. 17, does not convey the same meaning when considered in the context of the paragraph quoted above.
27
As the Solicitor General correctly notes in his brief, "this Court has no
power to create any exception to a constitutional bar to federal court jurisdiction. Ex parte Young rests instead on recognition that the Eleventh
Amendment simply does not apply to suits seeking to restrain illegal acts
by state officials-whether those acts are illegal because they violate the
Constitution, as in Young, or federal or state law." Brief for the United
States 23 (citations omitted).
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In Hans the Court held that the Eleventh Amendment applies to all cases within the jurisdiction of the federal courts
including those brought to require compliance with federal
law, and bars any suit where the State is the proper defendant under sovereign immunity principles. A long line of
cases has endorsed that proposition, holding that irrespective
of the need to vindicate federal law a suit is barred by the
Eleventh Amendment if the State is the proper defendant. 28
It was clear until today that "the State [is not] divested of its
immunity 'on the mere ground that the case is one arising
under the Constitution or laws of the United States.'"
Parden v. Terminal R. Co., 377 U. S. 184, 186 (1964) (quoting Hans, 134 U. S., at 10).
The pivotal consideration in Young was that it was not conduct of the sovereign that was at issue. 29 The rule that unlawful acts of an officer should not be attributed to the sovereign has deep roots in the history of sovereign immunity and
See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U. S. 332, 345 n. 17 (1979); Alabama v.
· Pugh, 438 U. S. 781 (1978) (per curiam); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S.
651, 668--$69 (1974); Employees v. Missouri Public Health Dept., 411 U. S.
279, 280 n. 1 (1973); Smith v. Reeves, 178 U. S. 436, 444-449 (1900); Fitts v.
McGhee, 172 U.S. 516 (1899); InreAyers, 123 U.S. 443 (1887); Hagood v.
Southern, 117 U. S. 52 (1886); Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U. S. 711 (1882).
See generally C. Jacobs, The Eleventh Amendment and Sovereign Immunity 88-91, 109-110 (1972).
28
The distinction between the sovereign and its agents not only explains
why the rationale of Ex parte Young and its predecessors is consistent with
established sovereign immunity doctrine, but it also explains the critical
difference between actions for injunctive relief and actions for damages
recognized in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651 (1973). Since the damages remedy sought in that case would have required payment by the
State; it could not be said that the action ran only against the agents of the
State. Therefore, while the agents' unlawful conduct was considered
ultra vires and hence could be enjoined, a remedy which did run against
the sovereign and not merely its agent could not fit within the ultra vires
doctrine and hence was impermissible. If damages are not sought from
the State and the relief will run only against the state official, damages are
a permissible remedy under the Eleventh Amendment. See Scheuer v.
Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232, 237-238 (1974).
28
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makes Young reconcilable with the principles of sovereign
immunity found in the Eleventh Amendment, 30 rather than
merely an unprincipled accommodation between federal and
state interests that ignores the principles contained in the
Eleventh Amendment.
This rule plainly applies to conduct of state officers in violation of state law. Young states that the significance of the
charge of unconstitutional conduct is that it renders the state
official's conduct "simply an illegal act," and hence the officer
is not entitled to the sovereign's immunity. Since a state officer's conduct in violation of state law is certainly no less illegal than his violation of federal law, in either case the official,
by committing an illegal act, is "stripped of his official or representative character." For example, one of Young's predecessors held that a suit challenging an unconstitutional attempt by the Virginia legislature to disavow a state contract
was not barred by the Eleventh Amendment, reasoning that
"inasmuch as, by the Constitution of the United States,
which is also the supreme law of Virginia, that contract,
when made, became thereby unchangeable, irrepealable
by the State, the subsequent act of January 26, 1882, and
all other like acts, which deny the 9bligation of that contract and forbid its performance, are not the acts of the
State of Virginia. The true and real Commonwealth
30

"While in England personification of sovereignty in the person of the
King may have been possible, attempts to adopt this reasoning in the
United States resulted in the postulation of the abstract State as sovereign. Since the ideal State could only act by law, whatever the State did
must be lawful. On this ground a distinction was drawn between the State
and its officers, and since the State could not commit an illegal act, any
such act was imputed to government officers. It logically followed that a
suit against state officers was not necessarily a suit against the State."
Note, The Sovereign Immunity of the States: The Doctrine and Some of its
Recent Developments, 40 Minn. L. Rev. 234, 244-245 (1956) (footnotes
omitted). Curiously, the majority appears to acknowledge that it has created a sovereign immunity broader than had ever been enjoyed by the king
of England. Ante, at 23, n. 25.
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which contracted the obligation is incapable in law of doing anything in derogation of it. Whatever having that
effect, if operative, has been attempted or done, is the
work of its government acting without authority, in violation of its fundamental law, and must be looked upon,
in all courts of justice, as if it were not and never had
been. . . . The State of Virginia has done none of these
things with which this defence charges her. The defendant in error is not her officer, her agent, or her representative, in the matter complained of, for he has
acted not only without her authority, but contrary to her
express commands." Poindexter v. Greenhaw, 114
U. S. 270, 293 (1885) (emphasis supplied). 31
It is clear that the Court in Poindexter attached no significance to the fact that Virginia had been accused of violating
federal and not its own law. 32 To the contrary, the Court
treated the Federal Constitution as part of Virginia's law,
and concluded that the challenged action was not that of Virginia precisely because it violated Virginia's law. The rnaSee also Barney v. City of New York, 193 U. S. 430, 439-441 (1904).
This approach began long before Poindexter. The earliest cases in
which this Court rejected sovereign immunity defenses raised by officers
of the sovereign accused of unlawful conduct did not involve charges of unconstitutional conduct, but rather simple trespass actions. In rejecting
the defense, the Court simply noted that although the officers were acting
pursuant to their duties, they were engaged in unlawful conduct which
therefore could not be the conduct of the sovereign. See Bates v. Clark,
95 U. S. 204, 209 (1877); Mitchell v. Harmony, 13 How. 115, 137 (1851);
Wise v. Withers, 3 Cranch 331 (1806); Little v. Barreme, 2 Cranch 169
(1804). In the landmark case of Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 9
Wheat. 738 (1824), the Court took it as beyond argument that if a state
officer unlawfully seized property in an attempt to collect taxes he believed
to be owed the state, the Eleventh Amendment would not bar a simple
trespass action against the officer. The majority strangely takes comfort
in the fact that the former cases allowed damages actions against federal
officers. Ante, at 20, n. 21. The allowance of a damage remedy is no
more consistent with the Court's approach than the allowance of an injunction, see n. 10, supra.
31

32
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jority's position turns the Young doctrine on its head-sovereign immunity did not bar actions challenging unconstitutional conduct by state officers since the Federal Constitution
was also to be considered part of the State's law-and since
the State could not and would not authorize a violation of
its own law, the officers' conduct was considered individual
and not sovereign. No doubt the Courts that produced
Poindexter and Young would be shocked to discover that conduct authorized by state law but prohibited by federal law is
not considered conduct attributable to the State for sovereign
immunity purposes, but conduct prohibited by state law is
considered conduct attributable to the very State which prohibited that conduct. Indeed, in Tindal v. Wesley, 167 U. S.
204 (1896), the Court specifically found that it was impossible
to distinguish between a suit challenging unconstitutional
conduct of state officers and a suit challenging any other type
of unlawful behavior:
"If a suit against officers of a State to enjoin them from
enforcing an unconstitutional statute . . . be not one
against the State, it is impossible to ·see how a suit
against the individuals to recover the possession of property belonging to the plaintiff and illegally held by the
defendants can be deemed a suit against the State."
Id., at 222. 33
33
To the same effect as Tindal is South Carolina v. Wesley, 155 U. S.
542 (1895). The majority argues that the case notes that South Carolina
was not a party to the proceeding and suggests the ruling was "purely procedural," ante, at 18, n. 19, but that misses the whole purpose of the "procedural" point made in the opinion-Eleventh Amendment immunity may
only be claimed by the State; it does not extend to state officers accused of
violating state law. See also Florida Dept. of State v. Treasure Salvors,
Inc., 458 U. S. 670, 697 (1982) (opinion of STEVENS, J.) ("If conduct of a
state officer taken pursuant to an unconstitutional state statute is deemed
to be unauthorized and may be challenged in federal court, conduct undertaken without any authority whatever is also not entitled to Eleventh
Amendment immunity.").
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These cases are based on the simple idea that an illegal act
strips the official of his state-law shield, thereby depriving
the official of the sovereign's immunity. The majority criticizes this approach as being "out of touch with reality" because it ignores the practical impact of an injunction on the
State though directed at its officers. Ante, at 1&-17. Yet
that criticism cannot account for Young, since an injunction
has the same effect on the State whether it is based on federal or state law. Indeed, the majority recognizes that injunctions approved by Young "have an obvious impact on the
State itself," ante, at 13. In the final analysis the distinction
between the State and its officers, realistic or not, is one
firmly embedded in the doctrine of sovereign immunity. It
is that doctrine and not any theory of federal supremacy
which the Framers placed in the Eleventh Amendment and
which this Court therefore has a duty to respect.
It follows that the basis for the Young rule is present when
the officer sued has violated the law of the sovereign; in all
such cases the conduct is of a type that would not be permitted by the sovereign and hence is not attributable to the sovereign under traditional sovereign immunity principles. In
such a case, the sovereign's interest lies with those who seek
to enforce its laws, rather than those who have violated
them.
"[P]ublic officials may become tort-feasors by exceeding
the limits of their authority. And where they unlawfully seize or hold a citizen's realty or chattel, recoverable by appropriate action at law or in equity [the] dominant interest of the sovereign is then on the side of the
victim who may bring his possessory action to reclaim
that which is wrongfully withheld." Land v. Dollar,
330 u. s. 731, 738 (1947). 34
While Land v. Dollar is a case dealing with the sovereign immunity
of the Federal Government, it is pertinent to the Eleventh Amendment,
which after all for present purposes is no more than an embodiment of sovereign immunity principles.
34
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The majority's position that the Eleventh Amendment does
not permit federal courts to enjoin conduct that the sovereign
State itself seeks to prohibit thus is inconsistent with both
the doctrine of sovereign immunity and the underlying respect for the integrity of State policy which the Eleventh
Amendment protects. The issuance of injunctive relief
which enforces state laws and policies, if anything, enhances
federal courts' respect for the sovereign prerogatives of the
States. 35 The majority's approach, which requires federal
courts to ignore questions of state law and to rest their decisions on federal bases, will create more rather than less friction between the States and the federal judiciary.
Moreover, the majority's rule has nothing to do with the
basic reason the Eleventh Amendment was added to the Constitution. There is general agreement that the Amendment
was passed because the States were fearful that federal
courts would force them to pay their Revolutionary War
debts, leading to their financial ruin. 36 Entertaining a suit
for injunctive relief based on state law implicates none of the
concerns of the Framers. Since only injunctive relief is
sought there is no threat to the state treasury of the type
that concerned the Framers, see Milliken v. Bradley, 433
U.S. 267, 2~290 (1977); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S.
651, 667-668 (1974); and if the State wishes to avoid the federal injunction, it can easily do so simply by changing its law.
86
For example, in cases barring suits against individual officers as suits
against the state, the Court has also acknowledged the importance of statelaw authority for the challenged conduct of the officer. In such cases the
Court has frequently noted that the relief sought would be unauthorized by
state law and would therefore adversely affect the state itself. See, e. g.,
Hagood v. Southern, 117 U. S. 52, 68 (1886); Louisiana v. Jumel, 107
U. S. 711, 721 (1882). In contrast, in cases of official actions contrary to
state law, a federal court's remedy would not adversely affect any state
policy.
86
See, e. g., Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n, 359 U. S. 275,
276 n. 1 (1959); Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U. S. 18, 27 (1933); Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 406-407 (1821).
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The possibility of States left helpless in the face of disruptive
federal decrees which led to the passage of the Eleventh
Amendment simply is not presented by this case. Indeed,
the Framers no doubt would have preferred federal courts to
base their decisions on state law, which the State is then free
to reexamine, rather than forcing courts to decide cases on
federal grounds, leaving the litigation beyond state control.
In light of the preceding, it should come as no surprise that
there is absolutely no authority for the majority's position
that the rule of Young is inapplicable to violations of state
law. The only cases the majority cites, ante, at 14-15, for
the proposition that Young is limited to the vindication of federallaw do not consider the question whether Young permits
injunctive relief on the basis of state law-in each of the cases
the question was neither presented, briefed, argued nor decided. 37 It is curious, to say the least, that the majority disapproves of reliance on cases in which the issue we face today
was decided sub silentio, see ante, at 28, yet it is willing to
rely on -cases in which the issue was not decided at all. In
fact, not only is there no precedent for the majority's position, but, as I have demonstrated in Part II, supra, there is
an avalanche of precedent squarely to the contrary. 38
37
The majority cites Quern v. Jordan, 440 U. S. 332 (1979); Scheuer v.
Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232 (1974); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651 (1974);
Georgia R. & Banking Co. v. Redwine, 342 U. S. 299 (1952). In each of
these cases, the only question presented or decided was whether monetary
relief could be obtained against state officials on the basis of federal law,
except for Redwine, where the Court decided that a suit to enjoin collection
of a state tax on the basis of federal law was not barred by the Eleventh
Amendment. In none of these cases was any question concerning the
availability of injunctive relief under state law considered even in dicta.
38
In addition to overruling,the cases discussed in part II, supra, the majority's view that Young exists simply to ensure the supremacy of federal
law indicates that a number of our prior cases, which held that the Eleventh Amendment may bar an action for injunctive relief even where the
State has violated the Federal Constitution, see, e. g., Alabama v. Pugh,
438 U. S. 781 (1978) (per curiam), were incorrectly decided. The Court
can have no satisfactory explanation for Pugh, which held that even as to a
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That the doctrine of sovereign immunity does not protect
conduct which has been prohibited by the sovereign is clearly
demonstrated by the case on which petitioners chiefly rely,
Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U. S.
682 (1949). The Larson opinion teaches that the actions of
state officials are not attributable to the state-are ultra
vires-in two different types of situations: (1) when the official is engaged in conduct that the sovereign has not authorized, and (2) when he has engaged in conduct that the sovereign has forbidden. A sovereign, like any other principal,
cannot authorize its agent to violate the law. When an agent
does so, his actions are considered ultra vires and he is liable
for his own conduct under the law of agency. Both types of
ultra vires conduct are clearly identified in Larson.
"There may be, of course, suits for specific relief
against · officers of the sovereign which are not suits
against the sovereign. If the officer purports to act as
an individual and not as an official, a suit directed against
that action is not a suit against the sovereign. If the
War Assets Administrator had completed a sale of his
own personal home, he presumably could be enjoined
from later conveying it to a third person. On a similar
federal constitutional claim, a suit may not be brought directly against a
state even where it may be brought against its officials. On the majority's
view, there is no basis for distinguishing between the state and its officials-as to both there is a need to vindicate the supremacy of federal law
through the issuance of injunctive relief, and unless the officials are acting
completely outside of their authority, they must be treated as is the state.
However, Pugh can be explained simply by reference to Young's use of the
ultra vires doctrine with respect to unconstitutional conduct by state officers-such conduct is not conduct by the sovereign because it could not be
authorized by the sovereign, hence the officers are not entitled to the sovereign's immunity. A suit directly against the state cannot succeed because the ultra vires doctrine is unavailable without a state officer to which
it can be applied. Pugh makes it clear that Young rests not on a need to
vindicate federal law, but on the traditional distinction between the sovereign and its agents.
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theory, where the officer's powers are limited by statute,
his actions beyond those limitations are considered individual and not sovereign actions. The officer is not doing the business which the sovereign has empowered him
to do or he is doing it in a way that the sovereign has
forbidden. His actions are ultra vires his authority and
therefore may be made the object of specific relief. It is
important to note that in such cases the relief can be
granted, without impleading the sovereign, only because
of the officer's lack of delegated power. A claim of error
in the exercise of that power is therefore not sufficient.
And, since the jurisdiction of the court to hear the case
may depend, as we have recently recognized, upon the
decision which it ultimately reaches on the merits, it is
necessary that the plaintiff set out in his complaint the
statutory limitation on which he relies." I d., at 689-690
(emphasis supplied).

Larson thus clearly indicates that the immunity determina- ·
tion depends upon the the merits of the plaintiff's claim. The
same approach is employed by Young-the plaintiff can overcome the state official's immunity only by succeeding on the
merits of its claim of unconstitutional conduct.
Following the two-track analysis of Larson, the cases considering the question whether the state official is entitled to
the sovereign's immunity can be grouped into two categories.
In cases like Larson, Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U. S. 643
(1962), and Florida Dept. of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc.,
458 U. S. 670 (1982), which usually involve the state functioning in its proprietary capacity, the ultra vires issue can be resolved solely by reference to the law of agency. Since there
is no specific limitation on the powers of the officers other
than the general limitations on their authority, the only question that need be asked is whether they have acted completely beyond their authority. But when the State has
placed specific limitations on the manner in whiCh state officials may perform their duties, as it often does in regulatory
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or other administrative contexts as were considered in Scully
v. Bird and Johnson v. Lankford, the ultra vires inquiry also
involves the question whether the officials acted in a way that
state law forbids. No sovereign would authorize its officials
to violate its own law, and if the official does so, then Larson
indicates that his conduct is ultra vires and not protected by
sovereign immunity.
Larson confirms that the Court's disposition of this case in
1981-ordering the Court of Appeals to consider respondents' state law claims-was fully harmonious with established
sovereign immunity principles. The jurisdiction of the federal court was established by a federal claim; 39 the Court of
Appeals therefore had jurisdiction to resolve the case and to
grant injunctive relief on either federal or state grounds.
Respondents pleaded a specific statutory limitation on the
way in which petitioners were entitled to run Pennhurst.
The District Court and the Court of ~ppeals have both found
that petitioners operated Pennhurst in a way that the sovereign has forbidden. Specifically, both courts concluded that
petitioners placed residents in Pennhurst without any consideration at all of the limitations on institutional confinement that are found in state law, and that they failed to create community living programs that are mandated by state
law. In short, there can be no dispute that petitioners
There can be no doubt that respondents' federal claims were sufficiently substantial to justify federal jurisdiction in this case. In another
case brought by a resident of Pennhurst, we held that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires, at a minimum, that petitioners provide the residents with reasonable care and safety. See
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U. S. 307, 324 (1982). The uncontested findings
of the District Court in this case establish that Pennhurst was neither safe
nor providing reasonable care to its residents. Therefore, respondents'
federal claims not only were sufficiently substantial to support the exercise
of federal jurisdiction in this case, but would almost certainly have justified
the issuance of at least some injunctive relief had a state-law basis for the
relief been unavailable.
39
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ran Pennhurst in a way that the sovereign had forbidden.
Under the second track of the Larson analysis, petitioners
were acting ultra vires because they were acting in a way
that the sovereign, by statute, had forbidden. 40
In Larson, the Administrator of the War Assets Administration was in
possession of coal that the plaintiff claimed the Administrator was contractually obligated to deliver to it. Instead of seeking damages for breach of
contract in the Court of Claims, the plaintiff sought an injunction in the
district court. The Court held that the Administrator had acted properly
in refusing to deliver the coal and instead insisting that the plaintiff seek its
remedy in the Court of Claims.
"There was, it is true, an allegation that the Administrator was acting
'illegally,' and that the refusal to deliver was 'unauthorized.' But these
allegations were not based and did not purport to be based upon any lack of
delegated power. Nor could they be, since the Administrator was empowered by the sovereign to administer a general sales program encompassing
the negotiation of contracts, the shipment of goods and the receipt of payment. A normal concomitant of such powers, as a matter of general
agency law, is the power to refuse delivery when, in the agent's view, delivery is not ~ailed for under a contract and the power to sell goods which
the agent believes are still his principal's to sell.'' 337 U. S. at 691-62
(footnotes omitted).
Thus, the Administrator had acted properly. He was doing what any
agent would d~holding on to property he believed was his principal's and
insisting that the claimant sue the principal if it wanted the property. He
was merely exercising the "normal" duties of a sales agent. Congress envisioned that he do exactly that; the remedy it had provided required the
claimant to sue for damages in the Court of Claims rather than obtaining
the property directly from the Administrator, and no one had questioned
the constitutional sufficiency of that alternate remedy. See McCord,
Fault Without Liability: Immunity of Federal Employees, 1966 U. Ill.
L. F . 849, 862-867. "Since the plaintiff had not made an affirmative allegation of any relevant statutory limitation upon the Administrator's powers, and had made no claim that the Administrator's action amounted to an
unconstitutional taking, the Court ruled that the suit must fail as an effort
to enjoin the United States.'' Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U. S. 643, 647
(1962). Malone can be explained similarly. These cases hold that Congress had empowered the governmental official to make necessary decisions about whether to hold onto property the official believes is the government's, at least pending the aggrieved party's remedy in the Claims
Court under the Tucker Act, 28 U. S. C. §§ 1491-1507 (1976 ed. and
40
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Petitioners readily concede, both in their brief and at oral
argument, that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar a suit
against state officers who have acted ultra vires. The majority makes a similar concession, ante, at 10, n. 11. Yet
both ignore the fact that the cases, and most especially
Larson, set out a two-step analysis for ultra vires conductconduct that is completely beyond the scope of the officer's
authority, or conduct that the sovereign has forbidden. In
fact, the majority goes so far as to quote the passage from
Larson indicating that a state official acts ultra vires when he
completely lacks power delegated from the state, ante, at
10-11, n. 11. That quotation ignores sentences immediately
preceding and following the quoted passage stating in terms
that where an official violates a statutory prohibition, he acts
ultra vires and is not protected by sovereign immunity.
This omission is understandable, since petitioners' conduct in
this case clearly falls into the category of conduct the sovereign has specifically forbidden by statute. Petitioners were
told by Pennsylvania how to run Pennhurst, and there is no
dispute that they disobeyed their instructions. Yet without
explanation, the Court repudiates the two-track analysis of
Larson and holds that sovereign immunity extends to conduct the sovereign has statutorily prohibited. 41 Thus, conSupp. V 1981 and West Supp. 1983). See Byse, Proposed Reforms in Federal "Nonstatutory" Judicial Review: Sovereign Immunity, Indispensible
Parties, Mandamus, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 1479, 1490-1491 (1962); Jaffe, The
Right to Judicial Review I, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 401, 43&-437 (1958).. Thus,
where the official acts as the sovereign intends, he is entitled to the sovereign's immunity under the principles discussed above. Where that is not
the case, Larson permits injunctive relief. In this case, respondents did
plead a specific limitation on petitioners' powers, and the holding of the
Court of Appeals on the merits of respondents' state law claims indicates
that petitioners were not exercising the "normal" duties that the sovereign
had envisioned for them, unlike the Administrator in Larson. Instead,
petitioners were running Pennhurst "in a way which the sovereign has forbidden." 337 U. S., at 689.
41
The majority also repudiates JUSTICE WHITE's recent statement in
Treasure Salvors: "where the officer's actions are limited by statute, ac-
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trary to the Court's assertion, Larson is in conflict with the
result reached today. 42
In sum, a century and a half of this Court's Eleventh
Amendment jurisprudence has established the following. A
suit alleging that the official had acted within his authority
but in a manner contrary to state statutes was not barred because the Eleventh Amendment prohibits suits against
States; it does not bar suits against state officials for actions
not permitted by the State under its own law. The sovereign could not and would not authorize its officers to violate
its own law; hence an action against a state officer seeking
redress for conduct not permitted by state law is a suit
against the officer, not the sovereign. Ex parte Young concluded in as explicit a fashion as possible that unconstitutional action by state officials is not action by the State even
if it purports to be authorized by state law, because the federal Const#ution strikes down the state law shield. In the
tort cases, if the plaintiff proves his case, there is by definition no state-law defense to shield the defendant. Similarly,
when the state officer violates a state statute, the sovereign
has by definition erected no shield against liability. These
precedents make clear that there is no foundation for the contention that the majority embraces-that Ex parte Young authorizes injunctive relief against state officials only on the
basis of federal law. To the contrary, Young is as clear as a
tions beyond those limitations are to be considered individual and not sovereign actions." 458 U. S., at 714. Four Members of today's majority
subscribed to that statement only two Terms ago.
42
Indeed, the majority senses as much, by admitting that it cannot reconcile the ultra vires doctrine endorsed by Larson with its approach. See
ante, at 23, n. 25. The majority is also incorrect in suggesting that Larson
overruled most if not all of the cases contrary to its position. In fact,
Larson cited most of those cases with approval, including Clemson, Tindal
v. Wesley, Poindexter v. Greenhaw and Land v. Dollar; the Larson opinion
stated that it was overruling only a single case, Goltra v. Weeks, 271 U. S.
536 (1926). See 337 U. S., at 698-702. Larson simply did not wreak the
kind of havoc on this Court's precedents that the majority does today.
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bell: the Eleventh Amendment does not apply where there is
no state-law shield. That simple principle should control this
case.
IV
The majority's decision in this case is especially unwise in
that it overrules a long line of cases in order to reach a result
that is at odds with the usual practices of this Court. In one
of the most respected opinions ever written by a Member of
this Court, Justice Brandeis wrote:
"The Court [has] developed, for its own governance in
the cases confessedly within its jurisdiction, a series of
rules under which it has avoided passing upon a large
part of all the constitutional questions pressed upon it for
decision. They are:
The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question
although properly presented by the record, if there is
also present some other ground upon which the case may
be disposed of. This rule has found most varied application. Thus, if a case can be decided on either of two
grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the
other a question of statutory construction or general law,
the Court will decide only the latter. Siler v. Louisville
& Nashville R. Co., 213 U. S. 175, 191." Ashwander v.
Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U. S. 288, 346-347
(1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
The Siler case, cited with approval by Justice Brandeis in
Ashwander, employed a remarkably similar approach to that
used by the Court of Appeals in this case. A privately
owned railroad corporation brought suit against the members
of the railroad commission of Kentucky to enjoin the enforcement of a rate schedule promulgated by the commission.
The federal circuit court found that the schedule violated the
plaintiff's federal constitutional rights and granted relief.
This Court affirmed, but it refused to decide the constitutional question because injunctive relief against the state offi-

.-
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cials was adequately supported by state law. The Court
held that the plaintiff's claim that the schedule violated the
Federal Constitution was sufficient to justify the assertion of
federal jurisdiction over the case, but then declined to reach
the federal question, deciding the case on the basis of state
law instead:
"Where a case in this court can be decided without reference to questions arising under the Federal Constitution, that course is usually pursued and is not departed
from without important reasons. In this case we think
it much better to decide it with regard to the question of
a local nature, involving the construction of the state
statute and the authority therein given to the commission to make the order in question, rather than to unnecessarily decide the various constitutional questions appearing in the record." Siler v. Louisville & Nashville
R. Co., 213 U.S. 175, 193 (1909). 43
The Siler principle has been applied on numerous occasions; when a suit against state officials has presented both
federal constitutional questions and issues of state law, the
Court has upheld injunctive relief on state law grounds.
See, e. g., Lee v. Bickell, 292 U. S. 415, 425 (1934); Glenn v.
Field Packing Co., 290 U, S. 177, 178 (1933); Davis v. Wallace, 257 U. S. 478, 482-485 (1922); Louisville & Nashville R.
Co. v. Greene, 244 U. S. 522, 527 (1917); Greene v. Louisville
& Interurban R. Co., 244 U. S. 499, 508, 512-514 (1917). 44
In Siler the Court decided the case on state-law grounds, even though
it acknowledged that "[i]n this case we are without the benefit of a construction of the statute by the highest state court of Kentucky, and we
must proceed in the absence of state adjudication upon the subject." Id.,
at 194.
44
Justice Peckham's opinion in Siler rested on a long line of cases, dating
back to Chief Justice Marshall's decision in Osborn v. Bank of the United
States, 9 Wheat. 738, 822 (1824), holding that a federal court has jurisdiction over all the issues-state as well as federal-presented by a case that
properly falls within its jurisdiction. Nor was Siler breaking new ground
in avoiding a federal constitutional question by deciding on state law
43
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In Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U. S. 528 (1974), the Court
quoted from the Siler opinion and noted that the "Court has
characteristically dealt first with possibly dispositive state
law claims pendent to federal constitutional claims." Id., at
546. It added:
"Numerous decisions of this Court have stated the
general proposition endorsed in Siler-that a federal
court properly vested with jurisdiction may pass on the
state or local law question without deciding the federal
constitutional issues-and have then proceeded to dispose of the case solely on the nonfederal ground. See,
grounds. In Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific R. Co., 118 U. S.
394 (1886), the Court noted the importance of the federal constitutional
questions. Even though these had been treated as dispositive by the
lower court, and though they were the "main-almost the only-questions
discussed by counsel," id., at 395, the Court stated, "These questions belong to a class which this court should not decide, unless their deterrillnation is essential to the disposal of the case in which they arise.''. Id., at
410. It then determined that the challenged tax assessments were not authorized by state law and affirmed the judgment solely on that ground. In
addition, the Court has routinely applied the Siler rule in cases upholding
injunctive relief on the basis of state law against municipal officials, see,
e. g., Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U. S. 620, 629 (1946); Cincinnati v.
Vester, 281 U. S. 439, 448-449 (1930); Risty v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific R. Co., 270 U.S. 378 (1926); Bohler v. Callaway, 267 U.S. 479, 489
(1925); Lincoln Gas & Electric Light Co. v. City of Lincoln, 250 U. S. 256,
268-269 (1919); and in cases in which the plaintiffs were not held to be entitled to the relief they sought, see Schmidt v. Oakland Unified School
Dist., 457 U. S. 594 (1982) (per curiam); Railroad Comm'n of California v.
Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 302 U. S. 388, 391 (1938); United Gas Co. v.
Railroad Commission of Kentucky, 278 U. S. 300, 307 (1929); Waggoner
Estate v. Wichita County , 273 U. S. 113, 116 (1927); Chicago Great Western R. Co. v. Kendall, 266 U. S. 94, 97-98 (1924); Ohio Tax Cases, 232
U. S. 576, 586-587 (1914); Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Garrett, 231
U. S. 298, 303-304 (1913). Numerous other cases decided by this Court
have cited Siler as an accurate statement of the law regarding pendent jurisdiction. See, e. g., Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U. S. 1, 7 (1976); Florida
Lime Growers v. Jacobsen, 362 U. S. 73, 81, n. 7 (1960); Hurn v. Oursler,
289 u. s. 238, 243-245 (1933).
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e. g., Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U. S. 620, 629-630
(1946); Waggoner Estate v. Wichita County, 273 U. S.
113, 116-119 (1927); Chicago G. W. R. Co. v. Kendall,
266 U. S. 94 (1924); United Gas Co. v. Railroad
Comm'n, 278 U. S. 300, 308 (1929); Risty v. Chicago,
R. I. & P.R. Co., 270 U. S. 378, 387 (1926). These and
other cases illustrate in practice the wisdom of the federal policy of avoiding constitutional adjudication where
not absolutely essential to disposition of a case." 415
U. 8., at 547, n. 12.
In fact, in this very case we applied the Siler rule by remanding the case to the Court of Appeals with explicit instructions
to consider whether respondents were entitled to relief under
state law.
Not only does the Siler rule have an impressive historical
pedigree, but it is also strongly supported by the interest in
avoiding duplicative litigation and the unnecessary decision
of federal constitutional questions.
"The policy's ultimate foundations ... lie in all that
goes to make up the unique place and character, in our
scheme, of judicial review of governmental action for
constitutionality. They are found in the delicacy of that
function, particularly in view of possible consequences
for others stemming also from constitutional roots; the
comparative finality of those consequences; the consideration due to the judgment of other repositories of constitutional power concerning the scope of their authority;
the necessity, if government is to function constitutionally, for each to keep within its power, including the
courts; the inherent limitations of the judicial process,
arising especially from its largely negative character and
limited resources of enforcement; withal in the paramount importance of constitutional adjudication in our
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system." Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U. S.
549, 571 (1947). 45

In addition, application of the Siler rule enhances the decisionmaking autonomy of the States. Siler directs the federal
court to turn first to state law, which the State is free to modify or repeal. 46 By leaving the policy determinations underlying injunctive relief in the hands of the State, the Court of
Appeals' approach gives appropriate deference to established
state policies.
In contrast, the rule the majority creates today serves
none of the interests of the State. The majority prevents
federal courts from implementing State policies through equitable enforcement of State law. Instead, federal courts
are required to resolve cases on federal grounds that no State
authority can undo. Leaving violations of state law unredressed and ensuring that the decisions of federal courts may
never be reexamined by the States hardly comports with the
respect for States as sovereign entities commanded by the
Eleventh Amendment.

v

One basic fact underlies this case: far from immunizing petitioners' conduct, the State of Pennsylvania prohibited it.
Respondents do not complain about the conduct of the State
of Pennsylvania-it is Pennsylvania's commands which they
seek to enforce. Respondents seek only to have Pennhurst
run the way Pennsylvania envisioned that it be run. Until
today, the Court understood that the Eleventh Amendment
Cf. H. L . v. Matheson, 450 U. S. 398, 407 (1981) (citing Justice Brandeis' opinion in Ashwander); Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U. S. 111, 122
(1979) (citing the Court's opinion in Siler).
46
In some of the cases following Siler, this Court has required that the
decree include a provision expressly authorizing its reopening in the event
that a state court later decided the question of state law differently. See
Lee v. Bickell, 292 U. S. 415, 426 (1934); Wald Transfer & Storage Co . v.
Smyth, 290 U.S. 602 (1933); Glenn v. Field Packing Co., 290 U.S. 177,
178-179 (1933).
46
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does not shield the conduct of state officers which has been
prohibited by their sovereign.
Throughout its history this Court has derived strength
from institutional self-discipline. Adherence to settled doctrine is presumptively the correct course. 47 Departures are,
of course, occasionally required by changes in the fabric of
our society. 48 When a court, rather than a legislature, initi7
• "I agree with what the Court stated only days ago, that 'the doctrine of
stare decisis, while perhaps never entirely persuasive on a constitutional
question, is a doctrine that demands respect in a society governed by the
rule of law.' City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health,
Inc.,-- U. S. - - , - - (1983). While the doctrine of stare decisis does
not absolutely bind the Court to its prior opinions, a decent regard for the
orderly administration of justice requires that directly controlling cases
either be followed or candidly overruled.'' Solem v. Helm, - - U. S.
- - , - - (1983) (BURGER, C. J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
This statement was joined by four members of today's majority. The
fifth was the author of the opinion of the Court in City of Akron.
48
This is 'an especiaily odd context in which to repudiate settled law in
that if anything changes in our social fabric favor limitation rather than expansion of sovereign immunity. The concept that the sovereign can do no
wrong and that citizens should be remediless in the face of its abuses is
more a relic of medieval thought than anything else.
"Whether this immunity is an absolute survival of the monarchial privilege,
or is a manifestation merely of power, or rests on abstract logical grounds,
it undoubtedly runs counter to modern democratic notions of the moral
responsibility of the State. Accordingly, courts reflect a strong legislative
momentum in their tendency to extend the legal responsibility of Government and to confirm Maitland's belief, expressed nearly fifty years ago
that, 'it is a wholesome sight to see "the Crown" sued and answering for its
torts.'" Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U. S. 47, 59 (1944)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
In the even older decision of Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U. S. 270
(1884), the Court, after observing that "the distinction between the government of a State and the State itself is important, and should be observed," id., at 290, wrote:
"This distinction is essential to the idea of constitutional government.
To deny it or blot it out obliterates the line of demarcation that separates
constitutional government from absolutism, free self-government based on
the sovereignty of the people from that despotism, whether of the one or
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ates such a departure, it has a special obligation to explain
and to justify the new course on which it has embarked. Today, however, the Court casts aside well settled respected
doctrine that plainly commands affirmance of the Court of
Appeals-the doctrine of the law of the case, 49 the doctrine of
stare decisis (the Court repudiates at least 28 cases), 50 the
the many, which enables the agent of the State to declare and decree that
he is the State; to say 'L'Etat c'est moi.' Of what avail are written constitutions whose bills of right for the security of individual liberty are written, too often, with the blood of martyrs shed upon the battle-field and the
scaffold, if their limitations and restraints upon power may be overpassed
with impunity by the very agencies created and appointed to guard, defend, and enforce them; and that, too, with the sacred authority oflaw, not
only compelling obedience, but entitled to respect? And how else can
these principles of individual liberty and right be maintained, if, when violated, the judicial tribunals are forbidden to visit penalties upon individual
offenders, who are the instruments of wrong, whenver they interpose the
shield of the State? The doctrine is not to be tolerated. The whole frame
and scheme of the political institutions of this country, State and Federal,
protest against it. Their continued existence is not compatible with it. It
is the doctrine of absolutism, pure, simple, and naked .. · .. " !d., at 291.
See also Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1889 (1983) . .
49
The heart of today's holding is that this Court had no power to act as it
did in 1981 when it ordered the Court of Appeals to consider and decide the
state law issues in this very case.
60
In the following cases the Court held injunctive relief may issue against
state officers on the basis of state law after explicitly rejecting their Eleventh Amendment defense: Rolston v. Missouri Fund Commissioners, 120
U. S. 391 (1887); South Carolina v. Wesley, 155 U. S. 542 (1895); Tindal v.
Wesley, 167 U. S. 204 (1897); Scully v. Bird, 209 U. S. 481 (1908); Hopkins
v. Clemson College, 221 U. S. 636 (1911); Atchison &c. R. Co. v. O'Connor, 223 U. S. 280 (1912); Johnson v. Lankford, 245 U. S. 541 (1918); Martin v. Lankford, 245 U. S. 547 (1918); Greene v. Louisville & Interurban
R. Co., 244 U. S. 499 (1917); Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Greene, 244
U.S. 522 (1917); Illinois Central R. Co. v. Greene, 244 U.S. 555 (1917).
Since petitioners' position applies also to federal sovereign immunity (indeed the principal case on which they rely, Larson, is a federal sovereign
immunity case), the following additional cases which refused to apply sovereign immunity to suits against federal officers acting within the scope of
their authority because the plaintiff had alleged that the officers had en-
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doctrine of sovereign immunity, 51 the doctrine of pendant jurisdiction, 52 and the doctrine of judicial restraint. No sound
reason justifies the further prolongation of this litigation or
this Court's voyage into the sea of undisciplined lawmaking.
As I said at the outset, this case has illuminated the character of an institution.
I respectfully dissent.

gaged in unlawful conduct are rejected: Little v. Barreme, 2 Cranch 169
(1804); Wise v. Withers, 3 Cranch 331 (1806); Mitchell v. Harmony, 13
How. 115 (1851); Bates v. Clark, 95 U. S. 204 (1877); Belknap v. Schild,
161 U. S. 10 (1896); Sloan Shipyards v. U.S. Fleet Corp., 258 U. S. 549
(1922); Santa Fe Pac. R. Co. v. Fall, 259 U. S. 197 (1922); Philadelphia
Co. v. Stimson, 223 U. S. 605 (1912); Land v. Dollar, 330 U. S. 731, 738
(1947). Larson itself cites most of these cases with approval, and disapproves of none of them. All are overruled today. In fact, today the
Court repudiates the two-track analysis of Larson, since in Larson the
Court stated that conduct which has been specifically prohibited by statute
is not protected by sovereign immunity even if it is performed within the
scope of the official's duties~ yet today the Court holds that even if an officer violates a statute, his conduct is protected by sovereign immunity.
The Court also overrules the cases cited in n. 52, infra. If some of these
cases have been rarely cited, see ante, at 24, n. 27, this is because until
today the law was thought to be well-settled on this point.
51
From the fifteenth century English common law to Larson and beyond,
courts have never held that prohibited conduct can be shielded by sovereign immunity. That rule makes good sense-since a principal cannot authorize unlawful conduct, such conduct is of necessity ultra vires. There is
no reason to abandon such a well settled and sensible rule.
52
The majority also overrules Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 213
U. S. 175 (1909), and its progeny, including Louisville & Nashville R. Co.
v. Garrett, 231 U. S. 298 (1913); Davis v. Wallace, 257 U. S. 478 (1922);
Chicago Great Western R. Co. v. Kendall, 266 U. S. 94 (1924); United Gas
Co. v. Railroad Commission, 278 U. S. 300 (1919); Glenn v. Field Packing
Co., 290 U. S. 177 (1933); Lee v. Bickell, 292 U. S. 415 (1934); Railroad
Commission of California v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 302 U. S. 388
(1938).
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answered by this Court many times in the past. The affirmative
answer to that question is supported by sound reasons of judicial
administration, by the doctrines of stare decisis and law of the
case, and by a correct understanding of the doctrine of sovereign
immunity.

A negative answer will place additional burdens on the

judiciary and on the victims of unlawful conduct by state
officials.

It will also require unn e cessary determinations of

constitutional questions, a result inimical to sound principles
of judicial restraint.

I. ~

I therefore respectfully dissent.
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In one of the most respected opinions ever written by a
Member of this Court, Justice Brandeis wrote:

"The Court developed, for its own governance in
the cases confessedly within its jurisdiction, a series
of rules under which it has avoided passing upon a
large part of all the constitutional questions pressed

No. 81-2101

...

- 2 upon it for decision.

They are:

*

*

*

"The Court will not pass upon a constitutional
question although properly presented by the record, if
there is also present -some other ground upon which the
case may be disposed of. This rule has found most
varied application. Thus, if a case can be decided on
either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional
question, the other a question of statutory
construction or general law, the Court will ~cide only
the latter.
Siler v. Louisville & NashvilleR. Co.,
213 U.S. 175, 191." Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley
Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 346-347 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring).

The ( siler

c~ cited

Ashwande ~-- ~~_?____r-e-markably
today.

with approval by Justice

Bra~deis

in

similar to the case the Court decides

A privately owned railroad corporation brought suit

against the members of the railroad commission of Kentucky to
enjoin the enforc e ment of a rate schedule promulgated by the
Commission.

The federal circuit court found that the schedule

violated the plaintiff's federal constitutional rights and
granted relief.

This Court affirmed, but it refused to

~ecide

the constitutional question because injunctive relief against

x~e

state officials was adequately supported on the basis of state
law.

The Court explained:

"The Federal questions, as to the invalidity of
the state statute because, as alleged, it was in
viola ~ the Federal Constitution, gave the Circuit
Court jurisdiction, and, having properly obtained it,
that court had the right to decide all the questions in
the case, even though it ec1 e
e edera questions
adversely to the party raising them, or even if it
omitted to decide them at all, but decided the case on
local or state questions only.

*

*

*

·";o
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"Where a case in this court can be decided without
reference to questions arising under the Federal
Constitution, that course is usually pursued and is not
departed from without important reasons.
In this case
we think it much better to decide it with regard to the
question of a local nature, involving the construction
of the state _statute and the authority therein given to
the commission to make the order in question, rather
_,h
than to unnecessarily decide the various constitutional
/~~""""'
questions appearing in the record." Siler v.
~ _.} Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 213 U.S. 175, 191, 193
,),

tt ./
tL

~_v/

~~

A

(~ ~)

The Siler principle has been repeatedly applied in cases
state as well as local officials.

On numerous

occasions, when a suit against state officials has presented both

pvr-~ederal
~

.

~-

~~volving
~

•

constitutional questions and issues of state law, the

Court has upheld injunctive relief on state law grounds.

See,

1
In Siler the Court decided the case on state-law grounds,
even though it acknowledged that, "fi)n this case we are without
the benefit of a construction of the statute by the highest state
court of Kentucky, and we must proceed in the absence of state
adjudication upon the subject." 213 u.s., at 194.
Justice Peckham's opinibn in Siler rested on a long line of
cases, dating back to Chief Justice Marshall's decision ·in Osborn
v. Bank of the United States, 9 Cranch 738, 822 (1824), holdi~g '
that a federal court has jurisdiction over all the issues--state
as well as federal--presented by a case that properly falls
within its jurisdiction. Nor was Siler breaking new ground in
avoiding a federal constitutional question by deciding on state
law grounds.
In Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad
Co., 118 u.s. 394, 410-411 (1886), the Court noted the importance
of the federal constitutional questions. Even though these had
been treated as dispositive by the lower court, and though they
were the "main--almost the only--questions discussed by counsel,"
id., at 395, the Court stated, "These questions belong to a class
which this court should not decide, unless their determination is
essential to the disposal of the case in which they arise." It
then determined that the challenged tax assessments were not
authorized by state law and affirmed the judgment solely on that
ground.
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- 4 e.g., Greene v. Louisville & Interurban R.R. Co., 244 U.S. 499,
508, 512-514 (1917)

(state board of valuation and assessment;

state attorney general); Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v.
Greene, 244 u.s. 522, 527 (1917)
u.s. 478, 482-485 (1922)

(same); Davis v. Wallace, 257

(state tax commissioner, state

treasurer, state auditor, state attorney general, and secretary
of state); Glenn v. Field Packing Co., 290 u.s. 177, 178 (1933)
(state tax commissioners); Lee v. Bickell, 292 u.s. 415, 425
(1934)

(state comptroller).---In

the~,:~the

considered and necessarily rejected the

Court

ention that the

Eleventh Amendment bars such relief; state officials had argued
at length that the actions were suits against the State and had
.
.
. h Ex parte Young. 2
en d eavore d t o d 1st1ngu1s

In addition, the

Court has routinely applied the Siler rule in cases upholding
injunctive relief on the basis of state law against municipal
officials, 3 and it has repeatedly reaffirmed the general

2

see Brief for Appellants, Greene v. Louisville and
; '
Interurban Railroad Co., 244 u.s. 499, at 27-45; Brief for State
Board and Officers, Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v.
Greene, 244 U.S. 522, at 74-101. See also Reply Brief of
Illinois Central Railroad Co., Illinois Central Railroad Co. v.
Greene, 244 U.S. 555, at 38-39 (companion case). The Court in
Greene noted that the highest court of Kentucky had held that
"discrimination such as that complained of" was not in accord
with the constitution and laws of the state. Although there was
no redress in state courts, the Court stated, "This, while
admitting the wrong, merely denies judicial relief, and is not
bindinq upon the federal courts." 244 U.S., at 512-513; see id.,
at 514.
3 see, e.g., Lincoln Gas & Electric Light Co. v. City of
Lincoln, 250 U.S. 256, 268-269 (1919) (modifying judgment to note
specifically that the District Court had relied on state
constitutional grounds rather than federal grounds to enjoin
Footnote continued on next page.

.~

.
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principle in cases in which the plaintiffs were not held to be
entitled to the relief they sought. 4

In Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 546 (1974), JUSTICE
WHITE, writing for the Court, quoted from the Siler opinion and
noted that the "Court has characteristically dealt first with
possibly dispositive state law claims pendent to federal

enforcement of occupation tax); Bohler v. Callaway, 267 u.s. 479,
489 (1925) (affirming injunction based on state constitutional
grounds, barring county tax receiver from levying execution of
assessments); Risty v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway
Co . , 2 7 0 U . S . 3 7 8 ( 19 2 6 ) ( in d i v e r s i t y act ions , a f f i r min g
injunction on state law grounds barring county officials from
assessing costs for drainage system, and citing Greeene with
approval); Cincinnati v. Vester, 281 U.S. 439, 448-449 (1930)
(affirming injunction on state statutory grounds preventing
municipality from appropriating certain parcels of real
property); Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U.S. 620, 629 (1946)
(affirming injunction, on state statutory grounds, barring
assessment of a tax by county tax collector). Such suits, of
course, do not implicate the Eleventh Amendment. Lincoln County
v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529 (1890).
4Most recently, in a unanimous per curiam opinion a year
ago, we held that it was an abuse of discretion for the Court o~
Appeals to decline to resolve a pendent state-law claim which ;
might have afforded relief against a school district, thus
avoiding a decision on federal constitutional grounds.
Schmidt
v. Oakland Unified School Dist.,
U.S.
(June 21, 1982)
(citing Ha gans v. Lavine, discuss~in text infra).
See also
Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Garrett, 231 U.S. 298,
303-304 (1913); Ohio Tax Cases, 232 U.S. 576, 586-587 (1914);
Chicago Great Western Railway Co. v. Kendall, 266 U.S. 94, 97-98
(1924); Waggoner Estate v. Wichita County, 273 U.S. 113, 116
(1927); United Gas Co. v. Railroad Commission of Kentucky, 278
u.s. 300, 307 (1929); Railroad Comm'n of California v. Pacific
Gas & Electric Co., 302 u.s. 388, 391 (1938).

I

Numerous other cases have cited Siler as an accurate statement
of the law regarding pendent jurisdiction. See, e.g.~ Hurn v.
Oursler, 289 U.S. 238, 243-245 (1933); Florida Lime Growers v.
Jacobsen, 362 U.S. 73, 81, n. 7 (1960); Aldinger v. Howard, 427
u.s. 1, 7 (1976)
0
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- 6 constitutional claims."

He added:

"Numerous decisions of this Court have stated the
general proposition endorsed in Siler--that a federal
court properly vested -with jurisdiction may pass on the
state or local law question without deciding the
federal constitutional issues--and have then proceeded
to dispose of the case solely on the nonfederal ground.
See, e.g., Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U.S. 620, 629630 (1946); Waggoner Estate v. Wichita County, 273 u.s.
113, 116-119 (1927); Chicaqo G.W.R. Co. v. Kendall, 266
u.s. 94 (1924); United Gas Co. v. Ra1lroad Comm'n, 278
U.S. 300, 308 (1929); Risty v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R.
Co., 270 U.S. 378~ 387 (1926). These and other cases
illustrate in practice the wisdom of the federal policy
of avoiding constitutional adjudication where not
absolutely essential to disposition of a case." 415
u.s., at 547 n. 12.
Not only does the Siler rule have an impressive historical
pedigree.

It is strongly supported by the interest in avoiding

duplicative litigation as well as the interest in avoiding the
unnecessary decision of federal constitutional questions.

H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 407 (1981)

Cf.

(citing Justice

u.s.

Brandeis' opinion in Ashwander); Hutchinson v. Proxmire,·- 443

111, 122 (1979).

In addition, it enhances the decisionmaking : "

autonomy of the States.

Unlike the majority's position, which

requires a decision on federal constitutional grounds that no
State authority can undo, the Siler rule directs the federal
court to turn first to state law, which the State is free to
modify or repeal.

Indeed, in some of the cases following Siler,

this Court has required that the decree include a provision
expressly authorizing its reopening in the event that a state
court later decided the question of state law differently.
v. Field Packing Co., 290

u.s.

Glenn

177, 178-179 (1933); Wald Transfer

..
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- 7 & Storage Co. v. Smyth, 290
U.S.

415~

426 (1934).

u.s.

602 (1933); Lee v. Bickell, 292

By leaving the policy determinations

underlying injunctive relief in the hands of the State, the Court
of Appeals' approach gives -appropriate deference to established
state policies.

Ironically, the premise underlying the Siler principle--that
------------------~

lawsuit ___.-I
also has jurisdiction over pendent state law issues, even

---

...-----..__

if the defendant is a state official--was most recently

--------

recognized by this Court in this very case.
~

.t

relied on three sources of law to support its holding that

~ ~ spondents
~

The District Court

have a right to treatment in the least restrictive

environment: a federal statute, a Pennsylvania statute, and the
Federal Constitution.

See 446 F. Supp. 1295 (ED Pa 1977).

The

u rt of Appeals, sitting en bane, affirmed on both state and
federal statutory grounds, and therefore found it unnecessary to
review the District Court's holding that the federal
constitutional rights of the Pennhurst residents had been
violated.

See 612 F.2d 84 (CA3 1979).

When we reviewed the case

in 1981, we rej e cted the federal statutory basis for the Court o f
Appeals' decision.

We did not accept respondent's contention
'

that the state law grounds provided an adequate basis for
affirmance of the judgment, because we were concerned that the
Court of Appeals' analysis of the state law question might have
been influenced by its erroneous reading of the federal statute.
Concluding that it was "unclear whether state law provides an

No. 81-2101
- 8 -

independent and adequate ground which can support the court's
remedial order," 451

u.s.

1, 31 (1981}, we "remand red] the state-

law issue for reconsideration in light of our decision here."
Ibid.

We appended a footnote explaining why we declined to

consider the effect of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's then
recent decision, In re Schmidt, 494 Pa. 86, 429 A.2d 631 (1981}.
In that footnote, we again expressly stated that the Court of
Appeals could "consider the state law issues in light of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court's recent decision."

451 U.S., at 31,

n. 24.

The possibility that Siler was no longer good law, or that
the Eleventh Amendment might provide a basis for refusing to
decide the state law issues, apparently did not occur to any
Member of this Court.

Siler was still good law in 1981.

-------------------------II

The fair and efficient administration of the law is served
by respecting settled rules and by carrying out orders entered in
the course of litigation.

Neither the doctrine of stare decisis,

nor the doctrine of the law of the case, rigidly forecloses the
re-examination of old rules or outstanding orders.

The

doctrines, do, however, establish strong presumptions.

A

proponent of change must come forward with strong reasons to
disregard what has already been decided--reasons that are strong
enough to overcome the interests in certainty and stability which

No. 81-2101

- 9 underlie so much of the framework of our law.

In this case, the parties have litigated for almost a decade
the assumption that the -rule of the Siler case was sound law.
The state law issue was fully briefed by both sides on the merits

'---·---

when the case first came before the Court.

See Brief for

Petitioners 9, 39-43; Brief for Respondents Terri Lee Halderman,
et al. 23-34; Brief for the United States 37-38; Reply Brief for
Petitioners 17.

Only after the case had been fully tried,

affirmed by the Court of Appeals sitting en bane, reviewed for
the first time in this Court, and remanded to the Court of
Appeals, did petitioners advance the argument that the Court
finds persuasive today.

In rejecting this contention, the Court

of Appeals quoted at length from this Court's opinion remanding
for reconsideration of the state law issue, 673 F.2d, at 649-651.
it is tolerably clear that the only reason the Eleventh Amendment

l

argument was not advanced at an earlier stage of the
nobody thought of it before.

cas~

Yet the Court accepts the

is that

State~s ~

contention at this late stage, requiring the plaintiffs to start
all over again in a state court if they wish to rely on state
law, and requiring the Court of Appeals to decide a serious
federal constitutional question which could be avoided if
plaintiffs obtain relief on the basis of state law.

Today the Court rejects settled doctrine, repudiates the
-----~____,

powerful interests supporting the Siler rule, and disserves the

--~
interest in bringing protracted litigation to a conclusion--an

No. 81-2101
- 10 interest that is particularly strong in a case in which the
mistreatment of a relatively helpless segment of the community is
graphically described by undisputed findings of fact.

The

countervailing reason must -presumably be strong indeed.

In the

view of the majority, that reason is the doctrine of "sovereign
immunity."

The essence of the Court's anal~sis is encapsulated

in this statement:

"The constitutional principle of sovereign immunity,
embodied in the Eleventh Amendment, demands that claims
against state officials on the basis of state law be
resolved in state courts." Ante, at 21.

The Court's explanation of the doctrine that issues such a
powerful command is inadequate.

I shall therefore comment on it,

I

giving special attention to its historical and logical
relationship with the Siler rule repudiated today by the Court.

III

In Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419 (1793), the Court was
required to decide whether the doctrine of sovereign immunity
deprived a federal court of jurisdiction in an action in
assumpsit brought against the State of Georgia by a citizen of
South Carolina serving as the executor of the estate of a British
creditor.

In a decision that was unpopular with state

governments which were either unable or unwilling to pay their
just debts when due, the Court held that Georgia was amenable to
suit.

The analysis of the doctrine of sovereign immunity in the

No. 81-2101
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opinion of Chief Justice Jay is illuminating:

"It will be sufficient to observe briefly, that
the sovereignties in Europe, and particularly in
England, exist on feudal principles. That system
considers the Prince as the sovereign, - and the people
as his subjects: it regards his person as the object of
allegiance, and excludes the idea of his being on an
equal footing with a subject, either in a Court of
Justice or elsewhere. That system contemplates him as
being the fountain of honor and authority: and from his
grace and grant derives all franchises, immunities and
privileges: it is easy to perceive that such a
sovereign could not be amenable to a Court of Justice,
or subjected to judicial control and actual constraint.
It was of necessity, therefore, that suability became
incompatible with such sovereignty. Besides, the
Prince having all the Executive powers, the judgment of
the Courts would, in fact, be only monitory, not
mandatory to him, and a capacity to be advised, is a
different thing from a capacity to be sued. The same
feudal ideas run through all their jurisprudence, and
constantly remind us of the distinction between the
Prince and the subject. No such ideas obtain here: at
the Revolution, the sovereignty devolved on the people
" Id., at 471 (emphasis in original}.
It is familiar history that it took only five years for the
sovereign States, many of which were heavily in debt even though
the new central government had relieved them of their
revolutionary war obligations, to overrule the Chisholm case by
ratifying the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution.
of that amendment has two noteworthy features:

The text

it encompasses

only suits by citizens of other States and foreign nations, and
it refers only to suits against States. 5

At the outset, this

5

"The Judicial power of the United States shall not
be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
Footnote continued on next page.
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Chief Justice Marshall

wrote that the amendment would not apply to an action commenced
by a citizen of Virginia against the Commonwealth of Virginia.
Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 412 (1821).

He also asserted

that its force was, "of necessity, limited to those suits in
which a State is a party on the record."

Osborn v. Bank of the

United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 857 (1824}.

Before the end of the 19th century, however, the reach of
the Eleventh Amendment had been expanded along both dimensions.
The first of these textual limitations upon the scope of
constitutionally-mandated sovereign immunity was swept aside in
Hans v. Louisiana, 134

u.s.

1 (1890).

Hans was a suit against

the State of Louisiana, brought by a citizen of Louisiana seeking
to recover interest on the State's bonds. 6

Disagreeing with the

majority's analysis in Chisholm, the Court explained that some of

States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. Const. Arndt. XI.
6 The Court's opinion expressly distinguished cases in which
a State might have unconstitutionally invaded the enjoyment of
other rights:
"Whilst the State cannot be compelled by suit to
perform its contracts, any attempt on its part to
violate property or rights acquired under its
contracts, may be judicially resisted; and any law
impairing the obligation of contracts under which such
property or rights are held is void and powerless to
affect their enjoyment." 134 U.S., at 20-21.
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- 13 the arguments made during the process of ratifying the
Constitution had become a part of the Constitution itself. 7
Thus, in the Court's view, the Eleventh Amendment merely
exemplified the broader and more ancient doctrine of sovereign
immunity, 8

and the Constitution bars a suit in federal court

brought by a citizen against his own State. 9

Second, the Court did not long adhere to Chief Justice
Marshall's test that a State must be a party of record for the
suit to be barred by sovereign immunity.

It held in a number of

cases that a suit against a state official was in essence a suit

7 Hans did not specify the precise constitutional basis for
this conclusion. Some years later, in Monaco v. Mississippi, the
Court recognized this problem:
"Manifestly, we cannot rest with a mere literal
application of the words of § 2 of Article III, or
assume that the letter of the Eleventh Amendment
exhausts the restrictions upon suits against nonconsenting States. Behind the words of the
constitutional provisions are postulates which limit
and control." 292 U.S. 313, 322-323 (1934).

~

"

8 The discussion of the doctrine of sovereign immunity in the
Hans opinion made no attempt to explain its virtues.
It relied
instead on the antiquity of the rule and the notion that a
contrary point of view is simply unthinkable. 134 u.s., at 21.
9 In support of its conclusion, the Court noted that Congress
had merely given the federal courts jurisdiction that was
"concurrent with the courts of the several States," and suggested
that it would be anomalous to permit a citizen to sue in federal
court when the state courts were closed to him.
Id., at 18. Of
course, that argument cuts the other way today, since, as
petitioners acnowledge, respondents' claim for relief under state
law could be brought in state court. Brief for Petitioners 32.

.

No. 81-2101
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Unlike suits against States, suits against state officials in
their own names were not dismissed at the threshold, Poindexter
v. Greenhow, 114 u.s. 270, - 288 (1885): Illinois Central R. Co. v.
Adams, 180 u.s. 28, 37-38 (1901), but the Court considered the
nature of the relief sought in order to determine whether the
State was the "real party in interest."

Cunningham v. Macon &

Brunswick R.R. Co., 109 U.S. 446, 456-457 (1883): In re Ayers,
123 U.S. 443, 487-492 (1887).

If the plaintiff sought relief

that required direct payment of money out of the State's treasury
to fulfill the State's financial obligations, or otherwise
directly interfered with the State's finances, then the suit was
treated as an action against the State, barred by sovereign
immunity. 10

But the Court preserved a selective approach to extending
the doctrine of _sovereign immunity.

It was settled doctrine that
~

the Eleventh Amendment did not protect unconstitutional
---------~.__....-....._

-----

by state officials acting in their official capacity.

"'

condu~t

,..

Poindexter

v. Greenhow, supra, at 288; Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, 140 U.S. 1,
10-12 (1891): Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 518-519 (1898) . 11

As

10 see, e.g., Governor of Georgia v. Madrazo, 1 Pet. 110, 123124 (1828): Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U.S. 711 (1882): Hagood v.
Southern, 117 U.S. 52 (1886): North Carolina v. Temple, 134 u.s.
2 2 , 3 0 ( 18 9 0 ) ; Lou i s ian a v • S tee 1 e , 13 4 U . S • 2 3 0 , 2 3 2 ( 18 9 0 ) :
Smith v. Reeves, 178 u.s. 436 (1900).
11 see also Board of Liquidation v. McComb, 92 u.s. 531, 541
(1875); Allen v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 114 U.S. 311, 315-316
Footnote continued on next page.
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the Court wrote,

"The other class is where a suit is brought against
defendants who, claiming to act as officers. of the
State, and under the color of an unconstitutional
statute, commit acts of wrong and injury to the rights
and property of the plaintiff acquired under a contra6t
with the State. Such suit, whether brought to recover
money or property in the hands of such defendants,
unlawfully taken by them in behalf of the State, or for
compensation in damages, or, in a proper case where the
remedy at law, is inadequate, for an injunction to
prevent such wrong and injury, ••• is not, within the
meaning of the Eleventh Amendment, an action against
the State." 140 U.S., at 10.

The Court reasoned that the absence of valid authority left the
official as a private actor, stripped of his representative
capacity. 12

This was not merely an ad hoc accommodation between

(1885); In re Tyler, 149 U.S. 164, 190-191 (1893); Reagan v.
Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 154 u.s. 362, 388-391 (1894); Scott v.
Don a 1 a , 16 5 u • s • 5 8 , 6 7- 7 0 ( 18 9 7 ) ; Prout v • s tar r , 18 8 u . s . 5 3 7
(1903); McNeill v. Southern Ry. Co., 202 U.S. 543, 559 (1906}.
12

"That, it is true, is a legislative act of the
government of Virginia, but it is not a law of the
State of Virginia. The State has passed no such law,
for it cannot; and what it cannot do, it certainly, in
cont e mplation of law, has not done. The Constitution
of the United States, and its own contract, both
irr e pealable by any act on its part, are the law of
Virginia; and that law made it the duty of the
defendant to receive the coupons tendered in payment of
taxes, and declared every step to enforce the tax,
thereafter taken, to be without warrant of law, and
therefore a wrong. He stands, then, stripped of his
official character; and, confessiong a personal
violation of the plaintiff's rights for which he must
personally answer, he is without defence." Poindexter
v. Greenhaw, supra, 114 U.S., at 288.

" "
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- 16 federal and state interests, see ante, at 14, 15, but an
application of the Court's established framework of Eleventh
Amendment

~ ysis.

In short, the decision upholding injunctive

relief in Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908}, which today's
~ajority

treats as a limited exception to the sweeping generality

of the Eleventh Amendment, in fact merely restated a well-settled
rule. 13

Another line of cases--highly relevant to today's decision-also shows that barring suits against state officials was as much
the exception as the rule.

State officials and other agents of

the State were not protected by the federal doctrine of sovereign
immunity from tort
...__- actions under state law.

In a diversity case,

federal courts had power to decide such cases and to award
injunctive and monetary relief against individuals who claimed to

13

As the Court observes, it is familiar learning that . there
is a tension in Ex parte· Young because the scope of the Eleventh
Amendment was held to be narrower than the scope of the
; /
Fourteenth. But the two amendments differ both in language and
purpose with regard to defining action by the State.
It is
clear, at all events, that the limitations on the Eleventh
Amendment in Ex parte Young simply followed the principles
established by the Court in cases that did not involve the
Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court stated:
"The answer to all this is the same as made in every
case where an official claims to be acting under the
authority of the State.
The act to be enforced is
alleged to be unconstitutional, and if it be so, the
use of the name of the State to enforce an
unconstitutional act to the injury of complainants is a
proceeding without the authority of and one which does
not affect the State in its sovereign or governmental
capacity." 209 U.S., at 159-160.

;

No. 81-2101

- 17 have acted as state officials, unless they proved that the
challenged conduct had in fact been authorized by law.

This rule was expressly reaffirmed in

~

case decided by this

Court in the same Term as Ex parte Young and published in the
same volume of the United States Reports.

The appellant in

Scully v. Bird, 209 U.S. 481 (1908), brought a diversity suit
seeking injunctive relief against the dairy and food commissioner
of the State of Michigan, on the ground that "under cover of his
office" he had maliciously engaged in a course of conduct
designed to ruin plaintiff's business in the State.

The circuit

court dismissed the complaint on Eleventh Amendment grounds.

On

appeal, the plaintiff contended that the Eleventh Amendment "does
not apply where a suit is brought against defendants who,
claiming to act as officers of the State, and under color of a
statute which is valid and constitutional, but wrongfully
administered by them, commit, or threaten to commit, act? of
wrong or injury to the rights and property of the plaintiff, qr /
make such administration of the statute an illegal burden and
exaction upon the plaintiff."

Id. at 481. 14

This court agreed.

14
"Your orators further represent that all the acts
and doing sof the said Arthur c. Bird, as above
specified, in relation to the prohibition of the sale
of your orators' said syrups in the State of Michigan
are entirely unauthorized by the statutes of the State
of Michigan, and the said Arthur C. Bird, in committing
said acts above complained of, was and is acting as a
private citizen of the State of Michigan, but under
Footnote continued on next page.
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duties enjoined by the statutes of the State," and concluded that
it was "manifest from this summary .of the allegations of the bill
that this is not a suit against the State."

Id., at 490.

It was firmly established by 1908 that -· tortious acts by
state officials under color of office were not protected by the
Eleventh Amendment.

Cunningham v. Macon & Brunswick R. Co.,

supra, 109 U.S., at 452; Poindexter v. Greenhaw, 114 U.S., at

287; Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust, 154
(1894). 15

u.s.

362, 390-391

A few years later, the Court explained the

relationship of these tort cases to the doctrine of sovereign
immunity in Hopkins v. Clemson Agricultural College, 221 U.S. 636

(1911):

"immunity from suit is a high attribute of sovereignty-a prerogative of the State itself--which cannot be
availed of by public agents when sued for their own
cover of his said office of Dairy and Food
Commissioner ..•• " Record 11.

15 The Court explained that the individual officer sued in
tort
"is not sued as, or because he is, the officer of the
government, but as an individual, and the court is not
ousted of jurisdiction because he asserts jurisdiction
as such officer. To make out his defense he must show
that his authority was sufficient in law to protect
him." Cunningham, 109 u.s., at 452; quoted in
Poindexter v. Greenhaw, 114 u.s., at 287.
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afford them freedom from liability in any case where,
under color of their office, they have injured one of
the State's citizens. To grant them such immunity would
be to create a privileged class free from liability for
wrongs inflicted or injuries threatened •••. Besides,
neither a State nor an individual can confer upon an
agent authority to commit a tort so as to excuse the
perpetrator.
In such cases the law of agency has no
application--the wrongdoer is treated as a principal
and individually liable for the damages inflicted and
subject to injunction againsl the commission of acts
6
causing irreparable injury."

This principle was repeatedly applied in federal courts in
cases contemporary with Young and Siler. 17

In Johnson v.

16 The Court also stated:
"Corporate agents or individual officers of the State
stand in no better position than officers of the
General Government, and as to them it has often been
held that:
'The exemption of the United States from
judicial process does not protect their officers and
agents, civil or military, in time of peace, from being
personally liable to an action of tort by a private
person, whose rights of property they have wrongfully
invaded or injured, even by authority of the United
States.' Belknap v. Schild, 161 u.s. 10, 18." 22r
u.s., at 645.

The importance of state law authority for the actions of state
officials also appears, by implication, in cases barring suits
against individual officials as suits against the State. In such
cases the Court frequently noted, as one relevant factor, that
the relief sought would be unauthorized by state law and would
therefore adversely affect the State itself. E.g., Louisiana v.
Jumel, supra, 107 U.S., at 721; Hagood v. Southern, supra, 114
u.s., at 68. In contrast, in cases of official actions that were
never authorized by state law, a federal court's remedy would not
run contrary to state policy.

17 some of · this Court's general language in Larson v. Domestic
& Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 691-702 (1949), is
inconsistent with the approach taken in the cases cited in text.
Footnote continued on next page.
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u.s.

541 (1918), the Court reversed the dismissal

of an action against the Bank Commissioner of Oklahoma and his
surety to recover damages for the loss of the plaintiff's bank
deposit, alleged

~o ~ave

been caused by the Commissioner's

failure to safeguard the business and

asset~

of the bank ih

negligent or willful disregard of his duties under state law.
The Court explained that the action was not one against the
State.

"To answer it otherwise would be to assert, we think,
that whatever an officer does, even in contravention of
the laws of the State, is state action, identifies him
with it and makes the redress sought against him a
claim against the State and therefore prohibited by the
Eleventh Amendment. Surely an officer of a State may
be delinquent without involving the State in
delinquency, indeed, may injure the State by
delinquency as well as some resident of the State, and
be amenable to both." Id., at 545. 8
But Larson is readily distinguishable. Not only was it a suit
against the federal War Assets Administrator rather than against
a state official.
It also involved a claim to a particular,
identified object of property, whose retention by the official
was "unlawful" only in the sense that the plaintiff claimed
~ ,
title, id., at 692. Such a claim is quite different from a suit
for injunctive relief against enforcement of a general policy or
practice, which the state supreme court has held to be
inconsistent with "the state's responsibility" which the state
"will not be allowed to ignore." In re Schmidt, 429 A. 2d 631,
637 (Pa. 1981). To the extent that Larson suggests that
sovereign immunity bars all suits based on action within the
scope of official authority, it is not necessary or appropriate
to read it back retroactively into the Eleventh Amendment, given
the clarity of our precedents in the Eleventh Amendment area.
18 In Lankford v. Platte Iron Works Co., 235 U.S. 461, 471,
476 (1915), the Court assumed that the Eleventh Amendment would
not bar a suit "to compel submission by the officers of the State
to the laws of the State, accomplishing at once the policy of the
law and its specific purpose," but rejected the appellees'
interpretation of the state statute. See also Old Colony Trust
Footnote continued on next page.
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plaintiff could bring a suit under state law against a state
official even if he did not allege that the defendant had acted
ultra vires--that is,

l

authority.

comp~etely

beyond the scope of official

A suit alleging that the official had acted within

his authority but in a manner contrary to state law was not
barred for a simple reason.

The Eleventh Amendment bars suits

against States; it does not bar suits against state officials for
action not authorized by the State's own laws.

If one accepts

the holding of Ex parte Young, as the majority apparently does,
this principle follows a fortiori.

Ex parte Young concludes that

unconstitutional action by state officials is not action by the
State even if it purports to be authorized by state law, because
the federal Constitution strikes down the state-law shield.
U.S., at 159.

In

the ~~

209

if the plaintiff proves his

case, there is by definition no state-law defense. 19

~hese

Co. v. Se attle, 271 u.s. 426, 431 (1926} (reaffirming general J ,
principle of Clemson in suit against city and county officials};
cf. Worcester County Trust Co. v. Riley, 302 U.S. 292, 297 (1937}
("generally suits to restrain action of state officials can,
consistently with the constitutional prohibition, be prosecuted
only when the action sought to be restrained is without the
authority of state law or contravenes the statutes or
Constitution of the United States"}; Cory v. White, _ _ U.S. _ _ ,
__ (1982} (stating that Worcester established that the "Eleventh
Amendme nt bars suits against state officers unless they are
alleged to be acting contrary to federal law or against the
authority of state law"}.
19
.
"If conduct of a state officer taken pursuant to an
unconstitutional state statute is deemed to be unauthorized and
may be challenged in federal court, conduct undertaken without
any authority whatever is also not entitled to Eleventh Amendment
immunity." Florida Department of State v. Treasure Salvors,
Footnote continued on next page.

.,
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historically wrong when it says that, because "the Young doctrine
rests on the need to promote the vindication of federal rights,"
injunctive relief may not be awarded against state officials
"where unnecessary to promote the supremacy 9f federal law."
Ante, at 14, 15.

-------------

These two lines of cases--upholding actions against state
officials for conduct violating the

F~ Constitutio~,

and

actions against state officials for conduct unauthorized by state
law--demonstrate that the Siler rule was fully harmonious with
Eleventh Amendment principles.

The jurisdiction of

the federal court in Siler was established by a federal claim
similar to the one asserted in Ex parte Young; the pendent statelaw claim was not barred by the Eleventh Amendment under the
rationale of the tort cases. 20

The federal court therefore had

Inc., 50 U.S.L.W. 5056, 5063 (July 1, 1982)
"Larson established that where the officer's
by statute, actions beyond those limitations
individual and not sovereign actions." Id.,
dissenting).
2 OA

(plurality opinioi)') ~
actions are limited
are to be considered
at 5068 (WHITE, J.,

.
.
.:3
t
s pe t 1. t 1oners
recogn1ze,
t h e same E 1 event h Amenumen
principles apply to diversity cases and to pendent state-law
claims. Brief for Petitioners 21. This Court's identical
treatment of the Eleventh Amendment issues in a trio of companion
cases, only one of them within the federal diversity jurisdiction
but each of them presenting pendent state-law claims, makes this
point clear. Greene v. Louisville & Interurban R. Co., 244 U.S.
499, 506-508 (1917); Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Greene, 244
U.S. 522, 528 (1917); Ill1n01S Central R. Co. v. Greene, 244 U.S.
555, 559 (1917). Thus it is highly improbable that the Court's
assertion of federal jurisdiction over pendent state-law claims
in Siler and Greene inadvertently ignored Eleventh Amendment
Footnote continued on next page.
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jurisdiction to resolve the case and grant injunctive relief on
either federal or state grounds, without encountering any barrier
imposed by the Eleventh Amendment • . Moreover, decision on state
grounds in Siler served the powerful interest in avoiding
unnecessary decision of federal constitutional questions.

Thus the Court's rejection of Siler not only runs counter to
the salutary principle of judicial restraint in constitutional
adjudication; it is also completely unsupported by this Court's
Eleventh Amendment decisions.

The majority acknowledges that the

defendant state officials are properly joined as parties to the
lawsuit, and that the District Court has ample power to grant
injunctive relief against them, but somewhere in the recesses of
the Eleventh Amendment it finds a limitation on the source of law
on which the District Court may rely.

To reach this conclusion

it cavalierly overrules a number of earlier cases and rejects a
rule that has been repeatedly approved by this Court.

This sort

of freehand rewriting of constitutional text is simply too much ,
'
for me to accept.

In p as sing the majority also casts doubt on another
apparently well-settled line of cases--those which make clear
that counties and other political subdivisions of States are not

problems, as the majority suggests. Ante, at 17-19. The Court
had repe atedly rejected the contention that state-law claims
against state officials were suits against the State itself.
Today's decision necessarily rejects those prior holdings.
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The defendants in this case

include various county commissioners, county mental retardation
administrators, and other officials of five Pennsylvania counties
surrounding Pennhurst.

Th~

Court casually suggests, "Given that

the actions of the county commissioners and mental health -·
administrators are dependent on funding from the State, it may be
that relief granted against these county officials, when
exercising their functions under the MH/MR Act, effectively runs
against the State."

Ante, at 21-22, n. 22.

flatly inconsistent with settled law.

This dictum is

Even if injunctive relief

against officials of the State itself would require additional
expenditures from the state treasury, we have consistently held
that it does not violate the Eleventh Amendment.

As we wrote in

Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 667-668 (1974), "the fiscal
consequences to state treasuries in these cases were the
necessary result of compliance with decrees which by their terms
were prospective in nature.

Such an ancillary effect on the

state treasury is a permissible and often an inevitable
consequence of the principle announced in Ex parte Young, supra."
See also Milliken v. Bradley, 433

u.s.

267, 288-290 (1977).

This

principle applies a fortiori to suits against county officials,
who serve a governmental body that is not itself immune from
suit.

IV

The Court's willingness to cast off the

-

constraint ~ f

- 25 p~~~t __:n~~~

seems to stem from two sources:

an

unstated concern about the ability of feoeral judges to decide
issues of state law, ana a belief
immunity establishes such

~

~hat

the doctrine of sovereign

stron9 imperative that it must be

extended into areas where it has not previou_sly held sway. - I
find both of these grounds of decision to be indefensible.

Ever since the enactment of the Rules of Decision Act in
1789, Congress has assumed that federal courts are fully capable
of understanding ana applying the law of the States in which they
sit.

They apply such law routinely in diversity cases.

The

federal bench is served by former members of the state bar who
have achieved eminence in the practice of their profession before
assuming

feaer~l

office.

Indeed, in this case, the en bane court

which decided the state law issues included several such members
of the bar of Pennsylvania bar.

Federal judges should not have

their ability to decide an entire case undermined by an arbitrary
rule that deprives them of power to determine state law questions
when relief is sought against state officials. 21

The arbitrary rule announced today also results from an
exalted notion of the doctrine of sovereign immunity.

If one day

21 we have recently rejected any suggestion that state judges
are not fully competent to resolve issues of federal law. See,
~.,Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493-494, n. 35 (1976).
It
is equally truei however, that federal judges are fully capable
of deciding all issues that arise in litigation over which they
have jurisdiction.
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unstated concern about the ability of feoeral judges to decide
issues of state law, and a belief that the doctrine of sovereign
immunity establishes such

~

strong

imperativ~

that it must be

extended into areas where it has not previou_sly held sway. ·

I

-

find both of these grounds of decision to be indefensible.

Ever since the enactment of the Rules of Decision Act in
1789, Congress has assumed that federal courts are fully capable
of understanding and applying the law of the States in which they
sit.

They apply such law routinely in diversity cases.

The

federal bench is served by former members of the state bar who
have achieved eminence in the practice of their profession before
assuming

feder~l

office.

Indeed, in this case, the en bane court

which decided the state law issues included several such members
of the bar of Pennsylvania bar.

Federal judges should not have

their ability to decide an entire case undermined by an arbitrary
.

rule that deprives them of power to determine state law questions
when relief is sought against state officials. 21

The arbitrary rule announced today also results from an
exalted notion of the doctrine of sovereign immunity.

If one day

21 we have recently rejected any suggestion that state judges
are not fully competent to resolve issues of federal law.
See,
~.,Stone v. Powell, 428 u.s. 465, 493-494, n. 35 (1976).
It
is equally truei however, that federal judges are fully capable
of deciding all issues that arise in litigation over which they
have jurisdiction.

,
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this Court were to undertake a complete reexamination of Eleventh
Amendment doctrine, I might well subscribe to a literal
interpretation of the amendment such as the view espoused by
Chief Justice Marshall, see pp. ___ supra, _or by JUSTICE

BRENNA~

in his dissenting opinion in Employees v. Missouri Public Health
Department, 411 U.S. 279, 298 (1973).

But, assuming that stare

decisis requires adherence to Hans v. Louisiana and other 19th
century cases that broadened the reach of sovereign immunity, see
supra, 22 the underlying nature of the doctrine counsels strongly
against detaching any new areas of judicial activity from the
purview of federal courts. 23

22 rf the sovereign immunity doctrine were confined to
collection cases like Chisholm and Hans, it could be applied in
an evenhanded manner that produces no unanticipated injustice. A
rule that makes clear that "the obligations of a State rest upon
its honor and good faith, and cannot be made the subject of
judicial cognizance unless the State consents to be sued" gives
lenders and suppliers fair warning of the added risks involved in
doing business with a sovereign State.
23 rn Nevada v. Hall, 440 u.s. 410 (1979), we squarely,
rejected the notion that the Constitution contains some unwritten
guarantee that protects a State from being sued without its
consent in the courts of another sovereign. Referring to the
prevailing opinion in Chisholm v. Georgia, supra, we wrote:
"Mr. Chief Justice Jay described sovereignty as
the 'right to govern'; that kind of right would
necessarily encompass the right to determine what suits
may be brought in the sovereign's own courts. Thus,
Mr. Justice Holmes explained sovereign immunity as
based 'on the logical and practical ground that there
can be no legal right as against the authority that
makes the law on which the right depends.'
"This explanation adequately supports the
conclusion that no sovereign may be sued in its own
courts without its consent, but it affords no support
for a claim of immunity in another sovereign's courts."
Footnote continued on next page.

'·'

'

-

.
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Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322

u.s.

47, 59 (1944):

"Whether this immunity is an absolute survival of the
monarchial privilege, or is a manifestation merely of
power, or rests on abstract . logical grqunds, see
Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 u.s. 349, it undoubtedly
runs counter to modern democratic notions of the moral
responsibility of the State. Accordingly, courts
reflect a strong legislative momentum in their tendency
to extend the legal responsibility of Government and to
confirm Maitland's belief, expressed nearly fifty years
ago that, 'it is a wholesome sight to see "the Crown"
sued and answering for its torts.'
3 Maitland,
Collected Papers, 263."

I respectfully dissent.

•

440

u.s.,

at 415-416.

Similar reasoning applies to the Court's decision today to invent
a new principle of sovereign immunity that is totally unsupported
by the text of the Constitution or by any of our prior decisions.

